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We take up Part II of the lectures on Remedial Law. You are through with Part I criminal procedure and
evidence. You were forced to read criminal procedure ahead of civil procedure because that is the curricula that
is required by the board of legal interpretation for law schools. You see, criminal procedure is taken up in 2
nd

year much ahead of civil procedure. Criminal procedure really is taken up by 2
nd
year law students and then
civil procedure is taken up by 3
rd
year law students. The other reason why there was a lecture on criminal
procedure ahead of civil procedure is to emphasize that, although learned in criminal procedure that, generally,
the criminal action carries the civil aspect of the case, with regard to the civil aspect of the case, we usually do
not apply the rules for civil procedure.

X X X the defendant the accused , after he enters the plea of not guilty, is not required to file an answer to the
civil aspect of the case. It is enough that he pleads not guilty. That plea of not guilty is also a denial of this
probable civil remedy. This is also the reason why, in a civil aspect that is brought along by the criminal action,
we dont apply the rule on specific denial. This is required in civil cases. In a criminal case, the plea of [not]
guilty is not considered a specific denial if we apply the rules on civil cases because the plea of not guilty will
if there is a plea of not guilty, the court cannot compel the accused to explain why he is entering such plea. If he
chooses to plead not guilty, the court can do nothing about it. The court cannot ask the accused: what are your
reasons? what are your defenses? Unlike in a purely civil action where there is a civil complaint filed against the
defendant and the defendant simply tells the court in his answer, I deny liability. If we apply civil procedure,
that is a judicial admission of liability. In fact, that kind of denial in a civil case may lead to a judgment on the
pleadings. In civil, purely civil cases, not the civil aspect of a criminal case there is always a need for specific
denial which is not, again, required in the civil aspect of a criminal case. So do not have the impression that
although a criminal case carries with it, generally, the civil aspect of the case We dont apply civil procedure to
the civil aspect. That criminal case which carries with it the civil aspect will always be governed by criminal
procedure, not by civil procedure.

The only difference, probably, that can be cited with respect to procedural rules governing the civil aspect of a
criminal case will be the quantum of evidence. You learned in criminal procedure that the guilt of the accused
shall be demonstrated by proof beyond reasonable doubt. But in so far as the civil aspect of the case is
concerned, the quantum should only be preponderance of evidence. So that, in a criminal case, it is very likely
that the accused will be acquitted of the crime but he can be held civilly liable because the quantum of evidence
used, in so far as the civil aspect, is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but only preponderance of evidence.

But just like in criminal procedure, we always start with the topic on jurisdiction of courts. With respect to
jurisdiction over civil actions, we have several laws governing jurisdiction of courts in civil cases. Primarily, we
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have the Constitution. And then we have the Judiciary Act of 1948 that is R.A. 296. And then we have this B.P.
129 the Judiciary Reorganization Act and its amendments. And then we have the law creating the family
court I think it was in 1997. And then the law creating the Sandiganbayan. Because we have so many
substantive laws governing jurisdiction of courts X X X identified the general law on jurisdiction in this country.
The general law on jurisdiction in our country is B.P. 129. All other laws are special laws governing jurisdiction.
So that if you find the conflict between B.P. 129 and the special law on jurisdiction, we just apply the rule on
statutory construction: the special law prevails over the general law. A good example is the provision in B.P. 129
on the jurisdiction of a regional trial court. X X X In testing the jurisdiction of a regional trial court, B.P. 129 says
that a Regional Trial Court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over the enumeration of cases, one of which
is cases which were cognizable by the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. So we have all these in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and then B.P. 129 provided that, thereafter, the jurisdiction of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall be exercised by the Regional Trial Court in the concept of exclusive
original jurisdiction. But X X X in the Family Court law, which is a special law, it is provided that a Family Court
has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving marriage, adoption, guardianship of minors, X X X
criminal cases and civil cases that involve a minor. There is then a conflict now between B.P. 129 and the law
creating the Family Court. But since the law creating the Family Court is a special law, its provisions will prevail
over that of B.P. 129. That is why these civil cases in adoption they are no longer cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court. They are cognizable by the Family Court.

We also meet in our classroom discussion the legal maxim that jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law. But
that is not necessarily true. What is governed by substantive law, in so far as jurisdiction is concerned, is
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the nature of the case. This is the aspect of jurisdiction that is
governed by B.P. 129 and the other substantive laws on jurisdiction. There are other aspects of jurisdiction aside
from jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the nature of the action. One aspect of jurisdiction is jurisdiction
over the person of the litigants. That is not governed by B.P. 129. That is governed by the Rules of Court.
Another one is jurisdiction over the property involved. That is also not governed by B.P. 129. Its governed by
the Rules of Court. Jurisdiction over the issues of a case that is not governed by B.P. 129. That is governed by
the Rules of Court. So jurisdiction, as part of substantive law, is limited to the authority of a court to decide in so
far as the subject matter is concerned or the nature of the action. But when it comes to jurisdiction over the
person of the plaintiff, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, jurisdiction over the issues these are
aspects of jurisdiction that are governed by procedural law mostly, by the Rules of Court.

Youll also notice that in B.P. 129 that B.P. 129 does not mention anything about the Supreme Court. B.P. 129
begins with the Court of Appeals and goes down to the Regional Trial Court, the inferior courts, and in the last
part, there is a mention of the Sharia Court. So where does the Supreme Court derive its authority in exercising
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jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or over the nature of the action? Of course, it is vested by the
Constitution itself. But if we read the Constitution on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Constitution
classifies the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court only into 2 kinds, that is: original jurisdiction X X X and appellate
jurisdiction. But the Constitution does not say that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive
its just plain original. The Constitution does not also tell us that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
is exclusive appellate. It only says that Supreme Court exercises appellate jurisdiction over the following cases.
We now ask whether the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive or coordinate with other courts. And yet,
in most law books, there is always an item concerning exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
also exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The basis of all these commentary is the old Judiciary
Act of 1948. The Judiciary Act of 1948 talks about the Supreme Court. It confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme
Court in a very thorough manner such that the Judiciary Act of 1948 provides for exclusive appellate
jurisdiction, exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In other words, we still enforce and recognize
the Judiciary Act of 1948. It has not been repealed by the Judiciary Reorganization Act. B.P. 129 did not repeal
the old Judiciary Act. The old Judiciary Act is still in force. But whats repealed by B.P. 129, in so far as the old
Judiciary Act is concerned, are provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which are inconsistent with B.P. 129. So do
not be of the impression that we no longer have the Judiciary Act of 1948. We still enforce and recognize the
Judiciary Act of 1948. The best argument to support this statement is found in Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. If you read Sec.
9, thats the section providing for the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. In Sec. 9 of B.P. 129, there is an
enumeration of cases that are allocated to the Court of Appeals exercising original jurisdiction and exclusive
appellate jurisdiction. It is in that last part of Sec. 9. That part which talks about appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals. We notice a clause in Sec. 9 saying that the Court of Appeals exercises appellate jurisdiction
over cases decided by the Regional Trial Court or quasi-judicial bodies in said laws that are assigned to the
Supreme Court under the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Thats the best proof that the Judiciary Act of
1948 is still in force. It is expressly recognized as existing up to the present by the provisions of B.P. 129.

When it comes to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Constitution as stated, the Constitution
provides for a limited number of cases over which the Supreme Court can exercise original jurisdiction and over
limited number of cases over which the Supreme Court can exercise appellate jurisdiction. And as we said
earlier, these are not exclusive. The exercise of original jurisdiction is not exclusive. The exercise of appellate
jurisdiction by the Supreme Court as provided by the Constitution is likewise not exclusive. Why do we say
this? We have to read the provisions of the Constitution together with the provisions of B.P. 129 in allocation of
jurisdiction with the other courts. The cases that are assigned to the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction involve cases involving ambassadors, ministers and consuls. And then theres also the vesting upon
the Supreme Court of original jurisdiction over cases involving petitions for certiorari, petition for mandamus X
X X. If we read the provisions of the Constitution together with B.P. 129, we will find out that the same authority
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is given by B.P. 129 to other courts like the Court of Appeals. Again, in Sec. 9, B.P. 129 provides that the Court of
Appeals also exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, quo
warranto, or habeas corpus. And then under the Chapter on the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court , B.P. 129
also vests upon the Regional Trial Court a similar authority. The Regional Trial Court shall exercise original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, and quo warranto. So if we take the
Constitution together with B.P. 129, there are, in effect, 3 courts in our judiciary which exercise original
jurisdiction over these petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus. They are
the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Court. Which means to say, theoretically, that if a
petitioner feels that his rights have been violated lets say through a grave abuse of discretion committed by a
lower court, he can file a petition for certiorari or prohibition or mandamus against this judicial officer with the
Supreme Court, or with the Court of Appeals, or with the Regional Trial Court upon his choice. Theoretically,
that is the implication where the Constitution and B.P. 129 have given 3 different courts a similar jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. So for purposes of jurisdiction, there is nothing wrong
if, for instance, there is a case pending before an inferior court (a Municipal Trial Court or a Municipal Circuit
Trial Court) and this inferior court gravely abuses its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and the
aggrieved litigant decides to file a petition for certiorari or prohibition or mandamus directly to the Supreme
Court. There is nothing wrong with that theoretically in so far as the issue of jurisdiction is concerned. Because
the Constitution has vested upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to entertain these petitions together
with the Court of Appeals and together with the Regional Trial Court. But the choice given by B.P. 129 and the
Constitution over the jurisdiction of these petitions is only theoretical. It has been greatly limited by certain
procedural rules. That is with respect to certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The limitation is known as
hierarchy of courts. Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, procedurally, are governed by Rule 65. If you read
Rule 65, you will meet a section, I think its Sec. 4, which speaks about hierarchy of courts. This is a limitation
given to the right of a petitioner to file a petition directly with the Supreme Court. Thats a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus, or even quo warranto. While theoretically we can file the case with the Supreme
Court, we should follow the procedural principle of hierarchy of courts. In Rule 65, it is expressly provided that
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus would be filed directly with a Regional Trial Court or the
Court of Appeals. If we analyze carefully Sec. 4 of Rule 65, that is a severe limitation of the right of an aggrieved
party x x x as provided for in the Constitution. So although one of the basic principles why Congress enacted
B.P. 129 was to do away with the concept of concurrence in jurisdiction, B.P. 129 has not been able to do away
entirely with concurrent jurisdiction. B.P. 129 does not use the word concurrent in vesting jurisdiction upon the
courts. The law classifies the jurisdiction only into original jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction, original and
exclusive, appellate and exclusive. Unlike in the past, under the old Judiciary Act of 1948, where the law
expressly contained provisions that conferred concurrent jurisdiction over certain cases upon different courts
which resulted, really, in confusion. Thats one of the purposes why we now have the Judiciary Reorganization
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Act to do away with concurrence in jurisdiction. Generally, B.P. 129 has been able to do away with this concept
in concurrence of jurisdiction except with respect to certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus since the Constitution and B.P. 129 allocate original jurisdiction upon 3 courts X X X, then it is
safe to conclude that these 3 courts exercise original and concurrent jurisdiction over these petitions.

With respect to the Court of Appeals, B.P. 129 classifies the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals into original and
exclusive jurisdiction, original jurisdiction, and then exclusive appellate jurisdiction. With respect to the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, there is only 1 case over which the Court of Appeal can
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. And that is annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial Court. Because
the Constitution as well as B.P. 129 provide for certain cases only that could be adjudicated by the Supreme
Court and by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, we cannot classify the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals as courts of general jurisdiction although they are the 2 highest courts of the
land. The Supreme Court, although it is the Supreme Court, is not a court of general jurisdiction. It is still a court
of limited jurisdiction. Its authority is limited to those provided in the Constitution. Outside of those provided in
the Constitution, the Supreme Court does not exercise jurisdiction over other cases. The same is true with the
Court of Appeals. In Sec. 9 of B.P. 129, the authority of the Court of Appeals is very limited in so far as exclusive
original jurisdiction is concerned. There is, as we said, only 1 case over which the Court of Appeals can exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction. That is a petition to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court.

If the Court of Appeals is given the authority to annul the judgment of a Regional Trial Court, does not the
conferment of this authority carry with it the authority of the Court of Appeals to annul the judgment of an
inferior court, which is lower in rank than a Regional Trail Court? That is a logical argument. If the Court of
Appeals can annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court, it should be reasonable that the Court of Appeals can
also annul the judgment of an inferior court. But that is not to construe jurisdiction over the subject matter or
over the nature of the action since the Court of Appeals since a court of limited jurisdiction. The Court of
Appeals can only annul the judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It cannot annul the judgment of an inferior
court. Does it mean to say that, while the decision of a Regional Trial Court can be annulled in a case filed before
the Court of Appeals, that the decisions of an inferior court is immune from annulment by the Court of Appeals?
That is right. The decision of a Regional Trial Court can be annulled by the Court of Appeals because that is
what B.P. 129 provides. But the decision of an inferior court is immune from annulment by the Court of
Appeals. But the decision of an inferior court can be annulled by the Regional Trial Court. Why is this so? Is it so
provided in B.P. 129 that a Regional Trial Court can annul the judgment of an inferior court? There is really
nothing provided in B.P. 129. If you read B.P. 129, I think the jurisdiction of the RTC starts with Sec. 19, there is
no provision on the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction which expressly confers upon a Regional Trial Court an
authority to annul a judgment of an inferior court. Nothing is provided in that matter in B.P. 129.
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Since we are talking about annulment of judgment, we might just as well go to the procedural principles and X
X X to Rule 47 and thats the rule on annulment of judgment. You will notice it is Rule 47 of the Rules which
gives us the procedure to be followed when it comes to annulment of judgment The annulment of judgment
mentioned in Rule 47 is the annulment of judgment conferred by B.P. 129 to the Court of Appeals. In Rule 47, we
will notice that the 1
st
part the 1
st
few sections of that very short rule speaks about how a petition to annul a
judgment of a Regional Trial Court is filed with the Court of Appeals what the Court of Appeals can do after
the filing of the petition. But in the last 2 or 3 sections of Rule 47, the topic is suddenly changed from annulment
of judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court to annulment of judgment rendered by an inferior court. So
there is a jump from annulment of judgments rendered by the Regional Trial Court to annulment of judgment
rendered by an inferior court. And in these last few sections of Rule 47, the Supreme Court says that a judgment
of an inferior court can be annulled although there is again no mention B.P. 129. And the court that has
jurisdiction original exclusive jurisdiction to annul a judgment rendered by an inferior court is a Regional
Trial Court. Can we not challenge the Supreme Court under Rule 47 to a Regional Trial Court of authority to
annul the judgment of an inferior court considering that B.P. 129 does not expressly give to a Regional Trial
Court authority to annul the judgment of an inferior court? We cannot because, under B.P. 129, there is an
allocation to the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction to entertain and decide all kinds of actions which are not
especially given to other courts. In other words, that provision of B.P. 129 is the justification why our books treat
the Regional Trial Court as a court of general jurisdiction. In fact, it is only the Regional Trial Court that is
considered as a court of general jurisdiction in our system and it is because of that provision in B.P. 129. If you
conceive about an action and then you start asking yourself which court has jurisdiction over this action. But
then you go through a process of elimination. If you entertain the idea of going to the Supreme Court, then you
just read the Constitution. And then you eliminate the Supreme Court if it has no authority under the
Constitution. Then you go to the Court of Appeals. Then you read B.P. 129. If, under B.P. 129, the Court of
Appeals does not have jurisdiction then it does not really have jurisdiction. Then you go to an inferior court. If
an inferior court also does not have jurisdiction, then you can be sure it is a Regional Trial Court that has
jurisdiction over the case. That is the principle is followed by Rule 47 when the Supreme Court, in the last few
sections of Rule 47, inserted a provision saying that with respect to the decisions of an inferior court, it is a
Regional Trial Court that has exclusive original jurisdiction. Because while there is an action known as
annulment of judgment rendered by an inferior court, since substantive laws have not allocated authority to
decide these cases to any other court, then it follows that it is a Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over
these cases.

In our study of Rule 47, the threshold case that you probably read or was assigned to read is that case of Islamic
Dawah v. Court of Appeals. In that case, the Supreme Court traced the history of annulment of judgment as an
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action. The Supreme Court mentioned that in the past, before B.P. 129, the Supreme Court had from the start
recognized the propriety, the regularity of filing a petition for the annulment of judgment rendered by a court.
And before B.P. 129, the Supreme Court said that annulment of judgment of an inferior court can be entertained
by a Regional Trial Court. How about a judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court? Can it be entertained by a
coordinate court? By another Regional Trial Court? The Supreme Court said yes because a Regional Trial Court
is a court of general jurisdiction. Thats the reason why in B.P. 129, the Court deemed it necessary to incorporate
this provision giving exclusive authority to the Court of Appeals to annul a judgment rendered by the Regional
Trial Court to do away with the anomalous situation then obtaining, before B.P. 129, where a Regional Trial
Court can annul a judgment rendered by another Regional Trial Court. Because there was no specific provision
in substantive law which allocated unto other courts this authority to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial
Court. So, because of B.P. 129, we now have a situation where the Court of Appeals can annul the judgment of a
Regional Trial Court expressly provided. And it is a Regional Trial Court that can annul the judgment of an
inferior court.

How about the Court of Appeals? Can the Supreme Court annul a judgment of the Court of Appeals, given that
the Supreme Court is the highest court of the land? The answer is no. Because there is nothing provided in the
Constitution which gives to the Supreme Court authority to annul a judgment of the Court of Appeals. So while
we have an action to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court, an action to annul the judgment rendered by
an inferior court there is no recognized action, under the Constitution or under B.P. 129 or under the Judiciary
Act of 1948, authorizing the Supreme Court to annul the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals. Although
there is 1 isolated decision by the Supreme Court which mentioned that the Court of Appeals itself can annul its
own decision. But that is not so provided in B.P. 129. If we rely solely on substantive laws like the Constitution
and B.P. 129, there is no such action as annulment of judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals. It does not
mean to say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is immune from annulment. There could still be an
annulment if the Supreme Court will exercise what we call its equity jurisdiction. Rule 65, most likely, could be a
remedy in order to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals based on the same grounds that are given in
Rule 47. But there is no actual, recognized by substantive law, that is filed for the purpose of annulling the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. But B.P. 129 recognizes the propriety of a petition to annul the judgment
rendered by the Regional Trial Court. It also recognizes the propriety of filing an action to annul the judgment of
an inferior court.

If a judgment of a Regional Trial Court, if a judgment of an inferior court can be the subject of annulment by the
Court of Appeals or by the Regional Trial Court, as the case may be, can we not also seek the annulment of a
judgment rendered by a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency? After all, these quasi-judicial bodies,
they also exercise the functions of a court. That is, the adjudicate, they determine the rights and liabilities of the
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litigants in the cases that are presented before them. This is also a settled issue. Annulment of judgment under
B.P. 129, as procedurally explained by Rule 47, does extend to annulment of judgment of quasi-judicial bodies.
There is no such thing as annulment of a judgment of a quasi-judicial body or an administrative body unless the
law creating the quasi-judicial body or a chapter of that administrative body allows the petition to be filed for
the annulment of these decisions of quasi-judicial bodies. In other words, we cannot file a petition under Rule 47
for the annulment of the decision of a Civil Service Commission or a Securities and Exchange Commission. You
will notice that in Rule 47, which follows, literally, the provisions of B.P. 129, it is provided that Rule 47 refers to
an action filed by a petitioner to annul the judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court in a civil case. That is
clearly provided in Rule 47, which is what, literally, what B.P. 129 provides. B.P. 129 provides that the Court of
Appeals can annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court. Now, the procedure, as given in Rule 47, is the Court of
Appeals can allow the judgment of a Regional Trial Court in a civil action. So if the action is not a civil action, it
is simply a criminal action or it is a decision rendered by a quasi-judicial body, then we cannot make us of Rule
47.

Since Rule 47 says that the annulment contemplated in B.P. 129 the authority given to the Court of Appeals to
annul the judgment refers to a judgment of a Regional Trial Court in a civil action. Does it mean to say that the
judgment of a Regional Trial Court acting as a criminal court cannot be the subject of annulment under Rule 47?
You know very well that a Regional Trial Court could act as a civil court and it could also act as a criminal court
because the Regional Trial Court exercises original jurisdiction over both civil actions and criminal actions. With
respect to the exercise by the Regional Trial Court of authority over civil actions, the decision of a Regional Trial
Court in these civil actions could be the subject of annulment of judgment by the Court of Appeals under Rule
47. But if the decision rendered by a Regional Trial Court is a decision in a criminal case, even if we can
challenge the validity because of the lack of jurisdiction or collusion or fraud, if the decision rendered by the X X
X [Regional Trial Court] is a decision in a criminal case, we cannot use Rule 47. Rule 47 is not a remedy to annul
a judgment rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its jurisdiction as a criminal court. So you do away with the
impression that Rule 47 is a remedy to annul a judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court in all kinds of
actions. Sec. 1 of Rule 47 is very clear. The decision of the Regional Trial Court must be in a civil case so that it
can be the subject of annulment under B.P. 129, in relation to Rule 47. Does it mean to say then a decision of a
Regional Trial Court in a criminal case cannot be annulled? The answer is yes, under Rule 47. But a decision of a
Regional Trial Court in a criminal case can be annulled but not under Rule 47. It can still be annulled by filing a
petition for habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is the equivalent of annulment of judgment rendered by the RTC in a
civil case because B.P. 129 is very clear that, in relation to Rule 47, what can be annulled under Rule 47 is only a
decision of a Regional Trial Court in a civil case. If a party desires to challenge the validity of a decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court in a criminal case, he should not resort to Rule 47. He should file a petition
for habeas corpus.
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Is there a difference actually between Rule 47, that is a petition to annul the judgment rendered by a Regional
Trial Court in a civil case, to a petition for habeas corpus, which is a special proceeding but designed to set aside
the decision of a Regional Trial Court in a purely criminal case? There are substantial differences. Annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 is what we call as a direct attack on a final and executor judgment. The only purpose
why a party X X X resorts to Rule 47 is to have the decision declared null and void nullified and set aside. But
in a criminal case where the decision of the RTC may not be valid because of the same reasons given in Rule 47
lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud the remedy is habeas corpus which is not a direct attack on the judgment
rendered by a Regional Trial Court. Habeas corpus, in other words, is an indirect attack on the judgment of a
Regional Trial Court in this criminal case. Why is it an indirect attack unlike annulment, which is a direct attack
on a judgment? In habeas corpus, where it is filed in order to nullify a decision of a Regional Trial Court in a
criminal case, the principal relief which the petitioner in habeas corpus seeks is to declare that the petitioner has
been deprived of his liberty unlawfully unlawful deprivation of a right that is the principal relief which
habeas corpus seeks. It is not principally to set aside a judgment of a Regional Trial Court in that criminal case.
So that if you compare these remedies which seek to nullify or set aside the judgment of a Regional Trial Court
in a civil case and in a criminal case, the remedies of the petitioner in a criminal case are more advantageous
than simply compared to an annulment of judgment. Because annulment of judgment is a direct attack on the
judgment. While in a criminal case, the detainee or prisoner can challenge the validity of the judgment of
conviction although he is not attacking directly the validity of the judgment of conviction. He is attacking the
validity of the deprivation of his liberty.

You will also notice that Rule 47 is inserted in the 16 or 17 rules concerning appeals. In our Rules, the procedure
for appeal starts with Rule 40 and it ends up with Rule 56. So from Rule 40 up to Rule 56, the topic of these 16 or
17 different rules is always cases on appeal. Except now Rule 47, thats why the insertion is quite scandalous.
Annulment of judgment should have been included in the enumeration of special civil actions because it is
incorporated in the Rules on appeal but annulment of judgment has nothing to do with appeals. B.P. 129
considers annulment of judgment as an original action to be filed with the Court of Appeals or with a Regional
Trial Court. And in Rule 47, particularly applied to a petition for annulment commenced before the Court of
Appeals, you will notice that some of the features of a special civil action are carried by a petition to annul the
judgment filed with the Court of Appeals. For instance, if a petition to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial
Court in a civil case is filed before the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals has the authority to outrightly
dismiss the petition. That is similar to Rule 65 where a court can outrightly dismiss a petition for certiorari if it is
not meritorious on its face. That is, of course, provided in Rule 47. The Court of Appeals can outrightly dismiss a
petition to annul a judgment. So if the petitioner has in mind stopping the execution or preventing the execution
of a final and executory judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court by making use of Rule 47, there is a big
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chance he will not succeed because the Court of Appeals could outrightly dismiss a petition to annul a judgment
filed before the Court of Appeals.

Since the judgment sought to be annulled under Rule 47 is a final and executor judgment, will the filing of a
petition to annul the judgment be a good reason for the trial court to deny a motion for execution? Even if there
is a petition to annul a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, if that decision has become final and
executory and it is not the subject of annulment of judgment, Rule 47 is not a justification for the trial court not
to execute its final and executor judgment. So the prevailing party can still move for the execution of that
judgment, notwithstanding the commencement and pendency of a petition to annul the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court. The only remedy available to a petitioner in annulment of judgment before the Court of
Appeals to stop execution is to apply for a provisional remedy of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order. Thats why in most petitions to annul a judgment filed with Court of Appeals, the petitioner
variably applies for the issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction. Without these provisional remedies, even if
there is a petition with the Court of Appeals for the annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial Court in a civil
case, that petition to annul a judgment will not prevent the execution of that final and executor judgment.

Under Rule 47, in relation to B.P. 129, on annulment of judgments commenced before the Court of Appeals, is it
correct to say that only the litigants before the Regional Trial Court can make us of annulment of judgment?
That question has also been answered by the Supreme Court in the threshold case of Islamic Dawah v. Court of
Appeals. That case ruled that annulment of judgment, as contemplated in B.P. 129 and also as envisioned in
Rule 47, does not prohibit a stranger from filing a petition to annul a judgment rendered by a Regional Trial
Court although the petitioner may not have been a litigant in that particular case. He can do so as long as he can
show that he will be prejudiced by the execution of the decision sought to be annulled.

You will also notice that the requirements in Rule 47 before annulment of judgment can be properly commenced
are very strict. 1 of the requirements is that the petitioner must show that the remedies for motion for new trial,
that is, petition for relief and appeal, are no longer available through no fault of his own. In other words, if the
judgment has not yet become final and executor, a litigant cannot make use of annulment of judgment because
he can still appeal. He has other remedies. He can file a motion for new trial. If he has filed a motion for new
trial and that motion is denied and he neglects to appeal, so the judgment becomes final and executory, can he
now properly file a petition to annul the judgment? Still no because his failure to appeal was through his own
fault. He could just have appealed the judgment of the court. Let us say that the aggrieved party has failed to
appeal, has failed to file a motion for new trial and his failure to do so cannot be traced to his negligence or
inexcusable conduct, can he now file a petition to annul the judgment in the Court of Appeals? Still the answer is
no because there is still an available remedy to challenge a final and executor judgment. And that is a petition
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for relief from judgment. The rules in 47 which apply the provision of B.P. 129 on annulment of judgment
rendered by a Regional Trial Court are very, very strict. All the other remedies must not have been availed of
through no fault of the petitioner. So even if we cannot fault the petitioner, as long as petition for relief from
judgment is still a remedy, still available, we cannot resort to annulment of judgment under 47. In that case of
Islamic Dawah, the Supreme Court said that if we allow a stranger to avail of annulment of judgment of a
Regional Trial Court in a civil case where he is not a party, then we should not also require the petitioner to
satisfy the requirements like availability, availment of new trial, motion for new trial, or appeal, or petition for
relief from judgment. The reason, according to the court, is that a stranger to a case cannot possibly cannot
possibly make use of a motion for new trial or appeal or a petition for relief from judgment because these
remedies, under the Rules, are available only to a litigant in a case. If the petitioner is not a litigant, he could not
conceivably satisfy this requirement.

If you compare the procedure in Rule 47 between annulment of judgment that is commenced before the Court of
Appeals and annulment of judgment commenced before a Regional Trial Court, you will immediately notice a
very significant difference. While the Court of Appeals has the authority to outrightly dismiss a petition to annul
judgment, a Regional Trial Court cannot. So if there is a petition to annul a judgment filed before the Regional
Trial Court and the subject judgment, of course, is one that has been rendered by an inferior court, the Regional
Trial Court has no authority to outrightly dismiss that petition to annul the judgment. In so far as the Regional
Trial is concerned in a petition to annul a judgment rendered by an inferior court, that petition to annul should
be treated just like any other case. So after of the filing of petition to annul, the Regional Trial Court will issue a
summons and then, having served upon the respondents, let the respondents file the answer, and then file the
case, and then render the decision. That is the significant difference between annulment of judgments
commenced before the Court of Appeals compared to annulment of judgment commenced before the Regional
Trial Court.

In Rule 47, if the judgment is annulled, then it is declared void by the court. So it can no longer be enforced or, if
that judgment has already been executed, the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court can order restitution
of properties if that is still possible. In analyzing Rule 47, the provisions of Rule 47 in relation to B.P. 129 on
annulment of judgment conferred upon the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court, I suggest that you
also read a rule in evidence. That is, impeachment of a judicial record which you must have taken up. That is in
Rule 132 of Evidence. Impeachment of judicial record. In that evidentiary rule, impeachment of judicial record
means to discredit a judicial record. A judgment of a court if, of course, a judicial record. So we can discredit or
set aside a judgment of the court under that principle of impeachment of judicial record. This is related to Rule
47 as well as to the provisions of B.P. 129 on annulment. In B.P. 129, there are no grounds for annulment
mentioned at all. The grounds for annulment are contained in Rule 47 and also in Rule 132 of Evidence. If Im
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not mistaken, that would be Sec. 28 or 29 or 30 of Rule 132 in Evidence. The topic is impeachment of judicial
record. In that evidentiary rule of impeachment of judicial record, there are 3 grounds X X X: 1) lack of
jurisdiction, 2) fraud, and 3) collusion. If we compare that to Rule 47, there are only 3 grounds in Rule 47: 1)
absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or 2) absence of jurisdiction over the person of the litigants, and
then 3) extrinsic fraud. Rule 47 does not mention anything about collusion as a ground to annul the judgment.
Does it matter? It does not matter. Collusion is encompassed by the term extrinsic fraud as a ground for
annulment of judgment. So there is no conflict between impeachment of judicial record and the grounds
mentioned in Rule 47 for the annulment of judgment.

We go back to B.P. 129 and talk about the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court. With respect to a Regional Trial
Court, the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court is founded on certain factors. The 1
st
one is whether or not an
action is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The other one is if the action is a real action it involves title to or
possession of real property. And then, if it does not involve real property or the action does not within the
concept of incapable of pecuniary estimation, then it is the amount involved whether it is properly for the
recovery for money or for the recovery of personal property.

The 1
st
factor is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. So if you come across of an action that is incapable
of pecuniary estimation, then that action is cognizable by a Regional Trial Court. Is it correct to say then that all
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are cognizable by a Regional Trial Court always? That also is not a
correct assumption. If you read again B.P. 129, there are several actions incapable of pecuniary estimation which
are not exclusively cognizable by a Regional Trial Court. For instance, annulment of judgment which we
discussed a minute ago Annulment of judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation but B.P. 129 says that
annulment of judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court is cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. How
about annulment of an arbitral award by a barangay court which could also be the subject of annulment of
judgment under the Local Government Code? That is not capable of pecuniary estimation. Is it cognizable
exclusively by the Regional Trial Court? The answer is no. Annulment of a judgment or an arbitral award by a
barangay court acting as an arbitral body, although incapable of pecuniary estimation, is cognizable only by an
inferior court. This is so provided by the Local Government Code. So the Local Government Code is a special
law in this matter. If it conflicts with B.P. 129, then it is the special law that will prevail. Certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus. They are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation but they are not exclusively cognizable a
Regional Trial Court. So the provision in B.P. 129 which allocates to a Regional Trial Court exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions which are not capable of pecuniary estimation admits of several exceptions. And these
several exceptions are also found in B.P. 129. So not all actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are cognizable
only by a Regional Trial Court. There are such actions not capable of pecuniary estimation which are allocated
not to a Regional Trial Court but to other courts under the provisions of B.P. 129.
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With respect to real actions, that is title to or possession of property this is now qualified by the amendment to
B.P. 129 which expanded the jurisdiction of inferior courts. These are the actions involving title to or possession
of real property: accion reinvindicatoria, accion publiciana they are cognizable by a Regional Trial Court
exercising exclusive original jurisdiction as long as the assessed value of the property is more than P20,000 or
P50,000, as the case may be. So you have to relate it to the expanded jurisdiction of the inferior courts. But with
respect to unlawful detainer and forcible entry they are also actions involving possession of real property
then they are always cognizable exclusively by an inferior court, regardless of the assessed value of the property.

Is it possible that an action is a real action and at the same time one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation?
The answer is also yes. We have such actions. They are real actions but they are also incapable of pecuniary
estimation. A good example is foreclosure of real estate mortgage since the property in mortgage to be
foreclosed is a mortgage constituted over real property, then that foreclosure of real mortgage is a real action
but, at the same time, it is not capable of pecuniary estimation because the issue to be resolved by the court by
the foreclosure court is always this issue: does the mortgagee (the plaintiff) have the right to foreclose? That
issue is not capable of pecuniary estimation. So what do we do in determining jurisdiction if an action is both a
real action and one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation? What factor will be determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court? Will it be the assessed value of the property or will it be the fact that the issue involved
is not capable of pecuniary estimation? Again, this is a settle issue. The Supreme Court said that if an action
carries the feature both of incapable of pecuniary estimation and a real action, like foreclosure of real mortgage,
the determinative factor is the feature of incapable of pecuniary estimation. So it is a Regional Trial Court that
will always have jurisdiction over foreclosure of real mortgage even if the assessed value of the property sought
to be foreclosed is only P1,000. As long as the action is foreclosure of mortgage, the action is exclusively
cognizable by a Regional Trial Court. So if you find in one action the 2 features which could be determinative of
jurisdiction incapable of pecuniary estimation and real action the determining factor will always be that
characteristic that it is not capable of pecuniary estimation. So it is a Regional Trial Court that will have
jurisdiction. The feature of foreclosure of mortgage as a real action will only be important in determining the
venue of the action but not the jurisdiction of the court. A similar action which applies the same principle is
expropriation of a piece of land. Expropriation of a piece of land is also a real action because it involves title to or
possession of real property. But expropriation of a piece of land will not take into account the assessed value of
the land sought to be expropriated for purposes of determining jurisdiction over the case. According to the
Court, expropriation, although it could be a real action, is also an action that is not capable of pecuniary
estimation. So expropriation of real property, even if the assessed value again is P1,000, will always be
cognizable by a Regional Trial Court.

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When it comes to personal action under B.P. 129, the determining factor will be the amount sought to be
recovered if it is purely a claim for money. Or if it is recovery of personal property, it is the value of the personal
property according to the complaint. But when it comes to a pure collection suit that is, the creditor is
interested only in collecting money from the defendant there are exclusions given in the amendment to B.P.
129. Excluding charges, interests, attorneys fees, and damages. So the determining factor in a complaint for the
recovery of money, in so far as jurisdiction of court is concerned, will only be the principal sought to be
recovered. So that if the amount sought to be recovered by the plaintiff in his complaint against the defendant is
P1,000,000 a total of P1,000,000 the conclusion that the case is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court will not
be correct. A complaint to recover the totality of P1,000,000 could be cognizable exclusively by an inferior court
if the P1,000,000 is the aggregate of the principal, the interest, the costs, the damages, the attorneys fees then
we have to find out the principal which the plaintiff seeks to recover. If the principal is only P200,000 but
P800,000 represent interest, damages, costs, and other excluded items, that will be cognizable by an inferior
court. That is now settled.

Supposing that the complaint is for the recovery of damages. You know very well that in a complaint to recover
damages, what is sought to be recovered is always money in terms of pesos and centavos. But under the
amendment to B.P. 129, we should exclude the item of damages. Supposing the complaint is purely for
damages, and the plaintiff seeks to recover actual damages, moral damages, temperate damages, exemplary
damages How will we now ascertain the jurisdiction of the court? We cannot use the rule of exclusion because
what the plaintiff seeks as are relief is the recovery of damages. Let us say that the plaintiff seeks to recover
P100,000 actual damages, P500,000 moral damages, and then another P500,000 exemplary damages. The
aggregate will be P1.1M but the complaint says that, principally, the plaintiff seeks to recover actual damages of
P100,000. With what court do we file that complaint? Again, this is settled. It should be with the Regional Trial
Court. When it comes to complaints purely for damages, the determining factor, in so far as jurisdiction of
courts is concerned, is the aggregate amount of damages the totality of the damages. So even if the complaint
has specified the amount of damages for each aspect actual, moral, exemplary, temperate damages the court
that will acquire jurisdiction is the court that has authority to rule on the aggregate totality of all the damages
claimed by the plaintiff.

With respect to recovery of personal property For instance, the recovery of a car. Do we take into account the
assessed value of the car in order to ascertain the jurisdiction of the court? The answer is no. B.P. 129 and the
amendment to B.P. 129 takes into account the assessed value for purposes of jurisdiction for real properties.
With respect to personal properties, the assessed value of that personal property has nothing to do with
jurisdiction of the court. So instead of using as a standard the assessed value, when it comes to personal
property, the determining factor will be the value of the personal property according to the complaint. In other
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words, in our complaint for the recovery of a car, replevin for instance If the plaintiff wants the case to be tried
by the Regional Trial Court, all that he needs to do is state in his complaint is that the value of the car is P800,000
although it may not be true. Although it may be a false figure. When it comes to personal property, we always
rely on the variation given by the plaintiff in his complaint. So the jurisdiction of the court will depend solely on
the allegations in the complaint. Whether the allegation is true or false, the jurisdiction will be determined by the
figure given in that complaint, with respect to personal properties. Supposing the defendant challenges the
valuation given by the plaintiff in his complaint by telling the court that the car could not be worth P800,000
because it is a 30 year old car the true value of the car is only P100,000. And then the defendant is willing to
submit evidence to show the true value of the car. Will the court entertain the defendants move? No. The court
will not. The jurisdiction of the court will be based solely in the allegations in the complaint. In civil cases, after
the court has acquired jurisdiction over this particular complaint, relying on the allegations contained in the
complaint, it is very likely that, after trial, the evidence submitted by both sides will convince the court that the
true value of the car is really P100,000. Can the Regional Trial Court decide the case although it is now the
conclusion by the Regional Trial Court that the value of the car is only P100,000? The answer is yes. If a Regional
Trial Court acquires jurisdiction over a complaint to recover a car which, according to the complaint is valued at
P800,000, the Regional Trial Court continues to exercise jurisdiction over the case until it is finally decided,
regardless of the finding of the court that the value of the car is only P100,000. You know that principle very
well. That is called adherence to jurisdiction. Once the court acquires jurisdiction over the car, it cannot be
ousted of that jurisdiction. It will continue to exercise jurisdiction over the case until the case is finally
adjudicated. The only means by which we can oust the court the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over the
case is if Congress enacts a law saying that the jurisdiction of the court will not be based solely in the allegations
in that complaint. In other words, if Congress decides to abandon the principle of adherence to jurisdiction then
it is possible that the RTC will be deprived of jurisdiction. But as long as the principle of adherence to
jurisdiction is not abandoned by Congress, then if the court acquires jurisdiction over a particular case, the
exercise by the court of the jurisdiction of that case continues until that case is finally decided.

With respect to inferior courts Notwithstanding the expansion of the jurisdiction of the inferior courts
Meaning to say that in the expanded jurisdiction of inferior courts, practically all cases that can be decided by a
Regional Trial Court can now be decided by an inferior court, depending only on the amount involved upon
the value of the property. So real actions accion reinvindicatoria, accion publiciana they are all cognizable by
inferior courts now depending upon the assessed value of the property. Even estate proceedings can now be
entertained by an inferior court under its expanded jurisdiction. Does it mean to say that an inferior court which
exercises expanded jurisdiction can now be treated as a court of general jurisdiction? Its still a court of limited
jurisdiction. It can only take cases that are given to it by substantive law. The provision of B.P. 129 which makes
a Regional Trial Court as a court of general jurisdiction is not given to an inferior court. In B.P. 129, in the
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enumeration of cases exclusively cognizable by a Regional Trial Court is an item which says the Regional Trial
Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all action that are not especially assigned to any other
court. That provision in B.P. 129 is not contained in the allocation of jurisdiction to inferior courts. So inferior
courts continue to exercise jurisdiction only over cases that are assigned to it under B.P. 129 and special laws, or
amendment to B.P. 129.

You will also notice that in B.P. 129, with respect to the vesting of authority to inferior courts, there is an
identification in Sec. 33 of what we call the totality test in determining jurisdiction. In Sec. 33, the totality test is
just a proviso with respect to ascertainment of jurisdiction of courts. The totality test given in B.P. 129 is more
encompassing than the totality test given in the Rules of Court. We also have a totality test in the Rules of Court.
That is in Rule 2. There is a totality test with reference to the section of joinder of causes of action. If you are
going to compare the totality test given in the Rules of Court, under the section on joinder of causes of action,
the totality test in the Rules of Court appears to be of a more limited scope. In B.P. 129, the totality test refers to
all claims of causes of action that are embodied in 1 complaint, whether they pertain to the same or different
parties or they arise out of the same or different transaction. X X X If you compare it to the totality test in Rule 2,
the totality test in Rule 2 speaks only about causes of action for money. The totality of money claims will be
determinative of the jurisdiction of the courts.

In B.P. 129, with respect to inferior courts, we also meet the term delegated jurisdiction to inferior courts. And
also the interlocutory jurisdiction to inferior courts or special jurisdiction to inferior courts. In delegated
jurisdiction, the inferior court acts as if it is a Regional Trial Court in deciding land registration and cadastral
cases which are contested or which will not be contested. If contested, the limitation is the value of the contested
property. If uncontested, the inferior court can act as a land registration court or cadastral court without any
limitation. But B.P. 129 is very clear in saying that if an inferior courts as a land registration or cadastral court,
the decision of the inferior court is appealable to the Court of Appeal, not to a Regional Trial Court. Which is the
rule that we follow in B.P. 129.

That is the delegated jurisdiction of an inferior court. In habeas corpus proceedings, there is also a mention of an
inferior court trying a habeas corpus proceeding. It does not mean to say that habeas corpus is cognizable also
by an inferior court. The authority of an inferior court to entertain a petition for habeas corpus refers to a
situation where a petition for habeas corpus is filed with the proper court usually a Regional Trial Court. But
there are no judges available to act on the petition. But that petition for habeas corpus is filed, still, with a
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus. So the petition for habeas corpus is
filed with the Regional Trial Court but the clerk of court finds out that there are no RTC judges that are available
they are absent or are on leave that can entertain a petition for habeas corpus. This is the remedy provided in
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B.P. 129. Attention to habeas corpus cases is urgent under our laws. In fact, habeas corpus proceedings are
always given preference by law. So if there are no RTC judges that are available, the next best thing to do X X X
is to transfer the petition filed already with a Regional Trial Court to an inferior court. That provision in B.P. 129
does not authorize the filing of a petition for habeas corpus directly with an inferior court. A petition for habeas
corpus filed directly with an inferior court can be challenged on jurisdictional grounds because B.P. 120 does not
vest unto an inferior court an authority to entertain a petition for habeas corpus. It is only under circumstances
where there are no other RTC judges available to entertain a petition for habeas corpus. X X X the judge can now
analyze and study the propriety of issuing the writ of habeas corpus.

We need a break in the meantime but before we have a break, I will give you this riddle and then you try to
answer it. Just like the riddle in grade school X X X. The question is: who am I? I am just an object. A face in a
crowd. Nothing outstanding about it about my form about my look. But, usually, Im between 4 inches to 8
inches long. And both genders, both men and women, young or old, adore me. And then I, on one end I have
a forest of X X X but my friends usually tell me that I am like a soldier X X X because I am on call 24 hours a day.
If there is no assignment given me, I just hang around I just lie down doing nothing. But when Im giving a
specific assignment, I see to it that Im always ready to complete the X X X. And when I am at work, I usually go
back and forth and that is warm and that is dark. And then when Im through with my job, my assignment, I
always see to it that I give out a sticky X X X white X X X and then I return to my X X X and then just hang
around and just lie doing nothing. Who is this person or object?

Before we leave jursidiction altogether, You have to know the meaning of primary jurisdiction and residual
jurisdiction

Residual Jursidiction is found in appealed cases particularly Rules 41 and 42. It is the jurisdiction enjoyed by the
trial court to act on certain matters even if the case is already on appeal. It is well explained in Rules 41 and 42.
So it is not correct to assume that if a case is decided by the trial court and the aggrieved party perfects an appeal
on time and the jurisdiction over the case is now assumed by the appellate court, like the Court of Appeals, it is
not correct to assume that the trial court is divested entirely of jurisdiction even if there is already a perfected
appeal. In Residual Jursidiction, the trial court continues to exercise jurisdiction over ceratin matters for a very
limited period of time. And after the expiration of that period, absolute jursidiction over the case will now be
assumed by the appellate court.

In Primary jurisdiction, this involves quasi judicail bodies, what happens in Primary Jurisdiction is that congress
enacts a law which vests jurisdiction under the quasi judicial body to try and decided cases which are
cognizable by regular courts under the provisions of BP 129. The reason why congress usually enacts these laws
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is that congress feels that the quasi judicial body is better equipped in order to decide disputes between the
litigants. A good example of a Primary Jurisdiction conferred by substantive law is the jurisdiction given to a
quasi judicial body called HLURB, this board is given original jurisdiction, in some cases exclusive original
jurisdiction, to adjudicate cases of disputes between a subdivision buyer and a subdivision developer, so if a
subdivision buyer feels aggrieved for the non-performance by the developer of his commitments under the
contract, the buyer should not file the complaint with a regular court although under BP 129 the regular court
may have jurisdiction, usually for breach of contract the remedies given in the CC would Specific Performance,
Recission of Contract or damages for both cases or damages alone. In this rule on Primary Jurisdction, these
actions will not be assumed by the regular court although BP129 gives the regular court such authority
particularly the Regional Trial Court. The jurisdiction is given by substantive law to the quasi judicial body
HLURB because the HU presumably is better equipped to adjudicate contests between the subdivion buyer
and developer so that there is a breach by the subdivision developer of his commitments to the buyer, what the
buyer will do is to file a complaint with the HLURB.
There is one case however decided by the SC, where the subdivision developer filed a compalint for ejectment
against a subdivision buyer because it was the buyer who allegedly violated the terms of the contract and the
developer wanted to recover possession of the property purchased by the buyer. The subdivision buyer
challenged the authority of HLURB to entertain a complaint for ejectment which under BP 129 is exclusively
cognizable by an inferior court. The SC said the primary jurisdiction of the HLURB does not extend to
complaints for ejectment filed by one party against the other. So that in the case of primary jurisdiction vested
by substantive law to quasi-judicail bodies, the authority of the quasi-judicial body is interpreted strictly.
Ejectment could really be a dispute between a subdivision buyer and developer but then when the purpose is to
recover physical possession of the property or even in accion publiciana, the court said that it is the regular court
who has authority over the complaint.


Now we go the Rules of Court. In analyzing the provisions of the 1997 Rules of Court you should always bear in
mind the consitutional limits that are provided by the Constitution to the authoity of the SC on the rules on
pleadings, practice and procedure, like the ROC, the rules should be uniform in all courts of the same grade and
then the rules should provide for a speedy and inexpensive determination of the case and then the rules should
not increase, decrease or modify substantive rights. So if there is any rule on procedure which violates any one
of these limitations given under the Consitution, we may then properly challenge the applicability and validity
of these rules of procedure. There was one litigant who challenged the validity of a Rule in Criminal Procedure,
its Rule 115, and Rule 115 of Criminal Procedure really speaks not about procedure but more of the rights of the
accused. So the party said that Rule 115 should be excluded from the Rules of Court for it is not procedural but
substantive. It modifies, increases or decreases the rights of the person given by substantive law. The SC denied
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the petition, saying that while the authority of the SC deals with the procedure, pleadings and practice and that
substantive rights should not even be covered, the court said that it is practically impossible for rules of
procedure to be devised without incorporating certain provisions that are concered with substantive law. The
standard should be if we take the ROC as a whole: are the Rules of Court primarily procedural in character? if
the answer is yes and there are certain provisions which speak about substantive rights or its coverage, that
should not be the justification for deleting the said provisions in the rules of court. The other justification given
by the SC is the Civil Code, the CC is substantive law but if we go over the CC, it contains provisions which are
not substantive in character, they are also procedural but that does not make CC a procedural law, its still a
stubstantive law. Some articles cited by the court which refer to procedural matters are articles concerning the
issuance by the court of a preliminary mandatory injunction or preliminary injunction in cases of unlawful
detainer and focible entry. But the SC said that we cannot simply say that the CC is no longer substantive simply
because there are certain articles that speak about procedural matters. So if you come across a provision of the
rules of court which violates substantive law in the sense that the rules of court reduces substantive rights or
modifies substantive rights there is a possiblity that this provision could be challenged or deleted from the rules.
For instance, in special procedings like the settlement of estate of a deceased person there is a provision in the
rules concerning the filing of claims. You are familiar with the rule that when a person dies and then there is a
settlement proceeding that is commenced with the court, the creditors for money arising from a contract which
is expressed or implied, should file their claims against the estate, they have no right to file a civil action for the
recovery of the money claim against the estate of the deceased or against the executor or administrator.
Otherwise, if the money claim is not submitted within the period fixed under the rules, the claim of these
creditors will be barred. and then there is another provision that says that if the deceased is a solidary debtor
together with another one who is still alive, it is the duty of the creditor to file a claim against the estate for the
recovery of the whole indebtedness. That is a violation of a principle under the Civil Code which says that when
there is solidary relationship between two debtors, the creditor is given by the CC the authority to file a
complaint against any one of the solidary debtors for the recovery of the whole indebtedness. So, if we apply the
Civil Code provisions, the creditor in the example could file a complaint for the recovery of the whole obligation
against the solidary debtor who is still alive, he does not have to file a money claim against the estate of the
deceased solidary debtor. In several cases which raised this issue, the SC said that the CC provision saying that a
creditor can file a complaint against any one of the solidary debtors will not be affected by the provision of the
Rules of Court concerning the filing of claims. This is an example of a provision in the Rules of Court which
substantially reduces the right given by law to a creditor to file a complaint against any one of the solidary
debtors for the recovery of the whole obligation.

