Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 144 (1988), 332-342 ZeitachriN flr die geumte Stantewissenschaft Historical School and “Methodenstreit”” by Kare HAuser* No one would remember the old German Historical School if it were not for the famous Methodenstreit. Actually, no one remembers them anyway. There must be @ lesson in that. F. R. Sorow [1985], p. 328 1. Exposition It might be appropriate to begin with a question: How could it happen that in Germany Schmoller has been outstanding, if not dominant in his time whereas today students in Germany neither know one of his works nor what Schmoller really means? Even more, some of them do not even know his name. But to blame students means to blame professors as well, for students always tend to learn what they are told it is essential to learn and ignore what professors ignore, To be sure, most of our colleagues disregard the history of economic thought and in particular those parts which are not, what one might call, market efficient. This is certainly true for Schmoller and the “historische Schule”. Yet, Schmoller influenced and stimulated economics in nineteenth century Germany more than anybody else and he vigorously treated one of the most fundamental questions for economic science: the nature of economics as a body of knowl- edge, as well as the consequent and genuine methods of economic research. As Schmoller’s name, if any, is mostly associated with this crucial question, disput- eda 100 years ago in the ““Methodenstreit”, a battle which went on for many years, it should be reconsidered on occasion of the 150th anniversary of his birthday, at least. But before starting it might be reasonable to describe the trends in economics which eventually led to the emergence of a “Methaden- Streit”. Obviously scholarship (Wissenschaft) cannot develop independently from its time. Hence, the forces shaping an era — its Zeitgeist, dominant doctrines, events — influence not only the subject matter and the direction of intellectual * Lam very grateful to Wolfgang F. Stolper who did me the favor of translating this article into English.144/3 (1988) Historical School and "'Methodenstreit” 533. and scientific endeavor, but also the manner of thinking about it, as each age choses different paradigms, analogies and methods of scientific work. 2. The Scenery The historical arena for the Methodenstreit is the last quarter of the past century. The formative influences of this age, and particularly the second half of the century, were nationalism and the idea of the nation state, bourgeoisie and labor movement, economic development and industrial revolution, liberal- ization and the “religion of freedom” (Croce), science and belief in progress, technology and rationalism. Influences of these kinds may be observed also in our science, both with respect to the subject matter and the methodology chosen. At the time of the Methodensireit, economics was not yet established as a discipline and was only on the way to independence. Economic studies knew neither final exams nor diplomas, and not at all the profession of the econo- mist. Even in England and Scotland where, according to a long-held view, political economy first became an independent subject, chairs of economics were only gradually established during the past century.? Long after Adam Smith, the discipline which traces itself back to him had to appear in the cloth of other sciences and was taught, for example, by chairs of moral philosophy (Mill). In Europe, however, economics was not yet part of the canon of the traditional faculties which knew only theology, jurisprudence, philosophy and later medicine, natural sciences and engineering. Except for theology? and medicine* it could arise from almost any of the “classical” disciplines. 3. Different Origins of Political Economy And this was indeed the case. Economics is a bastard, a creature of uncertain ancestry. At times it appeared to be a child of philosophy, at other times one of jurisprudence, and later also a daughter of the natural sciences. Philosoph- ical, legal and natural science elements can be traced not only to the family tree The German expression “Okonom’* was throughout the 19th century widely used for someone irained in agriculture and exercising an agrarian profession. 2 ‘As far as I know the first chair for economics in the British Isles was the chair for history and economics at the newly founded East Indian College in Haileybury in 1805 and Malthus was its occupant. 