N.S BN aye) Xes.) oY, CU IRMA C TINO) f DERN NAVAL STRATEGY — ENTAIL)‘Table of Contents Chapter One: History of Iran's Naval Forces and the Importance of the Strait of, Hormuz, Brief History of Iran's Naval Forces 1 Importance of the Strait of Hormuz 2 Chapter Two: Iranian Naval Strategy. Historical Context Preparing for an Asyrametric War Passive Defense, Decentralization. . Destabilization... Cpitlizing on Favorable Geogrophymvscomnrsnrsnreseooreone ee ‘The Maral Component 10 Political Victory Trumps Military Victory 10 Naval Reorganization —Incseasing Effectivences n Chapter Three: Procurement and Acquisition Trends. Self-Sulficiency, Smaller, Faster, More Numerous Vessels. Iranian Mines... Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles. ‘Torpedoes, Submarines KILO YONO| NAHANG. Iranian Air Defense Chapter Four: Operations and Readiness.. Patrols Exercises Training Dispersals. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 22 IRGCN Small Boat Tactis. 22 ‘Small Boat Wasfare: Advantages and Disadvantages IRGCN Small Boat Exaployment resistin Chapter Five: Outlook. Submarines Surface Ships non Weapons, : Changes in Strategy ConelasionGhapter One History of Iran’s Naval Forces and the Importance of the Strait of Hormuz Brief History of lran’s Naval Forces Tran’s naval forces, like the country itself, have been shaped by the Islamic revolution, petro- leum, and an often adversarial relationship with neighboring countries and the interna- tional commmaity as a whole. These factors have influenced how Iran’ naval forces axe o- yanized, how they are equipped and manned, and how they interact with external forces, Tran has two naval forces: the Islamic Republic ofan Navy, or IRIN, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, or IRGCN, ‘The IRIN is the naval branch of Iran's Artesh, the traditional military force that existed prior to the 1979 revolution. This force was ‘the former Shah’s Imperial Iranian Navy and was originally desisaed to be a blue-water force capable of demonstrating the power and prestige of the Shah's Iran. Today, it consists mainly of older, mid-sized naval combatants, such as corvettes and missile-equipped patrol cxaft purchased by the Shah from western nations, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, The IRIN has not filly escaped the stigma of its pre~ revolution loyalties and remains secondary in most respects to the IRGCN. ‘The IRGCN emerged after the Islamic revolution dusing the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, The revolutionary forces not only distrusted the former Shah's military, they greatly weakened it by executing many senior ‘commanders and condueting purges t rid it of any loyalists to the Shah. This allowed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ARGC)}—the Ayatollah Khomeini’s base of revolutionaries turned paramilitary internal security force—to take on a larger role the country’ defense, In addition to the original ground forces element, the IRGC also formalized an emerging naval component in the mid-1980s, following snecessfal amphibious operations in the southern marshlands of Iraq, ‘Over the intervening decades, the IRGCN has Ibcen politically favored over the IRIN and has capitalized on this status to acquire advanced ‘weaponry and better platforms to develop additional capabilites Iran's British-made VOSPER- cla: corvette, a remnant of the Shah's navy Unlike many countries, Iran does not have 2 Jong naval history. The development of Iean’s naval forces was kickestarted by the discovery ‘of Iran's petroleum deposits in the early 20° century and the country's subsequent need toprotect its maritime commerce. However, the Shah's navy operated under the shadow of for= eign forces until the 1970s when British stew- ardehip in the Persian Gulf came to an end. After the British withdrawal, Iran took a larger role in protecting the Persian Gulf sea-Janes, particularly escorting Iranian merchant ships ‘The Shah, awash with oil revenue, provided a large defense budget and the promine of new ‘equipment with which the navy could carry out its expanding missions. In line with the govern- ‘ments cooperative relationship with the West, ‘the Shah's navy bought frigates, destroyers, corvettes, and patrol craft and operated them. largely according to NATO doctrine. Ivers ordered included modified SPRUANCE- class destroyers and diesel submarines fro ‘the United States and Germany: While some acquisitions were necessary for the navy’ mission, others were more for the prestige that ‘came with having one of the stronzest navies in the region. So great were the Shah's ambitions ‘hat a few western countries sought to impose limits on the Shah's quest for regions power. ‘The Shah's plans to dominate the region's wa ters were ulimately terminated by the Islamic Revolution, In 1979, the Shah was deposed and ‘the nation wa transformed into the Islamic Republic of Iran, led by Supreme Leader Aya ‘olla Khotucini. Iran ties with the West and ‘the defense contracts that came with thea were severed, leaving many Iranian naval aspira- ‘ions unfulfilled. However, the remnants of the Shah's Imperial Iranian Navy survived to form. the core ofthe new Islamic Republic of Iran Navy Soon after the revolution the Iranian naval forces experienced their most active period, During the Iran-Iraq War, both belligerents staged attacks against merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf, By one estimate, 546 comrmer- cial vessels were damaged, most of which were ‘Kuwaiti vessels artacked by Tran, Iranian naval forces executed hit-and-run attacks with small boats, fired naval guns from IRIN warships, boarded coramercial vessels in search of mate- rial destined to support Iraq's war efforts, and attacked merchants using coastal defense crnise missles Iran's use of naval mines during the war was, however, the most notable aspect of the mari- time front of the war. Dring the very first ex- cort mission of re-fagged tankers by U.S, Navy ships in July 1987, the Kuwaiti super tanker ALREKKAH, re-flagged asthe United States super tanker BRIDGETON, struck a mine ‘Two momthe later, the Linited States caught the TRIN’ IRAN AJR-class landing ship IRAN AJR laying mines off the coast of Bahrain. ‘Then in April 1988, USS SAMUEL B, ROB- ERTS hitan Iranian mine, initiating the retaliatory Operation PRAYING MANTIS by US. forces. This lst is not all-inchnsive, and many other incident of Iranian mine stikes ‘occurred throughout the course of the war, ‘Today, Iran's naval focces protect Iranian waters and natural resources, especially Iran's petroleum-related asets and industries, Iranian maritime security operations guard against the smuggling of legal goods (espectally drugs) and immigrants, and protect against the poaching and stealing of fish in territorial waters, Additionally, Iran nses ts naval forces for political ends euch a2 naval diplomacy and strategic messaging. Most ofall, Iranian naval forces are equipped to defend against perceived ‘external threats, Public statements by Ira- nian leaders indicate that they would consider losing or controlling the Strait of Horr if provoked, thereby cutting off almost 30 percent of the world’s oil supply Importance of the Strait of Hormuz ‘The US. Department of Energy estimated that in 2008 Gulf nations produced 29.8 percent of the world’ oil supply, much of which transited the Strait of Hormnz. Additionally the PersianThe Strait of Hormuz is just under 90 neutical miles long and only about 22 to 35 