These 1997 Rules of Court should be interpreted liberally according to the Rules. But the interpretation is not a
liberal interpretation in favor of the plaintiff or in favor of the defendant. A court being an impartial party to the
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dispute. The meaning of a liberal interpretation is to promote justice, to carry out the duty of the SC under the
limitations given under the Constitution.
Under the Rules now, a civil action is always commenced by the filing of a complaint. That is the general rule.
There are certin civil actions usually special civil actions which are not commenced by a filing of a complaint.
Instead, we file for a petition. But it does not really matter whether we file a petition or a complaint when an
action is sought to be commenced. The filing of a complaint has given rise to the action that when a compalint is
filed, the court automatically acquires jursidiction over the person of the plaintiff. So in that action, the only
problem concerning the jurisdiction is the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant. But the
latest decisions, last year the court decided a case where it was held that even if a complaint is filed before a
competent court, if the one who filed the complaint is not authorized to do so, the court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff. In fact, the court said that the court does not even acquire
jurisdiction to try or adjudicate the case. So the rule that we follow in our procedural principles which says that
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff through the filing of a complaint will not
necessarily give jurisdiction by the court over the person of the plaintiff. The court can examine whether or not
the filing of the complaint is authorized by the plaintiff. If it is not authorized by the plaintiff, the court will not
acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff. The court will not even acquire authority to decide the case. The court is
absolutely without any jurisdiction to try and decide the case if it is demonstrated that the filing of the complaint
is without authority given by the plaintiff.
In a complaint properly filed in court, that is one filed by the plaintiff himself or with the authority of the
plaintiff, of course the plaintiff under rule 10 has the right to amend that complaint provided that an answer has
not yet been filed by the defendant. The amendment made under Rule 10 is a matter of right. If the plaintiff
amends that complaint by impleading another defendant, then the court will have nothing to do except accept
the complaint since the amendement is a matter of right. And in so far as that new defendant is concerned, the
date of the filing of the complaint will relate back to the date when the original complaint was filed unless a new
cause of action is introduced in that complaint. In which case, we dont make use of that relating back doctrine.
The classification of actions under the rules is very simple as civil action, a special civil action, criminal action
and special proceedings. In the definition of a civil action, it is very clear that we do not necessarily follow the
definition of a cause of action under Rule 2. In Rule 2 a cause of action is defined as a violation by the defendant
of a right belonging to the plaintiff. So for a cause of action to accrue, the plaintiff must allege that he has a right
and that the defendant has violated such right. The indication given by this definition is that the right holder
must wait for a person to violate his right before he can have a cause of action to bring an action in court. That
concept of a cause of action should always be related to the definition of a civil action under section 1. The
definition of a civil action does not require a prior violation of a right so that the rightholder may have a
justification to go to court. The definition of a civil action is one by which a person sues another for the
enforcement or protection for a violation or a threat to violate such right. So there is no need for an actual
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violation of a right before a case can be properly filed in court. Under the definition of a cause of action if there is
a threat to violate a right, there is already a cause of action.
Our rules of procedure become complicated when there are several rights that are violated by one and the same
wrongful act. If there is just one wrongful act and there are several rights that are violated, how many causes of
action will accrue? The standard given by decisions of the court is that in order to determine whether or not
several cause of action will arise if there is one wrongful act and there are several right that are violated is to
determine whether these rights belong to the same person or to different persons. That is the common standard
that we apply now. For instance, if a person drives negligenlty his car, and then he causes, as a result of the
negligent driving, damage or wrecks three cars, how many causes of action will accrue against the negligent
driver? Using the standard given by the court, we have to determine whether the three cars belong to one
person or the three cars belong three different persons. If the 3 cars belong to only one person, only one cause of
action will accrue. In other words, the person owning the three cars cannot file an action one complaint for
damages involving the first car and another complaint for damages involving the second car and another for the
third car. That not possible. That is spitting a cause of action because we are talking about violation of rights in
the concept of a cause of action. The owner of the three cars has only one right that has been violated by the
wrongful act of the negligent driver. But if these three cars belong to three different owners, the owner of the
first car has his own cause the owner of the second has another cause and the owner of the third has his own
cause of action. And because there are three causes of action that arise belonging to three different persons then
it follows that these three different persons can file separate complaints. They do not have to be joined as
plaintiffs in one compalint. They can file their own seprate complaints before the competent court. So that if the
3 cars belong to three different persons, the first owner can file his complaint before the RTC if he claims that the
damages suffered by him amount to 500,000. The second car owner can file his own claim before an inferior
court if the damages suffered by him abount ony to 200,000. So the filing of these complaints by the 3 different
owners will depend on the amount of damages which each will respectively claim in their complaints. The fact
that there are 3 different causes of action does not mean that the 3 different parties should go to the same court
in order to protect their interest and recover damages suffered by them. In our first example where the wrongful
act of driving has caused damages to 3 different cars but belonging to the same person, there is only one cause of
action. This owner of the 3 cars can only file one complaint for the recovery of damages of his 3 cars. Can he
properly and rightfully go to court right away because his right has been violated by the wrongful act. If we rely
solely on substantive law, the answer is yes. As long as a right has been violated by the wrongful act of another,
the right holder has the prerogative of going to court for protection and enforcement of his right. If we apply
procedural principles, the owner may be precluded from filing right away because other procedural rules has
introduced several precedents before a cause of action may accrue and if these conditions are not first satisfied,
the filing of the complaint will be premature. There could be dismissal by reason of prematurity. And what are
these conditions precedents established by rules of procedure and sometimes by substantive law? The first
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condition precedent given by procedural and substantive rules is prior barangay conciliation. So even if a right
has been violated and the rightful owner goes to court but the dispute is covered by the circular on prior
barangay conciliation, then there could be reason for the court to dismiss the case or not to entertain the case and
just tell the parties to undergo barangay conciliation. The other condition precedent given by both procedure
and substative law is an arbtration clause that is usually given in contracts. The arbitration clause in contracts
invariably provide that there is a breach of contract, the innocent contracting party cannot simply go to court.
The dispute should first undergo arbitration proceedings. If the arbitration clause breached by immediately
filing a complaint in court, the court can refuse of try the case and the court can compel the parties to observe
the stipulations under the arbitration clause. The other condition precedent that is purely procedural is the
certification on non-forum shopping found in Rule 7. If a complaint or initiatory pleading is filed without a
certification on non-forum shopping, and remember that this defect is not curable by amendment, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the case under BP 129, but the court can order the dismissal of the case for non
observance of the certification as a condition precedent. There is another condition precedent that is given under
political law: Exhaustion of administrative remedies for the accrual of a cause of action. Under the civil code,
another condition precedent for members of the same family. It must be shown earnest efforts toward a
compromise must have been resorted to before going to court. So in the definition of a cause of action under the
rules of court is not qualified by certain condition precedents before going to court. He must see to it that these
conditions, if applicable, must be observed. The court, although competent and may have jurisdiction over the
case, will refuse to try the case and instead issue an order to the plaintiff to comply with the conditions. If there
is already a cause of action and these conditions are applicable, the general rule is for every cause of action the
rightholder can file one complaint. If there are 2 acuse, the right holder can file 2 complaints. If there are 3
causes, he can file 3 complaits. But what is proscribed by the rules of court is for the plaintiff to file more than a
single complaint arising from a single cause of action. In other words, the rules abhor splitting a cause of action.
Filing 2 or more complaints founded on the same cause of action is splitting a cause of action. The usual example
given in splitting a cause of action is lets say that the creditor is entitled to receive from the debtor 2 million
pesons. The obligation has matured, it has become due but not been paid. In the ordinary cause of things, the
creditor should file one complaint for the recover of 2 million pesos plus interest that has been earned by the
principal, cost and damages if there are any. If the creditor files one complaint for the recovery of 2 million pesos
as principal and this complaint will be filed before a RTC and then he files another complaint for the recovery of
interest in the amount of 200,000 pesos in the MTC. That is splitting a cause of action regardless of whether these
actions are filed before different courts. Since the rules prohibit a right holder from splitting a cause of action,
thus the rule also provides for sanctions. These are given by the rules itself. The filing of one could be used in
order to dismiss the other by reason of litis penencia, pendency of another action or if one of the causes has been
decided, the decision in one case can be used to dismiss the other by reason of res judicata. So there could be 2
grounds for dismissal of complaints which are a product of splitting of a cause of action. There is a third ground
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provided by rule 7, and that is forum shopping. So if a right holder splits his cause of action, he can move for
dismissal either by reason of litis pendentia, res judicata or under Rule 7 on forum shopping. It is now settled
that if a party is guilty of splitting of causes of action, he is also guilty of forum shopping. There is no need to
elaborate on whether there is forum shopping as it can be shown that there is splitting of cause of action. Why
does the rule in the first place prohibit splitting? If you look at the consequences there is really not much
anything that can be suffered by the defendant. In our case the debtor is bound to file 2 million pesos plus
interest. So if the creditor files one complaint for the recovery of 2 million and the second complaint for the
recover of interest and damages amounting to 200,000. Even if we assume that the plaintiff will eventually win
in both cases, he will not enrich himself because in the first case he will be recovering only 2 M and in the second
cause only 200,000, his entitlement is merely the same even if he does not split his cause of action. so in the point
of view for recovery of money due the creditor, the creditor will not have much benefit that he can derive by
splitting the cause of action. Why dont we just allow the the plaintiff to file as many complaints as he wants
involving the same cause? If we look at it, it can even enrich the government because everytime we file, we pay
docket fees. We can even encourage for as long as he pays docket fees. If we look at it in that point of view, there
is nothing wrong with splitting. But if we look at it at a broader point of view, the effect of splitting a cause of
action could be very harmful not to the parties, but to our courts. In our example if we allow two complaints to
be filed based on one cause of action, and these cases is filed before 2 different courts, there is a very strong
probability that the RTC may decide in favor of the plaintiff and there is also a strong probability that the MTC
will decide not in favor of the plaintiff but against the plaintiff, so that our courts may look funny if one court
will decide will decide in favor of the plaintiff and the other will decide against him involving the same cause of
action and same evidence that will be submitted. In other words, this rule on splitting is for the protection and
integrity of our courts. There is a likelihood that the different courts will be rendering conflicting decisions
involving the same issue and parties and that will destroy the integrity of our judiciary. Supposing that the
plaintiff indeed splits his cause of action against the same defendant, but the defendant ignores the breach of
procedure by the plaintiff and does not ask for the dismissal of any one of the cases by reason of litis pendencia
or res judicata, can the court on its own order the dismissal of the existing cases? The answer is yes because litis
pendencia and res judicata are both not waivable defenses and the defendant does not raise these issues that
arise from splitting, the court, on their own, can order the cases pending before them. But if the dismissal is by
reason of litis pendencia, it is not correct to assume that both cases will be dismissed. Only one will be
dismissed. If by reason of res judicata, the remaining case which is pending will be dismissed. So if both cases
are pending, and the defendant files a motion to dismiss these two cases, only one case will be dismissed. In
other words, in litis pendencia it is not possible for the defending party to move for dismissal of all pending
cases. So that if you are the lawyer for the defendant and you are choosing which of the two will be dismissed,
youd rather move for the dismissal of the case pending before the RTC because the amount involved is 2
million pesos and let the cause before the MTC to depreive the RTC. If the MTC eventually decides the case
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involving only 200,000 and the decision becomes final and executory, that is the end of the creditors claim for 2
million pesos. He can no longer recover because there is now res judicata. Can we give to the defendant a
remedy to have the 2 pending cases dismissed? The answer is yes. If the ground for dismissal is forum shopping
Rule 7. Under the Rules, if a plaintiff is guilty of forum shopping, the court can order the dismissal of all
pending cases but the qualification is that the dismissal is without prejudice. So it is not an adjudication on the
merits unless forum shopping is found to be deliberate. But nonetheless, if the wish of the defendant is to have
the all the cases dismissed, he can make use of Rule 7. Move for the dismissal on the ground of forum shopping.
Anyway, when a person violates the rule on splitting of cause of action he violates the rule on forum shopping.
But again one of the cases has been decided, the remaining could be dismissed by reason of res judicata for as
long as such decision has become final and executory. Litis pendencia and res judicata are non-waivable
defenses. We do not need for any motion from the defendant. For as long as it becomes clear before the trial
courts that there is litis pendencia or res judicata, the courts simply follow rule 9 which provides that if it
becomes clear during trial that there is litis pendencia or res judicata, it is muto proprio on the part of the trial
court to order the dismissal of the case. There are certain instances involving the existence of certain causes of
action. If the obligation of the debtor in our example is payable on installments and then principles of this case
Larena vs Villanueva which was decided almost 100 years ago. In our example, if there is an obligation to pay 2
million pesos on installment, each installment will have its own date of maturity. Under this decision in Larena
vs Villanueva, it is a rule that for each installment that becomes due and unpaid, one cause of action arises for
that installment. SO that if there are four installments of 500,000 each and the maturity differ, if the first
installment has become due and unpaid, the creditor will now have one cause of action. But the cause of action
is for the recovery only of the first installment for the recover of 500,000. Can the creditor insist that if he files a
complaint he should be able to recover 2 Million pesos? He cannot because the other installments are not yet
due. He still does not have the right which has been violated. But there are certain mechanisms in Civil Law
which will enable him to recover the entire obligation simply because one installment has been due and unpaid.
We call it in civil law as the acceleration clause. If there is an acceleration clause in our contract, i.e. the non-
payment of the first installment will cause the whole obligation to be due, then the creditor will have one cause
of action only. If the first installment has become due and there is an acceleration clause, if the creditor files one
complaint only to recover 500,000 and then the case is decided in his favor and judgement is entered, and later
on the second installment also becomes due and unpaid, he can no longer file another complaint for the recovery
of the second installement by virtue of the acceleration clause. When an acceleration clause works, the whole
obligation becomes due and that should be the subject in just one complaint as only a single cause of action
accrues in favor of the creditor. But without the clause, the rule of thumb is that each installment, if unpaid, will
give rise to different causes of action. So it is possible that there could be different complaints filed by the same
creditor against the same debtor corresponding to different installments. The qualification given in Larena is
that if two installments are already due, then they should be the subject of just one complaint. There is only one
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cause of action pertaining to these two installments that have remained unpaind. The other installements which
are not yet due cannot be the subject still of a separate complaint. And then together with this case of Larena, the
Court also decided another case almost 100 years ago. This case is Blossom vs. Manila Gas. In our example, there
is a monetary indebtedness for the debtor to pay 2 million pesos in 4 separate installments. Lets say that the
obligation to pay the first installement will be due on or before December 31,2013. Since you are still in May
2013, can the creditor file today a complaint against the debtor for the recovery of 2 M or even the first
installment? The answer is no because the plaintiff still has no right which has been violated by the defendant.
So as of today, the creditor cannot complain that his right has been violated. Supposing that last month, the
debtor conferred with the creditor, and the debtor in writing formally saying that I have no intention of paying
my obligation in your favor. So I disown my obligaion. Do not expect me to pay anything between now and
December 31. Do not expect me to pay you any of the installments that are specified in my note. I have
absolutely nothing to do with this promissory note. I wont pay you a single centavo. If that is the attitude of
the debtor in our example, you can apply the principle in Blossom vs. Manila Gas that is even if the obligations
are not yet due according to the terms of the agreement but the debtor his expressred formally his desire not to
pay and he tells the creditor that he should not expect any payment from him. The court said that it is an
anticipatory breach of the contract. So that if there is an anticipatory breach of the contract, the creditor can
rightfully file a complaint against the debtor for the recovery of the whole obligation of 2 million account. But
remember that this should be treated merely as an anticipatory breach. That the debtor formally tells that he is
not going to pay the indebtedness. Supposing that there is no such anticipatory breach that can be shown by the
creditor. He files a complaint today for the recovery of the whole indebtedness, 2 M, although the first
installment on or before Dec 31. He files the complaint. Does the RTC have jurisdiction? Of course it has
jurisdiction since the amount to be recovered is 2 million. The defendant after receiveing the summons and he
does not file any responsive pleading or even if he files an answer but does not raise as an issue the propriety of
filing a complaint where the obligation is not yet due. The Court will follow will the order of things in civil
procedure and the court will set the case for pre trial and during the pre trial there is no settlement. Lets say
that the pre trail will be scheduled next year, Feb 2014. By the time the pre trial is scheduled, the first installment
will become due. There is no amicable settlement. The court scheduled it for trial by the end of 2014 and by that
time let us say that the whole obligation has been due. So at the time the Trial Court conducts a trial on the case
the debtor has already defaulted but at the time of the filing of the complaint this obligation has not yet been
defaulted. Can the Court properly decide the case in favor of the plaintiff? The answer is no. There is a 2005 case
with the same set of facts. The title of the case is Swagman Hotel vs. CA. In this case which is a modification of
the principle in blossom. The SC said that if a plaintiff files a complaint in court although he has no cause of
action at all, but the defendant does nothing and then the claim of the plaintiff matures at the time it is decided,
the court still has no authority to decide the case because at the time of filing, the plaintiff has no cause of action.
One of the issues raised by the defendant, can we not apply rule 10, that is amendment to confrom to evidence?
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While the case is not final, the obligation became due already and of course the note must have been presented
as evidence that the obligation at that time was already due and demandable. The SC said that we do not apply
amendment to conform to evidence if in the first place the plaintiff does not have a cause of action at the time of
the filing of the complaint. So it is essential that a complaint must be filed after the cause of action has accrued. If
there is no cause of action that has yet accrued and a complaint is filed, the court will have no authority to
decide even if it matures and becomes defaulted during the trial of the case. We apply the rule on amendment to
conform to evidence only if there is really a cause of action at the time of the filing of the complaint. So you take
note of these differences between the rule on anticipatory breach given in Blossom vs Manila Gas and the much
later case of Swagman Hotels vs CA. The principle of Swagman has been reiterated by the court in subsequent
cases. At the time of the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff must already have a cause of action. He must show
that his right has already been violated at the time of the filing. Otherwise, he cannot make use of amendment to
conform to evidence. Amendment to conform to evidence presupposes the existence of a cause of action on the
part of the plaintiff.
The opposite of splitting a cause is joinder of causes of action. Splitting is prohibited while joinder of causes is
encouraged by the rules. So in joinder of causes, the plaintiff is encouraged to incorporate as many causes of
action as he may have against the same defendant although these causes of action are totally unrelated to one
another, although these causes arise from different transaction as long as the parties to the transaction are the
same plaintiff and defendant. So a plaintiff can file a complaint against a defendant for accion reinvidicatoria,
recovery of money arising from loan, recovery of damages from quasi delict. Althought they arise from different
transaction. So that is there is one plaintiff and one defendant. There is nothing wrong if the plaintiff sets up 3
different causes of action although these causes of actions arise from different transactions. The limitations of
joinder of causes can be summarized in three issues that is the issue of jurisdiction, the issue of venue and issue
of joinder of parties. There could be joinder of causes of action according to Rule 2 which is encouraged as long
as the party does not violate the rule on joinder of parties found under the next rule as long as these cause
enjoined do not follow different rules of procedure and of course these causes of action should be within the
jursidiction of the Trial Court. So that if the plaintiff files a complaint against the same defendant and his first
cause of action is accion reinvidicatoria assesed at 1,000 and the second cause of action is for the recovery of
money, 2 Million pesos. Obviously, the causes are misjoined because the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the
accion reinvidicatoria valued at 1,000. About 7 months ago, the SC decided a case where one of the parties in
August 2012, this case presented a joinder of causes where there was really misjoinder of causes of action. The
complaint filed by the plaintiff against the defendant set up as first cause of action a complaint for partition. And
the second cause of action was for recission of a donation. Both causes of action are cognizable by the RTC. If we
rely solely on rule 2 section 5, is there misjoinder of cause of action? the first cause is partition, the second cause
is recission of donation. The answer is Yes. Why? because a complaint for partition is a special civil action. If you
look at the Rules, Partition is enumerated in the list of Special Civil Actions. While recission of donation is an
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ordinary civil action. In other words, they are governed by different procedure. So, here is indeed in this case
misjoinder of causes of action. But the defendant did not raise this assigned issue. The defendant either did not
realize that partition is a special civil action while recission in an ordinary action. The defendant did not do
anything and the worse is that the judge did not know any better. ! He most likely waited for the defendant to
raise this issue on misjoinder of causes of action but since no motion came from the defendant, the judge said I
will just try these two misjoined causes. Under the rules, can the court muto proprio apply the rule on
misjoinder of causes by ordering the severance of one of the cases that is misjoinded? The answer is yes. Under
the Rules, we do not really need a motion coming from the defendant. On its own, if the court finds out that
there is a misjoinder, the court is given the prerogative motu proprio to order the severance of cases. This is for
the benefit of the court because of if the court will wait for the move from the defendant to raise misjoinder of
causes, the court will find itself confused with the procedure that will follow. Because partition has a procedure
different from ordinary civil actions. In fact, partition under our rules now is a multi-staged proceeding. Thats
why it is a special civil action while recission is an ordinary civil action. It is not divided into several stages like a
complaint for partition. But since nobody raised the issue of misjoinder and the court did not realize that there
was misjoinder of causes, the court just went on to try these two cases until a decision was finally issued by the
court. When the matter appealed to the SC, the SC said that there was nothing irregular with the performance of
the court even if the causes of action are misjoined. But the issue is not raised before the trial court, and the trial
court goes again with the trial of these misjoined causes of action. The decision of the court will still be valid.
The only qualification given by the SC is that this misjoined causes should be within the jurisdiciton of the trial
court under BP 129. In other words, this rule of joinder of causes could be a ground for severance of one of the
causes but if it is not raised timely and the trial court eventually decides the case, the decision of the trial court is
binding. Its perfectly in order as long as the trial court has jurisdiction over the misjoined causes. Does the RTC
have jurisdiction over the complaint of partition? Does the RTC have jurisdiction over recission of donation?
Recission is incapable of pecuniary estimation. So even if there are misjoined causes in one complaint, but this
misjoinder is not raised before the trial court, the parties are deemed to have waived this misjoinder of causes of
action. The judgment rendered by the court is valid and it can be executed if it is duly entered. If the court does
not motu proprio order the severance of cases, we cannot blame the court for it. It is the bargain of the defendant
to raise this as an issue before the trial court. So again, this is the attitude of the SC when it comes to misjoinder
of causes of action. As long as the misjoined causes fall within the jurisdiction of the trial court, there is nothing
wrong if the trial court will eventually decide the case although there is misjoinder of causes of action.
Can the complaint be filed where these two causes of action are set-up? First, it is a petition for certiorari
and then as a second cause there is a petition for habeas corpus. If you read literally section 5 that is not allowed.
But the SC allowed. A petition for certiorari which is a special civil action could be filed together with a petition
for habeas corpus which not a special civil but it is in fact a special proceeding and therefore the procedure
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followed by 2 different petitions are different. That should be disallowed under Section 5, but that is allowed
according to the court by way of exception.
A complaint is filed with an inferior court. The first cause of action is reinvidicatoria. Recovery of title to a piece
of land. The assessed value of the land is 5000 pesos. The second cause of action is unlawful detainer of a
condominium unit. The back rentals to be recovered is 2 Million pesos. So in this complaint the first cause is
accion reinvidicatoria of another piece of land or property whose assessed value is 1000 pesos and then unlawful
detainer of a condominium unit the back rental sought to be recovered is 2 Million pesos. Does the inferior court
over the 2 causes of action. The answer is yes. because an inferior court has jurisdiction over a case of accion
reinvidicatoria where the assessed value is only 1000 pesos. The inferior court also has jurisdiction over
unlawful detainer regardless of the back rentals sought to be recovered. So with respect to jurisdiction on the
part of the inferior court, there is no problem at all. It really has jurisdiction. Are the two causes properly joined?
Although they are within the jurisdiction of the inferior, the answer is No. There is still misjoinder although both
cases are cognizable by the inferior court. Because accion reinvidicatoria, although cognizable by an inferior
court will be governed by ordinary procedure while unlawful detainer will be governed by summary
procedure. That is one of the limitations in joinder of causes of action. We cannot join causes of action which are
governed by different procedures although they may fall within the jurisdiction of the same court. But you
always refer to this new case of Baylon (?), even if there is misjoinder, if it is not raised as an issue, the issue is
waived and there is nothing wrong with a decision rendered by the court thereafter as long as the court has
jurisdiction over all the causes of action that are misjoined in the same complaint.

Good afternoon. To continue with the just todays discussion on joinder of causes of action, you should be
conversant with the limitations to this prerogative given to the plaintiff. You also notice that, unlike joinder of
parties, there is a rule against misjoinder of causes of action in the same way that there is a rule against
misjoinder of parties. But there is no rule which governs non-joinder of causes of action while in joinder of
parties, there is non-joinder and misjoinder of parties. The reason why we cannot conceive of a rule on non-
joinder of causes is because joinder of causes is always permissive. It is always at the option of the plaintiff.
Thats why the rules state that the plaintiff can join as many causes of action as he may have. That is permissive.
If he does not want to join causes of action against the same defendant, the court cannot force him to do so. But
there is a rule against misjoinder of causes and misjoinder occurs when the two causes joined violate some of the
limitations contained in Sec. 5, like rule on joinder of parties, rule which prohibits joinder of causes which are
governed by different rules, such as when a special civil action is joined together with an ordinary civil action
although both would be cognizable by the same court, the joinder is prohibited but as to the mentioned
yesterday, the latest decision of the court is to the effect that even if the causes are misjoined, if that issue is not
raised on appeal before the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, these courts will just ignore the violation on the
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rule on joinder of causes of action. The judgment rendered by the court cannot be challenged provided that the
court has jurisdiction over the two or more causes that have been joined.
The first limitation to joinder of causes is the rule on joinder of parties. And the rule on joinder of parties which
serves as a limitation to joinder of causes is the rule in Sec. 6 of Rule 3 that is permissive joinder of parties. In
permissive joinder of parties, it envisions a situation where there are two or more plaintiffs, or two or more
defendants or both, and the right to relief arises from the same transaction or a series of transactions and there is
a common question of law or fact in so far as the defendants and the plaintiffs are concerned. Usually, joinder of
permissive joinder of parties, issues when there are at least two causes of action, pertaining to the two plaintiffs
or against the two defendants as the case may be. A good example is illustrated by case decided by the court
about 10 years ago. The owner of a tract of land discovered one morning that his property has been occupied
forcibly or through intimidation or any other means and that they retained physical possession of this property
about 10 or 11 informal settlers or squatters constructed their houses on that property. The owner of the land of
course wanted to recover physical possession of the property. The procedural problem that they face was this.
Can he file, should he file 11 complaints of forcible entry against each one of the informal settlers or squatters or
can he file just one complaint against eleven defendants, eleven informal settlers, but in that complaint, he will
allege eleven causes of action. Each one cause of action against each one of the informal settlers. The SC said the
owner of the land has the option of choosing any one of these remedies. The owner of the land can file eleven
complaints for forcible entry but each complaint must implead only one informal settler. He can also file just one
complaint against eleven squatters but in that complaint, she should allege eleven causes of action. The last
recourse will involve joinder of parties. There is just one complaint, against eleven squatters but in effect, in
filing effectively, he can be filing eleven separate complaints, but there is only one complaint. That is the
illustration of permissive joinder of parties. We should also note that joinder of parties in Sec. 6 of Rule 3 as a
limitation to joinder of causes of action is also permissive in character. The title of the section is permissive
joinder of parties. In another section, in Sec. 7 of Rule 3, there is another concept of joinder which is compulsory
joinder of parties. In other words, the joinder of parties in compulsory joinder is a must, it is a mandate required
by law. And this refers to compulsory joinder of indispensable party. In compulsory joinder of indispensable
party, the definition of an indispensable party in the Rule is that it is a party without whom no final
determination of a case can be had. Meaning to say that even if the court tries a case without an indispensible
party having been impleaded, the decision of the court is void, the proceedings of the court are void. The
decision will never be entered; it will never become final and executory. That is the message given in rule on
compulsory joinder of indispensible party. If there are only two parties in a contract of sale, there is just one
vendor and just one vendee and there is a violation of the conditions of the sale, the innocent contracting party,
will of course be indispensable and the party who has committed the breach will also be an indispensable party.
The opposite of indispensable party is a necessary or proper party. Rule 3 also gives us the definition of
necessary party. But we will know that the joinder of a necessary party is not compulsory. The law does not
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require the plaintiff to implead a necessary party unlike in the case of indispensable party. Because it is the law
itself that compels the inclusion of an indispensable party, what is the sanction if a complaint is filed without
impleading an indispensable party? If an indispensable party is not impleaded, either as plaintiff or as a
defendant, and the defendant files a motion to dismiss on that ground, that is the ground relied upon by the
defendant is an indispensable party has not been impleaded, will the court grant the motion to dismiss? The
answer is no. Because Sec. 11 in Rule 3 is very clear: non joinder or misjoinder of a party is not a ground for
dismissal. But in other cases, decided by the SC, the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant for the reason that
an indispensable party has not been impleaded, is not failure to implead an indispensable party. The ground
used by the defendant is failure to state a cause of action.
In Rule 16, that is the rule on motion to dismiss, failure to state a cause of action is a ground for dismissal.
Failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for dismissal under Rule 16. In fact, Rule 3 is very
clear in saying misjoinder or nonjoinder of a party is not a ground to dismiss. But if the defendant uses another
ground that is failure to state a cause of action, there are conflicting decisions of the SC when the SC resolved the
question of whether or not failure to implead an indispensable party is a good ground for dismissal. Remember
that the ground used by defendant is not failure to implead an indispensable party but the ground for dismissal
is failure to state a cause of action. One set of decisions of the SC said that if an indispensable party is not
impleaded and there is a motion to dismiss founded on failure to state a cause of action, the case would be
dismissed on that ground. Because there is really failure on the part of the plaintiff to state a cause of action if an
indispensable party-defendant is not impleaded. In the definition of a cause of action, the law says that a cause
of action exists when there is a violation of the right by another party. In other words, a cause of action envisions
the existence of a right and a violation of that right. If there is a wrong doer who has violated the right of a party,
that wrongdoer should be impleaded as a party defendant. The reason given by these one set of decisions of the
SC in affirming the dismissal of a complaint where an indispensable party defendant has not been impleaded is
that the proceedings taken by the court are void. With respect to the parties who are present in the case and with
respect to other parties who could have been parties to the cause. The judgment is null and void. And therefore
the court said if we dont dismiss the case, we allow the court to continue trying the case and we allow the court
to eventually decide the case. The court will just be spending useless his time, because the judgment to be
rendered by the court, in a way cannot be enforced; it will never become final and executory. That was the
justification given by the court in this set of decisions which allowed the dismissal of a complaint for failure to
state a cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action because an indispensable party-defendant has not been
impleaded. The other set, the second set of decisions of the SC is to the effect that if an indispensable party-
defendant has not been impleaded, and there is a motion to dismiss filed by the present defendant on the same
ground failure to state a cause of action, the court should not dismiss the case. The reason given by the SC is
Section 11. Misjoinder or nonjoinder of a party is not a ground for dismissal. The court said: if an indispensable
is not impleaded, and a motion to dismiss is filed by the defendant, what the court should do is to order the
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amendment of the complaint. Is it proper for a court to order the amendment of a complaint if the motion before
the court is a motion to dismiss? Should not the court either grant or deny the motion to dismiss? If you read
Rule 16, on the alternatives, the options given by Rule 16 to a court which is going to rule on a motion to
dismiss, Rule 16 really says that a trial court has three options. The first is to deny the motion, the second is to
grant the motion and the third is to order an amendment to the pleading. So this decision of the SC is also
founded on an express provision of Rule 16. A trial court really can refuse to grant a motion to dismiss by using
the third option that is order an amendment of the pleading. In fact as of now, there are four alternatives given
to a trial court in resolving a motion to dismiss. The first three: grant the motion, deny the motion or order an
amendment to the pleading and the fourth alternative introduced by a circular is that for the court to refer the
matter to arbitration or a prior barangay conciliation. There are now four options given to a trial court. But we
are interested in the third option given in Rule 16. And the Supreme Court said if a person is an indispensable
party to the case and he is not impleaded as a defendant, the person who has been sued in that case can move
for a motion to dismiss but the court will not grant the motion, the court will instead order the amendment of
that complaint. So the motion to dismiss will not be granted instead, the court will tell the plaintiff: you amend
your complaint by impleading the indispensable party. If the plaintiff receives an order from the court, directing
him to amend his complaint by impleading an indispensable party, the plaintiff also has a choice. He can ignore
the order of the court or he can comply with the order of the court. If the plaintiff complies with the order of the
court and the plaintiff amends his complaint, and impleads the indispensable party, then the defect in that case
is solved. There is no more procedural defect because an indispensable party has been impleaded. But if the
plaintiff disobeys the order of the court, directing him to implead an indispensable party, can the court do
something about the disobedience of the plaintiff? This other set of decisions said, the court can now order the
dismissal of the case but the dismissal of the case will not be founded on Rule 16 but it will be a dismissal found
on Rule 17. Rule 17 is also about dismissal of actions. And the court said if the dismissal of the action is
thereafter ordered by a court by reason of the disobedience by the plaintiff of a lawful order of the court, that
dismissal under rule 17 is a dismissal with prejudice. In other words, that will be an adjudication upon the
merits. If that order of dismissal is finally entered, then there will be res judicata and the plaintiff will be barred
from further pursuing his claim in another complaint.
This issue as we said is a subject of conflicting decisions of the court and if by chance, this is asked in your
examinations, I would suggest that you adapt the second set, that is if an indispensable party has not been
impleaded and there is a motion to dismiss the court should not order a dismissal of a case. The court should
order the amendment of that complaint. If the amendment is not complied with, the court can now order the
dismissal of the case not by reason of a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 but by reason of Rule 17, dismissal of
the action by reason of failure to obey a lawful order of the court. Is there a difference between a dismissal under
Rule 16 on that ground failure to state a cause of action and a dismissal under Rule 17 failure to obey the rules of
court or a lawful order of the court? There is a great difference. If a complaint is dismissed under Rule 16
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because of failure to state a cause of action and the failures to state a cause is founded on the failure to implead
an indispensable party, the order of dismissal under Rule 16 is a dismissal without prejudice. The plaintiff can
file another complaint. But in that other complaint, he should see to it that the indispensable should now be
impleaded. But if the dismissal of the complaint is by reason of Rule 17, if you read the third section of Rule 17,
it is clearly provided that a dismissal for failure of the party to obey a lawful of the court or failure of a party to
obey the Rules of Court is a dismissal with prejudice, unless the court otherwise provides. But generally, the
dismissal under Rule 17 is a dismissal with prejudice. That should be the thrust of your answer in the event that
this problem is given in your bar examination. Failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for
dismissal of a case. Under Section 11 of Rule 3, nonjoinder or misjoinder of a party is not a ground for dismissal.
But if the ground used is failure to state a cause of action, you also say that under Rule 16, a court has an option
not to grant the motion to dismiss, not to deny a motion to dismiss but simply order the amendment of the
pleading or the complaint. If the order to amend is not complied with, there could now be a dismissal not under
Rule 16 but under Rule 17 - Failure to obey a lawful order of the court.
How do we distinguish whether a party is an indispensable party or necessary party? This matter is illustrated
usually in our textbooks with an illustration of a relationship between a creditor and his two debtors. Lets say
that the creditor lends 1M pesos to two debtors: Debtor 1 and Debtor 2. And then the obligation is defaulted. If
the creditor files a complaint, should he implead debtor 1 and debtor 2? Or can he just file a complaint against
debtor 1, leaving out in a complaint debtor 2. In other words, in a complaint contemplated by the creditor, who
between debtor 1 and debtor 2 is an indispensable party and who between debtor 1 and debtor 2 is a necessary
party. That question will not be answered by the Rules of Court. That question will be answered by the Civil
Code. In several cases decided by the court, the plaintiff should first evaluate whether the debtors are solidary
debtors or they are only joint debtors. So we are going to apply the provisions of the Civil Code. And in the Civil
Code, in the absence of any stipulation or some other factors given in the Code itself, when there are two or
more debtors of the same indebtedness, the presumption is that they are only joint debtors. But if there is a
stipulation that they are jointly and severally liable, then debtors 1 and 2 will be considered as solidary debtors.
So we must first establish whether the debtors are joint debtors or solidary debtors. And in determining the
relationship of these two debtors to the creditor, it is not the Rules of Court that will guide us. It is the
substantive law. It is the civil code to determine whether the parties, the debtors are jointly liable or severally
solidarily liable. If we apply the presumption in the Civil Code that debtors 1 and 2 are joint debtors, and the
creditor files a complaint for the recovery of the whole indebtedness of 1M pesos, do we consider debtor 1 and
debtor 2 as indispensable parties? The answer is YES. If the purpose of the creditor is to recover the entirety of
his claim that is 1M pesos, he can recover his credit from both joint debtors. But if the plaintiff, if the creditor
decides to run after Debtor 1 only, can the complaint be prosecuted successfully? The answer is YES. Because
the creditor has a cause of action against D1. The creditor has a right to compel D1 to pay but from the point of
view of the Civil Code, the issue is how much is the liability of D1? Again, applying civil code on joint liability
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of debtors, d1 is liable to pay only 500K pesos. If the debtors are jointly liable it is not possible for the creditor to
recover from only one of the joint debtors 1M pesos. He can recover only the portion of the obligation which has
been shared by d1. Why do we say that in our example, the creditor can recover from d1 500K pesos? Why not
400 why not 800K pesos. Because there is another presumption in the civil code that if there is no express
stipulation between the parties, the debtors should share equally in the liability. So we are applying
presumptions in the civil code. The liability of d1 could be 700k pesos, if that is so stipulated among the parties.
But in the absence of stipulation, we assume that the liability of d1 is equal to the liability of d2. Again, if the
action is creditor vs. debtor1, the claim that should be recovered by the creditor is only 500K pesos. In this
example, d1 is an indispensable party because without d1, it is then unlikely for the court to render a judgment
in favor of the creditor directing d1 to pay if d1 is not made defendant to the case. So d1 is an indispensable
party. How about d2? Will he be considered as a necessary party in this complaint? The answer is yes. So if there
is a complaint filed by the creditor only against d1, the creditor is indispensable, d1 is also indispensable, but d2
will only be impleaded as a necessary party. D2 satisfies all the requirements of a necessary or proper party in
that even. If you read the rules, the presence of a necessary party is not indispensable. The case can go ahead.
But the presence of a necessary party could be required by the court if in order to give complete accord of relief
to the parties in so far as the complaint is concerned or for the purpose of a complete determination of the
subject matter of the action. The subject matter of the action for the purpose of satisfying that phrase complete
determination of the subject matter therein is the recovery of 1M pesos. Thats why d2 becomes only a
necessary party. But the rules do not compel the creditor to implead d2. Since d2 is only a necessary party, even
if you dont implead him, the case can prosper, the court can try the case, but the decision of the court will be
limited to the awarding to the creditor 500K pesos. What is the duty of the creditor or the plaintiff if he has not
impleaded a necessary party? The duty of the plaintiff is only to tell the court that he has left out in his
complaint a necessary party. That is enough. So he may not be compelled. He is not compelled by the rules to
implead a necessary party. All that he needs to do is to file a complaint against an indispensable party and in
that complaint, he will tell the court, I have not impleaded a necessary party. And it is up to the court now to
determine whether or not it is essential for the court to order that d2 must be impleaded to this action. If the
court does not issue an order requiring the plaintiff-creditor to implead d2, there is no need for the plaintiff to
amend his complaint. But if the court orders the plaintiff creditor to amend his complaint by including by
impleading d2, the plaintiff again will have two options either to file in court or not to file in the court. If the
plaintiff follows eventually the order of the court, then we will have a situation where the complaint will be
amended, the necessary party will be impleaded as defendant but the complaint will now be for the recovery
not only for 500k but for the recovery of 1M pesos. If on the other hand, the plaintiff-creditor ignores the order of
the court, can the court now make use of Rule 17? Can the court also order the dismissal of the complaint under
Rule 17 because of the refusal of the plaintiff to obey a lawful order of the court? We dont apply Rule 17 in this
situation. We dont apply Rule 17 because Rule 3 itself already provides for a sanction if the plaintiff refuses to
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obey an order of the court directing him to implead a necessary party. The sanction given in rule 3 is simply that
the plaintiff is deemed to have waived his right to recover from the necessary party. That is expressly mentioned
in rule 3 concerning impleading a necessary party. So you will also note that there is a difference between the
effect of disobedience by a plaintiff to an order of a court to implead an indispensable party compared to the
disobedience by the plaintiff to an order by the court to implead a necessary party. If the plaintiff refuses to heed
an order of the court to implead an indispensable party, the complaint could be dismissed under rule 17 and the
dismissal general is a dismissal with prejudice. If the plaintiff ignores an order of a court to implead a necessary
party, the court cannot order the dismissal of the complaint under rule 17. What the court will apply is the
sanction given in rule 3,that is failure to implead a necessary party if directed by a court. The case will continue,
the case will not be dismissed, but in so far as the necessary party is concerned, the right of the creditor against
him is deemed waived. But if you look further into the consequence of that sanction given in rule 3, if later on
the plaintiff creditor decides to file a complaint against d2, that complaint will no longer prosper. Why? Because
the d2 can now make use of rule 16, file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the claim has been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished. So at the end, the effect could be the same. Whether a party not
impleaded is indispensable or necessary. But the ground for the dismissal will be different. In the case of an
indispensable party, the ground for dismissal is rule 1 sec. 3, failure to obey a lawful order of a court. In the case
of a necessary party, the complaint again will also be dismissed under rule 16, that is the claim has been paid,
waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. There are other sections in rule 3 which could give rise to an
occasion where we have to determine whether a party is indispensable or a necessary party or whether he is a
real party at all to the existing case. And we are referring to the rule on assignment or transfer of interest during
the litigation. I think that is the last section in rule 3, that transfer of interest pendente lite and transfer of interest
before the complaint is filed.
We are going to make use of the same example: there is a creditor who has lent out 1M pesos to the debtor. This
time, we will only have 1 debtor. The debtor defaults in the payment of the obligation. But before the creditor
files a complaint against him, the creditor feels that he needs money right away. So he decides to sell his claim to
assign his credit to an assignee. Can the creditor do that. Of course the answer is yes. That is covered by
procedural law. That is covered by the civil code. That is simply assignment of right. So if the creditor who has a
claim for 1M, decides to assign his credit before a case is filed, he can assign this credit to any person who is
willing to assume the risk of indebtedness. That is what we call in civil law assignment of credit. There is an
assignor, there is an assignee. Usually in assignment of credit, the assignee pays or buys the credit for an amount
which is much less than the credit. So if the credit assigned is 1M and it is assigned, it is very likely that the
money to be paid by the assignee for the 1M credit will only be 700K pesos. So it is a claim to recover 1M pesos.
It is sold to the assignee for only 700K pesos. So in dealing up a claim of 1M pesos, the creditor will receive only
700K pesos. But the indebtedness is already in default. Can the assignor, the original creditor file a complaint
against the debtor for the recovery of 1M pesos? Of course not. Because he is no longer the creditor. He has
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already sold his right. He is no longer a real party in interest. So that if the original creditor files a complaint
against the debtor, the court will dismiss the case. The original creditor is no longer a real party in interest. He
has no right to enforce the payment of his claim that has already been assigned to another person. Supposing it
is the assignee who will file a complaint against the debtor, will the filing of the complaint be proper. Of course
it will be proper. The assignee is a real party in interest. Hes an assignee of the credit, and therefore he stands to
be benefited or injured by the outcome of the case. If it is the assignee who will file a complaint against the
debtor, can the assignee recover 1M pesos from the debtor? The answer is yes. Because in civil law, the assignee
merely steps into the shoes of the assignor, if the assignor was entitled to recover 1M pesos, then assignee is also
entitled to recover 1M pesos. But in this case, filed by the assignee, against the debtor, the assignor is not a real
party in interest, he is not a necessary party. He cannot be a considered necessary party because he is not even a
real party in interest.
But if we change the facts a little bit, the answer will also be different. If lets say that the original creditor has
not assigned his credit for 1M. He files a complaint against the debtor for the recovery of 1M pesos. Is the filing
of the complaint proper? The answer is Yes. Because he is still the creditor. The owner of the credit. While the
case is pending before the RTC, the plaintiff-creditor also feels the need for cash right away. While the case is
pending, can the plaintiff-creditor assign his claim? The answer is Yes. He can assign his claim. Does he need the
permission of the court? He does not need permission from the court. Because that is not governed by
procedural rules. That will still be governed by substantive law, by the provisions of the civil code. So while the
case is pending before the RTC, the plaintiff creditor signs or executes a deed of assignment pendente lite,
during the pendency of the case in favor of the assignee. The consideration for the assignment is still 700K pesos.
There is nothing wrong with the assignment. As we said, he doesnt even need permission from the court for the
plaintiff-creditor to assign his credit during the pendency of the case. So we now have a plaintiff-creditor who
has assigned his right to an assignee. Will the assignee be considered as an indispensable party? The answer is
NO. Will the assignee pendente lite be considered as a necessary party? Still the answer is No. if you read in
that section on transfer pendente lite, we find out that the court has the option not to order the amendment of
the complaint. The court can go ahead with the original parties to the case. So the assignee pendent lite is not an
indispensable party. The assignee pendent lite is not even a necessary party.
Let us say that after the assignment, the assignee may submit a manifestation to the court and tells the court that
during the pendency of the case, he acquired the rights of the plaintiff to recover 1M pesos for only 700K pesos.
Can the defendant now tell the court: I am willing to pay 700K right away to the assignee but the complaint will
have to be dismissed? Because the assignee purchased the credit during the pendency of the case for only 700K,
although the credit is really for 1M pesos? Is the stand of the defendant correct? In other words, can defendant
compel the assignee to receive 700K pesos as full payment for a 1M peso obligation? The answer is YES. Under
the civil code, you will read that is Art. 1634 of the civil code. That is the difference between assignment of a
credit before a complaint is filed and assignment of credit while the case is pending before the court. The
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defendant, the debtor in assignment pendente lite can compel the assignee to accept an amount, the amount
paid for the consideration for the assignment for the full payment of the credit. That is what the civil code
provides. You always have to analyze whether the assignment takes place before a complaint is filed or the
assignment takes place after a complaint is already filed. There is a big difference between the consequences of
assignment pendente lite and assignment before the case is commenced for the purpose of satisfying the
indebtedness. And we are going to apply the provisions of the civil code on assignment pendente lite when it
comes to the manner of satisfying of full payment of the account. Remember that in assignment pendente lite, if
the account is only 1M pesos, and there is an assignment only for 700K pesos, the defendant can compel the
assignee to receive 700K pesos as full payment for the 1M pesos account. And this is provided in the civil code.
Another section in rule 3 which could give rise to the determination or ascertainment as to whether a person will
be treated as indispensable or merely a necessary party. It is the rule concerning husband and wife. Rule 3 is
very clear in saying that in all actions, the husband and the wife must be joined together. But the exception,
there is an exception, except as provided by law. So if we simply rely on the rules of court, whenever there is a
case filed by a husband as plaintiff, he should always join his wife as a co-plaintiff. Whenever there is an action
filed against the husband, the plaintiff should see to it that the defendants are both the husband and the wife.
That is the general rule under the rules of the court. The husband and the wife shall sue or be sued jointly,
except as provided for by law. That exception, that phrase, except as provided for by law is also the source of
conflicting decisions of the court. If you will notice, the rules simply say except as provided by law. And the rule
itself does not provide for the exceptions. So the rule compels us to look for an exception, either from procedural
law or from substantive law. Now the Supreme Court in the latest decisions, said that the law contemplated in
the exception is the Family Code or the Civil Code as the case may be. And SC said, if we are going to look for
the exceptions to this procedural requirement that husband and wife should sue or be sued jointly, the chapter
in family code or in the civil code as the case maybe that is most pertinent to this procedural principle will be the
rule on partnership or the rules on co-ownership as found in the family code or in the civil code. And in each
decision, the court said that it is not always correct to require the husband to include his wife as a co-plaintiff
whenever the husband files a case against another person. The court said that under the rules on co-ownership
and the rules on partnership, the code, the civil code allows a co-owner or a partner to file a case on behalf of the
partnership; a co-owner can file a complaint on behalf of the other co-owners without impleading the co-owners.
So that if lets say the husband is in the retail business, and then a customer of the husbands business defaults in
the payment of an obligation, can we allow the husband to file the case without including his wife as a co-
plaintiff. Supreme Court said yes, its not necessary to include the wife. Why? Because the law on co-ownership,
the law on partnership allows a co-owner a sole co-owner to file a case in order to protect the interest of the co-
ownership without impleading the other co-owners. In the family code, it seems even if the property
relationship between the husband and wife is covered by conjugal partnership of gains or absolute community
of partnership between the husband and the wife, they are treated as co-owners. The husband and the wife are
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treated for purposes of actions as co-owners of the properties acquired during the marriage. And in civil law, a
co-owner is authorized to file a case without including the other co-owners for the protection of the interest of
the co-ownership over certain properties. In the civil code, as well as in the family code, according to the code, a
co-owner can even file an action of unlawful detainer or forcible entry against a trespasser who co-owned
property without including the other co-owners. So as of now, if the husband files a complaint alone, without
joining his wife as a party-plaintiff, the filing of the complaint will not be a violation of the rules of court which
requires that husband and wife should sue or be sued jointly. We apply the provisions of the family code on co-
ownership as well as the rules of partnership. Either the family code or the civil code provisions will apply. But
there is a caveat given by the SC in its decision. If the husband as a co-owner files a complaint against a
wrongdoer, he should see to it that in that complaint, he is admitting that he is simply acting as a co-owner of
the property. That he recognizes the existence of the co-ownership. But if in the complaint filed by the husband
alone, without the wife, the husband alleges that he is the sole owner, that there is no co-ownership between the
husband and the wife, then he should implead the wife because he is no longer filing a complaint in
representation of the co-ownership but instead he now denies the existence of that co-ownership. That is the
caveat given by the court in its latest decision concerning the propriety of the husband filing a complaint alone
without being joined by his wife. As long as one of the spouses who acts as plaintiff continues to recognize the
existence of the co-ownership, there is nothing wrong if the other spouse is not included in that complaint. So if
we allow the husband alone to file a complaint, do we consider the wife as an indispensable party? The wife
will not be considered an indispensable party because the law authorizes the husband alone or the wife alone to
file the complaint. Is the spouse who was left out considered a necessary party? The court said the spouse who
has been left behind in that case is not even considered a necessary party because the case can be adjudicated by
the court and the adjudication by the court can become final and executory. There could be a complete
determination of the case even without joining the absent spouse. So in this husband and wife relationship, if the
law authorizes one of the spouses to file the complaint and when say the law its the substantive law, the family
or civil code, the absent spouse will not even be treated as a necessary party.
Another provision in rule 3 which could give rise to a situation where we have to determine whether a
party left out is indispensable or necessary is the idea of class suit. In a class suit, the requirement is that there is
a community of interest. There is common interest among persons that are so numerous it is impracticable to
bring them all before the courts. And in a class suit the law does not require that all the members of the class
should be impleaded as plaintiff or as defendants as the case may be. What the rule requires is only a number
enough to represent the members of a class should act as plaintiff or should act as defendant as the case may be.
But the most important feature in a class suit is of course community of interest. That is, the interest of the
members of the class are not specified. The interest of one member will also be the interest of the rest of the
members. But if the interest of one member is different from the interest of the other members, that will not be
considered as class suit. If youve read the case of Oposa vs. Factoran, that is an example of a class suit. In fact,
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the doctrine in oposa vs. factoran is now formally a part of the rules of court. That is, a person files a complaint
on behalf of children who are yet unborn. That is allowed. Because of the decision in oposa vs. factoran, that is
now made a part of the rules of court. Under the circular on kalikasan, in fact, if you have the circular in
kalikasan, there is the section called citizen suit, and that section on citizen suit have this verbatim the decision
of the SC concerning the feasibility, the propriety of a person filing a case, a kalikasan case on behalf of persons
who are yet unborn. You know the reason given by the court in oposa is that this is allowed because of the
principle of intergenerational ethic responsibility. But from a procedural point of view, that will be a class suit
although the writ of kalikasan conceived a citizen suit that is effectively a class suit. In a class suit, do we
consider the members of the class as indispensable or necessary parties? According to the court, in a class suit all
the members of the class are indispensable parties. But that is now settled. That is what the SC said that in a
class suit, all the members of the class that is involved in the litigation are considered as indispensable parties. If
the members of the class are all considered as indispensable parties, should we not identify them individually in
the pleadings, in the complaint or in the answer? The SC said no, in a class suit the class may be represented by a
sufficient number of the class but although the members of the class are all indispensable parties, they need not
be identified individually in the pleadings submitted to the court. In other words, the SC has inserted an
exception to the rule on compulsory joinder of indispensable party. The general rule as we said a while ago is
that an indispensable party must always be joined. He must always be impleaded because without him, no final
determination of the case can be had. But because of this decision of the Supreme Court saying that although the
members of a class in a class suit are indispensable parties, they should serve as an exception to our rule that
indispensable parties must be impleaded in an existing action. Why did the court conclude that in a class suit the
members of the class are all indispensable parties? The reason given by the SC is the last sentence in the
definition of a class suit in rule 3 which is very logical. The last sentence in that section on class suit says that a
member of a class in a class suit shall have the right to intervene. In other words, if there is a class suit, let us say
there are 1000 members of the class and only 20 members of the class have been identified as plaintiff or
defendant in the class suit, so if we read the complaint, there are only 20 plaintiffs or 20 defendants as the case
may be. But they represent 1000 members of the class. The 1000 members of the class are all indispensable
parties according to the court itself. And if anyone of the members of this class decides to intervene in the case,
the trial court does not have any discretion to deny the motion for intervention of a member of a class. Because
the language of the rules is very clear. A member of a class in a class suit has a right to intervene, which also is
now a modification to our concept of intervention. Intervention usually is a matter that is given to the discretion
of the trial court. Thats why, in a pending case if a stranger decides to intervene, he has to file a motion for
intervention; he has to get permission from the court. If the court decides not to allow the intervention, we
cannot accuse the court of abusing its discretion because the law gives to the trial court discretion in allowing an
intervention or not allowing an intervention. We leave anything to the discretion of the court. Thats why the
general principle in intervention is it is up to the court to allow or not to allow an intervention. But because of
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this last sentence in the definition of a class suit which gives to a member of a class a right to intervene.
Whenever a member of a class in a class suit files a motion for intervention, the court does not have a discretion
to deny the intervention. A court will be compelled to allow the intervention because the rule itself states that a
member of a class has a right to intervene. In other words, the court has no discretion in granting or denying the
motion for intervention by a member of a class in a class suit.
The other important topic in rule 3 is about the consequences of the death of a party ! either the plaintiff
or the defendant in a pending action. When a party dies, whether he is a plaintiff or defendant, the law requires
the lawyer of the deceased litigant to give information to the court about the death of his client. This
requirement stems from a provision also in civil code, the provision of the civil code on agency. The civil code
looks at the relationship between a lawyer and his client as a contract of agency. The client is the principal and
the lawyer is the agent. In the civil code, if either the principal or the agent dies, the contract of agency is
extinguished. So the relationship is cut off. Thats why the rule is very clear in saying that when a client or
litigant dies, it is the duty of the lawyer to inform the court about the death of his client. The lawyer will be
telling the court, I am no longer an agent of my principal because my principal has already died. There is no
more principal-agent relationship between the two. The lawyer withdraws his right to represent his client in
court once his client dies. If the lawyer informs the court about the death of his client either the plaintiff or the
defendant, it is now the duty of the court to order substitution if substitution will be proper. So if it is the
plaintiff who dies, the court will require the presence of the substitute plaintiff, if it is the defendant who dies
the court will require the presence of the substitute defendant. If the court is duly informed about the death of a
plaintiff or a defendant, but the court does not observe the process given in the rules concerning substitution,
and the court goes ahead with the trial of the case and then the court eventually decides the case, will the
proceedings taken by the court, will the judgment of the court be valid? The court said if the trial court does not
observe the procedure mentioned in rule 3, after having been notified of a death of a litigant, there is no
substitution made by the court, the proceedings taken by the court as well as the judgment rendered by the
court are void. So it is now the duty of the court to order substitution of parties. That is if the dismissal of
plaintiff if the death of the plaintiff or the defendant does not result to the dismissal of the case. There are certain
instances where the death of a plaintiff of defendant will automatically lead to the dismissal of the case. For
instance, in marriage related case, legal separation, annulment of marriage, an action to declare the marriage
void, if either the husband or the wife who are the contestants dies during the pendency of the case, the case will
be automatically dismissed. That is also provided in the family code as well as in the circular of the SC on family
related cases. But according to the circular on marriage related cases, if the death of the husband or the wife
takes place after the judgment has been entered, the death of the husband or the wife will not affect the
judgment. So it is the death of the husband or the wife in marriage related cases which will lead to the dismissal
of the case if the death takes place before entry of the judgment rendered by the court. So the focal point will be
the entry of judgment in marriage related cases. In cases where the death of the plaintiff or the defendant will
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not lead to the dismissal of the case, the trial court will have to follow the procedure for substitution of the
parties. Note that its either the plaintiff or the defendant who will die during the pendency of the case that
where we follow this procedural substitution of parties. If it is the plaintiff who dies and we assume that the
lawyer for the plaintiff has duly informed the court about the death of his client, the court will now require the
lawyer to submit to him a list of heirs of the plaintiff. And it is up to the court now to issue an order directing
these heirs of the plaintiff to appear before the court to act as substitute plaintiff. If the heirs refuse to act as
substitute plaintiff, can the court compel the heirs or anyone of them to act as substitute plaintiff? The answer is
NO. The court has no authority to compel an heir of a deceased litigant to act as a substitute party in the case. If
the heirs refuse to act as substitute parties, then the court will have to go to the next step given in rule 3. That is
to require the other party, the defendant in the case to seek the appointment of an administrator or executor of
the estate. In the appointment of an executor or administrator of estate of course can only be done in a
settlement court. We assume that in directing the defendant to seek the appointment of an executor or
administrator of the deceased plaintiff, the defendant will be filing a petition for probate of a will or intestacy as
the case may be. Because it is only in this proceeding where a court can appoint an administrator or executor of
the estate. Remember that in a settlement proceeding, the competent court could be an inferior court, it could
also be a RTC, depending upon the gross value of the estate. So if the first case is pending before a RTC, the
appointment of an executor or administrator could be secured from an inferior court acting as a settlement
court. It is not correct to assume now under the circumstances that simply because the case is pending before a
RTC, that the appointment of executor or administrator should also come from a coordinate court, another RTC.
It depends on the gross value of the estate for the ascertainment of the competent court in the appointment of an
executor or administrator of the estate. If an executor or administrator has already been appointed and he has
taken his oath of office, then the trial court, the RTC can now order the executor or administrator to act as a
substitute plaintiff or to act as a substitute defendant. This time, the executor or administrator does not have any
option to deny, to refuse to act as a substitute party. That is one of the duties of an executor or administrator, to
represent the estate of the deceased litigant in pending litigations. So one of the duties or executor or
administrator of an estate. And this case will be pursued until the judgment is finally entered. In other words, if
the death of the plaintiff or the defendant takes place while the case is undergoing trial and there is an appeal
from the decision of the trial court, the executor or administrator will be representing the estate even during the
period where there is an appeal to the court of appeals or to the SC. The matter can only be submitted to the
settlement court if there is already an entry of judgment. The settlement court will have to wait until this case is
finally decided and the decision in the case is finally entered. So what if the complaint is for the recovery of a
defaulted loan, and the amount sought to be recovered is 2M pesos and during the pendency of the case, the
defendant dies. Will the case be dismissed? The case will not be dismissed. Does not the civil law provide that
the death of a debtor will extinguish the obligation? Theres no such provision in the civil law. The death of a
debtor does not extinguish an obligation. There are only few factors which are taken in determining whether an
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obligation to pay money will be extinguished and the death of the debtor is not one of them. So if the debtor dies
during the pendency of the case, and the court is notified about the death of the defendant, the court will have to
observe the procedure given in rule 3 for substitution of party. So if there is proper substitution, the executor or
administrator of the deceased defendant will now be acting as a substitute defendant. The case will be pursued
until the decision is entered. So if the decision is in favor of the plaintiff and the decision is finally entered, the
decision in favor of the plaintiff has become final and executory and the decision directs the substitute
defendant, the executor or administrator, to pay 2M pesos, can the plaintiff-creditor, the judgment creditor, file a
motion for execution of that judgment? The answer is no. Rule 3 is very clear. If there is a judgment against the
estate represented by the executor or administrator, a judgment for money, which has been entered, that
judgment cannot be executed under rule 39. What the judgment creditor should do is to submit his claim
supported by a final and executory judgment before the settlement court and in that settlement court, although
the judgment is already final and executory, there is no assurance at all that the judgment-creditor will be able to
obtain satisfaction of judgment. It is axiomatic in settlement proceedings that when the property of a deceased
person is under the control of a settlement court, no court can issue a writ of execution against the estate of the
deceased person. We dont make use of rule 39 when it comes to a final and executory judgment for money
against the estate of a deceased person. We follow the procedure for the payment of claims outlined in special
proceedings - settlement of estate. We dont make use of rule 39; we dont allow the court to issue a writ of
execution against the estate of a deceased person although the estate of a deceased person is a party to the case.
The satisfaction of judgment will have to be submitted to the settlement court. So after the case is decided by the
trial court, and then the decision in favor of the plaintiff becomes final and executory, the trial court has done its
duty. The trial court will have no authority at all to issue as a matter of right the writ of execution in favor of a
judgment creditor if the defendant is a deceased defendant represented by his estate which is in turn
represented by executor or administrator.
Now we go to rule 4 on venue of action. Venue is one procedural principle which the SC allows to be
changed by the parties. Generally, our rules of procedure cannot be changed by an agreement between the
parties. There is only one court that can disregard the rules of court in the application to pending cases and that
is the SC. The CA, RTC cannot disregard the provisions of the rules of court although the CA or trial courts feel
that application of the rules may lead to injustice. That is a prerogative that is enjoyed only by the SC. The
reason why the SC can disregard the rules of court is because it is the SC that is the author of the rules of court.
The rules of court come from the SC. So if the court of appeals or the trial courts come to the conclusion that the
application of the rules of court may lead to an injustice but they cannot disregard the rules of court, what is the
duty of the court of appeals or the trial courts? The trial courts can incorporate in their decision that is written in
accordance with the rules, an advisory to the defeated party to appeal the matter to the SC. In that way, they
comply with the provision of the rules of court and they give an opportunity to the aggrieved party to bring the
matter out to the SC. But in so far as the SC is concerned, if the SC concludes that an application of a procedural
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principle is inequitable or it will lead to injustice, the SC can simply disregard the rules. We come across in our
studies of procedure that even the principle or res judicata can be set aside by the SC although res judicata is a
concept that on the state policy, it is envisioned as part of the rules of court. If the rules say that even if the rules
say that intervention for instance can be done only before judgment is rendered by the trial court and therefore
intervention can no longer be had on appeal, if the SC thinks that an intervention should be allowed even the
case is already on appeal, the SC will allow the intervention and the SC has done so several times. So the SC can
disregard the provision of the rules of court if the SC thinks that it will lead and work equitable solution of the
case. But with regard to venue, this is one procedural principle that can be a subject of stipulation between the
contracting parties. In fact, if there is a stipulation between contracting parties concerning venue, which is in
conflict with rule 4, it is the stipulation between the parties that will prevail. So that, if you are confronted with a
question on venue of actions, do not always look at the problem from the point of view of rule 4. You always
first determine whether there is a written agreement between the parties concerning venue and that written
agreement has the feature of exclusivity; That agreement must be reduced in writing; The feature of exclusivity
and it has been entered before the commencement of the action. Rule 4 on venue is the rule which recognizes the
classification of actions into real action and personal actions. So you will notice that in rule 4, there is a venue for
real actions, there is a venue for personal actions. But again, there is an express provision saying that the parties
can change this rules on venue depending on an agreement reduced into writing with the feature of exclusivity
before the case is filed. So in a real action usually, the venue in the absence of an agreement is the place where
the property is situated or any portion thereof is situated. So if the land subject of the controversy is located here
in Manila, the venue should be Manila. But there is nothing wrong if the parties to a contract let us say a contract
of sale involving this parcel of land will agree in that contract of sale that the venue of an action that will arise
out of the breach of contract of sale, the venue shall be Quezon City or Makati or even Cebu City. And that will
govern the rule on venue in so far as the parties are concerned. In personal actions, that is, the action does not
involve real rights or real property, the venue in the absence of stipulation is the residence of the plaintiff or the
residence of the defendant, the principal plaintiff of the principal defendant at the option of the plaintiff.
Supposing the action is called a mixed action, meaning some decisions of the SC, there is also a classification of
action into mixed that is aside from real and personal action, the court added the 3
rd
classification, a mixed
action. The action is both real and personal. What will be the venue of the action in the absence of stipulation?
The venue will follow the rule on real actions. So the feature of an action as a real action will prevail over its
feature as a personal action in so far as the matter concerning this is concerned. Supposing the action is in
personam or the action is in rem, or quasi in rem, do we have a rule on venue under rule 4 if the action is in rem
or quasi in rem or in personam? Well if you read rule 4, the only classifications that are relevant or material to
venue is the classification of real and personal. So that if the action is in rem or in personam or quasi in rem, how
do we determine the venue of the action in the absence of stipulation? Thats not a problem. If the action is in
rem or quasi in rem or in personam, all you have to do is to further analyze whether that in rem or quasi in rem
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or in personam action is real or personal. If an action is classified into in rem, quasi in rem or in personam, it
does not mean to say that that classification of in rem or in personam or quasi in rem prohibits further
classification of the same action into real or personal action. So we can have an in rem action that is a real action
at the same time; we can have an in personam action that is a real action at the same time. But for purposes of
venue, we simply follow its classification as a real action. In the same way that an action in personam could also
be real or personal. If the action in personam is a real action, then we follow its feature as a real action for
purposes of venue. For instance, action reinvindicatoria, that is, to recover title to or ownership or possession of
a piece of land is of course a real action. The venue therefore is the place the property or any portion thereof is
situated. But if the classification to action reinvindicatoria right away is in personam, you have to further
determine if that in personam actin is either real or personal for purposes of venue. Action reinvindicatoria is a
real action and at the same time in personam action. It is not correct to say that simply because title to or
possession of property is involved, that the action is a real action and at the same time it is an action in rem. A
real action could be in personam. We said that action reinvindicatoria, action publiciana, they are real actions
but they are also in personam at the same time. A good example of an in rem action which is personal will be
settlement of an estate of a deceased person when the only properties of the estate are personal properties. There
are no real rights; there are no real properties in the estate. That is in rem because a settlement proceeding is an
in rem action but at the same time is only a personal action. You have to be reminded always of the decision of
the SC in that old case of Sweetlands (?). Although parties are generally given the prerogative to stipulate on the
rules on venue as long as there is that the agreement is reduced into writing and there is a feature of exclusivity
and the agreement is entered into before the action is commenced. That in the case of Sweetlands(?), the courts
also have the power to determine the validity of an agreement concerning venue. According to the SC in that old
case of sweetlands(?), if the agreement concerning venue will cause undue burden of remedies to a plaintiff,
then the agreement can be set aside by the court. In that case of sweetlands(?), the injured parties, the plaintiffs
were heirs or representatives of a person who died as a result of an accident involving a vessel. In the passenger
ticket issued by the shipping company which transportation company usually adhere there is embodied a
stipulation saying that the venue of the action shall be the principal office, the place where the principal office of
the shipping company is located. That is a valid agreement. But when the victims of this accident tried to file
cases in their respective provinces or cities where they were residents, the courts before these complaints were
filed told them that you have to follow the rule on venue. You have to file your cases, your claims for damages
according to the contract at the place where the principal office of the shipping company is located. And the
place where the principal office of the shipping company I think was Cebu City and the victims were all
residents of Southern Luzon, of Northern Luzon, so it was practically impossible for the victims to file their
complaints in Cebu and attend trial in Cebu. So the court said, exercising its authority on liberal construction,
that agreement is void. It is not valid although it is part of the ticket issued by the shipping company adhered to
by the victims. The rule on venue in rule 4 is designed for the convenience of the plaintiff, to the injured party. It
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is not designed to serve the interest of a defended party. Thats why it is axiomatic when it comes to venue that
the rule on venue is primarily for the benefit of a plaintiff. Thats why in personal actions, the plaintiff is always
given the choice, the option whether to file the complaint in his place of residence or in the residence of the
defendant at the choice of the plaintiff. You will also notice that the rule on venue applies only to trial courts.
They dont apply to appellate courts so there is no rule on venue in so far as the SC is concerned because there is
only one SC unlike RTC or an inferior court where there are several regional districts throughout the country so
this is limited only to trial courts, RTC or inferior courts.

