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PEOPLEvs.JUMAWAN31SCRA825G.R.No.L28060,February27,1970
Teehankee,J.
FACTS:ThiscasereferstothetrialCourtsjudgmentonJune5,
1967,itwasshownthattheaccusedcollectedamountsfromcustomers
ofthebusinessfirms,namely;MontelDiscountCenter,theIloilo
EnterprisesandthePiamonte,Bros.forbeinganagent
onc o m m i s s i o n b a s i s . T h e s a i d c o l l e c t i o n s w e r e r e t u r n e d t o
t h e f i r m s , b u t o n o n e instance,herefusedtoturnoverthe
collectionsforJulyandAugust1965totheMontelDiscountCenter.He
alsorejectedthedemandletterofthecompanyforthe paymentof
FiftyFive(Php55.00)
pesos.Theaccusedcontendedthathedidnotreturnthemoneybecause
Mr.ManuelP i a m o n t e , h i s r e a l o r i g i n a l p r i n c i p a l , h a s n o t p a
i d a n d r e f u s e s t o p a y h i m h i s commission,onaccountof
businesslosses.Hefurtherallegedthatheshould
haveb e e n p a i d b y t h e c o m p l a i n a n t t h e a m o u n t o f P 1 .
5 0 p e r d a y a s h i s e a r n e d commissions.Supposedly,theamount
hewithheldwhichconstituteshisaccruedcommissionsisequivalenttoor
morethanwhatheshouldreceivefromMr.Piamonteaspaymentconsidering
thathewasabletoturnoverthefullamountofPhp65.00
tohim.Thus,theCityCourtofSanCarlosCity(Negros
Occidental)initsjudgmentfindtheaccusedappellantguiltyof
estafaunderArticle315,paragraph1(b)ofthe
RevisedP e n a l C o d e , f o r h a v i n g r e t a i n e d i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n e
v e n a f t e r d e m a n d , h i s l a s t collectionsintheamountofP55.00,due
tononpaymentofhisaccruedcommissionsinthelargeramountofP65.00
earnedonpreviouscollectionsactuallyturnedover,aswellasnonpayment
ofhisexpenseallowanceofP1.50perday,thetrialcourtbasedits
verdictsolelyonitsrejectionofappellantsdefensethathe
hadsuchrightofretentionunderArticles1912to1914oftheCivil
Code.
ISSUE:Whetherornottheaccusedshouldbeheldliableforestafa
underArticle315,par.1(b)oftheRevisedPenalCode?
HELD:AppellantcontendedthattherewasanerrorwhenthetrialCourt
madenorulingonhislackofcriminalintentandtheabsenceofdamageor
prejudicetohisprincipal.Likewise,itwasnotevenestablished
thattherewasadamageorprejudiceasanessentialelementof
estafa.Appellantsprincipalcouldnotclaimanysuchdamageorprejudice,
forappellanthadretainedandsetoffmerelyinpartwhatwasjustly
andlongduetohim,withabalancestillowingtohim.All
thesefactors,theabsence
ofcriminalintentonappellantspartandlackofdamageor
prejudicecausedtotheprincipal,besidestheappellantsproven
goodfaith,entitleappellanttoaverdictofacquittal.ACCORDINGLY,the
judgmentappealedfromwassetaside;thetrialCourtsconvictionof

TomasJumawanwasreversedandhewasacquittedofthecrimeof
estafa,withcostsdeoficio.

Peoplevs.Tomotorgo(April30,1985)
Post undercase digests,Criminal LawatPosted bySchizophrenic
Mind
Facts:Plaintiffwas the husband of the victim Magdalena de los
Santos.Magdalena had been persistentlyasking her husband to sell
theirconjugalhomeinCamarinesSurinorderforthemtotransferto
thehouseofherhusbandsinlaws.Plaintiffdidntwanttoabandon
theirhousebecausetheimprovementsthathemadetothelandsince
thisiswherehefarms.Saidlothadalotofplantsandwasveryfar
fromhisinlawsplace.
Upon returning home from his farm one day, he found his wife and
threemontholdbabyalreadygone.Hewentouttolookforthemand
caughtupwiththem200metersfromtheirhouse.Hesawhiswifewith
theirkidandabundleofclothes.Plaintiffbeggedforhiswifeto
surrender and when she refused, they got into a scurry when
theplaintifftried to take their child from his wife. The wife
arousedtheireoftheplaintiffwhenshethrewtheirchildontothe
grassy portion of the trail.Plaintiffpicked up a wood and began
hitting his wife. She fell to the ground and complained of
severechestpains.Realizingwhathehaddone,hebroughtherhome
butshedieddespiteplaintiffsefforttoalleviateherpain.
Plaintiffbroughtthepieceofwoodandreportedtheincidenttothe
baranggay captain who brought him to the police. He was charged
withparricideandpleadednotguilty.Uponrealizingthegravityof
his offense, he changed his plea to guilty. The court found him
guilty ofparricidebut with three mitigating circumstances
voluntarysurrender,pleaofguiltyandthatheacteduponanimpulse
sopowerfulasnaturallytohaveproducedpassionandobfuscation.
Hewasgiventhepenaltyofreclusionperpetua.Appellantclaimsthat
the court handed him the wrong punishment. Appellant claims that
article49oftheRevisedPenalCodeprescribestheproperapplicable
penaltywhenthecrimecommittedisdifferentfromwhatwasintended.
Ifthepenaltyprescribedforthefelonycommittedishigherthanthe
offensewhichtheaccusedwantedtocommit,thepenaltycorresponding
tothelatershallbeimposedasthemaximumperiod.Appellantavers
thatthepenaltyforthefelonycommittedbyhimparricidewas
higherthanthatwhichheintendedtocommitphysicalinjuries.
Issue:Whetherthecourtimposedthewrongpenalty

