"Palamas Among The Scholastics" Logos 55 (2014)

Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies
Vol. 55 (2014) Nos. 12, pp. 175220

Palamas among the Scholastics:
A Review Essay Discussing
D. Bradshaw, C. Athanasopoulos,
C. Schneider et al., Divine Essence
and Divine Energies: Ecumenical
Reflections on the Presence of God
in Eastern Orthodoxy
(Cambridge: James and Clarke, 2013)
Christiaan W. Kappes, J. Isaac Goff,
and T. Alexander Giltner

Sigla

NB, unless otherwise cited, English translations and emphases
in bold are our own, while we also modify some English trans-
lations.

Acta Graeca Quae supersunt Actorum Graecorum Concilii
Florentini. CFDS Series B, vol. 5, books 12,
ed. J. Gill (Rome: PIOS, 1953).
Acta Latina Acta Latina Concilii Florentini. CFDS Series
B, vol. 6, ed. G. Hofmann (Rome: PIOS,
1955).
Ad Thalassium Maximus Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalas-
sium. Corpus Christianorum: Series Graeca
22, ed. C. Laga and C. Steel (Turhout: Bre-
pols, 1990).
176 Kappes, Goff, and Giltner

Amb. Maximus Confessor, Ambigua ad Iohannem.
Corpus Christianorum: Series Graeca, 18, ed.
Edouard Jeauneau, (Turnhout: Brepols, 1988).
BAV Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana.
Caritas J. Isaac Goff, Caritas in Primo: A Historical
Theological Study of Bonaventures Quaes-
tiones Disputatae de Mysterio Ss. Trinitatis
(New Bedford, MA: Academy of the Immacu-
late, 2014).
CFDS Concilium Florentinum Documenta et Scrip-
tores Series B, ed. G. Hoffman and M. Candal
(Rome: PIOS, 1942, 1952).
CUP Cambridge University Press.
Capita 150 Gregory Palamas, The One Hundred and Fifty
Chapters (Capita 150), ed. and trans. R. Sin-
kewicz (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies, 1988).
Chrestou Gregory Palamas,
, 5 vols., ed. P.K. Chrestou (Thes-
saloniki: Ethniko Idrima Erevnon, 1962
1992).
De distinct Titus Szab, De distinctionis formalis origine
bonaventuriana disquisitio historico-critica,
in Scholastica ratione historico-critica
instauranda, ed. Charles Bali (Rome:
Antonianum, 1951), 379445.
DSSB Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera
Omnia, 9 vols. (Quarrachi: Ad Claras Aquas,
18821901).
First Antir Mark Eugenicus, First Antirrhetic on the
Distinction between Essence and Energy: First
Antirrhetic against Manuel Kalekas. Editio
princeps, ed. M. Pilavakis (PhD diss.,
University of London, 1987).
Lectura John Duns Scotus, The Examined Report of
the Paris Lecture. Reportatio I-A, 2 vols., eds.
A. Wolter and O. Bychkov (St. Bonaventure,
NY: Bookmasters, 2004).
Palamas among the Scholastics 177

OCGS George-Gennadius Scholarius, Oeuvres
Compltes de Georges Scholarios, 8 vols., ed.
L. Petit, X. Sidrids, and M. Jugie (Paris:
Maison de la Bonne Presse, 19291935).
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Mariani Ioannis Duns Scoti Ordinis Fratrum
Minorum opera omnia. Opus Oxiense, 14
vols., ed. C. Bali, M. Bodewig, et al. (Vatican
City: Polyglott, 19502013).
OUP Oxford University Press.
GLIH J.A. Demetracopoulos, Palamas Trans-
formed: Palamite Interpretations of the Dis-
tinction between Gods Essence and
Energies in Late Byzantium, and Georgi
Kapriev, Lateinische Einflsse auf die
Antilateiner. Philosophie versus Kirchen-
politik?, in Greeks, Latins, and Intellectual
History 12041500, ed. M. Hinterberger and
C. Schabel (Paris: Peeters Leuven, 2011),
263272; 385395.
PG Patrologiae cursus completus, series graeca
(Paris: Migne, 18621866).
PP John Scottus Eriugena, Periphyseon. Corpus
Christianorum: Continuatio Medievalis, 161
165, five vols., ed. E. Jeauneau (Turnhout:
Brepols, 19962003).
PIOS Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studio-
rum.
ScG Thomas Aquinas and Sylvester Ferrariensis,
Summa contra Gentiles. Commentari Ferra-
riensis. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris
Angelici opera Omnia, vols. 1315 (Rome:
Riccardi Garroni, 1926).
Second Antir Manuel Kalekas, Second Antirrhetic against
Manuel Kalekas. Editio princeps, ed. M.
Pilavakis (Athens, Ph.D. diss forthcoming).
S.Th. Summa Theologiae.
SVTQ St. Vladimirs Theological Quarterly.

Theo dogmatica Martin Jugie, Theologia dogmatica chris-
tianorum orientalium ab Ecclesia Catholica
dissidentium, vol. 2 (Parisiis: Letouzey et An,
1933).
Tomo Sinodale Neilus Cabasilas and Philotheus Kokkinos,

, in Gregorio Palamas e oltre: studi e
documenti sulle controversie teologiche del
xiv secolo bizantino. Orientalia Venetiana 16,
ed. A. Rigo (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 2004),
1134.
Triads Gregory Palamas, The Triads. The Classics of
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Meyendorff, trans. N. Gendle (Mahwah, NJ:
Paulist Press, 1983).

Introduction

Scholars show ever-increasing interest in the essence-
energies distinction of Gregory Palamas. This essay confronts
unresolved difficulties that persist in spite of David
Bradshaws Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the
Division of Christendom (2004) and its virtual sequel, Divine
Essence and Divine Energies (2013). In the latter compilation
of essays, Bradshaw dialogues with critics discussing patris-
tics, medieval theology, and modern philosophy. Our present
essay confronts three major themes of the two aforementioned
books: (1) Palamas place in the general history of philosophy
and theology; (2) Palamas singularity vis--vis the essence-
energies distinction; and (3) Palamas unparalleled distinction
among Latins. The essay compares primary Orthodox sources,
such as Palamas and Mark of Ephesus, to primary Latin sour-
ces, such as Bonaventure of Bagnoregio and John Duns
Scotus. Furthermore, this essay critiques Bradshaw as well as
classic Renaissance and Enlightenment schoolmen, to offer a
global perspective of Palamas historical role within the con-
text of forgotten or ignored historical chronicles that challenge

present historical narratives. It ends by suggesting areas of
further investigation to arrive at a satisfactory description of
Palamas historical role in East and West.
The question of the so-called real distinction (pragmatik
diakrisis) between Gods essence and his energies continues
to inspire lively debate and discussion, as evidenced in the re-
cently published Divine Essence and Divine Energies (here-
after, DEDE). In view of the popular and scholarly success of
David Bradshaws Aristotle East and West (hereafter, AEW)
1

and the more recent book of 2013 we provide a careful read of
this eclectic collection of essays, offering an historically based
and selective critique, along with a constructive corrective, to
the book. We also intend to weigh specific strengths and weak-
nesses of the work on two outstanding points summarized by a
co-editor, Christoph Schneider, within his introduction:

1) For most contemporary Orthodox theologians the
distinction between the divine essence and energies
belongs to the very core of the Orthodox tradition and
has no direct equivalent in the West (DEDE, 9).
2) David Bradshaw, Constantinos Athanasopoulos,
and Nikolaos Loudovikos share the view that the es-
sence-energy distinction is a key doctrine in the Ortho-
dox tradition that is without parallel in the West
(DEDE, 10).

We begin our critique by including an additional point of
Bradshaw (hereafter, B.) within his original work (AEW, xxi),
wherein he clearly desired a future place in the history of
philosophy for Palamas. In fact, B.s desire inspires our own
effort to respond to AEW and its virtual supplement in DEDE.

1. An Eclectic Approach to Palamas

The essays in DEDE are interesting in and of themselves.
B.s in-depth philological study of energy (energeia) in AEW
provided strong foundations for arguments on behalf of Pala-

1
David Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of
Christendom (New York: CUP, 2004).

mas. Furthermore, B.s philosophico-theological chronicle of
energy from Aristotle to Palamas evoked even begrudging
praise from B.s most ardent critics. Nonetheless, upon B.s
comparison between Aquinas and Palamas, he predictably pro-
voked reactions to his critical positions. DEDE reflects a scho-
larly attempt to further B. claims with recourse to diverse me-
thods of reading much of the same source material in AEW.
Besides, DEDE attempts to provide B. with critical comments
from scholars about AEW, especially vis--vis Palamas funda-
mental metaphysical positions.
2

In chapter one of DEDE (published 2013), B. summarizes
his understanding of the essence-energies distinction to set the
stage for his interlocutors subsequent chapters. Actually, the
first chapter is merely a reprint of an article published in
2006.
3
B. read aloud his 2006 article to the audience at the In-
stitute for Orthodox Christian Studies on 5 December 2008.
4

By reprinting an antecedently published article, the editors
mean to provide the reader of 2013 with an abbreviation of
AEW. Therefore, the reader should not expect new develop-
ments. Nevertheless, the original 2006 article was an excellent
summary of AEW.
5
One of B.s important observations
(DEDE, 28) attributes Palamas orphan status in the history of
theology and philosophy to a neglect among scholars to con-
textualize Palamas within the history of philosophy and bib-
lical theology. We agree and, for this reason, the historical
reception of Palamas ought to be a predominant scholarly
concern to fill the void propos Palamas historic contribution.
After all, a subtle and highly metaphysical school adopted

2
We intend metaphysical to describe being beyond Aristotles categories
of being and, thus, a transcendental science leading to knowledge of attri-
butes characteristic of necessary, infinite being.
3
David Bradshaw, The Concept of the Divine Energies, Philosophy and
Theology 18 (2006): 93120.
4
David Bradshaw, The Concept of the Divine Energies in Eastern Ortho-
doxy (a colloquium on David Bradshaws book Aristotle East and West:
Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom, University of Cambridge,
filmed May 12, 2008, 2:33:37, posted 2009, http://sms.cam.ac.uk/media/
517136).
5
Ibid. See his presentation at: 10:301:10:33/2:33:26.

Palamism.
6
From Neilus Cabasilas to Mark of Ephesus and
Gennadius Scholarius,
7
Palamism constituted a controlling
idea for doing Byzantine theology.
If part of DEDEs purpose is to accede to B.s understan-
dable hope to win Palamas a seat within the history of theolo-
gy and/or philosophy, DEDEs weakness regrettably leaves
this task undone. Since DEDE (2013) repackages B.s sum-
mary (2006) of AEW (2004), it will strike the reader as dated
and woefully uncreative. Distressingly, current well-estab-
lished studies seem to be incorporated only tangentially into a
volume that nobly intends to take the essence-energies discus-
sion to a new level.
One typical example occurs within B.s discussion of
Basils notion of epinoia. Though B. is unique to cite a revolu-
tionary study on Palamism in concluding remarks,
8
B.s pre-

6
Recent studies catalogue peculiar intellectual currents within the Palamite
school. See Antonis Fyrigos, Tomismo e antitomismo a Bisanzio (con una
nota sulla Defensio S. Thomae adversus Nilum Cabasilam), in Tommaso
dAquino (1274) e il mondo bizantino, ed. A. Molle (Venafro: Edizioni
Eva, 2004), 2772; Marcus Plested, Orthodox Readings of Aquinas (Oxford:
OUP, 2012); J.A. Demetracopoulos, Thomas Aquinas Impact on Late
Byzantine Theology and Philosophy: The Issues of Method or Modus Scien-
di and Dignitas Hominis, in Knotenpunkt Byzanz: Wissensformen und kultu-
relle Wechselbeziehungen, ed. A. Speer and P. Steinkrger (Berlin: De Gruy-
ter, 2012), 333410. We omit critiquing DEDE in light of the latter two
studies, since they are contemporaneous with DEDE. Aquinas incorporation
into Palamite theology is now established, the fact of which B. will need to
address in his East-West paradigm.
7
Modern Catholic apologists co-opted Scholarius, inciting contemporaneous
Orthodox to exclude Scholarius from Orthodoxy. Contrariwise, Mark Eu-
genicus deliberately designated Scholarius his successor to synthesize Latin
and Scholastic material to defend Orthodoxy, following explicit examples of
Palamas (partim), Macarius Makrs, Joseph Bryennius, and Mark, who
eagerly absorbed Latin sources. See Christiaan Kappes, A Provisional Defi-
nition of Byzantine Theology contra Pillars of Orthodoxy?, Nicolaus 40
(2013): 187202. Marks use and alotted authority to Latins is discussed in:
Georgi Kapriev, Lateinische Einflsse, in GLIH, 391392. Mark adapted
Aquinas S.Th. for a defense of the resurrection and for defending divine
mercy vis--vis hell. See J.A. Demetracopoulos, Palamas Transformed, in
GLIH, 36870.
8
See Palamas Transformed, in GLIH, 265266. Basils is derived
from Stoic logic, complicating the field of distinctions on the question. For
instance, the intention/concept of a common botanical seed contains the

sentation (2006) of Basils Stoic notion (katepinoian) of the
essence-energies distinction falls rather flat. Is there little new
from AEWs release (2004) to DEDE (2013)? The reader
would greatly benefit from knowing that Basils use of epinoia
stems from the Stoa, not from a Neo-Platonic or Aristotelian
origin.
9
Additionally, Palamas intentional avoidance of Basil
ad litteram (viz., omitting Basils katepinoian) should be
cause for deep pause.
10