nautical miles wvide. Ithes tevo decp-rwater channels, one cach for inbound end outbound traffic; these two channels are about 1 nentical mile wide, Gulf region produced 29.1 percent of the natural gas for export to the world's markets Clomnte of the Strait of Hormnz would require the use of overland routes to transport oll out of the Persian Gulf. Cussenuly the Saudi Arabia East-West Pipeline has the capacity to move five million barrels per day to the port of Vanbu on the Red Sea, well short of the average 17 million barsels per day that currently transit the Strait of Hormuz. Tran would not be immune to the econamic impact ofa Strait of Hermuz closure, Iran's exports of crude oil and petroleum products alone in 2006 accounted for 74 percent of the oad Khomeini Khorramshahy © Co ‘tal value of Iran's exports and were equal 10.29 percent ofthe nation’s gross domestic product (GDP). By volume, ronghly'87 percent ‘of ran’ imports and 99 percent ofits exports ‘ace by sea. The vast majovity of this trade tean- sits the Stait of Horm Figure 1-1 (page 4) shows the leading countries for Iranian imports and exports, Closing the Steait of Hormnz would cause Ivan, ‘tremendous economic damage, and therefore Iran would probably not undertake a closare lightly. However, given the importance of the Steait, disrupting traffic flow or even threaten ing to do 20 may be an eflective tool for Iran, Bandar ed “Major ports in the Persian Gulf regionimports by value Iran's main trading parmers for 2006 se Iran's main trading partners for 2006 exports by valu Figure 1 ‘The other Persian Gulf countries are also dependent on trade via the Strait of Horau: primarily of crude oil and liquefied natural Exports from many of these countries consist gas (LNG) going to world markets. The United therefore must transit the Strat. Iraq’+import ‘Arab Emirates (UAB) ports of Abu Dhabi and iz. Dubai are the busiest in the region and account for 88 percent of the UAE's GDP. Most UAE. trade involves these Persian Gulf ports and. 100%. 90% 0%. 10%. 60, 50%. 40% 30%. 20% 40%. Percentage of value that transits the Strait of Hormuz Imports/Exports as percentage of GDP [a imports lm Exports 100%. imports Exportsdependence is less than the other comntries in the zegion; about 55 percent ofits imports by valne come over land from Syria, Turkey, and Jordan, Figure 1-2 (page 4) shows imports? exports for Persian Gulf countries other dian Iran) as percentage of CDP ae well as percent- age of value of GDP thar transits the Strait for those countries ‘The world as a whole, especially industrialized nations, would experience a serious economic ‘impact from a sustained clomre of the Strait of Hormuz due to greatly xeduced supplies ofcrude cil, petroleum products, and LNG. According to Reuters, “Any military action in the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf would knock out cil exparts from OPEC's biggest produc ers, cut off the oil supply to, Japan and South, Korea, and knock the booming economies of Ghlf'states”"' In 2007 the Strait of Hormauz accommodated outhound exports of about 16 million barrels per day of crude oil and refined petroleum products. These exports amounted to about 40 percent of all scaborne ail exports, ‘Mont of the oil exported via the Strait goes to Asia, the United States, and western Enzope. An average of 15 large crude oil tankers per day transited Hormuz in 2007, a8 well as ocher Oil canker typically found in the Persi Gulfregion PACT BOLE: Sait of Bares eanonie fin of drape," Pats, 7 Jen 2008, Dhow typically found in the Persian Gulfregion ‘tankers transporting petroleum products and LNG, Ofnote, about 19 percent of global LNG exports transited the Strait outbound from ‘Qatar and the UAE in 2007, The importance of the Strait of Hocmus will ikely continue to increase over time, In addition to the high volume of energy related maritime traffic, a large volume of other civilian traffic uses the Strait on a regular basic. Small local craft, known a= dliows, ply these waters every day. Many wansport a variety of consumer goods ‘thronghout the Persian Gulfand others ave used for fishing. These craft add to the ‘overall volume of traffic crossing the Strait of Hormuz,Chapter Two Tranian Naval Strategy “Tnanians are preparing for gueills war ats... lke operations on land, wakonétvo unequal opbonens face each ther, the best aay fr the soeak side isto srt toa usar af attrition and guerilla operations.” Historical Context ‘The origins of Iran’s naval strategy can be found within the context of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). This was a crucible for the na~ scent Islamic Republic, and while both naval forces engaged in operations driring the war, the IRGC’ small boat attacks established itas a legitimate entity and viable threat and solidified the primacy of the IRGCN'* aeyan- metic tate Iran first employed an asymmetric naval doctrine during the Tanker War (1984-1982), part ofthe larger Iran-Iraq War. It decreed an. exclusion zone off its Persian Gulf coast that forced non-lranian shipping to circumnavigate ‘this area, limiting shipping to a narrow lane where Iran could monitor and attack encraies ‘and mine sea-lanes far from its own shores and friendly shipping. Iran conducted the manjor~ ity ofits early ship attacks in a conventional manner, using naval gunfire and anti-thip ccmnise missles fired from ships, aircraft, and coastal launchers. However, as these were only moderately saccessfil, Iran also employed small, fast attack boats to conduct ambushes and hitand-run missions against tankers etind Rear Admiral Al: Arghar Kazert Profsson, Tehran nicesio? Furthermore, these inventive tacties, developed out of necessity and using the limited assets on ‘hand, became the forerunners of Iran's modern asymmetric warfare doctrine. ah, Rid, “Tan Pls Fr Atton Were Gat" Dawe Neos, G dey 2006.1Tt was during the IrancIragq War that Iran realized the consequences of technological inferiority, According to retired Iranian Navy Rear Admiral Ali-Asghar Kazemi, currently professor of political science at Tehran Unie versity, Iran turned to a guerilla strategy after Operation PRAYING MANTIS, a naval battle between the United States and [ran in 1988, during which the United States sank one Iranian VOSPER-class corvette (heavily dam- aging a second) and one COMBATTANTE- chavs guided missile patrol craft. Kazemi said that the lesson fro this battle was that, “in a purely classical naval engagement, the Iranian Navy would not be able to sustain combat capability and will soon be out of effective operation.”® [ran has incorporated lessons from this conflict and subsequent regional wars such, as Operation DESERT STORM, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM into its naval strategy. Preparing for an Asymmetric War In studying these conticts, the IRGC decided that Tran should plan to fight an asymmetric ‘war against potential enemies. According to the IRGC commander, an asymmetric war would involve “working on all the weak= nesses of the enemy and the maximal usage of our capability.” By choosing an asymmetric approach, however, Iran is not abandon~ ing modern military technology. The IRGC claims that Iran would use its growing arsenal of modern weapons, including cruise missiles, modern mines, and submarines, but in dif ferent way and at a time and place the enemy would not know or expect. During the 1990s, the regime sought to rebuild from the Iran-lraq War and bolster its national defenses, The IRGO, the favored military force due to its performance in the Iran-Iraq War, took the lion’s share of Iranian Katou, Red, after being attacked by the United States Navy during Operation PRAYING “MANTIS in 1988 defense funding, increased domestic weapons production, and ramped up the procurement ‘of weapons from Russia, China, and North Korea.