We said yesterday that prior barangay conciliation is a condition precedent to the accrual of the cause of
action. Even if the rightholder can show that his right is already violated by other party, he cannot simply
commence an action in court without first undergoing prior barangay conciliation. As long as the requisites are
applicable. There are two requisites under the LGC: first is that the parties must be natural persons and second,
they reside in the same city or municipality. As long as these requisites are present, prior barangay conciliation
is a must regardless of nature of action, i.e. real or personal. Or if it is a claim for money, regardless of the
amount involved.
If the party is a creditor and the amount sought is 1 Million pesos, prior barangay conciliation is necessary.
It is easy to conclude after reading the LGC and The Implementing Rules approved by the Supreme Court that
prior barangay conciliation is a first layer set up by law to prevent parties from bringing the action to any court.
The reason is that the courts are loaded with cases. IF there is a chance to settle amicably, then they must do so.
After all in the Civil Code, amicable settlement is part of public policy.
The barangay court is not really a court. It is part of executive department. In adjudicating disputes it may
be considered as quasi-judicial body. Barangay courts are not allowed to adjudicate cases. Their only role is to
conciliate, mediate and encourage parties to amicably settle and submit compromise agreement if the parties
agreed freely. Procedurally, a barangay court follows more or less the procedure we follow in regular cases. The
barangay court sends notice to respondent if a complaint is filed against him. But the complaint does not have to
be in writing but barangay courts usually require a written complaint and a written answer. The barangay court
also requires payment of fees, but the fees are minimal. In Metro Manila, the highest fee imposed is not more
than 50 pesos. A barangay court has the authority to collect docket fee when a complaint is filed.
If the complainant fails to appear when the barangay court calls for conferences, the barangay court may
order a dismissal and that dismissal is one with prejudice. Thus, the complainant may lose the right to recover
his claim against respondent.
There is also a rule in venue, but different in the rules set out in Rule 4. The venue before the barangay court
is the residence of the respondent if the complainant and respondent reside in different barangays of same cities
or municipalities. It does not matter what kind of action is as long as the contestants are natural persons who
reside in same city or municipality. This applies to all civil actions. It is applicable also in special civil actions like
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in an action for unlawful detainer, forcible entry and interpleader. But we do not apply barangay conciliation in
an action for declaratory relief because there is really a dispute in such case, also in Rule 65 even if parties reside
in same cities or municipalities. The reason is that in the enumeration of excepted cases, it includes public
officers in the performance of their duties. In certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, you expect the respondent
is always a judge performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. We also do not apply it in expropriation or quo
warranto.
The duty of the barangay court is just to convince the parties to settle amicably. If they do not, the barangay
court must issue a certification stating that no compromise occurred in matter or case under conciliation. And
this enables parties to file a case in court. But if the parties agreed to sign a compromise agreement, then the
agreement later on could be considered as a final and executor judgement, that is, if there is repudiation made
by anyone of the parties. They may avail the execution of the same. The grounds for repudiation are the same
grounds given in the Civil Code and treated as vices of consent (fraud, intimidation etc). If there is repudiation,
the barangay court will issue a certification that the plaintiff is free to file a complaint in court.
In converting a barangay court in an arbitral tribunal, the parties must sign in writing constituting the
barangay court as such. That agreement may also be repudiated within 5 days from submission. If not
repudiated, the barangay court will act as quasi-judicial body. It can receive evidence, and render a decision as
arbitral body. That decision may also be contested, not by repudiating but a petition to annul before an inferior
court. The annulment here is different from that of Rule 47. The annulment in barangay conciliation is founded
on vices of consent. It is enough that there is fraud, intimidation or violence shown by the aggrieved party.
If there is a compromise agreement submitted, the barangay court need not ask inferior court to confirm
compromise agreement. If there is no repudiation, the compromise agreement becomes final and executory and
may become a subject of execution by the barangay court.. So, the barangay court after it received compromise
agreement, may wait for lapse of 10 days and if there is no repudiation, the barangay court may consider the
compromise agreement as the law between the parties. If the terms of the compromise agreement are not
complied with by one of the parties, the barangay court may execute the judgement and the period thereof is a
very short period of 6 months compared to that of Rule 39, which is 5 years from entry of judgement. And after
5 years there is another period of 5 years for the revival of judgement. Insofar as compromise agreement in
barangay courts, we do not follow the same.
In the matter of execution in barangay court, while the barangay court may make a levy on execution, the
same is limited to personal property. The barangay court is authorized to do so, it means to say that the
barangay court may sell these in a public auction to satisfy the claim. If there is no satisfaction of the terms of
compromise agreement after selling the properties, the remedy of creditor is to file a petition before inferior
court for the enforcement of judgement.
In one case decided by the SC, the SC decided a dispute concerning enforcement of compromise agreement.
(Miguel v Montanez), it gives a manner in which execution may be done. Under LGC and Implementing Rules,
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it is specified that a barangay court can enforce the compromise agreement that becomes final and executory
through levy of personal properties and sell them in public auction. In the case, the claim of the creditor is for
example 500,000 and the creditor and debtor reside in same city or municipalities. There Is a compromise
agreement submitted. And the claim of 500,00 was reduced to 200,000. substantially and the creditor admitted
that the claim may be paid in installments. The debtor did not comply but the creditor did not repudiate the
agreement. So, what the creditor did is not to ask for execution by barangay court but filed a complaint for
recovery of the original amount. The trial court said that the only recourse is to enforce the compromise
agreement and cannot file an action for recovery. The Supreme Court said that when compromise agreement
becomes final and executory and the debtor fails to comply with the terms of the agreement, the Court said that
such failure is a repudiation of the agreement. The SC cited Article 2041 of the Civil Code and in this article, it
is provided that when a party to compromise agreement does not comply with his obligation, the agreement is
deemed rescinded. It is rescission by operation of law. Thus the creditor is entitled to recover the claim before
the courts of justice.
As long as the terms are complied with, there is no problem. But if the terms are not followed, the failure of
debtor to follow means repudiation and automatic rescission of the compromise agreement.
In our study of rescission, there must always be a complaint filed. But in the article cited by SC, there is
rescission by operation of law and thus judicial decision is not necessary. The creditor then will be reverted to
his original position insofar as the original amount is concerned even if he agreed to the reduction of the amount
of credit in the compromise agreement. The repudiation then may be manifested by mere refusal or failure to
comply with the terms of the agreement. Im not sure if this decision is applicable to compromise agreements
submitted before regular courts of justice. In regular courts if the parties submitted a compromise agreement,
such agreement becomes the basis of the judgement of the court (judgement on compromise) and it is
immediately executory. If the parties violate the terms of the agreement, the remedy is to move for execution. In
this case when the parties submitted the compromise agreement before the court, that becomes the law between
the parties and it cannot be set aside becased on failure to comply with his obligations.

SUMMARY PROCEDURE
Summary Procedure refers to Summary Procedure followed by inferior courts in Unlawful Detainer,
Forcible Entry and claims for money not exceeding 200,000.
Small Claims involve claims for money that do not go beyond 100,000.

There are also cases that follow Summary Procedure even though cognizable by RTC. And these cases are
those that are mentioned in the Family Code.
The only pleadings allowed in Summary Procedure are complaint, answer, compulsory counterclaim and
crossclaim. So permissive counterclaim is not allowed. A defendant that has permissive counterclaim must file
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his own complaint for the enforcement of his claim. There are also motions which are prohibited like Motion to
Dismiss under Rule 16 unless the ground is absence of jurisdiction over subject matter or absence of prior
barangay conciliation. Since the motion to dismiss is prohibited, does it mean to say that the case may not be
dismissed on any of the grounds mentioned in Rule 16? That is not so. What is prohibited is a Motion to Dismiss
filed by a defendant, but Summary Procedure allows dismissal based on Rule 16 as long as the order of
dismissal comes from court itself, without motion filed by defendant. The court is given authority to dismiss
without correlative motion filed by the defendant by examining contents of the complaint. If the court finds that
a ground under Rule 16 is present, it may dismiss the case on its own. Thus Rule 16 is still applicable but it is the
court that must order dismissal of the case.
Ordinarily, a court in which a complaint is filed cannot simply dismiss the complaint without a motion filed
by the defendant, even if the court thinks that there is a ground for dismissal except the non-waivable defenses.
The defendant is allowed to file responsive pleading. And the period to answer is non extendible.
Supposing the defendant ignores the period, and files a motion for extension of 5 days. The court will consider
the motion as not having been filed and the defendant cannot expect the court to issue an order denying the
motion for extension because that is a prohibited pleading. If there is such a motion filed and the defendant does
not file an answer within the non extendible period of 10 days, the plaintiff may ask the court to render
judgement based on the complaint and the evidence attached in the complaint. So it is a very risky move to file a
motion that is prohibited since it will not be acted upon. The court has the discretion not to act on it.
If the defendant is prohibited from filing motion to dismiss except on grounds mentioned earlier, and the
defendant after evaluating the complaint is convinced that the case should be dismissed under Rule 16, he may
still use the grounds under Rule 16 as an affirmative defense in an answer. He may then raise these issues and
the court studies the case after submission of position papers.
If the defendant does not answer and the court will render judgement based on complaint and evidence
attached, it means that the court will not issue an order that the defendant is in default since a motion to declare
the defendant in default is a prohibited motion. An order of default is also prohibited. What follows now is
judgement rendered by the court in favor of the plaintiff based solely on the complaint and attachments.
If you compare this to regular procedure, if the defendant does not answer, the court cannot simply
declare the non-answering defendant in default. If there is no answer and the plaintiff does not file a motion to
declare the party in default, the court cannot issue an order of default on its own. It must be initiated by plaintiff
by motion. In ordinary procedure, if defendant is ordered in default, he is prohibited from participating in the
trial of the case.
The reason why Summary Procedure does not allow the court to issue an order of default is to prevent the
defendant from making use the remedy to file a motion to lift the order of default, thus delaying the
proceedings.
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In Summary Procedure, some of prohibited motions are motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
and petition from relief from judgement. If there is judgement rendered and the defendant is prohibited from
filing those motions, the only remedy of the defendant is to appeal from the judgement. But there is another
remedy given, that is, by annulment of judgement under Rule 47 since it is not prohibited. But again, before he
can make use of Rule 47, the Rules are very strict insofar as annulment of judgement are concerned.
In Summary Procedure, we have preliminary conference similar to pretrial conference. There is no actual
trial. What the court would require the parties to do if there are triable issues is to submit testimony of witness
in a form of affidavit and position papers. These are the papers to be evaluated by the court in deciding.
A trial is not absolutely prohibited since Summary Procedure includes certain criminal cases. If the case is a
criminal case, the court cannot do away with a trial. The court cannot deprive the defendant of the right to cross
examine the witnesses. What happens then is that the prosecutor will submit affidavit of prosecution witnesses
but they may be subject to cross examination. If they dont go to court for that purpose, the court may strike out
the affidavits insofar as such witness is concerned.
The reason why trial is allowed in a criminal case is that the SC cannot violate the constitutional right given
to the accused to confront the witnesses against him and to cross examine the witnesses in a criminal case. That
right is not given to a defendant in a civil case.

SMALL CLAIMS
In Small Claims, lawyers are prohibited from appearing. The parties may still protect their interest because
they are not required to make their own pleadings. There are forms prepared by the courts to be filled out by the
parties. It is a matter of asking from the clerk of court of these forms and the parties will just fill up the blanks
and then submit it to the court. But payment of docket fees is also necessary.
Joinder of causes of action is allowed as long as the causes of action joined will not go beyond 100,000,
exclusive of interest, damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, costs.
We also have similar section in prohibited pleadings as in Summary Procedure.
What is emphasized in Small Claims is the Judicial Dispute Resolution(JDR). The inferior court will
encourage the parties to enter into compromise agreement.
One of the differences between Small Claims and Summary Procedure is that there are no criminal cases
involved in Small Claims. Another important difference is that in Small Claims, the judgement of the court is
immediately final and executory. There is no appeal available. It also prohibits Motion for New Trial, Motion for
Reconsideration and Petition for Relief from Judgement. All the remedies available to aggrieved party to
challenge judgement is not available. The Circular says the judgement is immediately final and executory. The
only available relief then is Rule 65. While in Summary Procedure, appeal is available. If appeal is available,
Rule 65 is not available. Availability of appeal forecloses availability of Rule 65. Availability of Rule 65 is not
really a benefit because petition filed under Rule 65 does not stop the court from rendering a decision unlike in
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appeal. In appeal, execution of judgement is not allowed except in Unlawful Detainer and Forcible Entry
because there is a provision that says that in these cases, the judgement rendered in favor the plaintiff is
immediately executory without prejudice to the filing of appeal. In unlawful detainer, the execution of
judgement can easily be corrected by posting a supersedeas bond if necessary. These remedies are not available
to defendant in Small Claims but he can avail of Rule 65. But when he avails Rule 65 it does not meant to say
that the inferior can no longer execute judgement. The only way by which Rule 65 can stop immediate execution
of judgement is if the court taking cognizance of Rule 65 will issue TRO or writ of preliminary injunction which
may not be complied with by defendant because in preliminary injunction or TRO since the applicant here must
post a bond. So it is difficult for the defendant to prevent the execution of judgement in Small Claims.
RULE 6 and RULE 10
In ordinary procedure, pleadings are always in writing even if the court is an inferior court. The rules
now allow a party to make use of 9 pleadings. If you compare it with motions, there is no limit with respect to
number of motions that may be filed. The Rules classify pleadings into claim pleadings and responsive
pleadings. There are only two responsive pleadings: reply and answer. But it does not mean to say that the
defendant cannot make use of claim pleadings like a counterclaim, crossclaim or third party complaint. Even if
there is a classification of these pleadings, there is no prohibition on the part of the defendant to make use of
these pleadings. If defendant files answer and he thinks he has claims against plaintiff, he may file answer with
counterclaim. He may also file a crossclaim against co-defendant.
In Rule 7, the classification of pleadings into initiatory and non-initiatory pleadings is necessary for the
purposes of determining whether or not the party must accompany his pleading with certification of non-forum
shopping. In initiatory pleadings, it is necessary that there is such certification. Without which, the complaint
may be dismissed, with prejudice or without prejudice. Also, the classification is necessary to enable the court
and the parties to know whether there is a need to pay for docket fees since in initiatory pleadings, payment of
docket fees is necessary. If an initiatory pleading is filed without payment of docket fees, the court does not
acquire jurisdiction over these pleadings.
With respect to a compulsory counterclaim, it is not considered by the court as an initiatory pleading for
the purposes of payment of docket fees. If defendant files answer with permissive counterclaim, and he does not
pay, and the court has neglected to collect the payment and has tried the case, and in such decision the relief
prayed for in the permissive counterclaim is granted by the court, the decision in that counterclaim is void for
lack of jurisdiction over that counterclaim. As such it can be subject of collateral attack.
With respect to a complaint, what the Rules require to be alleged are only ultimate facts. This rule is not
followed in certain cases, like when the case is governed by Summary Procedure since in such procedure, it is
necessary that the complaint is accompanied by evidence that the plaintiff decides to submit to the court. Also
the circular on Kalikasan, the complaint must be accompanied by evidentiary facts(testimony, documentary).
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Thus when defendant files his answer, he must support it also with evidence that he intends to present to the
court Note that Rule 6 does not prohibit the plaintiff or defendant from alleging evidentiary facts.
Ultimate facts are facts which constitute cause of action. An allegation that plaintiff has a right. An
allegation that the right is violated by defendant. An allegation that there is compliance of conditions precedent.
For instance, an allegation that plaintiff has undergone prior barangay conciliation is an ultimate fact if the case
is governed by prior barangay conciliation.
Insofar as the answer is concerned, it is a pleading that responds to a complaint. The answer must
contain a negative defense, affirmative defense of both. The problems that usually arise in an answer is with
respect to a negative defense. A negative defense is an important part of pleading, and when we talk about
negative defense, it involves specific denial. The standard to be followed in ascertaining whether denial is a
specific denial or not a specific denial is found in sec 10 of Rule 8.
There are three modes by which specific denial may be had. The first mode is the denial of allegations
with accompanying grounds relied upon to support his denial. Second is part denial and part admission. Third
is just a statement that he has no knowledge concerning truth of allegations in the complaint. If you analyze
Rule 8 on specific denial, the law does not require the defendant to file an order of reference. It is a choice on the
part of the defendant as to what mode he opts to choose. So that theoretically, the defendant may make use of
the third mode right away. Theoretically, the defendant may file answer that he has no knowledge and
information of the truth of allegations in paragraph 1, 2, 3 etc, I specifically deny paragraphs 1, 2, 3 etc. But the
SC discourages the defendant in using the third mode since it imposes some sanctions if defendant insists in
using third mode as the only mode in his answer. If you note the allegations in paragraph 1, it usually contains
the legal capacity of plaintiff and defendant. If defendant make use of the third mode, it is unreasonable that he
alleges that he does not know his citizenship, etc. there are certain allegations in complaint that is known by
defendant like his name and residence. If he denies it, he must make use of other modes of denial. To avoid the
possibility that defendant may abuse the use of third mode, the SC says that if the defendant says that he has no
knowledge as to certain allegations in the complaint and therefore specifically denies them, the defendant has to
explain why he has no knowledge with respect to such allegations. If he fails to do so, it will not be considered
as specific denial. It will be considered as general denial. And if it is a general denial, it will be treated as judicial
admission as to the truth of the allegations contained in the complaint. The effect of judicial admission is that it
is considered as conclusive. It cannot be rebutted. If there is judicial admission, there is no hope to rebut the
same. The court then may immediately enter judgement on the pleadings upon motion of the plaintiff.
Another form of specific denial frowned upon by jurisprudence is this kind: I specifically deny
paragraph 1 of the complaint because I have no business with plaintiff. I deny specifically paragraph 2 because
there is no contact between plaintiff and defendant that is not specific denial. That is general denial and thus
considered as general denial.
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A negative pregnant is a denial in form since it uses the words specific denial but when you look at the
denial, there is no ground to support the denial. That is in violation of the first mode. Thus it may be treated as
judicial admission. If defendant files an answer with a general denial, and he uses the words I specifically
deny but he does not inform the court of the grounds relied upon to support his denial. It is a specific denial in
form and insofar as the court is concerned that is a general denial. Does the defendant have any remedy at all to
convert the general denial into a specific denial? Yes. It is provided in Rule 10. If the pleader feels that he
commits an error, he may amend the pleading as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is filed.
In some special proceedings we dont apply this rule on specific denial since we allow general denial
like in Habeas Corpus. But the Circular on Amparo, Habeas Data expressly prohibits general denial. It must
always be specific denial. A counterclaim is a pleading filed by defendant against the plaintiff. There are two
kinds: permissive and compulsory. The Rules made a distinction between a compulsory counterclaim filed
before RTC and that filed before an inferior court. The requisites are the same. But we are concerned with the
other qualification. A counterclaim may be a compulsory counterclaim if filed with RTC but not a compulsory
counterclaim anymore if filed with inferior courts simply because there is an amount alleged in that
counterclaim. The usual example of compulsory counterclaim usually alleged in the answer is that the filing of
the complaint is unjust and without basis and therefore the defendant has been compelled to avail the services
of a lawyer and forced to pay attorneys fees and because of the unjust filing of the complaint, he suffered
damages in the amount of example, 200,000. If that is the tenor of a compulsory counterclaim filed by the
defendant in RTC, it is still treated as compulsory counterclaim by RTC even if the amount is only 200,000 which
is below the jurisdictional amount. If there is a complaint for the recovery of 1 Million and the defendant alleges
compulsory counterclaim where the amount is 200,000, that will still be entertained by RTC. We cannot
challenge the jurisdiction of RTC simply because the amount is below 400,000. But if the complaint is filed before
an inferior court and the amount sought is only 300,000 but the defendant sets up what he calls a compulsory
counterclaim in the amount of 600,000. Under the Rules, that counterclaim, although it arises or connected with
the subject of the complaint, is treated as permissive counterclaim. Thus the inferior court may order the
dismissal of the counterclaim for being outside of its jurisdiction. If the amount is beyond the authority of
inferior court, the compulsory counterclaim will be treated as permissive counterclaim. But if the court is RTC
and the amount of the compulsory counterclaim is below its jurisdictional amount, it may still hear the case with
respect to counterclaim.





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A reply is the disgusto of all the pleadings. It is practically useless, if you read the definition of a reply,
particularly the second part of the definition. It provides that even if the reply is not filed by the plaintiff the
new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted. They are not deemed admitted. Usually, what
happens in a complaint, for instance, is that if the allegations in a complaint are not specifically denied or there
is nothing mentioned at all in the answer about the truth or falsity of such allegation, then the allegation in the
complaint is admitted. That is a judicial admission. We dont follow that principle when it comes to a new
matter that is alleged in an answer filed by the defendant. For instance, the creditor files a complaint against a
debtor for the recovery of an unpaid loan. We assume that the allegations in the complaint are adequate, that the
creditor has a right to enforce collection against defendant. If the defendant does not specifically deny or does
not set up properly affirmative defenses in his answer, the defendant is sanctioned by law. The failure of the
defendant to make specific denial or properly set up an affirmative defense will lead the court to conclude that
the defendant has admitted all the allegationsin the complaint and therefore the defendant will have no chance
of winning the case, if his answer is not amended, should there be a judgment on the pleading. But if the
defendant files an answer properly crafted and he introduces a new matter in that answer - the new matter
introduced is the assertion that the defendant has paid the debt. Is that a good defense? that is good a defense. In
fact it is even a ground for a motion to dismiss, that the debt has been paid with abandoned or otherwise
extinguished. So instead of filing a motion to dismiss the defendant chooses to incorporate that in an answer as
an affirmative defense,which is also allowed by law. So the new matter introduced is the fact of payment. The
plaintiff does not file a reply. Is the plaintiff deemed to have admitted that the obligation has been paid? The
answer is no. This time we follow the definition of a reply. The new matter alleged in the answer is deemed
controverted even without a reply. So the plaintiff does not have to submit his own pleading in response to that
new matter alleged in the answer. It is the law itself which tells the court that the new matter in the allegation is
deemed controverted. It will be deemed subject of a trial conducted by the court. If we are going to follow rule
16in our example, the defendant now can ask for a preliminary hearing in order to show that there has been the
payment of the debt. But for purposes of reply, there is no need for the plaintiff to controvertthe new matter. So
whenever you go to the definition of a reply you must take into acounterclaimount the second sentence.That is
the most important part in the definition of a reply. If there is no reply the new matter is deemed controverted. It
is deemed denied by operation of law. Because of this definition of a reply, we always consider as the least
useful among the pleadings.
Are there instances where a party should file a reply not because it is mandated by the rule but in order to
protect his interest in the pending case? in the past there were two exceptions expressly recognized by the old
rules,where the filing of areply was mandatory because otherwise the plaintiff does not file areply he would
suffer serious and adverse consequences. The first was when there was an allegation in answer of the defendant
about usury. The second was where the answer of the defendant is founded on an actionable document. In these
two instances in the past, the plaintiff was expected to file a reply For the reason that if he fails to file a reply
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made a specific denial under oath the allegation of usury and the genuineness of the execution of the actionable
document are deemed admitted. And that is not good for the plaintiff.
Under the present rules, there is only one exception. The first exception -if an allegation of usury in an answer
necessitates the following of areply - is no longer applicable because the 1997 rules have introduced a new rule
concerning allegations of usury which need specific denial under oath. Under our present rules, an allegation of
usury contained in acomplaint or similar pleading is deemed admitted if not specifically denied under oath. So
when an allegation of usury for the purpose of recovering the usurious interest is contained in an answer, we
dont follow this requirement that there must be a specific denial under oath. The law is very clear on this. The
allegation of usury must be embodied in a complaint. the liberal interpretation of the rules will lead to the
conclusion that as long as the allegation of usury is contained in a complaint or a claim pleading like
counterclaim or cross claim there is need for a specific denial under oath. But the responsive pleading is not
areply. The responsive pleading to that complaint or counterclaim or cross claim will be an answer. A reply is a
responsive pleading only to an answer. So if the allegation of usury is contained in acomplaint the denial under
oath should be contained in an answer. If the allegation of usury is contained in a counterclaim the responsive
pleading of a counterclaim is also an answer. If it is contained in a cross claim, the responsive pleading to a cross
claim would still be an answer. If the allegation of usury is contained in the answer then the law will apply the
rule which requires specific denial under oath. Theres no such provision now in the rules.
It is the second exception that is still applicable up to the present. When the answer is founded on an actionable
document,the law says that whenever an actionable offense is founded on an actionable document the adverse
party should, if he wants to make a denial of the actionable document, do so specifically and under oath. For
instance, if the defendants defense again is payment and he alleges in his answer that the fact of payment is
supported by receipt issued by the plaintiff himself acknowledging full liquidation of the indebtedness, under
law if a claim or demand is founded on an actionable document, it is imperative upon the pleader to allege in
the compliant the actionable document. How does the pleading of a defendant allege an actionable document?
there are two ways of doing that. in the pleading whether in acomplaint or an answer the substanceof the
actionable document should be stated and then a copy of the actionable document should be appended or
attached to the pleading, to the complaint or the answer. Or if he does not want to place a summary of the
contents of the actionable document, the pleader can simply copy word for word the actionable document. On
the part of the adverse party, whether it is plaintiff or defendant who is confronted with an actionable
document, the law requires this party to make a specific denial under oath. So if it is the defendant who sets up
as his defense an actionable document, it is the duty of the plaintiff to make a specific denial under oath.
Otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the actionable document will be deemed admitted. And again
that is judicial admission.
If it is the plaintiff who should make a specific denial under oath, so that he is not deemed to have admitted the
genuineness and due execution of that receipt, can he not simply file an affidavit? After all he is under oath. The
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only way by which the plaintiff can make a specific denial under oath of an actionable document incorporatedin
an answer is by way of reply because reply is the only pleading available. The only pleading that responds to an
answer is a reply. And if the plaintiff makes a reply and he sets up in that reply a specific denial, he should also
see to it that that specific denial is under oath. If there is only specific denial without having been verified that is
not enough. There is genuineness and due execution of the it will be deemed admitted. We will take note of the
exceptions given in the rules with respect to the nonapplicability of this principle on judicial admission on
genuineness and due execution if there is no specific denial under oath, if the actionable document is contained
in the answer. There are two exceptions in the rule. First, when the adverse party is not a party to that particular
document or even if he is party to that document, an order for an inspection of the original issued bythe court is
not obeyed by the defendant. In these two instances, we dont apply the rule on judicial admission of
genuineness and due execution of the actionable document contained in the answer. The rule requiring the
mode by which an actionable document must be alleged in apleading either to a complaint or an answer is
described by the supreme court as ?? . meaning that is mandatory. If the pleader does not follow any of the
modes in the rules for pleading an actionable document. The sc said the plaintiff will not be allowed to present
proof of his cause of action. if it is the defendant who fails to do so, He will not be allowed to present proof of his
defense. So the attachment of the actionable document or copying the contents of that act doc in the pleading
itself is amust. It will adversely affect the pleader if he does not follow either the modes of pleading an act doc.
Now we go to the third part of the complaint fourth party complaint or fifth party complaint. We follow literally
what the rule say it is third party complaint fourth party complaint etc. meaning to say there is no end To the
number of complaint that can be impleaded, third party complaint fourth party sixth party complaint. As long
as the allegations in these complaint has something to do with the claim of the plaintiff in the complaint . you
will notice that among all these claim pleadings, it is only a third party complaint where their filing requires
prior leave of court. We cannot simply file a third aprty complaint without leave of court. There is a need for
leave of court. And the 3
rd
party complaint must allege that the 3
rd
party defendant is liable to the 3
rd
party
plaintiff. The 3
rd
party plaintiff is always a defendant. The defendant-3
rd
party pal is entitled to recover from the
3
rd
party defendant by reason of contribution,subrogation or any other relief in relation to subject matter of the
claim in the complaint. so the 3
rd
party complaint is always connected with the subject matter of the complaint.
If the complaint,for instance,is for the recovery of an unpaid loan,the 3
rd
party complaint cannot pertain to a
recovery of the ownership of a piece of land. If the subject of a3rd party complaint should always be related to
the subject matter of that complaint. Why do we need permission from the court before the defendant can file a
3
rd
party complaint? Because the 3
rd
party complaint will forcibly bring into the action a stranger to the case. The
3
rd
party defendant is not at present a litigant to the case. It is a stranger to the case. That is why the rules require
that the court should be given discretion whether to allow or not to allow the 3
rd
party complaint because there
may be no need at all in bringing a stranger to the case or even if there be aneed the claim against the stranger is
unrelated or unconnected to the subject matter of the complaint. If the court denies the motion for the admission
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of the 3
rd
party complaint the remedy of the defendant- 3
rd
party plaintiff is just to file a separate complaint
against the 3
rd
party defendant. It is in a 3
rd
party complaint were we can best illustrate the meaning of ancillary
jurisdiction of trial courts. Let us say the subject of the complaint is still the recovery of loan, 1m. So the
competent court is the rtc. 1m figure is principal obligation. The defendant asks the court permission to file an
answer with a 3
rd
party complaint. In the 3
rd
party complaint, the defendant asserts that a stranger, juan dela
cruz, is bound to pay him in relation to the 1m loan the sum of 250T by reason of contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief. With respect to the complaint, there is no jurisdictional issue because the
competent court is really the rtc . It is with respect to the 3
rd
party complaint were a jurisdictional issue could be
raised. The 3
rd
party complaint is effectively a complaint filed by the defendant against a stranger in a case. And
the amount that he seeks to recover is only 250k this amount is not w/in the jurisdiction of a rtc. Can the court
upon motion of the 3
rd
aprty defendant order the dismissal of the 3
rd
party complainton the ground of lack of
jurisdiction? Remember the figure is only 250k. the answer is no. we apply the rule on ancillary jurisdiction of a
rtc. If a trial court has jurisdiction over the principal case which is the complaint filed by the plaintiff against the
defendant the same court will also exercise ancillary jurisdiction over all collateral pleadings, incidental
pleading that are related to the complaint. So the 3
rd
party complaint to recover 250k should still be cognizable
by the rtc. Is it correct to say that a 3
rd
party complaint, 4
th
party complaint are the only pleadings which will
enable a litigant before the court to bring in by compulsion a stranger in a case? Can a litigant also bring in
stranger to the case w/o a pleading or 3
rd
party complaint. The answer is no. that law does notsay that the 3
rd

