Can White Men Play the Blues?

Music, Learning Theory, and Performance Knowledge

Author(s): David Carr
Source: Philosophy of Music Education Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring, 2001), pp. 23-31
Published by: Indiana University Press
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Can White Men Play the Blues?

Music, Learning Theory, and Performance Knowledge
David Carr
Universityof Edinburgh

A PersistentQuestion
At firstglance,it mightseemthattheonly
gauche
politically
properanswerto thesomewhat
is:
title
both
can
and
of
this
yes,they
essay
question
as thebasicbluesformis thebackbone
do. Insofar
haveofcourse
ofjazz music,whiteinstrumentalists
bluesperformances
been authorsof distinguished
thetwentieth
century.However,with
throughout
of
thepost-war
discovery folkor 'ethnic'bluesby
white
musicians,blues themesand forms
young
ofpopular
themainstream
much
havevery
entered
musicand the formhas been bothpursuedand
andintegwithgreatenthusiasm,
extended
energy,
white
musicians
operating
rityby professional
a
or
at
more
conscious
either
within,
puristremove
wellsay
one
that
mainstream.
Indeed, might
from,
what
of
other
form
music
ofthisorany
seems,on
thefaceof it,to be trueof anyand all art:thatit
mustbe possible foranyoneto learnit as one
knowledge
acquiresanyothersortofperformative
or skill. Whyshouldtherebe anymoredifficulty
bluesthan
orsinging
aboutwhitemusiciansplaying
in the
thereis aboutJapaneseorKoreanspainting
or
tradition
of Americanabstractexpressionism
?
Kabuki
Africans
performing
been asked
Yet thequestionhas frequently
it
had
the
considerable
during presentcentury,
andsixtieswhensuchleading
inthefifties
currency
ofpopularmusicas ElvisPresley
whiteinnovators
and Bob Dylanbeganto explore-with
greatpasof
folk
blues
success-the
if
variable
sion,
repertoire
such black artistsas ArthurCrudupand Bukka
ofmore
tobe a concern
White,anditstillcontinues
forms.
I
folk
and
other
puristdevoteesof blues
also believe thatthe questionis a morewidely
one to the extentthatit raises quite
significant
knowlissues
aboutthenatureofartistic
complex

to humancultureand
edge and itsrelationship
whichare relevantto underexperience-issues
musicin general(as wellas otherkinds
standing
ofperformance
art). Itis clear,forexample,that
excellencein art-unlikeengineering-is
by no
meansa straightforward
function
ofsuperior
skill
or technique;artistsor musicianswithlimited
techniquecan succeedin sayingor expressing
morethanotherswithgreattechnicalvirtuosity.
Butyetothers,one suspects,can perform
witha
skillandexpressive
that
nevertheless
power may
appearto lack otherdimensionsof artisticauAt all events,anyunderstanding
of
thenticity.
musical and otherartisticknowledgeseems
of judgimplicatedas muchin considerations
ment,apprciation,expression,taste, virtue,
cultural
andpersonalexperience,
as in
affiliation,
thoseofskillandtechnique-and
I wishtoattempt
some small explorationof these immensely
inthisessay.
complexrelationships
SkilledPerformance
and TheoriesofLearning
Itmayfirst
ofall be instructive
to examine
themostbasicassumption
onekindof
underlying
affirmative
responseto thequestionof mytitle.
Afterall,generations
ofeducationalists
appearto
haveaccepteda particular
theoretical
tothe
story
effectthatlearninganything
is just a matter
of
ofpatterns
ofbehaviorby
systematic
acquisition
causal processesof association. If
essentially
catscanlearntheirwayoutofboxesandchildren
can learn theirmultiplication
tables by such
what
is
so
different
about
whitemen
processes,
to
this
music
or
that?
Box escapollearning play
andinstrument
ogy,tablelearning,
playingareall
moreorlesscomplexpractical
which
procedures
arguablycan be brokendownintotheircompo-

Philosophy
ofMusicEducationReview9,no. 1 (Spring2001): 23-31.