3 However, Galiani and Tugot had studied theology, and it is well known that during the middle ages theology discussed intensively the just price (justum pretium) and interest Malthus, too, was a pastor before receiving his professorship. See footnote 2. * Medicine, too, provided famous economists, so Quesnay.534 Karl Hauser OME but can be proven to influence it to this day, There is just the same general agreement that the English variant of economics committed itself primarily to. the method of the natural sciences. But this development did not occur every- where at the same time, and on the European continent not without strong resistance. The debate about the path economics should take led in Germany and Austria later to the famous Methodenstreit. The three disciplines which are the ancestors of economics — philosophy, law and natural sciences — were from the very beginning more strictly separated from each other in German universities than ever was the case in England. In this respect there was no difference between German and Austrian and almost all continental-European universities. Here we are interested at first only in the different nature of the German and English universities because it draws atten- tion to the fact that the mixed origins of economics led to greater tensions in Germany and Austria than in England. The distinction between the disciplines existed here as there. But institutionally the separation developed in different ways. The German universities were from the beginning constructed on the principle of faculties, the English on the college-system. The faculties live in the colleges under the same roof, they belong to the same body of a scientific community. Who lives and teaches in a college remains in constant touch with other disciplines. This was and still is true to a much greater extent than for universities of the continental type. During the period in which we are interest- ed, students of a college were almost always simultaneously taught in different disciplines and it was selfevident that studies included several disciplines de- pending on the interest and profession aims of the students. Adam Smith, for example, had studied in Glasgow mathematics, classical philology and philos- ophy and perfected the last named disciplines in Oxford. Malthus dedicated himself to the study of the natural sciences but also mathematics and languages (including even German); Mill, though not educated in a college, was, as is well known, a Wunderkind in several disciplines at the same time; the same may be said of Edgeworth who was educated at Oxford, while Marshall tended primar- ily towards mathematics, classical philology and theology. Even Keynes, who actually studied economics, divided his interest in economics with his inclina- tions for mathematics, politics, history and the fine arts. Thus, anyone who as a college student devoted himself a century ago to economics could acquire a broad knowledge of other disciplines. The academic disciplines were thus in England much closer to each other than on the continent. It was quite different in Germany or Austria where economics predominantly grew out of jurisprudence or philosophy. Until Menger, incidentally, German and Austrian economics were identical. Only Menger and the Methodenstreit has separated them, though not in principle. This was also the time of the founding of the German Reich. Until then all German speaking countries were culturally a unit not only in music and literature but also in the sciences and they formed particularly in economics a “Common Market”. F. A. Hayek even thought that “Austria had practically no economics of its own during the first144/3 (1988) Historical School and “‘Methodenstreit” 535 half of the 19th century. At the universities at which Menger studied, political economy was tought as part of jurisprudence and mostly by German Schol- ars”.> MENGER [1934] even dedicated his famous Grundsdtze der Volks- wirthschaftslehre to the ‘‘Kéniglich-sdchsische Hofrath Dr. Wilhelm Roscher... in achtungsvoller Verekrung”’. Unlike at the English universities where econom- ics has, for the reason alluded to, remained in much closer contact with the other and particular the exact sciences, at German and Austrian universities a neighborly relationship hardly ever developed. Even the natural sciences had to wait a long time until they were recognized in the traditional educational canon of German universities. As a result, the different orientations had to clash more violently with each other in Germany and Austria than in other countries. In the German-speaking countries economics began most frequently as cameral- ism and thus as a legal sub-discipline — a long list of important cameralists may be cited as proof — but it found also early a political and political-philosophical expression — Hegel, Fichte, A. Miller, later also List, Marx, Rodbertus - and only in isolated cases the mathematical-scientific direction which is dominat today (von Hermann, Thiinen, Gossen). The legal, philosophical and scientific roots of economics can be traced also in other countries — the legal roots particularly easily in France and Italy, e.g. to Montequieu, Bodin, Verri and Beccaria; the philosophical roots appear most impressively in England with Locke, Hume, Smith, Mill, and in France and Italy with, among others, Mirabeau and Galliani; and the scientific roots once again in England and France with Petty and later Quesnay - but the legal tradition was at least dominant, if no solely in possession in Germany and in the German speaking countries in the guise of cameralism. Cameralism was the German-Austrian version of mercantilism. It is due to cameralism, that the first chairs for economics were established in Germany and Austria almost a century before the British Isles®, But the price was that economics very long, even too long, remained beholden to this tradition. 4. Characteristics of Political Economy in Austria and Germany Two characteristics of cameralism have played a decisive role for German speaking economics up to Schmoller and beyond: the primarily etatistic orien- tation of the economy and the closeness to law and. political science. Both tendencies reinforced each other in the view that the basic raison d’étre of the economy was the state and the common good. Aspects of individual economic agents and the related theory, were considered only to the extent that they were considered useful to the general good. Thus German economics from early 3 Tn the Introduction to MENGER [1968], p. XI. © The first two chairs of economics — chairs of cameralistics — were established in 1723 in Halle and 1727 in Frankfurt an der Oder.144/3 (1988) Historical School and “‘Methodenstreit” 535 half of the 19th century. At the universities at which Menger studied, political economy was tought as part of jurisprudence and mostly by German Schol- ars”.> MENGER [1934] even dedicated his famous Grundsdtze der Volks- wirthschaftslehre to the ‘‘Kéniglich-sdchsische Hofrath Dr. Wilhelm Roscher... in achtungsvoller Verekrung”’. Unlike at the English universities where econom- ics has, for the reason alluded to, remained in much closer contact with the other and particular the exact sciences, at German and Austrian universities a neighborly relationship hardly ever developed. Even the natural sciences had to wait a long time until they were recognized in the traditional educational canon of German universities. As a result, the different orientations had to clash more violently with each other in Germany and Austria than in other countries. In the German-speaking countries economics began most frequently as cameral- ism and thus as a legal sub-discipline — a long list of important cameralists may be cited as proof — but it found also early a political and political-philosophical expression — Hegel, Fichte, A. Miller, later also List, Marx, Rodbertus - and only in isolated cases the mathematical-scientific direction which is dominat today (von Hermann, Thiinen, Gossen). The legal, philosophical and scientific roots of economics can be traced also in other countries — the legal roots particularly easily in France and Italy, e.g. to Montequieu, Bodin, Verri and Beccaria; the philosophical roots appear most impressively in England with Locke, Hume, Smith, Mill, and in France and Italy with, among others, Mirabeau and Galliani; and the scientific roots once again in England and France with Petty and later Quesnay - but the legal tradition was at least dominant, if no solely in possession in Germany and in the German speaking countries in the guise of cameralism. Cameralism was the German-Austrian version of mercantilism. It is due to cameralism, that the first chairs for economics were established in Germany and Austria almost a century before the British Isles®, But the price was that economics very long, even too long, remained beholden to this tradition. 4. Characteristics of Political Economy in Austria and Germany Two characteristics of cameralism have played a decisive role for German speaking economics up to Schmoller and beyond: the primarily etatistic orien- tation of the economy and the closeness to law and. political science. Both tendencies reinforced each other in the view that the basic raison d’étre of the economy was the state and the common good. Aspects of individual economic agents and the related theory, were considered only to the extent that they were considered useful to the general good. Thus German economics from early 3 Tn the Introduction to MENGER [1968], p. XI. © The first two chairs of economics — chairs of cameralistics — were established in 1723 in Halle and 1727 in Frankfurt an der Oder.44/3 (1988) Historical School and ‘‘Methodenstreit” 537 principle of German philosophy. It was not utilitarianism which ruled, but German philosophy, which tended to overemphasize the state. The powerful romantic movement which really looked backwards and was interested more in the medieval than the modern world, could hardly be favorable to liberalism. To be sure, there were romantic movements also in England and elsewhere, but in German intellectual life they gave direction not only to literature and the fine arts, but also to the humanities. This could not fail to influence economic theory which only in the first half of the past century began to develop as an academic discipline, and was at that time but a small branch of the humanities. As is well known, the history of economic thought does indeed know a toman- tic school of economics. But it remainded without offspring, and did not help to found the historical school, though it might at most have favored it. 5. Historism More important than romanticism for the development of sciences was the subsequent historism, which had one of its roots in romanticism. It not only influenced the content but at the same time the methodology. By its nature, historism understood the world of man as the result of history and thereby interpreted it in a relativist manner. All institutions, activities and events are put into their historic constellations and are thus unique. It is, therefore, impossible for man, and for human phenomena to follow fixed unchanging laws because everything depends on everything else and the world changes all the time. Human phenomena can be explained and understood only on the basis of their