party complaint is the only means available to bring a stranger to a case. What the law tells us only in the filing
3
rd
pc is that it is the complaint filed by the defendant- 3
rd
party plaintiff against a stranger with court because
the stranger is liable to the defendant for contribution, indemnity subrogation or other relief. the rule does not
say that the 3
rd
party complaint is the only means by w/c a stranger can be compelled to be a [party to the case.
canthe defendant compel a stranger to be a party to the case by filing a counterclaim? Can the defendant make
use of a cross claim in order to bring in forcibly a stranger to the case. The answer to thesequestions is yes. The
law authorizes the defendant to bring in a stranger not by way of a 3
rd
party complaint but by way of
counterclaim either permissiveor compulsory counterclaim.The law also authorizes the defendantto bring in a
stranger to an existing case thru the filing of a cross claim. Although the law defines a cross claim as a claim by a
defendant against his co-defendant, the law does not say that in filing a cross claim against a co defendant that a
3
rd
person cannot be impleaded by a cross claim. in the definition of a compulsory counterclaim, if you go again
to the definition of a compulsory counterclaim the defendant could set up a COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM
against the plaintiff and the party who is not a party to the case,as long as the court can acquire jurisdiction over
the person of this stranger. That is so allowed in the definition of a compulsory counterclaim. One thing allowed
a defendant in bringing a stranger to the case by not using a 3rd party complaint but by using cross claim or
counterclaim, preferably a compulsory counterclaim. Because there is another provision in the rules will say that
if there is a compulsory counterclaim orcross claimthat is not set up in an answer that compulsory counterclaim
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or cross claim are barred. So if the defendant decides to set up a cross claimagainst a co defendant, lets say,a case
filed by AvsB and C. the defendants are B and C. if defendant b has a claim related to the subject matter of the
complaintagainst C, B should file an answer w/ a cross claim. but it could happen that in that cross claimagainst
C thereis a necessity to bring x or y or z. so the problem of b when he files a cross claim can I file a cross
claimagainst my co-defendant c plus x/y/z. he has to resolve this question right away because if he fails to set
up a cross claim in this case he is barred from recovering a cross claim. That is a principle in the rules if
compulsory counterclaim and across claim are not set up they are barred. So the best to set up this cross claim
otherwise his cross claim will be barred. If there is a need to implead a stranger it will be allowed to implead a
stranger although it is not using a 3rd party complaint. If you will read sec 11 of rule 6 it provides that a cross
claim or counterclaim it will be the basis of the court to bring in a stranger to the case for the complete
determination of the issues.
Well discuss some aspects of the forms of a pleading Rule 7. If we just literally follow rule 7, we can arrive at
this same principle. A pleading must always be signedbecause a pleading that is not signed according torule 7
will be treated as a sham pleading. It has no legal effect at all. It is deemed not rendered filed. So a pleading
must always be signed. If a pleading is unsigned it is asham pleading and the courtmotu proprio can order the
striking out of the pleading.Who can sign the pleading? the litigant can sign the plead or if he has a counsel, the
counsel can sign the pleading, if anyone or the respective counsels or both of them the counsel and the client can
sign the pleading. are there pleadings which will not be admitted by the court if the only signature is that of the
lawyer? Is the rules expect the plead to be signed by the party himself, not only by the counsel? by way of
exception the answer is yes. In Marriage related cases annulment of marriage or to declare the marriage void,
the Sc circular says that the complaint and answer must be signed by the client, by the party himself. if signed
alone by the lawyer the court will not accept this pleading for filing. But generally the signature of the counsel
will be enough In order to have this pleading accepted by the court. Again if we literally follow rule 7, if the law
requires a pleading to be verified but the pleading is not verified or there is insufficient verification, rule 7 says
that the absence or inadequacy of a verification meansthat that pleading is effectively an unsigned pleading and
therefore it produces no legal effect. With respect to verification, the general rule again is the law requires
pleadings to be verified. It is only in instances that the law requires verification that the lawyer should have his
pleading verified. And the rule 7 is also very emphatic in telling the lawyer how to verify. The pleading is
verified by the verified statement of the affiant that he has read the contents of the pleading, that these
allegations are true of his own personal knowledgeor it is an authentic document. if the verification is not
according to the tone given in the rules that will be an inadequate or insufficient verification. And under rule 7
the absence or inadequacy of verification carries with it the effect of an unsigned pleading. But the SC keeps on
ignoring the provisions of rule 7 with respect to verification.although it would appear in rule 7 that absence of
verification or inadequacy of verification would be a fatal defect of apleading. The sc keeps on ruling that
absence or inadequacy of verification is only a formal defect. So if you come across a question concerning the
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need to verify a pleading or to determine whether a verification given in the question is adequate or inadequate
and then you are asked what is the effect. Then just adopt the rulings of the sc that theabsence of verification in
instances required by law that the submission of a pleading with inadequate verification is only a formal defect.
In fact it has always been a formal defect. It is only in the 1997 rules that the sc inserted these provisions that lack
of verification or inadequacy of verification is equivalent to the submission of an unsigned pleading. but the sc
did not change the doctrines and it follows without saying that lack of verification in instances required is only a
formal defect. You might be asked whether verification of a pleading is now the general rule given that in rule 7
all initiatory pleadings must carry with them a certification of non forum shopping. a complaint being an
initiatory pleading will always carry with it a certification on non forum shopping.Permissivecounterclaim is
also initiatory so we need to append to permissivecounterclaim certification on non forum shopping. Same
withcross claim, a 3rd party complaint, a 4 party complaintbecause these are all initiatory pleadings.If the rule
requires a complaint or other initiatory pleadings to carry with them a certification on non forum shopping,
does it not mean to say that these pleadings must also be verified under rule 7? The answer is no. the
certification on non forum shopping is different from verification of a pleading. When you speak about
verification of a pleading, we refer to the allegations contained in the pleading. Thats why in a verification the
verifier tells the court that he has read the pleading and that the allegations are true and correct of his own
personal knowledge. The contents of the certification on non forum shopping will not have anything to do with
the contents in the allegations in the initiatory pleading. the certification on non forum shopping simply certifies
under oath that no same action has been filed Before another tribunal, agency or court. That if later on the one
who signs the certification comes across such similar or identical action that he will so inform the court right
away. So the contents of the certification on non forum shopping have nothing to do with what is alleged in the
initiatory pleading . so we can have a pleading that is not verified but it must contain a certification on non
forum shopping. With respect on this rule on non forum shopping, the court appears to have adopted the rule
on substantial compliance With the requirements of certification on non forum shopping . In the past the sc was
quite strict. The sc will affirm the dismissal of the complaint because the provisions on certification on non
forum shopping where not literally followed. In a case decided, there was a complaint where there were 5
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were all principal plaintiffs. If we follow strictly the rule on certification on non-forum
shopping, the certification should be signed by all the 5 principal.Otherwise it would be a defective certification
and under rule 7, this defect is not curable by amendment. If we would follow the rule on certification it would
lead to the dismissal of the case.In this case, only 2 of the plaintiffs signed the certificationon non-forum
shopping. so the defendant challenged the authority of the court. The authority of the court to go ahead to
entertain the petition because the rule on non-forum shopping has been violated. the court refused to dismiss
the case. The court says that we will go ahead with the case but we will just drop the claim of the non-signing
plaintiffs. so the case will go on insofar as the plaintiffs signed the certification on non forum shopping are
concerned. The sc said that the signature of the two plaintiffs will be substantial compliance with the
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requirement. With respect to the issue of a lawyer signing the certification on non-forum shopping the general
rule is the rules require that the party himself must sign the certification on non forum shopping. If a lawyer
signs the certification on non forum shopping hes not aplaintiff/ defendant. Hes just a lawyer for the plaintiff
and he signs the certification non forum shopping he must be able to show a special power of atty authorizing
him to sign the certification on non forum shopping.
Somebasic principles in rule 8. We have taken up actionable document.
The first basic principle of rule 9 is the consequence of the omnibus motion rule. The defense/ objection is
deemed waived if it is not set up in pleading or in a motion to dismiss. Another basic principle is because the
rules encouraged the joinder of causes or even the joinder of parties, there could be several causes of action that
could be alleged in a complaint. there could be several defensesalso set up in an answer and these causes of
action that are set up could be set up jointly or in the alternative so that there could be a complaint with joint
causes of action. There could be a complaint with alternative causes of actions. There could also be defense with
alternative defenses, an answer with alternative defense and answer with joint defenses. Rule 3 in relation to this
rule says that since there could be alternative causes or alternative defenses, we can also have in relation to rule
3 alternativedefendant so theaction can be filed and the captionis plantiff vsdefendant 1 or defendant2. in this ex
the defendants are impleaded as alternative defendants. since we allow alternative causes, alternative defenses
and also alternativedefendant, can the court also tender a decision where the dispositive portion also be in the
alternative? That is also allowed. In some special cases, in replevin the last sec in rule 60 authorizes the court to
tender a judgment in the alternative. what is not present in our rules is the propriety of a complaint where the
plaintiffs are made in the alternative. nothing is mentioned in the rules. But there is no mention at all in the rules
concerning complaint filed by plaintiff made in the alternative. so in our rule nothing is mentioned about the
propriety of these complaints, plaintiff 1 or plaintiff 2 vs defendant. there could be plaintiff 1 and plaintiff 2 vs
defendant. the plaintiffare named jointly. there is nothing mentioned in rules where plaintiffs being named in
the alternative. so again the rules expressly authorize the filing of a complaint where the pl 1 or pl 2 vs
defendant. But if we follow the gen rule that pleadings should be liberally interpretedto provide for just speedy
and inexpensive determination of the case,well if the court issues the sc might allow a complaint where the
plaintiffs are named in the alternative, which is a principle that is followed by courts in the US.In federal rules in
civil procedure theres an express provision saying that plaintiffs could benamed in the alternative,defendants
could be named in the alternative, causes of action in the alternative.Defenses can also be alleged in the
alternative. Unfortunately, that provision on the federal rules on civil procedure were not incorporated in our
rules with respect to plaintiffs being named in the alternative. But again we have defendants in the alternative
byexpress provision in the rules, causes of action alleged in the alternativedefenses alleged in the alternative.
There could also be a judgment where the dispositive portion is written in the alternative, like in the case of
replevin. But with respect to the non waivable defnses given in rule 9,it is always better to compare the non-
waivable defenses in civil actions and non-waivable defense in criminal actions. if you go to criminal procedure,
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there are also 4 non-waivable defenses.They cannot be subject of waiver. They cannot be subject of application of
the omnibus motion rule. In rule 9, the rule on non-waivable defenselack of jurisdiction overthe subject matter,
litis pendentia prescription andres judicata. if you compare this non-waivable defenses to a criminal case, you
will immediately notice that there are similarities, there are also differences. for instance res judicata w/c is non-
waivable defense in civil case. It is also non-waivable defense in criminal case. But of course it is not called res
judicata in a criminal case. In acriminal case it is called double jeopardy. There was a question asked in the bar
once. Explain the concept of res judicata in treason. That is double jeopardy. so in civil cases, re judicata is the
equivalent of double jeopardy in criminal cases.In prescription, prescription in a civil case is alsonon-waivable
defense in a criminal case that is also non-waivable extinguishment or prescription of a penalty. so in both
prescription is non-waivable defense. The 3
rd
one where this grounds are similar the absence of jurisdiction over
the subject matter that is also non-waivable in a criminal case. It is in the 4
th
ground that there is distinction bet
these non-waivable grounds. In a civil case, the ground of litis pendentia is non-waivable.but in a criminal case,
theres no such thing because in criminalprocedure, the 4
th
non-waivable ground is the information does not
charge an offense. That is a non-waivable defense. the only difference between the non-waivable defense in civil
and criminal actions is with respect to a criminal action where the non-waivable defense is the informationdoes
not charge an offense. but in a civil case the equivalent is the failure to state a cause of action. litis pendentia is
not really non waivable defense in a criminal case. so there seems to be no litis pendentia that is applicable in a
criminal case. but when it comes to that non waivable grounds, theinformation does not charge an offense is
equivalent to a civil case if we make use of rule 16 will be failure to state a cause of action. But failure to state
cause of action is also a ground for a motion to dismiss under rule 16. That means to say that if the complaint
fails to state a cause of action, that it can be remedied even w/o expressly or formally amending the
complaint.Thecourt will decide still in favor of the plaintiff although the plaintiff has not at all amended his in
order to allege a cause of action. Is that possible in a civil case? That is possible if the complaint does not
properly allege a cause of act that defect must be remedied under rule 10 amendment of pleading to conform
with the evidence if the complaint does really allege a cause of action the defendant does not raise as an issue in
a motion to dismiss or does not raise as affirmative defense in answer if during the trial the plaintiff presents
evidence showing that he really has cause of action and this evidenceis admitted in the court the complaint is
deemed amended by operation of law. Insofar as the court is concerned that complaint now states a cause of
action . that is the remedy if a complaint fails to state a cause of action. so the court cannot consider it as non-
waivable defense it is really a waivable defense in a civ case. Because it can easily be amended or remedied by
the principle in rule 10 about amendment to conform w/ evidence. can we not follow this in a criminal case?
Lets say that the info does not charge an offense during the trial the prosecutor presents evidence that there is
really a crime committed although the information does not accuse thedefendant of committing a particular
offense cannot the court apply the rule on amendment to conform w/ evidence? That is not allowed because
that will violate constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him. so the only reason
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why we dont allow amendment to conform w/ evidence in criminal case is because it violates constitutional
right of the accused. if he is arraigned for an information which does not accuse him of any crime, then he is
arraigned for nothing. That is what criminal procedureprovides. In other words, it can apply amendment to
conform w/ evidence as long as we dont violate the constitutional rights of the accused. Unlike in civil case, if
the civil action does not state a cause of action but the defendant has not filed motion to dismiss. it participates
in the trial and during the plaintiff presents evidence that the he has cause of action. that complaint is deemed
amended by operation of law.
Another principle is the rule on default. And we have come across certaincases were the court were default is
prohibited in summmary procedure, small claims, in amparo cases, in habeas data, default is prohibited. and in
rule 9, in marriage related cases default also prohibited. So it is not correct to say that in civil action, if the
defendant has not filed his answer or a responsive pleading, he can be declared in default upon motion by the
adverse party. That is not an absolute rule.If a complaint is filed,summons is served upon the
defendant,defendant does not file an answer during the reglementary period, upon motion by the plaintiff, we
can order a default. That is a general rule except in caseswhere the motion to declare the defendant in default is
prohibited or even in cases were the law directs the trial court to assign somebody to make an investigation as
to whether there is collusion in marriage related cases. So in a complaintgoverned by ordinary procedurelike
recovery of an unpaid loan. if the complaint seeks to recover from the debtor an unpaid loan of 1m and interest
and then the defendant after summons have been served does not file an answer, can the court now on its own
declare the defendant in default? the answer is no. default can be done only by the court if there is a correlative
motion filed by the plaintiff. without the correlative motion, the court has no authority to motu proprio declare
the non answering defendant in default. We need a motion. If the plaintiff on the,other hand, does not file a
motion to declare the defendant in defaultwhen it is very clear from the records of the case that the time to
answer has already been expired and the plaintiff does not file a motion, what can the court do now if we
prohibit the court from declaring the non-answeringdefendantin default motu proprio? insofar as declaration of
the courtis concerned, we need a motion coming from the plaintiff. w/o the motion, the court cannot do
anything concerning the declaration of default. if the plaintiff keeps on ignoring that he has a prerogative to file
a motion to declare the defendant in default. He does not exercise this prerogative, chances are, the court will
lose sympathy with the plaintiff and court might order the dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute for an
unreasonable length of time. So the rules expect a plaintiff to be active in filing a case. What happens to the
complaint that he has filed? If he does not receive an answer on time, he should avail of this remedy to file a
motion to declare the defendant in default. If he does not file a motion, hell end up receiving an order from the
court dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. That is under rule 17.And under rule 17, the dismissal by
reason of failure to prosecute is a dismissal with prejudice. That is certainly adverse to the plaintiff because he
can no longer file another complaint for the recovery of his claim against the defendant.
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Supposing that plaintiff initiates this move to declare the defendant in default, he files a motion. but the motion
that he files is called an ex parte motion to declare the defendant in default which usually happens in trials. The
theory of the plaintiff when he files a motion to declare the defendant in default ex parte is because the
defendant does not even bother to answer. why should he be served with a copy of the motion to declare in
default? If he is served with a copy of that motion, the defendant might entertain the idea of filing an answer in
order to preempt the granting of that motion. The sc said that it is not the correct argument. In fact rule 9 is very
clear. A motion to declare a defendant in default will be served upon the defendant if it is not served upon the
defendant that motion is a useless piece of paper. So if the defendant receives a copy of the motion to declare
him in default and there may be signs to file an answer and his answer is now received can the court still declare
him in default? The answer is yes. If the court follow strictly the rules of court. But as a matter of policy if the
answer is already been filed although it is filed out of time it is now part of the rec of the case. Will the trial court
still declare him in default? The answer is no. the sc has repeatedly informed the trial court that as much as
possible this very technical rule on default should not be applied strictly. Even if the period to answer has
already expired, but an answer is filed out of time the court should still admit that answer and deny a motion to
declare the defendant in default. The reason why the sc has adopted this policy is because if the defendant is
declared in default the court can right away render a judgment of default against defendant without conducting
a trial. In rule 9 if defendant is declared in default rule 9 gives the trial court 2 choices. 1
st
is to render judgment
right away based on the allegations contained in the complaint. 2
nd
is to require the plaintiff to present evidence
ex parte in support of his allegations. At least in the 2
nd
option there will be a reception of evidence. Unlike in
the 1
st
option the trial court will just rely on the allegations in the complaint. And if there is trial ex parte where
the defendant is in default, the defendant will not be allowed to participate in the trial unless he is able to secure
an order from the court to lift the order of default. So if the defendant is declared in default and then a trial is
ordered by the court even if defendant goes to court w/ his answer the court will not entertain the defendant
because one of the sanctions of a declaration of default is the defendant inability to participate in the trial. So if
the defendant is in default there is 99% chance that he will lose the case because he has not filed an answer at all.
And if theres going to be a trial, it is only the plaintiff who will be allowed to present evidence and appear
during the trial because this is a likelihood in default in court cases rule 9 is also very explicit in saying that
when the defendant is declared in default although the judgment in default is favorable to the plaintiff the trial
court should see to it that the award should not be more or different than that prayed for in the complaint. So in
our ex where there is a complaint to recover an unpaid loan, the defendant is in default and the court orders the
presentation of evidence ex parte, the plaintiff is the only one present in court and introduce any evidence he
wants because nobody is around to object to his evidence. He presents evidence that the indebtedness of the
defendant is not only 1M but 3M the court now decides the case if the court believes that there is preponderant
evidence that will justify an award of 3m can the court render such judgment? The answer is no. in rule 9, the
award in default judgment by the court cannot be more than what is prayed for in the complaint. It could not be
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different from the relief prayed for on the complaint. It could be less than what is prayed for in the complaint, it
could be equal but it could not be more than what is prayed for in the complaint. Even if there is ex parte
presentation of evidence. Do we follow this rule whenever the court authorizes the plaintiff to present evidence
ex parte? Because of the inability of the defendant to comply with certain rules/ orders of the court. we follow
this rule limiting the award only to default cases. A similar case where there could be an ex parte presentation of
evidence is found in rule 18 on pre trial. In the rule on pre trial, the parties should present a pre trial brief. And
they should also be present during the pre trial conf. if it is the plaintiff who does not appear during the pre trial
or does not submit a pre trial brief, the court can order the dismissal of the case. And that is dismissal w/
prejudice. But if it is the defendant who does not appear during a pre trial or he does not submit a pre trail brief
the court can authorize the presentation of evidence ex parte by the plaintiff . so whether it is under rule 18 or
rule 9, the defendant has violated certain provisions of the rules in rule 9 the violation by the defendant is his
not filing of an answer w/in the reglementary period. In rule 18, the violation by the defendant consists of not
appearing during pre trial or non-submission of his pre trial brief. In these situation, that the defendant violates
the rules governing submission of certain papers and appearance during pre trial then rule 18 authorizes the
trial court to allow the presentation of evidence ex parte by the plaintiff. Weve taken up what is going to
happen after an ex parte presentation of evidence under rule 9. The decision of the court cannot be more than
what is prayed. The decision of the court cannot be different from what is prayed. How about in rule 18? The
complaint is still for the recovery of 1m. there is an ex parte trial allow by the court under rule 18. The plaintiff
presentation evidence ex parte. During the ex parte hearing the the plaintiff presentation evidence w/c
convinces the court that the entitlement of the plaintiff is not 1m but 2m. can the court later on award to the
plaintiff 2m although his complaint prays only for the payment of 1m? if we read carefully that provision in rule
18 the answer will be the court can award 2m because in rule 18 what the court can do is to grant a relief
according to the evidence submitted by the plaintiff unlike in rule 9 w/c says that the extent of the relief cannot
be more than what has been prayed for. It cannot be different from what has been prayed for. But insofar as rule
18 is concerned, after an ex parte presentation of evidence the relief will be based on what has been proven by
the evidence. Although that relief could be more than or different from what has been prayed for in the
complaint. Why do we treat the default defendant in rule 9 with more flexibility with more compassion
compared to the defendant in rule 18. Well the significant different bet this 2 defendant is that in rule 9 the
defendant has not filed an answer the court will take pity on the defendant who can be considered as having
surrendered the case to the plaintiff for his failure to file his answer. In rule 18, the defendant has filed an
answer thats why the court holds a pre trial conf. the violation by the defendant in rule 18 is not his failure to
answer but his failure to comply with the requirements of rule 18. Remember these 2 different bet rule 9 and rule
18 when it comes to the extent of the award after an ex parte presentation of evidence.
Another principle in rule 9 is the rule on partial default. In partial default, the factual antecedents are that there
are at least 2 defendant sued under a common cause of action and then one defendant answer and the other
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does not answer. Can the non-answering defendant be declared in default upon motion of the plaintiff? The
answer is yes. He can be declared in default because default is founded on the premise that the defendant has
been served w/ summons but does not file an answer w/in the reglementary period. So that is his punishment.
He will be declared in default. Can the court also render judgment by default against a non-answering
defendant? This time the court cannot do that. Partial default, the most that the court can do is to declare the
non-answering defendant in default. The court cannot declare the answer defendant in default. There is no
reason to declare him in default. So if there is an answer filed by one of the defendant, the court will be forced to
follow the ordinary course of the the court will have to call a pre trial. The court will have trail if necessary. But
insofar as the non-answering defendant is concerned, he will be declared in default but there is no separate
judgment in default that will be rendered against him. So we follow the normal course. There is now a trial. And
during the trial the answering defendant will also be given a chance to present his evidence. Can the answering
defendant call the defaulting defendant to be a witness? The answer is yes. The answering defendant can call the
defaulting defendant as a witness. There is nothing in the rules according to the court which prohibits a
defaulting defendant to testify in the case. Although he will not be allowed to participate as a litigant during the
trial. After trial the court finds in favor of the answer defendant will that decision be also in favor of the
defaulting defendant? The answer is yes. Whatever happens to that case, if the answer defendant wins the
defaulting defendant wins. The answer defendant loses, the defaulting defendant also loses. this is one situation
where a defaulting defendant can prevail in the case. The reason is because these 2 defendant are sued under a
common cause of action. Because this is the rule that we follow in our system where a defaulting defendant can
conceivably win in case of partial default, in one case the creditor who sued 2 defendant where one of the
defendant has answer and the other fails to answer. The court has already ordered the non-answering defendant
in default, his counsel most likely told him of this principle in rule 9 so the plaintiff-creditor asked himself if I go
ahead w/ the trial of the case and this answer defendant puts up a good fight, I might lose the case. Can I just
not move for the dismissal of the case so far as the answer defendant is concerned so I will be left fighting a
defendant who is already in default, who cannot participate in the trial. Well if you look at it pragmatically, that
is a good move. because he avoids fighting a defendant who has already filed an answer. So what the plaintiff
did was to move for the dismissal of the complaint against the answer defendant the answer defendant naturally
will not object to the dismissal of the case. So the caption of the case was change from plaintiff vs defendant1
and defendant2 to plaintiff vs defendant2. Defendant1 is already out. Can the court now after presentation of
evidence ex parte rule against defendant2 who is the only defendant left on the case? Would it be proper for the
trial court to . The sc said not necessarily. Even if defendant1 has been dropped from the case upon the initiative
of the plaintiff, what the trial court should examine is whether defendant1 is an indispensable party to the case.
If defendant1 is an INDISPENSABLE PARTY to the case, the court should require that defendant1 be
impleaded in the case because if defendant1 is an INDISPENSABLE PARTY and he is not around the
proceedings taken by the court could be void. So it is useless for the court to try the case. Under the new
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doctrines enunciated by the sc, if an indispensable party is not impleaded or if he has been impleaded he is
dropped from the case the court should compel that the indispensable party be impleaded. There should be an
amendment to the complaint. If the plaintiff ignores the order of the court compelling him to amend his
complaint and therefore the indispensable party is not yet impleaded the next move of the court is to make use
of rule 17 order the dismissal of the case because of the refusal of the plaintiff to obey an order of the court. that
is a dismissal similar to dismissal for failure to prosecute, that is failure to obey a lawful order of the court or the
refusal to obey the provisions of the roc. So that in our ex what the court should do is to require the plaintiff who
has dropped defendant1 to implead defendant1 in the complaint. That should be another amendment to that
complaint. If defendant 1 is an indispensable party. We use the new doctrines given out by the court. that if the
indispensable party is not made a party to the case what the trial court should do is to require the plaintiff to
implead the indispensable party. If the order of the court is ignored what the court should do is to order the
dismissal of the complaint. And that is a dismissal w/ prejudice. Since it is not advantageous for a non-
answering defendant to be declared in default because he is disallowed from participating in the trial of the case,
what are the remedies for the defaulting defendant? The first one is to file a motion to lift the order of default.
That is before judgment based on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and together w/ this motion
he should already submit his proposed answer because rule 9 also requires him to convince the court that he has
a good defense. The only way to do that insofar as the defaulting defendant is concerned is to submit a motion
with affidavit of merit and append to this motion his proposed answer to the complaint. His answer to the
complaint shall be evaluated by the court and the court could be convinced that the defaulting defendant really
has a good and substantial defense. And the defaulting defendant if his motion to lift the order is denied cannot
appeal. He cannot appeal the denial of his motion to lift the order of default because the denial is only an
interlocutory order. That is not appealable. Supposing that the court has already rendered a judgment of default
can he appeal the judgment by default? The answer is yes. He can appeal the judgment by default because the
judgment by default is an adjudication of the merits of the case. Can he also file a petition for cert under 65 to
challenge the judgment by default? He cannot. If appeal is available then rule 65 is automatically not available.
But if what is being challenged only is the denial of his motion to lift an order of default because the law does
not allow the defendant to appeal he can make use of rule 65. But he has to convince the higher court that the
trial court has acted w/o jurisdiction in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Supposing the
defendant simply tells the court pls lift the order of default and just allow me to file an answer can the court give
him the opportunity to file an answer although there is already a declaration of default the court should not
allow the filing of answer unless the court lifts the order of default if the court orders the lifting the order of
default the defendant can now file an answer although the time has already expired. The court as a matter of
public policy should not apply strictly the rules on default because the sc said if we allow strictly the rules on
default we are depriving a litigant of his opportunity to present his side.
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Rule 10 on amended and supplemental pleadings lets say that the plaintiff files an action reinvindicatoria
against the defendant in accion reinvindicatoria one of the jurisdictional allegations is the assessed value of the
property. This complaint is filed before the rtc but there is no allegation concerning the assessed value of the
property. Can the court order the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The answer is yes. Because
by merely reading the complaint the court will be convinced that it has no jurisdiction the court will not be able
to determine if it has jurisdiction or not unless the assessed value of the property is alleged. So there is
something wrong jurisdictionally in our complaint. The rtc may not have jurisdiction over the case. The plaintiff
discovers the error that he has committed. Can he amend his complaint so that he can alleged in the complaint
the assessed value of the property and that will now confer upon the rtc the jurisdiction over the case. If we are
going to rely on the old doctrines of the sc, the plaintiff will not be allowed to do that. Because the old doctrines
are to the effect that if the amendment will cure absence of jurisdiction that will not be allowed but under the
liberal interpretation under rule 2. In our problem if the court does not have jurisdiction simply because of
failure of the plaintiff to alleged the necessary jurisdictional averment, he should be allowed to amend the
complaint. Amendment will be a matter of right. A similar ex has already happened but that case is one of
unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer is of course cognizable by an inferior court not by the rtc and in certain
instances of unlawful detainer what terms jurisdictional allegation is the presence of a prior demand to vacate
the property it is now settled that in unlawful detainer if there is no prior demand made by the plaintiff upon
the defendant for the defendant to vacate the property and pay the rental then that complaint will not come to
the jurisdiction of an inferior court so this averment concerning the plaintiffs prior demand upon the defendant
is according to the court jurisdictional w/o that allegation the inferior court will not acquire jurisdiction of the
complaint for unlawful detainer. So if that is the defect in our complaint simply that there is no allegation in the
complaint for unlawful detainer regarding the presence of a prior demand upon the defendant can the
defendant amend his complaint as matter of right by simply inserting this allegation that the plaintiff before the
filing of the case. Again under the present rules that is allowed. That is a matter of right. that amendment will
give to the inferior court jurisdiction over the case. So if you still use these old principles probably under these
ex given you should allow the amendment as matter of right to that complaint even if that amendment will
confer jurisdiction upon the trial court. In amendment under rule 10 or even in supplemental pleadings, do not
limit the term pleadings only to the complaint. All pleadings can be amended as a matter of right. They can be
amended w/ prior permission of the court. complaint can be amended as matter of right answer can be
amended as a matter of right. counterclaim, cross claim, 3
rd
party complaint can be amended as a matter of
right. The only limitation is that amendment should only be once. And before a responsive pleading is filed. So
you have to be conversant w/ the responsive pleading to w/c pleading it will relate to. Complaint- answer.
counterclaim- still an answer, same w/ cross claim and 3
rd
party complaint. So in case of these claim pleadings,
the plaintiff can amend his respective pleading as matter of right once before the answer is filed. Can the
plaintiff amend his pleading as a matter of right or even w/ prior permission from the court if he changes his
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cause of action? the answer is also yes. Under the present rules, and as authorize by the sc a cause of action can
be changed in a complaint, in a permissive cc even if it is a matter of right as long as the responsive pleading has
not been filed. Right after the efficacy of the there was a case decided by the sc w/c authorize a plaintiff to
change his cause of action by simple amending his complaint under rule 10 that decision of the sc was in conflict
w/ old doctrines where under the old rules it does not allow the change in the cause of action by simply
amending the complaint even if it is a matter of right. The latest case decided by the sc affirmed this 1997 case
entitled phil ports authority v ?? decided in 2007. Its relatively the same. The case of ports authority vs ?? the
court allowed an amendment to the complaint not as matter of right but as a matter of discretion of the court
even if there was already an answer filed by the defendant. Under rule 10, if there is already an answer, the
amendment can no longer be a matter of right. It always w/ a leave of court. But this case of ports authority vs
gozon, the plaintiff filed a complaint for specific performance after it was answered he filed a motion before the
court to change his complaint to a complaint for injunction. There was really a substantial change to the action
from specific performance to an action for injunction. But this was thru a motion because an answer was already
filed by the defendant the trial court allowed the amendment siting provisions of rule 10, and the court affirmed
the ruling of the trial court. So the rule that we follow at present is if it is a matter of right the plaintiff can
amend his pleading by changing his cause of action if it is no longer a matter of right but a matter of discretion
upon the court the court can still allow the amendment of a pleading by changing the cause of action. It does not
matter if an answer has been filed or not. The sc said that we follow this principle in order to give to the parties
an opportunity in order to have the court adjudicate on the true dispute bet the parties as long as it does not
involve prejudice to substantial justice there is nothing wrong if the trial court allows an amendment to the
complaint where the plaintiff will change the cause of action. But the court also said that since the amendment is
w/ leave of court then they are going to assume that the defendant has already filed an answer to the 1
st
cause of
action if the court allows the amendment naturally the defendant will be given an opportunity to amend his
answer. His answer now to the 2
nd
cause of action. Theres nothing wrong w/ this procedure. In fact the sc in
this case encourage trial court to use liberally the rule on amendment to pleadings whether as a matter of right
or as a matter of discretion.
On the part of the defendant, if a defendant files an answer w/ a general denial thats bad for the defendant hes
going to lose the case the responsive pleading to an answer is a reply. If no reply has been filed and the
defendant amend his answer as matter of right w/o getting permission to the court by changing a general denial
to a specific denial. The answer is yes. We give the same right enjoyed by the plaintiff to the defendant. So the
amended answer will now contain a specific denial. But what is important to amendment as a matter of right is
that it should be exercised only once before the responsive pleading has been filed. If no responsive pleading is
yet filed, but the amendment is already the 2
nd
amendment, we need permission from the court. amendment is
only a matter of right if it is exercised once before the responsive pleading is filed. Can we also amend pleadings
if the case is already on appeal to the ca or to the sc? particularly if the amendment is only formal in nature.
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With respect to substantial amendments appellate courts because that will injure the rights of the party who has
not appealed. What can be brought only to appeal are issues that can be raised before the trial courts even if it is
only a matter of discretion trial courts are liberal in allowing amendments. there is a particular rule of evidence,
in rule 10 w/c is amendment to conform to evidence. in amendment to conform to evidence, if the evidence
presented by the plaintiff is not material to the allegations in his complaint then if there is an objection by the
defendant, the objection should be sustained. but if the presentation of evidence does not appear to be material
and not objected to by the defendant, the court cannot tell on its own the plaintiff not to continue w/ with the
presentation of the evidence. For instance the complaint accion reinvindicatoria, a case where the title to or
possession of real property, during the trial the plaintiff does not present evidence which shows that he is
entitled to the possession of the property subject matter of the proceeding. instead the plaintiff presents evidence
which demonstrates that the defendant owes him 3M. if you are the lawyer for the defendant in this case, you
stand up and tell the court that the evidence concerning defendants liability for 3M is not material to the case
because the allegations in the complaint pertain to recovery of ownership of a piece of land. If there is an
objection which is raised by the defendant the court will sustain the objection. So the plaintiff will not be
allowed to introduce this evidence concerning the defendants liability for 3M. But supposing that the plaintiff
starts presenting evidence that he is entitled to 3M from the defendant, the defendant does not stand up and
does not object. The defendant keeps quiet about the reception of evidence. Can the court refuse to admit the
evidence? The court cannot because the court will always admit evidence although irrelevant or immaterial if
not objected by the defendant so the court will now receive this evidence showing that the plaintiff is entitled to
recover from the defendant the 3M. You remember that the complaint is for the recovery of the title to or
possession of real property. When the time comes for the court to render a decision, can the court simply award
to the plaintiff the 3M, although the plaintiff has not amended his complaint? The answer is yes and the reason
is that the amendment to conform to evidence in rule #10 and this is evidentiary principle. It also states that this
is no need for the plaintiff to formally amend his complaint. The amendment will take place by operation of law
in order to conform on the evidence submitted by the plaintiff.
Even in supplementing pleadings, the principal difference between the supplementing and amended pleadings
is that in supplementing pleading we always need permission of the court. There is no supplementing pleading
as a matter of right and in supplementing pleading the pleader will not be allowed his cause of action. It is only
in amendment the pleader can change his cause of action. In supplementing pleading the antecedent facts that
are given in the supplementing pleading have taken place after the original pleading has been filed and it cannot
give rise. A supplemental pleading cannot give a new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff. Also for the
purposes of evidence, an amended pleading takes the place of the original pleading. So an amended complaint
takes the place of the original complaint. An amended answer takes the place if the original answer. Will the
court necessarily discard the original pleading, the original answer, the original complaint or can they remain as
part of the records of the case? For evidentiary purposes, however, the admissions given in the original
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complaint or in the original answer, any admission made in an original pleading will not cease to be a judicial
admission. In rules in evidence, admissions made in pleadings even in motions for are considered as judicial
admissions. They are conclusive upon the admitter. But if there is an amendment, the amended pleading will
now take the place of the original pleading. How about the admissions made in the original pleading? Will they
remain to be admissions? According to the court, they remain to be admissions but they are no longer judicial;
admissions. They could be treated as extrajudicial admissions. For instance, in the example awhile ago, if the
original answer contains a general denial, that is judicial admission of the allegations contained in a complaint
and that will justify a judgment on the pleadings. If the defendant amends his answer by converting a general
denial into a specific denial, then the general denial is construed as an admission will now be converted into an
extrajudicial admission by the defendant. will that be beneficial to the defendant? if you tell him that his judicial
admission has been converted into an extrajudicial admission simply because he has filed an amended answer?
That is so beneficial to the defendant because it will not be considered as an evidence against him by the court.
Where as if the admission remains to be a judicial admission, in the study of evidence, a judicial admission is
always conclusive upon the pleader. It cannot be the subject of rebuttal evidence.


With respect to the preceding section there's not much discuss except that in the periods for replevin or period
for the filing or issuing notice that there is nothing mentioned at all about the period as to when a complaint
may be filed the periods begin with the period to file a responsive pleading but nothing speaks in the rules as to
when a complaint should be filed. The reason is because the filing of a complaint is solely dependent upon the
claim of the plaintiff. We can't force him to file a complaint. It's not possible for the Supreme Court to tell the
plaintiff you should file this complaint within this particular period. If the SC does so the SC will be invading
the turf of substantive law. The filing of a complaint is dependent solely on the decision of the plaintiff and if
there is ever a period fixed as to when that complaint should be filed it will not be determined by the SC it will
have to be determined by substantive law. A complaint must be filed so that it can be prosecuted successfully as
long as the claim has not prescribed. Prescription is a matter of substantive law. Thats why in the rules it begin
with the period of when to file an answer but with respect to the other claim pleadings a cross claim,
counterclaim a third party complaint there is a period fixed now in the rules. With respect to a cross claim and a
compulsory counterclaim they must be filed within the period fixed for the filing of an answer because even if a
crossclaim a counterclaim or third party complaint are claim pleadings the rules do not allow the defending
party to file an answer separately from a counterclaim or a crossclaim or a third party complaint. These 3
pleadings must always be added or incorporated in the answer. So if defendant has claims against the plaintiff
or against 3rd persons who are not litigants he should file an answer with a counterclaim an answer with a
crossclaim or an answer with a third party complaint. The trial court will not allow the defendant to file an
answer today and then next week the defendant will file a compulsory counterclaim or even a permissive
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counterclaim or a crossclaim. He will have to amend his answer and then incorporate in that amended answer a
crossclaim or counterclaim or a 3rd party complaint and with respect to a thirdparty complaint you have to file a
motion with the court asking for permission to admit this third party. That is the way how these pleadings are
submitted by the defending party. Because this is the rule that we follow the filing of a compulsory counterclaim
generally should be together with an answer and an answer has to be filed within 15 days or 30 days or 60 days
as the case may be. If there is an answer filed without a counterclaim but later on the defendant feels that he
should set up a counterclaim he will have to file an amended answer with a counterclaim.
With respect to bill of particulars this is one of the mechanisms that are prohibited in small claims procedure
even in summary procedure and in our proceedings like amparo or habeas data. If the defendant feels that there
is a need for the plaintiff to be more definite in crafting the allegations contained in the complaint the remedy of
the defendant is to file a motion for bill of particulars. If the defendant cannot fully comprehend the subject
matter of the complaint because there are certain inadequacies or the allegations are not definite enough can the
defendant file a motion to dismiss on this ground? The answer is no Rule 16 does not include as a ground for
dismissal the inadequacy of the allegations contained in the complaint. May there be an instance where a
defendant can rightfully file a motion to dismiss because of the vagueness or inadequacy of the allegations
contained in the complaint. that is instead of filing the motion for bill of particulars he should file a motion to
dismiss and the court grant dismissal because of the inadequacy or vagueness of the allegations contained in the
complaint. The answer is yes. By way of exception, this happens when a RTC acts as a commercial court. When
the trial court tries disputes in a corporate dispute or disputes among partners or among members of an
association with a juridical personality and if there is indefiniteness or vagueness in the allegations contained in
the complaint the remedy of the defendant is to file a motion to dismiss on this ground. The reason given by the
court is that in commercial courts applying the procedure outlined by the SC for RTC acting as a commercial
court, a motion for bill of particulars is prohibited. So if there is vagueness since motion for bill of particulars is
not allowed to be filed by the circular on commercial courts the remedy left for the defendant is to move for the
dismissal of the case on this particular ground, vagueness or indefiniteness in the allegations contained in the
complaint. In ordinary civil cases where we allow a motion for bill of particulars, the motion is available to both
sides the plaintiff and the defendant. If the allegations in the complaint are indefinite or vague the defendants
remedy is to move for bill of particulars. If the allegations contained in the answer are likewise vague or
indefinite the remedy of the plaintiff is also to move for bill of particulars but they are also in the form of a
motion. There is something special about a motion for bill of particulars filed by either party. While that motion
should comply with the requisites of a motion under the rules so as not to be considered as a useless piece of
paper and there should therefore be service upon the adverse party there should also be a notice of hearing
when a motion for a bill of particulars is submitted the court, the court can act upon the motion right away
without waiting for the hearing set for that motion. Usually we set a motion for hearing during a motion day
which is usually a friday. We wait until that motion day so that we can submit to the court for resolution this
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motion but not in the case of a motion for bill of particulars if we set the motion day for bill of particulars on a
friday and it is received by the court on tuesday prior to this motion day on tuesday can right away resolve the
motion it can grant the motion or to deny that motion. This is one of the few motions that can be acted upon
right away by the court without waiting for the arrival of the date set for the hearing of the motion. And a
motion for bill of particulars by its very nature should be filed by the defendant before he submits an answer.
And it should be filed also by the plaintiff before he responds to the answer before he submits his reply. If the
defendant has already submitted his answer it is useless for the defendant to be asking for a bill of particulars.
The filing of the answer means that the defendant has understood has comprehended fully the allegations
contained in the complaint. But if the defendant files a motion for bill of particulars and that is denied then the
denial is still an interlocutory order what the defendant should do is to file an answer on time within the
remaining period which should not be less than 5 days but if the motion is granted. The order of the court will
be directed to the plaintiff ordering him to submit an amended complaint or simply a bill of particulars which
will form part of the allegations contained in the complaint. If the plaintiff does not obey the order of the court
directing him to submit a bill of particulars what is the remedy of the defendant? Either to move for the striking
out of the allegations in the complaint which are vague or indefinite. The second more practical remedy is to
move that the whole complaint be stricken out and if that complaint in its entirety is stricken out the case will be
dismissed. If it is the plaintiff who is the movant for bill of particulars and the court directs the defendant to
submit the bill or to amend his answer but the defendant disobeys the order of the court what are the remedies
of the plaintiff? He can ask the court to strike out the allegations in the answer which are vague or indefinite or
he can also move that the answer be stricken out as a whole. If the court authorizes or directs that the answer be
stricken out although it has been filed on time because of the refusal of the defendant to amend his answer or
submit a bill of particulars the situation will be as if the defendant has not filed an answer at all and therefore
the next recourse of the plaintiff is to file a motion to declare the defendant in default. So this is one instance
recognized in the rules where a defendant can be declared in default although he may have already filed an
answer on time. Usually the filing by the defendant of an answer on time will preclude his declaration by the
court in default. So it is not always correct to say that declaration in default is predicated on the premise that no
answer has been filed by the defendant. This is one case where there could be a declaration of default even if the
defendant has filed an answer. The other situation is found in rule 29 the consequences of failure to obey an
order of the court related to the statute of discovery the modes of discovery. If you go to rule 29 there is a
provision which says that if the defendant disobeys an order by the court relating to the use and availment of
the modes of discovery, what the court can do is to strike out the answer filed by the defendant. And if the
answer filed by the defendant is stricken out the next move of the plaintiff should be to have that defendant
declared in default.
With respect to the filing and service of motions pleadings and other papers with the court we should always
have in mind the difference between substitute service of pleadings and motions and substitute service of
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summons. The two are completely different from one another. The substitute service of motions pleadings and
other papers refers to a situation where the motion or pleading cannot be served in person or personally there is
failure to serve even if it is service by mail by registered mail or ordinary mail. In substitute service of these
papers motions and pleadings what the movant should do is is to submit these motion or pleading with the
clerk of court with proof that personal service and service by mail has failed and when it is received by the court
that is the substituted service of motions and pleadings and other papers is now completed. In the case of
substituted service of summons it happens when there is failure on the part of the sheriff to serve in person
upon the defendant the summons. If after several attempts the sheriff still could not serve summons in person
upon the defendant the next step for the sheriff to do is to substitute service of summons. So what the sheriff
does in substitute service of summons is to serve the summons at the residence of the defendant upon a person
of sufficient intelligence and discretion or if there is none at the place where the defendant has his office upon a
person who is competent and in charge of that office. That is the meaning of substitute service of summons you
distinguish it with substitute service of motions and pleadings.
With respect to service of pleadings there is always a preference given by the court to personal service compared
with the other modes of service and if a movant or a pleader chooses a mode of service different from service in
person the law requires that you should submit to the court an explanation. Why this other mode of service by
mail has been resulted to instead of personal service. The court in the past has been very strict in this order of
preference in the use of the modes of service but recently the court has relaxed somewhat the rule depending on
the nature of the motion that will be served in person or by mail as the case may be. In the past if a movant for
instance files a motion but he chooses to serve upon the adverse party by mail and then he has not stated in the
motion the reason why he has not observed personal service, usually the court consider that motion as a scrap of
paper because it does not comply with the provisions of the rules but as we said this rule has been relaxed by
the court. It all depends on the importance of the motion that will be filed with the court and that will have to be
resolved by the court. And one such important motion is a motion to dismiss. Courts are very strict with respect
to a motion to dismiss. The adverse party the plaintiff must be served with a copy by personal service if he is not
served by personal service but by mail what the trial court usually requires the defendant to do is to submit
proof that the plaintiff has indeed received through the mail the motion to dismiss and this can be done by
submitting to the court the registry return and unless the registry return is submitted the court will not act on
that motion to dismiss for failure to observe the requirements for service of this important motion.

Now we go to summons. Summons is the writ available to the trial court in order to enable the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Is it the only writ or process which will enable the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant? Not so. Summons is the usual writ which enables the court to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defending party but the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant by compulsion even if the court does not issue the summons. For example is the special
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civil action in Rule 65 certiorari prohibition and mandamus. They are special civil actions distinct from the case
from which that order or decision has originated but in rule 65 the rules does not allow the certiorari court or
prohibition court to issue a summons addressed to the defendant. What rule 65 authorizes the court to do is to
issue a notice addressed to the defendant requiring them to submit their comment before the court. That order to
comment if served upon the respondents will enable the court to acquire jurisdiction. So it is not correct to say
that summons is the only mechanism or process available to the court which will enable the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant forcibly that is by compulsion. We don't have to talk about these
writs or the notice if the defendant voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court, in this case the court will
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. You should also take note of the entity level notification
given by a circular of the court concerning service of summons upon a foreign corporation which has transacted
business in the philippines but it is not registered as a foreign corporation or it has no resident agent in the
philippines. In this 2011 circular the summons to be served upon this foreign private corporation may be done in
four ways but always with the approval of the trial court. First is personal service of summons upon the foreign
private corporation not doing business in the philippines. But with the assistance of the department of foreign
affairs and also the court of the country where this foreign corporation has its office. The second mode is which
can also be authorized by a domestic trial court is the publication of the summons. It is not the one found in rule
14. The summons will be published in the place in the country where this foreign corporation has its office. So if
the foreign corporation has its office in taiwan the publication should be in a newspaper in taiwan. The third
mode given by this 2011 circular is by fax message or any electronic device authorized by the trial court for the
service of summons upon this foreign private corporation or entity. The fourth mode is a combination of any of
the three as authorized by the court.
With respect to domestic private corporations do not forget the rule on acquiring jurisdiction through the service
of summons as explained in that old case of Villarosa vs UNECO. If you are going to sue a domestic corporation
you should see to it that summons is served upon the officers of that corporation or a domestic association with
juridical entity upon the officers enumerated in the rules of court but the decision of Villarosa vs UNECO has
not been changed it has not been relaxed at all. So you have to know who these officers are they are enumerated
in the rules of court the president the managing partner the general manager the treasurer the corporate
secretary or in house counsel of the corporation. Remember that in the case of Villarosa the summons was
served upon a branch manager of the defendant and the rules do not include a branch manager as one of the
officer upon whom summons can be served and the court ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of this corporation because the summons was served not upon anyone of the officers mentioned
in the rules of court. Again the doctrine in Villarosa has been affirmed by cases subsequently decided by the SC
involving corporations and partnership. But in the case of a partnership there could be a revision. When the
association with juridical entity is a partnership what the rules require is that summons must be served upon the
managing partner or a general manager as the case may be. So if the defendant is a partnership duly registered
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with the securities and exchange commission 31:22 and the partnership is composed of four partners service
upon anyone of the partners will be a valid service of summons. Because under the civil code in a partnership
the presumption is that all the partners are managing partners so we apply certain provisions of the civil code.
Since all partners under the civil code are presumed to be managing partners service of summons upon anyone
of the parties will be a sufficient compliance with the law.
It is in service of summons upon a natural person there is a conflict of decisions rendered by the court insofar as
the decision of jurisdiction over this natural person is concerned. In one case decided in 2006 a defendant was
sued a natural person for the recovery of money. The defendant stayed in a gated subdivision according to the
court it means that not anybody can enter the subdivision without obtaining the permission of the guards on the
gate or the owner of the house living within the subdivision. This defendant resided in this gated subdivision so
everytime that the sheriff would go to the residence of this defendant to serve summons the guards would not
let the sheriff enter the property. The guards always told the sheriff that that person is not around he cannot be
served with summons personally. So we will not allow you to enter the subdivision. After so many attempts the
sheriff got fed up and what the sheriff did is to leave a copy of the summons together with a copy of the
complaint with the guards of the subdivision. Is that a valid substitute service of summons. Literally that is not
a valid service of summons if you will read rule 14 on substitute service of summons. It means that the
summons should be served at the residence of the defendant upon a person of sufficient age and discretion then
living therein. If the summons and the complaint was left only with the security guards at the gate of the
subdivision this will not comply with the rules on substitute service because the guards do not reside at the
place of residence of the defendant. And then the court also said that the meaning of the phrase of sufficient age
and discretion does not mean that the person to be served by substitute service could be a minor residing in the
residence of the defendant. The court said that this person of sufficient age and discretion means that this person
is at least 18 years he is no longer a minor and that a provision there is a relationship of confidence between this
person and the defendant himself. So if the person served is simply a visitor of the residence that will not be
sufficient service of summons. But in this 2006 case the SC became very liberal. Although it was clear that the
sheriff did not satisfy the requirements of a substitute service of summons the court ruled that the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant so it would seem that in this case we did not follow
strictly the substitute service of summons. But in 2009 another case was decided by the court involving the
validity of a substitute service of summons that is not made in accordance with the provisions of the rules. And
this time the court said if substitute service of summons is not in accordance with section 7 or Rule 14 the service
is not valid the court will not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and therefore if the court
does not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant the proceedings taken thereafter by the court may
be invalidated the proceedings may be void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
In summons you concentrate your study in section 14 15 and 16. These are the sections in summons which has
been the subject of decisions of the supreme court that are really in conflict with one another. Before 1997 it was
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firmly established that if an action is filed against the defendant that is purely in personam and also personal at
the same time like recovery of an unpaid loan and the defendant cannot be served by summons either in person
or by substitute service the doctrine then which we follow was that the court cannot simply authorize
publication of the summons and after publication of that summons as directed by the court the court will now
have jurisdiction to try the case. This is restricted by that old 1960s or 1970s decision of citizen surety vs herrera.
This was the generally prevailing doctrine in this case a case was filed for the recovery of a deficiency arising
from a foreclosure of real estate mortgage. So that action was in personam it was also personal in character.
Although previously the collateral owned by the mortgagor who is now the defendant in this complaint have a
known address when this complaint for deficiency was filed and a summons was issued the sheriff reported to
the court that it can no longer locate the defendant in the residence or in any other address given to him by the
plaintiff so service in person of the summons could not be had substitute service also could not be had because
the residence of the defendant was unknown. What the plaintiff did was to file a motion to court where he
sought authority from the court to publish these summons of course this was in the form of an ex parte motion
because summons has not yet been served upon the defendant the court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant. During the hearing of the motion it was only the plaintiff who was present and the
lawyer explained to the court that several attempts were made but the sheriff have failed to serve these
summons in accordance with these modes so the plaintiff asked with the court for authority to publish the
summons which the court readily granted. There was no opposition. After receiving the order of the court
authorizing the publication of the summons the plaintiff transacted with a newspaper of general circulation and
caused the summons to be published. The newspaper of course gave to the plaintiffs lawyer the affidavit of
publication so that it can be presented with the court as evidence that the order of the court to publish the
summons has been complied with. After 60 days from the publication of the summons the court has not
received any responsive pleading any answer coming from the defendant. So what the plaintiff did was to file a
motion to declare the defendant in default. In rule 14 the period within which to answer a complaint after
publication ordered by the court is a period of 60 days so what the plaintiff did there was in accordance with the
rules. Since there was no answer filed the plaintiff thought to file a motion to declare the defendant in default.
During the hearing of the motion the plaintiff presented to the court a copy of the order authorizing publication,
the proof that the summons was indeed published and the affidavit of the publisher of the newspaper saying
that there was indeed publication of the summons. The plaintiff obviously was expecting the court to grant his
motion to declare the defendant in default but much to the surprise of the plaintiff the trial court which was
presided by judge Sereno who became chief justice of the SC she was then a trial court judge asked the plaintiff
after presentation of evidence by the plaintiff to explain to me why your complaint should not be dismissed. So
the lawyer was taken aback he told the judge your honor we moved for authority to publish the summons
because the summons cannot be served in person or by substitute service. You allowed us to publish the
summons and we spent money for the publication of the summons we have done our part and now you are
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asking us to explain why this case should not be dismissed is there anything wrong with our case in the first
place? And the judge told the plaintiff even if you publish the summons that publication did not enable the
court to acquire jurisdiction over the person you should have complied with the requirements of the rules of
court so the lawyer asked himself what parts of the rules of court did I fail to comply with? And then it came up
to the decision that the requirement which appears not therein satisfied was what the SC calls the constitutional
requirement of due process that the action should have been converted into one that is in personam into in rem
or quasi in rem. And the means by which an action in personam and also personal at the same time could be
converted from in personam is to apply to the court for the preliminary attachment of the properties belonging
to the defendant and of course after the court has granted the writ of preliminary attachment that there should
be an actual attachment on personal properties of the defendant. The cases for this conclusion by the plaintiff
aside from Rule 14 section 15 where there is a mention of the issuance of a preliminary attachment over
properties of the defendant the other rule that supports this argument is rule 57 on preliminary attachment. If
you read section 1 of rule 57 on preliminary attachment. The last situation enumerated instance where
preliminary attachment could be issued by the trial court when the defendant is not a resident of the philippines
and he is not found in the philippines and he could be served with summons by publication. The court
interpreted these provisions to mean that if there is publication of the summons there should be a preceding or
accompanying preliminary attachment over personal properties of the defendant. Without this actual
preliminary attachment of the personal properties of the defendant the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. In other words if we are not able to convert the action in personam to one that is in rem
or quasi in rem the court will not be able to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and therefore
the court will have no authority at all to entertain that case. This ruling of the SC in citizens surety vs herrera
was issued in the 1960s or early 70s and that has been the rule that was always followed when it comes to
actions in personam that are also personal at the same time. The innovation introduced by the citizen surety was
that if no preliminary attachment of properties belonging to the defendant could be had, it is not right also to
order the dismissal of the case. The court said instead of ordering the dismissal of the case what the trial court
should do is to order the archiving of the case. So there will be no dismissal of the case simply archiving of the
case. The court explained that if we simply archive the case if we dont order the dismissal of the case then the
law on prescription will not start to run and therefore it is not possible for the defendant later on to setup the
defense of prescription which is one of the non waivable defenses. The defendant cannot possibly setup the
defense of prescription if the complaint is archived not dismissed because under the civil code if there is a
judicial demand for the payment of an indebtedness prescription will not start to run. And the court complaint
that is archived will constitute always as a judicial demand for the performance of the obligation. From that time
on we followed this procedure whenever a defendant in an action in personam that is also personal cannot be
served with summons in person or by substitute service. Until the 2008 this case of PNOC vs Santos was decided
by the court and if you're not familiar with that case I suggest that you read. Because it is a case that has all
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revised or changed the principles applicable to this situation where an action in personam can be filed by the
court even if there is no conversion into in rem or quasi in rem. PNOC vs Santos a 2008 case involved practically
the same claim it was a claim for money arising in fact from a sale. The defendant could not be located anymore.
So his whereabouts are unknown. And therefore summons cannot be served in person or by substitute service.
Instead of following the steps taken by the lawyer in citizens surety vs herrera the lawyer in pnoc did not move
for the publication of summons. What the lawyer filed was a motion to allow him to present evidence ex parte
because no answer has been filed by the defendant and the trial court allowed it. Evidence was presented ex
parte and later on the judge rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff directing the defendant to pay. When
the defendant learned of the decision he presented himself before the court and he asked the court for
reconsideration of the decision. That was a mistake of the defendant. Because the court said that when he filed a
motion for reconsideration he admitted the jurisdiction of the court over his person. So there was no more issue
on absence of jurisdiction. The filing of a motion for reconsideration was voluntary appearance on the part of the
defendant he's admitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. From that time on since 2008 lawyers have made
use of PNOC vs Santos as the authority to convince a court the trial court that there is no more need for
publication and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment before the court could acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant. In 2010 there was another case which the court resolved Padua vs Galvez. This
case practically reiterates the ruling in PNOC vs Santos. There is no need for the conversion of an action in
personam to in rem or quasi in rem before the court could acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
In this case of Padua the court explained that we should apply literally what the rules provide. If you go to rule
16 if the defendant is a resident of the philippines but is temporarily out of the philippines in relation to section
14 if the whereabouts of the defendant are unknown there could be publication of summons and that will enable
the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. So it would seem that the principles which
were adhered before as enunciated in citizens surety vs herrera are no longer binding upon plaintiffs they can
ignore the requirement of prior preliminary attachment of properties of the defendant before there could be
publication of summons to enable the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. So 14 15 and
16 are the sections involved in the case of PNOC vs Santos and Padua vs Galvez. There is really no need for the
plaintiff under 14 15 and 16 to make a conversion of an in personam action into in rem or quasi in rem through
the process of a writ of preliminary attachment that is actually carried out by the court.
But what is the advantage of using this principle in citizens surety vs Herrera. Is there any advantage if the
plaintiff first moves for preliminary attachment over the properties of the defendant and thereafter ask the court
for publication of summons. Compared to just the plaintiff asking for publication of summons without an
accompanying writ of preliminary attachment. The advantage in the mechanism given in citizen surety is that
there is a security that is enjoyed by the plaintiff when the property of the defendant is attached through a writ
of preliminary attachment. If you read rule 57 that is precisely the purpose of preliminary attachment over the
property of the defendant to provide security in favor of the applicant for whatever judgment the court may
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render in favor of the plaintiff. But again the present stand of the court is not to apply anymore that principle in
citizens surety vs herrera insofar as publication of summons is concerned. There is no more need for converting
an action in personam into one that is in rem or quasi in rem. Again the court explained that if there is a
preliminary attachment of a property belonging to the defendant the act of actual attachment of the property is
the act which converts the in personam action into in rem or quasi in rem. Because a property belonging to the
defendant is now within the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Now we go to motions. In motions the general rule is that if a motion is not made in open court it must be
reduced into writing and it must satisfy all the requirements given in the rules for the motion. There must be a
service upon the adverse and that motion should be set for hearing. That is always the general rule with respect
to motions. So if there is a motion that is reduced into writing but it is entitled ex parte motion that motion on its
face already violates the rules. Because an ex parte motion is not served upon the adverse party and usually it is
not set for hearing in accordance with the provisions of the rules on motion. When it comes to the notice of
hearing of motions what some lawyers do is to address the notice of hearing to the clerk of court. So in the notice
of hearing it is provided the transfer of court RTC Manila the transferee and then the pleadings this include the
foregoing motion and your schedule of motions for hearing on motion day and then particular day for that
motion day and then signed by the movant. And of course at the bottom there is proof of service either in person
or by registered mail. The SC said that is not the notice of hearing that we require in motion. The notice of
hearing must be addressed to the adverse party. It should not be addressed to the branch clerk of court so the
proper way of presenting a notice of hearing of any motion in general is to make the adverse party or the lawyer
of the adverse party as an addressee. Mr Juan Dela Cruz lawyer for the defendant please take note that the
foregoing motion will be heard with the RTC on particular motion day at 830 etc. That is a proper way of
preparing a notice of hearing the notice should be sent to the adverse counsel and then at the bottom there must
be proof of service by registered mail or by personal service as the case may be. Remember that the SC has
repeatedly held that if a motion is submitted to court and the motion does not emit the requirements the
formalities the mechanisms and the rule as to service and notice of hearing that motion is a scrap of paper. The
court does not have to entertain that motion. So we should not expect the court to consider by granting or
denying the motion the court will simply ignore the scrap of paper that has been filed with the court.
And then we have this omnibus motion rule which again emphasizes the non waivable defenses in civil action.
In any civil proceeding if there is an objection to a pleading or to any claim it should be contained in the motion
or in another pleading and if the objections are not setup these objections are deemed omitted except for the non
waivable defenses.
Now we go to a motion to dismiss. Which is always a litigated motion. A motion to dismiss is prohibited in
certain procedures and circulars of the court. In small claims, even in summary procedure and in some special
proceeding amparo and habeas data like that they are also prohibited. But in regular procedure a motion to
dismiss is of course allowed in civil cases. And a motion to dismiss under rule 16 should be filed as a matter of
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general practice before the defendant submits an answer. Can the defendant properly file an answer and a
motion to dismiss at the same time? in Rule 16 that is also allowed but the motion to dismiss will simply be
incorporated in the answer we note that under rule 16 if the defendant does not have in mind filing a separate
motion to dismiss but the defendant has in mind submitting his responsive pleading right away he can file an
answer effecting the motion to dismiss by incorporating in his answer the grounds in rule 16 as affirmative
defenses. In other words if the defendant files an answer with affirmative defenses these affirmative defenses
are those that are enumerated in rule 16 the grounds for a motion to dismiss. He is allowed to do that. And once
the answer is filed with the court the defendant can ask the court to conduct a preliminary hearing on this
affirmative defenses and the court can grant it as if the defendant has previously filed a motion to dismiss. So
there could be an answer together with a motion to dismiss. But these are not separate submissions. The answer
is not separate from the motion to dismiss. There is just one answer and then in that answer affirmative defenses
are set up and possibly negative defenses but with respect to the affirmative defenses they are those that are
mentioned in rule 16 as grounds for a motion to dismiss. In this case there will be a preliminary hearing as if a
motion to dismiss has been filed by the defendant. But in the case of a non waivable defense since they are non
waivable if you give effect to this effect of non waivable defense it is possible it is proper for the defendant to file
motions to dismiss one after another without violating the omnibus motion rule if these motions to dismiss are
founded on these non waivable defenses. The defendant can fila a motion to dismiss based on prescription. If
that is denied do we allow the defendant to file a second motion to dismiss based on litis pendentia? yes if the
second motion to dismiss is filed do we allow the defendant to file a third motion to dismiss? This time on lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter? The answer is yes again and then if the third motion to dismiss is denied
can the defendant again can file a fourth motion to dismiss founded this time on res judicata? The answer again
is yes because of the application of these non waivable defenses. It is conceivable and it is proper for the
defendant to file successive motions to dismiss that contain of course distinct non waivable defenses and we do
not make use of the omnibus motion rule. So a motion to dismiss founded on lack of jurisdiction over the person
only will be a waiver of the other grounds in rule 16 except litis pendentia lack of jurisdiction or res judicata.
There will be waiver of course of the other grounds in rule 16 but not those contained in letters f and h except in
unenforceability under the statute of fraud which is a waivable defense. IN the resolution of a motion to dismiss
rule 16 gives to the court 3 choices. Grant or deny the motion or order amendment of the pleadings. A fourth
option now given to the trial court by virtue of these laws on Alternative Dispute Resolution that is if these
grounds are available what the court can do as a fourth choice is to refer the matter into mediation or arbitration
as the case may be and suspend further hearings. So as of now there are 4 options available to a trial court in
resolving a motion to dismiss under rule 16. Grant the motion deny the motion order an amendment to the
pleadings and then refer the matter to conciliation or mediation as the case may be.
Is there any tactical advantage or procedural advantage if the defendant instead of filing a motion to dismiss
under rule 16 will simply answer the complaint but in his answer he will set up affirmative defenses those
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enumerated in rule 16? Is there a procedural advantage? Yes there is. There is a procedural advantage. If the
defendant files an answer with an affirmative defense and these affirmative defenses are the grounds
enumerated in rule 16 for a motion to dismiss and after preliminary pleading on this affirmative defenses the
court orders the dismissal of the case. The defendant will be given an opportunity to recover his claim for
damages if in his answer there are counterclaims permissive or compulsory together with the affirmative
defenses. So if the answer of the defendant is an answer with a negative defense with affirmative defenses and
compulsory or permissive counterclaim and the defendant asks the court to conduct a preliminary hearing on
the affirmative defenses and the court orders the dismissal of the complaint because the affirmative defenses are
properly demonstrated by evidence the complaint will be dismissed but the defendant will have an opportunity
to recover damages or whatever relief he has sought in his permissive or compulsory counterclaim. We note that
in rule 16 the dismissal of the case will not affect any counterclaim or crossclaim or any other claim that has been
submitted by the defendant before the court and this can only be done if the defendant files an answer. The
defendant cannot file a motion to dismiss with a counterclaim impossible. He cannot file a motion to dismiss
with a crossclaim because a motion to dismiss is not a pleading it is only in an answer where we can have a
crossclaim or a counterclaim a counterclaim against the plaintiff as the case may be. So that is the procedural
advantage if the defendant is advised by his counsel not to file a motion to dismiss as a separate motion but
simply file an answer with a counterclaim and setting up negative and affirmative defenses. In a motion to
dismiss of course we can make use of any of the grounds mentioned in rule 16 but again with the exception of
non waivable defenses if there is a motion to dismiss founded on grounds other than the non waivable defenses
the grounds not cited are deemed omitted. So if there is a motion to dismiss founded on lack jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant which is a waivable defense and then that is the only ground that is setup in the
motion to dismiss and that motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant will be precluded from filing a second
motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue because these are waivable defenses. What we said earlier
there could be a second motion to dismiss if the second motion to dismiss or the succeeding motions to dismiss
are founded on the non waivable defenses.
With respect to lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the nature of the case, this ground it is the
topic in our case of Tijam vs Sibonghanoy. I assume all of us are familiar with this case. If the trial court does not
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case normally the conclusion is that the judgment of the court is
void because the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter before it can properly try the case. If the
court on the other hand does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case but the defendant kept
silent about this issue about this absence of jurisdiction and then the defendant allows the court to conduct a
hearing on the case he allows the court to decide the case and the defendant thereafter appeals let us say to the
Court of Appeals and before the court of appeals the defendant also does not raise the issue of lack of
jurisdiction and then the CA renders its own decision affirming the decision of the RTC and after receiving the
decision of the CA the defendant asks for an extension of the period to file a motion for reconsideration which at
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that time is allowed. And instead of filing a motion for reconsideration the defendant this time challenges the
validity of the decision of the trial court as well as the decision of the court of appeals on the ground that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction from the very start . And lastly that case has been pending before the courts
for 15 years. In Tijam the SC refused to resolve the issue of validity of the judgment. In the case of Tijam the
court simply said it is true that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised at anytime even for the
first time on appeal but in this case we have to make use of the rule on estoppel by laches. The case has been
pending for 15 years and during this 15 year period the defendant did not challenge the jurisdiction of the court
in fact the parties litigated by filing submissions to the court of appeals. So it is not fair and just according to the
court to declare the judgment as void and then to remand the case to the lower court to the proper court to try it
all over again. The SC observed it might take another 15 years for the trial court to eventually decide the case. So
overall the SC observed we have a case that seeks to recover only 1900 pesos pending before the courts of justice
possibly for 30 years. It is not just according to the SC. The SC said that while the decision really may be
challenged because of the absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter the defendant is estopped by laches by
his act of negligence in failing to raise this issue as soon as possible. He is guilty of estoppel by laches he can no
longer challenge the validity of the decision of the court. The case of Tijam was decided in 1968 its really an old
case. Our rules that we have now took effect in 1997 but under the rules that we are discussing we still have non
waivable defenses like lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. And in rule 9 there is no exception as to this
non waivable defenses there is just an enumeration of these non waivable defenses and the first one is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rule 9 does not even mention the case of Tijam vs Sibonghanoy even by way
of exception to its character of a non waivable defense. So we argue that under the 1997 rules Tijam should be
considered abandoned. We should forget about Tijam vs Sibonghanoy. That is not a good argument because in
rule 47 in annulment of judgment the doctrine in Tijam was incorporated as part of the rules of court. If you go
to rule 47 one of the grounds for annulment of judgment is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. In rule 47
there is an exception, except when there is estoppel by laches. That is an express recognition of the 1997 rules
about the applicability of the case of Tijam vs Sibonghanoy. So we still have laches by estoppel as a good defense
against this non waivable defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In other cases that are factually different from Tijam the SC also used another kind of estoppel in order to bar a
party from raising the issue of jurisdiction although the trial court really does not have jurisdiction. A good
example is the 2004 case of Soliven vs Fastforms. In the case of soliven vs fastforms a case was filed before an
RTC after the effectivity of BP 129 and after the effectivity of the 1997 rules. The amounts to be recovered in that
complaint was almost 800 thousand pesos. The court before which the complaint was filed was a regional trial
court in Makati. So if we apply BP 129 in determining the jurisdiction of the court simply because the amount
sought to be recovered was in the aggregate sum of 800 thousand should not lead us to the conclusion that the
RTC really was the competent court. That is not what BP 129 tells us. In BP 129, in order to determine the
competent court in complaints for money we should exclude items like interests damages cost and attorneys
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fees. And the remainder will be the basis in ascertaining the competent court. Obviously in this case at the start
the issue of jurisdiction was not raised at all. So the defendant instead of filing a motion to dismiss which was
not expected of him because he also thought that the trial court really have jurisdiction over the case. He simply
filed an answer and in that answer incorporated a counterclaim. So there was an answer by the defendant
together with a counterclaim. The judge unfortunately also did not study the complaint well so the court also
was not aware that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. Because if the court read the complaint, the court
could have discovered that the amount sought to be recovered by the plaintiff as principal amount was less than
300 thousand pesos. So that case is cognizable only by an inferior court. So nobody brought the issue of
jurisdiction with the regional trial court. Then later the court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff this
time the defendants lawyer studied thoroughly the records of the case. The lawyer arrived at the conclusion that
there is something wrong with the complaint. That the court did not have jurisdiction over the case and he can
easily prove to the court that the court did not have jurisdiction because the amount sought to be recovered as
principal was less than 400 thousand pesos. What the defendant did was to file a motion for reconsideration
before the trial court and he raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction. So he asked the trial court to reconsider the
decision and order the dismissal of the case. On the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The
trial court denied the motion and said you participated in the case you did not challenged the jurisdiction of the
court and you presented evidence for the court in support of your counterclaim and now that you have lost the
case you return to the court and tell the court that it does not have jurisdiction over the case. That is not fair said
the RTC. So the RTC stood up to its evaluation that there is nothing wrong with the decision. The case
eventually reached the SC and the SC said the defendant will no longer be allowed to challenge the jurisdiction
of the court. Remember that the factual setting of this case Soliven is not similar to Tijam. The case in soliven
was only about 3 years old at the time it was decided by the RTC so we cannot make use of the 15 year period
that was capitalized by the SC in using estoppel by laches. We cannot make use of that concept of estoppel by
laches because the period was not similar to Tijam. But what the supreme court did here was to introduce
another kind of estoppel. The court said there may be no estoppel by laches but there is estoppel in pais that is
estoppel by deed. The act of the defendant in participating actively during the trial of the case and in seeking an
affirmative relief through a counterclaim contained in his answer makes the defendant in estoppel in pais. he
can no longer challenge the validity of the decision rendered by the court although the court may not have
jurisdiction over the case. So another kind of estoppel was now set by the SC in order to prevent a party from
challenging jurisdiction the first is estoppel by laches in Tijam and then the second one is estoppel in pais
estoppel by deed.
We of course lawyers were contented with the explanation given by the court in these two cases. Which
decisions were really fair its not good to allow a party to participate in the trial and then if he loses the case he
challenges all that the judge has done in rendering a decision. He should have set up these issues even before
the case is decided or even through a motion to dismiss. But in 2009 another case which was a criminal case
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Figueroa vs People this was a criminal case. In Figueroa there was a criminal case filed against the accused for
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. If you recall under BP 129 these criminal cases of reckless negligence
are cognizable by an inferior court under BP 129. But unfortunately in Figueroa the information was filed by the
prosecutor before the RTC. Just like in Soliven vs Fastforms the prosecutor was unaware that the RTC did not
have jurisdiction. When the appeals was taken in the custody of the court. His lawyer the defense counsel also
assumed that there was nothing wrong with the jurisdiction of the trial court although in truth again the RTC
did not have jurisdiction over the case. So just like in Soliven vs Fastforms the judge also did not know because
nobody raised the issue of jurisdiction. He must have made use of the presumption in evidence that there is
regularity in the performance of the duty of the prosecutor and then his presumption that a court has
jurisdiction over a case that has been filed before it. Really under the rules of evidence the courts can make use
of these presumptions that it has jurisdiction over the case. There was trial where the court the prosecution and
the accused presented their respective evidence. The trial court convicted the accused. the accused appealed to
the CA and then in the CA the accused moved for the dismissal of the information of the criminal case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. The solicitor general who is the lawyer of the people of the philippines cited this
doctrine in soliven vs fastforms that when a party participates in the litigation before the trial court and does not
challenge the validity of the orders of the trial court he should be estopped from questioning the proceedings
taken by a trial court or even the validity of the judgment that is estoppel in pais. So active participation means
that the litigant who participates is estopped from challenging the validity of the proceedings where there is
direct participation. The CA agreed with the Solicitor General because the arguments presented by the sol gen is
applying the rule on estoppel in pais. The case reached the SC. The SC said the judgment is void because we
cannot apply the rule of estoppel in pais in this case. So even if there wasactive participation by the accused in a
criminal case he still can challenge the validity of the information against him if the court really has no
jurisdiction over the case. Since this case of Figueroa is a criminal case but the case of Soliven is a civil case does
it really matter? I'm not saying that you follow Figueroa or you follow soliven vs fastforms but if you are
confronted with a problem on lack of jurisdiction and it is a civil case you apply soliven vs fastforms but if the
problem involves a criminal case then you follow Figueroa. There is reason really for the SC to adopt a different
path in Figueroa because Figueroa was a criminal case and of course the liberty of the accused was to be
considered. In 2010 again there was another similar case which involved also estoppel in pais. NAPOCOR vs the
province of Quezon. The SC adopted the doctrine in Soliven vs fastforms so there is a continuity of decisions in
civil cases where the SC applies the principle of estoppel in pais in order to prevent the party from raising the
issue of jurisdiction if the party has already participated during the hearing of the case. The principle is we still
have estoppel by laches and estoppel in pais that will preclude the party from raising the issue of jurisdiction.
We continue tomorrow.


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Motion to dismiss (Rule 16)
Another ground for motion to dismiss is lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. This will take
place if the defendant is not properly served by summons, in accordance with rule 14 either service in person or
substituted service. The problem of the defendant if he contends before the court that the court has not acquired
jurisdiction over his person is that he has to file a motion before that same court. So he will then file a motion to
dismiss based on that ground, lack of jurisdiction over his person. If the defendant files a motion to dismiss
before the court on the ground of absence of jurisdiction over his person does not the defendant admit that the
court already has jurisdiction over his person? The answer is NO. The filing by the defendant of a motion to
dismiss on that ground is the only mechanism available to him to manifest to the court that the court has not
acquired jurisdiction over his person. In old cases what the defendant did so that he can avoid that argument,
that by filing of motion to dismiss he in fact recognizes that the court acquires jurisdiction is to tell the court
right away that his appearance before the court in filling a motion to dismiss is considered only as a special
appearance. Only for that purpose of telling the court, that the court has no jurisdiction over his person. This
special appearance rule, extend to another principle in the past, that when a defendant files a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the court has not acquired jurisdiction over his person and then he has another ground in
Rule 16, by virtue of the application of the Omnibus Motion Rule, the decisions of the court then, will have to
the effect that if he adds to a motion to dismiss another ground mentioned in Rule 16, he may not use this
ground of lack of jurisdiction. That has been changed by the present rules of court. A defendant who files a
motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over his person and another ground, is not deemed to have
admitted jurisdiction of the court over his person. That is the present rule that we follow.
In other words, a defendant is free to file a motion to dismiss citing a s to one of the grounds lack of jurisdiction
over his person and other grounds in Rule 16. He is not deemed to have waived his argument that the court has
no jurisdiction over his person.

Let us say that the defendant who claims that the court has not acquired jurisdiction over his person does not
respond on the summons, on the belief that the filing of an answer will in effect make himself liable for the claim
in the complaint. Then he is declared in default. He receives the order of the court and then following the rules.,
the defendant files a motion to lift the order of default. The filing of a defendant of a motion to lift the order of
default is acceptance of the defendant of the jurisdiction over his person. Or on other instances, where the
defaulting defendant has received a judgment of the order of default, and he files a motion for reconsideration
or a new trial, the filing of the motion for reconsideration or the new trial in effect is submission of the defendant
of the jurisdiction of the court over his person. This is the reason why in case cited Padua vs Galvez, the Supreme
Court said that if the defendant claims that the court has not acquired jurisdiction over his person and then he
moves for reconsideration or new trial, he should in that motion specify to the court that the filing of the motion
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for new trial or reconsideration, is not to be treated as voluntary submission of his person to the jurisdiction of
the court. He must always qualify the filing of such motion.

One the grounds is failure to state a cause of action. The Supreme Court has emphasize the difference between
failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action. Lack of cause of action is not a ground for motion to
dismiss. It is failure of the complaint to state the cause of action. The difference according to the court is that if
the plaintiff has no cause of action at all, that is he does not allege a right, or even if he alleges a right there is no
further that his right has been violated, there is really no reason for the plaintiff to go to court. In this situation,
the complain will be dismissed for prematurity. The court will not acquire jurisdiction over the compliant. In
Rule 16 failure to state a cause of action assumes that the plaintiff really has a cause of action and the failure to
state will solely be the fault of the lawyer who prepared the complaint.
For instance, in accion reinvindicatoria, let us assume that there is really a plaintiffs right and entitlement to the
ownership and possession to the land, and the defendant has failed to comply with his obligation, there is now a
cause of action. But in the complaint prepared by the lawyer, the lawyer neglects to allege the assessed value of
the property which is the factor which ascertain the jurisdiction of the court. There could be now a motion on the
part of the defendant to dismiss the case for failure to state a cause of action. If there is an action reinvindicatoria
filed before the RTC and there is no allegation as to the assessed value, the RTC will not acquire jurisdiction over
the case. The reason is under BP 129 there are two courts which are given jurisdiction, RTC and inferior court.
Let us say that there is accion reinvidicatoria before the RTC but there is no allegation as to the assessed value of
the property, the defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff of course will be given a
copy of such motion, the plaintiffs counsel analyzes the motions but the counsel is self-centered and the counsel
thinks that he could not commit such error, so the court hears the motion. But in hearing of a motion to dismiss
founded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court will not allow the parties to present evidence in
support of the opposition. The reason is because lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is purely a legal
question and the only evidence to be taken into account by the court is the complaint itself. Applying the
principle that a court acquires jurisdiction based simply on the allegations of the complaint.
In the hearing of a motion there will be presentation of evidence only if the question that will be raised is a
factual issue, like if the ground is the obligation has been waived or paid or abandoned. But if the issue is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only paper to be examined is the complaint itself. The court can easily
resolved by merely reading the contents of the complaint.
So the parties submit this motion to dismiss. The court concludes that it really has no jurisdiction. The court
grants the motion. So the case is dismissed. The lawyer of the plaintiff will receive the order of dismissal from
the court, he will be bothered this time. He will convert himself as a self-centered lawyer to a more humble
lawyer, so he accepts his defeat. Can the lawyer for the plaintiff amend his complaint although the court order
the dismissal based on the defendants motion to dismiss? The answer is YES. Why do we allow amendment?
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Because the order of dismissal will not be entered until the lapse of 15 days. The case is still pending before the
court. The plaintiff may still amend the complaint. He can rectify the error that he committed by inserting the
assessed value. He may do so as a matter of right, no need for the permission of the court. Because according to
SC, a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading, and under rule 10, amendment of a complaint is a matter of
right as long as it is the first amendment and no responsive pleading has been filed. The responsive pleading in
Rule 10 is an answer.
In this situation, what is the effect of dismissal, if the order is eventually entered, it can no longer be challenged
and has become final and executory order. Does the plaintiff have any other recourse? If we are going to apply
Section 5 of Rule 16, you notice that the rule implicitly makes a distinction between an order under rule 16
which is founded on letters f, h and i compared to other grounds. If dismissal is based on f, h, i and the order has
not been entered, the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal. But if order of dismissal is founded on other grounds,
nothing is mentioned. What is the remedy of the plaintiff? The answer is provided by Rule 41, section 1. In
analyzing rule 16, 17, 18, and 33 must relate to rule 41.
If you will go through the provisions of rule 41 section 1. There is an enumeration of orders, which according to
the rules, these final orders are not appealable, although final in character. If we relate rule 16 to 41, the
dismissal that is closely related to rule 16 in rule 41 will be the last enumerated item, that is dismissal without
remedies. In rule 16, a dismissal under f, h, i is subject to appeal, such dismissal is with prejudice because rule 16
expressly say that remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal. But if the dismissal is founded not f, h, I implicitly the
dismissal is without prejudice. Rule 41 tells the plaintiff one of his recourse, if his complaint is dismissed is
without prejudice. By simply reading rule 41, the plaintiff may immediately conclude that if his compliant is
dismissed by reason of Rule 16 or any other rule which talks about dismissal without prejudice, appeal is not a
remedy available. The plaintiff should not appeal.
So if the order of dismissal is without prejudice and cannot be appealed. It is very likely that the 15 day period
will lapse without any action from the plaintiff. Can the plaintiff challenge the order of dismissal even after the
lapse of 15 days? The answer is YES. Under Rule 41, although appeal is not allowed, the last paragraph tells the
plaintiff what to do. The remedy is to file an appropriate petition under Rule 65, certiorati or prohibition.
Why do we allow the plaintiff to allow petition for certiorari although the 15 day period has lapsed? Under Rule
65, the filing of the petition is 60 days not 15 days. Thus even after 15 days, he still have 45 days. But because the
dismissal is without prejudice, the plaintiff may forget to file to a higher court, he may opt to file a new
complaint against the defendant.
We can easily understand why f, h and i is dismissal appealable. It is right a way a judgment on the merits. If the
claim of the plaintiff allege in the complaint has really been extinguished. That means he really has no claim to
the defendant. Therefore, it should be dismissed with prejudice. The motion will present a factual issue. During
the hearing of the motion, the defendant can prove that the obligation has been paid, waived or otherwise
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abandoned. The hearing is as if the court is trying the case. They may present witnesses and evidences to prove
their allegations. The enumeration in h is not exclusive. Laches may be included.

Remember that there is difference procedurally in a hearing on a motion to dismiss founded purely on a
question of law compared to a hearing on a motion to dismiss founded of a factual issue. If founded on a legal
issue the court will not allow presentation of evidence. The court will simply read the allegations in the
complaint. If the issue raised is factual the court will be forced to conduct a hearing s if it were a hearing on the
merits.
Let us say that the motion to dismiss is founded in letter h, during the hearing the defendant presents evidence
and tells the court that he has no further evidence to produce so the motion is now submitted for resolution, the
court denies the motion. What is the next move of the defendant? Rule 16 tells him that he should file an answer
within the remaining period which shall not be less than 5 days. The defendant files an answer, in that answer
can we incorporate as an affirmative defense the same grounds in the motion to dismiss? YES, he can still make
use it. Is that not repeating? He is merely repeating but it is allowed. This is because according to the rules, if
there are grounds not raised in the pleading, these grounds will be deemed waived. He does not want that to
apply to him. Can the defendant after filing the answer with the affirmative defense, move the court to allow a
preliminary hearing with this affirmative defense? The court will not allow it because there was already a
hearing on the same ground. During the trial, he may be allowed to present additional evidence.
Going back to Rule 41 in relation to Rule 16, in a dismissal with or without prejudice, that is the court in Rule 41
in order for the party to determine whether his remedy is appeal or rule 65. If the court orders the dismissal of a
complaint, do we consider the dismissal as a final order? YES. Any dismissal by the court is a final order. But
what matters is whether the order is with or without prejudice so that we can ascertain the remedy available.
And the plaintiff should be able to determine correctly.
Supposing that the plaintiff committed error. His complaint was dismissed due to f,h, I but he concludes that the
dismissal is without prejudice. So he has in mind to use rule 65. He reads that rule 65 may be availed of for 60
days. On day 40 he files a petition for certiorari, such will be dismissed. The court tells him that the proper
remedy is an appeal. Can he make use if the remedy of appeal? The answer is NO, because the period to appeal,
for 15 day has already expired. The order of dismissal has been entered. Can he file another complaint? NO,
since the dismissal is with prejudice.
If the dismissal is founded on Rule 17, we follow the same principle. In Rule 17, there are several dismissals. It
also speaks dismissal with and without prejudice. There is also a dismissal in Rule 18, during the pretrial, the
dismissal is with prejudice. The remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal. The plaintiff failure to submit a pretrial brief
or failure to attend the preliminary conference. There is also another which is found in Rule 33, judgment on
demurrer of evidence. The dismissal is again with prejudice. That is an adjudication of the merits.
Rule 17
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Another rule for dismissal of actions. If you will recall, rule 17 is connected with an order that can be issued by
the court in relation to a motion to dismiss. If the defendant alleges that an indispensable party has not been
impleaded. The defendant can file a motion to dismiss, not on the ground of failure to implead an indispensable
party but on the ground that the complaint has failed to state a cause of action. If that is the ground used by the
defendant on the ground on the theory that an indispensable party must be impleaded so that the court can
have a final determination of the case, that motion to dismiss will be resolved by the court using Rule 16 but
availing of the other option given in rule 16. Remember that in Rule 16, if there is a motion to dismiss filed by
the defendant, the law gives the court 3 options. The first is to grant the motion, the second is to deny and the
third is to order amendment. In our example where an indispensable party has not been impleaded, the court
will not grant or deny the motion, but will simply order the plaintiff to amend his complaint. So that the
indispensable party will be impleaded. There court can now have the final determination of the case.
If the court orders the plaintiff to amend his complaint so as to include an indispensable party, if the plaintiff
follows the order of the court, then he can just submit an amended complaint. But if the plaintiff does not obey
the order of the court, and not amend his complaint, can the court now order the dismissal of the compliant?
Yes. Under rule 17, that is a dismissal with prejudice. Failure to comply with the order of the court. Therefore
the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal.
There are 3 sections concerning dismissal in Rule 17, Sections 1,2 and 3. The section provides for grounds and its
consequences of the dismissal. The dismissal contemplated in section 1 is the dismissal of a complaint upon the
initiative of the plaintiff itself. If the plaintiff files a complaint today and changes his mind next week, the
summons has not been serve upon the defendant, he can go to the court and file a notice of dismissal for the
complaint, not a motion. Is there a difference between the motion filed by the plaintiff than a notice of
dismissal? There is a big difference. If the plaintiff files a motion, that means to say that the court is given the
prerogative to grant or deny. But if simply a notice, the court is left without any discretion except to confer. That
dismissal is without prejudice unless the plaintiff tells the court that the notice should be considered as an
adjudication upon the merits.
If the dismissal of the complaint is confirmed by the court and he receives the notice of confirmation and the
plaintiff again change his mind, can he file another complaint? NO. because the confirmation of the dismissal
will be entered only after the lapse of fifteen days. Within the 15 day period, the plaintiff can change his mind.
He will just ask the court to revive his complaint, he does not need to file another complaint. no need to pay
another set of docket fees.
Supposing that the defendant files a motion to dismiss under rule 16, and subsequently the plaintiff files a notice
of dismissal, which of the two submission should be resolved by the court? This issue was resolved by the SC,
what the court should do is to confirm the notice of dismissal by the plaintiff.
Section 1 also give a concept of two dismissal rule. The creditor files a complaint against the debtor for the
recovery of an obligation for P500,000. A week after the filing of the complaint, and upon receipt of the
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defendant of the summons, the defendant visits the plaintiff, and the defendant cries on the plaintiff and
pleaded and says that he promises to pay just dont proceed with the complaint. so the plaintiff files a notice of
dismissal. The case confirmed the dismissal. The court has a ministerial duty to conform with the notice. The
defendant does not still pay. Can the plaintiff file a second complaint? YES the notice of dismissal is without
prejudice. The plaintiff then files a second complaint. the defendant again pleaded. The plaintiff files a second
notice of dismissal. The court again confirms. That dismissal will now be considered with prejudice. So that if
the plaintiff files a third complaint, such complaint will be dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
Can the court in the second notice of dismissal, confirm the dismissal and say that te dismissal is without
prejudice? NO it is the rule that tells that the second dismissal is with prejudice, the court is not given discretion.
But there could be a situation that the second dismissal will not be considered with prejudice. The two dismissal
rule refers to a situation where the cases have been filed before a competent court. If one of the cases has not
been file before a competent court, that dismissal will not be with prejudice.
In section 2,involve another dismissal. This time not by mere notice of the plaintiff but upon motion. The
plaintiff after defendant files an answer is not given a prerogative to file a notice of dismissal but must file a
motion.
In the ordinary course, if the plaintiff files a motion, the likelihood is that the defendant will not object. But
section 2 gives the defendant a chance to object. Why would a defendant oppose the dismissal of the case upon
motion of the plaintiff if it is favorable to him? Section 2 is clear in saying that the dismissal is without prejudice.
in other words, if the defendant does not object and the court grants the dismissal, the plaintiff is later on
allowed to file another a complaint founded on the same cause. The defendant can insist that the dismissal
should be considered with prejudice. In section 2 the defendant also might have another good reason. If the
defendant has already filed an answer and has set up a counterclaim. He could insist on the dismissal but the
court should continue with his counterclaim. Dismissal of the complaint does not dismiss the counterclaim,
although it is a compulsory counterclaim. In effect section 2 gives us a very rare situation where a compulsory
counterclaim could survive without the principal action.
Section 3 presents an instance where the case is dismissed but this time the case could be dismissed on the
initiative of the defendant or the court itself. Dismissal for failure to prosecute, failure to attend trial in
presenting his evidence in chief, failure to comply with the lawful order of the court or to obey the provisions of
the Rules of Court. How can a court order a dismissal of the complaint upon the ground that the plaintiff failed
to obey the provisions of the Rules? A good example is Rule 18. It is provided expressly that it is the duty of the
plaintiff to set his complaint for pre-trial. Once the last pleading is filed. If the plaintiff fails to do so for a
reasonable length of time, the case may be dismissed. The dismissal is with prejudice unless the court makes a
qualification.
In most courts, if the court calls the case for trial in the merits and the plaintiff does nit appear. The defendant
may take advantage of the absence of the plaintiff. The lawyer for the defendant may ask the court for the
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dismissal of the case on the ground of failure to prosecute or failure to appear during presentation of evidence of
chief. Usually the trial court in most instances accommodates.
The dismissal is upon the adjudication of the merits. In order to be valid the order of dismissal should comply
with the essentials requirements of a valid judgment under Rule 36 and also under the Constitution. What are
the requirements? Under Rule 36, one of the essential requisite of a valid judgment of any court, is first there
must be factual findings, conclusions of law. If it decision does not have factual findings and conclusion of law
applicable, that decision is null and void. So if the court simply says for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute for
unreasonable length of time, that is not a factual finding of the court, it is a conclusion of the court. The SC said
for a trial court to render a valid judgment the court should explain why and how it come to a conclusion that
the plaintiff failed to prosecute. The court should give circumstances based on the record of the case which
convince the court to conclude that the plaintiff indeed is guilty of failure to prosecute, without such
explanation, the judgment is null and void. Therefore it can be subject to a challenged at anytime. It can be
collaterally attack. Remember that if there is adjudication upon the merits according to the rules, the order is
simply an order of dismissal under Rule 16 or 17. For the validity of such dismissal the court should explain. An
order for dismissal with prejudice should comply strictly with the requirements of Rule 36. If no compliance, it
is not considered a valid judgment. It is a void judgment.
RULE 18
Pre-trial is mandatory in all cases, civil or criminal. Even in summary procedure,we have compulsory pre-trial,
though it is called preliminary conference. Also in small claims there is a semblance of a pre-trial because the
small claims court will call the parties to a preliminary conference wherein the court will make use the JDR rule,
Judicial Dispute Resolution. In all civil actions a pre-trial is mandatory. In fact it is the duty of the plaintiff to
schedule his complaint for pretrial after the last pleading has been filed. And if he fails to do so, that could be a
ground for the dismissal of the case. The dismissal will be with prejudice.
This rule on pre trial has been modified by certain circulars of the SC, applying the principles of mediation and
conciliation. Usually if the trial court calls the parties to a pretrial and the parties present themselves to the court
for pretrial conference, what trial courts usually do now is to tell the parties that they should first attend
mediation and conciliation by SC accredited mediators or conciliators. After the mediation or conciliation
process is terminated without an agreement. Then the parties are required to go back to court to attend the
formal the pretrial conference. During the mediation and conciliation process, the mediator or conciliator will
issue a notice to the litigants on the date scheduled for the mediation and conciliation. If the plaintiff does not
appear he ignores the notice sent by the mediator or conciliator for the mediation or conciliation conference and
repeatedly ignores such notice, the mediator will submit a report to the trial court telling the court on what has
transpired in the mediation or conciliation proceeding. If the conciliator submits the report saying that plaintiff
has absented himself, then that is a ground for order of dismissal. And could be a dismissal with prejudice. So if
the court issues a notice requiring the parties to attend a pretrial conference and during that conference the court
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also instructs the parties to attend mediation or conciliation proceedings, that mediation or conciliation
proceeding are part of the pretrial to be conducted by the court. If the party absents himself in the mediation or
conciliation, it is as if the party absents himself in the pretrial conference. There can be a order of dismissal if it is
the plaintiff or the court may order the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte if it is the defendant.
If the conciliator or mediator fails in his attempt to convince the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement, he
will simply submit his report to the court and the record will be return to the court for a pretrial conference.
If we based it purely in Rule 18, the parties have the common duty. The first is to submit a pretrial brief and the
second is to attend the pretrial conference. If the fail to submit a pretrial brief there are serious sanctions that
may be imposed by the court. Even if they were able to submit a pretrial brief on time but they failed to attend
the pretrial conference there could also be serious sanctions and consequences. In case of the plaintiff, the
sanction is dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. In case of a defendant, the sanction is for the plaintiff to
present his evidence ex parte. In other words, we do not observe anymore the principle that if the defendant
does not attend the pretrial conference or fails to submit a pretrial brief on time, the court cannot anymore issue
and order telling that the defendant as in default. The decision of the court will be based on the evidence
presented by the plaintiff.
If a defendant is in default under Rule 9, the court may order the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte, in the
absence of the defendant. The same is true with Rule 18 , if the defendant has filed an answer but neglects to
submit a pretrial brief or fails to attend the pretrial conference or even send a representative armed with SPA,
what the court will order the plaintiff to do is to present evidence ex parte.
In rule 9 when the defendant is in default and there is an ex parte presentation of evidence, the court may only
award what the plaintiff has prayed for in the complaint. But in rule 18, the court may make an award in
accordance with the evidence presented by the plaintiff. In other words, we apply the amendment in pleading to
conform to evidence in rule 18,in ex parte presentation of evidence. But not applicable in rule 9. The reason is
because the defendant is not in default in rule 18, there is already in an answer.
Please also take note the difference of a pretrial conference in a civil and criminal case., particularly in the
stipulations of fact. In a civil case, the parties can stipulate on facts even without a pretrial conference, in fact the
parties can simply submit to the court joint stipulation of facts but during the pretrial conference, the parties are
present together with the lawyer for one of the principal purposes is to enable to parties to agree on a the
existence of certain facts and that will be treated as a judicial admission on the part of the parties. These facts
stipulated will be a part of the record of the case. They can be even made verbally. There is no rule that the facts
stipulated should be reduced in writing. But in a criminal case, the rules are stringent. There could also be
stipulations but procedure is very strict with regard to the admissibility and enforceability of the stipulation of
facts. In Criminal procedure if the prosecution and defense stipulate on certain facts that stipulation must be
reduced in writing, and must be signed by the counsel for the accused and the accused himself and such must
be approved by the court.
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After the pretrial conference is terminated, a trial court is required to issue a pretrial order. That is a requirement
for all courts. The last section of pretrial pertains that the pretrial order will control the proceedings later on. In
that pretrial order the court is required to specify the issues that had not been stipulated upon and the issues
that should be the object of the trial. It is the pretrial order that will be followed by the court, when the court
finds it necessary to conduct a trial. The pretrial order is a very important document. If we follow decisions of
the SC, the issues specified in the pretrial order in a civil case since they control the proceeding taken after by the
court. The court can even disregard the pleadings submitted by the parties.
For instance, the plaintiff files a complaint against the defendant for the recovery of an unpaid loan. The
defendant files an answer and the issue that is raised by the pleadings is whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover P 1 million from the defendant. The case is scheduled for pretrial. The parties attended the pretrial
and during the conference the plaintiff and the defendant agree that the issue to be tried is not the right of the
plaintiff to recover P 1M but the entitlement of the plaintiff to recover from the defendant a piece of land. So we
start with a civil action but during the conference, the parties can tell the court that the issue is whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover apiece of land from the defendant. And that is the issue that is embodied in the
pretrial order. Is that pretrial order valid? YES, although it is in conflict with the pleadings raised by the parties.
It is because Rule 18 is very clear, it is the pretrial order that will govern the course of the proceeding. Even
there is no amendment in the pleadings. The issue as to recover the sum of money will simply be disregarded by
the court. The prevailing order will be the pretrial order issued by the court. Why do we allow the trial court to
change the issues without changing the pleadings? Remember that in a pretrial conference both parties are
present. Both parties must come into an agreement themselves. The court will simply be following the desire of
the litigants. However such procedure is not proper in a criminal case.
Let us say that the court strictly follows its pretrial order and then it schedules the case for trial. The court
reminds the parties to present evidence limited to the issue on whether the plaintiff is entitled to the piece of
land. During the trial the plaintiff presents evidence that he is entitled to recover the piece of land. There is
nothing wrong with that. But what if the plaintiff also presents evidence that he is entitled to recover P 1M. Can
the plaintiff so present evidence on such issue? He cannot if the defendant objects but if the defendant does not
object, the plaintiff will be able to present an issue not raised in the pretrial order. So in our example, the
plaintiff presents 2 evidence, one of which is specified in the pretrial order, the other is not specified but has
been raised in the pleadings. Why do we allow the plaintiff to present evidence on an issue not raised in the
pretrial order? It is because on the rule on amendment to conform to evidence. In other words with respect to
issues in the civil case, we can jump from one issue to another as long as the parties agreed. And the court will
render a judgment based on the evidence presented.



