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[G.R. No. 183053 : June 15, 2010]

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-
SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, PETITIONER, VS. ISABEL COJUANGCO-
SUNTAY, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.

Doctrine: The law [of intestacy] is founded... on the presumed will of
the deceased... Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally,
spreads sideways.

Facts:
1. On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to
Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate.
~ In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both
Cristina and Federico.
~ At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and
several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III)
and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
2. Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children,
namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II
3. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter,
Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo
(Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos,
respectively.
4. Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with
their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father and
paternal grandparents.
5. Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation
rights over his grandchildren. It was altogether stopped because of a manifestation
filed by
respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her
grandparents.
6. After her spouses death, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on
September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita
7. On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor. Federico filed his opposition. Being the surviving
spouse of Cristina, he is capable of
administering her estate and he should be the one appointed as its administrator;
that as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be
accorded legal preference in the administration
8. After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico
filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III,
as administrator of the decedents estate on his behalf. Subsequently, the trial
court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave
to Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case.
9. In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.
10. The trial court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing herein
petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate.What
matters most at this time is the welfare of the estate of the decedent in the light of
such unfortunate and bitter estrangement. The Court honestly believes that to
appoint the petitioner would go against the wishes of the decedent who raised
[Emilio III] from infancy in her home in Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it
would go against the wishes of the surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio
III] for appointment as administrator.
11. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to
Emilio III. In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs status as an
illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased
father in the estate of the latters legitimate mother, the decedent. That he cannot
be appointed for the ff reasons:
i. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition,
i.e., Federicos appointment as administrator of the estate
ii. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate
offspring (Emilio III) of decedents son, Emilio I, respondent is
preferred, being the "next of kin" referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court
iii. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 of the Civil Code
bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother.

ISSUE :

A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE UNDER
SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE
992 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and

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B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN PETITIONER WAS
REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY,
WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO
BAR HIM FROM BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
DECEDENT'S ESTATE

The pivotal issue:

Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as
administrator of the decedent's estate.

Ruling:

The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule,
is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual
relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the
other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives;

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in
the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out
the appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of
the estates, a situation which obtains here.

Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative
heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita
Taedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of
respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting claims
of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and
Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in
only one direction,i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.

One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the
Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of
a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate
the contrary - Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually
treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy,
educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by
decedent's husband, the original oppositor to respondent's petition for letters of
administration.

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of
intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not
distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her
husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an
illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of
this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal
presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and
antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration
over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both
petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon
payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination
and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the
actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal
interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Perez,
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JJ., concur.

1. The Court cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling excluding Emilio III in
the administration of the decedents undivided estate. The underlying philosophy
of our law on intestate succession is to give preference to the wishes and
presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will
The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule,
is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual
relationship between Federico and
Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III. Both spouses acknowledged Emilio III as
their grandchild. Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still
commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal
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partnership, albeit terminated upon her death, remains undetermined and
unliquidated
Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution
of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply
representing his deceased illegitimate
father, Emilio I.
2. It is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the
administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs
interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest
therein of respondent. Considering that the CA even declared that "under the law,
[Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the
conjugal partnership."
3. However, the order of preference (Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists
the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate) is not
absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case.
Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound
discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of
this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and
Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.
4. [I]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the
interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not
rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and
equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.
5. Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative
heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita
Taedo.
6. On a final note, counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the
Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of
a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate
the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually
treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son.
7. Contention on 992 by JBL:
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted
only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code
prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father and mother.
The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle
since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with
fine inconsistency
i. in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the
hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a
legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the
grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so
This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the
Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate
issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be
suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998.
8. Manresa:
The law [of intestacy] is founded... on the presumed will of the
deceased... Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads
sideways.
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis
of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not
distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her
husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an
illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child.
The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for
petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that
there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate
descendants of a deceased. It must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us
to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the
presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico,
considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the long
deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Decision: The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE