,::-.-:,.

KIlLASSI ED
waihins

iin

0 c.

20M0

JQQ

A0 0%3A
ARA

Harry

W.

Shlaudeman

'~'J

ARA Monthl
Re ort. (Zul )
The "Third World War" and South America

The military regimes of the southern

America see themselves as embattled:
on one

side'

by

international

terrorist exponents,

cone of South

ttarxism and-

and

the other by the hostility

industrial democracies misled

of the

on

by

its

uncomprehending

Marxist propaganda.

In response they are banding together in what may well

political bloc Lof some cohesiveness. But, moresignificantly,
they are joining forces to eradicate "subversion",
1)
a word which increasingly translates into non-violent dissent
from the left and center left. The security forces of the
become a

I )

southern

cone

intelligence activities closely;

operate in the territory of one another's countries
in pursuit of "subversives";
now

o" 0

established Operation Condor to find and kill

terrorists of the "Revolutionary Coordinating Committee"
in their own countries and in Europe. Brazil is coooera-

have

8"

j,)j)

coordinate

ting short of murder operations.

This siege mentality shadinq into paranoia is perhaps

result of the convulsions of recent years in which
the societies of Chile, Uruguay and Argentina have been badly
shaken by assault from the extreme left. But the military
'leaders, despite near decimation of the ttarxist left in Chile
and Uruguay, along with accelerating oroqress toward that goal
in Argentina, insist that the threat. remains and the war must
go on. Some talk of the "Third tlorld War", with the countries
of the southern cone as the last bastion of Christian civiliza%he natural

tion.

~/iXGDS-2

NOTICE:
SENSIT~E 1'NTELLIGEitCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED.
DISSEtlINATION AND EXTRACTION OP INFORi~iATION CONTROLLED.

WARNING

BY ORIGINATOR.

Fd

8t17

g az+PW

IIHBSSIFIED

'IKLhSSIN
rati c!. lly,
-- they con. ider their counter-terrorism every bi& as
justified as Israeli" actions against Palestinian
terrorists; and
they believe t1 at the criti ism from democracies
of their 3"ar on terror'sm reflects a double standard.
'
'
1t of tt'" . "
to
magnify the isolation o t he mil ii=a y i ls itutio 1' from
tj e civ'' lian sector, thus narrpi~ing the range Gf poli t ical
Somel!hat mor

~'~11,

and economic

options.

The broader im licati ns ~t i 3. and for fui=ure trend

in the hemiso, ere are disturlbingThe use of bloo ty couni. t rterrorism by th" se reg-''-. ::=s t,lr'ea'-ens
jleir increasing isola Ll 1
from t?= ?t'est and tjle opentir. g of deep .ideological divisions
among the countries o the hemisphe:-e.
33' outbreak
of pLO-top
terrorism on a ltorld;ride scale in response is &%iso a possib li y.
Tj".e industl:ial
democracies mould be Ljle ba'Ltlcfic'd.
~

This -month' s trends' pa13e' c, tte1!1o s f'03. tjlp- f 3-3. st

.m dangers Gf Pt rid?!L !tting L oc
.nitial
policy reco~landations arel

time to focus on long-tc.

Our

'.

To et!!Gjl.,

countr. e
To

'i pe

depcli

To oppose
'

at

i-!,t.

etfer

ticise

'

rance s
ooporttl-lit

jluman

Lr:: -en

Lhe

tjle s i ':

rights
thte

tvpc

potential

.i Livp. 3'."!ivel.sp

exchanges.

'.e

rjtetorica. ' exaoc. rations of

Third-Horld-fftar'

To br'ng
our' cog

di

bloc-metmbers bacj -into

througjl sy teisla tie

ICLN SIFTED

is

Security Cooneration

a Fact

There is extensive cooperation between the security/

in elligence opeiations of si" covernments: Arc!entina,
Brazil, . Bolivia, Chil. e, Paraguay, an" Uruauay. Their
intelliaence. services hold formal meetir. gs to plan
"Operat'on Condor. " It will i!.cl uoe extensive FBI-type
exchanges of information on sl.acy cl!a-actas. There
are plans for a special comimur icat ioris networlc. Those
details are still secret, but broad security cooperation
is nct. Officials in Paraguay ard 11rr~entina have told
us that they find it necessary to cooperate !i&ith each
other and their n igl bors against in er!rationally-fuded
"

terrorists

"subversives.