Another illustration hints at possible signs of stagnation
within DEDE. Since Reinhard Flogaus and J.A. Demetra-
copoulos coeval discovery (2006/2007) of Palamas textual
dependence on Augustines De Trinitate,
11
no real attempt
occurs throughout DEDE to integrate this startling turn of
events.
12
One can worry that the radically anti-Augustinian

intrinsic notion of quality. Stoic conceptualization suggests a virtual or
real distinction propos as applied to God, among the triple use of
in Basils Contra Eunomium. See J.A. Demetracopoulos, The
Sources of Content and Use of Epinoia in Basil of Caesareas Contra Euno-
mium I: Stoicism and Plotinus, 20 (1999): 1027. NB, Basil uses
similar to the Stoic Paraphrasis Themistiana. See J.A. Demetraco-
poulos, Glossogony or Epistemology? Eunomius of Cyzicus and Basil of
Caesares Stoic Concept of Epinoia and Its Misrepresentation by Gregory of
Nyssa, in Gregory of Nyssa; Contra Eunomium 2: An English Version with
Supporting Studies. Proceedings of the 10
th
International Colloquium on
Gregory of Nyssa (Olomouc, September 1518, 2004), ed. L. Karikov, S.
Douglas and J. Zachhuber (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 395397.
9
Demetracopoulos, The Sources, 3339.
10
Palamas Transformed, in GLIH, 268, 278279.
11
See Reinhard Flogaus, Theosis bei Palamas und Luther ein Beitrag zum
kumenischen Gesprch. Forschungen zur systematischen und kume-
nischen Theologie 78 (Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997); John A.
Demetracopoulos, .
(Athens:
Parousia, 1997).
12
See DEDE, 4549. Augustines nascent doctrine of actually infinite
notions within the divine mind serves a metaphysic of plurality in unity. See
Augustine of Hippo, De ciuitate Dei. Series Latina 48, in Corpus Christiano-
rum Patrum Latinorum 0313, ed. B. Dumbart and A. Kalb (Turnhout: Bre-
pols, 1955), 375:

Nor are there many, but there is one wisdom, in which are certain
[items] of an infinite nature [belonging] to such [a wisdom], which
wisdom [has the nature] of a treasure trove of the finite, i.e. of
intelligible things, in which are all invisible and incommutable

conclusions of AEW provide little lebensraum for any such
project.
Palamas sources and tradition (e.g., Nicholas Cabasilas
13

and Mark of Ephesus) narrate the incorporation of Augustine

rationes of things, even of visible and mutable things, which were
made through that self-same wisdom [] And thus, an infinity of
number is still not incomprehensible for Him, whose understood
items (intellegentiae) are not a collective quantity [of numerical
items], even if number is of no account with respect to infinite
mathematical numbers. (De ciuitate Dei, 11, 10, line 74; 12, 19,
lines 1415).

NB, Augustine likely uses Porphyry, who unified Plotinus threefold Hen
univocally, so that Proclus and Damascius fiercely criticized him (cf. supra,
n. 10). Bonaventures reception of Augustines divine ideas (c. 12547)
cedes (implicit) priority to Maximus Confessor (see note 18 below) and Ps.-
Dionysius, explicitly prioritizing Damascene on divine infinity. Hence,
Bonaventure situates Augustines understanding of infinity of the divine
ideas within the prior and conceptually broader affirmation of the actually
intensive infinite of the divine essence itself. See J. Isaac Goff, Caritas. Cf.
De scientia Christi, qq. 12, in DSSB, 5: 310. In the first questions con-
clusion Bonaventure simply quotes Augustine and concludes, on the basis
of such testimony we are compelled to posit and say that God knows an
infinite [number of items]. Then, Bonaventure reasons:

Therefore, because knowable [items-objects] are not limited to
actually existing beings, but also include potential beings and since
one can affirm an infinity of items in potential, so also it is fitting
to affirm that God knows an actual [numerical] infinity of items.

Bonaventures disciple, Scotus adapts this in Lectura I 2.80:

Numerical plurality requires a greater perfection, and infinite [plu-
rality] an infinite perfection. Yet, the intellection of many items
distinctly is of greater perfection than intellection of but one item
[] Therefore, intellection in act (actu) of infinite items requires
an infinite perfection. Yet, He, Who is the one first understanding
and effecting via a unique intellection, understands actually (actu)
and distinctly infinite items [] Therefore, this is actually the
character of an infinite perfection.
13
E.g., he cites Augustine in his Life in Christ. See Marie-Hlne Congour-
deau, Nicholas Cabasilas et le Palamisme, in Gregorio Palamas e otre.
Studi e documenti sulle controversie teologiche del XIV secolo bizantino.
Orientalia Venetiana 16, ed. A. Rigo (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 2004), 201
202. Cabasilas also cited the quasi-Augustinian, Anselm of Canterbury, for
aspects of his soteriology. See John A. Demetracopoulos, chos dOrient

and Latin sources into the history of Byzantine theology/
philosophy.
14
The once celebrated (though today obnoxious)
figure of Augustine in Palamite theology must be confronted
in order to give Palamas his rightful place.
15
Failure to engage
the historical Palamite tradition risks harsh criticism, for it
happens to parallel traditional Protestant approaches to
theology, wherein post-apostolic, exegetical and hermeneutic
traditions of scriptural study are ignored because of super-
stitions imputed to patristic authors. We will explore below
whether the contributors of DEDE transcend familiar post-
Reformation approaches that pay little heed to a tradition of
reception of an authority into historical (Byzantine) Chris-
tianity. Here, our investigation is not directed primarily to B.,
but rather to DEDE as a whole. Has DEDE advanced the ques-

Rsonances dOuest. In Respect of: C.G. Conticello V. Conticello, ed., La
thologie byzantine et sa tradition. II: XIII
e
XIX
e
S., Nicolaus 37 (2010) :
7071. Cf. Yannis Spiteris and Carmel Conticello, Nicola Cabasilas Cha-
maetos, in La thologie byzantine et sa tradition, ed. C.G. Conticello and V.
Conticello (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 326328.
14
See Christos Arampatzis, Lonore e lautorit di s. Agostino nella lettera-
tura teolgica tardobizantina, in SantAgostino nella tradizione cristiana
occidentale e orientale, ed. L. Bianchi (Padua: San Leopoldo, 2011), 261
274.
15
After Palamas, Mark of Ephesus more effectively integrated Augustine
into Byzantine theology. See George Demacopoulos, Augustine and the
Orthodox: The West in the East, in Orthodox Readings of Augustine, ed. A.
Papanikolaou and E. Demacopoulos (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimirs, 2008),
1518. Marks third ex professo work on the essence-energies argues:

So God possesses all these [attributes], just like natural properties
( ), and operations (), after which man-
ner [God] produces the act of operation. Yet, God possesses no-
thing like specific differences (), neither perfections, as if
in fact qualities, nor accidents (). For this reason too
He Himself is precisely all the items that he possesses [] Where-
fore, God possesses all these very [attributes] and they are items
properly pertaining to Himself, and for that fact these items are
God! (Second Antirrhetic, 12, lines 1518)

Subsequently, Mark condemns Manuel Kalekas, OP, for impiously trying to
force a dichotomy between Palamite and Augustinian metaphysics based
upon the Fathers. Consequently, the culmination of the Palamitico-Orthodox
tradition rejects anti-Augustinianism.

tion of Palamas to a new level since 2008 or has it failed to in-
corporate relevant scholarly findings to keep pace with current
research?

2. Anti-Western Approaches

Constantinos Athanasopoulos has written the second
chapter rather irenically (excepting polemical anti-Augustinian
comments like unto B.). Though cautious toward B.s pre-
sumed East-West metaphysical divide, Athanasopoulos uncri-
tically paints the West as reductively Augustino-thomistic in
B.s image (AEW, 264, 267). Even if Thomism ebbed and
flowed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it petered out
during the Enlightment. Thomisms nineteenth-century revival
(especially after Pope Leo XIII)
16
still colors non-specialist,
contemporary misconceptions about Medieval Latin theology.
Latin Scholasticism tended toward eclecticism from the thir-
teenth to the fifteenth centuries.
17
For instance, the Franciscan
school was built on utterly different metaphysical foundations
from those of Albert the Great (d. 1280) and Thomas Aquinas
(d. 1274).
18
Though contemporary theology (as Palamism) is
correct principally to confront Aquinas, it anachronistically

16
J. Weisheipl, The Revival of Thomism. An Historical Survey, in New
Themes in Christian Philosophy, ed. R. McInerny (South Bend, IN: Univer-
sity of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 164177.
17
E.g., Charles Lohr, Stephen Brown et al., A Companion to Philosophy in
the Middle Ages, ed. J. Garcia and T. Noone (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).
18
Importantly, the rediscovery of the centuries-lost (terminus post quem c.
1298) MSS of Bonaventures De mysterio Trinitatis and De scientia Christi
definitively confirmed this in the 1870s. Naturally, scholarly literature was
bound to a new reading of Bonaventure. Additionally, granted the De myste-
rio Trinitatis dates quite early (c. 12557), Bonaventure appears exotic,
utilizing Nazianzen (likely via Rufinus), Maximus the Confessor (via
Eriugena), Ps.-Dionysius, and Damascene (via Cerbanus and Burgundio of
Pisa). These authors guide Bonaventures alternative reading of Augustine
through a Maximian lense. Consequently, Bonaventure is a case of Palamis-
mus in fieri or a pre-Palamite anticipation of the essence-energies distinction.
For an emphatic treatment and definitive textual proof of dependencies, see
Goff, Caritas as well as T. Alexander Giltners forthcoming presentation on
the Maximian influence in the West of Scottus Eriugena, which will be de-
monstrated at the Symposium of Medieval and Renaissance Studies at Saint
Louis University, June 1618, 2014.

tends to read back into medieval philosophy and theology
Aquinass present celebrity, even his supremacy.
19
Thus, an
uncritical embrace of B.s admittedly provisional East-West
paradigm (see AEW, xxi)
20
naturally limits authors from
expanding the conversation about Palamism to new frontiers.
As long as medieval Scholasticism is forced into the Pro-
crustean bed of neo-thomist historical narratives, contempora-
ry non-medievalists will continue to miss the mark in their
attempt to compare and contrast East-West philosophy and/or
theology. Contra Thomism, Bonaventure of Bagnoregio (d.
1274) and Scotus are heavily biased toward Greek patristic
readings over and against Augustines simplicity criterion for
the essence-energies distinction.
21
This fact accounts for the
odd Franciscan tradition of reception of Augustine in contrast
to a more classically Aristotelian interpretation, as exemplified
in Dominican theology.
22
These points are supremely relevant
for this chapter, given Athanasopoulos marvelous assertion:

19
After double condemnation (1277) by local ecclesiastical authorities, some
of Aquinas theses were quite contested until his canonization (1323). Thus,
wholesale adoption of Aquinas was rare. His apotheosis eventually augured
the development of orthodox Thomism, which allowed integral adoption
of his tenets and system. In 1346 Pope Clement VI publicly recognized
Aquinas teaching had transcended the confines of the Dominican Order, en-
couraging the Dominican general chapter to forbid any friar from daring to
depart from Aquinas. See W. Wallace, A. Weisheipl, and F. Johnson, St.
Thomas Aquinas, in The New Catholic Encyclopedia, ed. B. Marthaler et al.
(Washington, DC: Thomson Gale, 2003), 14: 23.
20
B. references no primary or secondary literature (save Guichardan infra)
related to either Bonaventure or Scotus (AEW, 285). Though B. provides no
particular assessment of Franciscan theology, he cites V. Grumel, Review
of Grgoire Palamas, Duns Scot et Georges Scholarios devant le problme
de la simplicit divine, by Sbastian Guichardan, chos dOrient 34 (1935):
8496. Guichardan and Grumel are neo-Thomists unconcerned with Scotus,
yet Grumel pummelled Guichardans apologetic read of patristic authors
contra Palamism.
21
Scotus explicitly subjugated Augustines metaphysics of divine simplicity
to Damascene. See Christiaan Kappes, The Latin Sources of the Palamite
Theology of George-Gennadius Scholarius, Rivista Nicolaus 40 (2013): 71
114.
22
Bonaventure avers that divine simplicity implies God as most perfect,
containing every befitting perfection in the most perfect manner, each accor-
ding to its proper ratio. Thus, Bonaventure affirms divine being as fully in
itself (in se). It is not susceptible to addition or diminution either accidentally

I have to observe that looking at the East and some of
its most profound contributions to the understanding of
Orthodox dogma and Aristotelian metaphysics through
a Western and culturally embedded Augustinian filter
has never produced a clear and accurate estimate of the
value of the East. And how can any such attempt pro-
duce anything good, when it is based on a disregard of
the fact that Palamas and his faithful disciples have
condemned in the strongest of terms the works and
ideas of Augustine as sources of heresy? (DEDE, 56)

This gratuitous assertion and anti-Augustinian paragraph
would be more appreciable were there a citation from primary
or secondary literature about Palamas or his faithful dis-
ciples alleged anti-Augustianism.
23
Perchance a slip of the
pen, in the following paragraph (DEDE, 56), has the author
anachronistically citing Photius of Constantinople (Mysta-
gogia) as proof of the claim that the Palamite tradition is
irreconcilable to Augustine. We have already referred to Con-
gourdeaus study indicating a solid reference for the Augus-
tinian influence on the Palamite Nicholas Cabasilas (let alone

or unitively. Conversely, Bonaventure argues divine being (quia revera
aliquid respondet ex parte Dei) contains an infinite infinity of distinct
perfections and ideas prior to any finite mental activity. Cf., De mysterio
Trinitatis, in DSSB, 5: 70a71a, 73b (q. 3, a. 1, conc., ad 13); De scientia
Christi, in DSSB, 5: 310 (qq. 12). In order to maintain his account of di-
vine simplicity and infinity (summe simplex et simpliciter summa), while
avoiding any attribution of discrete parts to the divine being, Bonaventure
utilizes common distinctions characteristic of the Franciscan school; namely,
formal distinction, disjunctive transcendentals and, implicity, conceptual uni-
vocity. See Goff, Caritas and De distinctionis, 379445. Bonaventure sets
himself, and the entire Franciscan school post, apart from Dominican
simplicity and infinity criteria. Aquinas and Bonaventure negate any aptitude
for composition within divine simplicity, thus implying absolute necessity of
essence and existence. Cf. S.Th. I, q. 3. See too Richard Cross, Duns Scotus
(New York: OUP, 1999), 4445. Aquinas Aristotelico-simplicity constitutes
a controlling idea to close the door to any consideration of Scotism.
23
Conversely, Palamas names Augustine a wise and apostolic man. See
Michele Trizio, Un uomo sapiente ed apostolico. Agostino a Bisanzio:
Gregorio Palamas lettore del De trinitate, Quaestio 6 (2006): 131189.