‘ Naval acquisitions inckaded C802 anti-ship cruise missiles (both sea~ and land ounched systems) and auznerous patrol boat. ‘The IRIN devoted the bulk of its acquisition funding to order three K[LO-class attack submarines. Submarines had long been on the IRIN’: list of desired platforms. During the Shah’s reign, the navy had ordered both US. TANG- and German TYPE 209-class diesel submarines. Despite the change of regime, the navy’s Shah-era plan to acquire submarines was finally realized, With the receipt of'new equipment, Iran continued to develop its naval tacties, Even. the IRIN focused on developing integrated. tactics using several weapons and platforms simultaneously (inciding its new submarines, smaller missile boats, mines, aircraft, and Tand-based missile systems) to overwhelm an. ‘enemy. Aware of its weakness against a modern air campaign, Iran also began decentralizing its command structure in order to decrease its Pls For dition War x Gu ise Now, Bay 2006p. 1 Uagisnoans Paar, Fabien L178, “ont Dearing Armani Aen! ing" Washing iin fr Moor Bat Posey Wahine, Zi Dee 2008In 1988, a U.S. Navy ship, SAMUEL B, ROBERTS (PFC 58), hit an Iranian mine in the Persian Gulf. It was only due to extraordinary efforts on the partof the ship's crew thatthe Bigate did not sink, Mineo were Iran's main weapon to control the Persian Gulfand influence the military supplies transported. to Iraq via maritime means. Since that time, Iran has worked. to gain new, more powerfil ‘weapons to use againstan cencaay force in the Persian Gul, the Gulf of Oman, and the Steait of Hormns. Iran has contiqued to update theve weapons and Iranian tactics have evobved to make the best use of them as well sto capitalize on the region's geography. In this photograph ROBERTS is seen aboard M/V MIGHTY SERVANT 2 reliance on communications and enable com- tinued resistance in the event ofan attack Iran hhas continued enhancing nearly all ts weapons systems and developing its tacties, watching and learning from regional conflicts, through, the 1990s to the present time, ‘While asymmetry is the cornerstone of Iran’ access denial strateyy, there are many other concepts that Iran is incorporating into its naval construct. Passive defense, capitalizing con favorable geography, and the primacy of Iran's moral cause are important factors in, Iran's naval planning, Passive Defense In both 1991 ond 2008, zauch of Taq’ de- fenses, military infrastructure, and forces were destroyed early in the conflict by United. States and Coalition air power. Iran appears to understand that its forces must be able to withstand such an initial attack in order to fight back, From this need for survival, Iran's naval forces have developed plans for passive defense, seeking to ensure that assets remain available after an initial strike. Iran definespassive defense as “a defense without weapons [which] comprises a range of measures that reduce vulnerability and increase endurance against foreign threats”* Measures such as camouflage, concealment, and deception ase probably key elements in Iran's passive defense plans, Potential examples ofthese measuses include hiding platforms along Iran’s coastline, ‘which i filled with islands, inlet, and coves, as ‘well a a plethora of cil-elated infrastructure, ‘The IRGC! has ako built unnels and under- ground bunkers on the Persian Gulfislands Which could provide proteetion from initial strikes Decentralization In addition to passive defense efforts, [ran has embraced what.it calls a “mosaic defense.” ‘This strategy essentially decentralizes the command structure, making Iranian forces moce resilient in the face of'initial strikes against their command and control architecture, According to Farihorz Haghshenass of The Washington Institue for ‘Near East Policy: “Bheedboats willbe taken out of cariou- _fleged coastal or tnland hide sites and Durkor, hauled on trailers to coastal release points, and given micsion-tpe oro that will not ga thr to saan 2 contart with thei chain of eommand. Each unit of such teams will be assigned a naval sector af eration where, in theaoent ofa confiet, ening) naval aces or eivilian marities ta Fle wil be attacked.” Destabilization While controlling the Strait of Hornmz is the ey tool by which Iran could internationatize any conflict, it has other options as well, Iran could strike regional countries that actively support or participate in a conflict against the Pasion Pr ran Parlor Dene Ohi utes Pang Islamic Republic in an attempt to dissuade ‘them from following mech a course, Accord- ing to former TRIN Rear Admiral AshKbus Daneh-Kar, “There are numerous ports, oil ‘terminals, industrial installations and rich resources in the Persian Gulf area—on the ‘coastal areas, in the continental shelf and on the numerous islands, Asa result, the Persian Gulf becomes specifically a vulnerable target for special [commando] operations.”* “Indeed Sram’ netural gegraphis advantage provide the nay with the aption of serionaly Hite the evans manesaerebilty in the Peston Galt™™ Retired Rear Admival Ackibus Danel- Kar Islamic Republic oflren Ney oason riguies separate tacts fr the definse of exch ava.” Rear Admiral Habibollsk Sapyari Commander, [slamie Republic of fran Nawy Capitalizing on Favorable Geography Iran's naval leadership has stated that today’s ‘threats across the world are sea-based and Iran needs to design its naval forces and strategy to defend against them, [ran’s four strategic mari= ‘time areas are the Gulfof Oman, the Strait of Hormnz, the Persian Gulf, and the Caspian, Sea. Each of these areas has its own unique geography and challenges leading Iran to tailor defense plans by location. Geography is ‘especially important with regard ta the narrow Strait of Hormuz as it gives Iran the potential to disrupt the world’s ecomomy. Ingressiny or cegressing warships must pass through mineable ‘waters within the range of a variety of weap= ‘ons including coastal defense cruise missiles, significantly increasing the ship vulnerability hse Bs," Tekan Fim, 25.9 2007 ‘Darel shibur Rex Aer, “Opal Decne of ba Mey of te Ld Raabe of Por” Saf ite Mx 285 py 32-38 "Diack Ron, BBs Rowe Av, “Coronal Dacre te ayo te lilac Rapa oT, "Sith“Taday, the security and tramguility of our county’ soa burden i secured Baccus ofthe solfsacrifiee of nag foes ho aff their Kies homatly and are full-hacrtedy mady to safeguard the religion and courte.” Major General Mestefe MohammadNajjar Fomnar Ainistrof Defence and Avimed Forees Logistics “In Iran there are peal who will not back doom when the energy attacks and they are ready to be martyred for Godin resisting te ener whe end it ‘Iran's four strategic maritime areas Iran ako has developed tactics based on the ‘water depth and confined nature of the Per sian Gulf. Maneuvering in some parts can be difficult due to the shallow waters more suited ‘to small boats, Also, Iran's 1,000 nautical niles of coastline contains many coves and marshes in which small boats could hide from enemy forces. Because the Gulfis less than 100 nautical miles wide in many places, coastal defence cruise missiles would be able to reach ‘targets in nearby shipping lanes, ‘The Moral Component