and

begins' with t!Ie definii=ion o' "subve" si pin"

never the most precise o& te"..is. One reporte- writes
that subversion "has aro!.n to incl'!de nearli& anyone ;!hio
opposes governri!e;t policy. " In co ntries 1!here everyo! e
kno!!s that subve sives can !-;ind up read or tortured,
educated peoole have an understa!ic!able conc'rn about
the boundar ies of dissent.
Tire coincer:1 doubles wheil
'there is a char'ce 0 4ersecutio&n by foreiai! poi. ice
acting on indi rec :, unkno! Gn in forriaiior!
Jiumerous
Uruguai&an refuraes havbeen merce -ed in Arg n fina,
and there:, ar-e widespread - cc'us "tlon tl1at I!gentine
police are cloing tiheir Uruaiia. ,&an colleagues a favor.
These accusai:ions are -at 'least c edible iwl!etlrer or
not they ar: e e!act.
The r!roblem

The Na ure

f.

he L

.t:

t-Zxtre

i!!vei,

"Thir'd i!ior1cl J7ar" I

--

;Uruguayan Foreic'n l'inister Blar"co

one of the
brighter and normally steadier members of the group
was the first. to descril-. e the campaic:!i against terrorists
as a '"Third r&lorld i!ar. ' The descriotion is interesting
for
rea -ons!
two

It justifies

meas. 'res.

harsh ar. d si:;eeping "!vartime"

It O&
emphasizes the
{-1-ah&i

'

beyond

national

''3&

interr ' ational

' '

J .
~

~ -.

i-

'

eI

borders.

UHCLASSIF1ED

and
~~

institutional
'
.

&&&

'

The threat is not ima inar

It may be exaggerated.
This is hard to suggest to a man like Blanco, who believes
probably correctly -- that he and his family are
targeted. One must admire his personal courage.
had

objective standards, the ter oris

substantial accompl. ' shments over the years:
Even by

s have

At one time or other, urban and rural

guerril i as have created severe probleias
for almost eve-y South D~merican government,
including thos irhere democ acy is still
surviving.
-.

y have provok d reoressive reactio isi

includingi torture and. quasi-governmencal
death sguads. (The guerrillas typically
claimed to welcome repression, but iie ironder
if &hey really like i!iat they got. )
L'".

They sti 1 oos a serious threat in Argent'na

and
argus!sly
a lesser pro!. =-'.. in ti:o
or 'till i e 0 h
coun. tl:Les,

--

--

'

There is a terror oriented "B vo'utionarv

Coordinat''ng Junta", poss' . bly headqaiir tered
in Paris, iinich is both a co nterpart Qf and
an incentiv
for coop ration bet:e n govcrnmen's.
Navel. 't! ale as

"

',is al in trthee. "c:..

-

ro

ue tllcLt,

lef t ilai e
he minds of studio.
revolutionaries.
Che Guevara'
romantic fias o crushed
bones for rural revolutio.
Allende's fall is taken
speaking. . both te=io
Thi- i" tru
failed.

'"

s 2nd
even

',

=-

(perhaps pessimis icall~i) as proving that the -electoral

route cannot work. Urban cuerrilla. s collaose'- in
Brazil viith Carlos !!arighela and in Urugr!ay oith th
The latter represented
Tupamaros.
a hie h-i;ater riar!r.
Their solid, off icient str ucture posed a real iiartime
threat. Probably the milit'iry believe that torture
i;as indispensable to crack this structure.

UHCLNIFH

-.