Held:The judgment is affirmed but the court would recommend that

executiveclemencybeextendedtotheaccused
Article4oftheRPCstatesthatcriminalliabilityshallbeincurred
byanypersoncommittingafelony(delito)althoughthewrongfulact
bedifferentfromthatwhichheintendedandthataccusedisliable
foralltheconsequencesofhisfeloniousact.
Article 49 of the RPC does notapplyto cases where more serious
consequencesnotintendedbytheoffenderresultfromhisfelonious
actbecauseunderArticle4.Par.1ofthesamecode,heisliable
forallthedirectandnaturalconsequencesofhisunlawfulact.His
lackofintentiontocommitagravewrongisatbestmitigating.

PeoplevsFranciscoAbarcaG.R.No.74433September14,1987Facts:
ThisisanappealfromthedecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtof
Palo,Leyte,sentencingtheaccusedappellantFranciscoAbarca
todeathforthecomplexcrimeofmurderwithdoublefrustrated
murder.ThecasewaselevatedtothisCourtinviewofthedeath
sentenceimposed.WiththeapprovalofthenewConstitution,
abolishingthepenaltyofdeathandcommutingallexistingdeath
sentencestolifeimprisonment,werequiredtheaccusedappellant
toinformuswhetherornothewishedtopursuethecaseasan
appealedcase.Incompliancetherewith,hefiledastatementinforming
usthathewishedtocontinuewiththecasebywayofanappeal.On15
July1984inTaclobanCity,theaccused,FranciscoAbarcawith
deliberateintenttokillandwithevidentpremeditation,andwith
treachery,armedwithanunlicensedfirearm(armalite),M16rifle,
shotseveraltimesKhingsleyPaulKohonthedifferentpartsofhis
bodyinflictingupongunshotwoundswhichcausedhisinstantaneous
deathandasaconsequenceofwhichalsocausedgunshotwoundstoLina
AmparadoandArnoldAmparadoonthedifferentpartsoftheirbodies
whichhavecausedthedeathofsaidspouses.
Issue:
W/Oaccusedappellantisliableforthecrimeofcomplexcrimeof
murderwithdoublefrustratedmurder?
Held:
Thecaseatbarrequiresdistinctions.Here,theaccusedappellant
wasnotcommittingmurderwhenhedischargedhisrifleuponthe

deceased.Inflictingdeathunderexceptionalcircumstancesisnot
murder.Wecannotthereforeholdtheappellantliableforfrustrated
murderfortheinjuriessufferedbytheAmparados.Fortheseparate
injuriessufferedbytheAmparadospouses,wethereforeimpose
upontheaccusedappellantarrestomayor(initsmediumandmaximum
periods)initsmaximumperiod,arrestotobeingthegraverpenalty
(thandestierro).ThedecisionappealedfromisherebyMODIFIED.The
accusedappellantissentencedtofourmonthsand21daystosix
monthsofarrestomayor.Theperiodwithinwhichhehasbeenin
confinementshallbecreditedintheserviceofthesepenalties.
HeisfurthermoreorderedtoindemnifyArnoldandLinaAmparadointhe
sumofP16,000.00asandforhospitalizationexpenseandthesumof
P1,500.00asandforArnoldAmparado'slossofearningcapacity.No
specialpronouncementastocosts

PeoplevsFranciscoAbarcaG.R.No.74433September14,1987Facts:
ThisisanappealfromthedecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtof
Palo,Leyte,sentencingtheaccusedappellantFranciscoAbarca
todeathforthecomplexcrimeofmurderwithdoublefrustrated
murder.ThecasewaselevatedtothisCourtinviewofthedeath
sentenceimposed.WiththeapprovalofthenewConstitution,
abolishingthepenaltyofdeathandcommutingallexistingdeath
sentencestolifeimprisonment,werequiredtheaccusedappellant
toinformuswhetherornothewishedtopursuethecaseasan
appealedcase.Incompliancetherewith,hefiledastatementinforming
usthathewishedtocontinuewiththecasebywayofanappeal.On15
July1984inTaclobanCity,theaccused,FranciscoAbarcawith
deliberateintenttokillandwithevidentpremeditation,andwith
treachery,armedwithanunlicensedfirearm(armalite),M16rifle,
shotseveraltimesKhingsleyPaulKohonthedifferentpartsofhis
bodyinflictingupongunshotwoundswhichcausedhisinstantaneous
deathandasaconsequenceofwhichalsocausedgunshotwoundstoLina
AmparadoandArnoldAmparadoonthedifferentpartsoftheirbodies
whichhavecausedthedeathofsaidspouses.
Issue:
W/Oaccusedappellantisliableforthecrimeofcomplexcrimeof
murderwithdoublefrustratedmurder?
Held:
Thecaseatbarrequiresdistinctions.Here,theaccusedappellant
wasnotcommittingmurderwhenhedischargedhisrifleuponthe
deceased.Inflictingdeathunderexceptionalcircumstancesisnot
murder.Wecannotthereforeholdtheappellantliableforfrustrated
murderfortheinjuriessufferedbytheAmparados.Fortheseparate
injuriessufferedbytheAmparadospouses,wethereforeimpose
upontheaccusedappellantarrestomayor(initsmediumandmaximum
periods)initsmaximumperiod,arrestotobeingthegraverpenalty