historical conditions. Methodologically, historism demanded the consideration of the special case. This in turn demanded a primarily descriptive method which could do justice to each individual characteristic. Hence historism condemned all speculative procedures and — outside of the natural sciences — renounced all general theories to explain the dependence of one magnitude on another and in general to apply any models. This conception of historism influenced not only the historic scholarship which blossomed in Germany during the first half of the last century and which became increasingly influential. It influenced also the other humanities including theology and even the fine arts. Historism became particularly important for jurisprudence in which the name of the great legal scholar Savigny stands for what can be characterized as a “Historical School” already decades before it arose in economics. Its influence on the subsequent (older) historical school of economics is unmistakable. It nevertheless was not the decisive influence. The leading intellectual power in Germany at the time was certainly philosophy. Philosophy had to provide the decisive impulses if historism was to succeed. It is, of course, beyond my competence to describe how historism arose among the philosophers, or that a straight road led from Kant via Hegel to historism. A few hints may suffice to suggest that such a road, albeit not a538 Karl Hauser JMNE straight one, could have existed. At the same time, Kant and German idealism moved philosophy in a direction which was certainly metaphysical, and thus might have favored theorizing, but which at the same time wanted to be enlightening and thus also pledged to progress. The belief in progress propelled and animated almost all sciences. It not only provided them with the power by which, during the past century, the German universities achieved the rank and. dignity worthy of a world power. It also led to a faith in science which has encountered limits only in our time, limits within which science is to be con- fined. Idealistic thinking, faith in science, and the orientation towards develop- ments, as well as emphasis on uniqueness: those have formed the historical context and have made history into a respected discipline. With Hegel history received even the stature of “objective spirit’. Historical reality is not under- stood as a special case or as a snapshot but as the result and expression of powers which it has brought about. The moving influences can be studied and recognized only through this reality. History gets in this manner the key role and historism is the workshop which can produce such keys. Nipperdey corre- spondingly entitles a section of his book on Germany History which itself has a humanist view point, as “The Revolution of Historism and the Development of the Humanities” '° which deals in detail with the intellectual tendencies which we have only hinted at. The blossoming of universities and the sciences benefited in Germany the historic sciences to an extent which has been unique. It may suffice to list a few representative names from the first half of the last century, such as Boeckh, Dahimann, Droysen, Humboldt, Niebuhr, Ranke and the brothers Grimm. The list may easily be extended during the second half of the century, (though in fact the names overlap the two halves) with such names as Delbriick, Har- nack, Meyer, Mommsen, Oncken, Sybel, Treitschke etc. Frequently history was combined with other sciences, with philosophy, philology, theology, jurispru- dence and so on. It is therefore not surprising that economics, too, succumbed to the attraction and fascination of history. Even Menger who later started the Methodenstreit and who led the attack on historism in economics paid his respects not only by the already mentioned dedication of his Grundsdtze to Roscher, but also later in his major contribution to the Methodenstreit in his “Untersuchungen tiber die Methode der Sozialwissenschaften und der Politischen Gkonomie insbesondere” '* (Investigations Into the Methods of the Social Sci- ences and of Political Economy in Particular). He deals in this book respectfully and tactfully with the founders of historism, the older historical schoo! with Roscher, Hildebrandt and Knies. Later on, his whole ire is directed towards Schmoller who had criticized Menger's “Untersuchungen”. Only in his second 10 See NIPPERDAY [1983], p. 49817. 1 of Mencer [1883]. This book appeared in Leipzig 1883 with Duncker and Hum- blot, the publisher of Schmoller!144/3 (1988) Historical School and “Methodenstreit” 539 pamphlet “Die Irrtiimer des Historismus” (The Errors of Historism) MENGER [1884] becomes polemical. Schmoller did not answer this second attack. The summary is the recognition that the intellectual development in Ger- many was favorable to historism and even had to give birth to it. It certainly did not spring from the head of a particular overpowering spirit but developed as a historic movement of an age which finally enveloped all humanities. But was it inevitable that it also enveloped economics? Is economics a humanity? Where does economics belong, whose child is it? This is ultimately the question which underlies the Meshodensireit. 