UNljgggl'ItU

There is still a major campaign in Argentina.

expect the military to pull up their ocks and isin.
They have precedents to guide t! em, ancl tI 2 terrorists
have no fialldy refuge in neichborina cauntries.
We

What ivill remain is a chain o' gavernmenl. s, started

Brazil in 1964, lchas origin ;;*as ' n battle c: 'el nst
the extreme left. Tt is important to thai- eao, their
salaries, 2nd heir equicment-budgets to believe ir
a Third World War. A best
'(!I' n Alcertina stabil'zes,
ise can hope to convince them that they have . lreadv 1'an. l
The iiarrio-s vc 11 no like this.
Thev airer dcc snick
at us for bei .g iiorried about kid s uff like drug-

by

smuggling i!hen th re is a rea" militarcy campaicn going

on. They accuse. us of applauding the clefeat of tri=rorism
in Entenbe hilt not in IIontevidea.
Cur differinq
pelceotlocis of the th eat are als1. su Dig&on s a!..0|'.t
oux. "reliabl' i y. '
~

Ilihat

the Plgh

Wir. q ";cc- imes

I!ave in

Cams Ion

These gav, . Xnments are reactive: the r deriv. c t'; eif

initial lcgi'cimacy rxom 2 reacti oil aciainst terror is ii..
ler i:elctremism iilsl shill tyc aild ! s tccey SQQ
lt)
Ncnxxlsm.
Thus c 2,1. -'ia xls\' 1's a. mo ':. 1 ac.c Doll t1 c cl
jfox' c

There is also an ic'eoloqv tl 2- ' s r;:,or~ositive

in orz. c, in ."L-ilat of na-'. ' oral c'. v &D .ent
.

The

vision of

llc. tlo;1

has been cis effc:

t'v.

in South America as it i!as i i. Europe.

(It mav
yet turn out to be as dost ructlve; this - pape
Ioolcs only briefly at the r otential fo conflicts
betwPen Latin nations 2nd blocs. ) Iiilitarv
es tabli sitter. t s, trac'. itiona 1 Drotecto' s of
boundaries Pnci national in
a position to profi'c from the neil nationalism.

is'

a p -essing neeo. and

demand.
Disciolined milita y establishrcenis can rior!c riith technocrats to Droc!uce

Econoi, '.
a public

dec!elopment

econo.ic developmellt.
In the countries lse
are considering, the militcry .is alicays the
strongest national insi itutioil -- sc.,:etimes

I;imlLILSStFH

almost the only one. It has, typically,

saved the nations from civilian chaos.

National developmer. talism is t"erefo. e real medicine

closer to r!o.:t citizens then trendy left o rioht-':!inq
causes, To this e te!!t, military po-;; - ca!a iind a
-.

popula

bae.

National

deve opmentali

sm

J.a s obv ous and

paral'els to Jiational
of the military regimes call them
effective pejdrativ-, thc more so
said to be i:ec}.nically accurate.
These days, to call a m. n fascis"
desc ibe his economic v'. 'vs.
bothersome

Socialism.

Opponents

fascist. It rs a"!
J:e ause it can b.
But it is a pejorative.
is not

primarilii.

to

In practice, the military regiI. :es end M be

full of the same inconsistencies tha characterize.
non-military, prags. atic, non idco'cg, cal regimes.
Local political i!-.stitui:fons are (reasonably}
conisidered to have been a, raid are, and it is
sugges Qd t}!a% deil. ocr. cy c. : sn t iioz} f Gr u.
Leacers i, at to build nacre e" icient institutio is,
to organiz t'ai r societis=- etirely differently.
Yet there is, at some leve1 o cons iouness,
an accep-ance tl:ai= democracii is t}e ideal
eventua ' ly to be soug}lt
J.'o otJ'er insi. ituti on is al o!ed to cha' lenge
military po.;er, ve ioolrti eel part2. es al'!d
courts often e:;ist and perfo rm some valid
toot'l="ss parliam: rit,
funci=ious.
Brazil
f or e-;:ample, doe cautio. isly articu}. ate
public opinion and provide a dormant alterna ive to r!ilitary rule.
Insecure, repre sive govern .: ts nevertheless
"democratic" rre do::.. s,
allo!v- substatial
including varying degrees of freedom of.
i

'

expression.

Washington
ne! soaoer,

blue jeans,

painti. ng.

