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Nigerias Political Violence Research Network (NPVRN)

From Boko Haram to Islamic State in West African Province

The Changing Dynamics

Fr. Atta Barkindo

Shortly before the 2015 elections, Nigeria pushed for a shift in the election date to enable the
security forces to defeat Boko Haram and ensure peaceful conduct of the elections. To achieve
this, the government, in addition to the regional forces, engaged mercenaries from South Africa
and the former Soviet bloc1. As a result, many of the former Boko Haram Caliphate areas
were decimated and recaptured2. Additionally, the bomb making factories of Boko Haram have
been shut down by Nigerian security services in Potiskum, Buni Yadi, Mubi, Gwoza, and Enugu
this year3. Many of these suicide bombing and improvised explosive device (IED) operations
have been averted through heightened security measures by security operatives and IDPs, or
botched attacks resulting in the deaths of the suicide bombers themselves4. The Nigerian military
is now clearing Boko Harams last stronghold in the Sambisa Forest. As of April 28, 2015 troops
have captured and destroyed three Boko Haram camps inside the Sambisa Forest, including the
notorious Tokumbere camp, rescuing 200 girls and 93 women. More people are being rescued
though not the Chibok girls. The man who heads the team that supplies Boko Haram food and
fuel has also been arrested5. The loss of territory has significantly weakened the morale of Boko
Haram. First, leading up to the elections, suicide bombings accounted for 27% of Boko Harams
tactics since March 14, 2015. However, since the regional onslaught against them, there have not
been recorded bomb explosions except the one that occurred on May 30 in Kogi state 6. The
desperation of Boko Haram is indicated by the fact that there were eight attempts on Maiduguri
using suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices planted within the Internally displaced
person (IDP) camps. Even as regional forces made attempts to rescue women and children,
Boko Haram fighters stoned captives to death, some girls and women were crushed by an
armoured car and three died when a land mine exploded as they walked to freedom 7. It is the
same desperation that has pushed Boko Haram to strategically go into an alliance with ISIL.
Despite the loss of members and the significant loss of territories, Boko Harams cells are still
active throughout the country, mounting about twenty-seven surprise attacks on Niger, Chad,
and Cameroon in addition to Nigeria. April 25th, 2015 Boko Haram mounted an attack on
the Niger Island army base as a retaliation for Niger joining the MNJTF to put down the
insurgency. Niger suffered a wave of attacks and suicide bombings in its southern border region
of Diffa in February and March, prompting the government to declare a state of emergency
Kiley, Sam. 2015. Mercenaries Launch Dark War Against Boko Haram. Sky News 16 March, 2015.
http://news.sky.com/story/1446159. See video: www.youtube.com/watch?v=DBPge0Xiu4Y (accessed March 17, 2015)
2 Nigerian Army Recaptures More Towns, Assures On Security. April 10, 2015. www.channelstv.com/.../nigerian-armyrecaptures-more-towns-assures-o...
Nigerian
Army
retakes
Damboa,
Askira
Uba,
others
from
...www.premiumtimesng.com/.../180919-nigerian-army-retakes-damboa-as...
3 Nigeria: JTF Raids Boko Haram Bomb Factory, Arrests 156 ...www.voiceofafricaradio.com News. JTF Bursts Another Boko Haram
Bomb Factory, Kills 3, Articles www.thisdaylive.com HOME NEWS
4 Musdapha Ilo, Soldiers Foil Bomb Attack On Maiduguri IDP Camp. icirnigeria.org/soldiers-foil-bomb-attack-on-maiduguri-idp-camp/
5 Nnenna Ibeh. 2015. Man who supplies fuel, food to Boko Haram arrested Nigerian military. Premium Times, May 3, 2015.
6 African Spotlight. 2015. africanspotlight.com/.../explosion-rocks-popular-tao-fm-radio-station-in-...
7
Michelle
Faul.
2015.
With
rescue
near,
Boko
Haram
stoned
Nigerian
girls
to
death.
abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/nigeria-freed-women-girls...
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there. On April 2, Boko Haram mounted an attack on Malam Fatori, a border town with Chad
and killed nine Chadian soldiers, wounding sixteen in the process8. Since March 14 Boko Haram
has been contesting for territories around Biu, Hawul, Madagali and Damboa. The sect also
continues to contest Local Government Areas of Mobbar (Damasak & Gachagar villages), Marte
(New Marte, Marte and Kirinowa villages), and Ngala (Gamboru and Fuye villages) while
remaining active in Askira/Ube, Chibok, Gwoza and Ngala. The reason for this is the fact that
the border zone area between Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon provides a strategic
advantage to Boko Haram as it is thinly populated and control of the state is weak. This region is
a strategic informal trade and smuggling corridor where activities are facilitated by exploiting
kinship links, such as the Kanuri groups9. Second, Boko Haram has in most battles deployed its
followers and sympathisers to fight, reserving the hard-core loyal members as well as the
ideologues for the bigger jihad. Most importantly, with Boko Haram, there is always an on-going
conscription and recruitment at the border region, using money and force. According to the
findings of IRIN, Boko Haram pays jobless men who live at these ungoverned spaces, as much
as between US$600 US$800 each month to join their cause10. Considering the weakened
condition of Boko Haram at the moment, it is unlikely that it will be able to control the
territories it is contesting, even if it succeeds in seizing one or more of these territories.