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We go now to the remedies to appeal a judgement. If we are going to compare the remedies available to the
defeated party in a civil case, you must have noticed that the remedies mentioned in civil procedure are also
mentioned in criminal procedure but there are certain instances where the consequences could be different from
one another. There are also remedied in a criminal case to appeal a judgment which may not be available in a
civil case or available in a civil case but not available in a criminal case.
For a civil case, the remedies available to the aggrieved party would depend primarily on whether the judgment
has been entered or not. If the judgement has not been entered, following the provisions of Rule 36, that is to say
the period to appeal is not yet expired, the 15-day period is still running, and the remedies available to the
aggrieved party in this instance would be Rule 37, motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration and of
course, the last is appeal. But if the judgement has already been entered, it has become final and executory, we
can no longer make use of appeal, new trial or reconsideration. We can make use of other remedies beginning
with 38, that is relief from judgement, then we can have annulment of judgment in Rule 47 and in certain
instances, Rule 65.
If you compare these remedies available in a civil case depending on whether the judgment has been entered or
not, and we jump to a criminal case, you will notice that in a criminal case, before the judgment of conviction
becomes final, we have the same remedies-- new trial, reconsideration, appeal but there is a fourth remedy, that
is reopening of the case. Notice that reopening is available by express provision even after a judgement by
conviction has been rendered. But in a civil case, there is no mention of the availability of reopening in order to
challenge a judgment that has been rendered in a civil case. It does not mean to say, however, that reopening of
a civil case is not available in a civil case. It is still available in a civil case but before the judgment is rendered. If
there is already a judgement rendered by the trial court, reopening is no longer available to the aggrieved party.
The SC said that we also have reopening in a civil case as a remedy but since jurisprudence requires that there
must be no judgment yet rendered by the court, the time frame for the remedy of reopening in a civil case will
be a short period, that is from the termination of the trial which is after the parties presented their evidence and
before thr judgement is rendered by the trial court. That could be a long period depending on whether the trial
court renders judgment promptly. But as long as the judgement has not yet been rendered by the trial court in a
civil case, any one of the parties can move fore reopening of the case. Because reopening as a remedy in a civil
case should be held before a judgement is rendered, of course we cannot make use of the grounds mentioned in
Rule 37 on newly-discovered evidence, judgement is contrary to law, we cannot make use of these grounds to
justify a reopening of a civil case. The SC said that there are no grounds specifically mentioned in the Rules, in
fact, reopening a civil case is not expressly recognized. It is just a remedy accepted by jurisprudence. And
usually, reopening is a remedy availed of in a civil case after trial has ended but before judgement for the
purpose of allowing the movant to offer evidence which he may have forgotten to present during trial or
additional evidence. So reopening is available also in a civil case but the time frame is before judgment is
rendere but after trial is terminated. If you compare that to a criminal case, you will immediately notice the
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difference. In a criminal case, reopening as a remedy is expressly recognized in criminal procedure. And
reopening can be had by the accused even if there is already a judgment of conviction as long as that judgement
has not yet become final and executory.
So in a criminal case, you also have new trial, reconsideration, appeal and reopening. But after the judgement of
conviction has been entered, you will also notice that in criminal procedure, there is nothing mentioned about
petition for relief from judgement. It is not applicable. Also, there is nothing mentioned about annulment of
judgement. And so the accused cannot make use of relief from judgement and annulment of judgement. The
remedies available to the accused if his conviction becomes final and executory could either be habeas corpus or
a petition for certiorari in the exercise by the court of its equity jurisdiction. If the accused only feels that his
detention in prison is unlawful, his remedy is habeas corpus. The SC has made this very clear already. Rule 47
applies only to a civil case. It cannot apply to a criminal case. The SC in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction
could also entertain a petition for certiorari even if the judgement of conviction has become final and executory.
There is a case where the SC exercised this equity jurisdiction involving a criminal case. It was a capital offense
tried by the RTC, the accused was represented by counsel, there was a judgement of conviction but at that time,
death penalty was still allowed. The case eventually reached the SC because of the penalty imposed, death
penalty. The SC analyzed the records of the case and was convinced that there was nothing wrong about the
judgement of conviction. So the judgement became final and executory. After the entry of that decision by the
SC, the Executive Department started the process of putting to death the convict. And then, there came a time
when the date of execution was approaching. A journalist went to the hometown of the accused and found
overwhelming evidence that the accused was insane. When this story came out, the Executive Department, the
DOJ and the SC sent investigators to find out the truth and their report was to the effect that the court may have
committed an error in convicting the accused because the accused should not have been charged of a capital
offense in the first place. The SC allowed petition for certiorati to be filed which eventually resulted in the
release of the accused. When questions were raised as to propriety of a petition for certiorari long after the
judgement has become final and executory, the SC said that certiorari as remedy is part of its equity jurisdiction.
So certiorari is available both in civil and criminal cases to challenge a final and executory judgement if the
situation calls for the SC's exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
Now, with respect to new trial and reconsideration in a criminal case, nothing is mentioned about a pro forma
motion for new trial or pro forma motion for reconsideration. If you read Rule 37 for civil cases, the Rule is very
explicit in requiring that a motion for new trial or reconsideration must strictly comply with the requirements of
a motion so that that motion will not fall under the concept of a pro forma motion. A pro forma motion will
always be denied and it could result to an instance where the losing party could lose all the remedies because he
has filed a pro forma motion. This is possible in a civil case because if the aggrieved party files a pro forma
motion, the pro forma motion will not stop the running of the reglementary period to appeal. And if the denial
comes after the expiration of the 15-day period, then the aggrieved party would have lost the remedy of appeal.
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Entry of judgement takes place by operation of law. He would only be left with the remedies of petition for relief
from judgement, annulment of judgement and certiorari under 65. In a criminal case, the SC said there is no
such thing as a pro forma motion in a criminal case. So in a criminal case, the filing of motion for new trial or
reconsideration will always stop the running of the period to appeal, even if it is pro forma.
Another distinguishing feature of a new trial or reconsideration in a criminal case is that the idea for the accused
to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration could come from the court or the court could even initiate a new
trial or reconsideration as long as the accused gives his consent. In a civil case, we always need a motion for new
trial or reconsideration initiated by the aggrieved party.
In Rule 37, the grounds for new trial are completely different from those of reconsideration. This is the reason
why these two motions are distinct and independent of one another. Supposing that a defendant in a civil case is
advised while the period to appeal is running, we have three remedies--- motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration and appeal. Then the counsel avails of these three remedies. What happens? The SC said that if
the losing party files an appeal during the pendency of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, the
motions are deemed abandoned. It is the appeal that will prevail. It is inconsistent for an aggrieved party to file
a motion for new trial and while waiting for the resolution, he would perfect an appeal. That will render the
motion academic. Upon perfection of the appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction, what would be left is residual
jurisdiction. In another case, the winning party filed a motion for execution pending appeal under Rule 39. Then
the losing party filed a motion for new trial. The issue raised before the SC was can the court act on the motion
for execution pending appeal without first resolving the motion for new trial. The SC said it is not proper. The
trial court should first resolve the motion for new trial. The court should always give preference to a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration.
In a motion for new trial founded on fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence (FAME) which ordinary
prudence could not have prevented and which probably impair the rights of the movant, we need an affidavit of
merit. The affidavit of merit should be executed by persons who have personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding these acts of FAME. So it is not correct to say that in a motion for new trial, we always need an
affidavit of merit. We only need an affidavit of merit if thr grounds relied upon are FAME. If the ground relied
upon is newly-discovered evidence (NDE), we don't need affidavit of merit. What we need is an affidavit of the
witness who is going to give testimony if the motion is granted. But if the evidence to be presented is
documentary, an authentic copy should be attached to the motion for new trial.
You are also familiar with the principle in new trial that the fraud contemplated in 37 is always extrinsic fraud.
If the fraud that is alleged in a motion for new trial in intrinsic fraud, that motion will be denied. Rule 37 speaks
of fraud that could not have been prevented with the exercise of ordinary prudence. The phrase "that could not
have been prevented with the exercise of ordinary prudence" will really imply the type of fraud that could be a
ground for new trial which is extrinsic fraud. So lawyers are allowed to cheat one another as long as it is
confined to intrinsic fraud that could be avoided through the use of ordinary prudence. For instance, the
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presentation of a forged document will not be a ground for new trial because the presentation of a forged
document by the plaintiff could be easily avoided by the defendant through the use of ordinary prudence. He
could have called witnesses to testify that that document was forged. Another instance of dishonesty which the
court did not consider extrinsic fraud is when the plaintiff presented witnesses who were perjured. Extrinsic
fraud is that which deprived a party of his day in court. If we allow every act of dishonesty to be a ground for
new trial, there will never be an end to litigation.
With respect to mistake, the mistake of the lawyer is the mistake of the client. The SC is just applying the rule on
agency, the act of the agent is the act of the principal. But there is one situation when the SC relaxed the
application of this principle. The SC said that if the mistake of the lawyer amounts to bad faith, that there is an
insinuation that the lawyer committed the mistake to cause the defeat of his client, then that will be a ground for
new trial. If it can be proven that a lawyer sold out his client, that will be also be a ground for new trial.
In newly-discovered evidence, because of the requirement that if admitted by the court, it will probably alter the
result of the case, we cannot consider corroborating evidence as NDE. This will not alter the result of the case.
The recantation of a witness is not NDE. The testimony of a witness given in open court reflects the truth.
In a motion for reconsideration under Rule 37, there are only 3 grounds. There is also a rule that only one motion
for reconsideration will be allowed to the aggrieved party. A second MR will not be allowed even if based on
another ground. This rule is absolute, there is no exception unlike a motion for new trial where rule 37 expressly
allows the movant to file a second motion for new trial provided the second motion is founded on a different
ground. But whether it is a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, the court will not allow an
extension of time to file these motions. The party must observe the 15-day or 30-day period. If the MR is
favorably acted upon, what the court will do is to render an amended judgement. If the motion for new trial is
granted and it is not a partial motion for new trial, the judgement will be vacated but the evidence presented
during the trial of the case will not be disturbed. But if that motion for new trial is granted in a criminal case,
judgement will also be vacated and the evidence presented during trial must be retaken. Because the grounds
for new trial in a criminal case are serious irregularities or errors committed by the trial court.
In Rule 37, it is clearly provided that if a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration is denied, the denial
cannot be appealed. What should be appealed is the decision itself rendered by the court. It cannot even be the
subject of Rule 65. The only remedy of the aggrieved party is to appeal from the judgement in the merits that is
the subject of new trial or reconsideration. In appealing the judgement, the aggrieved party can assign as error
the denial of the motion for new trial or reconsideration.
Relief from judgement, that's rule 38. Relief from judgement is a remedy available to the aggrieved party after
the entry of judgement. In Rule 38, there are two periods to be reckoned. The second period, the 6-month period
is counted from entry of judgement. There was one case where the aggrieved party before the entry of
judgement filed before the trial court a petition for relief from judgement. The filing of that petition was really
improper because a judgement has not been entered. The SC said that the trial court should not have dismissed
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the petition but instead, it should have treated the petition for relief from judgement as a motion for new trial
because the grounds for motion for new trial are similar to those of petition for relief from judgement which is a
very liberal attitude adopted by the SC. So even if a lawyer commits an error, he files a petition for relief from
judgement founded on FAME but the judgement has not yet been entered, the court will consider the petition as
a motion for new trial provided that the petition carries with it the requirements in 37, that is an affidavit of
merit that will prove that there was FAME.
Is a petition for relief from judgement considered similar to annulment of judgement? It is not. A petition for
relief from judgement is not an independent action. In fact, it is just a continuation of the original case. If it were
an independent action, a petition for relief from judgement should always be filed with the RTC because it is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. But since it is not considered an independent action, Rule 38 provides that a
petition for relief from judgement should be filed with the same court that decided the case. In fact, in a petition
for relief from judgement, we use the old docket number of the case. Rule 38 is also very specific, a petition for
relief from judgement should be filed in the same court. What is important is the time frame provided in Rule
38. Because the judgement has already been entered, the winning party may have already filed a motion for
execution under Rule 39. Should the court grant the motion for execution? The answer is yes because that is a
ministerial duty of the court under Rule 39. If the court grants the motion for execution, will it not render
academic the relief from judgement filed by the aggrieved party? The answer is no. If you read Rule 38, it says
that the executing court that granted the motion for execution can issue a TRO or a preliminary injunction
against the enforcement of the writ of execution. This is an exception to the principle in injunction that to enjoin
a court, the injunctive relief should come from a higher court. Here it is the same court that issues the writ of
execution that will issue an injunctive writ against its own order to carry out the execution.
If petition for relief from judgement is granted, can the winning party appeal from the granting of the petition
for relief from judgement? The answer is no because the granting of the petition is only interlocutory. If a
petition for relief from judgement is denied, is the denial a final order? Yes. Can it be appealed? The answer is
no. You refer to Section 1 of Rule 41, it is a final order which is not appealable. The remedy of the petitioner is to
file a petition under Rule 65.
Now we go to the third remedy when the judgement has not yet been entered, that is appeal. Appeal as a
remedy could be a matter of right or a matter of discretion. When we say that the aggrieved party has the right
to appeal, it means to say that when he is able to perfect the appeal, the appellate court has no choice but to
render a decision as an appellate tribunal. When we say that appeal is a matter of discretion, we are giving to the
appellate court the discretion on whether or not to entertain the appeal. For a civil case, there are only 3 modes
of appeal, that is ordinary appeal, appeal by petition for review with the CA and appeal by petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. If the case originates from an inferior court, the only mode of appeal available is the
first one, ordinary appeal, even if the questions raised are purely questions of law. The Constitution does not
give to the SC exlusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain appeals involving purely questions of law. The
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procedure is provided in Rule 40. The aggrieved party will file a notice of appeal and of course pay the appellate
court docket fees. In some instances, the aggrieved party is required to file a record of appeal. The payment of
appellate court docket fees is jurisdictional. Let us say that the case pending before the inferior court is unlawful
detainer which is exclusively cognizable by an inferior court, the inferior court is presented with a motion to
dismiss, is that allowed in Summary Procedure? No, unless the ground is lack of jurisdiction or absence of prior
barangay conciliation. The defendant files a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction which the inferior
court grants. In Rule 16, if the dismissal is founded on lack of jurisdiction over the dubject matter, the dismissal
is without prejudice. If the aggrieved party wants to bring the matter to a RTC, will he appeal the order of
dismissal or should he file a petition for certiorari? If he is going to follow Rule 41 and the dismissal is a
dismissal without prejudice, he should not appeal. The remedy is a petition under 65. But in Rule 40, if an
inferior court dismisses a case which is within its exclusive jurisdiction on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the
remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal, ordinary appeal, not Rule 41. Why don't we just follow Rule 41? Because
there is a provision in Rule 40 which says that if the matter is brought to the RTC and RTC affirms the dismissal
made by the inferior court, it is the duty of the RTC to assume jurisdiction over the case. In unlawful detainer
decided by an inferior court, there could be an appeal to the RTC on both factual and legal questions. Whenever
the mode of appeal used is ordinary appeal, the appeal is a matter of right.
Before the RTC as an appellate court, since the appeal by the losing party is a matter of right, can the RTC also
order the dismissal of the appeal because the appellant has violated certain orders or provisions of the Rules of
Court? The answer is yes. Although it is the right of the losing party to appeal to the RTC, the losing party as an
appellant should also obey the orders of the RTC. One such order is given in Rule 41, that is the appellate court
can require the appellant to submit an appeal memorandum. If he does not submit an appeal memorandum,
that could be a ground for the dismissal of the appeal by the RTC.
If the RTC renders its own decision, can there be a second appeal? The answer is yes. This time to the CA via
petition for review. A second appeal is generally a matter of discretion. The first appeal is generally a matter of
right as long as the mode of appeal is ordinary appeal but if the mode of appeal is Rule 45, that is always a
matter of discretion on the part of the SC. In the appeal from the RTC to the CA via petition for review, only
questions of law could be raised. From the CA, do we allow a third appeal? There could be a third appeal to the
SC, but this is always a matter of discretion in a civil case.


Before we push through with the discussion on appeal, I suggest that you should first familiarize yourselves
with some terms that are relevant to appeal which are usually found in the decisions of the Supreme Court
resolving propriety or impropriety of appeals. The first of course is a final order compared to an interlocutory
order. You know the concept of these. Another one is the question of fact compared to question of law. The third
would be the material data rule in appeals. And then we have improper appeal and erroneous appeal, a
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memorandum decision on appeal and rule on harmless errors. A memorandum decision is found in Rule 51.
The harmless error rule is also found in Rule 51. The opposite of harmless error is of course harmful error.

With respect to material data rule, the material data rule is always an essential component of any mode of
appeal whether it is ordinary appeal or petition for review or petition for review on certiorari. The material data
rule simply tells the appellant that regardless of the mode of appeal chosen by him he should see to it that in this
appeal he should inform the court about the dates that when he received the decision, the date when he received
a denial of his motion for new trial or reconsideration so that the court can immediately ascertain if the appeal is
perfected on time. So the material data rule will consists of dates when the decision is received or when there is
a motion for reconsideration when it is filed or when it is denied, if there is motion for new trial when it is filed
or when it is denied so that on the face of the mode of appeal used, the court can readily ascertain whether the
appeal is timely perfected. This is always important in the appellate court because when the appeal is not
perfected on time, the appellate court has not acquired jurisdiction over the appealed case, it has something to
do with the authority or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or even the Regional Trial
Court. This is not a new rule introduced in the 1997 Rules, this is an old doctrine we have been observing this
even before 1997 Rules. But there was a time, before 1997 when the Supreme Court dispensed the material data
rule. Then in 1997, the Supreme Court decided to re-impose this as an essential so that an appeal can be
entertained by an appellate court. Again, the reason why we have the material the data rule is the question of
jurisdiction of the appellate court is a judgment has been entered then it is obvious that this issue can no longer
be appealed so the only recourse for the court usually is to deny the appeal, to disallow the appeal.

With respect to the concept of erroneous appeal and improper appeal, this is also mention in the rules. There is
an improper appeal when the mode of appeal used by the applicant is the correct mode but the issues or the
questions raised in that appeal should not be raised during the appeal. So it has something to do with question
of fact and question of law. So that for instance, if the trial court is a Regional Trial Court, from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court there could be an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the mode of appeal is still ordinary
appeal, a notice of appeal. So the notice of appeal is filed with the Regional Trial Court and eventually the
records are transmitted to the Court of Appeals. Under the rules, when there is an appeal by ordinary appeal to
the Court of Appeals from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of questions of fact and of law could be raised.
But the Rules says that if the only issue raised in that appeal is purely question of law, the Court of Appeals has
no jurisdiction. So the Court of Appeals will only dismiss the appeal. That is the importance of knowing the
meaning of improper appeal.

Erroneous appeal, on the other hand, refers to a situation where the mode of appeal used is not the correct
mode. For instance, under the rules, the correct mode is ordinary appeal but the mode used by the appellant is
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petition for review. That is an example of erroneous appeal. But as we go on, we will conclude that unlike
improper appeal where it could lead to dismissal of the appeal there are certain instances where even if the
appeal is erroneous the error committed by the appellant will not lead to the dismissal of the case.

Yesterday, we said that if the court of origin is an inferior court, there could be an appeal to the Regional Trial
Court. The mode of appeal is ordinary appeal just file the notice of appeal or notice of appeal plus a record on
appeal in certain instances where the law requires the submission of a record on appeal. From the Regional Trial
Court as an appellate court we said that there could be a further appeal, a second appeal to the Court of Appeals
but this time the mode of appeal is by petition for review. So we go back to the inferior court. From the inferior
court the mode of appeal is a notice of appeal, which is ordinary appeal. Supposing the aggrieved party chooses
the second mode which is a petition for review, which is the wrong mode. So immediately you will notice that
there is something wrong with the way by which the appeal has been perfected. Can the Regional Trial Court
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appellant has chosen a wrong mode of appeal? The Supreme Court
said no. Even if the appellate court is a Regional Trial Court, and the appellant has chosen wrong mode of
appeal, which is a petition for review, the Regional Trial Court cannot dismiss the petition, he should disregard
the error committed by the appellant the reason given by the Supreme Court, if you compare the contents of a
notice appeal to that of a petition for review, the contents of the petition for review more than satisfied the
requirements of notice of appeal. If you have seen how the petition for review is drafted, it is a very lengthy
document. In that petition for review there is also an application of the material data rule and then there are
errors that are assigned by the appellant and there are arguments also that are embodied in that petition for
review whereas in the notice of appeal, the appellant simply tells the court in one paragraph, I am appealing
from the decision rendered by the court dated such and such and together with this notice of appeal, I have paid
the appellate court docket fee of so much. That is what a notice of appeal simply contains so if the appellant
hopefully chooses a petition for review, the Supreme Court said the Regional Trial Court should entertain the
appeal because the essential of notice of appeal are already contained in the petition for review. But if it is the
other way around such as where the Regional Trial Court is an appellate court exercising its appellate
jurisdiction from its decision under the rules, the right mode is as we said petition for review, the appellant
instead of filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals and serving a copy upon the Regional Trial
Court files simply a notice of appeal that appeal will be dismissed because the mode of appeal used is erroneous
and it will not conferred jurisdiction anymore upon the Regional Trial Court. In other words there are instances
where a wrong choice in the mode of appeal will lead to dismissal of appeal. There also instances where the
wrong choice will be disregarded by the appellate court.

Also under the rules, the only mode of appeal that is allowed in civil cases with the Supreme Court is Rule 45
that is petition for review on certiorari or appeal by certiorari. The case is decided by the Regional Trial Court
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exercising original jurisdiction, from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, there could be an appeal either to
the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court depending on the choice of the appellant. The appellant decides
to go to the Supreme Court directly but instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari or appeal on certiorari
under Rule 45, he simply files a notice of appeal. The Supreme Court will dismiss the appeal because the choice
of mode of appeal is erroneous. Under the rules, if there is erroneous appeal, the Supreme Court will dismiss
that appeal. A notice of appeal will never be able to satisfy the contents of petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. On the other hand, even if the rules are very keen in saying that in civil cases, the mode of appeal to the
Supreme Court is only through Rule 45, using the petition for review on certiorari or appeal by certiorari. If the
appellant in avertedly calls his petition simply a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the Supreme Court has
also been very liberal in considering a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as a petition for review under Rule
45. The Supreme Court said, after all the contents of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are exactly the same
as the contents of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. But the Supreme Court cautioned parties that
petition for certiorari although in fact it should be a petition for review on certiorari should be filed within the
time given for appeal that is within a period of 15 days. If you will recall, in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 the period provided is 60 days but in Rule 45 the petition for review on certiorari should be filed within 15
days. As long as it is timely filed even if the appellant wrongly calls his petition for review on certiorari simply
petition for certiorari the court shall just disregard the error committed by the appealing party. In the Court of
Appeals, the decisions that could be appealed to the Court of Appeals do not necessarily come from the courts
of justice. The decision that could be appealed in the Court of Appeals could be penned by quasi-judicial bodies.
But whether the decision is issued by quasi-judicial body or a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, there is just a common mode of appeal that is petition for review. Is
there any difference procedurally between petition for review filed before the Court of Appeals if the appealed
decision comes from the Regional Trial Court and when the appealed decision comes from the quasi-judicial
bodies? As to the contents of the petition for review, there is no significant difference. But as to the enforcement
of the decision appealed from, there is a great difference. If the decision appealed comes from the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the decision of the Regional Trial Court cannot be executed
there could be no execution. There could be an execution but it has to be an execution pending appeal. A motion
should be filed before the Court of Appeals and that motion must be supported by special reasons to convince
the Court of Appeals to order execution of judgment. So generally, when there is an appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a decision of a court of justice like a Regional Trial Court the appealed decision cannot be the
subject of execution. But when the decision appealed by way of petition for review to the Court of Appeals is a
decision rendered by a quasi-judicial body, the appeal will not stay the execution of the decision. The decision of
the quasi-judicial will have to be enforced during the pendency of the appeal. There is only one way by which
we can stop the execution of the judgment rendered by a quasi judicial body from being enforced during the
pendency of the appeal that is to ask the Court of Appeals to issue a writ of preliminary injunction. Why do we
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allow execution of a judgment that is being reviewed by the Court of Appeals when the judgment is rendered by
quasi-judicial bodies but we do not allow that when the judgment is rendered by the Regional Trial Court? One
reason given in the Rules is that in quasi-judicial bodies the quantum of evidence is only substantial evidence
whereas in the Regional Trial Court the quantum of evidence is preponderance of evidence.

If we compare also the remedies available to the defeated party before the trial court and before the appellate
courts, like the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals and Supreme Courts we will also notice that if the
appellate court becomes higher and higher, the remedies available to the defeated party on that appeal is
considerably lessen. Yesterday we said that before the court of origin whether it is an inferior court or a Regional
Trial Court, the aggrieved party can file a motion for new trial, he can file a motion for recon and he can also
appeal, so there can be three remedies before judgment is entered.

From the inferior court we go to the Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court also renders its own
decision. Can a defeated party can still file motion for reconsideration? Yes. There could still be motion for
reconsideration; there could still be motion for new trial before the Regional Trial Court, even if the Regional
Trial has decided the case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. There could be another appeal to the Court
of Appeals in fact this will now be the second appeal. If the Court of Appeals has rendered its own decision, can
the defeated party make use of the remedies that we mentioned? Can he file a motion for reconsideration? The
answer is also yes. There could be motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. Can there be a
motion for new trial before the Court of Appeals? Yes there is still a motion for new trial before the Court of
Appeals. But this time, there is only one ground for new trial before the Court of Appeals. The new trial in the
can be founded only newly discovered evidence. We cannot anymore use fraud, accidents, mistakes and
excusable negligence. And if you read carefully the provisions of the rules on appeals to the Court of Appeals,
you will notice that while a motion for new trial could still be availed of in the Court of Appeals it is not
necessary to wait for the Court of Appeals to decide the case. Even if the case has not yet been decided by the
Court of Appeals, the movant can already file a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence that is
not possible when the case is before an inferior court or even before the Regional Trial Court acting as an
appellate court, in the Regional Trial Court we have to wait for the Regional Trial Court to render a decision
before we can file a motion for reconsideration or motion for new trial. With respect to the Court of Appeals, we
should also wait for the decision of the Court of Appeals before we can move for reconsideration but when it
comes to a motion for new trial we do not have to wait for Court of Appeals to render a decision before we can
make use of a motion for new trial founded on newly discovered evidence that is clearly spelled out in the rules.
The availability of a motion for new trial before the Court of Appeals as long as the case is within the jurisdiction
of Court of Appeals. Even if the Court of Appeals has not yet decided the case, there could be a motion for new
trial founded on newly discovered evidence and that is the only ground for new trial in the Court of Appeals.
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We dont make use fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. But when the case finally reaches the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court has decided the case, then the only remedy available, among the
motions that we mentioned will be a motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court does not entertain a
motion for new trial regardless of the merit of that motion for new trial. The reason given by the Supreme Court
is that the Supreme Court generally is not a trier of facts and a motion for new trial, will always involved a
question of fact based on newly discovered evidence. So this remedy of motion for new trial will end to the
Court of Appeals as an appellate court but remember the new trial with the Court of Appeals is limited to only
one ground and it is newly discovered evidence. While a new trial filed before the Regional Trial Court can
involve newly discovered evidence, it can involve fraud, accident, mistakes and excusable negligence.

With respect to Rule 45, this is appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, in civil cases this is the only mode
used. In other words, we cannot use notice of appeal we cannot use a petition for review the Supreme Court
strictly applies this rule on appeal. It does not mean to say however that we cannot go up to the Supreme Court
by simply filing a notice of appeal or ordinary appeal, what the rules prohibit is ordinary appeal to the Supreme
Court that is notice of appeal if it is a civil case if the case is a criminal case, there could be a notice of appeal to
the Supreme Court such as when the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua by the Court of
Appeals, the appeal from that criminal case will be by notice of appeal, it will not be an appeal by petition for
review on certiorari. In a petition for review on certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals, it is axiomatic that
only question of law can be raised. So if we raised question of law and also a question of fact before the Supreme
Court, the Supreme Court will not necessarily disallow the appeal, the rules say that if the issues raised in an
appeal under Rule 45 are both factual and legal, the Supreme Court has the discretion to remand the case to the
Court of Appeals but that is always a matter of discretion. And when the Supreme Court sends the case to the
Court of Appeals because the issues raised are both factual and legal the Court of Appeals will have the duty
now to review the case and renders its own decision. But the opposite does not apply such as when the Court of
Appeal is the appellate court let us say there is an appeal to the Court of Appeals through ordinary appeal, the
court of origin being a Regional Trial Court. The mode of appeal as we said is ordinary appeal he simply file a
notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court and pay the appellate court a docket fee. It is in this kind of
appeal, that the Court of Appeals where the rules require the appellant to submit his brief on appeal that is why
sometimes in courts decisions you will meet the term brief for the appellant and brief for the appellee, these
submissions are required only if the appeal is by ordinary appeal the trial court is the Regional Trial Court and
the appellate court is the Court of Appeals. If the trial court is an inferior court and there is an appeal to the
Regional Trial Court and from the Regional Trial Court we go up to the Court of Appeals we dont use ordinary
appeal, the mode is petition for review. If the court of origin is a Regional Trial Court exercising original
jurisdiction, the mode of appeal is by ordinary appeal, notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. During the
pendency of the appeal, the Court of Appeals will require the appellant to submit a brief, called a brief for the
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appellant. Then the rules also provide for the contents of that brief for the appellant. If the appellant does not
submit his brief on time, that will be enough reason to dismiss the appeal. Even if the submits his brief on time,
the appeal could still be dismissed if the brief submitted by the appellant does not contain the essentials
mentioned in the Rules of Court. If you will read the provisions of the rules as to the contents of the brief for the
appellant, you will noticed that the brief for the appellant will be divided into several chapters, there is this
subject index there is this statement of the case there is this statement of facts, arguments and errors assigned by
the appellant. If the brief for the appellant does not contain an assignment of errors, that is fatal, the court will
dismiss the appeal even if there is a brief submitted by the appellant if the brief does not contain assignment of
errors. Why is the Court of Appeals is very much interested in that chapter in a brief that is the assignment of
errors, without which the appeal will be dismissed? The assignment of errors is essential in an appeal to the
Court of Appeals by ordinary appeal because in so far as the Court of Appeals that decision appealed from, that
is the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court is a correct decision. Remember that in our Rules on
Evidence there is disputable presumption that a decision rendered by any court is a correct decision, a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. So if the court decides a case there is a
presumption of regularity so there is a presumption that the decision rendered by the court is a correct decision.
The Court of Appeals will always be applying that disputable presumption whenever there is an appeal in a
civil case to the Court of Appeals. In fact that same attitude will be adopted by the Supreme Court whenever
there is an appeal brought to the Supreme Court under Rule 45, that disputable presumption as to the
correctness of the decision appealed from. Since the Court of Appeals will look at the decision of the Regional
Trial Court as a correct decision, the only means by which the appellant can destroy or overturn such
presumption is by convincing the Court of Appeals that serious errors have been committed by the Regional
Trial Court. And the problem of the appellant is that he is not allowed to introduce evidence to show that errors
are have been committed by the Regional Trial Court, the appellant will have to rely on the records that have
already been submitted before the Regional Trial Court. So the only way by which he can possibly convince the
Court of Appeals that errors have been committed by the Regional Trial Court is to make an assignment of
errors. If the appellant cannot make an assignment of errors in his brief that means to say that the appellant
finds nothing wrong with the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court, therefore the disputable
presumption stays, it will still be used by the Court of Appeals. That is why this chapter in a brief for the
appellant about assignment of error is always essential. Its absence will be fatal in appeal. The appeal can be
dismissed if there is no assignment of errors in the brief submitted by the appellant. Can the appellant let us say
in his brief assign as an error first and only error assigned the Regional Trial Court committed an error
deciding the case against the appellant? That is not the assignment of error that is expected by the Court of
Appeals. The errors should be specified particular facts, conduct, orders issued by the court, which could have
affected his substantial rights which brings us now to the concept of harmless errors in appeal. In Rule 51
Section 6 that is the section on harmless errors with respect to appeals. In any litigation we could expect that the
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trial court must have committed errors during the proceedings. After all the judge is also a part of humanity so
he could commit errors just like lawyers who represented their clients they could commit errors also. But in that
principle of harmless error in given in Rule 51, it is expressly provided that only errors committed by the court
in admission of evidence, in issuing orders that affects substantial rights of the appellant will be considered by
the appellate court. So if the error committed by court does not really affect the substantial rights of the
appellant, the error will be disregarded by the court even if it is made part of the assignment of errors. This
requirement on assignment of errors gives the message that in civil cases that are brought on appeal the
appellate court will only resolve the issues raised in the assignment of errors no other issues generally will be
resolved by the court only the errors assigned by the appellant in his brief. The only exception when the
appellate court or Court of Appeals will resolve other issues not raised in the assignment is when the Court of
Appeals sees that an issue is closely related to one of the issues raised by the appellant in his brief. That is why
we have also rule on appeals that the authority of the appellate court is only to resolve issues in the assignment
of errors made by the appellant. But again this rule applies only to a civil case it does not apply to a criminal
case. In a criminal case if there is an error committed by the trial court whether it is assigned as an error or not
assigned as an error the Court of Appeals or even the Supreme Court can take that into consideration in
resolving the case. The appellate courts are very flexible in a criminal case that are brought before them from a
decision of a trial court unlike in a civil case where there is a provision which limits the authority of the
appellate court to resolve only the errors or issues that are connected with the assignment of errors made in the
brief for the appellant.

If it is the appellant who does not submit a brief, the appeal will be dismissed. If it is the appellee who does not
submit his brief, the appeal will not be dismissed. The appellee can choose not to submit a brief at all. If the
appellee does not submit a brief, then the court will simply decide the case without a brief coming from the
appellee. It is the brief for the appellant whose non-submission could lead to the dismissal of an appeal. In the
Supreme Court under Rule 45 although Rule 45 is very clear in saying that only questions of law could be raised
in petition for review on certiorari the Supreme Court has recognized a number of exceptions. As of last count,
there are about 14 exceptional issues where the Supreme Court has allowed an appeal although factual issues
were raised in that petition for review on certiorari. I suggest that you memorize about five of them and that will
probably be enough for you to answer problems on appeals concerning Rule 45. In fact you can immediately
point three exceptions which are not a product of jurisprudence but a product of the circulars of the Supreme
Court where factual issues can be raised in a petition under Rule 45. The first one is kalikasan cases, the second
one is amparo and the third is habeas data. Under circulars of the Supreme Court on these three proceedings,
kalikasan, amparo and habeas data, the appeal to the Supreme Court should also be by petition for review on
certiorari and the circulars also provide that both factual and legal questions can be raised before Court of
Appeals under Rule 45.
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Rule 39 is described by the decisions of Supreme Court as the rule that which gives life to the law. It gives
life to the law in a sense that the winning party will be able to recover the award given in his favor through the
use of Rule 39. So if the civil case is for the recovery of money and the court awards let us say 2 million in favor
of the judgment creditor, the creditor of course will not be satisfied unless the 2 million is delivered to him. It is
not correct to assume that in order to satisfy the judgment we should always make use Rule 39. Satisfaction of
judgment as conceived in Rule 39 is a forcible satisfaction of judgment. So if the award in favor of the judgment
creditor is for the payment by the judgment debtor of 2 million pesos, the judgment creditor does not even have
to think about Rule 39 as long as he receives 2 million pesos from the judgment debtor. In other words, the
judgment debtor can voluntarily pay 2 million pesos to the creditor. It is only in that situation where the
judgment debtor refuses to pay where the only remedy of the judgment creditor to enforce payment is to make
use of Rule 39, that is to force the debtor to pay 2 million pesos by making a levy on his properties and by selling
this levied properties at public auction. That is the function of Rule 39 that is a forcible satisfaction of a final and
executory judgment. In the ordinary course of things, if there is an appeal from the decision rendered by the trial
court and it has reached the Supreme Court even if the decision has been affirmed by the Supreme Court and
the decision of the Supreme Court has been entered, it is not correct for the judgment creditor to ask for
execution from the Supreme Court. The matter of execution is a duty of the court of origin, if it is the inferior
court that originated the case it is the inferior court that will have the duty to enforce satisfaction of the claim.
The higher courts usually do not issue an order for the execution of judgment. What the lawyer for the judgment
creditor should do is to wait for the records to be returned to the court of origin. It could take time before the
records simply return to the court of origin. So if the records have not yet been received by the inferior court and
the judgment creditor files a motion for execution there is likelihood that the inferior court will tell him we have
not yet received the record so we cannot act on your motion although the issuance of execution, the granting the
motion for execution is already a ministerial duty of the court. Rule 39 has provided for the remedy in this
situation. If there is an appeal that has reached the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals as the case may be, the
appellate court will simply issue a certified true copy of the entry of judgment and that certified true copy will
be submitted immediately to the court of origin that could be the basis of the granting of a motion for execution
that is enough proof that there is really a final and executory judgment. Is there a need for the judgment creditor
to file a motion for execution? Of course there is always a need, if the judgment creditor does not file a motion
for execution the court has no business issuing a writ of execution because the court will not know whether
there has been voluntary satisfaction of the judgment so there has to be a motion for execution filed by the
judgment creditor. Since the judgment has become final and executory and it is now the ministerial duty of the
court to grant the motion and to issue a writ of execution, can the motion for execution can be heard ex parte?
This is without notifying the judgment debtor, without giving him a copy even with the motion. This issue
which is the subject of conflicting decisions of the Court the latest that I know of says that a motion for execution
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of a final and executory judgment can be heard ex parte by the trial court but previous decisions are to the effect
that the judgment debtor should also be given a copy of the motion for execution because the judgment debtor
may have grounds to oppose the issuance of the writ of execution. You adopt that old doctrine that the motion
for execution of a final and executory judgment should always be furnished upon the judgment debtor and that
the motion cannot be heard ex parte.

In the Rules, there is a period fixed within which the court can grant a motion for execution as a ministerial
duty. It is 5 years from entry of judgment. Then after the end of 5 years there could be revival of judgment, no
longer a motion but an independent action to revive the judgment but the independent action to revive the
judgment must be filed within the second five year period. The rules assume that the period of prescription for
the enforcement of a judgment is a ten year period. Is this a correct assumption? The answer is yes because that
is so provided in the Civil Code. The prescriptive period for the enforcement of a final and executory judgment
is really a period of ten years under the Civil Code. But what Rule 39 has provided is to divide the ten year
period into two parts. First five year and the second five year period, within the first five years you can execute
the judgment through a mere motion, a motion for execution. After the lapse of the first five year period, can the
judgment creditor still file a motion for execution? Not anymore. If he files a motion for execution, let us say on
the 7th year of the 10 year period, the court will deny the motion because the court does no longer have the
authority to order execution through the granting of a motion for execution. The second five year period is
designed to force the judgment creditor to file a separate complaint, an independent action for the revival of that
judgment. So the motion for execution should be filed within the first 5 year period of this 10 year period. Is the
first 5 year period strictly implemented by the Rules? It is not. Can it be extended? It can be extended according
to the Rules. The Supreme Court has decided that if the execution of the judgment within the first 5 year is
delayed and delay is attributable to the conduct or act that is traceable solely to the judgment debtor again the 5
year period is correspondingly extended that is equal to the period of delay caused by the conduct of the
judgment debtor. For example, within the first 5 years from entry of judgment, the judgment creditor files a
motion for execution. Let us say that the motion was filed on the 3
rd
year of the 5 year period. The judgment
debtor is given a copy of the motion, after receiving a copy of that motion for execution the judgment debtor
files a petition for the annulment of the judgment before the Court of Appeals. We assume that the execution
court is the Regional Trial Court. There is now a petition to annul the judgment under Rule 47, filed with the
Court of Appeals. And the Court of Appeals grants a preliminary injunction which is a relief sought by the
judgment debtor in his petition of annulment of judgment. Because of this preliminary injunction issued by the
Court of Appeals we cannot expect the Regional Trial Court to order the enforcement of that decision. So it will
take let us say the Court of Appeals a period of 2 years within in which to finally decide the case. At the end, the
Court of Appeals orders the dismissal for petition for annulment of judgment. So there is a delay by 2 years. If
the 5 year period has already lapsed then we are going to add another 2 years with that 5 year period. So the 5
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year period will be deemed automatically extended up to 7 years within which to execute the judgment to the
filing of a mere motion. That is how the Supreme Court describes how this first 5 year and second 5 year period
should be interpreted. It is not a fixed period. It could be extended by circumstances that could arise for each
and every case where there is a delay in execution arising from the conduct of the judgment debtor. It simply
means that the judgment debtor can really delay the execution of judgment. In fact he is given at least 2
remedies under the Rules even if the judgment has already become final and executory. As we said yesterday,
Rule 38 is one means of delaying the execution of judgment. In Rule 38, the court that has decided the case can
issue an injunction against the enforcement of its own decision. Rule 47 is another remedy available to the
judgment debtor in order to delay the enforcement of a final and executory judgment. As long as in that petition
to annul a judgment there is a corresponding provisional remedy of preliminary injunction that is issued by the
higher court. In annulment of judgment, the court where we file the case will always be a court higher than the
trial court. If the trial is Regional Trial Court, the annulment court will be the Court of Appeals. If the deciding
court is an inferior court, the annulment court will be a Regional Trial Court. So there is no way by which the
trial court can disobey the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this higher court. If the motion for execution
is granted, which is expected because the judgment has become final and executory, can the judgment debtor
appeal from the order granting the motion for execution? The answer is in Rule 41 section 1, an order granting
execution is not appealable. Although it will be treated as a final order, the only remedy of the judgment debtor
is to file a petition under Rule 65. Supposing the trial court denies a motion for execution of a judgment that has
already been entered. Is appeal the remedy of the judgment creditor? The answer is no. The remedy of the
judgment creditor is to appeal. That will be disadvantageous to the judgment creditor. The creditor should also
resort to Rule 65 but the petition that he should file is a petition for mandamus because mandamus is a writ that
will compel respondent to perform a ministerial duty and in Rule 39, as long as the judgment has been entered it
becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to grant the motion for execution. So that is an act that is
compellable by a writ of mandamus. So that is the remedy of judgment creditor. Can the trial court rightfully
deny a motion for execution although the judgment has been entered or can the trial court rightfully quash a
writ of execution that is issued because the judgment has become final and executory? The general rule, the trial
court cannot quash or rightfully deny a motion for execution if the judgment has been entered but there are
certain exceptions recognized by the court. First, when the judgment sought to be enforced has been novated or
the judgment has already become dormant. The five 5 year period has already stared and no motion for
execution has been filed by the judgment creditor. When the only remedy left in so far as the judgment creditor
is concern is an independent action to revive the judgment he cannot substitute by a mere filing of a motion for
execution. He should avail of this independent action to revive a dormant judgment. Can the parties, the
judgment debtor and judgment creditor enter into a compromise agreement after the judgment has become final
and executory? The answer is yes. What happens to the judgment if there is a comprise agreement signed by
both debtor and creditor and whose terms are not consistent with the award given; the effect is the compromise
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agreement will novate the judgment. So if the judgment awards to the judgment creditor a 2 million pesos but
because the debtor and the creditor are long-time friends and they agree to enter into a compromise agreement
where they provide that the entitlement of the judgment creditor is reduced from 2 million to P1.5 million and
that the debtor will have a period of 1 year within which to mitigate fully the obligation. That compromise
agreement is the law between the creditor and the debtor and that will have the effect of novating the judgment.
So if the debtor does not still pay, the court will no longer grant a motion for execution of the award that has
been given in the dispositive portion of the duly entered judgment. So the parties can novate by the act of the
parties the terms of a judgment that has been duly entered, it can still be changed that is an application of the
rule on novation in the Civil Code. Novation is a means in which an obligation is extinguished. Supposing that
within the first five year period the court grants a motion for execution and the court issues the writ of
execution. The writ of execution is carried out by virtue of a levy on execution on the properties of the judgment
debtor but the properties levied upon were not sold within the first five year period so at the end of the first five
year period there is a writ of execution, there is levy on execution of properties of judgment debtor but these
properties were not been sold at public auction we are now in the 6th year or 7th year of the 10 year period. Can
the properties levied upon within the first 5 year period be sold at public auction on year six or seven? The
answer is yes. According to the court, the first five year period does not require that the execution, the actual
levy and sale of property must be done within the first five year period. It is enough that there is a motion for
execution filed, the motion is granted by the court, and there is an actual levy of properties of the judgment
debtor. It does not matter if the actual sale of the levied property takes place after the end of 5 years. So what is
important in so far as the first 5 year period is concern is that there must be an actual levy on the properties of
the judgment debtor. So that the levy that carried out of the judgment can be enforced even beyond the five year
period. There was another case involving again this first 5 year period and second 5 year period where in year 7
of the 10 year period the judgment creditor whom elected to file a motion for execution filed a motion of
execution on year 7 and then the judgment creditor furnish the judgment debtor of this motion and the
judgment creditor convinced the judgment debtor not to oppose the granting of the motion so the judgment
debtor will accommodate the judgment creditor even filed his written position that he is not objecting to the
granting of the motion for execution. Because there is a manifestation by the judgment debtor that he is not
opposing the granting of the motion for execution although it was already year 7 the court granted the motion
for execution and then the writ was issued and properties of the judgment debtor were levied upon. When the
judgment debtor saw that his properties were levied upon he changed his mind. He challenged the validity of
the writ of execution issued on year 7 of the 10 year period. And the court sustained this stand of the judgment
debtor. The court said that after the end of the first 5 year period the court losses jurisdiction to execute a
judgment by a mere motion. And the fact that the judgment debtor did not oppose the issuance of the writ does
not matter because the issue is now one of the jurisdictions. The jurisdiction cannot be vested upon in court
simply by inaction on the part of the parties. So it is settled that when there is a writ of execution issued by the
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court after the first 5 year period because the motion was filed also after the first 5 year period the proceedings
taken by the court will be irrelevant and will be void. The issuance of writ of execution is void and therefore the
writ can still be quashed for lack of jurisdiction. With the respect to revival mentioned in the rules pertaining to
the second 5 year period. This is an independent action. Since it is an independent action, if the original action
was a real action for the recovery of title to or possession of a property, can we consider the petition to revive the
judgment still as a real action? The Supreme Court said yes. If the original action is a real action, the action to
revive that judgment will also be a real action and therefore the venue in Rule 4 still apply. If the action is a real
action the venue is the place where the property is situated. So the action to revive that judgment should also be
the place where the property is situated. An action to revive the judgment since it is an independent action will
always be cognizable by the Regional Trial Court because it is not capable of pecuniary estimation. So if the
decision sought to be revived is a decision rendered by an inferior court we do not file the petition to revive the
judgment before an inferior court. We always file the petition to revive the judgment with the Regional Trial
Court because we have to determine for purposes of jurisdiction whether the revival of a judgment is capable or
incapable of pecuniary estimation. It is incapable of pecuniary estimation and it is cognizable therefore by the
Regional Trial Court under BP 129.