The ar!bientc is r..ore liJce

than Jio cow. Yo" can buy a good
aair oc ected i. el ii-, li. er
a girlie mag. zin , or a modern

UNCLASSIFIED

These militar
regimes do not ez ect to last
forever. There is no thought- of a-ThousandYear Reich, no pretense of having arrived at
ultima. te liarzist-style truth.

siandi:oir

From thr

long-t

imoortant
'i

xm

of. ours

--

policy, the most

of ti.e e rei ames

characteristic

it.

theory ano oraci-ice. They kiroiii

Sut they co not
to co about ii-. -Political and sccial
developmi:nt lag . Long a ter le -t-sriing tixreat s
are squashed, tiie regimes are still terrified o them.
Fighti. .g the absenl= pirr, Gs remains a central goal
of naticnal
ecur' ty. Th. -eats and p'ots are ri'scov. red.
Some mistai;es are imade by ti;e torturers,
Who iran
difficulty finding logical vict'ms. 11urder squads
kill harmless people an(" petty thieves. Khan
elections are heidi the oeri-arse elec-'orate shoirs
a desire te put tiie militai:y out of o-. ;cr. Of icers
see the trer. d eriding. rrith their 'osrx bodies on the
!rnovr wlaat

rack.

iso more

electiws for

a rrhile

sugci";t that ihe e '. s a hopelessli

vj cious circle. Since some o. tirese r jimes are
produciiag really soli" ecoro-. .iic successes.
The
officers may ever trrally trust iiriliar to, succeed
th. m and provide an i.onorable e;:ii:. So far, tl'. e
military h ~ four. d it easier to riot ihe tiger tlian
tv d sniourit
1Vlnera an
lterrra
ve g ire rrment
evcntu. 11y has to be . oi.nd, it rright be that th
only one available rsill bi-. at the: far left.
&'ie

do rrot

(r

=-

But There

e Also L. adina Difz- rene. s

In discussing ti.e general characteristics of

tile sou thelil mill Ldry eg liiies i;e ii ve marie s 'me
indefen, ibly broad generali"ations.
The following
is an attempt to correct the riorst distortions,
country-by-country.
It is ir. iporta to be clea
about the differences because, for reasons ~re shall
'. . hat
develop late-. our oolicv slim!ii ! bc o einhasiz
the countries do not 1;ave in coiizon ra'-her than ahab
they do
i

-'

The
Ul. ugui

y.

front-burer

cases are ArgentinaChileiand

UNCLASSIIlED

MCLASSIPIEII
is

the most. interesting, -both. -because .

the directions of tl'e new
regime are not clear. Ti e Argentines are politically
sophisticated like the. "-r:zilians, b '= unlike ti.e
Brazilian. -, the Argentines lack socia' and even
military uni'ty,
To recove" econot, ;ically they must
break t?e power of trad'tional s"ructures, and esp. cialThere is also a genuine
ly of the labor movement.
challenge f; om le t-wing terra--''sts and righ' ing
counter terror. Ti-.e problem a})roaches civil ::ar
dimensions.
t!e beli eve that the Brazilian. mo-3el
will prevai3 . In the long run, thu . , we think the
military will win. Vide'la -- or his successor -- will
have more troub3 e with !=ard-line milita. -y officers
and right-wing terror than with the left. Forces
probably connected to the regime have alreadv been

it is

argentina

and b cause

important

killing

nriests,

and

emiles

among

othe: s.

Chile. has bee the subject of so much action

you pro! blv do not need to hear anz
='- aln o st
T!-'
sr)as!)e' t!
more .
Ci.' lean
hav
bui
.s tho g evil a, o,
t} repressiv,
as t })o1 ouoh
here is no
apparatus is m - h s;ore un--- straii)ed.
on.= a. '
)o toj) like Geis 1 who . ev .i seems to wish

latelyti at

',

regin' provides the archetyp:- cf the reasoning

that cri'-'cis. , of torture ca z ccme only from
internntio. . al:!artzist p3otte "s. The militarv
wrth !aspect to the Chime" n pu!)r c.
ll

the
he

tl-:,. '
-'

first

.to

Ci

'1

tal!

still ins: sts

'.

"t' '! *',' l3'.

.
).
"Tnird

l.! --

'

p' . '-

-'

'

--

Bl::

'. :or3.d V'a. -, " andabout the

tha' the threat continues high

Given this p'cturc. , uruguay is,

in his country.
of course, ager to cooperate w th its neighbors
Nevert!)e}ess, unl'!..e the
in defensive measures.
Chileans, tho Uruquayans !".ave n. ainta n=d som
sense of. proporticn about human righ-'- and interCivilians are up front
national public opinion.
in the rove -nment, g!ve the mi'ita-; su!)stantia
support, anc interact relative!. v well.