Palamas).
24
Furthermore, we have indicated Mark of Ephesus
explicitly Augustinian approach providing canonical weight to
Augustines influence. Truly, Augustines writings made a
positive impression on the Palamite tradition, but all this is
lamentably ignored in DEDE.
25
Nonetheless, we cite partial
support for Athanasopoulos claim. We note that the Constan-
tinopolitan Synod of 1368, condemning propositions of the
Byzantine Thomist Prochorus Cydones, rejected theologou-
mena derived from Augustines De Trinitate.
26
Accordingly,
the reader may indeed develop a historically rooted and cano-
nically sanctioned anti-Augustinian narrative via the Synodal
Tome,
27
likely authored by Neilus Cabasilas and Philotheus
Kokkinos.
28
Still, this demands the skilled reader to nuance

24
Cabasilas is quite relevant, for Athanasopoulos references his own pre-
vious study thereof: DEDE, 64, n. 1. Athanasopoulos implies Cabasilas
allegedly anti-Augustinian sentiments.
25
See Michele Trizio, Alcuni osservazioni sulla recezione bizantina del De
Trinitate del Agostino, in P. Ermilov/A. Rigo, Byzantine Theologians: The
systematization of their own Doctrine and their Perception of Foreign Doc-
trine (Rome: Universit degli studi di Roma Tor Vergata, 2009), 143168.
26
See Antonio Rigo, Testi I. Il Tomo sinodale del 1368 and Neilus
Cabasilas and Philotheus Kokkinos,
, in Tomo Sinodale, 8789; 119120, lines 565573: Again, after
[Prochorus] writings were read, he was discovered saying that, there does
not exist that famous light of metamorphosis [of Moses], which the just will
eventually enjoy, but the wicked will see too this light [of Moses]. Addi-
tionally, he bears alleged witness to Augustine, having misunderstood the
precise literal contents of the same [Augustine, De Trinitate 1.13.28]. NB,
Kokkinos (with Cabasilas) refuses to assign blame to Augustine.
27
Again, B. avoids this lacuna in AEW, 227229, when confronting Augus-
tines putative kainotomia vis--vis theophanies and cites the important
study of Bucur (DEDE, 207).
28
For a scholarly anti-Augustinian polemic, see Bogdan Bucur, Theo-
phanies and Vision of God in Augustines De Trinitate: An Eastern Ortho-
dox Perspective, SVTQ 52 (2008) 6793. Bucur does not cite the Synodal
Tome (1368). Plausibly, Augustines theology of theophany exposes an
Achilles heal vis--vis prior Latin and Greek tradition. Nonetheless, one
may legitimately distinguish between Augustines reverent reading (lectio
reverentialis) within Palamite tradition vs. Augustines real mens (phr-
nma). Presently, Byzantines are thought to have ignored Augustinian theo-
phanic exegesis. See Andrew Louth, The Reception of St. Augustine in
Late Byzantium, Nicolaus 40 (2013): 123.

reception of Augustine in Palamas and Palamite tradition,
hardly necessitating any rejection thereof grosso modo.
29

3. A Thomistic Approach to Palamas and AEW

In chapter four, Antoine Lvy bravely challenges B.s
reading of the essence-energies distinction. Lvys contribu-
tion is most welcome, since it provides an antagonistic and
predictably Thomistic defense against B.s critique. Though
Lvy strikes afoul of Orthodox and anti-Augustinian contribu-
tors, he advances little beyond points of his original thesis
(2006) in his impressively hefty tome.
30
Similar to his recent
article, Lvy insists on an interpretation that stretches Palamas
to fit him into the painful Procrustean bed made for Aquinas
height.
31
Although Lvy formerly argued from the mistaken
assumption that Palamas was the author of a work that
Philotheus Kokkinos had actually composed, this mistake has
been felicitously corrected in his more recent article. None-
theless, he continues to insist on Palamas crypto-Thomist
metaphysics of the analogy of being. Plainly, this cannot be
based on any textual dependence upon Aquinas nor upon any
actual phrase of Palamas penning katepinoian.
32
Instead,
Lvy refracts Palamism through a Thomistic prism of light
from emperor John VI and Philotheus Kokkinos, both idio-
syncratically Thomistic Palamites. Albeit one might object that

29
Contemporary Orthodoxys emphasis on Palamas and his school supports
present reception of Augustine. Prior to Palamas, Augustines canonical
standing in Orthodoxy, though positive, was relatively weak. See Peter
Galadza, The Liturgical Commemoration of Augustine in the Orthodox
Church: An Ambiguous Lex Orandi for an Ambiguous Lex Credendi,
SVTQ 52 (2008): 111130.
30
Antoine Lvy, Le cr et lincr: Maxime le Confesseur et Thomas
dAquin. Aux sources de la querelle palamienne. Bibliotque Thomiste 59
(Paris: J. Vrin, 2006), 33.
31
Lvy argues analogy of the concept of being in Palamas because of his
disciples interpretations (e.g., John VI). See Antoine Lvy, Lost in Trans-
latio? Diakrisis katepinoian as a Main Issue in the Discussions between
Fourteenth-Century Palamites and Thomists, The Thomist 76 (2012): 438
441.
32
For the singular alleged exception, see Palamas Transformed, in GLIH,
278279.

Lvys claim is beyond textual support within Palamas, Lvy
still introduces a serious consideration; namely, John VI and
Kokkinos currently form the inchoate membership of an
Orthodox tradition of reception of Aquinas. Still, this point
was made antecedently. Regrettably, Lvy was evidently un-
aware of a pioneering 100-page study, engaging primary texts
and philological points in the opera of Palamas, John VI, and
Kokkinos. The reader would be justly dissatisfied at this
hulking lacuna.
33
Though contemporary Orthodox dispositions
are infortuitous to augur Lvys strategy success, we rejoice
that Lvy concurs with previous studies indicating a Palami-
tico-Thomist tradition. Still, John VI and Kokkinos are weak
figures (i.e. neither saints nor momentous canonical authori-
ties) to evoke sympathy toward Thomism from contemporary
Orthodoxy. Should Lvy eventually happen upon other studies
on the Palamite tradition, we await a more satisfactory histori-
cal conclusion than assuming almost unanimous rejection of
St. Thomas Aquinas theology by the Orthodox Church
(DEDE, 97).
34

Despite the clear vulnerability of Lvys position, he
makes some excellent points in his critique of B. Whenever B.
restricts himself to historical and philological research into
particular vocabulary and exegesis of patristic texts, Lvys
silence bespeaks his consent to the high quality of B.s
research (DEDE, 101). Conversely, Lvys salient points
attack B.s obvious weaknesses; namely, historical generaliza-

33
We state this confidently, for Lvys Lost in Translatio neglects citing
Palamas Transformed.
34
Characteristically Latino-Scholastic doctrines of (a.) philosophical
necessity of the filioque and (b.) Aristotelian divine simplicity were normally
suspected or rejected. Conversely, Orthodox scholars acknowledged Byza-
ntine Thomism in the 1980s. See Macarius Mackrs, Macaire Makrs et la
polmique contre lIslam, ed. A. Argyriou (Vatican City: BAV, 1986), 65
84 (Oratio, 12, lines 202212). In his quasi-thomistic exposition, Makrs
designates a virgin best disposed for divinization or seeing the divine light.
See ibid., 310 (i.e., De virginitate, 2, lines 89). Makrs borrowed partially
from Cydones translation of ScG III.136 (cf. De virginitate, 4, line 44).
Macarius professes Palamism and Hesychasm in Makrs, Vita seu laudatio
Maximi Athonitae, in .
25, ed. A. Argyrou (Thessaloniki: ,
1996), 155165 (Vita, 28, line 540 31, line 594).

tions (always terribly risky in contingent matter). For example,
Lvy makes a skillful parry against B. citing the oft-neglected
critical editions of Barlaam the Calabrian.
35
Lvy levels his
accusation against B.s characterization of Latino-Aristotelia-
nism, challenging B. on his own history of philosophy. Lvy
notes that B. historically aligns himself with none other than
Barlaam, the first known Orthodox to attack the Latin
craze for Aristotle as the Wests own undoing. Though this
sally strikes only an ad hominem blow, it does hint at a
potential fallacy underlying AEW; namely, uniformity of
Aristotles reception among Schoolmen. Therefore, B.s
history of philosophy, wherein he collapses (similar to neo-
Thomism) all significant Western theology into a simplified
Augustinianism, subsequently and wholly transformed into
Aristotelico-Thomism in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries,
underscores inaccuracies and presumptions reminiscent of the
Calabrians specious rhetoric against an older model of a
straw-man-Aquinas.
36

Levy challenges B.s interpretation of Aquinas but is he
convincing? B. easily responds to Lvys arguments in defense
of Aquinas from the panoply of analytico-thomistic analyses
and a multitude of disparate reads of Aquinas at his disposal
(DEDE, 271). Certainly, a problem with Thomistic studies
(after many decades of ever increasing scholarship) is the
plethora of interpretations of him. Similarly, Palamas bur-
geoning popularity has begun to reap its own dried fruit of
scholarly disagreement.
37
On both accounts, might fragmenta-
tion be the natural result of intentionally avoiding and diver-
ging from each schools tradition of reception of their
respective doctor? Are Thomists and Palamites of yore without
understanding of the logical and metaphysical stakes in their
100-year polemic? The fundamental differences distinguishing

35
Barlaam Calabro, Opere contro i Latini, introduzione, storia dei testi,
edizione critica, traduzione e indici. Studi e Testi 347348, 2 vols., ed. A.
Fyrigos (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1998); Calabro, Dalla
controversia palamitica alla polemica esicastica: on unedizione critica
delle epistole greche di Barlaam, ed. A. Fyrigos (Rome: Antonianum, 2005).
36
See Fyrigos, Tomismo, 31.
37
See Anna Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Pa-
lamas (New York: OUP, 1999), 827.

medieval and Renaissance Thomists from Palamites seem to
be quite pronounced. We cannot pretend to add much to the
present thomistico-Palamite debate, save to note a curious lack
of reference to an entire rich history of the reception of Pala-
mas in the East and West. Did post-Capreolus, orthodox Tho-
mists in the West and post-Cydonian, Byzantine Thomists in
the East,
38
get Aquinas wrong?
39
Let the reader note that the
entire orthodox Thomist tradition, culminating in its universal
call for condemnation of Palamas at the Council of Florence,
40

did not find Lvys view very obvious. In order to embrace
Lvys optimistic reconciliation between Aquinas and Pala-
mas, the reader must do violence to the entire orthodox Tho-
mistic tradition from Cydones (ScG graece, 1354) until the
Council of Florence (14381439). Consequently, we think it
unlikely that Lvys own benign novelty (viz., kainotomia)
will convince contemporary Orthodox readership.