There is another section in Rule 39, section 34. It is more specific than section 6 when it comes to the use of term
revival of judgment. If you read carefully section 34, there is a mention of revival of judgment. The revival
of judgment in section 34 is not the revival of a judgment that has become dormant. The revival of judgment that
is carried out after the end of the first five year period refers to a judgment that has become dormant. It is a
dormant judgment so we have to revive it. The term revival of judgment in section 34 does not refer to a
dormant judgment. In fact, section 34 refers to a judgment that has already been executed so it could not be a
dormant judgment. It must be an executed judgment. But why does Rule 39 provide as a remedy revival of
judgment although it has been previously executed? The situation contemplated in section 34 is that judgment is
executed, properties are levied upon, and these properties had been sold in public auction but the highest bidder
or anybody who thereafter acquires the property is not able to get possession of the property because of
opposition or because of legal obligations that are related to the execution of judgment. So there is a difference
between revival contemplated in section 34 that a judgment has been executed and revival of a dormant
judgment wherein there is no execution that has taken place within the first 5 year of the prescriptive period of
10 years. Take note if these differences between revival mentioned in section 6 and revival mentioned in section
34. The improvement given by Rule 39 in the 1997 Rules, in so far as the judgment creditor is concerned is that
under the present rules, the writ of execution issued by the court by virtue of a motion for execution has a life of
5 years. So judgment creditor does not have to keep on filing one motion for execution after another, which was
the practice in the past. Because in the past the life of the writ of execution was a very short period, I think it is
only 60 days. But at present, it is has a period of 5 years. So at any time within the five year period, the sheriff
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could enforce the writ. The sheriff could make a levy on the properties of the judgment debtor at any time
within the 5 year period. The only limitation enforced by the rules is that the sheriff must make a periodic report
to the court as to the progress of the process of execution. So the life of the legal execution under Rule 39, at
present, is a very long period of 5 years. How does the court enforce a duly entered judgment through the
granting a writ of execution and the issuance a writ of execution? It all depends on the tenor of the judgment. If
the judgment awards money, there will be a levy on execution of properties. If the judgment is on delivery of
property or delivery documents, then there will be no levy on execution of properties. The property ordered to
be delivered will be seized by the sheriff and then there is delivery of possession with the judgment creditor. If
the judgment directs the judgment debtor to sign a deed of conveyance or a deed of sale in favor of judgment
creditor and the judgment debtor refuses to sign the document, the court can appoint another person usually the
clerk of the court to sign the document on behalf of the judgment debtor.

If the judgment directs the debtor, the defendant to vacate a piece of land or building and he refuses to vacate
building the court through the sheriff will forcibly oust him from the building, the court will throw out the
things belonging to the occupant from that building. Can the court cite the judgment debtor in contempt for
refusing to obey an order of the court which directs him to pay let us say 2 million pesos? In a deed of execution
to be issued by the court in this case in a money award, the writ will be directed to the sheriff but the writ will
contain word for word the dispositive portion of the decision. So if the sheriff of the court goes to the debtor, the
debtor can refuse to pay and the debtor can even go to court and tell the court that I have money but I dont
want to pay, I will get sick of pneumonia if I pay judgment creditor. Can the court cite him in contempt? No, the
court cannot cite him in contempt. This was a question in the bar examination four years ago. Citation for
contempt is not a remedy in Rule 39 generally to enforce a judgment because Rule 39 contemplates enforcement
of a judgment by the sheriff of the court making use of the processes in Rule 39 which is levy on execution of
properties so if a judgment debtor refuses to pay the creditor cannot go to court and ask the court to cite the
debtor in contempt of court that is not contempt of court because the according to the court the writ is not
addressed to the judgment debtor, the writ is addressed to the sheriff of the court so it is the duty of the sheriff
to carry out the dispositive portion of the judgment. May there be citation for contempt if there is an award of
money by way of exception? There is seems to be, that is in support cases. If the respondent is ordered to pay
support, he does not pay support, it is not only contempt that he will be facing but he will be facing a criminal
case for failure to give support. But generally, we dont use the power of a court to cite a person in contempt
simply because the judgment debtor has refused to obey a writ of execution issued by the court. There are other
and more effective remedies under Rule 39 in order to carry out a forcible satisfaction of the judgment and the
more effective remedy under Rule 39 is to levy on properties of the judgment debtor, seized the properties of the
debtor and sell them at public auction. In the levy of the properties under Rule 39, the levy does not
automatically mean that possession of the levied properties will be in the hands of the sheriff or in the physical
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possession of the court. If the properties of the debtor levied upon are real properties, the debtor will continue to
be in possession of the real properties, he will not be ousted from the properties. What the court will do is
simply to submit to the registry of property a copy of the levy on execution and ask the registry of property to
annotate the fact that this piece of land is already been a subject of levy on execution and this levy in execution
will serve now as lien over the real property of the judgment debtor. But when the property levied upon is a
personal property that is when the physical possession of the personal property will be turned over to the
sheriff. The personal property will be literally in custodia legis. It is now under the control of the court. What
happens after the levy has been implemented by the court? A levy on properties under Rule 39 should always be
followed by a sale at public auction of the properties. We cannot have an execution process where we will stop
at levying of the properties. The levy must always be accompanied by a sale at public auction. If there is only a
levy without a sale at public auction then that levy can be considered as nullified later on by the court. It is the
duty of the court to see to it that actual levy on the properties must be followed by public auction sale of the
properties. Under Rule 39 and some special laws, there certain properties of the judgment debtor which cannot
be the subject of a levy. If a property of the debtor is exempt from execution and it is levied upon the levy is void
and since the levy is void the sale is also void. The validity of a sale at public auction of levied properties will
always stem from the validity of a prior levy. If the levy is void the sale is also void. If the levy is valid, however,
it does not follow that the sale is also valid because under the rules there are some certain requirements that
must be complied with before a sale of a levied property could take place. For instance, if the property levied
upon is real property it cannot be simply be sold later on by the sheriff, there certain formalities to be followed,
there could be a requirement on publication of the sale of the properties. So even if there is a valid actual levy on
real property if later on the property is sold but there is no compliance with the requirement of publication the
sale will be void, the buyer of the property will not acquire any title to that property. So if the levy is void, the
sale is also void. If the levy is valid, the sale could still be void if the requirements for its valid sale under Rule 39
are not complied with.


We continue with rule 39, we talked about terceria-third party claim. The rule on terceria in rule 39 is also
contained in rule 57 in relation to writ of preliminary attachment. The principles in rule 39 and 57 governing
third party claim are practically identical. Terceria is predicated on the premise that the property levied upon by
the sheriff for purpose of executing the duly entered judgment does not belong to the judgment debtor. In rule
39 for the validity of a levy, the property levied upon must belong to the judgment debtor. If the property levied
upon belongs to another person, the levy is not valid. If the sheriff sells the property, nonetheless, the sale is not
valid. Rule 39 expects that the properties levied upon and eventually sold all belong to the judgment debtor
because rule 39 is the satisfaction of judgment against the judgment debtor. If the sheriff makes a levy on
properties which does not belong to the judgment debtor, you can expect the true owner to complain- he can
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even take an action by commencing a complaint for the recovery of the property from the sheriff. The remedy
mentioned in rule 39 available to the owner is just one of the several remedies which the owner can avail of. In
rule 39, the remedy of the real owner is to file a third party complaint. The other remedies which are expressly
acknowledged by Rule 39 is the commencement of a separate and independent action for the recovery of the
property that has been levied upon. If the property levied upon is personal property, capable of manual
delivery, the true owner can file a complaint for replevin against the sheriff who has seized the personal
property. If the property levied upon is real property, he can file a complaint to prevent the sheriff from selling
the property and to compel the return of the property to the true owner. And rule 39 does not tell the true owner
that he only has these remedies in the alternative.The owner can make use of these remedies successively. If he
files a third party claim and he does not succeed in recovering the property by reason of the 3
rd
party claim, he
can avail of the remedy to file a complaint for the recovery of the real or personal property, as the case maybe.
But the easiest and most practical remedy available right away to the third party claimant is this third party
claim. A third party claim does not require the filing of a pleading, it is just an affidavit filed by the third party
claimant to the sheriff or to the court
In the affidavit, one should also append supporting documents and papers that will justify his claim to the
property. What will the court do with this 3
rd
party claim? Can the execution court study and evaluate this third
party claim and eventually render a decision determining if the 3
rd
party claim is a proper or just claim? Can the
court render a judgment that will tell the sheriff that the true owner of the property is not the 3rd party claimant
but the judgment debtor? The court has no such authority because we are already at the stage of execution of
judgment. In so far as the court is concerned, the case is already completed, it has been terminated. The third
party claim will just be an incident to the execution process that is being followed by the court.Therefore, the
court has no authority to resolve an issue of ownership involving the property that has been levied upon. The
issue of ownership should be threshed out in a different and separate proceeding. So if the execution court
issues an order saying that the owner of the property is not the third party claimant but the judgment debtor
and the third party claimant does not assail the decision, that order will not be entered because such decision is
not rendered on the merits, it is not a final order. It will not constitute res judicata in so far as the third party
claimant is concerned. Regardless of the finding of the execution court that the true owner of the property is the
judgment debtor, that will not be binding on the third party claimant. If at all, the consequence of that finding of
the court is that the sheriff can proceed with the public auction sale of the property. If the sheriff schedules the
property subject to a third party claim to a public auction sale, the remedy of the third party claimant is to file an
independent action in order to prevent the sheriff from selling the property (complaint for injunction and
damages, for instance). That is one of the remedies available to the third party claimant. You do not file that
complaint in the execution court. If it is a complaint for injunction, you should file it in the Regional Trial Court
which has jurisdiction over the case and the venue will depend on the residence of the third party claimant or
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the sheriff or the judgment debtor. And it is the third party claimant who will have the right to choose the venue
of the action.
If the property levied upon, on the other hand, is a personal property, say a car in the possession of the
judgment debtor but is really owned by the third party claimant, can the third party claimant file a complaint for
replevin to recover the car from the sheriff? Of course, in that complaint for replevin, the defendants would be
the sheriff and also the judgment creditor because the levy was a result of a motion for execution that was filed
by the judgment creditor. If the execution court is RTC and the third party claimant decides to file a complaint
for replevin, can he file the complaint before an inferior court? Yes, because a complaint for replevin is
cognizable by the inferior courts depending upon the value of the personal property. So if the execution court is
the RTC, but the car is valued at only 250,000 pesos and the true owner, the third party claimant files a
complaint for replevin, the complaint will have to be filed with the inferior courts. That inferior court, in the
complaint for replevin can issue a writ of replevin or a warrant of seizure before the sheriff and the judgment
creditor could file an answer. We would have a complicated situation where the sheriff has seized a property by
virtue of a levy on execution in fact the sheriff has scheduled a public auction sale for the car but at the same
time there is a warrant of seizure or a writ of replevin issued by an inferior court which directs he sheriff of that
inferior court to seize the car from the sheriff and the judgment creditor. Can the judgment creditor and the
sheriff argue before the inferior court that the inferior court does not have the authority to issue the writ of
replevin or warrant of seizure because that is interfering with the processes issued by the Regional Trial Court?
The answer is no. The sheriff of the inferior court can enforce the replevin. He can seize the car from the sheriff.
Although the sheriff is in possession of the car, by virtue of a levy on execution, can not the sheriff or the
judgment creditor capitalize on the provisions of rule 60 that a writ of replevin cannot be enforced when the
property is already subject to attachment or the property is under distraint by reason of non-payment of taxes. If
you go to rule 60 on replevin, that is really a requisite, an essential requisite in the issuance of a writ of replevin.
The replevin court can issue a writ of replevin validly if the property to be seized by the writ of replevin is not
under custodia legis, either levy on attachment or levy on execution. If that car is subject to levy on execution,
then that car is under custodia legis. But notwithstanding that provision in Rule 60, the court said that the writ
of replevin issued by the inferior court will prevail over the levy on execution made by the sheriff because such
levy on execution is a void execution. The requirement in 60 which states that property under custodia legis
cannot be the subject of a writ of replevin assumes that the levy on execution is a valid levy on execution. We
said a while ago, that for levy on execution to be valid, the property levied upon must be a property of the
judgment debtor. If the judgment debtor is not the owner of the property levied upon, that levy is void and
therefore there could be a seizure or confiscation by another sheriff in compliance with the writ of replevin
issued by another court or even an inferior court. In our example, it is also proper for the inferior court to issue a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the sheriff so that the sheriff will be prevented from going
ahead with the sale. So this could be a situation, an instance, where a process issued by an inferior court can be
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enforced in order to defeat a process issued by a higher court. The levy court is a RTC but the injunction court is
an inferior court. But the injunction will not be directed against the RTC, it will be directed against the sheriff of
the RTC to prevent him from selling the property which is the subject of a void levy on execution.

In Rule 39, if a property of the judgment debtor has been subjected to a levy on execution, can it be made the
subject of another or further levy on execution? Yes. There could be several levy on execution over the same
property of the judgment debtor. So if the judgment debtor owns a piece of land, there could be a first levy, a
second levy or a third levy on that piece of land. The rule does not prohibit the enforcement of several levies on
execution over the same piece of land owned by judgment debtor because a vendee does not immediately obtain
ownership of the property. Notwithstanding a levy on a land owned by the judgment debtor, the debtor
remains to be the owner of the land. Under rule 39, a levy only creates a lien over the property similar to a
mortgage lien. Under civil law, we learned that the same property can be the subject of a first mortgage, second
and so forth. We apply that same principle to levy on execution. If we have three levies on execution, they are all
annotated at the back of the title, then we just follow the rule on seniority that we follow in mortgages and other
encumbrances. The first levy will be superior to the second and third levy. The second and third are inferior to
the first levy on execution. In fact the SC has also held that if a property of a debtor, a piece of land owned by the
debtor, is the subject of different levies and the judgment debtor sells the property, the buyer will have to
respect the annotation of levies at the back of the title. If the property is later on sold at public auction as a result
of levy on execution, then the buyer of the property could lose his title to the property. He cannot say that he
bought it in good faith because the fact of the levy is annotated at the back of the title of the judgment debtor. If
this property of the judgment debtor is already mortgaged for instance with the PNB, if the mortgage in favour
of PNB is still uncancelled or existing, can the sheriff levy on a mortgaged property of judgment debtor? Yes,
because levy under Rule 39 does not affect ownership of the property. Levy only creates a lien. When the
property of the judgment debtor is levied upon, he does not lose ownership of the property. He could lose
ownership of the property if there is a public auction sale of the property and even if there is a public auction
sale of the property later on, the public auction sale does not necessarily mean that he will automatically lose
ownership of that levied and sold property especially if that property is a piece of land. Under rule 39, the
judgment debtor can still exercise right of redemption so that he will still keep his title to the property.
In cases where there are two different levies over the same piece of land owned by the jd, usually the property
will be sold as a result of the first levy of property. If the property is later on sold at public auction, and the law
gives the jd a right of redemption, this right of redemption will also be enjoyed by the second levy owner. Rule
39, in its definition of a redemptioner, names the jd and his successors-in-interest and any creditor who holds
another levy or lien subsequent to that of the levying creditor who has caused the sale of the property. So in our
example, if this piece of land belonging to the jdis sold as a result of the first levy, the judgment debtor can
redeem and the second levy holder can also redeem. The right of the jd to redeem is distinct from the right of the
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second levy holder to redeem the property. If it is the second levy holder who redeems the property, the jd can
make a further redemption of the property. There could be another redemption by the jd. But if it is the jd who
redeems the property, then the second levy holder can no longer exercise the right of redemption. In the rule of
successive redemption in Rule 39, when it is the jd who redeems the property from the highet bidder, further
rights of redemption are cut off by virtue of the redemption made by the jd. We can speak of successive
redemption if the redemptioner is not the jd himself. If ht one who redeems is a redemptioner or another levy or
lien holder, we can apply the rule on successive redemption which says that another redemption could take
place within 60 days from the efficacy of the first redemption even if the period of redemption has already
expired. For instance, if there are two redemptioners and if we include the jd, meaning to say there are three
persons who can redeem the property. If the redemption is carried out by the jd, the other redemptioners will
lose their right to redeem. The period of redemption for all of them is 1 year from the registration of the
certificate of sale. We are going to assume a redemption made should be within 1 year from the registration of
the certificate of sale. If the second levy holder redeems then the third levy holder can also further redeem from
him within 60 days from the date of the last redemption. But in any event, within that 1-year period, the jd can
always exercise his right of redemption. And if it is the jd who indeed exercises redemption, the right of
redemption given to others will be cut-off. Will it not prejudice these other levy holders if we cut off the right of
redemption? It could not prejudice the other levy holders. Since they are other levy holders if the jd redeems the
property, they can still enforce their levy, they can have another public auction sale of that levied property. In
civil law as well as in rule 39, the SC has accepted the principle that whenever there is a doubt in the
interpretation of redemption rules and laws, the interpretation should always be in favor of the jd or the
redemptioner. But rule 39 is also very clear in saying that right of redemption will exist only when the property
sold at public auction is a real property. When the property levied upon and sold at public auction is personal
property, there is no ror. Because of these distinctions given in the rules, the SC has also come out with
principles that are applicable to redemption of real property and principles applicable because there is no
redemption as to real property.

One of these principles is that when the properties levied upon and sold at public auction is personal property
and the price is inequitably low at public auction sale, the sale is void. There has to be another sale of the
property. The personal property is a car owned by the jd, the market value of the car is 800,000. At the public
auction sale, the highest bid is only 50,000. Here, the highest bidder can acquire a car worth 800,000 for only
50,000. If we apply the principles given by the SC, the same is void. The highest bidder does not acquire
ownership over the property, the court can issue an order declaring the same as ineffectual and that the same is
void because the price is inequitably low. So the sheriff must schedule another public auction sale until the price
that will not fall within the classification of an inequitably low price. But when the property sold at public
auction is real property, it does not matter whether the highest bid is high or low or even if the price generated
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is inequitably low. In fact the SC said we cannot use this concept of inequitably low price when the property
sold is a real property because of the principle of redemption- the right of redemption given to the jd. And the
court explained that even if the piece of land owned by the jd is worth 700,000 and highest bid is only 50,000, the
sale is valid. The highest bidder can acquire ownership over the property if redemption is not exercised by the
jd. The SC said if the price is very low and the property is real, that is advantageous to the judgment debtor
because if he decides to redeem the property, he will only have to produce 50,000 and then he will get his
property that has been sold at public auction. In instances where the judgment debtor has say redeems the
property, the redemption will enable the jd to continue possessing the property and not lose ownership over the
property. But the public auction sale of this piece of land could also result in a situation where the price
generated during the auction sale will not sufficient to pay the claim of jc. For instance, the claim of jc is
1,000,000. A piece of land owned by jd is levied upon and sold at public auction and the price generated is
500,000 which is not enough to pay in full the jc. The 500,000 will of course go to the jc who has caused the sale
of the property but the jc has not yet been fully paid, there is still a residue or unpaid balance of another 500,000.
When the jd redeems the property, should he deliver to the sheriff 500,000 or 1,000,000? The jd should deliver
only 500,000. He need not deliver 1,000,000 because the redemption price is always the highest bid of the
property plus interest and other additional cost. So if in our example, the jd is able to redeem the property by
producing 500,000 but the jc has not yet been fully paid, the jc will be tempted to have another levy on the same
property that has been redeemed by jd. The jc could do so because he has not yet been fully paid and in rule 39,
there must be full satisfaction of the award to put an end to the case. If the jc decides to have another levy on the
same property that has been previously levied upon as a result of his execution process but this property has
been redeemed by the jd, can the same levy creditor impose or carry out another levy in the same property? The
SC said, in this situation, the same levying creditor no longer levy on the same property. If the same levying
creditor wants to get full satisfaction, he should make another levy on another property of the jd or he can resort
to other remedies provided for in rule 39 if he cannot get full satisfaction of the judgment. But the SC also
explained that this principle does not prohibit other creditors from making a levy on the property that was
already redeemed by the jd. If the jd is able to redeem his property, that same property can be the subject of a
levy to be made by his other creditors. But a subsequent levy cannot be made by the same levying creditor or the
first levying creditor who has caused the public auction sale of the property. With respect to the issue as to who
is entitled to the fruits earned by the property during the pendency of the levy and during the running of the
period of redemption, rule 39 has settled that issue. The fruits of the property sold at public auction will still
redound to the jd while the period of redemption. The basis is that the jd retains ownership of the property
while period of redemption is running. If the jd is unable to redeem the property within the period of
redemption, then the title will be consolidated in favour of the highest bidder of the property. During the
auction sale of this levied property, anybody can bid even the jc can bid. In fact, it is usually the jc who will offer
the highest bid because the jc can give an amount equivalent to the award given to him by the court. If the
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award in favour of jc is 1,000,000, the jc can give a bid as high as 1,000,000 and he does not to turn over the task
to the sheriff because he will just tell the sheriff I will consider the 1,000,000 bid as full payment of my claim. If a
stranger is the highest bidder and he bids for 1,000,000, this stranger is expected to shell out 1,000,000 and
deliver it to the sheriff. Can the jc be forced to shell out cash equivalent to this highest bid even if the highest bid
is the exact equivalent of his claim? Generally, no. but if there is terceria or third party claim and the highest
bidder is the jc, the jc must still shell out cash in order to be declared by the court and the sheriff as the highest
bidder of the property. If the jc is not fully paid, there are other options given in the rules- availment of which
could lead eventually to full satisfaction of the claim.
First is for the jc to file a motion with the court for the examination of the jd. Another remedy is for the judgment
creditor to file a motion with the execution court for the examination of a debtor of the jd. And the third remedy
is for the jc to file a motion for the appointment of a receiver of the remaining properties of the jd. We will note
that a receiver is one the provisional remedies in the rules of court. And also receivership here is allowed by the
court although the case is already terminated, already at the stage of execution of judgment.so this is one
instance, where a provisional remedy can still be used even if the case has been decided by the court. Usually
our concept of a provisional remedy is that it is a remedy that can be availed of during the pendency of a case
before entry of judgment. But receivership contemplated in rule 39, although it is the same receivership in
provisional remedy, can still be availed of even if there is no more pending case, meaning the case has already
been terminated in fact the judgment has already been entered.
The last topic in Rule 39 is of course one of the most important in procedure - the principle of RES JUDICATA.
Res judicata n rule 39 is covered by sections 47 and 48. Section 47 is the effect of a local judgment after it is
entered and then 48, is about the effect of a foreign judgment that is a judgment rendered by a foreign court. In
our study of res judicata, we studied that there are principle requisites of rj: a) identity of parties, b) identity of
causes of action and c) identity of subject matter. But the effect of rj under section 47 depends upon the nature of
the action whether the action is in rem or in personam. What is the effect of a judgment in rem? This is answered
by letter a of Section 47. The effect of a judgment in personam is letter of Section 47. Letter of c of section 47
speaks about the principle of conclusiveness of judgment. If you want to have a clearer view of the difference
between the effect of a judgment in rem compared to the effect of a judgment in personam contained in letters a
and b, all you have to do is look for conclusive in letter a and letter b. Letters a and b use this word conclusive in
both instances and then you analyse the clauses that follow the word conclusive in letter a and the clauses that
follow the word conclusive in letter b and you will immediately appreciate between a judgment in rem and a
judgment in personam. In letter a, the law says the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing, upon the
will or administration, upon the personal, political or legal condition of the person. Whereas in letter b, the word
conclusive is followed by the phrase upon the parties and their successors-in-interest litigation for the same
thing under the same title and in the same capacity. So that right away, when the judgment is a judgment in
rem, the judgment is conclusive not upon the parties, it is conclusive upon the title to a thing, upon the personal
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political or legal condition of a person. This is the reason why a land registration or a cadastral proceeding is
considered as an action in rem because the judgment in these proceedings is conclusive upon the title, it is not
considered conclusive upon the plaintiff or defendant. If the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing,
that judgment will be binding upon the litigants or anybody who might have an interest to the title of the thing
although these persons might not have been involved in the litigation process. In the probate of a will which is
another proceeding in rem, where there is a decision by the court admitting the will to probate, it is conclusive
upon the will or administration therefore anybody who might have an interest in the will will have to respect
that decision by the court. The personal condition of a person, if a person has in his favour a decree of adoption,
he is the adoptee of Juan Dela Cruz, the decree is conclusive upon the personal status of that adoptee and
therefore, anybody who transacts with the adoptee will be bound by the decree of adoption issued by the
adoption court. But you will notice, there is a caveat in letter a when it comes to probate of a will. The probate of
a will is not conclusive upon the fact that the testator is dead. It is only prima facie. If at all, it can serve only not
as a conclusive proof of the death of the testator but it could convince the court that the testator really is dead.
The reason for the caveat is because in civil law, as well as in rules of court, a probate of will can be commenced
even if the testator is still alive. Ordinarily, we conceive a proceeding for the probate of a will as one wherein the
testator is already dead, that is not so, under the civil code and the rules of court. There could be a proceeding
for the probate of a will even if the testator is still alive provided that it is the testator himself who will
commence the petition for the probate of his own will. That is the reason for the caveat in letter a of sec. 47. The
probate of a will in so far as the common requirements of a will are concerned but in so far as the issue as to
whether the testator is dead or alive, it is not conclusive.

In letter b, when the rule says that the judgment is conclusive upon their parties and their successors-in-interest
as to matters directly ajudged or as to matters which could have been ajudged, that phrase as to matters that
could have been decided or litigated in relation thereto, will refer for instance to a compulsory counterclaim or a
cross-claim. Because we learned that a compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that is not set up in the same
action will be barred. The reason for them being barred is that because they are matters which could have been
raised in relation to the principal action. In a judgment in personam, the judgment is conclusive between the
parties only as to the matters directly ajudged or any matter that could have been ajudged. An example of an
action in personam could be an action involving title to property by reconveyance of property. Plaintiff vs.
defendant, the action for reconveyance of property, this is not in rem but in personam. Not all actions involving
real property is in rem. There are only very few actions involving real property that are considered by the law as
in rem like cadastral or land registration proceedings but if the action is only for reconveyance or accion
reinvindicatoria, although what is involved is real property, that action is still in personam. The judgment is in
favour of the plaintiff. The judgment is entered. In so far as that case is concerned, the plaintiff is the owner of
the property. Later on, can X as stranger file his own complaint against the plaintiff in the first case for the
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recovery of real property? Can the plaintiff in the first case set up the defense of res judicata? He cannot. Because
the parties in the second case are not the same in the first case. There is no identity in the parties between the
first and second case. There is even no identity of causes of action but the subject matter is the same piece of
land. If there is already an identity of subject matter, does it not follow that there will be identity of causes of
action? This is not a correct assumption. There could identity of subject matter but the causes of action could be
still different. For instance, in accion reinvindicatoria, the subject matter is of course a piece of land, it involves
title to a piece of land. There could be another complaint filed involving the same piece of land but because of an
action different but referring to the same land. For instance, unlawful detainer involving the same piece of land.
But although there is identity of subject matter, the causes of action will be different- the first, accion
reinvindicatoria, the cause is for recovery of title to property, in unlawful detainer, the cause is physical
possession of property. So if the second case is unlawful detainer, the second case cannot be dismissed by reason
of res judicata. There is no identity of causes of action.
When the judgment is entered as contemplated in sec. 47, there is a judgment on the merits that is rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction is as provided-judgment in rem and judgment in personam. The collateral
principle we adopt on this rule on res judicata is that the judgment that has been entered becomes immutable-it
can no longer be change or modified even by the SC itself. So even if the judgment entered is a judgment of an
inferior court and that judgment has been entered, everybody will have to respect res judicata applicable to this
judgment. That entered judgment cannot be modified or changedby the inferior court, by the Regional Trial
Court or even by the Supreme Court. That is the general rule when it comes to res judicata-the final and
executory judgment enjoys now immunity from challenge or from being assailed by parties to the original case.
But it does not mean to say that the judgment that has become final and executory can no longer be challenged,
it can still be challenged by way of exception to the general rule.
We have learned the propriety of filing a petition to annul a judgment under rule 47. Annulment of judgment is
a challenge, an attempt to change or modify a final and executory judgment. One of the requisites of res judicata
is missing, the element that is missing could be that the court which decided the case is not a competent court
because in rule 47, one of the grounds to annul a judgment is because the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or over the person of the parties.
Another remedy that could modify a final and executory judgment and which does not follow res judicata is
Rule 38 or petition for relief from judgment on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. I
suggest that you read the case in March 2011, F.G.U. Insurance. In that case the SC summarized four instances
where a final and executory judgment can be modified, challenged or even set aside. The first instance is when
there is modification of clerical errors of a final and executory judgment. The second instance is when the
judgment is what we call a nunc pro tunc judgment. The third is when the judgment is void. And the fourth is
when circumstances intervened after the final entry of judgment which makes the execution of judgment unjust
and inequitable. That is usually the reason applied by the courts when it entertains a petition for setting aside a
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final and executory judgment. But in 2007, the SC also came out with another decision which says that the SC
has the inherent power to change or modify a final and executory judgment if substantial justice so requires. So
you can consider that as the fifth exception. The SC is simply telling that us that we are the author of the Rules of
Court so we can disregard it at anytime we want to. It seems easy to appreciate because the Rules of Court is a
product of the Supreme Court. So the Supreme Court will be allowed to disregard the application of res judicata
in any event where it sees that disregard of res judicata will yield to substantial justice. So there are five known
exceptions now where a final and executory judgment can be modified, assailed or set aside notwithstanding
application of res judicata.
Letter c of sec. 47 is about conclusiveness of judgment. It is a type of res judicata but with limited application.
There could be identity of parties and identity of subject matter but there is no identity of causes of action. Thats
why the subsequent cases can prosper. They will not dismissed by reason of res judicata. The usual example that
is given in textbooks about the application of conclusiveness of judgment involves a monetary obligation that by
stipulation of parties will be subject to periodic payments-obligation to pay money on instalments. If there is a
1,000,000 indebtedness payable in two instalments of 500,000 each, we learned that each instalment, if violated
or if defaulted, will give rise to one cause of action. So if there are two instalments, it is possible that two causes
of actions will accrue from the same promissory note because each instalment will give rise to a cause of action.
We now apply this to sec. 47. If the debtor defaults in the payment of the first instalment, the creditor can file a
complaint to recover 500,000-only the first instalment that is due and unpaid. That is one cause of action. Let us
say that the court, the RTC, will try the case and then it will hear evidence to be submitted by the creditor and
debtor. A defense set up by the debtor in his answer is that the promissory note upon which the complaint is
based is a forged promissory note, it does not contain the genuine signature of the debtor. After the trial, the
court decides in favour of the creditor. So the court, in effect, says that the document is not a spurious document,
it is not a forged promissory note. The signature is a genuine signature. Then the judgment is entered. After the
entry of judgment, the second instalment also becomes due. Can the creditor file a second complaint for the
recovery of the second instalment? The answer is yes, because our principle is that each instalment if unpaid will
give rise to a separate cause of action so if the second instalment becomes due and unpaid, the creditor can file a
separate complaint against the debtor. The second complaint can prosper. The debtor will again raise the issue
that the promissory note contains his false signature-it is a spurious promissory note. Will the court still make
adjudication as to whether that note is a forged promissory note or a genuine promissory note? Not anymore,
the finding in the first case by the court that the promissory note is genuine will be conclusive in so far as the
creditor and debtor is concerned in another case. Thats why in conclusiveness of judgment, the subsequent case
will not be dismissed, it will prosper but what the court cannot do is to make an adjudication on the issue that
has already been decided in the first case. That is a conclusiveness of judgment in so far as the genuineness of
the promissory note is concerned. That is the rule of conclusiveness in the last paragraph of sec. 47.
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In sec. 48 which, as we said, refers to a foreign judgment, this section also refers to a foreign judgment in rem
and foreign judgment in personam if you read the first two paragraphs of sec. 48. In sec. 48, it is provided that
the judgment of foreign court is conclusive upon the title to the thing and a judgment against a person is a
presumptive evidence of the rights between parties. So the first part speaks also about a judgment in rem that is
adjudicated by a foreign court, the judgment in rem is conclusive also upon the title to the thing. But when the
judgment is in personam , the judgment of the foreign court is only a presumptive evidence of the rights
between the parties in the complaint. An illustration of that judgment in personam rendered by a foreign court,
there is a creditor and debtor suit in a foreign country, say, before a Japanese court. The relief which the creditor
seeks before the Japanese court is for the recovery of an unpaid loan. The Japanese court in favour the creditor.
So the debtor is required to pay the said sum of 100,000 US dollars. The Japanese court has not executed the
judgment but somehow the creditor and debtor live in the Philippines, they are now in the Philippines. The jd
has accumulated certain properties in the Philippines. Can the jc in that Japan case file a motion for execution
before a Philippine court? The answer is no. you cannot file a motion before a Philippine court. The Philippine
court knows nothing about the Japan case. There is no basis for the Philippine court to issue a writ of execution.
Is there a remedy available to the creditor in order to enforce the decision of the Japan court in the Philippines?
The remedy is the second paragraph of Rule 48 which says that the judgment of the Japan court is a presumptive
evidence of the rights between the parties. How does the jc make use of the rule that the decision of the Japan
court is a presumptive evidence of the rights between the parties to the case? The creditor should file an
independent or separate complaint for the enforcement of the decision of the Japan court and the only evidence
that he needs in order to convince the court that there is preponderance of evidence in his favor is a certified true
copy of the decision rendered by the Japan court. If he is able to present a certified true copy of the decision of
the Japan court, the local court will now apply the presumption given in sec. 48 that the decision of the Japan
court is a presumptive evidence of the rights between the parties. That is enough to convince the courts that the
creditor is really entitled to recover some amount from the defendant. But you will also notice that in sec. 48,
there is a last paragraph which speaks about repelling a judgment by a foreign court whether it is a judgment in
rem or a judgment in personam, the judgment of a foreign court can be repelled by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact. In other words, if we have before a
Philippine court, a separate action for the enforcement of a decision rendered by a foreign court, the defendant
in this petition for the enforcement of foreign judgment can set up the defences given in the last paragraph of
sec. 48. The decision of the Japan court can be defeated or repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of
notice, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact. The defendant can set up properly the affirmative defense
that the Japan court did not have jurisdiction over the case or jurisdiction over his person because of want of
notice or that the decision the Japan court is void because of collusion or fraud or that the decision of Japan court
cannot be enforced because there is clear mistake of law or fact by the Japan court. Can we make use of these
grounds mentioned in Sec. 48 to repel a local judgment? Can we repel the execution of a local judgment, say
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there is a motion for execution filed before a trial court because the judgment has become final and executory,
the jc has now filed a motion for execution, can the jd oppose the execution by claiming that the judgment
entered by the court cannot be executed because the judgment is void by reason of absence of jurisdiction? It
cannot be done if the judgment is rendered by local courts. The motion for execution cannot be defeated by
setting up defense that the judgment is void because of want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, it
cannot also be done. Why cannot the defendant in this local judgment oppose the execution by setting up the
defences that the judgment sought to be enforced under rule 39 and that judgment is rendered by a local court?
Why can we not the same defences that are available when the case involves a foreign judgment? We do not
allow a motion for execution to be opposes or to be denied on the argument that the court did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter or jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, because that will be a
collateral attack on the judgment. That is not a direct attack on the judgment. We can directly attack the
judgment by filing a petition to annul the said judgment and the ground to be used is lack of jurisdiction over
the person or over the subject matter. But if we attack the judgment collaterally, not directly, we do not allow
that in our system. We can only directly attack the judgment on these grounds- lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, over the person and extrinsic fraud. We cannot use these to collaterally attack judgment. When
we say collaterally, the person attacking the judgment does not file a separate complaint for the purpose of
having the judgment set aside. If he only opposes the motion for execution and the ground of his opposition is
that the court did not have jurisdiction over the case, that is not a direct attack, it is collaterally attacking the
judgment because he is only setting up that defense in order to avoid execution of judgment. In a foreign
judgment sought to be enforced in the Philippines, sec. 48 appears to allow a collateral attack on that foreign
judgment which is not allowed in so far as a domestic judgment is concerned. With respect to the other grounds,
collusion and fraud, they are also grounds to directly attack judgment under Rule 47 even under Rule 38-petitio
for relief from judgment. But what cannot be done our system is a collateral of final and executory judgment.
But there is one occasion, according to the Supreme Court, where we could collaterally attack a judgment. If the
judgment is on its face a void judgment, for instance, a judgment rendered by a court contains only a dispositive
portion, it does not contain findings of fact or conclusions of law, that judgment is, on its face, a void judgment.
It does not with the constitutional requirements of a valid judgment. That can be attached collaterally. So if there
is a motion for execution for that judgment, an opposition can be set up attacking the validity of the judgment
because it does not with the constitutional requirements of a valid judgment. so in the matter of attacking a local
judgment, as long as the judgment, on its face, appears to be a valid judgment, in writing, there are findings of
fact and conclusions of law, there is the signature of judge, there is presumption of correctness of judgment. The
only way to have it set aside is to file an action directly for the purpose of declaring that judgment null and void
- annulment of judgment. You cannot do it by simply opposing a motion for execution. You cannot even do it in
order to oppose the petition for a revival a judgment. A petition to revive a judgment is an independent action
available to a jc who has failed a judgment within the first 5 years from the entry of judgment. If the jc files a
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petition to revive the judgment, the defendant will not be allowed to set up the defense that the judgment
sought to be revived is not valid because of lack of jurisdiction, that is another example of a collateral attack on
the judgment.If the argument that the judgment is void is only used as a defense in a separate proceeding other
than annulment of judgment, that is always a collateral attack of judgment and that is not allowed in our system.

The term Provisional Remedies is considered synonymous to two other terms as per the circulars of the
Supreme Court. And these two other terms are interim reliefs and provisional order. So the terms provisional
remedy, interim relief and provisional order refer to one and the same provisional concept-a provisional
remedy. So that we can rightfully conclude that the enumeration of provisional remedies in the Rules of Court
beginning with Rule 57 up to support pendent lite in Rule 61 is not an exclusive enumeration of provisional
remedies. We have to include the enumeration of interim reliefs in other circulars of the Supreme Court or the
enumeration of provisional orders in a separate circular of the Supreme Court. The enumeration of interim relief
could be found in the circular in amparo. There are four interim reliefs in amparo- protection order, production
order, inspection order, witness protection order. There are four interim reliefs in the circular on amparo. And
the circular on amparo itself says that amparo could be a provisional remedy under certain instances. Habeas
data could also be a provisional remedy under certain instances. So we can add in the enumeration the interim
relief in the circular on amparo, the four interim reliefs plus amparo itself and habeas data. There is another
circular issued by the Supreme Court which enumerates several provisional orders and this circular refers to
provisional orders in marriage-related cases. There are seven provisional orders contained in this circular-
spousal support, child support, visitation rights, custody of a minor, protection order, hold-departure order and
appointment of administrator of the co-owned properties of the spouses. These are provisional orders in
marriage-related cases. They are also treated just like a provisional remedy in the Rules of Court. And then in
the latest circular issued by the Supreme Court, the Kalikasan, we also find some provisional remedies like
temporary environmental protection order, this is a provisional remedy under the writ of kalikasan. And in the
writ of kalikasan, if you have gone over the circular, there is a separate section on discovery measures and the
kalikasan circular appears to consider the discovery measures also as provisional remedies or interim relief like
inspection order, production order which are interim reliefs in the writ of amparo. They should also be
considered interim reliefs in kalikasan cases. So there could be 3 or 4 additional provisional remedies if we
include discovery measures that are specified in the writ of kalikasan. Whether they are treated as interim relief
or provisional remedy or provisional order, their common element is that there must be a pending principal
action. You cannot use of these interim relief or provisional remedy or provisional order unless there is a
pending principal action except in those instances when the provisional remedy or provisional order can be
treated as the principal action. For instance, replevin is a provisional remedy but it can also be a principal action.
As we said earlier, amparo is a principal action by itself but it can also be treated as a provisional remedy. Just
like habeas data, it is a principal action by itself but it can also be treated as a provisional remedy. Since we
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always require an independent principal action before we can make use of these provisional remedies, it follows
that we cannot an independent action solely for the purpose of obtaining as a principal relief any of these
provisional remedies. For instance, a creditor cannot file a complaint for the issuance solely of preliminary
attachment, that will completely be dismissed. The application for preliminary attachment should be always
made to depend upon a principal action that is included in the enumeration of cases in sec. 1 of Rule 57. Thats
why in Rule 57, thats preliminary attachment, we immediately find actions that should be filed in court where
we can properly ask for the issuance of preliminary attachment. You should also be careful in ascertaining
whether attachment is provisional or it is not a provisional remedy. Rule 57 is a provisional remedy because of
the word preliminary. Attachment is a provisional remedy if it is a preliminary attachment. But if the
attachment is a final attachment, it is no longer a provisional remedy. It is now part of the execution process
under Rule 39. We kept on mentioning levy on execution in order to describe the process in Rule 39 to execute a
judgment. Levy on execution is just another term for levy on final attachment. But we use the term levy on
execution to differentiate it from levy on attachment. When we talk about levy on attachment, we refer to a
preliminary attachment. But when we talk about levy on execution, we are referring to a final attachment- an
attachment that is promulgated under Rule 39.