IIHCLASSIFIEIj

-'-%IlLASSIFIEO
Brazil:

We can and snould relate to Brazil as

world power rat?er than as a trouble-spot.
its 1964 "revolution" is the basic model for its
neighbors.
The biggest problem is that, despite remarkable successes, the Brazilian 'armed services still
cannot find a rral to relex their hold on power. Qn:
the other hand, they are not much worriec. abou
They have been able to tap civi'ian taler. t for economic
Th Left is smashed, but it. is nc'c clear
purposes.
whether the Presic". en can cor trol the zeal of. his
security forces. Attemp s at pol'iical diste156ao
have largely flor:ped.
!Thc word carries both th

an energing

',

it.

English sense of "distending", or en'argir g authority

from a n rrorr milMrl ba e, and the Fren 'n scrlse of
"relaxing". Better than deterte?) Brazi. l, like the
other larg countries, does s.=e itse f as a wor'd
accor, and 'his inh'b'ts e tr mism. .
Boli5~ia is an interesting case but not a hot
problera.
TEis is the scene of one o ti.e th -ee
ger. 'ir5 soon al revol tions in Latin rcccerica -- rrhi'ch
makes it all the more puzzling that Ch Guevara
though he had a con-ibut. ion to make.
Bes i'ce h's

consicler that Ci'e's c--ath mal:es them a ta:get of

revence fo- int rnational terroris'-='.
We -a 5not
'-'"
ti.
n--"=.
i', -ian erms,
.e s s;e .,
. in
quite perceiv
"c
tab"
v stab. e and
nor licallv
is no
government

successful.

It

'

has been moderat

on

ights.
tun as i'ts
l-.uman

Paraguav is marchin- Co tire same

neighbo ':- bl:, t 3 s a m'i le b h" llcl. Thl s s the. kind of
mi 'itary
nirieteenth-currtury
regirre tha'c looks gocd cn
the cartoon page. Parag. ay, hw;-eve -, ha. eminen ly
sound reasons for being backward and is not ir the
least apologetic. The Paraguayans remember. tnat,
in tl-. Chaco Wrar, th y fought. off ti:e massively
superior erred fore s of th -ee ncighi. ors for a
nothing
ridiculousl z long time. Pride was savedr
else. There is no democratic t. adition 5ratever.
The governm. .n has reacteci to fea:c of the left rath r
than the kind of specific clzali; rrge posed in tine oth r
cou tr l.es

if

LASSIFIEIj
A

Political Bloc In

Eormation?

If polic e:type cooperation evolves into formation

of a political bloc, our interests .&ill bc involved in
was that arc ne!v for South '-m!erica.
Such a bl c. is
not herc --et. The cond tioris for its foi=i'. ation are
'

i ':~1"

conviction thai an int rnaticnal

threat aimounts to a "(:,orld i;ar" and
rcguircs an alliance.

leftist

The

Big? ly

ompa

ib'e philosophies

objectives in other respects.

Improved

transpbrt

and

heiace

political
betveen

and ccaiemunication

neighboring couiir' es, -!vhich previously had

decay than
better linlcs !iith. the U. S. and Euro@!iiih each other.
il

s"spicion th it
to s'i, nd fr

jl

ev n
m

of Vie t-imam, detente

the U. S. h;, s

. Ga2i

i arid

st

commun'

so ia 1

"losi its
sm

becaus'

.
!hichhe-

criticism,
Pesenti. ient of human-ricrhts
is often taken as just one more sign of.
corim 1" e icircl. :-.eni-.

military of the civilian,

interplay !!hicl helps to maincai"
a sense of proportion.
Exclus'on
democratic

by th=

a"e a few inhibitions cin formation of

Iiationalistic thin!. ing is the obvious one.
Tradition 1 feuds have largely sinaped th sens o!f
'tension, .
nation. Hith the cxceotioii of the Peru/Cihile
ion-e
a'
-are no
ove=riding
ho!"ever, bori'er dispute
factor in the scut!!erin ceno.
There

a bloc.