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24

Philosophyof Music Education Review

nentpartsand learnedlikeotherskills. However,

thechiefobjectiontothisstory-an
objectionwhich
I yearsago airedinrelationtoanother
performance
aiV-is thatsinceit seemsto be a sine qua nonof
evenminimalhumanskillmastery
thattherebe
somebasicunderstanding
ofthepointandpurpose
ofa skill,anysuchaccountofskilllearning
is hard
putto get offtheground. The pointhere,to be
betterif
sure,is notjust thatit is educationally
of thebehaviorassociatedwitha given
mastery
skill is accompaniedby some understanding
of
whatthatbehavioris for,butthatmastery
ofbehaviorwithout
fallswellshort
anysuchunderstanding
ofmastering
theskill-andcertainly
shortofmasteringthepracticeofwhichtheskillis a part.Thus,
ifone succeedsin conditioning
chimpanzeesinto
execution
of
the
constitutive
behaviorofa
perfect
Israeli
folk
it
is
in
given
dance,
only an honorary
sensethatwe can say the apes have mastereda
skill-anditwouldbe surelyquite'Pickwickian'to
claimthattheyweredancing.
The trouble,in short,is thatdespiteits
of the label 'learningtheory,'
(mis)appropriation
modernexperimental
of a behaviorist
psychology
benthasprovedutterly
unabletoaccountforsome
of thebasic featuresof characteristically
human
of
the
or
learning-that
grasp
meaning significance
ofwhatwe do thatordinarily
goes bythenameof
Of
course, so-called learning
understanding.
theoryhas not entirelydominatedthe field of
modernpsychology
and cognitivepsychology-in
occasionalpartnership
withcognitivescience-has
forthemostpartbeen addressedpreciselyto the
semantic
andto thequestionof
aspectsoflearning
how humansimpose intelligibleorder on the
sensoryfluxof humanexperience. Inspiredby
constructivist
post-Kantian
epistemology,
Piaget
and otherstructuralists
have certainly
had some
successin showingthe originsof mathematical,
physicalscience,and even moral principlesin
distinctive
humancapacitiestogeneralizeoverthe
of experience.Moreprecisely,
and
particularities
in tunewithmodernpragmatist
of
philosophers
scienceand analyticaltheorists
of cmeaning-ashave soughtto accountfor
use', structuralists
semantic
in
capacities humanabilitiestoformulate,
and
instrumental
apply, followrulesof essentially
import;on thisview,theshapeof ourtheoretical

knowledgeof the world is to a large degree

conditionedby the characteristically
practical
purposes(of survivaland so on) thathuman
beingshave.
All thesame,despitethisemphasison the
teleologicaldimensionsof humanintelligence
and its significance
forpracticalproblems(of
survivalandso on) cognitive
hashad
psychology
little
to
about
the
relatively
say
psychologyof
skilledhumanpracticeas such;indeed,itseems
tohavebeenoftenimplicated
ina nearCartesian
conceptionof mind and reason as basically
separatefromthebodily,the material,and the
practical-inpart,no doubt,due to its Kantian
inheritance.To be sure,cogniepistemological
tivepsychology
is wwCartesian
to theextentthat
suchtheorists
as JeanPiagetand JeromeBruner
havereadilyregarded
thepre-linguistic
behavior
ofinfants
as a kindofprimitive
or
(psycho-motor
But
such
behavioris reenactive)reasoning.
gardedas reasoningonlyinsofaras it maybe
consideredto embodyprocedureswhichanticipate the lateremergenceof largelytheoretical
principles;the main emphasisin mainstream
cognitivepsychologyhas been a CartesianKantianone on thedevelopment
of theoretical
reason(intune,onemightadd,withtheemphasis
in cognitivescienceon information
processing)
to the considerableneglectof the practical
aspectsof rationality.This problememerges
incognitive
quitestrikingly
work
developmental
in the pre-eminently
practicalsphereof moral
education;ithasbeena majorstumbling
blockto
moraleducationalists
otherwisesympathetic
to
theinfluential
workof thecognitivist
Lawrence
Kohlbergthat Kohlberg's account of moral
has difficulty
development
accountingforthe
way in whichhis higherstagemoralprinciples
and affecengage-logically,motivationally,
theactualconductofagents.2
tively-with
PracticalReason and KnowingHow
In general,then,one troublewithmodern
isthatneither
thelearning-theoretical
psychology
non-rational
emphasisonthemechanical
acquisition of skill,nor the cognitivedevelopmental
oftheoretical
emphasisontheorigins
knowledge,

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David Cair

25

in music,dance,
muchinsightintolearning
afford
andothercruciallypracticalspheresof education.
I was manyyearsago perFromthisviewpoint,
thenatureof educationin
suadedin considering
these and otherpracticalfieldsthatwhat was
neededwas a theory
ofpracticalknowlprecisely
how. Atthattime,moreover,
the
edgeorknowing
locusclassicusforconsideration
ofthistopicwas
thecrucialdistinction
betweenknowingthatand
how
drawn
byGilbertRylein hisimporknowing
tantworkTheConceptofMind? Thekeypurpose
towhichRyleputsthenotionof 'knowing
how' in
hisphilosophy
ofmind,ofcourse,is in countering
the 'intellectualist
legend' of Cartesiantradition
thatintelligent
practiceneedsto be explainedby
to theoccurrence
reference
of an episodeofprior
To
theorizing. mymind,indeed,Ryleonceandfor
all disposes of any seriousattemptto construe
as a matter
ofthe'illumination'
practical
rationality
of blindpracticeby theoretical
principles;given
a
it
be
mistake
think
thatall one
would
to
this,
needsfora fullblowntheory
ofpractical
reasonis
with
to supplement
some
formof
theory
learning
On the debitside,
cognitivedevelopmentalism.
however,it would seem thatRyle subvertsthe
'intellectualist
how
knowing
legend'byconstruing
as morean expression
ofcausallygrounded
po wer
or disposition
thanprincipled
in
reason; short,in
of whatit is for
to
some
sense
attempting provide
practicalknowledgeto be practical,Ryle's work
leaveslessthanclearthesensein whichwe might
wanttoregarditas knowledge.
withRyle,
Given this apparentdifficulty
that
it
seemed
to
me
however, formerly
justsuchan
account-atonceavoidingtheintellectualist
legend
and restoring
therationality
of practice-wasimplicit in the modern revival byv Elizabeth
Anscombe4and othersof Aristotle'sdistinction
between theoreticaland practical reasoning.
theformal
workon thelogicofpractical
Moreover,
as GeorgHenrick
of suchphilosophers
inference
PeterGeach,6and Anthony
von Wright,5
Kenny7
of
seemeda pedagogically
way
identifypromising
ofprocedural
inherent
in
reasoning
ingthepatterns
did
and
skills-one
which
not
crafts
practices,
need to be takenas psychologically
implausibly
oftheconsciousprocessesofagentson
descriptive
eachandeveryoccasionofagency.In lightofsuch