Auunique, but key, component of Iran’s concept of naval strategy is its religious under pinning. The United States might be the sarter of oar, But & ell definite not Be the one Rear Admiral Mortera Safari Commandes Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Naw According to Fasibore Hoyhshenase, Iran zeliee ‘on the military's allegiance 10 the rule of the country’s religious regime, promotes resilience in the face of adversity, and glorifies culture ofjihad and martyrdom, These ideas provide an extra dimension to the naval strategy and may give the Iranian warfighter extra motivation, similar to the comcept of patriotism for the American warfighter. [ranian military leaders often publicly tont, ‘the mocal superiority of Iran's fighting forces, Political Victory Trumps Military Victory An emerging theary of warfare states that the world has moved from the third generation, of warfare, consisting of large armies moving against each other, to a fourth generation of warfare in which a smaller force would use asymmetric tactics to survive a conflict against technologically perior enemy. According to Colonel Thomas Hammes, author of Tie ‘Sling and the Stone, the fourth generation of war ‘uses “All available networks—palitical, eco= nomic, social, and military—to convince the ‘enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachiewable o 100 10Oil platforme attacked during costly for the perceived benefit. It does not at- ‘tempt to win by defeating the enemy's miliary forces, Instead...it dizectly attacks the minds of eneray decision makers to destroy the enemy's politcal will" In zm effort to attack political wil, Iranian leadership has stated thatif the United States took military action against fran, “200,000 American soldiers willbe seriously imperiled in the region.” and that “the US. Fifth Fleet in the Persian Guif would be turned into a ‘sea of fire.”*® Iran is also prepared to spread the con- flict beyond the Persian Gull, and leaders have publicly stared that Iran wonldl attack American interest around the word. Tran is aware that a conflict in the Persian Gulf would make the region, the focus of the world’s poiial considerations “Hla, Tiomas Gat, Th Sing and The Sone On Wri the 2 Centers Grath Pre, rk" Fa in Bago, 20 Sep 2008, Dri," Bein Fibs, 10 Bt 2068. Yap Ary abi Warne U8. dint ¥ Sanin Alito Exeie ret Prope 11 o, OS Noy Naval Reorganization— Increasing Effectiveness Iran's naval forces continue to change in order to better execute their naval strategy: Since 2007 the IRIN and IRGGN have been undergoing a reorganization that has inchided new base openings and a re-division of duties between the navies. Although the two navies have traditionally shared operations in the Caspian Sea, Pessian Gulf, and Gulf of Oman, the reorganization split the IRIN and IRGGN areas of responsibilty. The TRIN was assigned to the Gulf of Oman and Caspian Sea, while the IRGCN was given full responsibilty for operations in the Persian Gulf ‘This reorganization and the eablishment of new bases are in keeping with Iranian naval strategy in ‘the event of a conflict, Because Iran’ navel doctrine is based upon access denial, the realignament of IRIN agsete farther into the Gulf of Oman and the concentration of RGCN fast boats, suicide boats, and coastal defense cruise ‘missiles in the Strait of Hormnz and Persian Gulfbetter allow Iranian naval assets to contribute to and extend Iran’ layered defense strategy, Throughout the restructuring, senior ‘commanders in the IRIN and IRGCN have reiterated that the reorganization of existing Dbazes and the creation of new bases create a line of defense that would prevent an enemy from accessing the Strait of Hormuz and, thus, the Persian Gulf, IRIN Commander Rear ‘Admiral Habibollah Sayyari stated that new IRIN bases will extend fiom Bandar Abbas, near the Strait of Hormuz, to Pasa Bandar near the Pakistan border by 2015. Similarly, IRGGN Commander Rear Adzairal Morteza‘Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari Commander of the IRIN Safari described the necessity of creating a new 4 Naval District base at Asalnyeh to increase military capability in ease of any instability cansed by foreigners in the Persian Gulf, The goal of the naval seorgenization—allowing the IRIN and the IRGGN to operate in accordance with their relative strengths and thereby better contribute to Iran's layered defense strategy— may not be fully realized because ofa lack of 2 infcastrcture and resources, Ata minimum, both naval forces may experience some growing pains as they assume their new areas of responsibility ‘The geographic split of the two services not only streamlines command and control by redncing the need to coordinate and deconflict between different naval services operating in, the same water space, but should also reduce ‘confusion or miscommunication thar an enemy could exploit in wartime. This ivision of Iran's primary hodies of water is logical given the characteristics of IRIN and IRGCN ships. The IRIN operates traditional large warships and ausiliary ships, which have the endurance and searkeeping qualities needed for extended pax trols and missions in open waters. This makes ‘the IRIN the natural service to deploy in the Gulf of Oman to push Iran's reconnaissance ts far out as possible and also to engage enemy forces as fir away from Iranian teeritary as possible. The IRGCN operates a force of much smaller boats, most of whieh lack the endurance or configuration to remain at sea for more than afew days. These hosts will now operate in the enclosed waters of the Persian Gulf'and the Strait, and will rarely be far from an IRGCN base, ‘The reorganization has not been without chalk lenges. Although the IRGCN # Naval District and the IRIN 2* Naval District have alveady relocated to Asaliych and Jask, respectively, the new naval bases probably cannot accommodate all ofthe reallocated as- sets because ofa lack of pier space and support infrastructure, The [RIN has plans to expand these send other coastal ports, bout the time and resourc- cs required to do s0 mean that these investments will pay off only in the long term.Chapter Three Procurement and Acquisition ‘Trends In order to implementits naval strategy, Iran hhas engaged in a program to develop and ac- mire advanced weapons and platforms, Izan’s defense planning hinges on three motivations: achioving selfreliance, becoming 2 regional power, and maintaining strong deterrent mea= sures against future attacks, Overall, Iran's de~ ‘velopment program has strengthened its naval capabilities, yielding increases in the conntsy’s inventory of small boats, mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, torpedoes, and air defense equipment, Self-Sufficiency During the Iran-Iraq War embargoes against Iran inflicted shortazes of spare part, and many systems became non-operational es 2 result [n order to remedy this situation, Iran developed a campaign to decrease its reliance on outside suppliers. These so-called “self safficiency jihads” graduated from manufactus- ing spare parts for existing equipment to design- ing and constructing complete systems almost ‘entirely in Iran, Although Iran has sought to develop its own defense industries to reduce dependence on foreign arms suppliers and minimize the effect of furure armas embargoes, it is till heavily seliant on military technology eup- port from North Korea, Russia, and China. Smaller, Faster, More Numerous Vessels While the IRIN is comprised primarily of aging Shah-era