4. Anti-Scotistic Neo-Palamism

In chapter five, Nikolaus Loudovikos provides an interes-
ting contribution completely absorbed in refuting fellow con-

38
E.g., accusations of multiplying divine beings occur repeatedly in: Ma-
nuel Kalekas, De essentia et operatione, in PG, 152: 283428. Palamas
allegedly puts God into the genus of a being (ens commune), composed of
act and potency; ibid. 353B-C.
39
Dominicans and Thomists objected to Palamas metaphysics of the god-
head, parallel to Scotus violation of divine simplicity. See Francis Silves-
tris, Commentari Ferrariensis, in ScG, 13: 100101. Modern neo-Thomists
generally repeat traditional accusations against Scotus (as against Palamas),
accusing him of pantheism and anthropomorphism. See Reginald Garrigou-
Lagrange, The One God: A Commentary on the First Part of St. Thomas
Theological Summa, trans. B. Rose (London: B. Herder, 1955), 6, 249251;
Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, ed. and trans. J. Bastible
(Rockford, IL: TAN, 1974), 29. Cf. Theologia dogmatica, 2: 74.
40
Thomistic calls for condemnation were in 1437 by: Andreas Escobar, De
graecis errantibus. CFDS, 4.1: 83 (section 94, lines 34); in 1438 by John
Lei, Tractatus Ioannis Lei O.P. De visione beata Nunc primum in lucem
editus. Introductione notis indicibus auctus. Studi e Testi 228, ed. M.
Candal (Vatican City: BAV, 1963), 8384, 193; in 1439, by John Montenero
in: Acta Graeca, 2: 346350; by Andreas of Santa Croce in: Acta Latina,
177; in 1441 by John Torquemada, Apparatus super decretum Florentinum
unionis Graecorum. CFDS, 2.1: 86 (section 102, lines 3034).

tributor, John Milbank. Loudovikos initial concern is to
uncover the real Palamas, who is assertedly misunderstood by
those in the geographical and intellectual milieu of the West.
Meanwhile, he laments Orthodox near-univeral misunderstan-
ding of the real Aquinas, just as handicapped as Western in-
terpreters of Palamas. Naturally, Loudovikos proposes his
remedy to this universally lamentable situation. Chiefly worri-
some for Loudovikos is the possibility of fundamental agree-
ment between Duns Scotus and Palamas (DEDE, 122).
Unfortunately, we can only regret that Loudovikos is
forced to confront a pseudo-Scotus, who emerges from Mil-
banks spirited condemnation of the Subtle Doctor. We regret
that Loudovikos shows unfamiliarity with the real Scotus and
his sources since Scotus approach to his doctrine of divine
infinity and the formal (viz., quasi-real), essence-energies dis-
tinction; viz., ad intra or perfections (DEDE, 123124),
matches Palamas. Auspiciously, Loudovikos lists Palamas
authorities (among others) as: the Cappadocians, Maximus the
Confessor, Ps.-Dionysius, John Damascene, and the sixth
Ecumenical Council. Similarly, Scotus established his theolo-
gic relying upon (1) Bonaventures read of the Cappadocians
and Maximus,
41
(2) a parallel read of Gregory Nyssa (in-
directly via Damascene)
42
and Gregory Nazianzen (indirectly
via Bonaventure)
43
on the divine essence, (3) the use of Ps.-
Dionsyian unitive containment,
44
and (4) Scotus principal

41
The formal distinction has been long traced to Bonaventure. See De
distinctionis, 380445.
42
See Richard Cross, Gregory Nyssa on Universals, Vigiliae Christianae
56 (2002): 372410; Cross, Two Models of Trinity?, Heythrop Journal 43
(2002): 396399. Scotus employs Damascenes term describing immaterial
substance as genus generalissimum. See Ord. I, d. 8, pars 1. q. 3. 26. The
apparatus criticus betrays Scotus direct knowledge of Damascene
( ) through Robert Grosseteste. Cf. John Damascene,
Institutio elementaris, in Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos. Patris-
tische Texte und Studien 7, ed. B. Kotter (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1969), 24 (ch.
7, line 34 = PG 95, 107).
43
For the texts of Nazianzen and Maximus that influenced Bonaventure, see
Goff, Caritas (cf., supra, note 19).
44
See Jan Aertsen, Being and One: the Doctrine of the Convertible Trans-
cendentals in Duns Scotus, in John Duns Scotus (1265/61308): Renewal of
Philosophy, ed. E.P. Bos (Amsterdam: Radopi B.V., 1998), 2526:

psychological analogy for the energies, namely, the formal
difference between will and intellect in the divine essence.
This last point puts Scotus in an exact parallel with Palamas
own visage of this psychological distinction. If Palamas hints
at the Sixth Ecumenical Council,
45
Scotus himself might have
had recourse to the Lateran Council (649), the theological
authorship or inspiration of which is virtually the same.
46
As

1) Dionysius makes clear that all beings are in God, not as in created
things in a plurality but unitively.
2) Scotus framed Dionysian unitive containment in the discussion of
the relation between God and his attributes.
3) One of these is the relation between being and the convertible
transcendentals.
4) Perfections are not unitively contained as altogether identical, only
to the extent that they are one res.
5) Union presupposes distinction among really distinct attributes.
6) Unitive containment-distinction presupposes a minor real
difference, not constituted by the intellect.
7) Scotus calls a formal distinction that which exists between
different formalitates or realitates, i.e. not things but quiddities
independent of the intellect.
8) The model of unitive containment connects real identity with a
formal non-identity, viz., features that hold for the relation
between being and the convertible transcendentals.
9) Scotus affirms that the transcendental one expresses some other
res than being, provided that thing is understood in the sense of
realitas.
45
Loudovikos citation is unpropitious (DEDE, 124), for Palamas dubiously
made authentic use of the 6
th
Ecumenical Synod, though the Palamite school
employed this topos rather abundantly. Palamas erringly cites the Synod in:
Gregory Palamas, Against Akindynus, 2, 10, 38. Chrestous edition (to which
Loudovikos refers) notes in locus citatus: fontem non inveni. Palamas
actually cites Photius of Constantinople, who condemns erroneous persons
for believing that Christs two natures have one operation (mia energeia).
Cf. Loudovikos appeal to Christs theandric energy [sic] (DEDE, 127);
Photius, Amphilochia. Epistle 1, in Photii patriarchae Constantinopolitani
Epistulae et Amphilochia. Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romano-
rum Teubneriana, ed. B. Laourdas and L. Westerink (Leipzig: Teubner,
1983), 1: lines 345352. Loudovikos authority Eugenicus cites the 6
th
Ecu-
menical Synod frequently (e.g., Second Antirrhetic, 15, 31, 40).
46
The synodal texts were available in Latin and Greek, the latter of which
represents the original language. Scotus too associates activities naturaliter
in an increate essence, which spring forth ex natura rei. Cf. Martin I, Maxi-
mus Confessor et al., Concilium Lateranense a. 649 celebratum. Acta con-

his doctor Bonaventure, Scotus prioritizes Greek sources over
and above Augustine, making his famous formal distinction
between Gods essence and energies (ad intra).
47

Although we await the occasion for Loudovikos to en-
counter the real Scotus, he lucidly argues Palamas distinction
within the Godhead. Loudovikos wisely argues that the
energies must have ontological identity with the essence. For
this reason he is sure to reject the suppositions of Martin
Jugie,
48
Rowan Williams, and John Milbank that Palamas
particularizes divine items (DEDE, 125). Ostensibly synop-
tic with Aquinas, these authors seem unwilling to grant partial
forms, entities, or formalities, all of which connote non-
subsistent distinct perfections in the Godhead.
49
Blissfully,

ciliorum oecumenicorum Series 2, ed. R. Riedinger (Berlin: de Gruyter,
1984), 1: 125:

Yet, if [] there was a created operation (conditam operationem;
) of Christ [] then [the imprudent Theodore]
does not confess along with us that the very same [Christ] is also
uncreated (increatum; ). This is not that the same Christ is
God and man by natural necessity (naturaliter), but only that He is
pure man, because He is not uncreated according to [this] nature
(secundum naturam; ); i.e. He does not possess in
Himself by natural necessity (naturaliter; ) an increate
operation (increatam operationem; ).

47
Milbank concedes this point (while loathing Scotus; cf. DEDE, 180),
which was previously made in: Christiaan Kappes, The History of a Dia-
logue, in LOsservatore Romano: Weekly Edition in English 45, n. 24 (13
June 2012): 910. Scotus clearly parallels Palamas on reading Damascene,
noticed prior by George-Gennadius Scholarius (scripsit 14451458). See
Kappes, The Latin Sources, 110112. Milbanks authority states this with
respect to Scotus read of Ps.-Dionysius in: Aertsen, Being and One, 25
26.
48
Jugie sees Palamas as a Scotist in: Theologia dogmatica, 2: 148: On the
question [of Palamism], Scotism is as if Palamism in fieri.
49
Loudovikos appeals to the saintly and canonical authority of Mark
Eugenicus, who calls the gifts () non-subsistent perfections/
formalities ( ). By implication, these are infinite perfec-
tions of the Spirit ad intra. Yet, their mental content cannot be grasped fully
by a creaturely intellect because of the divine perfections infinite mode of
existence. Still, the finite subject may grasp in some way each gift (intui-
tively?). See Acta Graeca, 2: 348. Mark coincides with scotistic doctrine of
formalities in the godhead. See Ord. I, dist. 2, p. 2, qq. 14, n. 390): I

Loudovikos shows himself to be a subtle doctor after all.
When subsequently rejecting parallelism between Scotus and
Palamas, he declares:

It is really difficult, after all these texts [of Palamas],
to speak of any Scotist formal distinction or separa-
tion, as some sort of fundamentum in re, in Palamas, as
Milbank so persistently claims against me, though
without bringing any textual evidence. (DEDE, 126)

Truly, Scotus and Palamas parallel each other.
50
Unlike
Aristotelico-Thomism, Scotus and Palamas reduce divine
simplicity to a real inseparability criterion whereby it is abso-
lutely impossible (de potentia Dei absoluta) to separate any
given energy from the essence.
51
Both reject nominalism and
analogical concept of being, employing either Stoic or formal
distinctions, for no other historical or logical competitors exist.
Loudovikos emphasis on the divine essence as a quasi-cause
of the excrescences (alias essential idioms) is also scotistic
doctrine (DEDE, 126).
52
Scotus and Palamas assume a positive

understand [that it exists] thus: really (realiter), because in no way [does
this entitas exist] through an act of the considering intellect [viz., a logical
second intention]. Nay, such an entity (entitas) would be there, if no
considering intellect were present; and thus would be there were there no
intellect ever to consider it. I declare that it exists prior to every act of the
intellect.
50
Scotus and Palamas were traditionally condemned together for isomorphic
doctrine (e.g., errors of Gilbert Porretanus; viz., making a distinction
between God and His Divinity). See C. Duplessis and DArgentre, ed.,
Collectio iudiciorum de novis erroribus, qui ab initio duodecimi seculi post
Incarnationem Verbi, usque ad annum 1632 (Paris: Andrea Cailleau, 1727),
1: 286a, 323ab; Dionysius Petavius, De theologicis dogmatibus (Venice:
Andrea Poleti, 1745), 1: 77ab. Petavius (d. 1652) pairs Scotus with Pala-
mas distinction with exact metaphysical parallels via primary sources. Here-
after, Thomasian theology textbooks correctly note metaphysical equivalen-
cy between Scotus and Palamas. E.g., Virgil Sedlmayr, Columban Paruck-
her, and Boniface Selzer, Deus unus in se et attributis suis scholastico-
dogmatice expensus (Ratisbonne: John Baptist Lang, 1735), 4647.
51
E.g., Ord. II, d. 1, qq. 45, n. 200. Cf. Triads 2, 3, 15; 3, 1, 34; 3, 2, 13.
52
E.g., Ord. I, d. 26, un., n. 28: The persons have the character of relations
of origin, because these two [relations of origin] spring up (pullulant [=
]) in the circumstances of the divine essence, since firstly there is a

notion of divine infinity, the very ground for infinite modes of
perfection. Both value the disjunctives of being (create-
increate, finite-infinite, etc.), which favor univocal understan-
ding of being. Scholars interpret both within their respective
traditions (even among moderns) to univocate the Dionysian
proodoi and Damascenian energeiai emanating from the di-
vine essence.
53
Both hold for a doctrine of the logoi in the
divine essence.
54
Thus, at least with respect to ad intra meta-

double divine fecundity in the essence, inasmuch as intellect is infinite and
will infinite [] See Capita 150, 135, lines 1525. Palamas admits that
attributes spring forth (), yet both authors also profess that will
does not create by nature, for it chooses freely, not necessarily, to create.
53
Many agree on this interpretation of Palamas. See Kalekas, De essentia et
operatione, in PG, 152: 299A-D; First Antirrhetic, 166167; 205: Also,
the divine Maximus in his scholia on Ps.-Dionysius, declares: Hence, an
emanation () is the divine energy ( ), which
[same energy] produced every substance. (lines 2123) Cf. Bradshaw
(AEW, 269); Rowan Williams, The Philosophical Structure of Palamism,
Eastern Churches Review 9 (1977): 3637.
54
Scotus divides divine knowledge into two quasi-moments pace his own
essence and finite contingent beings: (1) first God knows his own necessary
essence and all possible-contingent essences insofar as they are knowable
essential structures: esse intelligibile; (2) then, Gods will freely acts with
respect to a given knowable essence-structure-state of affairs, marking a
given object of his will acting with voluntative being: esse volitum (=
). Both are known in virtue of Gods omniscience, which is really
identical to his essence. However, the esse intelligibile are absolutely neces-
sary as objects of Gods infinite knowledge arising from nature, while the
esse volitum are effects of the divine will resulting in contingent finite
existences standing outside their divine cause. Thus, Scotus holds that God
knows the inclusive infinite number of contingent-finite essences in two
modes: actual infinity in esse intelligibile and potential infinity in esse
volitum. See, Antonie Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, (Edin-
burgh: Edinbugh University press, 2008), 489495; Richard Cross, Duns
Scotus on God (Burlington, VA: Ashgate, 2005), 5585. These contingent
essences map onto the Maximo-Palamite doctrine of the , in which
finite essences are known, approved, and willed by God. Bonaventures
doctrine of the divine ideas (rationes aeternae-exemplaria) is concentric
with the scotistico-Palamite theory of the in DSSB 5: 5a:

There is in God cognition of approbation, vision and intelligence.
Cognition of approbation is of good entities alone and is finite.
Cognition of vision is of evil and good, but is of finite things inso-
far as they are realized in time; for it is of only those things which
were, are or will be. Cognition of intelligence is of an infinite

physics of God, both mirror one another remarkably.
55
Further
parallels are readily available.
56

Even if we can only wish that Loudovikos might directly
avail himself of Scotus, he is correct to suggest that Milbanks
arguments are not as well developed.
57
Thus, Loudovikos is
justified in his rejection of Milbanks parallels from a modest

number of things, insofar as through this knowledge God knows
not only future events, but also knows possible items; possible
items, however, to God are not finite, but infinite. (De scientia
Christi, q. 1, conclusion)

Next, Bonaventure clarifies that within the divine noetic realm of finite
essences (exemplary ideas, logoi), one must distinguish between Gods
knowledge of mere possibles, which is of an infinite number of items, and
those items that he calls, per Ps.-Dionysius, predefinitions (praedefini-
tiones; ) which stem from the will of God (De scientia Christi, q.
2, conclusion [DSSB 5: 8b]).
55
NB, for differences with infinity, negations, and participation, see Triads,
1, 1, prologue. The and (per Maximus) simply coin-
cide with res volitae of Bonaventure and Scotus.
56
See Palamas Transformed, in GLIH, 369. Mark affirmed that God is
pure actuality (actus purus) in an explicitly Aristotelian sense. As Scotus,
Mark first justifies the positive essential infinity of God, then quasi-
derivative items naturally following it (
, ). See First
Antirrhetic, 195, lines 23. he lack of potency in God follows from the
fact that God is perfectly in act and, thus, His essence -in virtue of its
actuality- springs forth () natural and co-essential activities or
characteristic energy. See Second Antirrhetic, 9, lines 1520. Inspired
by Damascene and Ps.-Dionysius, Scotus subtracts all imperfections in an
accident, retaining what is conceptually indifferent to finitude or infinity.
Before his eyes is ch. 48 of Damascenes De fide orthodoxa. See Reportatio
I-A, d. 8, n. 109 and especially:

But formal intensive infinity and fundamental [infinity] are
together there in the divine essence qua essence, and for this
reason it is called, per Damascene, a sea. Still, formal [infinity]
only (not fundamental [infinity]) is in every other perfection [not
only in the will] unqualifiedly; for each one has its own formal
perfection from the infinity of the essence just as from a root and
foundation. (Ord., IV, d. 12, q. 1, n. 124)

57
His works are bereft of primary or secondary literature on Scotus. E.g.,
Nicholaus Loudovikos, A Eucharistic Ontology of Being as Dialogical
Reciprocity, trans. E. Theokritoff (Brookline: Holy Cross, 2010).

sampling and a clear misconstruction of scotistic doctrine.
Unexpectedly, however, Loudovikos cites the worst possible
authority to defend a distinction of reason (katepinoian) in
Palamas, whereby he invokes Mark of Ephesus to stretch the
hopelessly univocal Palamas upon the painful Procrustean bed
of Thomism (DEDE, 226227):
58

Concerning Palamas [d. 1357], I think that it is clear
enough that he would not endorse either a real or a
formal distinction between essence and energies, in the
sense given to these terms by Milbank. This is why
great Palamists of the next generation [sic] after Pala-
mas, such as Markus Eugenicus [d. 1444],
59
following
an analogous Palamite expression in his fifth treatise
Against Gregoras,
60
without any hesitation and

58
Assymetrically, Loudovikos cites Irines Bulovi,
[] 39 (Thessaloniki:
, 1983), 155159. For Bulovi, Mark opposes
a distinction . Within the pages cited, Mark opposes the
Thomist, Manuel Kalekas, OP, condemned for proposing a distinction in
God merely according to reason ( ). See Bulovis principal MS
citations, in: First Antirrhetic, 171172, 177179, 212, 219223. This
treatise embodies Marks first colossal attack against Thomism, analogous
predication, and a Latino-Scholastic distinction of reason.
59
Mark studied Scotism, feasibly citing a Scotist against his Dominican
interlocutor during the debates at Florence (1439). His study of Scotism was
with his ex-student Scholarius. See J. Monfasani, The Pro-Latin Apolo-
getics of the Greek migrs to Quattrocento Italy, in Byzantine Theology
and its Philosophical Background, ed. A. Rigo (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011),
165168. For Marks scotistic metaphysics at Florence, see Acta Graeca, 2:
267. Basils Epistle (as Mark supposes) may be from Nyssa, whose
predication (in relation to Scotus) is relevant to the discussion. On author-
ship, see Cross, Gregory Nyssa, 372374. Authors suggest the scotistic
formal distinction might bridge Palamite and Scholastic metaphysics. See
Steven Runciman, The Last Byzantine Renaissance (London: CUP, 1970),
82; David Coffey, The Palamite Doctrine of God: A New Perspective,
SVTQ 32 (1988): 335. Circumstantial evidence suggests Scotism, since one
does not find Basil in his two antirrhetics against Kalekas in the 1430s, in
Neilus on the Holy Spirit or hesychasm, in Palamas, or likely in Bryennius.
Marks Cappadocian-based concentric interpretation with Scotus appears
only in 1439.
60
This use of a distinction according to reason ( []
) merely refers to Palamas inseparability criterion, wherein the

without encountering any objection, used the term
katepinoian (i.e. made by mind) in order to describe
this distinction-in-identity between essence and ener-
gies in the Palamite oeuvre (DEDE, 127).

Now the singular use of epinoia in Palamas metaphysical
reasoning was previously identified and elaborated upon as
cited by B.
61
Taking into account philology and source texts,
Palamas singular use of epinoia is conceptually equivocal to
its homonym in Thomism, betraying Palamas penchant for
Stoic semantics. So, Palamas unique phrase actually refers to
a Stoic mental process, whereby the mind performs a sort of
reduction (reductio) from an effect to its cause(s).
62
Thus, the
phrase refers to psychical acts, which hardly justifies a merely
mental distinction within the godhead.
63
Much less can this
hapax legomenon exercise hegemony as the controlling idea
for Palamite metaphysics amid a plethora of phrases and voca-

two mentally distinct items (e.g., wisdom and essence) can be distinguished
by the mind, but are really impossible to separate.
61
See Palamas Transformed, in GLIH, 279.
62
This hearkens to the metaphysico-theological method of reduction so pre-
valent in Bonaventure, who understands (as Palamas) reduction as the
process of mentally tracing back a dependent or originated being to its cause.
Bonaventure distinguishes incomplete (resolutio semi plena) from complete
resolution (resolutio plena). Thus, for any category of being, the item under
consideration is understood in its relation of origination (e.g., accidents and
operations to substance, substance to transcendental properties of being). In
an incomplete resolution the mind arrives at knowledge of predicamental
relation within the categories and/or the relation of substance to the transcen-
dental determinations of being implicit in every concept. In a full resolution,
the mind goes beyond the transcendental determinations of being to consider
being in its divine cause. Bonaventures Trinitarian theologic achieves reso-
lutio plena, tracing back all reality to the divine being and likewise, in the
godhead itself, to the Father, the divine primordial cause and fontal
source whereat the mind finds rest and a full reductio. Thus, all reality of
faith is reduced to the charity of the Father. See De mysterio Trinitatis, q. 8,
a. unicus (DSSB 5: 112a115b) and De reductione artium ad theologiae
(ibid. 5: 317325); Gregory LaNave, Bonaventures Theological Method,
in Companion to Bonaventure, ed. J. Hammond, J.A. Wayne Hellmann and
J. Goff (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 114115; Guy-H. Allard, La technique de la
reductio chez Bonaventure, in S. Bonaventura 12741974, ed. J. Bougerol
(Rome: Grottaferrata, 1974), 2: 395416.
63
Palamas Transformed, in GLIH, 279.

bulary indicative of some kind of real distinction (ex parte
rei) in Palamas.
Loudovikos does make an important point that the Incar-
nation merits emphasis in authentic Palamism as central to the
diffusion of the divine energies in creation. We support Loudo-
vikos laudable embrace of Maximus theologoumenon, the
central thesis of which is the absolute predestination of the in-
carnate Christ.
64
More uncomfortably, however, Loudovikos
speaks of Christs theandric energy while contemplating
Jesus two natures (DEDE, 127).
65
Charitably, the reader
should not overly scrutinize the monoenergistic implications of
this phraseology, for Loudovikos considers Maximus his
hero.
66

Loudovikos hopefully affirms the implication of his judg-
ment that the divine energies and logoi in Maximus are not
concentric ideas and, thus, constitute a case of non-formal
identity (viz., non-concentric concepts apprehended directly
from the essence) among noetic items concomitant within the
divine essence.
67
Confessedly conciliatory toward Aquinas,

64
See Ad Thalassium, 7381 (q. 60, lines 5145). Scotists accord com-
pletely. See Maximilian Dean, A Primer on the Absolute Primacy of Christ:
Blessed John Duns Scotus and the Franciscan Thesis (Bedford, MA: Acade-
my of the Immaculate, 2006), 3055.
65
See Maximus, Concilium Lateranense a. 649, 124 (lines 2022): He
admits proof of his impiety, having defined in every way that, there exists
one energy of Christs divinity and humanity.
66
Pace Sophronius of Jerusalem, Maximus Confessor, Lateran Council
(649), and Constantinople III (681), this expression suggests monoenergist
leanings. See Pauline Allen, introduction to Sophronius of Jerusalem and the
Seventh-Century Heresy. The Synodical Letters and Other Documents, ed. P.
Allen and H. Chadwick (New York: OUP, 2009), 3040.
67
Milbank already observes this. Loudovikos would benefit greatly from
direct knowledge of Scotus as opposed to Milbanks Ps.-Scotus (DEDE,
166):

[Loudovikos] declares that the Palamite distinction of essence from
energy (and so of Logos from logoi) is not a Scotist-type formal
distinction, he disproves himself in the very next sentence by
declaring that this distinction here is not a separation [per Mil-
bank] but an expression of the fundamental distinction between
will and essence in God which is not of course a separation either.
This suggests that while the distinction is made purely kat epinoian

Loudovikos postulates the range of the terms processions,
participations, and logoi of beings as sufficiently overlap-
ping species to place them under the absolute genus of ener-
gies. Then, he locates their unifying principle in their resul-
tant reality as operations of the divine will. Perchance, Loudo-
vikos lacked space to argue his full case, since energy in
God (should no ulterior distinction in the genus energy be
forthcoming) would consequently fail to denote essentially
necessary ad intra attributes that spring (pephyke) from the
infinite essence (according to the Palamite school). Were this
the case, Palamas God would be strange indeed, willing his
very attributes into existence!
68

Consequently, Loudovikos approach is uncongenial to un-
derstand the Palamite tradition (to which he alludes) and, in-
felicitously, remains impotent to reconcile Aquinas to Pala-
mas. Lastly, Loudovikos concludes:

So what we need is not the happy but simplistic recog-
nition, made by both David Bentley Hart
69
and Anna

according to Palamas, it must have some sort of fundamentum in re
[]

John Milbank, Commentary: Ecumenical Orthodoxy A Response to
Nicholas Loudovikos, in Encounter Between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radi-
cal Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World Through the Word, ed. A Pabst and
C. Schneider (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 160.
68
A confused metaphysic makes no intrinsic distinctions between various
energies, whether ad intra or ad extra (cf. DEDE, 129131). Loudovikos
might be read to believe infinity, goodness, etc., are eternal products of
divine will. If will is productive of the energies tout court, then absolute
metaphysical necessity for energies to be products of essence qua infinite
disappears. Though and are uncontroversially products
of divine will, strange metaphysics are textually arguable, for Palamas eter-
nal energies include those distinct from God ad extra (besides uncreated
light). See Palamas Transformed, in GLIH, 273.
69
Laudatory reference to Hart risks Scotism, for Hart too supports Nyssas
positing of positive divine infinity and the disjunctive transcendentals. This
normally impels one toward univocity. See David B. Hart, The Beauty of the
Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2003), 193194. Hart mollifies anti-scotistic attacks, rejecting putative
ontologism from misreads by Heidegger and his school (who rely upon a ps.-
scotistic source). We have encountered one substantial criticism, whereat
Hart is without support from a primary or secondary source. He assumes

Williams that Thomas and Palamas basically say
the same thing; we need to try to establish a comple-
mentarity between them (DEDE, 148).

Granted Loudovikos Thomist pedigree, orthodox Tho-
mists and Palamites had been mutually acquainted since
Cydones translation of the ScG (1354), through the Council of
Florence (14381439), until the fall of the Polis (1453).
70

Ergo, the greatest contribution that a conciliatory theologian
can provide to the contemporary reader consists in explaining
how fundamental tenets of Latin and Greek Thomists, in oppo-
sition to stringent Palamites, have been fundamentally in error
for centuries. Too often modern ecumenical approaches to a
Palamitico-Thomasian semantic equivalence implicitly negate
the entire philosophico-theological tradition of saints and
doctors, respectively, as medievals having misunderstood
the real Aquinas. Were pertinacious Thomists and unadultera-
ted Palamites so mistaken for more than a century? Is it only
now that moderns have understood something beyond the
borders of univocity, analogy, and equivocity? If we reject the
irreconcilability of Palamism according to (1) fourteenth-
fifteenth century medieval and Renaissance Thomists, (2)
seventeenth-eighteenth century Thomasian theologians, and
(3) nineteenth-twentieth century neo-Thomists, then contem-
porary late-twentieth and early-twenty-first century Thomists
alone understand thomistico-Palamite questions. Tenacious
Thomists and pledged Palamites are unlikely to surrender their
academico-historical traditions for good-natured hearty
appeals to reconciliation. Either toleration or continued divi-
sion must reign.