To pred' ci a political bloc !!ould still be

The!-. e
Commonsense could assert itself.
speculative.
is pier ty of it. avai labile in these co inti:i. es and ei;en
i:,ie do thin}: t?at i ne trend
soi,".e in tiiei armies.
to!nard b'oc thin!;ing is present, clea, and troi. .ble-

s opiic

UIICLASSIEIED

-11Tf a Bloc Does Form.

In the early stages,

will be a "casual

we

b=:! e-

ficiary" (as or. e epo. -ter pu -s it) or reasor. s that

are too obvicus to need elaboration here. Gn tl7e !.!ain.
Easi-i, 'est st ge, .right-wing regimes car. hardll tilt
to!.ard the Soviets and Cubans. Yhe fact that we are
an apparer. t beeficiaxy can easily lu! 1 us into trouble,
as has historically been the case in this l. e.-.!ispherc.
Buiwc would e;!pect a ra!17ae of aro;7 ing prcb '!.
7,

are lready with us. Inter"ltionally, the Latin

generals look like cur guys. h'e are especia17. y identified with Chile. It ca7anot d us any gooi" E' rope ns,
cert"37!1y, i:.te Pinochet r Cor with a. passion that
rubs off on us.
Some

llore problem7s
ITum7a

are on the schedu3.

! !.ights abuses,

morc and rsore probler!s

dipl omacv

s y

7'

k! Cwf a. e cre tll!g

la77, a. .d
~

o. ccnscience,

Chile s b! vcl shee, status has a.ll eadv

trodi'e for it: eccnomic r: covery. lhe fartiler
to the -iai!t 7-he. .dlif t gces in o her countriesi
the more d7 fflcultl s;!e can expect ln c
ecoor!ic 1k' !v' tn th m.
;

like to snare witil, say, the Brazilians

a perception that we al . tu'-al allies.
Brazi lian pali ic" paiion i. a right. -! ing bloc

Ne would

would

make

th!i

un.

lii:ely.

Evet ua13. y, we could even see se!.10!'s st! a7 ns

wl th tl. e d e I.o! rzcic
farthe north
0 f!1 a 17a
told us tha he tl".inks a confro77taticn is
pons'ble. Urug77ay 7'nd ve:7ezue1 a have 7u!
broken rcla i7 o!".s over a ir. cldellt involving

pol'tical

a S7f1! .!1.

f3

p7 7-cer . 1!

%CI.ASSIRED

i!

%OSSIFIED
cn, there is a chal. ce of serious.
This is speculaiive but no longe"
ridiculous.
The Revolutionary
Coordinatil. g Junta now
seems to haire its headquarters
in Pari-, plus corrsidcrable ctivity in other Luirope n capitals.
i':i h t
being iorced. out 0- rrrgentinar their cones!iiration rroristk
in
Europ. (and pos iblv the U. S. ) will incrc se.
Gver t3:e hor'

world-scale

trouble.

The So! th rsierican

regimes )Knew! about this.

hev
ih ir
Euro, e . rr . cni!1!la Chile, and Uruguav are in the lead;
Brazil is wary but js prov'ding some techni a". Support

are Qlanninc

'

The ne'li step might be for the te rcris"s

'0 undartaI-e a wo ldiiide -a tack on eaba -sies and i.-t " esi, 0 =
the si- hated regimes.
The P10 has shown the !!ay. ( e
can picture South rimerican acti. vities on a ee. , paraLle
sccle, ega' n usirng the industria' cemocraci s Ps
L'at'-le f ielc:. Th. imposs ib' 1ity 0 f -caco ful chan"-a
will radicali" e e:;iles wi o might, in ea lier days,
have- 'QQKe
for. (ard to r turning ho;".e peace f u3 ly.
Gur Hr spol se: !30..; to cn ' tt.c T3!I -d;;Qrld l ar.
'

T i 11 !Qw r tho!!gh !;.e have tr.ied

modPr" (!ingl "1! 1!!Pace !!e have noi t

strai "gic vie!7

cf

the problems

thai

to exercise a
lone-ter!

en a.