(thandestierro).ThedecisionappealedfromisherebyMODIFIED.The
accusedappellantissentencedtofourmonthsand21daystosix
monthsofarrestomayor.Theperiodwithinwhichhehasbeenin
confinementshallbecreditedintheserviceofthesepenalties.
HeisfurthermoreorderedtoindemnifyArnoldandLinaAmparadointhe
sumofP16,000.00asandforhospitalizationexpenseandthesumof
P1,500.00asandforArnoldAmparado'slossofearningcapacity.No
specialpronouncementastocosts
Peoplevs.Cabalhin
(1994)CabalhinwasconvictedbytheRTCofparricide,homicide,and
frustratedhomicidefor,respectively,killinghiswife,killinghiswifes
paramour,andalmostkillingtheparamoursmotherwhosurvived.C.claims
thathecaughthiswifeandherparamourintheactofsexualintercourse
whileintheparamourshouse(heclaimshesawherwithherlegsapartand
themanontopofher),thenstabbedthebothofthemandthenstabbedthe
paramoursmotherwhenshetriedtostophim.Onappeal,C.claimsthatthe
exceptionalcircumstancesofArticle247shouldapplytohim.TheRTC,
however,greatlyconsideredthetestimonyoftheprosectionwitness,the
barangaytanodwhotestifiedthatwhenhesawthewifeandtheparamouron
thatday,allbloodied,thewifewasfullydressedwhiletheparamourwas
wearingkhakipantsandnoshirt.
Held:Decisionaffirmed.Guiltyofparricide,homicideandfrustrated
homicide.Theprincipalquestioniswhetherornotappellantkilledhiswife
andherparamourintheactofcommittingthesexualactorimmediately
thereafter.Findingsoffactofthetrialcourtsaregiven
greatweightonappeal,andtheCourtfindsthatthereisno
reversibleerrorcommittedbythetrialcourtinappreciatingthe
barangaytanodstestimony.UnderArticle247,thekillingofthewifebythe
husband(orviceversa)isjustifiedifthehusbandkillsherwhileengaged
insexualintercoursewithanothermanorimmediatelythereafter.
Clearly,inthepresentcase,C.failedtoprovethathekilledthem
whileintheactorimmediatelyafter.HecannotinvokeArticle247;
henceheisguiltyofparricideforkillinghiswife,homicideforkilling
herparamour,andfrustratedhomicidefortheparamoursmother.
PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,plaintiffappellee,vs.CAMILOFERRERand
ROMEOREYES,accusedappellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN,J.:
Inresolvingthiscase,thisCourtfindsoccasiontodifferentiate
between a state witness and a prosecution witness.It also

reiterates some wellsettled doctrines in appreciating the generic

aggravatingcircumstancesofnocturnityandcruelty.
ThisisanappealfromtheDecision[1]datedMay15,1991ofthe
RegionalTrialCourtofRoxas,Isabela,Branch23,findingappellants
CamiloFerrerandRomeoReyesguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthe
crime of murder for the fatal assault upon Florante Agtang and
imposing oneach ofthem the penalty ofreclusion perpetuaandthe
jointandseveralpaymenttotheheirsofthevictimoftheamountof
P50,000.00ascivilindemnity,pluscosts.
OriginallychargedintheInformationfiledbeforethethenCourt
ofFirstInstanceofIsabelaonFebruary18,1977wereTomasAgniror
Agner and appellants FerreraliasMilo and ReyesaliasRomy.The
Informationallegedasfollows:
Thatonoraboutthe27thdayofApril,1976,inthemunicipalityof
Quirino,provinceofIsabela,Philippines,andwithinthe
jurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,thehereinaccused,together
withJuanGalasi,whoisalreadydead,andfour(4)JohnDoes,whose
realidentitiesarestillunknown,armedwiththree(3)firearms,
boloesandpointedknives,conspiringandconfederatingtogetherand
allhelpingoneanother,withevidentpremeditationandtreachery,
didthenandtherewillfully,unlawfullyandfeloniously,withintent
tokill,suddenlyandunexpectedlyandwithoutgivinghimchanceto
defendhimself,assault,attackandstabwithsharppointedknivesone
FloranteAgtang,inflictinguponthelattermultiplestabwoundson
thedifferentpartsofhisbodywhichdirectlycausedhim
instantaneousdeathduetoacutehemorrhage.
CONTRARYTOLAW.[2]
ArraignedonJuly22,1977intheIlocanodialectwhichtheyspeak
and understand, the three accused pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.[3]

TheFacts
Thefactsofthecaseassummarized[4]bythetrialcourtareas
follows:
Theprosecutionpresentedfour(4)witnesses,includingoneofthe
accusedTomasAgnerwhowassubsequentlydischargedasastate
witness(p.160,records).
Thedefensepresentedthetwoaccused,CamiloFerrerandRomeoReyes,