Scotus holds (as Ockham) that God can create worlds alien to his own
nature(ibid. 256). This will be found nowhere in the real Scotus.
70
Scholarius, often dismissed as a Thomist, worries about the consequences
of Aquinas philosophy of divine names-attributes in: OCGS, 6: 283. Schola-
rius later associated Latin theology (viz., Aquinas) to anti-Palamism in:
OCGS, 5: 12. He asserts in his preface to his epitome of the ScG that Aqui-
nas essence-energies doctrine (as the filioque) constitutes an irreconcilable
difference between the Latin and Greek churches.

5. Anti-Palamite and Anti-Scotistic Radical Orthodoxy

In chapter seven, John Milbank issues his scotistic chal-
lenge to B. Even if Milbank has become synonymous with
controversy, he accurately recognizes that medieval Latin
tradition includes more than just Augustino-Aristotelico-Tho-
mism.
Milbanks polemics seek to position Aquinas as the last
authentic theologian (contra Scotus and Palamas). Yet, he puts
Aquinas at odds with the Dominican tradition and orthodox
Thomists by conceding that Scotus is more logically rigorous
(DEDE, 200). Milbank surrenders to analytic criticism and
admits that Aquinas genius lies principally in his affirmation-
negation theology that does not resolve the paradox of
divine being (in its existence and essence).
71
Hence, he invokes
ps.-Dionysian tensions or affirmation-negation statements that
characterize the Areopagite (e.g., God is good and beyond
all good). As does his school, Milbank throws in the towel on
Aquinas; namely, Thomas logic of analogy is rationally con-
tradictory and, thus, celestially mystical.
72
Instead, Milbank
elevates Scotus to the real logician and, thus, an unmysterious
rationalist (undoubtedly driving Dominicans into fits of
madness).
73
Consequently, for Milbank, a demythologizing
Scotus signals medieval theological decline. Lastly, Palamas
too must be banished to the sixth circle of the Inferno,
74
for he

71
See John Milbank and Slavoj iek, The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox
versus Dialectic (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 2008).
72
Ibid., 164. Milbank makes this point quite boldy, defending Meister
Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa for admitting that analogy violated the law of
non-contradiction (in the face of Scotism) to defend divine paradox.
73
Milbanks anti-scotistic authority (DEDE, 168) completely concedes the
fact that Thomisms logic is contradictory. See Catherine Pickstock, Duns
Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance, Modern Theology
21 (2005): 557558.
74
Dante Alighieri, Inferno, in Tutte le opere, 4
th
ed., ed. I. Borzi, G. Fallani,
et. al. (Rome: Newton, 2010), 86 (Canto X, lines 1315). Milbank might
place Scotus with Epicurus (and heretics), since he doubts the certainty of
philosophical proofs for the immortality of the soul!

sufficiently partook of the forbidden fruit of Franciscan sub-
tlety:
75

[Palamas] never suggested anything like a real
distinction in God between the reserved essence
and the shared energies. The question is whether he
nonetheless admitted a kind of formal distinction
between the two, if we define a formal distinction as
roughly a kind of latent division within a real unity,
permitting a real if partial separation on some arising
occasion. This mode of distinction is most of all
associated with John Duns Scotus, Palamas near con-
temporary in the West. I shall contend below that Pala-
mas did indeed make a distinction within God along
these lines and that to do so was to compromise the
divine simplicity to a dangerous degree (DEDE, 166).

Doubtless, for both Palamas and Scotus, a partial separa-
tion of any quasi-attribute (symbebks ps)
76
or quasi-per-
fection from divine essence is absolutely impossible and men-
tally unthinkable.
77
Surprisingly, Milbank fails to understand

75
Milbank makes this point orally in: The Concept of the Divine Energies
in Eastern Orthodoxy. Milbank rhetorically laments the fact that he cannot
compliment Palamas as a crypto-Scotist.
76
For the patristic origins of this term, see Demetracopoulos,
, 54. The crypto-Scotist, Hervaeus, entertained this
language to speak about divine quasi-attributes. The Palamite Scholarius
adopted Hervaeus into Byzantine theology for this reason. Though Hervaeus
rejected univocity, its very use necessitates the formal distinction to avoid
pantheism. See Kappes, The Latin Sources, 103.
77
Richard Cross is an authority here but Milbank summarily dismisses the
analytico-friendly Cross as an anachronistic scholar via one comment within
one footnote (DEDE, 168). Milbank ignores Cross patristico-contextual
work and extensive academic publishing in the field of Medieval Studies,
demonstrating his historical sensitivities. See instead Vos, The Philosophy of
John Duns Scotus, 255. Palamas forcefully rejects any potential division in:
Capita 150, 178:

The Akindynists do not accept nor are they capable of knowing the
indivisible distinction in God ( ),
even when they hear us saying of the divided union (
) in accord with the saints, that one aspect of God is incom-

this ontological aspect of the formal distinction.
78
Next, he
calls it a latent division. In this respect, he once again misses
the mark completely. The distinction is mentally and concep-
tually clear to the mind (e.g., goodness wisdom). Each con-
cept denotes some non-concentric aspect with respect to its
comparative conceptual item. What is more, the root or cause
of the mentally non-concentric concepts (i.e. a first intention)
is directly based upon a fully actual distinction (neither separa-
tion, nor division, nor something latent) within the limits of
the object itself. Hence, even if unlimited, the divinity views
itself (epoptik) as actually productive of distinct necessary
items (e.g., goodness, wisdom) and contingent items (e.g., an
actual infinity of possibly creatable items or logoi).
79
Because

prehensible and another is comprehensible [] For they do not
know that God is indivisibly divided and united divisibly and
experiences neither multiplicity nor composition. (Capita 150, sec.
82)

Nonetheless, the scotistic distinction is real (in unscholastic terms) to the
extent that the distinction is actually (not latently) within the object in ques-
tion. Elsewhere, inconsistencies exist in Palamas. See Palamas Trans-
formed, in GLIH, 276.
78
Milbanks authority (DEDE, 190) affirms this in: Aertsen, Being and
One, 2526 (cf., supra, note 47).
79
This constitutes another Franciscan-Palamite parallel. The quasi-Scotist,
Hervaeus Natalis, adopted the formal distinction and bequeathed it to
Byzantium in Greek translation (via Prochorus Cydones). See Kappes, The
Latin Sources, 71114. Hervaean scholars note that the distinction of the
persons and attributes (within Gods self-vision) constitutes a refined form of
Greek or divine metaphysics. See John Doyle, Introduction to A
Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323) the Doctor Perspicacissimus
on Second Intentions, Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation 44
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2008), 2: 12. Stoic metaphysics/
theology is perpetuated in Origen and the Cappadocians, early developed in
sync with hesychasm by Evagrius Ponticus. See Susanna Elm, Evagrius
Ponticus Sententiae ad Virginem, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 45 (1991):
107109. The Palamite school naturally embraced hesychastic to
understand the essence-energies distinction. Palamas surpasses the Stoic
threefold division of science (bypassing ):

Wisdom comes to man through effort and study [] [The Lord]
appears in one way to the ethical man ( ), yet in
another to the contemplative ( ) and to the theological
man ( ) in one way, and yet another way to the zealous

these items are not actually accidents, they do not compromise
divine simplicity, yet are essential to the definition of this-
possible-being. Contrafactually, were goodness completely
removed from infinite essence, then a non-good essence
would result. This makes no logical sense and is not a really
possible being. Therefore, infinite essence necessarily includes
goodness and, as such, is inseparable from infinite essence.
Given Milbanks misrepresentation of Scotus, Loudovikos
(unacquainted with the real Scotus) is justified in rejecting
Milbanks Scotus.
Elsewhere Milbank hits the mark in that both Palamas and
Scotus appeal to the distinction of powers within the soul as a
case of distinctions that really exist within a simple object
(DEDE, 167).
80
Happily, Milbank is correct to note that Scotus
applies literally Augustines divine psychology as something
parallel to human psychology. Auspiciously, Palamas uses
Augustine in a similar fashion with respect to analogizing
human and divine psychology.
81
Both theologians find their
ulterior justification in Maximus theology as exposited in the
analogical parallel between divine nature and divine opera-
tion as mirrored in human nature and human operation of
the Christ.
82
Palamas rightly appeals to the foundation of a

or to those become divine. There are numerous differences in the
divine vision itself ( ) [] but to Moses He
appeared face-to-face ( ) and not through enigmas. []
Recall the testimony of Maximus: Deification is an enhypostatic.
(Triads, 3, 1, 28)

Mark Eugenicus too argues ad intra distinctions via Basils appeal to the
divine and . See First Antirrhetic, 169, lines
2527. Scholarius follows suit: OCGS, 3: 215, line 11. For the definitive
study on epopteia, see Theo Kobusch, Christliche Philosophie: Die Ent-
deckung der Subjecktivitt (Darmstadt: Wissenschafliche Buchgesellschaft,
2006), 138151.
80
Cf. Triads 3, 2, 22 and Ord. IV, d. 43, q. 2, n. 6.
81
See Demetracopoulos, , 8594. Pala-
mas terms for divine psychology rely on texts from Augustine and Maxi-
mus, particularly on the notion of .
82
Palamas Augustino-psychological tradition (see Capita 150, ch. 3637)
culminates in the authoritative Palamite: Mark Eugenicus,
, in S Medicaeus Laurentianus Plut. 74, folio 264v, par-
tially edited in Theologia dogmatica, 2: 259:

metaphysical distinction between a nature and its operations as
rooted in Constantinople III. Scotus might easily draw from
the same background with recourse to the self-same Maximus,
or his theological tenets, ratified at the Lateran Council of 649.
Both loci/topoi are authoritative for Orthodox and Roman
Catholics and serve to bolster this theologics aforesaid dis-
tinctions. Unsurprisingly, then, Kokkinos posteriorly forced
Prochorus Cydones to read Maximus, the Sixth Ecumenical
Council, and Damascenes logic in order to rehabilitate him
from his Akindynist mental distinction, made between the
divine nature and its attributes.
83

Time and again, though absent within DEDEs thematic,
the rallying point for Franciscan and Palamite schools is posi-
tive divine infinity.
84
Scholars accept in bulk that pagan philo-
sophical and paganistico-Christian philosophical notions of
infinity up to Plotinus generally denote imperfection of
whatever sort.
85
Surprisingly, there is little interest in exploring
Franciscan and Palamite ulterior development of the highly
original Christian emphasis of divine infinity, as exposited in

For our mind (), being made according to Gods likeness
(), naturally () possesses the internal word (),
which dwells within itself, and it has products () from its
very self and spirit has a co-product (), itself paired
synchronously along with internal word ( ). In respect of
the paradigm of an image (), and in this very manner, do I
declare this in respect of God Himself. (folio 263v)

Pace hesychasto-Palamism psychology, Augustine and Nyssas psycholo-
gies form the base. See Georgi Kapriev, Die nicht-psychologische Deutung
des Menschen bei Gregorios Palamas, Archiv fr mittelalterliche Philoso-
phie und Kultur 12 (2006): 187198.
83
See Rigo, Testi and Cabasilas and Kokkinos, , in Tomo Sinodale,
34; 313314, lines 384427. The synod of 1351 already cited both Fathers
(cf. PG 151: 727729).
84
Radical Orthodoxy argues Scotus infinity leads to inexorable decay, even
Nietzsches nihilism. See Michael Hanby, Augustine Beyond Western Sub-
jectivity, in Radical Orthodoxy, ed. J. Milbank and C. Pickstock, J. Ward
(London: Routledge, 1999), 109.
85
See Leo Sweeney, Divine Infinity in Greek and Medieval Thought, 2nd ed.
(New York: Lang, 1998), 167168.

the Cappadocians (especially Nyssa).
86
This positive notion is
often maladroitly assumed to be a borrowing from Plotinus.
Alas, far too many diverse items (Nous, matter, etc.) are in-
finite for Plotinus to hope to justify such a simplistic reduc-
tionism.
87
Even if there seems to be minimally dual significata
for the infinite in Plotinus, none of his definitions do the
heavy lifting to raise Plotinian infinity to the level of the Cap-
padocian notion of an immense, unique, and infinite universal
or sea of infinite being, namely, the divine essence itself.
88

Byzantine tradition continued to emphasize (and even exagge-
rate)
89
this purely Christian philosophical value,
90
even serving
as the foundation for Bonaventuro-scotistic and Palamite

