LIN HU

http://linhuweb.weebly.com

Contact Information:
Department of Economics
Washington University in St. Louis
336 Seigle Hall, One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
linhu@wustl.edu
(602) 909-6756
Employment:
Washington University in St Louis, 2014 to present
Postdoc Research Fellow
Education:
PhD, Economics, Arizona State University, 2014
Thesis Title: Essays on Political Economy
MPhil, Economics, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
BA and BSc, Economics and Mathematics, Wuhan University
Other Education:

Empirical Implication of Theoretical Models, University of Chicago, Summer 2011
Department of Politics, New York University (Visiting), Spring 2012
Research Fields:
Political Economy, Applied Microeconomics
Teaching Experience:
Instructor, Undergraduate Level, Washington University in St. Louis:
Spring 2015
Political Economy
Instructor, Undergraduate Level, Arizona State University:
Summer 2010
Microeconomic Principles
Teaching Assistant, PhD Level, Arizona State University:
Fall 2013, 2010
Microeconomic Analysis I (PhD), Professor Edward Schlee
Spring 2011
Microeconomic Analysis II, Professor Madhav Chandrasekher
Spring 2012
Game Theory, Professor Amanda Friedenberg

Teaching Assistant, Undergraduate Level, Arizona State University:

Spring 2013
Intermediate Microeconomics Theory (Grader), Professor Ying Chen
Game Theory & Economic Behavior (Grader), Professor Ying Chen
Public Economics (Grader), Professor Dan Silverman
Fall 2012
Industrial Organization (Grader), Professor John McDowell
Fall 2011
Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory (Grader), Professor Galina Vereshchagina
Spring 2009, 2010 Microeconomic Principles, Professor Nancy Roberts
Fall 2008, 2009
Macroeconomic Principles, Professor Matthew Croucher
Professional Activities:
Presentations:
2014
North American Summer Meeting of Econometric Society, Annual Meeting of
Midwest Political Science Association, Washington University in St. Louis, Royal
Holloway University of London, Carnegie Mellon University
2013

Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association

2011

Empirical Implication of Theoretical Models, University of Chicago

Referee:
Public Choice, Journal of Economic Theory
Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008-Present

Rondthaler Award (Outstanding Performance on Dissertation Research)

NSF Funded Empirical Implication of Theoretical Models Fellowship
Microeconomics Student Assistant Award, Arizona State University
Hardison Award (Outstanding Performance on the Macroeconomic Qualifying
Exam), Arizona State University
Graduate Assistantship, Arizona State University

Working Papers:
Ideology vs. Pork: Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Systems (Job Market Paper)
In parliamentary democracies, the executive branch consists of a set of parties, called the Government. Across
parliamentary democracies, Governments differ in both the composition of the Government and government outcomes.
This paper asks how parliamentary characteristics and institutions influence the composition of the Government and
government outcomes. It addresses this question through structural estimation. Toward this end, it builds a model of
government formation in parliamentary democracies, where parties care about and bargain over both policy and office
benefits. It estimates the model using data from western European parliamentary democracies. It uses the estimated
model to conduct counterfactual experiments by varying institutions. The results have a number of important
implications for institutional reform. First, within parliamentary democracies, a stable government may come with
policies that are far afield from voters' policy preferences. So it is critical to evaluate a given institutional reform based
on both the policy consequences and the duration of the Government. Second, there are important synergies between
institutional rules. Whether adding a particular institution improves or worsens government outcomes often depends on
the broader institutional environment.

Work in Progress:
Legislative Bargaining with Endogenous Proposal Power
Are high quality politicians more likely to have proposal power? I address this question by building a formal model, in
which legislators are more likely to have proposal power when they bring a larger expected future budget to the table.

In the model, if legislators have proposal power, then on average they get a higher level of pork for their districts (in
equilibrium). If they are high quality legislators, this implies that they are more likely to bring in more tax revenue, i.e.
bring in a larger budget for the following year. I first consider a benchmark case, in which a legislator can only invest
pork in one project. I show that a high quality legislator is more likely to be recognized as the proposer. I then consider
an alternative setting, in which a legislator can invest pork in multiple projects with different risk levels. I show that a
high quality legislator may be less likely (than a low quality legislator) to be recognized as the proposer.
Voters and Governments: The Impact of Voters on Coalition Formation
This paper views voters decisions as an endogenous component of the coalition formation process. It seeks to
understand how voter diversity influences the composition of coalitions and coalitional outcomes. This project is a
follow up to Ideology vs. Pork: Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Systems. Unlike the previous paper, this project
endogenizes voters' electoral decisions. Thus, the paper can speak to the effect of parliamentary characteristics and
institutions on welfare, based on the ideological make-up of voters.

References:
Professor Amanda Friedenberg (Advisor)
Department of Economics
Arizona State University
Amanda.Friedenberg@asu.edu
(480) 727-7943

Professor Hector Chade

Department of Economics
Arizona State University
Hector.Chade@asu.edu
(480) 727-4714

Professor Alejandro M. Manelli

Department of Economics
Arizona State University
Alejandro.Manelli@asu.edu
(480) 965-4682

Professor Berthold Herrendorf

Department of Economics
Arizona State University
Berthold.Herrendorf@asu.edu
(480) 965-1462