MerlitaCajalne,wifeofaccusedRomeoReyes,andtheparentsof
CamiloFerrer,PedroFerrerandQuintinaFrancisco.
Fromthecombinedtestimoniesoftheprosecutionwitnesses,it
appearsthatintheeveningofApril27,1976,FloranteAgtang,
ApolonioVillanuevaandOscarViernes,threeyoungmenfromDolores,
Quirino,Isabela,wenttogethertobarangayVintarofthesame
municipalityandaneighboringbarrio,tovisitladiesoftheircourt
FloranteAgtangtothehouseofoneEsterGalasiandOscarViernes
tothehouseofoneLeticiaGambalan.ApolonioVillanuevapreferred
togowithOscarViernesandstayedinthehouseofLeticiaafter
theyconductedAgtangtothehouseofEster.
Atabout10:00oclockthatsameevening,FloranteAgtangdroppedby
thehouseofLeticiawherehiscompanionswereandbadetheduofor
allofthemtogohome.Theyallwenttogetherhomeboundwhenupon
reachingtheoutskirtsofbarangayVintar,aftertheyhadjustpassed
anIndependentChurchnotfarfromthehouseofLeticia,theyhearda
whistleandtwomenemergedfromnowhereandwarnedthemnottorun
away.Thetriostoppedandidentifiedthemselves.Thetwo
unidentifiedpersonsapproachedandfriskedthemforhiddenweapons
withoneofthetwopointingalongfirearmatthem.Apolonioand
OscarwerefoundtobecarryingkniveswhileFlorantewasdivestedof
ahomemadegunknownaspaltik.Proceedingfurtherastheywere
orderedtofollow,theycameuponaplacenearacornfieldwherefour
(4)morepersonsemerged,oneofwhomwasidentifiedastheaccused
TomasAgner.Apoloniowasabletofleeashewasfrightenedbytheir
captorsthattheywouldusetheknifeconfiscatedfromhispossession
tokillthem.Runningasfastashecould,hewasshotatbutthey
missedhim.InfuriatedbecauseofApoloniosescape,theystarted
beatingFloranteandOscarbeforetheyreachedariverbank.They
wereferriedacrosstheriveranduponreachingtheMagsaysayQuirino
boundaryneartheproposedrailroad,thetwowereagainorderedto
removetheirclotheswithwhichtheyusedtotiethem.Afterthey
weretiedacertainDominghitFlorantewithabuttofthegun
fellinghimtothegroundasaresult.Florantelyingfallen,Camilo
FerrerandRomeoReyestookturnsinstabbingtheirhapless
victim.TheywaylaidFloranteandthegrouplefthimwherehewas
slain,includingOscarVierneswhowasreleasedbutwasforewarned
nottorevealwhathappenedtoanyone.
Thefollowingmorning,theincidentwasreportedbyOscarViernes
despitethewarningtothebarangaycaptainofDoloreswhointurn
reportedthesametothepoliceauthoritiesofQuirino,Isabela.
Actingonsaidreportthepolicefoundthedeadbodyattheplace
pointedtobyOscarwheretheyweremaltreated.Thebodybore
multiplestabwounds.BroughttotheirhousethebodyofFlorantewas
autopsiedbyDr.LuisR.Tamayo,MunicipalHealthOfficerofRoxas,

isabela.ThefindingsofDr.Tamayoconfirmedthepresenceof
severalstabwoundsandthecauseofdeathwasattributedtoacute
hemorrhageresultingfromsaidinjuries.
ThestarwitnessfortheprosecutionwasTomasAgnir(orAgner)
who,uponmotionofthefiscal,wasdischargedfromtheInformation
by the trial court in orderthat hecould be astate witness.He
testifiedthus:
AgnerwasthebrotherinlawofJuanGalasi,thelatterssister
beingtheformerswife.HeandGalasicoownedaboatwhichAgner
himselfusedinferryingpeopleacrosstheriver.[5]Intheevening
ofApril27,1976,Galasi,RomeoReyes,CamiloFerrerandacertain
DomingoorDingwenttohishouseandaskedhimtotakethemacross
theriver.Theywarnedhimthatshouldherefusetoobeythem,they
wouldkillhim.[6]
Accedingtothegroupsdemand,Agnerwentwestwardwiththemto
the river. Along the way, they met Oscar Viernes, Florante Agtang
(Actang or Florendo Agtang[7]) and Apolonio Villanueva. Reyes,
DomingoandFerrersearchedthebodiesofthethree.Theygottwo
knivesfromeachofVillanuevaandViernesandapalticfirearmfrom
Agtang.Nearthebananaplants,asallofthemhadresumedwalking
totheriver,threeotherpersonswhowerestrangerstoAgner,joined
them. Suddenly, Villanueva ran away. Domingo shot at but missed
Villanueva.Consequently;Domingo,FerrerandReyestiedAgtangand
Vierneswithwhatlookedlikeaplasticrope.Allofthemwentto
theriverwhereAgnerferriedthemacross.
They went northward to the proposed railroad.There, Agner was
segregated from the group at a distance of around four (4)
meters.Fromthatdistance,AgnerwatchedasDomingostruckAgtangs
mouthwithagunbutt,causinghimtofalltothegroundwhileFerrer
andReyesstabbedthevictimseveraltimesashelayhelpless.All
these happened in the presence of Galasi. Domingo then ordered
Viernestogohome.Agnerhimselfwastoldbythethreeunidentified
personstogohomewithinstructionsnottorevealtoanyonewhathad
happenedotherwise,hetoowouldbekilled.
According to Agner, Agtang was assaulted by the group because
Galasi,whosedaughterwastobemarriedtoAgtang,didnotwantthe
marriagetotakeplaceashepreferredsomeonefromMagsaysaytobe
hisdaughtersgroom.DomingowasfromAggad,Magsaysay,Isabela.[8]
Villanueva, who was 21 years old when the incident happened,
corroborated Agner s story.He testified that, at around 7:00
oclockintheeveningofApril27,1976,he,togetherwithViernes