6. The Relevance of the Methodenstreit Menger’s second magnum opus of about 300 pages, the Untersuchungen, which. was published in 1883 after years of work marshalled the whole breath and power of his arguments for the debate which it started. The Methodenstreit was thus not started by an accidentally fired shot but by a deliberate full salvo. Gustav SCHMOLLER [1883] immediately recognized the threat to the historical school and answered it in a most serious manner. Menger’s rejoinder, the “Trrtiimer des Historismus” is generally judged to be exaggerated, polemical and substantively repeating earlier arguments. The main battle was thus fought at the very beginning. But peace was never concluded, and the cannonades of ongoing fightings in different battlefields remained to be heard for another decade and a half? The judgement of later contemporaries tend to declare Menger the victor, Schmoller the loser. Paradoxically, history appears to have decided against the historical school. But is history not rewritten again and again and always differently? The enmity between the two protagonists which was partly inherited by their students reminds one of the enmity of two closely related families. This may sound unconvincing because the opposing standpoints seem to be irreconcil- able. But Schmoller's views were less one-sided and antitheoretical than the history of economic thought usually describes them. His friendship with the physicist Hermann von Helmholtz or the fact that he saw to it that J. St. Mill, whom he admired, received an honorary doctorate from Halle/Wittenberg, his university at the time, are cleare symptoms of Schmoller’s openness towards other sciences.’ Menger on his part came from the German tradition which he 1 ‘The history of the Methodenstreit knows main and side theaters of war and has by no means remained a debate between Menger and Schmoller. Schmoller’s earlier review of the third volume of A. Wagner's Finanzwissenschaft anticipated individual arguments of the Methodenstreit which later reappear in the controversy between the two main combatants. Later, not only students of Schmoller but also such outsiders as W. Som- bart and M. Weber take part in the debate. ‘3 This is taken from the most thorough newer account of the Methodenstreit by HANSEN [1968].540 Karl Hauser DOE did not simply reject. The differences in their views about ‘the nature of our science, its tasks and its limits” (Menger) are certainly much smaller than is commonly supposed. Menger, too, was convinced “that economic theory as derived from Adam Smith and his students lacks assured bases, and that even the most elementary problems of economics have not found a satisfactory solution”.'* Menger thus agreed with the criticisms of the classical school by the historical school and he certainly recognized the justification and impor- tance of descriptive and historic scholarship. On the other hand he demanded “a reform of political economy” as a “science of the laws of the economy”.'* Schmoller on his part, far from trying to do without theory, went even further than Menger in demanding that “The practical purpose is prediction and with it the practical domination of reality”.!* The frequently found reproach that the historical school is hostile to theory*’ goes certainly too far, because the institutional school never gave up its claim to general knowledge and theory but only hoped to acquire it by other and more perfect means than would be possible for the Austrian school. The aim to achieve generally valid statements about reality could not be reached by isolated procedures, by “Robinson stories”, No axiomatic theory and partial analysis could do justice to reality but only a structure of thought that included social phenomena. The basis for this had to be built by wide-reaching empirical-historic studies. To this extent the pretensions of the historical school went very much further than those of the Austrian school which Schmoller reproached for not giving ‘“‘a theory of the general nature of the economy” but of having limited itself ‘essentially to the theories of value, price, income distribution and money”’®. The historical school certainly overreached itself with this claim to which it never could do justice. But the basic problem with which it grappled in vain — the overcoming of special isolating methods - has after a century gained a new importance. When during recent years it turned out that the hopes in the progress of economic theories were unfulfilled, hopes that it would be possible to steer the course of an economy on the basis of operational theories, the old problems concerning the possibilities and limits of economic theory were once again posed, The Methodenstreit does not, to be sure, give useful answers to these questions. It did, however, raise the perennial question about the com- petence and adequate methods of our science. Once again we are confronted with the “unfinished social sciences’? which remind us of Max Weber's dictum that economics, too, belonged to those disciplines which are destined for ‘4 So in the Foreword in Mencer [1883], p. XIII. 43 MenGeER [1883], pp. VIII, XVIII. 16 SCHMOLLER [1949], p. 68. 