vessels, the IRCCN has con- tinued to purchase and construct sew vereels over the years, The smaller and faster craft operated by the IRGGN are more snitable to the IRGC's mandate to protect the evolution, From a naval standpoint this translates into a focus on coastal waters. Fox these reasons the IRGCN has grown to be a non-traditional force, focused on preparing to survive any threat, while incorporating asymmetric and novel defenses. Moreover, unlike the tradi- tional naval force of the IRIN, the IRGGN remains politically favored. This is reflected iin the resources the IRGGN receives to bmild, craft indizenously and to seek out suitable tech- nology frora abroad. ‘Asa coastal, move flesile ce, the IRGCN be- gan primarily with small patrol craft similar to fishing or pleanme vessel, However, overtime and with increased funds, the IRGGN sought cot better equipped vesels and technology, often from abroad. In the mid-1990s the IRGCN ac- quired ten 38-meter HOUDONG-clase missle boat from China armed with C202 anti-ship couise mises, Iean ako received the Chinese- ile C-4-elas aisle boat in late 2000. This Memeter raft carvies horsrange anti-ship cise missiles anda xocket launcher, ad has a catamaran hull allowing itto reach speeds up 1050 knots, Later, in 2006, the IRGC took delivery from China of the MK 13-class patrol craft also measuring HM meters but armed with anti-ship cruise misiles and torpedoes 8IRGGN small patrol craft IRGGN HOUDONG- class missile boat IRGEN Chinese-built C-14-class missile boar IRGCN PEYKAAP-class coastal patrol erafe 4 Iran's aggressive move toward self-sufficiency hhas been evident in IRGCN vestels like the PEYKAAP [-class coastal patrol craft and the PEYKAAP II-clase missle boat, Although both clases ase reportedly based on North Korean designs, Iran indigenously builds and markets them for esport through Isan's Mari- time Industries Group (MIG). Despite being small, measuring 17 meters, the vessels carry. serious firepower, The PEVK AAP Il is not only armed with torpedoes but also the Irani an-made “Kowsa” anti-ship cmise missile Since the late 1990s the IRGGN has worked to enhance its small patrol boat inventory by purchasing fast bonts from Italian speedboat ‘manufacturer Fabio Buzzi (FB) Design. Be- sides purchasing a number of models, which are based on record-breaking racing beats, the IRGON reverse engineered the boats and began indigenously producing them. Like the PEYKAAP II, the FB boats are marketed for export by MIG’s parent company Defense Industries Organization (DIO). Advertised by FB Design with top speeds of 60-70 knots, these patrol boats give the IRGCIN some of the famtest naval vessels in the Pessian Gulf, Besides more traditional naval craft, the IRGCN also reportedly is working on incorpo- rating “unmanned vessels” into its inventory: (Other world navies operate unmanned vessels; IRGGN adoption of this modern technology demonstrates the continued initiative of the IRGGN to increase its naval capabilities. (Other exataples of the IRGCN’s search for innovative vessels inchice the GAHJAE- and KAJAML-class semi-submersible eraft that Iran reportedly purchased from North Korea in 2002, Measuring 15 meters and 20 meters respectively, these vestels are configured to carry two torpedoes each. The ability ta almost entirely submerge allows the vessels to hide from detection,Ese rte YONG 118-120), teieer) rue read KILO INAHANG Swimaner Delivery Vehicle ‘GAHJAE KAJAMI ALVAND (VOSPER MK 5) BAYANDOR (PP 103) KAMAN (COMBATTANTE ID TONDOR [HOUDONG) Cag MKS KAYVAN, 3 PARVIN (POM) 3 PEYKAAPID 25 PEYKAAPT. 5 US MK IIT 10 TR hus MK I PASHE (MIG-G-1900) (GHAEM (MIG-S-1800) MURGE (MIG-C-0900) MIL 40 MISS TARLAN KASHDOM I ASHOORA I (MIG-G-0800) BOGHAMMER, ‘Various Patrol Craft LsT TRAN HORMUZ 21 HENGAM KARBALA (MIG-S-3700) TRAN HORMUZ.24 LIYAN 110) WELLINGTON (MK 5) WELLINGTON (MK 5) TRAN‘The IRGCN continues to setitselfapart from. the IRIN as its naval vessels primarily consist of mnaller, faster platforms that can perform surreptitious operations while at the same time carrying significant firepower such as C802 anti-ship cruise missles. The smaller size and speed of the [RGGN’s fleet make it ideal for operations off the Iranian coast andl in the Strait of Hocmma. The ability to constract craft indigenously offers the IRGON increaced options, a8 it can work to design and fir ves- sels that fulfil ts operating requirements, tis likely thar the IRGC will continne to replace aging craft with new construction undertaken, at sites such as Joolalee Marine Industries, Arvandan Maritime Corporation, and Mastyr Dasvishi Marine, ‘Table 3-1 (page 15) shows a naval order of battle for Iran's naval forces. Iranian Mines Im addition to szaall boats, Iran's credible mining threat can be an effective deterrent to potential enemy forces: The Strait of Hormaz is anarrow chokepoint that could be mined effectively in a relatively short amount of time, Iran uses its mining capability as a trong deterrent to attacks from western nations. Such ‘operations would disrupt or temporarily halt maritime traffic and harm western ecemomies dependent on Middle Eastern cil exports In 1993 Iran entered into negotiations with (China to purchase the Chinese-developed EM52, a rocket-propelled anti-ship mine. The Iranian purchase of three Russian KILO-class submarines most likely inchnded modern mag- netic, acoustic, and pressure-sensitive mines. In addition to importing mines, [ran has contin ued domestic mine production, resulting in a growing stockpile of naval mines. As of 2004, US. experts estimated that Iran had an inven- tory of atleast 2,000 mines. (Chsrently Tran has a limited number of cone ventional naval vessels capable of mineslaying ‘Mine damage to USS TRIPOLI after hitting a mine during the first Persian Gulf Warin February 1991 ‘operations, and thus noneonventional tactics hhave been developed enabling Iran to deploy: mines using commercial veseels and small boats. Both the IRIN and IRGGN have been espanding their capabilities to perferza mine- Jaying operations. Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles An important layer in Iran's defense of the Persian Guilfand the Strait of Hormu2 is its ‘coastal defense cruise missile (DCM) ca ability. Iran can attack targeted ships with anti-ship cruise missiles from its awn shores, islands, and oil platforms using relatively small mobile launchers. ‘The primary misile in the Inanian mobile DCM arsenal isthe C201 /802, first import- ed from China in 1995. This system augmentsIranian coastal defense cruise missile systems the Seersucker znissile system used by xan in ‘the Iran-Iraq Was, Although the Seersucker series missile hav a greater range and a larger warhead, the C801 /802 missile is eapable ofengaging targets ata shorter range of six nautical miles vice the Seersucker’s ten nauti- cal miles. The C801/202 also boasts greater accuracy, a lower cruising altitude, and a rauch faster set-up time, These capabilities work together to make this missle a better choice ‘than the Seermcker for coastal defense within the narrow waterways alony the Iranian coast. Using the C201/802 alone, Iran can target any point within the Strait of Hormauz and zmuch of the Persian Cuif'and Gulf of Oman, Lebanese Hizballah successfully used 2 C802 missile to target an Issaeli naval vessel in 2006; Iran could use the missle in the same way. Addie tionally, Iran has worked jointly with China to develop shorter-range missiles, including the C701, for deployment