I atonetimeaspiredtoconstrue
views,therefore,
practicalknowledgeas theactivegraspof inferof practicalreasoningfor
entiallyvalidpatterns
themastery
ofskillsofsomelevelofcomplexity;
indeed,I tookitas a keyroleofpracticalreasonof complex
ing to show how theperformance
skills mightbe constructed
froman agent's
ofbasicactions(construed
as
repertoire
precisely
thosepowersor abilitieswhicha normalagent
shouldnotneedtheassistanceofpractical
reason
coherent
to exercise)in a rationally
way.8Itwas
also crucialto thisaccountof practicalknowlofvalidity
forpractical
edgethatthekeycriterion
is nottruth
inference
inthecase
preservation-as
of theoretical
reason-butsome such notionas
fora purpose.'9
'satisfactoriness
this
On
view,thegraspby an agentof a
of practicalreasoning(in deed if notin
pattern
a necessarycondition
of
word)wouldconstitute
to
said
know
how
to
do
-for,in
being
something1
theeventthatsomeonewas able todo something
without
muchin
havinghadto acquireanything
the way of technique,whatwas to thatextent
unlearned
couldhardly
be calledpractical
knowledge. However,as theaccountalso leftopenthe
possibilityof ascribingpracticalknowledgeto
someone with a mentalgrasp of procedural
butno abilitytoperform
a giventask
knowledge,
(forexample,a nowdisabledpianoteacher),the
capacityto reason practicallycould also be
considered
a sufficient
condition
ofknowing
how
a
somewhat
weaker
not
of
the
(in
sense)-though
of
skill.
as
indiFurthermore,already
mastery
thisunderstanding
of
cated,as wellas deploying
practicalknowledgeor knowinghow forthe
a generalaccountofskill
purposeofconstructing
I
to
to
acquisition, sought applyit in particular
of
artistic
aspects
understanding
technique.11
However,it now seemsbeyonddoubtthatany
suchaccountis immensely
and fails
problematic
like fulljusticeto therangeof
to do anything
qualitieswe shouldwanttoassociatewithintelliin suchcomplex
genthumanpractice-especially
realmsof humanactivityas music and other
arts.
performance

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Philosophyof Music Education Review

26
techneandphronesis
Aristotle,
First,such an accountis at best a partial
of thenatureof practicalknowlcharacterization
on thenormawhich-in
focusingexclusively
edge
tivedimensionsof practicalengagement-readily
formal
accommodates
onlythemoregeneralizable
aspectsof skilledpractice. In thisrespect,it is
thatthemainfocusofpreviousworkon
significant
waspurelyon theacquisition
artistic
of
knowledge
routine
or
habitual
well
fairly
techniques-keeping
clearoftheless predictable
creativeand imaginative aspectsof performance.However,to the
extentthatearlierinquiriesfocusedexclusively
on
the normative
dimension,theyaspiredto an accountofpracticalknowledgein termsonlyofthat
modeofrationality
whichAristotle
characterizes
as
techne. Butwhileon thefaceofitAristotle
himselfsuggests
thattechne-'distateofmaking,
involvI2-isthecharacterisinga truecourseofreasoning'
ticmodeofenquiryofartsandcrafts,
itshouldbe
clearthatonlythe mostlimitedformsof human
can be explainedexclusively
in terms
productivity
of techneand that any reflective,
creative,or
mustbe morethan
imaginative
practical
knowledge
technical
Aristotle
himself
knowledge.Moreover,
elsewhere
that
there
are
contexts
suggests
important
ofhumandeliberation
inwhichtechnical
reasoning
somewhat
froman appropriate
value
-prescinding
base-canbe no morethanmere'cleverness',13
and
is clearlyinclinedto hold thatin the absenceof
otherqualitiesand sensibilities
technecan fallwell
shortof the contextually
sensitivejudgmenthe
moregenerallyassociatedwithgenuinepractical
knowledge.But now,thepointis notjust thatan
accountofpracticalreflection
couchedexclusively
in termsof techneis only a partial accountof
morestrongly,
thatany
practicalknowledge-but,
such accountcould not but offera somewhat
distorted
viewoftheplace ofeventechnical
deliberationin the generaleconomyof musicaland
otherpracticalexpertise.
inAristotle'
sNicomachean
However,
Ethics,
techneis contrasted
notonly-asone sorto practical capacity-with
theoretical
butwith
knowledge,
anotherformof practicalunderstanding
to which
Aristotlegives the namephronesisor practical
wisdom.14
Whatdistinguishes
phronesisas a form