andAgtang,lefttheirplaceinDolores,Quirino,IsabelaforVintar
(Bintar), another barrio in Quirino.Negotiating the distance
between the two barrios on foot, he and his companions arrived in
Vintar at around 9:00 oclock that night.They proceeded to the
GalasiresidencewhereAgtangvisitedEsterGalasi.ThenVillanueva
accompaniedVierneswhilethelattervisitedLeticiaGambalan.After
aroundtwohours,Agtangfetchedthemandthethreeofthemproceeded
home.
Alongtheway,someonewhistledatthem.Whentheycametoahalt,
twopersonsapproachedandtoldthemnottorun.Thethreeyoungmen
were told to follow them northward. When they reached a banana
plantation,thetwopersons,whoturnedouttobeReyesandFerrer,
whistledandfourotherpersonscameoutfromhiding.Thesefourmen
asked the three young men to follow them to the fields.Of these
four men, Villanueva recognized only Agner whom he used to see in
Vintar.
When they reached the fields, one of them, whom Villanueva
identifiedlaterasFerrer,approachedhimandaskedforhissmall
bolo(imuco),saying that they would use the bolo in killing
him.Frightened, Villanueva fled into the tobacco field and hid
therethewholenight.Inthemorning,hewenthomeandcheckedon
hiscompanions.HefoundViernesbutlearnedthatAgtangsdeadbody
hadbeenfoundontheothersideoftheMalligRiver.[9]
TwentyoneyearoldAgtangsustainedseven(7)stabwoundsonthe
left chest, right chest, epigastrium and abdomen.These wounds
injured the lungs, heart and stomach and produced massive
hemorrhage.He had four (4) puncture wounds on the right iliac
region and two (2) other stab wounds ontheright and left axilla
whichinjuredthelungsandalsoproducedextensivehemorrhage.[10]
BasedontheswornstatementsexecutedbyVillanuevaandViernes
on May 4, 1976,[11]Sgt. Doroteo Villegas filed a complaint for
murder against Agner and five(5)John Does before the Municipal
Court of Quirino.[12]It was from Agner, who executed a sworn
statement on June 19, 1976,[13]that Sgt. Villegas learned the
identitiesofReyesandFerrer.[14]Accordingly,Sgt.Villegasfiled
anamendedcomplaintnamingthereinasaccused,asidefromAgnerand
Galasi,RomyReyes,MiloPerel(sic),DomingDoe,JohnDoe(sic),
Peter Doe and Bernard Doe.[15]On August 6, 1976, the Municipal
CourtofQuirino[16]orderedtheissuanceofwarrantsforthearrest
ofalltheaccusedbutdismissedthecaseasregardsGalasiwhohad
died.[17]After due investigation, the aforequoted Information was
filed.

TheDefense:DenialandAlibi
Intheirdefense,appellantsinterposeddenialandalibi,swearing
thattheywerebothathomewhenthecrimewascommitted.Merlita
Cajalne,thewifeofReyes,testifiedthatApril27,1976wastheir
wedding anniversary, having been married on April 27, 1971.After
taking their supper with their five children at 6:00 oclock that
night,theywenttobed.Shewokeupat6:00oclockthefollowing
morningandfoundherhusbandstillasleep.Shewassurethather
husbanddidnotleavehomeduringthenightbecauseshegotupsix
(6)timesthatnighttoanswerthecallofnature.[18]
AppellantReyestestifiedthathedidnotevengooutofhishome
in Aga, Delfin Albano, Isabela that fateful day, much less that
evening.He denied having been to Vintar.He was able to go to
Quirinoonlywhenhewasarrested.ThepoliceofQuirinotookhim
from the municipal jail of Delfin Albano.They rode a jeep from
Delfin Albano up to Santiago from where they walked to Quirino.
AccordingtoReyes,Agnerimplicatedhiminthemurdercasebecause
he had not paid Agner for services rendered in planting and
harvestinghis(Reyes)palay.[19]
For his part, appellant Ferrer, who used to farm the land of
Antonio Gambalan in Aga, Magsaysay (now Delfin Albano), testified
thathecouldnothavegonetoVintaronApril27,1976becausehis
sister,Margarita,waslyinginstateattheirhome.Shehaddiedat
duskofApril26,1976aftershefailedtodeliverthechildshewas
carrying.[20]
Pedro Ferrer, appellants father, testifiedthat heandhisson
Camilo,hadgonetobedatthesametimeintheeveningofacertain
day in April, 1976 when they served coffee to some visitors who
attended the wake of his dead daughter, Margarita.On cross
examination, however, PedroFerrer declaredthat onthat day, they
werecelebratingthedeathanniversaryoftheirgrandmother.[21]
Appellant Ferrers 70yearold mother, QuintinaFrancisco, could
not remember the date of the death of her daughter
Margarita.However, she insisted that on April 27, 1976, her son
Camilowasintheirhouse.Oncrossexamination,shedeclaredthat
herdaughterMargaritadiedintheearlyeveningofApril27,1976.
[22]
As stated above, the trial court held appellants guilty beyond
reasonabledoubtofthecrimeofmurder.Itfoundthatofthetwo
qualifyingcircumstancesallegedintheinformation,namely,evident