17 See, far example, ScuceER [1962], pp. 295¢f. 18 ScHMOLLER [1983], p. 39 In TeNBRUCK 1984. the Shite ina uta ‘of social sciences including econom- ics, but also the methodological problems are dealt with in a most original manner.14/3 (1988) Historical School and “‘Methodenstreit”™ S41 eternal youth because the same questions are always posed anew and always require new answers. The most recent past gives many examples of how earlier explanations must after only a few years be turned on their head if a “cor- rect” answer is to be given, as for example, the explanation of the course of the Dollar exchange rate, stock exchanges, interest rates, raw material prices, deregulation and regulation, with their counterpart of alternative theories, such as Keynesianism and supply side economics, fiscalism and monetarism, market failure and government failure, theories of information and market efficiency etc. The disquiet about the worth and reliability of our science may be more widespread on the old, culturally pessimistic continent than in the New World in which the faith in progress and science seems relatively unbroken. But the conflict of “The Two Cultures” ?°, though not identical with the questions posed by the Methodensireit, shows in an impressive manner that the borders between the natural sciences and the humanities may still separate different worlds and that the course of the border remains unclear. Economics lies on a border area between the two worlds. It has in the meantime taken its methods from one of the worlds while its problems belong to the other. For, all economic processes are historic and thus singular in nature. From this results the dilemma of economic theory which cannot foreswear abstractions and which must there- fore chose and decide what is essential and what may be neglected. The histo- rian, too, must write history in this manner. Economic analysis requires just as much intuition, insight and wide knowledge, as it does the professional tech- niques of dealing with the data. As far as the historic component of our science is concerned, we are emphat- ically directed to the demands of the historic school to the extent that it demanded that economics should include, or be based on, an enlarged theory of society. In a different manner and in other words, no less a scholar than J. M. Keynes in his memorial of Alfred Marshall formulated the requirements which must be demanded from a good economist: “He must reach a high standard in several different directions and must combine talents not often found together. He must be mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher — in some degree. He must understand symbols and speak in words. He must contemplate the particular in terms of the general, and touch the abstract and concrete in the same flight of thought. He must study the present in the light of the past for the purposes of the future. No part of man’s nature or his institutions must lie entirely outside his regard”. ?! This seems to be precisely what Schmoller and the Historische Schule had in mind when they wanted political economy to be treated as a social science (“‘Sozialwissenschaft”). 2° As is well known, Snow started an avalanche with his lecture in 1959 on The Two Cultures. On the reactions to his lecture see the comments in Kreuzer [1987]. 2 See Keynes [1951], p. 141.542 Karl Hauser OWE References EnceLHorn, W. (ed.) [1975], Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Universisdt Wirzburg (375-1975, Wirzburg. Hansen, R. [1968], “Der Methodenstreit in den Sozialwissenschaften zwischen Gustay ‘Schmoller und Carl Menger, seine wissenschaftliche und wissenschafistheoretische Bedeutung”, in: Beitrdge zur Entwicklung der Wissenschaftsthearie im 19. Jahr- sundert, Meisenheim a. Gl. Keynes, J. M. (1951), Essays in Biography, New York. Kreuzer, H. (ed.) [1987], Die zwei Kulturen — literarische und naturwissénschafiliche Intelligenz — C. P. Snows These in der Diskussion, Miinchen. Mencer, C. [1883], Untersuchungen aber die Methode der Sozialwissenschafien und der Politischen Gkanomie inshesondere, Leipzig. —— [1884], Die Jrrtiimer des Historismus, Wien. ~~ [1934], Grundsdtze der Volkswirthschaftslehre, Miinchen. —— [1968], Gesammette Werke, ed. by F. A. Hayek, Vol. I, 2nd edition, Tibingen. Nuprerpey, T. [1983], Deutsche Geschichte 1800—1866, Munchen. Swrrn, A. [1978], Der Wohlstand der Nationen, ibersetzt von H.C. Recktenwald, Miinchen. SCHMOLLER, G. [1883], “Zur Methodologie der Staats- und Sozialwissenschaften™, Jahrbuch fiir Geseizgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich, 7, 965-994. —— [1949], Die Vatkswirtschaft, die Volkswirtschaftslehre und die Methode, Heppenheim. ScHNEWeR, E. [1962], Einfihrung in die Wirtschaftstheorie, Part [V, Vol. I, Tibingen, Scememmer, E. [1985], Zur Geschichte und Gegenwart der wirtschaftswissenschafflichen Fakultdt und ihrer Institute an der Universitdt Heideiberg, Heidelberg. Snow, C. P. [1959], The Two Cultures, Cambridge. Sotow, F. R. [1985], “Economic History and Economics”, American Economic Review, ‘Papers and Proceedings, 75, 328-331. STIEDA, W. [1978], Die Nationalékonomie als Universitdtswissenschafi, Vaduz. TeNnaRucK, F. H. [1984], Die unbewdiltigten Sozialwissenschaften, Graz, Wien und Koln. Professor Dr. Karl Hauser Institut fiir Kapitalmarkiforschung Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitat Sophienstrape 56 6000 Frankfurt/Main 90 Bundesrepublik Deutschland