Updated Nov 14, 2014

Wenjun Ma
CONTACT
INFORMATION

RESEARCH

One Shields Ave.

Department of Economics
University of California, Davis
Davis, CA, 95616

Phone: +1(530)-220-3090
Email: wma@ucdavis.edu
Website: wenjunma8.weebly.com
Citizenship: P. R. China

Contract Theory, Game Theory, Experimental Economics

INTERESTS
EDUCATION

University of California, Davis

Ph.D., Economics, Expected June 2015
Dissertation: Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracting
Advisors: Burkhard Schipper (chair), Giacomo Bonanno, Martine Quinzii, Joaquim Silvestre
London School of Economics, London, United Kingdom
M.Sc., Economics,
Renmin University of China, Beijing, China
B.A., Economics,

September, 2007
September, 2006

JOB MARKET

Indescribable Contingencies versus Unawareness and Incomplete Contracting. With Burkhard

PAPER

Schipper.
Maskin and Tirole (1999) postulated that even though agents may not foresee physical properties of
future contingencies, they are at least able to foresee payoff consequences. They proved that such
indescribability of physical contingencies does not constrain contracting under symmetric
information in the well-known buyer-seller model. We generalize Maskin and Tirole's result to
asymmetric information with an extension of Bayesian implementation that allows for uncertainty
also about sets of available outcomes. Our contributions are as follows: First, we introduce a quite
general buyer-seller model with asymmetric information throughout the contracting relationship,
which may be of independent interest. Second, we show in a precise sense that for every such
buyer-seller model with describable physical contingencies there is an isomorphic buyer-seller model
with indescribable contingencies. Third, we generalize Maskin and Tirole's result to asymmetric
information throughout the contracting relationship. To prove this results, we extent Bayesian
implementation a la Mookerjee and Reichelstein (1990) from just incomplete information about
payoffs to include also incomplete information about sets of available outcomes. Fourth, we take
issue with Maskin-Tirole's postulate that agents are magically able to exactly forecast payoff
contingencies even when they cannot forecast physical contingencies (which among others also
means that risk attitudes are not affected by the fact that physical contingencies are indescribable).
We show by example that unawareness of contingencies is welfare-relevant despite the fact that
players are otherwise fully rational. These findings suggest the following interpretation:
Indescribability of physical contingencies is welfare-irrelevant for contracting as long as agents are
sufficiently aware of the contingencies so that they can precisely forecast payoff consequences.

RESEARCH

Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts - an Experimental Approach

IN PROGRESS

This series of lab experiments is designed in order to test how subjects interact in the contracting
game, whether the prediction of the contracting theory in economics is practiced by participants, and
whether a designed mechanism can implement the same outcomes as the contract.

TEACHING
EXPERIENCE

University of California, Davis

Teaching Assistant
Department of Economics: Intermediate Macroeconomics, Economics of Education,
Industrial Organization, Topics in Macroeconomics, Public Microeconomics, International Trade,
Economic History of the United States since the Civil War.
Graduate School of Management: Supply Chain Planning and Management.
Instructor
UC Davis Extension: Economics for visiting students from Hosei University, Japan.

AWARDS AND

University of California, Davis. Graduate fellowship, 2014-2015.

SCHOLARSHIPS

University of California, Davis. Non-resident tuition fellowship, 2009-2011.

Renmin University of China. Academic Performance Scholarship, 2002-2006.
Renmin University of China. Department of Economics, Jingying Award, 2005.

PRESENTATIONS

University of California, Davis. Microeconomics Theory Brown Bag series, Fall, 2014.
University of California, Davis. Microeconomics Theory Brown Bag series, Spring, 2011.

SERVICE

Graduate Student Mentor 2009-2010

SOFTWARE

STATA, Eviews, MATLAB, LaTex, Microsoft Office,

SKILLS
LANGUAGES

Mandarin (native), English (fluent)

REFERENCES

Professor Burkhard Schipper, Dissertation Chair

AVAILABLE TO

Email: bcschipper@ucdavis.edu

CONTACT

One Shields Ave. Department of Economics, University of California, Davis, CA 95616

Professor Giacomo Bonanno
Email: gfbonanno@ucdavis.edu
One Shields Ave. Department of Economics, University of California, Davis, CA 95616
Professor Martine Quinzii
Email: mmquinzii@ucdavis.edu
One Shields Ave. Department of Economics, University of California, Davis, CA 95616
Professor Joaquim Silvestre
Email: jbsilvestre@ucdavis.edu
One Shields Ave. Department of Economics, University of California, Davis, CA 95616