premeditation and treachery, only the latter was duly

proven.Evidentpremeditationhadnofactualbasiswhereastreachery
wassufficientlyestablishedbythefactthatAgtangwasstruckwith
thebuttofagunandstabbedrepeatedly,thathesustainedtwelve
(12)wounds(shouldbethirteen[13]wounds)whilehewastiedand
thereforeinadefenselessposition.
Appellantsnoticeofappealwasfiledbytheircounselofrecord,
Atty.EdwinC.Uy.[23]OnSeptember2,1992,theCourtrequiredhim
toshowcausewhydisciplinaryactionshouldnotbetakenagainsthim
forhisfailuretofileappellantsbriefwithintherequiredperiod
oftime.[24]Hedidfileafourpagebrief[25]butfailedtoexplain
itslatefiling.Thus,onNovember11,1992,theCourtimposedupon
Atty.UyafineofP500ora5dayimprisonmentforhisfailureto
explainwhyhedidnotfilethebriefwithintheprescribed10day
period.TheCourtalsodismissedhimascounselfortheappellants
and appointed the Public Attorneys Office of the Department of
Justiceascounseldeoficio.[26]
TheSolicitorGeneralfiledtheappelleesbrief[27]uponreceipt
ofthebrieffiledbyAtty.Uyfortheappellants.SincethePublic
AttorneysOfficefileditsownappellantsbriefonMay6,1993,the
Solicitor General filed a second appellees brief to traverse the
contentionsoftheappellants.[28]
In this appeal, appellants allege through the Public Attorneys
Office that the trial court erred in convicting them of the crime
charged notwithstanding the prosecutions failure to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.Appellants assert that they should
nothavebeenconvictedonthetestimonyoftheirformercoaccused
which was not materially corroborated and therefore insufficient,
comingasitdidfromsomeonewhohadhisowninteresttoprotect.
In so contending, appellants quote[29]the portion of Agners
testimony wherein he described the participation of each of the
perpetratorsofthecrimeasfollows:
Q.Afteryouweresegregatedandbroughttoadistanceofmore
orless4meterswhathappened,ifany?
A.CamiloFerrerandRomeoReyesstabbedFloranteAgtang.
Q.AboutDin/Doming,didhedoanyfromthepersonofFlorante
Agtang?(sic)
A.DingstruckwiththefirearmthemouthofFloranteAgtang,
sir.
Q.WherewasJuanGalasiwhenAgtangwasbodyharmed(sic)by

thepersonsyoumentioned?
A.JuanGalasiwaswiththegroupofRomeoReyes,CamiloFerrer
oracertainDoming,sir.[30]
CitingBarrettovs.Sandiganbayan[31]whereintheCourtheldthatthe
testimonyofastatewitnesswhichisnotmateriallycorroboratedis
not sufficient for conviction, appellants state that x x x
althoughstate witness Apolonio Villanuevatestified that he
recognizedtheAccusedAppellantsonthenightofApril27,1976,his
testimonyishoweverineffectiveandincredibleconsideringthatwhen
hewasconfrontedwithhisswornstatement(Exh.C)takenbyCpl.
Doroteo Villegas and subscribed before the Municipal Mayor of
Quirino, he could hardly explain the inconsistency between his
testimonyandhisswornstatement.[32]Theythenquotethatportion
of ApolonioVillanuevas testimonywhereinhe was confronted with
hisswornstatement.
Apolonio Villanueva was a prosecution witness butnota state
witness.UnderSection9ofRule119oftheRulesofCourt,astate
witness is one of two or more persons jointly charged with the
commissionofacrimebutwhoisdischargedwithhisconsentassuch
accusedsothathemaybeawitnessfortheState.Heshallonlybe
discharged after the court has requiredtheprosecutionto present
evidence and his sworn statement at a hearing in support of the
dischargeandthecourtissatisfiedthattherequirementsofSection
9arepresent.[33]
Inthiscase,ApolonioVillanuevawasnotanaccused.Havingbeen
inthecompanyofAgtangwhenhewaskilled,Villanuevawaspresented
by the prosecution as a witness.It was Tomas Agner who was
originallyincludedasanaccusedintheinformation,butbeforethe
startofthehearing,hewasdischargedasanaccuseduponthemotion
of the prosecution in order that he could testify for the
state.While the procedure undertaken in discharging him may be
questionedbecausethetrialcourtorderedhisdischargeevenbefore
theprosecutionhadstartedpresentingevidence,itissafetoassume
that said court, in the exercise of its sound discretion,
[34]consideredasbasisforhisdischargetheswornstatementAgner
executed before the police.Moreover, his discharge was effected
upon the motion of the trial fiscal who, being in possession of
evidenceaheadofthecourtandeventhedefense,wasbestqualified
todeterminewhoamongtheaccusedshouldbedischargedtobeastate
witness.[35]
Be that as it may, any legal deficiency attending Agners
dischargefromtheinformationmaynotaffecttheadmissibilityand