in narrow geographic environments. Iran's mobile CDCM launchers can readily ‘be deployed anywhere along the Iranian coast and target ranch of the Persian CulPand Gulfof Oman, ns well as the entire Strait of Hoenmuz. These systems have auto-control and. radar homing guidance systems, and some can target using a remote air link. Through, the deployment of mobile CDCMs combined ‘with multiple-rocket launchers (MRLs), coastal ‘artillery, and ballistic missiles, ean hopes to ‘overwhelm enemy air defenses, ‘Torpedoes In addition to mines and antiship cruise mise siles, Iran has a growing torpedo inventory. Former Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar said in 2007 that Iran had ‘macle great strides in building torpedoes, as well as anticmisile missiles, radar systems, and rockets." As evidence of this progress, in 2009 Iran announced that it had begun production ‘of two types of torpedoes Submarines Iran boasts the Gulf's only submarine pro- gram, Iran has three operational clastes of sub- marines: the KILO, YONO, and NAHANG, KILO Iran has three KILO-class diesel-electric submarines, all based at Bandar Abbas These relatively modern and quiet submarines were ought from Russia in the 1990s, The first KILO, TAREQ 901, was commissioned on 21 November 1992. The second KILO, NUH 902, was commissioned on 6 June 1908, while the third KILO, YUNES 903, was commis- sioned on 25 November 1996. © Trin Deine Mtr Eieorteon MEktary Galton,” Vion of te Lac Repub Fen Neto 2 1588 202 vIranian KILO-class submarine Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad | visiting a YONO-class midget submarine Following negotiations to upgrade the boats with Rosoboronesport, the Russian arms agency, TAREQ began a refit at Bandar Abbas in mid-2005, The Russian shipyard Sevinash is reported to be providing technical assistance during TAREQS sefit, The other two KILOs are likely to undergo refits follow- ing TAREQ, Reportedly, an upgrade might invoWve the fitting of the submarines with a cruise missle capable of hitting an adversary’s surface ship or land target ata range of up to 108 nautical miles. ¥ONO Tran also hae seven YONO-class midget submarines (also known as the 15-120, QADIR, or GHADIR), Hulls 1,2, and 3 are currently in service, and a fourth was reportedly launched on 28 November 2007. A ceremony introducing three additional YONOs was held on I June 2009, Iran is building more of these midget submarines, ‘and additional YONOs may be Ieunched. in the near fature, Little is known publicly ‘about these submarines; however, a video showing the internal ft of one of these boats suggests that they are equipped with modern, commercially available navigation and ship ‘control systems, These boats are likely to be ‘employed in shallow aveas of the Gulf, such as the Strat of Hormnz, and may be used to deploy divers, NAHANG Iran ako has a NAHANG-class midget, submarine, which became operational in 2007 Iran claims that this 25-meter submarine ‘was indigenonsly designed and built, The NAHANG reportedly was designed for the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf and may act asa mothership for swimmer delivery vehicles. Iranian Air Defense Iran is concentrating on its ground based aie defense (GBAD) assets and has puta large amount of financial resources into upgrades and acquisitions, Recently Iran acquired the BTOR M-I surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. ‘and has shown interest in acquiring the $-300 SAM system from Russia, Aircraft upgrades appear to be lagging behind GBAD scquisi- ‘ions, Since the mid-1990s Iran has invested heav- ily in its GBAD capabilities, which indicates ‘hat it realizes the most cost-effective way to defend itself rom an air attack is with GBAD systems. Most of these eystere are located near key strategic sites, euch as military or govern ‘ment installations, Iran secognizesits limita ‘ions against an air suppression strike, cruise missiles, or stealth aircraft, and is working to increase capabilities in these areas, Iran parchased 24 Improved HAWK (- HAWK) air defense systems from the United States in July of 1972 under the code name PEACE SHIELD. Delivery began in 1976 and ended on 4 November 1979, when revotution- aries seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The L-HAWK is a medium-range, mobile SAM system. Due to the high numbers originally delivered, Iran can likely keep a number of systems operational at any time, Tran also acquired a small number of the CSAAL, which is a Chinese copy of the Russian SA2 system. The CSA-1 is a medinm-range hhigh-altivade SAM ayster, ‘The SA-5 is Iran's long-range SAM, and. although it is an older system, iis still capable against modern aircraft. Iran is believed to have purchased anywhere from fous to ten SA.5 batteries and 25 missiles from the USSR, and another ten missiles from the Ukraine by ‘the early 19908, In 2006 Iran received the TOR-MI SA-15) from Rusia, The TOR-M1 is a very capable shortranye SAM system that ean identify 48 ‘targets and simultaneously engage two targets, Iran announced in December 2007 that it has contracted to purchase an unspecified number (of $-300e (S.A.20) from Rnssia. The $-300 is high-altitude, long-range SAM system that could significantly increase Tran’ air defense capabilites. In addition to SAM systems, Iran operates a number of anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and ‘man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to augment its GBAD forces, 19Chapter Four Operations and Readiness ‘The IRIN suffers from the problems inher- cent in trying to maintain aging western-built ships without access to western support. Mast of the [RIN’s surface ships are a combination of United States, French, and British designs, andmost are more than 30 years old, With- ‘out the ability to send these ships to foreign, ship repair yards or overhaul facilities, Iran hhas had to maintain them as best as it can for three decades, Approximately half of the IRIN’: misile-armed surface combatants are in very poor material condition, limiting their readiness and operational endurance. Despite their significant readiness problems, the [RIN ‘world probably be able to get most of ts major combatants to #ea in @ time of crisis or conflict, ‘The IRGCN operates smaller combatants and ppatrol boats, which have much lower mainte- nance requirements than the IRIN's large ships and enjoy better overall readiness, Most af the IRGC’ missile and torpedlo boats are less than ten years old, and should be much more reliable than the IRIN’ older shige and boats, ‘The IRIN’: three KILO-class submarines are ‘ll past the halfway polntin their estimated 30- year lifespan, and have not been sent back to Russia for overhaul. As mentioned earlier, fran is artempting to overhaul KILO SS TAREQ, the oldest of the three boats, at Bandar Abbas Naval Base, with Russian assistance. Crew training and materiel readiness are below the standards of western navies, and IRIN KILOs are probably not capable of detecting, track- ing, or attacking modern western submarines, although they should be able to defend them- selves if attacked. Despite their age and need of overhaul, the IRIN KILO: probably have fair to good readiness levee. Iranian maritime patrol and strike aircraft are amixme of 1970s American designs, such as the P-3 ORION and the F-4 PHANTOM, and 1970s Soviet aircraft, such as the SU-25. Iran thas managed to keep most of its aireraR flying through cannibalization and probably through black market