of rationality
fromepistemeand at least some
construais
oftechneis itsessentialinextricability
fromtheparticularities
of practicalexperience;
whereastheoretical
andtechnicalknowledgeare
aboveall concerned
withtheframing
of general
laws or principleswhichare applicableto any
conceivableempiricalexperienceirrespective
of
time or place, the knowledgeentrainedby
ofsuchgeneralization
phronesisis unsusceptible
and existentially
tiedto specificcircumstances.
It is essentiallyAristotle'scomplaintagainst
Plato's formofthegoodthatformalconceptsof
justiceand welfare,forexample,are too vague
and open-endedto be of muchpracticaluse in
sub-lunarhumanaffairs,and only make real
senseas appliedtoparticular
circumstances.
Phronesisis thusmorea matter
of experientialcultivationof a repertoire
of situationthan of skill acquisition;
specificsensibilities,
suchsensibilities,
thevaluestheyentrain,
andany
to
which
understanding
theygiverisearenotjust
resistant
tocodification
inthemanner
ofepisteme
and technebut also cruciallyconstitutive
of
personalidentityvia the cultivationof moral
virtues.Buttothatextent
themoraldeliverances
of phronesisarehighlyagent-relative;
themore
a givenvirtueormoralsensibility
is tuned
finely
totheparticularities
ofa specificmoraloccasion,
the more morallyaccurate it is likelyto be.
Moral objectivity
howeverodd it
is, therefore,
a
function
o
morethan
mayseem,
particularity
orgenerality:
themoreI knowabout
universality
someoneand his difficulties,
themoreappropriatelyI can respondto him;themoreI generalize
about him, the less morallyappropriatemy
responsesarelikelytobe. Butitalso followsthat
I cannotacquiresomeoneelse's moralknowledge-atsecondhand,as itwere-asI can acquire
herorhismathematical
or scientific
knowledge;
thereis something
quite ineradicably
personal
about the moral knowledgewhichphronesis
entrains.
Atfirst
itwouldappearthat
however,
sight,
Aristotle'sdistinction
of phronesisfromother
modesofknowledgeintheNicomacheanEthics
is moreor less tantamount
to a distinction
between
of
or
forms knowledge,
activity, endeavor;
onthefaceofit,phronesisstandstomoralunder-

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David Carr

27

enquiry
standingas epistemestandsto scientific
andtechnestandstoartistic
creation
orproduction.
Butifwe takethebasiclogicofhumanactiontobe
intheidea oftakingmeansto ends,itis
exhibited
clearthatany exerciseof practicalknowledgeis
intermsof
liableforappraisalin twoways-either
of themeansor thevalueof the
theeffectiveness
ends-andthis is suggestiveof a moregeneral
ofsome
as a matter
accounto practicalknowledge
That
between
techne.
and
said,
phronesis
interplay
theremay seem no morereasonwhyphronesis
as a modeofknowledge
construed
shouldbe tiedto
moralexperience
as such,thanthereis forsupposing epistemeto be tied exclusivelyto one
science-sayphysics-orforlinkingtechneexclutheimplicaMoreover,
sivelyto carmaintenance.
tionsforprofessional
andother
educational
practice
of the complex interplaybetweenAristotle's
evaluativeandtechnical
haverecently
deliberation
beenexploredingeneralby(amongothers)Joseph
Dunne1
reference
to music
5-and,withparticular
Jane
O'Dea.16
education,
by
The Artisticand theAesthetic
I havealsoelsewhere
triedtoshow
However,
-via criticalattention
toDunne'smagisterial
Back
to theRoughGround-that
Aristotle'sEudemian
analysisof phronesisas a mode of knowledge
seemsto applyjust as wellto artistic
appreciation
of moral
and creationas it does to thecultivation
it
is
in
in
useful
virtue17:
that, particular,
explicating
betweentheartistic
therathervexedrelationship
we mustherebe
andtheaesthetic.Thus,although
briefwithwhatis exploredmorefullyelsewhere,
betweenmoral
fivegeneralfeatures
of similarity
now
be
observed:(i)
and artistic
may
engagement
artisticendeavouris-likemoralconduct-focused
howmorethantheory;
onpracticeandknowing
(ii)
therewould seem to be a broadlyanalogous
in
'phronetic'focuson experiential
particularity
and
thecase of artistic
creation;
(iii)
appreciation
just as moralknowledgeand virtueseemsto be
andarticulawiththeproperexpression
concerned
involvement
withexperitionoffeeling,so artistic
concernwith
enceseemstohavea similarintimate
and knowledge
feeling;(iv) artisticappreciation
can be saidto have,as inthecase ofmoralvirtue,