credibilityofhistestimonyintheabsenceofprooftothecontrary.
[36]The trial court, upon which is vested the task of assigning
probativevaluetothetestimonyofawitness,affixedthestampof
credibility upon the testimony of Agner while treating it with
extreme caution.[37]In the absence of any clearshowingthat it
overlooked,misunderstoodormisappliedsomefactsorcircumstances
ofweightorsubstancewhichcouldhaveaffectedtheresultofthe
case,thetrialcourtsfindingsonthecredibilityofwitnessesare
entitledtothehighestdegreeofrespectandwillnotbedisturbed
onappeal.[38]
AlthoughitistruethatApolonioVillanuevafailedtowitnessthe
actualassaultuponAgtangashefledbeforeittranspired,Agners
sole testimony on that factstands unaffected.Thetestimony of a
singlewitness,ifpositiveandcredible,issufficienttosustaina
conviction even in the absence of corroboration[39]unless such
corroborationisexpresslyrequiredbylaw.[40]Truthisestablished
not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their
testimonies.[41]Agnerstestimonyisinfactmateriallycorroborated
by the wounds sustained by Agtang as reflected in the
certification[42]executed by Dr. Luis R. Tamayo who autopsied the
corpse,aswellasbythetestimonyofDr.Tamayo.
Thedefenseattempted to taint Agners testimony byimputing to
him a motive for testifying against the appellants.Through
appellantReyes,thedefensehintedthatAgnerhadanaxetogrind
againstReyesbecausethelatterfailedtopayAgnerformanualwork
performed in Reyes farm.Like the trial court,[43]we find such
allegedmotive altogether too insignificantto impel any personto
implicateanaccusedinsograveacrimeasmurder.Forappellant
Ferrer s part, he himself admitted that while Agner was an
acquaintance,theirrelationshipdidnotextendbeyondthat.[44]This
clearly implies that Agner had no reason to testify against
appellantsotherthantotellthetruth.Thetrialcourtsassessment
ofAgnerisilluminative:
xxxWhilehistestimonyshouldbetreatedwithextremecaution
becausehewasoriginallyindicted,thesamemustbeanalyzed
carefullyforitsprobativeworth.Itiswellsettledinour
jurisprudencethatwherethetestimonyofoneoftheaccusedis
credibleandcorroboratedbyotherwitness,thesamecannotbe
totallydiscardedbythemerefactthatsaidaccusedwasdischarged
tobeutilizedasagovernmentwitness(Peoplevs.Cutura,L12702,4
SCRA663).ThenarrationmadebyAgnerinhisaffidavitandhis
testimonyincourtiscorroboratedbywitnessApolonioVillanueva.
ThelatteridentifiedTomasAgnerasoneofthegroupofhis
tormentorsandthismusthaveledtothesolutionofthecrime

becauseTomasAgnerwheninvestigatedmadeacleanbreastofwhat
happened(ExhibitA,prosecution,p17,records),totheextent
thathenamedhiscodefendantsinthecommissionofthecrime
charged.HepointedtotheaccusedCamiloFerrerandRomeoReyeswho
stabbedFloranteAgtang.Hisidentificationofthetwocouldnotbe
saidtobetaintedwithdoubtbecausewithouthesitationandwith
spontaneityhefingeredthetwoaccusedwhostabbedmercilesslythe
deceasedvictim.ItcouldnotevenbepointedoutwhyAgnerhadto
implicatethemto(sic)thisgorycrime.Inshort,hehadnoknown
motivetodragthemintothiscase.TheclaimofaccusedFerrerthat
hedidnotpaythewagesofAgnerduringthelattersbriefstintin
thericefieldofFerrerasafarmhelpermusthavemotivatedhimto
pointhim,istooshallowapretense,ifnotpuerile,tobegiven
eventhemostscantconsideration.Absent(sic)ofanymotiveonthe
partofAgnertoincludeaccusedReyesisalsoworthyofnote.No
personworthhissaltwouldinconsciencepointtoapersonwithout
anyknownmotiveasinthecaseofotheraccused,RomeoReyes.[45]
Withrespecttotheallegedinconsistenciesbetweenthetestimony
and the sworn statement of Apolonio Villanueva or between his
testimony and the sworn statement of Viernes which, appellants
assert, rendered Villanuevas credibility doubtful, the Court has
time and again heldthat discrepancies between sworn statementsor
affidavits and testimonies made at the witness stand do not
necessarily discredit the witnesses, since exparte affidavits are
generallyincomplete.[46]Asageneralrule,aninconsistencybetween
twostatementsofawitnessshouldbedetermined,notbyresortto
individualwordsorphrases,butbythewholeimpressionoreffectof
whathasbeensaidordone.[47]
AppellantspointoutthatwhileVillanuevaadmittedinhissworn
statement that he did not recognize not even one of the
companions of Agner, on the witness stand, he claimed that he did
recognize appellants although he did not know their names.The
SolicitorGeneralcorrectlypointsoutthattheallegeddiscrepancy
wasclarifiedduringtheredirectexaminationofVillanuevawhenhe
testified that he recognized appellants as the ones who first
whistledathisgroupbutthathecouldnotrecognizethecompanions
ofAgnerwhoemergedfromthebananaplantation.[48]
In view of the positive identification of appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime, their alibi crumbled.[49]Besides, they
hadnotstrictlycompliedwiththerequirementsoftimeandplacein
saiddefense.Itshouldhavebeenestablishedthatappellantswere
somewhere else when the crime happened and that it was physically
impossible for themto be at the crime scene atthecrucialtime.
[50]Worthnotingisthefactthatthedistancebetweenappellants

respectiveresidencesinAga,Magsaysay(DelfinAlbano),Isabelaand
Vintar,Quirino,Isabelawasestablishedbythedefenseonlythrough
the manifestation in court of their counsel, Atty. Melanio T.
Singson, that there is no road connecting the two places which he
estimatedtobe70to80kilometersapartinastraightline.[51]
The trial court correctly held that treachery qualified the
killingofAgtangandthatappellantsshallbeheldresponsiblefor
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.There is
treachery because Agtang, was tied and therefore in a helpless
conditionbeforehewaskilled.[52]