Given the garnered momentum of the regional forces in the Northeast, Boko Harams ability to
leverage support from the Islamic State and/or other international jihadi networks may take on
greater significance. In the coming months, Boko Haram is likely to increase its use of Kanuri
tribal and ethnic networks at the border regions to attack regional forces. There is likely to be an
increase in the kidnapping of expatriates at the border region. The sect may also resume its old
ways of using guerrilla tactics to hit and run, infiltrate civilian population and kill at will. For
instance, on April 6, Boko Haram members disguised as preachers went to a Mosque in the
remote village of Kwajafa, on the outskirts of Maiduguri. They killed 24 people and left several
others severely wounded11. It is also expected that Boko Haram will now focus on taking
advantage of Islamic State to recover territories, assert control over these territories, and attack
regional forces. However, as a contribution to the ideals of ISIL, Boko Haram could also focus
on western interests and targets, including oil investments, businesses premises, western citizens
as well as anything related to the regional coalition. At the moment there has not been any
evidence to suggest there is a significant change in the tactics, objectives or targets of Boko
Haram because of its close relationship with ISIL. However, there has been evidence of closer
ties. The Islamic State recently released a new video eulogizing Nigerias Boko Haram - a sign of
closer ties between the groups, and suggesting their merger is complete. Boko Haram has been
rebranded as the Islamic States West African Province through social media channels most likely
controlled by the Islamic State or supporters.

Despite this seemingly natural alliance between Boko Haram and ISIL, changes within the sect
may not be easily visible to an outside observer. ISIL stated clearly on page 24 of ISs official
Boko Haram kills nine Chadian soldiers in ... - Daily Mail www.dailymail.co.uk/.../Boko-Haram-kills-nine-Chadian-soldiers-ambush-a...
Interview, Adamu Yayale, Fish Trader, held for a year by Boko Haram, Maiduguri March 23, 2015.
10 Nfor, Monde Kingsley. 2015. No shortage of recruits for Boko Haram in Cameroons Far North. IRIN News 5 March 2015.
11 Boko Haram disguised as preachers kill at least 24 in Nigeria www.reuters.com/.../us-nigeria-violence-boko-haram-idUSKBN0MX114...
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magazine Dabiq 5 in October 2014 that one of the conditions for groups to apply for ISIL
affiliation is to ensure that all factions are united, which means establishing a General
Command12. On 24 February 2015, Twitter suspended Boko Harams Twitter account called
Al-Urhwa Al-Wutqha. Security analyst suggest that al-Urhwa al-Wutqha represented a Boko
Haram (Jamaat Ahlisunnah Liddaawati Wal-Jihad, or JAS) faction that was comprised of former
Ansaru members who reintegrated with Boko Haram under Abubakar Shekaus leadership but
were never loyal to Shekau13. ISIL is now requesting from Shekau the need to restructure the
organization and establish a central command for the Islamic State of the West African Province.
The evidence for these changes could be gleaned from the video Boko Haram posted on 17
February 2015 that featured Al-Urhwa Al-Wutqha claiming to be the official mouthpiece of
Boko Haram, but oddly did not mention Shekaus name once. Al-Urhwa Al-Wutqha even
seemed to contradict Shekaus enthusiasm for mass killings with explanations and justifications
which almost seemed like excuses or even apologies for Boko Harams killing of civilians,
especially the several hundred to 2,000 civilians reportedly killed in Baga in January 201514. This
was also the first time Shekau ever appeared in a video that does not use the Boko Haram logo
of two rifles crossed over a Quran, which represents Shekaus faction15. Thus, even if the AlUrhwa Al-Wutqha faction is not loyal to or fond of Shekau, it can be presumed that an
accommodation has been reached between Shekau and Al-Urhwa Al-Wutqha. Together they are
likely the General Command, which plays the role of shura, of Boko Haram.