a significant
effecton personalformation;
(v)
moraland artistic
knowledgeandunderstanding
appearnotablyisomorphicwithregardto the
of virtueto moral
broadlysimilarrelationships
and
art
to
of
aesthetic
the
experience
experience:
cultivation
ofaestheticexperienceseemsnecesofartistic
or
saryforthepromotion
appreciation
ofmoralexpericreativity,
justas thecultivation
ence is necessaryforthe promotionof moral
virtue.
This lastpoint,moreovertakesus to the
heartof thematter.For therelationship
of the
artisticto theaestheticmay be conceivedpreciselyalongthelinesoftheAristotelian
conceptionof the 'phronetic'relationship
of virtueto
naturalmoralresponse. Once again,thisrelato Aristionshipis bestunderstood
byreference
totle'sviewoftherelationship
ofvirtueto moral
therawmaterialout
experience. ForAristotle,
of whichphronesisattemptsto constructthe
virtuesis the everydayroughand tumbleof
naturehas equippedus
association;
interpersonal
witha repertoire
of sensoryand affectiveresponsestotheworld-pleasures,
pains,love,fear,
and
on-which
it
so
is
the
task
ofnurture
in
anger,
theformofparentsandteachers-to
orderin line
withsome defensibleconceptionof individual
andsocialflourishing.
However,theAristotelian
inaccordance
withvirtueought
shapingofnature
not to be construedin termsof instruction
in
truths
orprecepts
ofmorallife,butrather
morein
thoseof the encouragement
and refinement
of
someresponses
anddispositions
andthediscournotextinction-of
others.Thus,the
agement-if
aim ofearlymoraleducationis notso muchthe
inculcation
of a bodyof receivedopinionabout
the natureof morallife-though
this is by no
meansan unimportant
of
moral
education
part
and training-but
the fostering
of a range of
sensibilities
and sensitivities
to thefeelingsand
needs of others,the reinforcement
of positive
attitudes
andattachments
to others,
andthebasic
ofmorepotentially
control
destructive
selfishand
anti-social
tendencies.
Likewise,however,educationin artistic
or appreciation
will dependupon the
creativity
ofan aesthetic
to
priorcultivation
responsiveness
best
in
terms
of
the
cultivaexperience regarded

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Philosophy of Music Education Review

28

of certainhumanpredispositionand refinement
and
to thesensory
tions,sensibilities, sensitivities
A
of
interested
in the
qualities experience. parent
of a child will generally
aestheticdevelopment
proceednotbytellinghimorherthatthisorthatis
beautiful
orugly,butbytraining
powersofsensory
and
discrimination.
Thus,just as itis a
perception
not
a
sufficient-condition
of
necessary-though
thatone has acquiredcertain
moraleducatedness
and empathyfor
practicalpowersof sympathy
not a sufficiothers,it is a necessary-though
ofartistic
ent-condition
educatedness
thatone has
a
certain
of
sensitivities
to the
acquired
repertoire
richness
ofsensory
and aesthetic
experience.This
also explainsthe respectsin which powers of
aestheticdiscrimination
are necessarilypresupto
effective
artistic
orcreativity;
posed
appreciation
if we understandartisticengagementas the
of experiencein accor'phronetic'organization
dancewitha particular
visionor ideal of beauty,
form,or expression,then powers of aesthetic
discrimination
as therawmaterimaybe construed
als upon whichsuch organization
oftenenough
to
work.
this
is
not
to denythat
goes
(Although
thereare formsof art-forexample,conceptual
art-towhichaesthetic
concernsarenotcentral).
Art,Music, and Tradition
thisthatthecapaciHowever,itfollowsfrom
tiesforsensory
discrimination
whichlie attheheart
of aestheticappreciationare not sufficient
for
artisticknowledgeand understanding
precisely
insofar
as theyarenotorganized
inaccordancewith
artistic
vision-andmaywell be, in
anyparticular
anothersenseof discrimination,
quiteindiscriminate. Thus,whatis preciselyneededto acquire
and creativity
is
capacitiesforartistic
appreciation
initiation
into one or moretraditionsof artistic
andendeavour
whichhavesoughttomake
enquiry
humanmeaningof the particularsof aesthetic
andsensibility.Here,tobe sure,itmay
experience
be illuminating
to recall Alasdair Maclntyre's
succinctdefinition
of a tradition-scientific,
moral
or artistic-as'an argumentextendedthrough
time'.18It is in thissense thatwesternclassical
musicis one tradition-despite
radicaland restless
and
of
downthe
developments changes direction