acquisition of parts, yet Iranian aircraft probably suffer from mach lower readi- ness than mort western ais forces’ aircraft, Patrols, Despite these seadiness problems, [ran cone ducts peacetime missions such as maritime security operations and patols, Iranian naval forces in 2008 confiscated ten oil tankers that, according to Iranian press, were smugeling 4,600 tons of Iranian fuel ont of the Persian, Gulf Iranian run-ins with western naval units, notably the capture of 15 British naval pertonnel in March 2007, suggest that Iran's nnaval forces are keenly interested in protecting Iranian territorial waters, Iran justified the seizure ofthe British personnel by saying that they had illegally entered Iranian waters, Iran also claims that its naval forces are conductingextended patrols. In December 2008 Iranian, press reported that Iranian warships were hhending to the Gulf of Aden to fight the bur- weoning piracy threat in that areayin Febru ary 2009 Iranian press reported thar the TRIN Jad started ta deploy ships on missions “to ‘he high seas,” including a deployment to the Indian Ocean, Exercises Both of Iran's naval services conductregular exercises, varying in size from a handful of “units condueting simple operations to up to dozens of units conducting multi-day opera~ ions over a wide area, Most of these exercises fe intended to improve military taining sand proficiency. These exercs ally include testfices of new weaponry, such a antisship crise missiles or torpedoes, and Iran frequently releases media photographs or video of these weapons events, Iran very rarely conducts exercises with other navies but has in the past exercised with the Pakistani Navy. ‘Asa rem, Iran's naval forces would probably have very poor interoperability with any’ other ‘navies in wartime ‘At times of heightened tension, Iran conducts highly publicized naval exercises, the most notable being the first NOBLE PROPHET. ‘exercise, which was held from 31 Mazeh to 6 April 2006. Iran held additional NOBLE PROPHET exercises in November 2006 and July 2008, Each of these exercises fearmred ‘extensive coverage in the press and showcased Iranian weapons and platforms, ‘Training ‘The IRIN and IRGGN maintain officer train= ing schools and specialist training schools, although litle is known about their curricula A few IRIN ships are probably employed ‘almost entirely as training ships for cadets and secruits, The Shah's personal yacht was con- ‘verted t0 a training ship for use in the Caspian Sea in 1903. The naval base at Bandar Anzali in the Caspian hosts a naval training center, and Iranian media have often shown naval special operations forces training there. IRIN submarine crews go through a training course, probably at Bandar Abbas, but little is known about the curriculum or the attrition rate for smdents Dispersals Both the IRIN and IRGCN will ikely rely ‘on dispersal from major bases and facilities in order to improve their survivabilityAn Iranian KILO. class submarine and email boats during. an exercise against attack, The IRGCN’s small boats are especially well suited for dispersale as they are inherently hard to detect and de not require large piers or deep-water facilities, Iran's lengthy coastline, mnmerone islands, and many inlets and inland waterways would provide ample hiding places for most of the IRGCN’s small boats, The IRIN’ larger ships would Jbe less capable of hiding along the share ar in inland waterways, but would probably attempt ‘to disperse from their major hases to smaller facilities in order to avoid detection and attack, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Iran uses a variety of means to conduct sur- ‘weillance along its coastline and in the Persan Gulf and Gulf of Oman, The Islamic Repub- lic of Iran Air Force's P-3F ORION remains Iran’s principal maritime patrol aircraft. Other aircraft that ean conduct patrols over water inchide the F.27 FRIENDSHIP, the SH-3D SEA KING, and the Y-12 TURBO PANDA, Dbutnone of these has the endurance of the ORION and are probably used only for local patrols, The IRIN’s large ships can conduct surface patrols of up to ten days, although they lack modern surface search sadars. The IRGCN’ smaller boats cannot patrol for a3 ‘many days as the IRIN’: hips but can make up for their shorter endurance with their much greater mmbers ‘Through a combination of traditional and supplemental ISR, Iran probably maintains a fairly accurate, tienely picture of the mari- time traffic in its waters, Iran's numerous oil platforms in the northern Persian Gulf prob- ably provide some supplemental surveillance capability, either through radars or simple ‘visual observation of nearby maritime traffic ‘The Iranian-held islands in the Strait provide {deal locations to monitor inbound and ont- hound maritime traffic, a the traffic separa tion scheme pastes within a few miles of several ey islands. Finally, there are several hundred small Ironisn boat and dhows afloat on the Persian Gulfevery day, coming and going to every comer of the Gulf, Any of these boats could pass ISR information to Iran's naval forces by satellite phone or radio, IRGCN Small Boat Tactics Unlike IRIN tactics—founded on conventional naval operations during the days of the Shah— the IRGCN’s tactics have grown from com bination offirregular warfare and ground force principles, Athongh the IRGCN has existed for more than 25 years—growing significantly more professional and structured during thattime—it has eschewed a conventional ap- proach to naval warfare in favor of aspmmetzie tactics and principles of irregular warfare, The remufts have been ndaptable tactics that lever- age surprise, speed, maneuverability, mass, and deception, and which ultimately manifest themselves in hit-and-run style attacks, Although public statements from Iranian, leadership routinely emphasize their “new” style of conductiny asymmetric warfare at sea, IRGCN small boat tactics are neither new nor original but are typical of historical small boat warfare tactics. Thus, in secking to understand the types of tactice used by the IRGCN, are- view of the basic principles and tactics of small boat warfare is essential, ‘Small Boat Warfare: Advantages and Disadvantages. Small boats offer a number of tactical advantag- es when operated properly inthe littoral. Most modern small boats are capable of high speeds, have very shallow drafts, can be difficult to de- tect because oftheir small size, and may not be positively identified even when detected. These advantages allow small boats to operate in areas where laryer ships cannot, and thei: high speeds and greater maneuverability axe well euited for conducting hit-and-run style attacks, While small boats do have several advantages, they are also constrained by a araber of tactical limitations, For example, small boats have limited sea keeping capability, limited operating ranges, and limited endurance. Ad- ditionally, they typically have a relatively smnall ‘weapons Joad-ont, litle armor or protection for the crew, and difficulty firing weapons accu- rately due to platform instability: Thus, small boats will generally have to be elose to their target to accurately employ their weapons, will have difficulty employing their weapons accurately at high speeds or when maneuver- ing, and will normally operate near shore or in shallow waters, Most small boats conduct hitand-run style at sacks using surprise or deception, capitalizing ‘on the surrounding environment, Small boats consistently attempt to