It is likely that Boko Haram will enhance its collaboration with ISIL in North Africa, particularly
Libya. However, an ascendant Boko Haram will also face competition from other al-Qaeda sects
in the region. The Sinam al-Islam Networks al-Qabidun Ala al-Jamr Media Foundation posted
the speech on its forum on November 14, 2013. The ANSARU leader called jihad a human
movement and railed against the removal of the democratically-elected Mohamed Morsi and his
Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt. He denounced Boko Haram but sent his greetings
to the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar and al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, as well.
Boko Haram may also face challenges from Mokhtar Belmokhtar (leader of Al-Mulathameen,
who took control of Tigantourine gas facility in Algeria in 2013) and AQIM. The Islamic State is
unlikely to have the reach and resources to significantly enable Boko Haram, at least in
the medium term. However, international pressure on ISIL could give Boko Haram more
relevance in the region as a province of ISIL. Most sympathetic supporters of Islamist militancy
will be drawn to the fight for ISIL, including their its province in West Africa16. There is a
possibility that foreign fighters could be attracted to fight alongside Boko Haram, and even on
the orders of ISIL. However, foreign fighters here should not be understood only in the sense
of westerners coming from France, Belgium, US, UK, Australia and other western nations, to
fight alongside Boko Haram; nor those of the Chechens and Asians coming from Russia and
China. Boko Haram has long had foreigners fighting within its ranks, but more regionally
based. In February 2012, the Nigerian government deported over 7,000 illegal immigrants,
mostly Chadians and Nigeriens. Some were suspected terrorists accused of assisting in the Boko
Jacob Zenn. 2015. Al-Urhwa Al-Wutqha Phase II: Insights, European Union Support to help strengthen Nigerias National
Capacity to Respond to Evolving Security Challenges, EUTANS, February 26, 2015, p. 1.
13 Interview, Security source at the Intelligence Office, Abuja, Nigeria, April 3, 2015.
14 Boko Harams deadliest massacre: 2,000 feared dead in ... www.theguardian.com/.../boko-haram-deadliest-massacre-baga-nigeria
15 The Author tried to have access to the video from my friends within the security circles but it has not been possible.
16 Interview with Derek Harvey, Deputy Director, Global Initiative on Civil Society and Conflict, GICSC, University of South
Florida, March 3, 2014.
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Haram threat, while others were said to be inciting radical views17. Thus, Boko Haram foreign
fighters could be limited to radical elements from within the region--Chad, Niger, Mali, Libya
and Algeria. ISILs newly established stronghold in Libya is of significance in this light. In fact,
some foreign volunteers will assist even out of Nigeria, through providing essential services for
Boko Haram such as recruiting more fighters, making video propaganda, sourcing funds and
providing logistic support.