xiglni-!; ng 3710
10 a sha' pel. fo: us
P

sha)1 hav' more race: mendations :n

37u! i
fol ' QW' ng are cn fair S' r. .'. i

Ve

m'7.''!Phe

to

'=-

Com= r

Uistj na", "'.ch r-. .;cpu co!7n.'. 7-i .:;!i

. If !;e trea!' lier: as a. wiio e, we wi.th', ' special
be encou- agin~!.
ther! to vie!: themselves as an e-..batcleo. bloc. In our
dealings with each country and in Conrgressional testimony,
we should r for ezampler
reflect re"cg!7ition tea!tl
lrrgentina, with ts virtual cavil;ia "r fa ps
a problem !".. ch difroren" = -om it - !ieigl: ors.
Uruguay, with its sui7s a!Stial rare~ants of
mlllta y/Cia 11a-r r rte!. P3 r S rot comPara! 1 =
to l'nile.

care

3. )

:=

'i

'

Bra .. 1. 1 has

!!e nt;
I

sQ,

UHCLASS(FIED

istlcatl

Qn

and

MLASSIIIEII
tary-sales prog ams may also'provide af.
opportunity for distinction.
Aid no longer provides .
si.gni. fi.cant. leverage.
There is vast. interest in overall
eco!lomlc relations but nGt muc!1 3:reedam 0 f Ea've!";re!li
2) T v .0 cot the Col:I.ties a!id i ea ogv c!': 0'
hurmr. ! riorhrtsl
Tir. s obje tive v!il!. be hard to .-r conci . e
!"it!i the egually Press'ng !.eed to raultilateralise Qur
concarn. Ta avoid 0!iarges af "ir:ta:veni:ion, "
mrUst i!acres sf. rgly !;03.k i:lr!:0!Ig1 tl e i..tr-Ar!erican
h!rman
lligiits Co."m!issian. The countries thsupport us
tliere Ilo':!ever, v!111 tend to b dcmocr. rcies (a!id oerhaos
one oi-. ttvo rdical Caribbean goverrnm nts) . Right 3;ing
regim" s;;ill f el besieg u. 1dea'3 ' vr v!e should !Cee-,. .
0- e Gl I ra! e 0- 'th, :1 \ail h U -. Zf \:!'! . 3 s imoos'- ib
!SS n033 SeemS lik!Slr!), rrre S!inuid take Sne.=ial -Care ta
make clPai". th t SU h0 i. ta' 1::! Pr. is!es Gi ir:lr"
3.ght
Our mili.

ha! e no s!'Uor!olv on ab!3sP.=.

. ~yorr

S!r"t'a-'r3~sr!eechr

tar'cal 0:~vggerations -- there

c lee" ll" .Our Saut Al! . : an 4!ealinr

3) Oppose Rh!
r

iake

tn

'.

'i

the

a!id 1'

ac

T!r 0 bio' ' ~3 rria

1C Ca 3 S OVS +r ar'
ito dang' ra I!s r 011.= '=.'' ''' '!ice =
'r

and !sere
r

In C~"-'-c"-"-z. ~-~ -'e"'imon's h=-"o " -=s" thaithe threat is rraa

for a co nrtry li! e 'irrgenbi!ia.

'

4)
ho!3?

. br r
ln!3 I .;!
"!Sbass-;
Our .
.i n

B3

la

r.

o Qu! co;3n ii"e !3ni SP -0

ps 1=as raca-:amen! ed tl. at
,

Q.

3-

ezc!iange 'nr-ell-: oonce briefings nit!i the Bali vians.

Tliis m: oht provide a !!ay !,.o reach sr"spicious military
OffiCe-' and r:ork on their "This!3 !".o-!d Oar" s r~drr"'me,
13ut there a. . e h. Sa d . 3!, e !QUld fail ta r:raducc i:1
rmati aust brining
tliei r tliesisr and !.ey might-ca!Sclrrde
that !ve e' e ' adly i!!formed or uncoocrei. ative. Enstcadr
vc think !:e s!iould !!crk Gn syste!;, aii ..= m'd 1 ve! e!Scl!ar.ges
sormething r:.Gre than etc!San!res c" i!!farr!ra 10 i 0!3
terrorists
e need to achieve a &cree r tian hat !iei' hsr
detel3te ncr "-' ste. rs=o is
hreat ta tl e lcgi timracy of

fc-

'

"-

friend!

v 3cp(3'-"e-.

ICLASSII:IEII

In time, perhaps we-can convince them that'. a Third

is undesirable.

World War

MA/PLC:

8/2/76

DC&roper/&lHLuers;

x-2~i192