use the geography to their advantage by engaging targets that are restricted in their maneuverability, such as ves sels operating in areas of high traffic density, in straits, or vessels entering or leaving port, In order to exploit these tactical advantages and attempt to overcome their inherent disadvan- ‘ages, small boats will most commonly oper ate in groups. Operating in groupe affords small oats etter combat capabilities through, ‘mutual protection while alto increasing their offensive firepower, Small boat tactics vary slightly depending on whether they are operat= ing in large groups, small groups, or indepen- dently, For example, deception and surprise ‘ave more essential for a small boat operating independently. However, surprise and decep- tion are more difficult for a large group of boats to achieve, so they will typically rely on ‘mass and maneuver to overwhelm their target, anticipating that some of the small boats will, penetrate a ship® defenses, IRGCN Small Boat Employment ‘The IRGCN has used groups of small boats since the mid-1990s, conducting a aumber of attacks on meschant shipping in the Tanker ‘War. While generally operating in relatively mall groups, the boats would approach the targeted veseel to very close range and then fire any number of weapons, which typically included machine guns and rocket propelled grenades, into the bridge and crew living spaces, Garrent IRGCN small boat tactics are prob- ably similar to historical IRGGN small boat tactics or, at a minimum, utilize the same principles, There is an abundance of liverause available on IRGCN small boat “swarms.” some stating that hundreds of boats may be used together.Chapter Five Outlook Submarines ‘Submavines will probably remain a key feanare of Iran's naval order of battle. Iran isthe only county in the Fersian Gulf region with sab- ‘marines, and Iranian naval leaders have stated publicly that they believe submarines are a bet- ter value than other weapons systems, The late Rear Admisal Ashidbus Daneh-Kar wrote that Iran “calculated the deterrent value of subma- rines—submarines could, on a purely self sufficient basis, detect surprise attacks launched from far distances and abort them.” In keeping with this focus on submarines, in August 2008 Iran reported that the Ministry of Defense's Marine Industries Organiza- tion inangnrated the production line of the (QNEM-class submarine, reportedly 2 450-ton submarine. Iran has stated that this new gen- eration submarine will be builtin Iran and will "Dahl, Abs, Rear Adit, “Opera Dacre Ibe equipped with torpedoes, naval mines, and missiles, According to Iran, the QNEM will bbe capable of carrying out both defensive and offensive operations, Additionally, the IRIN Commander, Rear ‘Admiral Sayyari, announced the production ofa submarine of more than 1,000 tons. This say be yet another submarine for the IRIN in addition to the QUEM. Surface Ships Tran has constructed what it calls the MOWJ- class destroyer—in fact a corvette—that, once accepted into service, will probably be em- ployed in the IRIN’s operating area in the Gulf ‘of Oman, More construction of larger sips hhas occurred in the Caspian. Iran announced ‘that it began a production line of the MOW]-2 ‘at Bandas Anzali, Abo in the Caspian, Iran thas built four copies of its COMBATTANTE class guided missle pateol boat, These con- struction programs demonstrate Iran's ability to produce mid- to large-size ships. Coupled with Iran’ continning interest in self-sufficiency, these ship-building programs will likely be fol lowed by others ‘The IRIN is also retrofitting older surface combatants with upgraded weapons systems, thcHan af the dail of rn," Sfp ise Ne 238 pp 40-22For example, in 2008 Iran announced that it had insalled missiles on one ofits patrol craft, turning it into a guided missile patrol craft substantially upgraded the PF-103- cass patrol ship NAGHDI with missiles, This type of retrofitting will allow the IRIN to extend the usefialness of its aging fleet, Tran In contrast to the IRIN, the IRGCN has con- centrated on acquiring and developing small, fast hoate, some lightly armed and others armed with missiles and torpedoes, and will probably continue this trend, Weapons ‘Naval modernization is one of Iran's highest military priorities and the country continnes 10 focus on weapons acquisition and development programs, Programs of interest include expand- ing inventories of existing weapons systems and increasingly sophisticated systems, Weapons, euch a2 the Hoot supercaviration high-speed snissile torpedo, may be proliferated through- out the Iranian naval inventory, as will lager range anti-ship cruise missiles, such a8 the Relad. Finally, given the importance of min- ing to Iranian naval strategy, sore effort will continue in this area as well, Changes in Strategy Iran's naval forces are unlikely to make whole- sale changes to their naval strategy: However, itis clear that Iran will modify its strategy when appropriate, Rear Admiral Daneh-Kar noted that Iranian planners would review and. revise their operational doctrine based on les« sons learned fem past and current operations, ‘aswell as on the capabilities of new weapons systems entering the service. He continued, “We cannot develop the Navy's operational doctrine in isolation." Recent activity bears witness to some of this adaptation. TRIN coramender Rear Adzniral Sayyari has stated that the IRIN will push ‘operations further ont into the Gulf of Oman and even the Indian Ocean to protect Iran's ‘maritime interests, and, as mentioned earlier, Tran claims its naval forces are conducting ex- tended patrols. A decade hence may see more frequent IRIN patrols in the north Arabian Sea or Indian Ocean, To support this, the TRIN has a plan to establish new naval bases along the Gulf of Oman by 2015 and strength- ‘en its presence outside the Strait of Hormuz, ‘The IRGCN will ikely continue to patrol and ‘operate inside the Persian Gulf, aplace where "Dane Rin, Aus Ror Acid, “Operational Darin of the ay ofthe Ils Republic of bon,” Sfh ise Ma 298, pp 5O-28itsagymmetvic tactics and mmerons platforms are at an advantage, However, its moderniza- tion efforts may provide it with move eaphieti- cared platforms, Conclusion. “The countries of this megion have a sensitive stratagic cand gaopaitce situation and the Islamic Rspublic of ran can lay a considerable role among there coun- pe Gmoral Mekammad-Bager Splgadr Former Deputy Conemander Islamic Rewbutivnary Guard Corps Iran sees ittelf asa regional power, and its naval forces, the IRIN and the IRGCN, plan to support this view as they work to expand both their weapons inventories and their capabilities. According to Iranian officials, “extrasregional” forces are neither welcome nor necessary in the waterways of the Middle East, and the Iranian armed forces have “proven during these 30 years ofthe revoin- tion that they are ready to defend the territory of their country?” ORIEC Commands ie Test Shows re Away Roy to Ra,” Vio te Elam pablo Bn eeu 19 Ja! 2008.PUBLISHED BY THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, Correspondence should be sent to Senior Intelligence Officer - Iran 4251 Suitland Road Suitland, MD 20395 ‘oni@nmic.navy.mil This report contains copyrighted material. Copying and disseminating the contents are prohibited without the permission of the copyright owners. Copyright permission has b: ght for those pictures where copyright was known, and attribution to those sources, when known, has been given.