Another challenge in the ISIL-Boko Haram alliance is likely to be the sociological limits on its
appeal due to its ethnic, geographic and linguistic differences, and racism. (AQIM itself has had
tensions between black and Arab jihadis in its ranks)18. Shekau likes power, control and
domination. It is unlikely he will accept an external actor as the head of the group in West Africa.
Second, this has been his war and it will be strategically fatal to replace him. There is no evidence
to suggest the existence of popular support for Boko Haram. On the contrary, expectations are
high in Nigeria, that with the inauguration of Buhari as president, he is capable of bringing an
end to the Boko Haram insurgency. Niger Deltas call to secession is a greater threat to Nigerias
security after the inauguration of Buhari19. The billions of dollars in oil pipeline protection
contracts given out to the Niger Delta militants as part of an amnesty deal is not sustainable
according to the new administration20. The implications of the possible invalidation of such
contracts by the president-elect could lead to the escalation of violence. Buhari has vowed not to
threat militants and terrorist differently. There is therefore the possibility that Buhari may face
two insurgencies at the same, Niger Delta militants from the south and a Boko Haram-ISIL
alliance from the North. To weaken Boko Harams ability to move men and material from across
the border into Nigeria, the regional coalition severed Boko Harams access to primary arms
suppliers, forcing the group out of the majority of the self-proclaimed Caliphate in the
Northeast. First, there were several offensives in the Sambisa Forest which expands into Niger,
Cameroon and Chad. The military forces retook Damboa, Biu, Gwoza, Askira/Uba and Banki at
the border with Cameroon to cut of Boko Harams access both to Cameroon and some parts of
the northeast. Nigerian forces took Wulgo, Gambaru-Ngala and Kala Balge to cut off Boko
Harams unconventional routes with Niger. The Chadian military also took Karamaga, Malam
Fatori and Abadam, controlling the territories around Damasak. In the process of these
offensives, Abu Mojahid (BH Commander) was captured and killed in Alagarno on April 20,
201521.

Although not all areas are secured, there are indeed realistic prospects that Nigeria and its
neighbours can successfully neutralize Boko Haram forces in Sambisa Forest, Gwoza Hills and
the Mandara Mountains. First of all, Boko Haram has lost men, territories as well as fighting
equipment. In addition, it has suffered defections and its source of funding and recruitment has
substantially been cut off. It will be difficult for Boko Haram to have the human resources to
Punch. 2012. Illegal routes into Nigeria countless Immigration. 15 July 2012.
Interview with Derek Harvey, Deputy Director, Global Initiative on Civil Society and Conflict, GICSC, University of South
Florida, March 3, 2014
19 Tremors of Secession in the Niger Delta By Tope Oriola saharareporters.com/2015/04/.../tremors-secession-niger-delta-tope-oriol...
20 African Development, 2915. Nigeria government justifies N5.6b contracts awarded to ex-militants, afrikandevelopment.net/nigeriagovernment-justifies-nb-contracts-award (accessed May 1, 2015)
21 Boko Haram commander killed in Borno m.news24.com/.../Boko-Haram-commander-killed-in-Borno-20150423
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maintain these territories. Second, the president elect has given a boost to the coalition by
announcing that he will increase regional collaboration not only in the fight against Boko Haram,
but to take on Boko Haram-ISIL alliance22. However, for both the Nigerian military and the
AU/UN force, their fight against Boko Haram still has enormous challenges. First, there is the
challenge of sustaining the military offensive in terms of allowances, purchase of military
equipment and salaries, particularly for the Nigerian soldiers in the face of dwindling oil prices
and the strains it is already putting on the economy. Second, there is the challenge of coming to
an agreement of how long these regional AU/UN forces will stay in the region. In the event that
the regional AU/UN forces have to withdraw, can the Nigerian military secure territories that
have been re-taken from Boko Haram? Can the Nigerian military on its own take the fight to the
new Boko Haram-ISIL alliance? Despite these challenges, there is every prospect that with the
coming of Buhari, military allowances will be paid adequately and on time, weapons will be
bought and changes will be made on the top echelon of the military and security institutions in
Nigeria. At the moment, some of the IDPs are returning home but in very small numbers. The
fear of Boko Haram attacks still hangs in the air. Again, the Nigerian military has the challenge of
maintaining security in re-taken territories due to the large number of areas and the limited
resources available to the military. There have been reports of Boko Haram retaking towns like
Gambaru Ngala. Additionally, some of the areas are adjudged to be infested with landmines,
unexploded bombs and other dangerous military hardware that need to be deactivated.

Fr. Atta Barkindo

Ph.D. Research Candidate, SOAS University of London &
A Research Fellow of The Global Initiative On Civil Society and Conflict (GICSC) University of South Florida,
Tampa, USA and Founder of the Nigerias Political Violence Research Network (NPVRN) based in London, UK

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Buhari assures collaboration with Cameroon, Chad, Niger in ...www.cameroononline.org/buhari-assures-collaboration-with-cameroon-c...