86
See Ekkehard Mhlenberg, Die Undenlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von
Nyssa: Gregors Kritik am Gottesbegriff der Klassischen Metaphysik (Gttin-
gen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1966), 103104. Nyssa provided the
foundation for ulterior Greek negation of concept formation vis--vis the
divine essence. See Lenka Karifkov, Infinity, in The Brill Dictionary of
Gregory Nyssa, ed. L.F. Mateo-Seco and G. Maspero (Leiden: Brill, 2010),
423426. The logico-metaphysical drive toward univocity, stemming from
necessary components of infinity and transcendental disjuncts, is argued in:
Frederick Sontag, Infinity and Univocity, The Review of Metaphysics 6
(1952): 219232.
87
Sweeney, Divine Infinity, 171219.
88
See Trinitarian predication in: Gregory Nazianzen, Discours 31.
Cinquime Discours thologique: Du Saint-Esprit, in Grgoire de Nazianze.
Discours 2731 (Discours thologiques). Introduction, texte critique,
traduction et notes. Sources chrtiennes 250, ed. P. Gallay and M. Jourjon
(Paris: ditions du Cerf, 1978), 300314 (nos. 1220); In Theophania & In
sanctum pascha, in PG, 36: 317B; 625D:
, , ,
, , ,
. These constitute the direct sources for Damascenes Trinitarian
predication and infinity.
89
Palamas Transformed, in GLIH, 279290. Palamas states (Triads 3, 2,
7) that the gap between the co-eternal energies and the essence is insur-
mountable, for the essence stands infinitely infinite times (
) higher.
90
E.g., this hyperbole exists in a common source for Bonaventure and
Palamas, viz., Maximus in: Ad Thalassium, qq. 56, 60, 63. Bonaventure imi-
tated this triple formulation of infinity in Eriugenas Latin translation. This
unique formulation, hereafter unknown until Bonaventure, occurs minimally
three times in the PP: I 517B; II 525A; II 586C. For initial discoveries and
research into the textual and conceptual overlaps between Bonaventure,
Eriugena, and Maximus, see Goff, Caritas.

metaphysics.
91
All the same, there is precious little interest in
the fact that Franciscan and the Palamite schools both explicit-
ly root their metaphysics in a positive notion of divine infinity.
This point is at least obliquely conceded in Radical Orthodoxy,
whereupon they blame scotistic metaphysics on Bonaventuran
philosophical perversity (DEDE, 191).
92
Indeed, Bonaven-
ture was himself obsessed with infinity, which he confronts as
a positive entity, along with a clear sense of unitive contain-

91
Palamas cites Maximus explicitly in: Capita 150, 178 (ch. 82, lines 3435;
NB, Sinkewicz marks this fontem non inveni). Just prior, Palamas referen-
ces a generic man who cannot distinguish between the geometric body vs. its
natural properties. A universal, instantiated as a nature, cannot (de potentia
Dei ordinata) be really separated from its natural properties (e.g., as a line
from a triangle, and presumably quantity from hypostasis). As these pro-
perties are inseparable from their natures (lest the object be mentally absurd
and really destroyed), a fortiori the divine energies and essence are too. N.b.,
Palamas avoids any distinction katepinoian, though Basils example of a
seed and its properties is apt here. Why? Palamas above appeals to Maximus
(cf. Maximus, Centuries on Charity, in The Philokalia, vol. 1, ed. G. Palmer,
P. Sherrard, and K. Ware (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981), 64 (bk. 1, sec.
96). Palamas notion of infinity (in the midst of plurality) cannot be merely
conceptual (as he likely understood Basil) in God but necessitates a real
difference. For other Maximian hyperbolic appeals to the positive notion of
divine infinity ( ), see also: Triads 1, 3, 22; 3, 2, 78; 3,
2, 21; 3, 3, 14; Chrestou, Homily 41, 4. Most importantly, Capita 150, ch.
82, appeals to Maximus, Ambigua ad Thomam una cum Epistula secunda ad
eundem, question 1, 25 in Corpus Christianorum: Series Graeca , 48, ed. by
B. Janssens, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), and his notion of plurality in unity
(i.e. trinity-unity). Palamas overplays his hand, for Maximus denies any
division () and admits only distinction (). See too
Triads 3, 3, 8: Maximus says this: beginningless actions ( ) of
God are immortality and infinity ( ) and reality ( ) and as
many [actions] considered essentially () surrounding God (
).
92
Pickstock, Duns Scotus, 546:

It is now regarded as a demand of rigour that one keep a transcenden-
tal universality strictly distinct from transcendent height and spiri-
tuality, logical abstraction from spiritual ascesis. This is what Duns
Scotus achieves by reading ps.-Dionysius and Augustine in his own
fashion, which was sometimes alert to ambiguities within their texts,
and at other times seemingly almost wilfully perverse. His new and
explicit deployment of perfection terms as common both to God and
creatures was nonetheless anticipated by Bonaventure.


ment, and the formal distinction within his opera. Even his
reading of Augustine, like unto Scotus, is colored by his Greek
prejudice.
93

Independent of Franciscan influence, Palamas forms a
coaxial theologic with Bonaventuro-Scotist metaphysics. He
too piously obsesses on divine infinity as part and parcel of his
justification for his distinctions within the Godhead. Yet, who
provides the common root for such metaphysical uniformity
between two topically and linguistically divergent traditions?
Clearly, the transcendental disjunctives of being (all being is
either created or uncreated, either finite or infinite,
either participated or unparticipated, etc.)
94
form a com-
mon value between the two schools.
95
Yet, the common

93
Bonaventure consistently founds infinity upon the Damasceno-Nazianzen
notion of positive infinity, calling divine being an uncircumscribed sea of
infinite substance. After affirming absolute infinity is a co-extensive and
absolute property of the divine essence, Bonaventure then incorporates the
Augustinian notion of divine infinity and, by implication, simplicity. This
best explains the manner in which Bonaventure argues for the possession of
an actual infinity of divine ideas in his De scientia Christi, serving to render
Augustinian divine simplicity, contrary to Aquinas, in its Franciscan recep-
tion intrinsically open to Greek patristic demands of divine beings actual
unitive containment of every perfection in the highest mode, namely, infinite
perfection. See I Sent., d. 43, a. 1, q. 2, conclusion (DSSB 1: 769b); I Sent., d.
45, a. 2, q. 1, conclusion (ibid. 1: 804a); De mysterio Trinitatis, q. 4, a. 1, nn.
2, 5 (ibid. 5: 79a).
94
See this metaphysical principle boldly dividing all beings (besides the
God-man) into one of two disjunctives in: Theodoret of Cyrrhus (Ps.-Justin),
Expositio rectae fidei, in Corpus apologetarum Christianorum saeculi se-
cundi, vol. 4, 3rd ed., ed. J. Otto (Jena: Mauke, 1880), (Morel p.) 374, sec.
D, lines 12: We shall discover that all being is divided into create and
increate ( ).
Theodoret (d. c. 457) capitalized upon the disjunctive transcendentals ex-
posited by Nyssa. Palamas exploits disjunctives participated-unpartici-
pated, which are in Maximus clearly in Amb. 41, constituting a fivefold
division of all things. Maximus canonical authority blesses Palamas
obsession with the disjuncts, culminating in Palamite adoption of a fuller list
of disjunctives from Bonaventura graecus in Scholarius (1445).
95
Eriugena follows Maximus framework of the disjunctive transcendentals
as a starting point, i.e. the second division of natura universa (creat et non
creatur; creatur et creat; nec creat nec creatur; creatur et non creat). When
the former two are split vertically from the latter two, they elucidate un-
created nature and created nature respectively. Furthermore, Eriugena
ruminates rather extensively on Maximus fivefold division twice in the PP

notions of positive infinity and disjunctive transcendentals
force us to a common doctrinal source in Nyssa,
96
followed by
textual dependence on Maximus the Confessor,
97
Ps.-Diony-
sius, and the final common apostle of the transcendental
disjunct-infinity dyad, the Damascene. Unfortunately for Radi-

(II 530Bff. and PP V 892Dff.). Like Maximus, Eriugena locates the over-
coming of this division in the mystery of the Incarnation and divine love (PP
I 449A-B). Similarly, the division between participatum-imparticipatum is
upheld by Eriugena (PP II 617A617C); Iohannis Scotti seu Eriugenea Ho-
milia super in principio erat verbum, n. 13 in Corpus Christianorum: Con-
tinuatio Medievalis 166 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008). For Eriugena on the
infinite-finite, cf., supra, note 18.
96
Nyssa is idiosyncratic, though divine infinity is arguably common to the
Cappadocians. Nyssa divides all being into disjunctive transcendentals from
his meditation on Christ as the juncture of create and increate natures.
This division pervades several works, especially: Gregory Nyssa, Contra
Eunomium, ed. W. Jaeger (Leiden: Brill, 1960), 1.1: 113:

Have we not come to know these distinctions of being in division
( )? [] Indeed, we say
that is knowable (). And again we grasp another
distinction from the knowable ( ), divided into what is
create and increate ( -
). And we have logically defined that the Holy Trinity is, on
one hand, of an increate nature ( ), and
on the other hand, that all such [beings] posterior to that [Trinity]
are said to be of a create nature ( ) [] (Contra
Eunomium, bk. 1, ch. 1, sec. 295, lines 18)

Nyssa is the intellectual well from which Damascene and Scotus draw a
positive notion of infinity in: Cross, Gregory Nyssa, 272324.
97
The clearest example of the disjunctive transcendental in Maximus is Amb.
41, where Maximus explicates his fivefold division of all things (Andrew
Louth, Maximus the Confessor [London: Routledge, 1996], 156):

The first of these divides from the uncreated nature the universal
created nature, which receives its being from becoming. For they
say that God in his goodness has made the radiant orderly arrange-
ment of everything that is, and that it is not immediately plain what
and how it is, and therefore the division that divides creation from
God is to be called ignorance. For what it is that naturally divides
these one from another, so that they may not be united in a single
essence, since they do not have one and the same logos, they grant
to be ineffable.


cal Orthodoxy, their accusations against Bonaventuro-Scotism
are truer than they might imagine. Bonaventure was not only a
missionary of positive infinity and unitive containment of the
divine attributes, but takes his inspiration from Nazianzen, ps.-
Dionysius, Maximus Confessor latinus, and the Damascene, as
far back as the early 1250s;
98
Bonaventure does anticipate
Scotus, but in a patristic fashion and in the image of Maximus
with his triple infinity formula propos divine being.
99

Naturally, Bonaventure drew from available translations of
Maximus, which he employed in Paris through the latent trans-
lation of John Scottus Eriugena (d. c. 877).
100
It is for these
reasons, and a host of others, that the last great Orthodox of the
Palamite school approvingly cited Bonaventures list of
disjunctive transcendental attributes in Greek, for this list of
disjuncts seamlessly expands and harmoniously develops the
theological insights of the Palamite school on the divisions
between create and increate being.
101

98
See Bonaventure, Commentaria in Sententiae (125253); De scientia
Christi (1254); De mysterio Trinitatis (12557).
99
See De mysterio Trinitatis, q. 3, a. 1, ad. 13 (DSSB 5: 73b): pro eo quod
infinitum, eo quod infinitum divinum esse est infinitissime infinitum. For
Bonaventures Greek sources, cf., supra, note 18.
100
See Ad Thalassium (trans. J. S. Eriugena), q. 60: Hoc est omnino myste-
rium secula circumscribens et superinfinitum et infinite infinitum ante secula
subsistens magnum dei manifestatum consilium, cuius angelus factus est
ipsum iuxta essentiam dei uerbum. Eriugena enjoys longstanding accep-
tance as a crucial link between the East and the West, providing the defini-
tive translation of ps.-Dionysius corpus until the 13
th
century and transla-
tions of Maximus Ad Thalassium, Amb., and Nyssas De opificio homini.
Moreover, Eriugena includes numerous translations of the Cappadocians
within the Periphyseon, the availability of which was widespread until his
ultimate condemnation in 1225 by Honorius III. This justifies Eriugena as
orientale lumen in Marie-Dominique Chenu, La thologie au douzime
sicle, 3rd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1976). For discussions on Eriugena as conduit of
the East, see B. McGinn and W. Otten, ed., Eriugena: East and West, (South
Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). The breadth of Eriugenas
influence as a theologian and conduit of Eastern patristic theology is still
largely neglected.
101
See De mysterio Trinitatis, q. 1, a. 1, nn. 1120 (DSSB 5: 46b47a):
Item, si est ens ab alio, est ens non ab alio [] Item, si est ens respectivum,
est ens absolutum [] Item si est ens diminutum seu secundum sive
secundum quid [] Item si est ens propter aliud, est ens propter se ipsum
[] Item, si est ens per participationem, est ens per essentiam [];

From the information provided, it should be obvious that
B.s provisional historical narrative would benefit greatly from
taking into consideration the Bonaventuro-scotistic school,
which has already been established in the history of philoso-
phy. Furthermore, DEDE failed to broach the subject of the
Palamite tradition to which explicit references were made.

6. Milbanks False Dichotomy:
Palamas and Scotus on Participation

In his screed against Scotus, Milbank fails to inform his
reader that there exists precious little by which to judge Scotus
on the question of participation (DEDE, 200). Milbank draws
attention to only one of the two known paragraphs to us about
Scotus musings on participation:

Scotus approach is in one sense more rationally rigo-
rous than Aquinas, yet at the risk of subordinating God
to esse, by too much regarding the participation of the
finite in being as a literal segment: this risks either
the notion of finitude as outside the reach of divine
omnipresence, or else pantheistic immanence (as will
arrive with Spinoza) if one takes the share of being to
be also a share of infinitude (DEDE, 200).