centuries.Thus,whiletherehavecertainly
been
radicalrevolutions
or 'paradigmshifts'in westernclassicaltradition
ofthesortcelebrated
inthe
criticalterminology
of'baroque','romanticism',
'impressionism','neo-classicism',and so on,
thereis nevertheless
to the
important
continuity
extentthattheharmonic
andotherinnovations
of
a Wagner,Debussy,or Schoenbergare barely
intelligibleotherthan as departuresfromor
of earlier'classical' forms.
developments
In thissense,moreover,
it is arguablethat
it
what
owes to western
despite
undoubtedly
classicalmusic,jazz inherits
enoughfromquite
different
Africanand Orientalsourcesto constitute a new musical conversationwith rather
different
termsof 'debate'. Here again, of
the
variousdepartures
fromtraditional
course,
jazz represented
byfirst'swing',then'bop' and
'freejazz', arebestseenas developments
rather
thanbreakswiththejazz tradition
as a whole.
But whatarguablydrivesinnovation,
developin bothclassicalmusicand
ment,andrevolution
jazz is theneedtorealizeorexpresspossibilities
ofaesthetic
and/or
humanexperience
sensibility
in wayswhichdefytheboundariesoftraditional
forms;thedissonancesofWagnerand Debussy,
the serial departuresfromtraditionaldiatonic
harmonyof Schoenberg,and the higherchord
intervaland rhythmic
explorationsof Charlie
Parker,
Dizzy Gillespie,andTheloniusMonkall
appear to have been drivenby aestheticand
needsandaspirations
whichcalledfor
expressive
new or extendedmusicalvocabularies. At all
events,understoodin termsof the mode of
callsphronesis,theoperaknowledgeAristotle
tionsof moraland artistic
reasonand sensibility
seemof a similarorder:just as it is theroleof
phronesisin the moralsphereto forgevirtue
fromthe raw materialsof pre-moralhuman
interpersonal
response,so itstaskin theartistic
sphereis to envisageand forgeexpressive
potentialfromtherawmaterials
of aestheticsensibility.
Moreover,if anyone should still have
doubtsaboutmypresentextensionofthenotion
ofphronesisorpracticalwisdomtothesphereof
artistic
and aestheticendeavour-anotionapparentlydevelopedby Aristotleto contrastmoral

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David Carr

29

judgmentwiththe moretechnicalreasoninghe
thatinhis
is worth
associateswiththearts-it
noting
recent
of
critique
post-modernism,
important
Reason,Truthand Self,MichaelLuntleyactually
deploysan exampleof learningin the sphereof
new
musicin orderto explicateand 'de-relativize'
construais
of practicalmoralreacommunitarian
moral
soning.19It is a problemof contemporary
and social theorythatin orderto discreditthe
andsocio-culturally
dislocated
emotionally
concept
of enlightenment
reason
characteristic
of moral
ethics, so-called communitarian
philosophers20
have developedneo-Aristotelian
conceptionsof
tiedto
phronesiswhichseemmorerelativistically
the contingencies
of particular
social conditions
and circumstances.Luntleyquite convincingly
shows,via reflection
upon whatis involvedin
and skills of a jazz
developingthe sensibilities
judgmentsaboutthe
pianist,thatnon-relativistic
artisticgoodnessor badnessof particular
artists,
are notat all pretheirworks,and performances,
thatparticular
cludedby our recognising
artistic
arequitesocio-historically
worksandperformances
and challenges
conditioned
responsesto problems
at specifictimesand
of local artistictraditions
places.
s choiceofexamplehere,however,
Luntley'
richerandmoretellingthaneven
seemspresently
he appearsto appreciate. For jazz is arguably
it is in
morethana musicor a musicaltradition;
itselfa humanculture.To be moreaccurate,
jazz
from
drawsinspiration
verymanyoftheimmigrant
musicaltraditionsof NorthAmerica-butfew
andcultural
heartland
in
woulddisputeitsspiritual
the'blues'
Americanfolkforms,
Afroparticularly
tradition.
However,thebluesis notjusta musicof
was andis,for
socialbondingandentertainment-it
black communities
long oppressedby appalling
an emoprejudice,and socialprivation,
injustice,
ofa peculiarstoic
tionaloutletandtheembodiment
with
whichsoughttoriseabovesuffering
morality
remarkable
honestyand integrity.Consequently,
a
it is difficult
if not impossibleto disentangle
of
or
vision
of
the
conception experience
particular
musical
worldfromthe oftenveryunorthodox
inwhichitcametobe expressed.Jazz
techniques
derivesmuchof itsmusicalvitality,
undoubtedly
thebluesandthemusic
and
from
integrity, veracity