The enumeration of provisional remedies in the rules of court is no longer exclusive. The various circulars of the
Supreme Court have introduced provisional remedies but in a different way. Instead provisional remedies in
marriage related cases, the term used by the Supreme Court is provisional order. In the circular on Amparo,
there are also provisional remedies but the term used is interim relief, and in the Kalikasan circular there are
also provisional remedies but the terms used are either provisional order or provisional remedy. But they are all
provisional in character because they cannot be the principal action itself.
These remedies are all incidents of the principal case just like the provisional remedies that we have in the rules
of court. When we say that provisional remedies cannot be the principal action itself, there is no such principal
action for issuance of preliminary attachment. There can be no principal action of issuance of preliminary
injunction. But in the case of replevin, as a matter of fact, this replevin has been treated by the court as a main
action, but the provisional remedy is an action for the issuance of writ of replevin or a warrant of seizure.
Support pendente lite is also conducted in the principal action, the principal action could be an action support
with an application for support pendente lite.
Although the term used in the other circulars are now different from provisional remedy, still the concept of
provisional remedy will apply in the provisional order or interim relief as the case may be. In the case of
marriage related cases, the following are the provisional orders. Spousal support, child support, visitational
rights, the custody of the minors, and the hold departure order, protection order or the appointment of
administrator of the common property only common or those belonging to the conjugal partnership of gains.
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Under the writ of Amparo, and also the circular on Habeas Data, Amparo and Habeas Data although principally
they are considered as actions in special proceeding, they are treated at the same time as provisional remedies. If
you read the circulars on Habeas Data and Amparo, if there is already a criminal case instituted in the court,
involving the disappearance of a person or extra legal killing of a person, that criminal action will be the
principal case. In that principal action, a party could move or apply for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo or
Habeas Data as the case maybe.
So there are four interim reliefs in Amparo, protection order, inspection order, production order and witness
protection order. We include now the four interim reliefs, Amparo and Habeas Data. In the circular of
Kalikasan, the provisional orders or interim reliefs are temporary environmental protection order and
preliminary attachment. And the circular also speaks of an optional protection order, cease and desist order, and
production and inspection order. If you will notice in these two circulars of the Supreme Court appears to detail
certain modes of discovery like the production of documents, inspections of things. They are the subject in the
modes of discovery as enumerated in the rules. They are now treated as provisional remedies. In the Kalikasan
court can issue a production order or inspection order. The same is true with the Amparo circular there is a
production order, and inspection order, although they are substantially of the same nature in that we have taken
in modes of discovery.
Although we have now several provisional remedies and interim reliefs or provisional orders, it is not correct to
assume that they follow common rules. These different circulars have not adopted the rules that are existing in
the rules of court. That is 57 up to 61. If you analyze the provisional remedies, found in the rules of court, one of
the common elements is the requirement for the applicant to post a bond. So we have an attachment bond, an
injunction bond, a receivers bond, and replevin bond. The only provisional remedy which does not require the
posting of a bond is support pendente lite.
But in the circular on marriage related cases, the premise is that the family court can grant these provisional
orders with or without bond. It all depends on the discretion of the family court. And then, on the same circular,
the law also provides that the family court can grant these provisional orders with or without a hearing. Which
can also be present in the rules of court, there are some provisional remedies that can be granted ex parte, there
are also provisional remedies which need a summary hearing before they can be issued by the court.
In the Amparo circular, when it comes to the interim relief of production and inspection order, there must be a
motion filed by the applicant and there must be a hearing conducted by the court. In respect to protection order
and witness protection order, these provisional remedies can be issued by the court without a hearing, ex parte.
In the Amparo circular, there is nothing mentioned about the posting of a bond by the applicant, so it would
seem that just like the circular on marriage related cases the court do not need a bond before the court can
validly issue this interim relief.
In the writ of Kalikasan, the usual provisional remedy that is issued by the court is of temporary environment
protection order. The applicant is not required to post a bond in the matter of issuance of temporary
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environmental protection order, and just like the preliminary injunction, there can be an ex parte issuance good
for 72 hours, but the Kalikasan court can extend that until the case is finally decided.
So if you compare that temporary environmental protection order to the temporary restraining order, In TRO
there is a definite time, and it is called a stag, it cannot be extended by the court, but in Kalikasan cases the
temporary environmental protection order can be extended by the court until the case is finally decided. There is
also no need for a bond.
What is original in this Kalikasan circular is the party who will be required to post a bond in the TEPO is not the
applicant, it is the adverse party, who will file a motion for the victim of the TEPO. In most instances of
provisional remedies where there is a need for the filing of a bond, like attachment, preliminary injunction, or
replevin or receiver, this can be defeated by the filing of a counter-bond. The same is true with the
environmental protection order, but the difference is that the applicant is not required to post a bond, but the
adverse party moves for the victim of that environmental protection order, he will need to require to post a bond
to protect the interest of the adverse party.
Another rule that applies provisional remedy that is in common, the issuance of these interim reliefs is always
interlocutory, the order is not the final order because it has nothing to do with the merits of the case. And since
the granting of the provisional remedy is interlocutory therefore it is not applicable. The accepted remedy to
challenge an order granting the provisional remedy is rule 65. But in some circulars that has also been changed
substantially. For instance, in summary procedure if in the cases that are cognizable by the inferior court, where
the inferior court is governed by the summary procedure if the inferior court grants a provisional remedy it is
interlocutory, it is not appealable but the adverse party cannot file a petitioner under rule 65. In other words
there is no remedy available to the adverse party. The reason is in summary procedure the application of
availment of rule 65 in order to challenge this interlocutory order issued by the inferior court is prohibited. That
is one of the prohibited pleadings in summary procedure, the availment of rule 65 to challenge the interlocutory
order issued by the inferior court.
In Amparo likewise, there is a section on prohibited pleadings, there is a similar provision in Amparo circular
that if the Amparo court grants a provisional order or an interim relief and therefore that order is interlocutory,
rule 65 is also not applicable. Because rule 65 is a prohibited pleading in order to challenge interlocutory order
issued by the Amparo court.
In the circular on Kalikasan the issuance of the TEPO is of course interlocutory can be challenged by the
granting of this TEPO. Yes, it is allowed, the problem is, the challenge in the TEPO is that can only be filed in the
Supreme Court. In other words, if we avail of rule 65 in Kalikasan case we cannot file the petitioner with the
RTC, CA, it is only in the SC that can entertain a petition assailing the issuance of TEPO. So, do not get the
impression that all of these remedies are provisional in character, they are governed by the same set of rules.
They are governed by different set of rules depending on the circular of the Supreme Court that is applicable in
each one of them.
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In respect to the authority of the inferior court to grant the provisional remedy, this matter has now been issued
by BP 129. In the past, before BP 129, there was the question as to the totality or the authority of the inferior
court to grant provisional remedy. But this was settled by BP 129. If you read section 33 of BP 129, it is now
clearly provided that the inferior court has the authority to grant provisional remedy as long as it has
jurisdiction over the action. So there is no question at all that the inferior court can grant preliminary
attachment, preliminary injunction, replevin, receivership, as a provisional remedy. But the problem is now with
support because the support as a principal action is exclusively cognizable by the family court. There could be
instances where the inferior court can grant support pendente lite but we have to look for a principal action
cognizable by inferior court, and one of the incidentals or collateral relief is support pendente lite, as long as the
inferior court has jurisdiction over the principal case the inferior court has the authority to grant this provisional
remedies as long as the requirements given in the rules and in the circulars are complied with.
Going to rule 57, in section 1 there are 6 instances where the court can properly grant an application for
preliminary attachment. In respect to the first 5 instances, there is a common requisite, that there is an intention
on the part of the adverse party to defraud the applicant. It is only in the last instance where there is no such
requirement that must be shown that the adverse party has intention to defraud the applicant. The only
requirement is that the defendant is a non resident and not found in the Philippines and summons can be served
upon him by publication. So even if there is no allegation that the adverse party have intention to defraud, there
could still be a preliminary attachment issued by the court. The fact that the defendant is a non-resident and is
not found in the Philippines, is closely related to the provision in rule 14 when the party can properly apply for
publication of the summons in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction to try and decide when a property of
the absent defendant is a non-resident and is not found in the Philippines is the subject of attachment that action
in personam against the defendant will be converted into quasi rem by virtue of the preliminary attachment
issued by the court implemented by the sheriff of the court. So instead of this last instance, the sole purpose of
the applicant in moving for the issuance of PA is to enable to obtain a security for any judgment that may be
rendered later on by the court.
So if you envision a case that is pending in the trial court, there is a plaintiff who filed a complaint for money,
there is no security that has been given to him and then the debtor according to the applicant is a dishonest
person and intends to leave the Philippines with the intention to defraud the applicant, or he may not actually
defraud the applicant. If you will note in the cases mention in Section 1 the conduct of the adverse party will be
criminal in character, embezzlement, misappropriation or property entrusted to him. That is why it is a common
saying in preliminary attachment, that the fraud committed by the adverse party could be a criminal fraud, that
is a crime under RPC or only a civil fraud, it is an act of fraud but it has not reached the level of a crime. And
that will justify the issuance of a writ of PA. So it is called a civil and criminal fraud, it will be sufficient for the
issuance of the preliminary attachment. But the conduct should fall within anyone of the instances mentioned in
section 1. So if the debtor instance draws a check and delivers the check in payment of his obligation to the
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creditor and the check bounces, can the creditor file a complaint and ask for the granting of PA? The answer is
yes, according to the court, because the issuance of a bouncing check is covered by section 1, that is fraud in the
performance of the obligation. In section 1, when there is fraud in contracting the obligation, PA can be issued. If
there is fraud in performance that is fraud in contractum, that is dolo causante in civil law. When there is fraud
in performance, there is dolo incidente in civil law. And in both instances that is a justification for the issuance of
a writ of PA.
Supposing that the plaintiff as a creditor holds a collateral given by the debtor, there is already an existing of
security. If there is default in the payment, and the creditor files a complaint. And that debtor has committed an
act of dishonesty with the intention to defraud the creditor. Can the secured creditor properly move for the
issuance of PA? The answer is yes. The Supreme Court has ruled in a judicial foreclosure in a real estate
mortgage when the mortgagee holds a security for the payment of liability the mortgagee can ask for the
issuance of PA and the court can grant the application. Although the applicant admits to the court that he holds
a security. The reason is that if you read the section and contents of the verified application in section 2 one of
the matters that is incorporated in the verified application for preliminary attachment aside from the statement
that the applicant cause of action, the third averment in the application is that the applicant does not hold a
sufficient security for the payment of his claim. So even if there is a security held by the creditor, if he can prove
to the court that the security is not sufficient, he can also ask for a preliminary attachment. So that if the court
grants the PA, the creditor will now look for the other properties of the creditor that could be the subject of
attachment. So if he holds only land by virtue of agreement, that security is not sufficient for the indebtedness of
the party, the court grants its application for preliminary attachment, he may have to look for other property to
be attached. He should not be attaching the same property he already holds a collateral security. So instead one
piece of land, he can attach another piece of land so the creditor now as security of payment of his claim.
In PA, there is a rule that is applicable to PA and other provisional remedies where these provisional remedies
are granted ex parte. The first one or first principle that you should always remember in PA this is applicable to
other provisional remedies, this could be granted ex parte is the rule on prior or contemporaneous service of
summons. The situation contemplated in rule 57 where it says that the court can grant ex parte an application of
PA, is that there is an application that is filed after the filing of complaint. And even before the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through the service of summons, the court may already have
approved the application for PA. Without notice, there is serious irregularity if rule 57 authorizes the court to
grant the PA ex parte that is without notifying the defendant without giving him a notice and even before the
court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through the service of the summons. That is
irregular procedurally. Because we learned in procedure that before the court can act validly, the court must
have jurisdiction over the nature of the action, and also the person of the plaintiff and defendant. If the court
does not have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the proceedings stated are void. So in rule 57 the
rule authorizes the court to approve PA even if the defendant has not been served with summons, because the
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motion is ex parte without notifying the defendant. Since there is a strong possibility that the defendant later on
might challenge the writ, the rules introduced the concept of prior and contemporaneous service of summons.
And the court explained, the issuance of PA is at 3 stage proceeding. First is the filing of the verified application,
the court will ex-parte grant it, and then the court will require the attachment which is always essential before
the court can issue the writ of PA. So that after the issuance of the court of a writ PA, as long as all the conditions
have already been met, the only problem is the implementation or the carrying out of the writ of PA. If the writ
is already in hands of the Sheriff, the sheriff will not carry out by simply attaching the properties of the
defendant. If that is what he is going to do, the attachment of the properties of the adverse party will be void
because the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. So what rule 57 requires is to
observed the rule on prior and contemporaneous service of summons. If summons has not yet been served
previously, at least the summons should be served contemporaneous with the actual attachment of the property.
So if the properties of the adverse party have been attached, the sheriff should see to it that the summons have
been served upon the defendant today and if the summons is served upon the defendant today that will remedy
the irregularity of lack of jurisdiction. If the summons is served today, the court automatically acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. That is the reason why the Supreme Court introduced the
principle of prior or contemporaneous service of summons. And as we said earlier, this rule on prior or
contemporaneous service of summons applies to all provisional remedies which can be issued granted by the
court ex parte even before the court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. So we can apply
it in injunction, where the court issues ex parte a TRO or PI. Because in the pleading, the provisional remedy is
granted by the court even if before the defendant answers meaning to say even if summons has not yet been
served upon the defendant. Since PA is carried out, it is derogation upon the defendants right of ownership over
his properties, the Supreme Court has also said that the rule on attachment should be strictly construed that is in
order to protect the rights of ownership of the adverse party.
If the properties of the defendant are now the subject of the PA and the properties are personal properties
capable of manual delivery, that could be prejudicial to the right of ownership of the defendant if the personal
property that is subject to PA is a car, that car may no longer be in the possession of the defendant, it will be
seized by the sheriff. It will be in custody of the court as long the preliminary attachment is not lifted. But the car
will not be delivered to the applicant, it will be in the custody of the court. So if the court will finally decide the
case after 3 years, during that 3 year period, the defendant will not be able to use it, it will be used by the sheriff
or of the court. That is why preliminary attachment is really derogation to the rights of ownership.
If the property seized or attached is a piece of land, the defendants possession will not be affected. But only
inconvenience to be suffered by the owner is that in the registry of the property, the property is subject of
preliminary attachment. It does not affect his title, there is only a lien, an encumbrance by the PA. SO if he does
not loose ownership, it means to say that he can still sell the property, but the buyer of the property must also
recognized the fact that the writ of PA can be later on sold on a public auction in which case the owner or the
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buyer of the property could be conceivable loose his title later on. In other words, the buyer of the land that is
the subject of the PA cannot complain later on that he is a buyer in good faith. He has notice of the existence of
preliminary attachment.
If the defendant owns a sizeable bank account, the sheriff could issue a writ of garnishment and served it upon
the bank. And when the bank received the writ of garnishment, the bank will freeze the account up to the
amount of the claim. The defendant could no longer use his fund anymore, if the defendant tries, the bank will
not allow him to withdraw. If it is a checking account, and he has issued checks to a current account, the checks
will be dishonoured upon presentment because the accounts are now frozen. Thats why PA is really a serious
derogation of the rights of ownership. In that writ of garnishment which is also applicable in execution, that writ
of garnishment will create a new relationship as an incident of the case called a force intervention. The debtor of
the defendant, whether he likes it or not will now be the subject to PA. So when the bank is garnished, whether
he likes it or not, the bank will be forced to intervene. In the sense that the bank will have to follow now the
orders to be issued by the court after the order of garnishment.
The remedies in 57 so that the defendant will get his rights of ownership in full, no longer subject to PA, are the
following: First, He can simply defeat the PA by putting up a cash deposit in the court equivalent to the
amount of the attachment bond. So if the attachment bond is 100k, the defendant has another 100k in his pocket,
he must deposit it in court. And that will compel the court to lift the writ on preliminary attachment. If he does
not have that much cash, he can just file a counter-bond, issued by a surety authorized by the Supreme Court
also up to the 100k. The filing or a bond or payment of cash deposit will make it a ministerial duty of the court to
lift the PA and that will enable to get back his properties. If the car has been seized the car will be returned. His
bank account will now be unfrozen. Cash deposit or put up a counter-bond. The other remedy is to file a motion
the lifting of the PA on the ground of the issuance is improper or irregular. That is always a remedy in order to
challenge the provisional remedy. The granting of the attachment is improper or irregular. But this needs a
motion filed by the defendant. He has to file a motion. And that motion should be heard. When he files a motion
he must give notice to the applicant.
One question that was raised before the Supreme Court is if the defendant has already posted a counter bond,
and therefore the preliminary attachment has already been lifted, can the defendant still make use of the 3
rd

remedy. Otherwise, can he file a motion for the lifting of PA or reversal of the order granting the PA.
Considering that the properties previously have been attached have only been returned to the defendant? The
Supreme Court answered yes. In other words, even if the defendant has caused the lifting of the PA, by virtue of
cash deposit or counter-bond, he can still make use of his 3
rd
remedy, to file a motion for the lifting of the
preliminary attachment. The reason given is that instead of his properties acting now as a security for the claim
of the applicant, he has put up a counter-bond or a deposit. So there is still a security that is involved by the
applicant. If the order granting the PA is lifted, the applicant will be left without security because the counter-
bond liability will be lifted, the cash deposit will have to be returned. So that the applicant will now be a debtor
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without any security at all if the court gives an order of PA, although the attached properties have been
returned, by virtue of the bond or the deposit.
Another principle mentioned in rule 57 which is applicable to other provisional remedies where there is a
requirement of a bond is the principle in section 20 that is the extent of liability of the applicant when it turns out
the granting of the remedy of the court is improper or irregular. Section 20 defines the procedure to be followed.
In an action where the PA is issued by the court, the writ will only be lifted if there is a counter-bond, deposit or
the court withdraws the order or reverses it. But ultimately the court will have to decide the merits of the case,
whether or not the plaintiff is entitle to recover. If there is judgment in favour of the applicant, can the adverse
party move for the recovery of the damages even if he lost the case? Yes, if the applicant wins the case on the
merits, he can still be held liable for damages because the issuance of the PA is improper or irregular. It was
explained that if the applicant eventually wins the case it means the applicant has a cause of action. To which the
allegations contained in the verified application for preliminary attachment as stated in section 5. That verified
allegations contains some serious allegations. First one is that the applicant has a cause of action, but if the
applicant wins. It does not necessarily follow that he has complained with the second allegations in the verified
application which is the applicant has a cause of action and that cause of action falls under anyone of the cases
mentioned in section 1 or rule 57. So if the applicant wins, definitely he has a cause of action. But it does not
mean to say that his cause falls under anyone of the cases in section 1. He may not be able to prove that the
existence of dishonesty or the intention of the defendant to defraud the applicant. So if the applicant is not able
to demonstrate that his case falls under the any of the cases in section 1, that means to say that the issuance of
the PA is improper and irregular. The only instances where the court can grant PA are the instances mentioned
in section 1. If the defendant wins the case on the other hand, it means to say that the applicant does not even
have a cause of action, because the complaint is going to be dismissed. The liability of the applicant for damages
will come as a matter of course, but section 20 provides the procedure to be followed in rendering the applicant
liable for damages for the wrongful or improper issuance of PA.
The first principles in section 20, is that the recovery of damages should be had in the same case, not in a
separate or independent civil action. So in that complaint filed by the applicant, the adverse party must have
already submit an application for the recovery of damages arising from the wrongful improper issuance of PA.
The most practical way or informing the court that the adverse party has a claim for damages is to set up in the
answer a compulsory counter claim, for the recovery of damages. If he sets up a compulsory counterclaim, for
the recovery of damages, and then he eventually wins, he will just have to ask the court to motion for the court
to conduct a hearing to the extent of likability to which the adverse party is entitled. What rule 57 tells us then is
that it is not possible for the defendant who has won the case to file a separate complaint for the recovery of
damages arising from the wrongful attachment. If he asks so that action will be dismissed even if there is no
motion to dismiss filed in that second complaint because the ground for dismissal is res judicata which is a non-
waivable defense.
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And section 20 also is now very clear that the extent of damages to be recovered by the adverse party is not
equivalent to the attachment bond. In the past if the attachment bond is fixed by the court at 100k, there is an
assumption that if the adverse party will ask for damages, the amount of damages will be limited to 100k that is
the value of the attachment bond. In section 20, there is nothing stated that the liability of the attaching creditor
will be limited to the value of the attachment bond by the court, there is nothing mentioned. What section 20
provides is that if the attachment bond is insufficient to answer for the liability of the applicant to answer for
damages then there could be an availment of writ of execution under rule 39. In other words if the attachment
bond is 100k, the court can fixed the liability of the applicant to 500k pesos, the liability of the bond will of
course be 100k but the 400k can be satisfied by making use of rule 39. We ask the court for the issuance of writ of
execution, there could now be a levy on execution of the properties belonging to the applicant. Remember that
in the section 20 is that it is followed in other provisional remedies like PI, Receiver and replevin. Well there is a
bond required before the court will grant this provisional remedy. The manner of collecting the damages on the
part of the applicant if it turns out later that the issuance of provisional remedy is wrongful or improper.
The next provisional remedy is preliminary injunction. And that the principal action could be any civil case like
a principal action of injunction coupled with the application for TRO or writ of PI. A petitioner of certiorari
under Rule 65 is usually accompanied by verified application of TRO or writ of PI. Because one of the principal
relief, that is asked by the petitioner in rule 65, is to prevent or prohibit the respondent to proceed with the case
that is pending in the court, in the case of certiorari, to set aside a decision or interlocutory order of the
respondent court.
PI and TRO could be availed of in any civil action where the relief or principal relief sought is to prevent the
defendant from performing an act in the case of mandatory injunction to compel a performance of an act. So we
will not limit the principal action in preliminary injunction to civil action, we can also make use of them in
criminal case, even in a special proceedings. As long as the principal is to prevent or prohibit a party from
performing an act or to compel him to perform an act.
In PI, there are in fact 2 provisional remedies that are contemplated. The first one is a TRO and the writ of
Preliminary injunction itself. Both now require an injunction bond. So even if the TRO in exceptional cases can
be granted ex parte, the injunction court should always require a bond. It is not correct to say that it is only in
preliminary injunction where you need a bond, even if the case of the TRO, there is always a need for a bond
fixed by the court. And the general rule which we follow is that a court cannot grant a TRO and PI without a
hearing, unlike a PA. We should always expect a hearing conducted by the court even in cases of the TRO. If
TRO is granted ex-parte, it is only by way of exception. The general rule is that we need a hearing. Although it is
a summary hearing with notice to both party in case of TRO. There is an exception however given in the rules,
when there is grave and irreparable injury.
The court if it is a one sala court can grant a TRO that will not go beyond 20 days, not extendible. But the court
will fix a TRO bond. During the 20 day period, the court will conduct now a new hearing for the purpose of
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determining whether or not the court will issue a PI. With respect to PI, the presence of summary hearing is
absolute. A court cannot grant a PI, without a hearing, there is no exception. There must always be a hearing to
be conducted. It is only in TRO where there is an exception to the general rule, there can be an issuance of TRO
ex parte as an exception. AN in the multi-sala court, that is where courts consists of different branches, there is
an executive branch, the executive branch can issue a TRO ex parte, but the TRO ex-parte is good only for 72
hours that is 3 days. And then, in a multi-sala court, what the petitioner usually files in the court is a motion of
special raffle and then if the motion is granted by the raffle. In the meantime the executive judge will issue ex-
parte TRO good for 3 days and after the raffle is completed, the sala before which the action has been assigned
will now conduct a summary hearing to determine whether or not it will issue a writ of PI. Do not forget the
modification in rule 58 by the 2007 circular of the SC. It has something to do with the court that has issued a writ
of PI. The modification in 2007 is that if a court issues a writ of PI which has no term anymore, that is it is good
until it is lifted or until the case has finally decide, unlike the TRO. That that court that issued the writ of PI must
decide the PI within a period of 6 months that is the modification introduced by 20067 circular. The idea of
course is very easy to understand, if the court does not raised a need of 6 months to which the principal action
could be decided, the PI will be perpetual injunction, because it is good until the case has been finally decided.
So if the court grants a PI today, it has only a period of 6 months within which to decide the principal case. And
in deciding the principal case, the court would either rule in favour of the applicant or defendant. If the court
rules in favor of the defendant, the PI is automatically lifted. That means to say that plaintiff has no right at all.
Although the power of the court to enjoin the performance of the act is broad there are certain instances given in
substantive law that is mentioned in the circulars of the Supreme Court where the court cannot properly grant
the PI, even in some cases a TRO.
The first situation wherein the court cannot grant a TRO or PI is in the enforcement of Kalikasan statutes. A
court cannot prevent the enforcement of Kalikasan statutes decided by the Supreme Court, the court of appeals
and RTC cannot prevent the enforcement of Kalikasan statues. Number two, if there is a TEPO issued by any
court, it is only the SC that can prevent the carrying out of the TEPO. In the case of infrastructure projects of the
national government, only the SC can issue an injunctive relief against the carrying out of infrastructure. When
it is a government owned bank that forecloses a mortgage like DBP, it is only the Supreme Court that can stop
the government bank from proceeding with the foreclosure of the mortgage, whether judicial or extra. And in
jurisprudence, the court has no injunctive relief against the bureau of customs because the BOC is an agency that
is tasked with collecting revenues, we cannot give a court the authority to enjoin the bureau of customs from
performing its task to collect revenues for the government. Although the court cannot grant injunctive relief
against the bureau of immigration, against deportation proceedings. That is already beyond the authority of the
injunctive relief.
If we are going to compare the remedies available to the defendant against whom an injunctive writ is issued to
that of a defendant in PA, we will notice right away that in rule 57, in the case of preliminary attachment, if the
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adverse party posts or files a counter-bond, it is a ministerial duty of the court to lift the PA, and therefore the
properties will be returned to him. But in PI, if the defendant posts a counter bond which he is entitled, it does
not mean to say that the injunctive court will have a ministerial duty to lift that PI. The court still has to study
the merit of the lifting of the injunction bond. The court cannot simply relief of the presence of the counter-bond
for the lifting of PI. So it is not a matter of right to expect the court to will lift because he has filed a bond. There
will be a motion for hearing and the court will determine the merit. The reason where the rules do not make it a
ministerial duty to the lift the PI simply because there is an injunction bond is the ground that is grave and
irreparable injury. And the meaning of irreparable injury according to the court is that injury cannot be
measured exactly in terms of pesos and centavos that is no mathematical formula in determining the liability or
damages that could be suffered by the applicant in injunction.
In PI and PMI, we should always relate this to the situation stated earlier. That is in summary procedure. A case
that is exclusively cognisable by an inferior court that is following the summary procedure is unlawful detainer
or forcible entry. The civil code contains some articles about procedure when there is a complaint pending
before an inferior court involving an unlawful detainer and forcible entry. And in the civil code, it is provided
that the court may grant PI or PMI in cases of ejectment. If it is an inferior court that grants a PI or PMI, that
cannot be appealed that cannot be challenged under rule 65. In summary procedure rule 65 is a prohibited
pleading. If rule 65 is used in order to challenge an interlocutory order, and the granting of PI or PMI is always
an interlocutory order that is the rule that we follow, as well as in civil code. In PI or PMI granted by an inferior
court in ejectment cases cannot be appealed, cannot also be challenged by petitioner under rule 65. But when
that ejectment case is appealed to RTC, that has jurisdiction in appellate jurisdiction, the civil code provides that
the RTC as an appeal court can also grant a PI or PMI if applied by plaintiff. The PMI or PI granted by the RTC
is still not appealable because it remains interlocutory but it can now be challenged by Rule 65. While we cannot
challenged an interlocutory order granted by an inferior court, in summary procedure, if the same interlocutory
order is granted by the RTC as an appeal court, but rule 65 is a remedy. So we can challenged a PI or PMI
granted by the RTC in ejectment cases. The reason is that in ejectment cases. Summary procedure governs the
case if it is still pending with the inferior court. But once it is appealed to RTC, the RTC will no longer observe
the summary procedure. It will now follow the regular procedure given in the rules of court as an appellate
court.
The third provisional remedy is the receiver which is one provisional remedy that has future not present in
other provisional remedy. Provisional remedies are contemplated to be used by litigants during pendency of the
case, that there is a need, we must have an independent action where we can give to the applicant a venue for
the use of the provisional remedies. In receivers, the court can appoint a receiver during the pendency of the
case if no judgement has been rendered but under the rules, the receivership court could appoint a receiver after
the case has been finally decided and the receivership court can still appoint a receiver even if there is a process
of execution under rule 39. So if the judgement of the court has been entered, in fact if it now in the process of
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execution and satisfaction of judgement, a court can still appoint a receiver as provided under rule 39. After a
case has been finally decided, there is no more reason for the court to grant a PI, PMI, if at all, the attachment
will be converted into a final attachment but that will simply be a levy on execution. The PI will be converted
into a permanent injunction. It ceases to be a provisional remedy, but in the case of receivers even if the case has
been finally decided by the court on the merits, the decision has become final and executor, we are now in the
process of execution, the court can still appoint a receiver under the procedures or Rule 39, the court can still
order the same. So there is no fix time in which the court can appoint a receiver. If the case is still pending a
receiver can be appointed, if the case has been decided a receiver can still be appointed. If we are now in the
process of execution, a receiver can still be appointed.
We should relate this to the remedies of a judgment creditor in rule 39 when the judgment creditor is not able to
recover full satisfaction of his account. Under rule 39, one of the remedies granted by the court is for the creditor
to ask for the satisfaction and for examination of the debtor, and the third is for judgement creditor to ask for
appointment of a receiver of the properties of a judgement debtor. So it is very clear, a receiver can be appointed
even if the cases are finally decided or undergoing execution.
A receiver cannot be appointed by the court ex-parte, there has to be a summary hearing. You will also notice
that the ground for the appointment of a receiver is quite broad. Whenever the court feels that there is a need to
appoint a receiver for the purpose of preserving of the property under litigation. So there must be a property in
litigation. And the rules also provided that in foreclosure of mortgage, again the foreclosure of mortgage
assumes that there are collateral, the mortgagee can move for the appointment of a receiver of the property that
is mortgaged. Even if there is no proof that the collateral will be loss or deteriorate, the foreclosing mortgagee
can file a petitioner for the appointment of a receiver, simply because in the deed of mortgage there is a written
stipulation authorizing the mortgagee to move for the appointment of a receiver. But generally the purpose of a
receivership is simply to preserve the property from deterioration. So that the court does not consider the
receiver as a representative of the parties, the SC has classified a receiver as a representative of a court, an officer
of a court. He represents the court, he is an officer of a court.
Because he is an officer of a court, the receiver cannot file a case as a receiver without the consent of the
receivership court. If he decides to file a complaint, on recovery of certain properties under receivership, he
needs permission from the receivership court. On the other hand, if the third person has a grievance against a
receiver in his capacity as a receiver, the third person must also get the permission of the receivership court. So
we find in a situation where the commencement of the action, will need permission from the court who has
appointed a receiver. If a permission is not granted, that action will fail, because it is deemed filed in violation
under the rules given in receivership., We also notice that in the appointment of a receiver, the practically the
issue is left at the discretion of the court. The qualification of a receiver, how many receivers will be appointed,
how much will be paid to the receiver, it all depends upon the receivership court because, of this broad
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authority of the court it follows that since it is the court that appoints a receiver, it can also fire and appoint a
new one, as a receiver whenever there is a need for the preservation of the property.
It is with respect to the bond where there is feature of receivership which is not followed in other provisional
remedies. We have an attachment bond, a PI/PMI bond. In receivership, there are two bonds that are filed. The
first is required of the applicant for the appointment of the receiver. And if the court eventually grants the
application, and the court appoints a receiver, the receiver will also be required to post a bond. So there is an
applicants bond and there is a receivers bond. The receiver bond is designed to protect the parties from
litigation from being abused and mislead by the receiver in the performance of his duties. We go to replevin.

As we said earlier, replevin is accepted as a main action or as a provisional remedy at the same time. SO the
recovery of the possession of personal property capable of manual delivery is usually referred even in the cases
decided by the Supreme Court a complaint for replevin. Although the proper role of replevin is that of
provisional remedy, the principal action is action for recovery possession of personal property. Since that is the
principal action, it automatic rules out real action. In a real action we cannot make use of a writ of replevin. In a
personal action for the recovery of possession of personal property, the proper provisional remedy to enable of
the applicant to immediately recover possession is by applying a writ of replevin or a warrant of seizure. So in
replevin cases, it is always for the recovery of possession of personal property, without this writ of replevin as a
provisional remedy, the plaintiff will be able to recover the personal property only after the court has finally
decided the case and judgment is in favor of the plaintiff so that if he files a complaint for the recovery of a car,
versus the defendant, if he files a complaint today, if he does not use of replevin as a provisional remedy there is
no way by which he can obtain a possession of the car. While it the case is pending. The only time when the
plaintiff can get back the car is when the court has finally decided the case and the decision is in favor of the
plaintiff. So that if the proper court will take 5 years to finally decide the case, during period of 5 years, the car
subject of the litigation will be in the hands of the defendant. Chances are by the time the case is decided, since it
is in the hands of the defendant who expect probably to lose the case, when he turns the car, the car would have
already been junk. That is the role made by a writ of replevin. So if the plaintiff files a complaint today for the
recovery of a personal property or car, which according to the plaintiff belongs to him or at least entitled to
possess the car. If he wants to get the car right away, he should also submit a verified application for writ of
replevin.
And we will notice that in the rules, the principles governing replevin are treated always in favor of the
applicant. Why do we say that the rules are treated in favor of the applicant? He files a complaint today, he
moves for the issuance of writ of replevin today, can the court grant the motion today or tomorrow although the
defendant has not yet been served with summons? In other words can the court grant the application for
replevin ex-parte. And the answer is yes. In fact this is one provisional remedy which cannot be granted by the
higher court. In PA,PI,PMI or receiver, the court of original jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction could grant
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these remedies except replevin. It could only be granted by the trial court because it can be granted only before
the defendant answers.
If the defendant has already answered, then it would be improper for the trial court to grant this writ of
replevin. So if file a complaint today for the recovery of a car, and then submit an application for a writ of
replevin also filed today, and the court grants it today, the sheriff will look for the car. And if the sheriff finds
the car in the possession of the defendant, the sheriff will seize the car from the defendant, but following again
the rule on prior or contemporaneous service of summons in order to cure any defect on jurisdiction. But as we
said earlier, the rule on prior and contemporaneous service of summons found in rule 57, equally applies to
other provisional remedies that are granted ex parte. So the sheriff will seize the car, and then after seizing the
car, the sheriff will take it for 5 days, that is five day holding period. If within that holding period, there is no
counter bond and there is no challenge to the court as to the sufficiency of the replevin, at the 6
th
day, the sheriff
will give the car to the plaintiff. So if the trial court will take 5 years to ultimately decide on the merits, the
plaintiff will not suffer any harm at all because within the period it is the plaintiff who will be in the possession
of the car, not the defendant.
That is the advantage given by the provisional remedy of replevin. It enables the plaintiff to immediately
recover the possession of the personal property that is the subject of litigation. But there could be some
problems, concerning the service of the writ of replevin. One of the problems is as follows, the court not always
the RTC but may be an inferior court, because if it is a personal property, the jurisdiction depending upon the
value of the personal property alleged in the complaint. So if the complaint is worth 250k, it will be filed in the
inferior court, if it is worth 600k, it will be filed in the RTC. But as long as it has jurisdiction, these courts have
the authority to grant in our complaint to recover possession of the car with a writ of replevin.
The bond required is also different form the usual bond, in other provisional remedies. The bond required is
always double the value of the personal property. In other words, unlike in PA PI where the court has the
discretion to fix the amount of the bond, in replevin, the court has no discretion, the replevin bond will always,
be in double of the value of the property as alleged in the complaint. So if the complaint alleged that the value of
the car is 700k the replevin bond will be 1.4 million. The court has no authority to further decrease or increase
the bond, it will be based on the value of the property according to the allegations contained in the complaint. If
all these requisites are met, the sheriff will seize the property from the defendant, or from any person who
claims to be entitled to its possession because of the authority given by the defendant.
The problem arises when the sheriff seized the car, that the car is not in possession of the defendant, the one in
possession of the car, claims that he is the owner of the car, he is entitled to the possession of the car, he does not
even know who the defendant is. If that is the situation, the sheriff will not seize the car. Because the authority of
the sheriff to seize the car in replevin is very clear, he will seize the car if it is possession of the defendant or
some other person claiming under the authority of the defendant. If it is in the hands of a third person, who does
not raised his interest from the defendant, the sheriff will be committing a crime if he seizes the car from the
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third person. So that is always a likelihood, that a writ of replevin even if granted by the court, can easily be
defeated if the sheriff submits a return to the court, informing the court that he could not seize the car because it
is in possession of a third person who is not a litigant in the case. In order to remedy this situation, lawyers have
always advised the clients who are plaintiff that if they file a complaint should always implead the defendant,
the first defendant should be a known defendants. A person who according to the plaintiff is in possession of
the car and the other defendant to be impleaded is an unknown defendant, so we have a complaint where the
caption is plaintiff vs. Juan dela Cruz and john doe, an unknown defendant, we also make use of that. So that
when the sheriff looks for the car, he does not find in possession of Juan de la Cruz, he finds it in the possession
of a third person, that third person will be John Doe. So the sheriff can rightfully seize the car from anybody
who might be in possession of the car. That solves the problem of the sheriff in enforcing the writ of replevin.
You know the rule in unknown defendant, we have to give him name in the complaint itself. John Doe...
anybody who might be in possession of the car, who might be an unknown defendant. If the car is seized, there
is a holding period of a 5 days, within that 5 days period, the defendant should do something if wants to recover
the car. The defendant should file a motion to challenge the sufficiency of the bond, although it is double the
property. He can say that the complaint is undervalued in order that the replevin bond became smaller. That
could be an issue raised. Or if there is a third party claim filed, if a third person claims to be the true owner of
the car, then he can file a third party claim just like in 39 and 57. But the difference in 60 is that the third party
claim in rule 60 must be filed within the 5 day period, if it is not filed within the 5 day period, it becomes a
useless third party claim. After the end of 5 days, the sheriff has the duty to deliver the car to the plaintiff so
while the case is going on it is the plaintiff in possession and enjoying the car.
There was another case decided by the Supreme Court whose facts are as follows. A complaint for replevin was
filed by applicant for recovery of personal property capable of manual delivery. The court included that the writ
that the sheriff cannot enforced the writ because the car can no longer be found, it seems that the property
simply disappeared. What the plaintiff did after receiving the writ of return was to file another application this
time for preliminary attachment of the properties of the defendant. So based on the same complaint, he moved
for replevin which cannot be carried about, he moved for the PA on the ground that the defendant has gotten
old of the property and that he has hidden by the car because the car cannot be found at all. If we go back to 57,
that could be a ground for the issuance of PA. The SC said that the conversion of application for PA could be
properly filed so that the new provisional remedy from replevin could be done founded on the same allegation
in that complaint. The court said it is not proper. That if the plaintiff does not succeed the writ of replevin issued
by the court, he cannot simply file another application for the issuance of PA over the same property or different
property. If the plaintiff decides to move for PA because of failure to carry out the replevin, he should overhaul
the complaint filed. The allegations contained in the complaint for the PA are different from the allegations
contained in the issuance of writ of replevin. In a complaint for replevin, the plaintiff tells the court that he is
owner of the car or entitled to the possession, whereas in the complaint for PI, the property to be attached by the
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plaintiff should not be the property belonging to the plaintiff. It should be a property belonging to the defendant
because attachment will be a security in favor of the plaintiff. So if we need a security, we should have in the
hands of the plaintiff a property belonging to the defendant not the property of the plaintiff. So it could not be
done unless, the complaint is amended so that the amended of complaint change the substantial allegations
contained in that complaint.
Another feature of replevin as a provisional remedy is found in last 2 sections of 60, that is in the complaint of
replevin the decision of the court could be in alternative. The alternative in replevin, that the property will be
delivered to the property or the value that the property that could not be delivered. It is only the replevin that
the court is given an express authority to render alternative judgment.
The last provisional remedy under the rules as I said is also mentioned in the circular of the SC on provisional
orders in marriage related cases. In fact the circular are more expansive because it does not mention only
support pendente lite there is a classification in fact of support, spousal support and child support. Although
again in that circular, the family court which has the exclusive jurisdiction over complaint a support can grant
spousal or child support even without hearing or without a bond, which is also a provision in provisional
remedy in support pendente lite. In support pendente lite, it is one of the provisional remedy which does not
require the posting of a bond. We follow that principle in that circular, child support and spousal support could
be granted by the family court with or without a hearing, with or without a bond. That is a principal difference
between the provision on circular on marriage related cases pending in the family court and support pendente
lite that is tried and pending by the court which is not the family court. Because in the rules of court, it is not
proper for a court to grant an order or application for support pendente lite without conducting a hearing.
In the rules, the support pendente lite can only be allowed after conducting a hearing where the parties are
given the change to explain, the reason why this is required in the rules of court under support pendente lite is
that a court cannot conceivable issue an order granting support unless the court is able to determine whether the
petitioner really needs a support and even if he really needs support, whether or not the respondent has the
financial ability to grant support. Because if the court simply grants the application without examining the
financial ability of respondent, the provisional remedy will be useless. It will only end up with the respondent
who has no means of support to go to jail. This is one action where we can imprison a respondent if he does not
comply with the court to issue support although he may not have really the ability to do so. In support
proceedings, there are three remedies given by substantive law which is certainly very unfavourable to us men.
We can be imprisoned for citation of contempt, there could be execution of our properties under rule 39 and the
third, we can be sent to jail not because of contempt but because we have committed a crime. So that in most
cases, before a family court where the defendant admits that even if he wants to give support and that he is not
financially able to do so and the court usually asks the petitioner. Are you willing that your husband go to jail?
And invariably he does not him to go to jail. And the court that the provision on substantive law violates
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probably the constitutional provision on equal protection of laws. But in the rules of court on support pendente
lite, you will notice that the principle in section 20 rule 57, rule 57 is not followed at all.
We said earlier that the remedy in order to recover damages in a wrongful issuance of attachment, PI, replevin
should be in the same case. It could not be held in an independent or separate action for damages. But if you
read provision on support pendente lite, it is expressly provided that there could be an independent action for
the recovery of money that has been given as support in compliance with the order of the court. So we do not
have to file a claim in the principal action, the one who gave support following the order of the court for him to
give support can file a separate complaint for the recovery of the amount that is needed in compliance with the
order of the court.
Going back to the circular of the SC in marriage related cases, this is trial can only be made by the family court.
If you were ask why the family court can order child or spousal support without a hearing the side of the
parties, you will just there is no need for the family court to determine the needs of the spouse, or the child, or
the financial ability of the defendant. Because it is in these family related cases, one of the requirements is that
there must be inventory of properties submitted to the family court to the petitioner. So if the family court
analyzes that the property owned in common by the parties, the family court can determine how much the
spouse is entitled to every month or how much given to the minors. So there is also good reason why family
court is not required to conduct hearing on the application of spousal or child support.
Also in respect to the provisional orders granted by the family court in marriage related cases, although the
provisional orders are called by some other name, these provisional orders partake of the nature of the
injunction, an example is a protection order. A protection order in family related cases is effectively a
prohibitory and mandatory injunction at the same time because in the protection order, the family court
prohibits the respondents from performing an act. The family court can tell the respondent that dont ever visit
your child in school, that is effectively a prohibitory injunction. It could also be in form of mandatory
injunction, the court can tell the respondent do not enter the conjugal house, you just remove the clothing and
dont ever show your face. Effectively the protection order in the marriage related cases partakes of a
prohibitory injunction and the mandatory injunction.
We have also this concept of receiver in marriage related cases, instead of appointment in the family court to
appoint a receiver, the co-owned of property or common property, what the court can do is to appoint an
administrator. So the administrator is effectively a receiver of this property under litigation in charge of solving
the property owned in common by the husband and wife.
With respect to the interim reliefs in Amparo, we said four of them, protection order, witness protection,
inspection and production order, and if we add in Amparo and Habeas Data. In effect we have six interim reliefs
available in Amparo. The circular does not mention anything of the filing of a bond before the Amparo court can
issue these interim reliefs, with respect to the Kalikasan circular, when the court issues a TEPO the applicant is
not required to post a bond, it is the adverse party who will be required to post a bond if he files an application
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for lifting or dissolution of writ of Kalikasan. And as a security to protect the interest of the applicant, it is the
adverse party who will be required to file a bond before the court will issue an order lifting or desolving the
TEPO.
I suggest that you read the circulars, but do not centre your attention on these provisional remedies or interim
reliefs. Its better off if you centre your attention to the procedures in the civil cases and criminal cases given in
this different circulars. For instance in Kalikasan case, the procedure in civil case that we have learned is not
applicable in some cases and they are applicable only partially in other cases. For instance in the circular of
Kalikasan which can be filed before a RTC, an Inferior court. But the special civil action of Kalikasan and
continuing mandamus are cognizable only by CA and SC. In filing the complaint involving the enforcement of
Kalikasan case, it is not enough to file a complaint, of course the law requires the filing of a bond. Together with
that complaint, the circular requires the party already to append to his complaint the evidence available. The
same is true with the defendant, when he files an answer, he can already attach the evidence in support of his
defences. And in Kalikasan cases, civil action, if the defendant does not file an answer, we do not require rule 9
that is the motion to declare defendant in default, a motion to declare defendant in default is also prohibited in
Kalikasan cases. If the defendant does not file an answer and the plaintiff is prohibited from filing a motion to
declare the defendant in default, do we expect the court to render a judgment just like in summary procedure
according to the tenor of complaint? The Kalikasan circular provides that if the defendant does not answer, it is
the duty of the court to declare the defendant in default, so there is default without the corresponding motion of
the plaintiff in Kalikasan cases, it becomes the duty of the court to issue an order declaring the defendant in
default, and thereafter receives evidence ex parte.
And in Kalikasan cases, while the courts totally used the state policy which encourages the compromise
agreement of settling the civil action. If there is a compromise agreement based in a Kalikasan civil case, the
judgement is not called a judgement based upon compromise, the circular has another term that is a consent
decree. That is just a judgement based on a compromise. I suggest you read the circulars, the procedure that
should be read.
You will also notice that the rules on evidence are not necessarily followed in Kalikasan cases. Although the
action maybe a special proceeding, the quantum that usually apply could be near substantial evidence. Which is
also the same principle in Amparo. If you read the circular, the quantum of evidence is only substantial
evidence, same in quasi judicial proceeding although Amparo is a judicial proceeding. So there is no problem if
the Supreme Court changes the quantum of evidence to be followed as in Amparo. But there is something
irregular, if a quasi judicial body will adopt a rule that quasi judicial body must support his stand with
preponderance of evidence. That act of is void, the rule on quantum of evidence is the turf of Supreme Court.
The administrative bodies cannot change the quantum of evidence.


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We start with 63: Declaratory relief and other Similar Remedies.
Rule 63 enumerates four SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS. The first is DECLARATORY RELIEF and OTHER
SIMILAR REMEDIES encompasses three special civil actions enumerated in the Rules: 1. Reformation of
Instrument; 2.Quieting of Title and; 3. Consolidation of Title under 1607 of the Civil Code. Although they are
contained in the same Rule, they are governed by different rules, by different procedures. So the procedure in
declaratory relief is different from the procedure in the other similar relief. The requirements of declaratory
relief are not the requirements of other similar remedies.
With respect to DECLARATORY RELEIF, the obvious nature of declaratory relief which makes it a special civil
action is that the petition must be filed must be filed before a breach or violation is committed. In other
words, if we are going to apply the principles governing ordinary civil actions, petition for declaratory relief will
be dismissed outright; because at the time of the filing of the petition, the petitioner does not have a cause of
action. There is no allegation in the petition for declaratory relief that there is a right that has been violated by
the act or omission of another. If there is an allegation, the petition ceases to be a declaratory relief. It becomes an
ordinary civil action. In short, a petition for declaratory relief is a preventive mechanism in order to prevent
contracting parties from getting involved later on in an ordinary civil action which could be tedious. Because, in
declaratory relief, the petitioner does not allege that he has a right or even if he has a right, it has not been
violated. And therefore, having no cause of action, the only relief which the petitioner seeks from the Court is
for the Court to determine what his rights are under a written instrument, deed or contract. The petitioner is not
absolutely certain if he has rights under a certain deed or instrument; and he is asking the Court to declare what
his rights are. So after the Court has declared what his rights are, that is the end. So we cannot have a petition
for declaratory relief with a prayer for damages. A prayer for damages in a declaratory relief will defeat the
nature of declaratory relief. Damages are awarded by the Court if there is already a breach of a right belonging
to the plaintiff.
You will notice that there is an enumeration in 63 about the instruments which can be subject of declaratory
relief; deed, will, contract, statute or an ordinance. With respect to statute or ordinance, the same principle
applies. So we cannot file a petition for declaratory relief involving a statute or ordinance if there has been a
violation of the statute or ordinance. So before the effectivity of the statute or ordinance, the usual prayer for a
petition for declaratory relief is to declare the statute or ordinance void or unconstitutional. So, you will notice in
some instances after the Congress enacted law, and the President has signed it into law, there is always a date of
effectivity given to that statute. If somebody wants to challenge the validity or constitutionality of that statute,
he must do so before the law takes effect and before the violation and before a violation of the law is committed,
solely for the purpose of determining if the statute or ordinance is unconstitutional or constitutional. So you will
meet decisions of the Court in certain declaratory relief to the effect that we cannot file a motion for execution in
order to carry out the declaratory judgment. The judgment in declaratory relief is usually called a
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT in order to differentiate it from what the Court usually renders after a judgment
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has been entered in order to clarify a judgment. In the latter phase, we usually call the latter judgment as
CLARIFICATORY JUDGMENT. In Clarificatory Judgment, there is already a judgment rendered by the Court, it
has become final and executory but there are certain ambiguities which will make it hard for the Court of origin
to execute that judgment. The remedy of the interested party is to file a motion for a rendition of a Clarificatory
Judgment.
In Declaratory Judgment, the Court will only tell the petitioner what is rights are, what his duties are under a
certain will, deed or contract. Or in the case of a statute or ordinance, the Court will tell the petitioner whether a
statute or ordinance is constitutional or unconstitutional. So after the Court has done its duty, there is more need
for the prevailing party to move for execution. We dont apply Rule 39 to a petition for declaratory. So that is the
first nature of Declaratory Relief which makes it a special civil action. So there is really no cause of action as
contemplated in ordinary civil action, where there is a right that has been violated by the defendant.
The second procedural rule that we apply to declaratory relief, which is not followed in other special civil
actions or ordinary civil action, is the authority of the Court not to entertain the petition for declaratory relief.
The Court can outright tell the petitioner, I am not inclined to entertain your petition. The Court can refuse to
declare the rights and duties of the petitioner or respondent under a deed, will or contract on the ground for
instance that the judgment of the Court will not bind parties who have not been impleaded a petition for
declaratory relief, which shows that a declaratory relief is not in rem but purely a petition in personam, it cannot
bind parties who have not been impleaded. Although, these parties who have not been so impleaded may be
contracting parties of the contract, subject matter of the litigation.
What is the competent Court in Rule 63? If the petition is for declaratory relief, it is the Regional Trial Court
because a petition for declaratory relief is not one capable of pecuniary estimation. But if we are going to look
for the competent court for other similar remedies, it is not always the RTC, we have to take into account in the
provisions of BP 129. For instance, reformation of instruments, is that cognizable solely by the RTC? Yes,
because reformation of instruments is not one capable of pecuniary estimation. What is the competent court for
Quieting of Title? It is not necessarily the RTC. It is because Quieting of Title involved title to or possession of
real property and under the standard provided by BP 19, actions involving title to or possession of real property
could be cognizable by the RTC or an inferior court depending on the assessed value of that property. So,
quieting of title could be cognizable by an Inferior Court if the assessed value of the property is only P5000 or
P10000. We apply the standard provided in the provisions under BP 129.
The third special civil action is Consolidation of Title. The competent Court is also decided by the assessed value
of the property involved, because consolidation of title always involves a real property. Using the standard
applied by the Court in Quieting of Title, we have to allege the assessed value of the property in order to give to
the trial court jurisdiction over the case.
Why do we need to file a special action for Consolidation of Title? Does not Consolidation of Title come a
matter of course if the period of redemption has expired and the redemption-er has failed to exercise his right of
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redemption? That is in fact the principle that we follow in Rule 39. In execution of judgment, if a real property is
sold in a public auction by virtue of a levy or execution, the highest bidder will not get automatically a title in
his own name. Rule 39 provides for a period of redemption, which is usually one (1) year from the registration
of the certificate of sale. After the lapse of one year, if the sheriff is not informed by the highest bidder whether
or not there has been a redemption that is carried out, what the sheriff will do is to issue a FINAL DEED OF
SALE. Initially, what the Sheriff issued in Rule 39 is a Certificate of Sale,that is the one that is recorded in the
Register of Deeds. So the Register of Deed can easily determine if the period of redemption has already expired.
It is just a matter of counting from the registration of the Certificate of Sale. If there is no redemption, the highest
bidder will naturally be interested in getting a title in his own name. The title of the judgment debtor will have
to be cancelled and a new title should be issued by the Registry of Deeds in the name of the highest bidder. The
highest bidder does not have file an action for the consolidation of title. The highest bidder will only secure from
the Sheriff or the Court this Final Deed of Sale and when he records this Final Deed of Sale, the Registry of
Deeds will simply cancel the title of the judgment debtor and issue a new one in the name of the highest bidder.
So the highest bidder now has in his hands Torrens Title in his own name. So in Rule 39 there is no such thing as
Consolidation of Title under Rule 63 as a Special Civil Action. This is also the procedure that is followed when
a Real Mortgaged in foreclosed. The mortgage is foreclosed, it is sold at a public auction and there is a highest
bidder. The sheriff will execute a Certificate of Sale and will be recorded and from that time on we count the one
year of redemption. If there is no redemption, the Sheriff will again issue a Final Deed of Sale and on the basis of
that Final Deed of Sale, the Registry of Deeds will cancel the title of the Mortgagor and issue a new title in the
name of the highest bidder. So you will notice under special laws, The Mortgage Law and even under Rule 39,
in order to consolidate title we do not require an action to Consolidate Title. The only public officer who is going
to deal with the interested party is the Register of Deeds, who has a ministerial duty to issue a title, a final deed
of sale. Why do we require an action to consolidate title under 1607 under the Civil Code? If you read the Civil
Code, 1607 also refers redemption rights, there is sale with a right redeem. It is a voluntary sale; it is not a forced
sale not like the sale in Rule 39. But it is a voluntary sale if you compare it in a sale in a foreclosure of mortgage.
Because in a foreclosure of mortgage, the mortgagee is given a special authority by the mortgagor to sell the
property. But suddenly 1607, the Rules of Court require an action, a special civil action for the Consolidation of
Title although the factual antecedents are the same. There is a right of redemption for a certain period, but the
right holder fails or does not exercise his right of redemption. Why do we require the adverse party to go to
court in order to obtain from the court a decision directing the Register of Deed to Consolidate the Title of the
buyer with right to redeem? The fact that is present in 1607 is that right of redemption is what is called is
CONVNETIONAL REDEMPTION; but in Rule 39 and Foreclosure of Mortgage is LEGAL REDEMPTION. It is
that classification of redemption into conventional which makes the distinction under the Civil Code. In the
Civil Code, when there is a sale with right of redemption, that redemption is called Conventional Redemption.
It is not Legal Redemption. When the period expires, the period for Conventional Redemption is also one year,
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the buyer of the property cannot go directly to the Registry of Deeds although he can convince the Registry of
Property that the period has already expired, there is no need to go to Court for the Registry of Deeds to
compute if the period has already expired, anybody can do that. So the buyer in Conventional Redemption
should be allowed to deal with the Registry of Deeds without requiring him to file an action in Court. The
reason why we suddenly provide a different remedy in a Conventional redemption is because under the Civil
Code when a sale with a right to repurchase, is not a sale but an equitable mortgage. The Civil Code assumes, a
disputable presumption, that the contract entered into is not a sale but an equitable mortgage. So in so far as the
Civil Code is concerned, the seller is not a genuine seller but is only a mortgagee. And the buyer is not a true
buyer, but is really a mortgagee, notwithstanding the designation as buyers and sellers in a Contract of Sale.
Also, the Register of Deeds has to observe this disputable presumption that a dead of sale with right of
redemption is presumably an equitable mortgage. So the party need to go to the Court to declare that his
Contract Sale, in so far as consolidation of title is concerned is a genuine Contract of Sale. This is the special
feature with regard to consolidation of title under Artcile 1607 of the Civil Code, to give the buyer the chance to
present evidence to defeat that disputable presumption under the Civil Code. If the plaintiff, who is the buyer In
that Sale, fails to defeat that disputable presumption, he can still obtain consolidation f title but he will be forced
to file another special civil action, this time Foreclosure of Mortgage. Hence, if he is not able to obtain a decision
under Rule 63 in a Special Civil Action to consolidate an Action under 1607, because he is a mortgagee in an
equitable mortgage, he has the right to foreclose the mortgage. And the only mean to foreclose the mortgage is
to avail another Civil Action which is a foreclosure of a Real Estate Mortgage. But the procedure is quite lengthy.
The Court is obligated to render three decisions.
NOTE: Although the Court can outright refuse to entertain a petition for Declaratory relief, it cannot outright
refuse to entertain Reformation of Instrument; .Quieting of Title and; Consolidation of Title.