Presently, Scotus extant works contain too little on the
subject to evoke such a reaction from Milbank, who greatly
overplays his hand on Scotus.
102
Duns has no doctrine of
participation to speak of. Ergo, one must refrain from saying
too much on the subject, though his disciple Francis Mayron
fully developed the notion of participation, potentially reflec-

Itinerarium ch. 3, n. 3 (DSSB 5: 304ab; scripsit 1259); Collationes in Hexae-
meron, ch. 5, 2829 (ibid. 5: 358b359a; composed 1273). Cf. George-
Gennadius Scholarius:
, ,
, ,
, . (OCGS, 6: 282, lines 2226;
scripsit 1445)
102
Cf. Ord. I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 2, n. 3738. NB, Scotus other brief allusion
to participation is Reportatio II, 16.1.

ting the logic of his master.
103
Finally, it is exasperating that
(self-styled) non-anachronistic historical theology absolutely
neglects speaking about scotistic doctrine of participation with
reference to Jesus and Mary. It can only be hoped that Scotus
and Palamas, along with their maximalist Mariological tradi-
tions, will eventually be consulted for instances of participa-
tion in concreto or in facto esse. Until Mariology becomes part
and parcel of the discussion of human natures capacity to
participate in the energies, absolutely no author may pretend to
plumb the depths of participation as possible to human na-
ture.
104

Summarily, Scotus and Palamas are not so distant from
one another (though Scotus is systematic, while Palamas is in-
consistent, perhaps due to literary genre and apologetic thrust).
While both missionaries of divine infinity hold for the abso-
lutely imparticible nature of the divine essence, Scotus sounds,
naturally, more professorical.
105
Palamas employs bombastic,

103
Francis is relevant and nearly contemporaneous with Scotus. Francis
logically developed scotistic doctrine of participation. Milbank is guessing,
or projecting, what Scotus might say. Mayron is relevant to Milbank and to
Byzantium since Scholarius approved of him. See OCGS, 2: 223; 6: 179
180. Moreover, no one questions the robust doctrine of participation in
Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in Deum and De triplici via.
104
For an attempted remedy of this gaping lacuna, see: Christiaan Kappes,
The Immaculate Conception: Why Thomas Aquinas Denied, While John
Duns Scotus, Gregory Palamas, and Mark Eugenicus Professed the Absolute
Immaculate Existence of Mary (New Bedford, MA: Academy of the Imma-
culate, 2014).
105
See Reportatio IA 36.4, n. 27:

The infinity of the divine essence is more perfect than any other
infinity; i.e. infinites of thinking (cognoscendi) perceptibles (cog-
nitorum), or of notions (rationum). Yet, He comprehends the
infinity of His own essence from the nature of the object (ex natura
rei). Therefore, he is able to comprehend any other infinity and,
consequently, if there is even an idea (idea) that is perhaps a
thought-object (obiectum cognitum) (since He comprehends in-
finite objects), then there are infinite ideas (ideae) in the divine
mind. If too an idea perhaps exists as a thought-object, since the
former are infinite and are in respect of Himself as infinite, and in
such wise, the same follows as before, since the ideas are infinite.
However, granted namely that the infinity of the essence is more
perfect than whatsoever other infinity, as of thought-object, or

mystical language. Scotus frequently follows his master Bona-
venture, yet in a more logically rigorous and perfective
fashion.
106
Bonaventure too anticipates Palamas through his
adoption of the disjunctives of particible-imparticible, as Pala-
mas himself draws this from his Ps.-Dionysian and Proclean
repertoire.
107
Consequently, the reader now has sufficient
indications to see that Milbank does not have the last word on
participation in the Franciscan school.

whatsoever other items, then it is obvious that His infinity,
which is the character of the [divine] essence, is utterly first
and unparticipated. Yet, another infinity is by way of participa-
tion, for the infinity of the essence is a quasi-cause of infinity of
objects existent in thought (in esse cognito). Whence the infinity of
other items is by means of a return (reductio) to the infinity of the
essence.

Bonaventure earlier expresses the same doctrine in his analysis of the created
intellectual perfection of Jesus: And therefore the soul of Christ, since it is a
creature and on account of this finite, howeversomuch it is united to the
Word, it does not comprehend infinity [] (De scientia Christi, q. 7, conc.
[DSSB 5: 40a])
106
Paul VI, quoting Pius X, calls Bonaventure the second leader of Scholas-
ticism:

It is universally recognized that John Duns Scotus surpassed the
Seraphic Doctor [] The Second Vatican Ecumenical Council
[] prescribed: Philosophical subjects are to be taught in such a
way that the students are led to acquire a solid and coherent know-
ledge of man, the world and God, based upon the patrimony of
perennially valid philosophy.

See Paul VI, Alma Parens (Acta Apostolica Sedis 58 [1966], 609614), as
translated by Stefano Manelli, Blessed John Duns Scotus: Marian Doctor
(New Bedford, MA: Academy of the Immaculate, 2011), 103110. This
perennially valid philosophy certainly includes the Franciscan School. John
Paul II gave the same academic judgment to the Commissio Scotista in 2002,
calling Scotus the perfecter of Bonaventure. See Manelli, Blessed John
Duns Scotus, 111113. Thus, Scotus enjoys weighty canonical approbation
in the Latin Church. Bonaventure and Scotus form part of the perennially
valid school of theology and philosophy, relevant to ecumenical discourse.
107
Proclus provides a more satisfactory source than Ps.-Dionysius in many
cases. See Palamas Transformed, in GLIH, 278.

7. Bradshaw: A Reply to Critics

In chapter ten, Bradshaw replies to his supporters and
critics. propos Athanasopoulos, B. offers no corrective to
note Palamas and his schools pro-Augustinian theology
(DEDE, 256258). This will strike the reader as entirely un-
satisfactory. The reception of Augustine in the East is clearly
relevant to AEW, considering the significant space accorded to
B.s anti-Augustinian criticisms. Should we find that the entire
Palamite tradition reveals a positive, synoptic embrace of
Augustine, a dynamic history of philosophy emerges in the
East. Palamas example and authority provided a strong cano-
nical basis for ulterior Palamite reception of Augustine.
Next, B. correctly rejects Loudovikos unnatural attempt to
graft a distinction of reason onto Palamas. B. fittingly refers to
Damascenes own use of katepinoian as denoting a mental
distinction that the mind makes between body and soul.
Transparently, Damascene refers to a real distinction, which
likely betrays Stoic sources.
108
Disappointingly, B. is content
to omit supposedly related passages in Palamas opera that
presumably connect him to Damascenes logic. Really, Pala-
mas avoidance of katepinoian in Basil and Damascene might
portend two completely diverse conclusions: (a) Palamas
recognizes Stoic logical terms and concepts and wishes to
avoid a real distinction in the sense of Basils seed-quality
and Damascenes soul-body examples; (b) Palamas misinter-
prets Basil and Damascenes epinoia from its authentic Stoic
sense, as if only a distinction of reason. Thus, Palamas avoids
epinoia, for a fullfledged real distinction.
Until B. provides an in-depth investigation of epinoia in
Basil, Maximus, Damascene, and Palamas, B.s appeal to
Damascene could turn out to be a double-edged sword (DEDE,
259). Additionally, we await future research to shed light on
the ambiguity that persists in B.s and Loudovikos categori-
zation and hierarchical order assigned to: logoi, energies,
predeterminations (proorismoi), divine volitions (thelmata,

108
For the Damascenes Stoic sources on human nature, see Richard Cross,
Perichoresis, Deification, and Christological Predication in John of Damas-
cus, Mediaeval Studies 62 (2000): 69124.

boulmata), powers (dynameis), etc. Logically, we will be
referred to AEW for assistance. Still, the logico-metaphysical
hierarchy and/or inter-relations of the items signified by the
aforementioned terms remain unclear. We must hope for
clarification in B.s future investigations.
Contra Milbank, B. correctly notes that his interlocutor
makes sweeping historical claims, while providing only
casual supporting references for persons such as Scotus.
Furthermore, B. properly orientates the reader to the source of
Milbanks claims, as do we; namely, his a priori denigration of
Bonaventuro-Scotism as the prelude to Spinoza. This prejudice
colors many a figure that Milbank evaluates, the corollary of
which necessitates a rejection of Palamas. However, in B.s
rejection of Milbank, we suspect that perhaps Scotus was
tossed too. At the 2008 colloquium, Milbank noticeably sur-
prised B., forcing him to consider the fact that the distinctions
between the soul and its faculties in Scotus parallel in detail
Palamas own understanding of the same. Dolefully, this reve-
lation has not resulted in a supplementary study comparing
Scotus to Palamas. This, we suggest, would be a momentous
means to further B.s philosophical efforts to collocate Pala-
mas accurately within the general history of philosophy and
theology.
109
Contrariwise, neo-Palamite theological obfusca-
tion of such attempts to compare Bonaventuro-Scotism and
Palamism merit a hefty charge indeed: namely, that Palamas
celebratory monopoly on the essence-energies distinction may
only be maintained at the price of blindly asserting a priori
denials of parallelism between Franciscan and Palamite tradi-
tion.

Conclusions

DEDE would have profited from the myriad of sources
that refute the antiquated Western-medieval, Augustino-Aris-
totelico-Thomistic narrative and provide numerous avenues to
link Western medieval schoolmen to Eastern patristic sources.

109
We must mention: Georgi Kapriev, Philosophie in Byzanz (Wrzburg:
Knighausen un Neumann, 2005), 249345. Kapriev has already notably in-
cluded Palamas and his school in the history of Byzantine philosophy.

As amply demonstrated, some traditional Western thinkers
give proper reverence to Augustine, yet prioritize Eastern fi-
gures like the Cappadocians, Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus, and
Damascene concerning divine metaphysics over/against the re-
ceived Augustinian triumphal procession amongst modern
scholars. Moreover, and more importantly, far from denigra-
ting Augustine, these thinkers actually situated their read of
Augustine on divine life and psychology within this broader
theological and primarily Eastern framework. The fact is, the
West particularized in the Franciscan lights of Bonaventure
and Scotus accessed important early Eastern sources, par-
ticularly through the Carolingian thinker and translator
Eriugena, and, moreover, greatly utilized them. This occurs
principally in descriptions of the divine ideas, the disjunctive
transcendentals, and the positive view of divine infinity. Even
distinctions between Gods essence and his energies (perfec-
tions, theophanies, etc.), far from being the sole property of
the Palamite tradition, have distinct and significant parallels in
the West. One may legitimately wonder how such a cornu-
copia of sources and incredible parallels have been bypassed.
The instinctive dismissal among historians, theologians, and
philosophers of both East and West, out of loyalty to en-
trenched but incomplete and oftentimes misleading narratives,
remains deeply problematic and will continue to obfuscate any
attempt to properly reconstruct the motion of medieval
theology, inasmuch as such reconstruction is possible.
Contra B., Athanasopoulos, and Loudovikos: the Latin
theological tradition, at least in the Franciscan school, reserves
a place for Eastern metaphysics and theology and shows re-
markable harmony with the insights of the Cappadocians,
Maximus, and Palamas. In light of the textual evidence pre-
sented above, the two key points summarized by Schneider in
his introduction to DEDE have been presently challenged and
demand reconsideration across a broader horizon of theologi-
cal and philosophical cross currents between East and West.
Historical and systematic theologians, as well as philosophers
and historians of philosophy, have yet to specify the actual
historical, textual, and conceptual dependencies, similarities,
and divergences between East and West. Only thereafter will

we be able to assess adequately where true differences lie and
where possibilities for mutual enrichment and even correction
exist.
Palamas role within the history of philosophy and/or theo-
logy was chronicled by Byzantine authors and within Palamite
tradition. We have given indications of this but until Palamite
reception of their master is fully exposited, little more can be
definitively said. Dominicans of the fifteenth century (e.g.,
Torquemada) had things to say on Palamas and his school, few
of them positive. Naturally, this encouraged famous authors of
the seventeenth century (e.g., Petavius) to discuss Palamas
minor role in the history of theology. Palamas, however, was
catalogued as a less subtle or feeble imitator of scotistic meta-
physics. Doubtless, Palamas holds greater importance for late
Byzantium than previously accredited by Thomasian authors.
First, Palamas gave Augustines opera in Greek an authorita-
tive nihil obstat for Byzantines. Secondly, Palamas school
ushered into Byzantium a synthetic project of harmonizing
Latin authors (especially Augustine and Aquinas) with Byzan-
tine theology and Orthodoxy. Nonetheless, Palamas and his
school remain opaque figures in scholarship vis--vis the Fran-
ciscan tradition. Only by comparing common historical sour-
ces, thematics, and theological premises and conclusions can
contemporary scholars secure for Palamas his claim to origina-
lity, independence, or his putative monopoly on the essence-
energies question. As it stands, thomistic, Thomasian, and neo-
thomistic chronicles all agree that Palamas is little more than
an ill-conceived son of Scotus. In order to rescue Palamas
from his traditional place in the history of Western theology/
philosophy, it is incumbent on todays scholars to outline the
points of agreement and contrast between the Franciscan and
the Palamite traditions. The results of such an effort might
finally seat the real Palamas in his proper, and potentially sig-
nificant, place in the story of theology, philosophy, and even
Christianity.

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Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies

Vol. 55 (2014) Nos. 12, pp. 175220

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