of even the mostsophisticated

and musically
educatedof modernjazz musicianswill invariablycontainfolkelements-for
example,theuse
ofquarter
tonesandslurs-which
areoftenagainst
the grainof a classicalmusictraining:
indeed,
primersof jazz and blues piano will warnthe
classicallytrainedthattheymayfindtheoften
'unnotatable'
demandsofjazz timing,
phrasing,
andfingering
alienorunnatural.
fairly
Therecan be littledoubt,of course,that
one does not need to be descendedfroman
African
slavetoappreciate
jazz andblues. Asfar
as jazz goes,thoughit drawson blues roots,it
doesnotexclusively
do so andmusiciansfroma
wide range of constituent American
cultures-Afro-American,
Jewish,Italian,Irish,
even native American-wereinvolved in its
creation
from
theoutset.However,itis probably
tounderstand
folk-blues
impossible
jazz fully-or
at ail-without
someunderstanding
of thesocioculturalconditions
in whichit was formed.All
thesame,sincejazz is as mucha product
ofwhite
as ofblackmusicalinspiration-color
is clearly
no
barto playingit. On theotherhand,folkblues
sinceitwas clearly
matter-for,
maybe a different
in
social
circumstances
whichwerethe
forged
unfortunate
of
a
predicament particularethnic
theremayappearto be something
community,
inauthentic
ordishonest
aboutmiddle
peculiarly
class whiteyouthsfromSurreysingingfield
hollersorchaingangsongs.Buttherecaninany
case be no doubtthatlearningto playjazz involves the cultivation
of an entirelydifferent
andsensibilirangeofmusicalhabits,responses,
ties from the learning of other musical
forms-which
makesitdifficult
ifnotimpossible
fora musicianto be equallyfluentin, say,the
languagesof classical and jazz piano; indeed,
musicianswhoattempt
to 'cross-over'areinvariless successfulin one
ably and conspicuously
spherethantheother.
Musical Performance,
Culture,and Identity
The pointis thatany understanding
of
moraland artisticpracticalknowledge(and I
believethattheseareinterestingly
in
connected)
termsof^Arortes/s-particularly
oftherichinter-

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Philosophyof Music Education Review

30
play of the social, the cognitive,and the affective,
of culture,reason, and sensibility,in such knowledge-mustI thinkshow us the finalbankruptcyof
any notions of universal episteme or techne in
eithermoralityor the arts. Moral and artistic
knowledge-howevermuch we take such knowledge to express objective truthswith which we
would have all human beings acquainted-are
nonethelessthe deliverance of experience in its
fine-grained
particularity. Despite this,however,
farfromtherebeing any oppositionbetweenexperientialparticularity
and objectivetruth,I mayonly
come to full understandingof the appalling truth
expressedin a Billie Holiday song insofaras I am
able to enterimaginativelyor empatheticallyinto
thehumanparticularities,
includingthe expressive
musical and otherculturalresources,which occasioned that song. But, since we are here in the
realms of practical knowledge, what goes for
and appreciationmustapply all the
understanding
moreto theacquisitionof moralvirtueand artistic
expertise. Differentinstancesofthatrichinterplay
of cognitionand affectwhich is greatartare liable
to have roots in diverse culturallyindexed traditionsof expressionwhich may share little,if anything,in the way of a common technicalgrammar
or vocabulary. Indeed, what more than likely
inclines us to deny the label of great art to the
stylistic
playfulnessofmuch 'postmodern'artis the
the apparmistakingof eclecticismfororiginality,
entlack of integrity
of what is merelyeclectic and
theshallownessof what is shorton integrity.
Be thisas it may, it should be clear thatthe
particularroutes through experience created or
provided by the performanceand other arts are
liable-even ifwe wantto claim neo-Hegelianlythat
theyare all partialglimpses of one truth-tosome
inconsistencyof practical realization. Here, it is
not just that there is no common set of rules or
techniquesofpianisticengagementwhichmightbe
given here a classical and therea jazz application;
itis rathermoreseriouslythat-insofar
as an artistic
response is one which by definitiongoes beyond
mere rule following-thedevelopmentof artistic
expertiseis notat all well modelled on the idea of
followingrules. In learningto playjazz, then,it is
not that one learns certaintechniquesand in due
coursecomes to experiencethefeelofjazz, butthat

cultivationof a particularrange of aestheticand

emotionalsensibilities-thefeelingforjazz gained
throughlistening,understanding,and appreciation-determineswhat shall count as appropriate
technical responses. Moreover, as we have
already noted, what we are here calling jazz
technique-thatrange of conventionaland personal responsesto theneeds of themusic expressive of jazz feeling-mustcome to be indelibly
in such
printedupon theagencyof theperformer
a way thatplayingin anothermusical stylewould
require conscious re-adjustmentif not actual
physical reconditioning. If practical musical
expertiseis a matterofphysicaladjustmentto the
requirementsof musical meaning,and the creationof musical meaiungis a matterof personalcum-culturalorganizationof aestheticsensibilities and responses in the lightof specifichuman
(perhaps local) experiences, then the physical
adjustmentsrequiredto realise some possibilities
may run counter to those required to realise
others; the route back from musical meaning-classical,jazz, or folk-tomusical capability
may well reach back beneath the skin to affect
the veryphysicalstructureand muscle organization of the musician. Apparentlyrich interplay
between technical, cultural, and experiential
considerationsin therealmsof artin generaland
musicin particularhave surelydeep implications
forquestions of artisticauthenticity
and ownerof
the
kind
which
the
title
of
this paper
ship
raises.
Of coursewe mightwantto insistthatthere
is basic piano technique-mastery
of scales, piano
harmony,and simple coordination-whichare
likely to be required by any pianist, jazz or
classical; indeed, basic classical techniques are
oftenregardedin thisway. However, it may be
just such an assumptionwhich we need to question. Indeed, it may well be thatthereare two
potentialmistakeshereaboutthemusical centralityof classical techniques-andit is possible that
many who have emancipated themselves from
the firstmay yetbe held captive by the second.
Thus, at a 'political' level, one may well have
come to appreciate that the western classical
traditionis only one part of the greatermusical
visionwhichhas to take itsplace alongside other

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David Carr

31

but equally culturally

alternative
valid musical
formsBut,despitethis,onemightstillbe inclined
toholdthatthereis a universal
ofmusical
grammar
which
is
best
in
performance
exemplified classical
which
must
therebyconstitute
techniques-and
foranymusicalperforoptimalmusicaltraining
mancewhatsoever
ofclassi(justas thetechniques
cal ballet have sometimes-quiteproblematiof effective
cally-beenregardedas a precondition
of
form
of
mastery any
dance). However,it has
of
beenthepoint thispaperto arguethatanysuch
idea ofa universal
musicaltechnemaybe no more
than a myth. From thisviewpoint,
my former
to
a
of
attempts develop theory practical
rationality

whichmightbe used to explicatethe general

character
of artisticexpertiseare preyto much
thesamedifficulties
as theabstract
developmental universais
of modernlearningand cognitive
theoryearliercriticized.21It is not just that
intheartsandother
knowledge
genuinepractical
fieldsrequiresthekindof fine-grained
context
specificjudgmentwhichcannotbe capturedin
thegeneralities
of epistemeand techne,butthat
it is indexedto culturalconsiderations
and personal experiences
in wayswhichmaypreclude
any easy or generalanswerto the questionof
whether
whitemencan playtheblues.

NOTES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

David Carr,"Dance,Education,
SkillandBehavioral
JournalofAesthetic
Education,18, no.
Objectives,"
4 (1984): 67-76.
See, for example,variousessays in Richard S.
and Moral Education
Peters,Moral Development
(London:GeorgeAllenandUnwin,198 1).
GilbertRyle,TheConceptofMind(London:Hutchinson,1949).
Intention
G. E. M. Anscombe,
(Oxford:Blackwell,
1957).
and Understanding
G. H. von Wright,
Explanation
(London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul, 1971).
P. T. Geach, Logic Matters(Oxford:Blackwell,
1972).
A. Kenny, Will, Freedom and Power (Oxford:
Blackwell,1975).
Carr,"WhatPlace Has theNotionofa Basic Action
intheTheoryofAcrion?"
/to/0,22,no. 1 (1980): 3951.
a Skill,"JournalofPhilosophy
Carr,"On Mastering
ofEducation,15,no. 1 (1981): 87-96.
Carr,"The Logic of KnowingHow and Ability,"
Mind,88, no. 351 (1979): 394-409.
Carr,"Thoughtand Actionin the Artof Dance,"
British
JournalofAesthetics,
27, no. 4 (1987): 345357.
TheNicomacheanEthics(Oxford:Oxford
Aristotle,
Press,1925),142.
University
Ibid.,157.
Ibid.,section6.
J. Dunne,Back to theRoughGround:'Phronesis'
'
and In Aristotle
and ' Techne inModernPhilosophy
ofNotreDamePress,1993).
Dame:
(Notre
University

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

J. O'Dea, "Phronesisin Musical Performance,"

JournalofPhilosophy
ofEducation,27, no.2 ( 1993):
233-243.
Carr,"Art,PracticalKnowledgeandAesthetic
ObjecRatio,12,no. 3 (1999): 240-256.
tivity,"
A. C. Maclntyre,
AfterVirtue(NotreDame: Notre
Dame Press,1981).
M. Luntley,
andSelf:ThePostmodern
Reason,Truth
Reconditioned
(London:Routledge,1995).
See Maclntyre,
and C. Taylor,Sources
AfterVirtue,
oftheSelf:TheMakingoftheModernIdentity
(CamPress,1989).
bridge:CambridgeUniversity
Carr, "Is Teaching a Skill?" in R. Curren,ed.,
ofEducation1999(Urbana,IL: PhilosoPhilosophy
phyofEducationSociety,2000).

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