AggravatingCircumstances:Nocturnity,Cruelty
However, the trial court improperly considered nocturnity as a
separate aggravating circumstance.While it correctly stated that
nighttime must be deliberately sought in the perpetration of the
crime,acloseexaminationoftherecordsshowsnofactualsupport
that the appellants indeed deliberately considered the cover of
darkness as an indispensable factor in assaulting Agtang.The
prosecutionestablishednomorethanthesimplefactthatthecrime
wascommittedatnight.
Neithermaycrueltybeappreciatedagainsttheappellants.This
aggravating circumstance is present when the wrong done in the
commissionofthecrimeisdeliberatelyaugmentedbycausingother
wrongnotnecessaryforitscommission.[53]Thetestinappreciating
cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is whether the accused
deliberatelyandsadisticallyaugmentedthewrongbycausinganother
wrong not necessary for its commission or inhumanly increased the
victim suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or
corpse.[54]InPeoplevs.DayugandBannaisan,[55]theCourtsaid:
xxx.Thereiscrueltywhentheculpritenjoysanddelightsin
makinghisvictimsufferslowlyandgradually,causinghim
unnecessarymoralandphysicalpainintheconsummationofthe
criminalactwhichheintendstocommit.Themerefactofinflicting
varioussuccessivewoundsuponapersoninordertocausehisdeath,
noappreciabletimeinterveningbetweentheinflictionofonewound
andthatofanothertoshowthathehadwantedtoprolongthe
sufferingofhisvictim,isnotsufficientfortakingthis
aggravatingcircumstanceintoconsideration.
Thus, where the victim suffered twentyone (21) wounds or
injuries,eight(8)ofwhichwerefatal,theCourtdidnotappreciate

cruelty as a generic aggravating circumstance in the absence of

positiveproofthatthewoundswereinflictedwhilethevictimwas
stillalivetoprolongunnecessarilyhisphysicalsuffering.[56]In
anothercase,wherethevictimsustainedthirteen(13)wounds,only
one of which was mortal, this Court similarly did not take into
account cruelty as an aggravating circumstance as there was no
showing that appellant deliberately and inhumanly increased the
sufferingofthedeceased.[57]
In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to prove that the
appellantsinflictedthethirteen(13)woundsuponthevictiminsuch
awaythathewasmadetoagonizebeforetheyrenderedanyofthe
blowswhichsnuffedouthislife.ByAgnersaccount,theappellants
and Domingo dealt the victim successive blows[58]so that he must
have died instantaneously, considering thatnine (9) ofhiswounds
were fatal.[59]As a matter of fact, the trial court appreciated
crueltyonlybecauseitconsideredthenumberofwoundsonthevictim
tobenotnecessarytoconsummatethecrimeofmurder.[60]
The penalty for the crime of murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code isreclusion temporalin its maximum period to
death.In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the imposable penalty is the medium period of said
penaltyorreclusionperpetua.[61]Theappellantsmustallbearthis
penaltyinviewofthedulyprovenconspiracyamongtheperpetrators
of the crime.Their cooperative acts towards the common criminal
objectiveoftakingthelifeofAgtangprovedthattheywereparties
toaconspiracy.[62]
WHEREFORE, the herein appealed Decision convicting appellants
CamiloFerrerandRomeoReyesofthecrimeofmurderandimposingon
each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the solidary
payment to the heirs of Florante Agtang of civil indemnity in the
amountofP50,000.00,isherebyAFFIRMED.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40294 July 11, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOBIAS RIBADAJO, ROMEO CORPUZ, FEDERICO BASAS, ROSENDO ANOR and
RODOLFO TORRES,defendants-appellants.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The death penalty having been imposed by the then Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal in Criminal

Case No. CCC-VII-1329-Rizal for Murder, the case is now before us for automatic review.
There were originally six (6) accused: Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Federico Basas, Rosendo
Anor, Rodolfo Torres and Loreto Rivera, all inmates of the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa, Rizal
One of the however, Loreto Rivera, died during the pendency of the case.
We find the facts of the case, as narrated in the Decision of the trial Court, home by the evidence thus:
From the evidence on record, it is clear that on November 18, 1971, at about 7:56
o'clock in the evening, prisoners from brigade 3-C, Muntinlupa, Rizal succeeded in
opening the door of their dormitory by means of a false key (tin can) and attacked the
inmates from dormitory 3-a, while the latter were then getting their food rations from the
delivery truck wherein the victim was among them. Records further show that while the
victim Bernardo Cutamora, was getting his ration he was sandwiched by the accused
who rushed towards the door and stabbed the victim simultaneously whereby the latter
sustained multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body which wounds caused
his death as evidenced by Necropsy Report marked Exhibit 'A'. To gain exit from their
brigade, accused Tobias Ribadajo used a false key (tin can) and immediately the door
was opened and his co-accused rushed towards the place where the prisoners of brigade
3-a were waiting for their ration and with respective matalas on their hands they stabbed
the victim to death. All the assailants confessed participation in the killing claiming that
they did it because they were being mocked by the inmates of 3-a who were members of
the OXO there was a time when these inmates threw human waste on their brigade
shouting that 'you Commando members could not do anything', and then they would
laugh at them; that in order to avenge this mockery the accused headed by Tobias
Ribadajo called up a meeting in the afternoon of November 18, 1971, at around 1:00,
and they planned to kill any prisoner from brigade 3-a in the evening and they would do
the killing at the time they (inmates from 3-a) were waiting for their 'rancho'. Soon their
plan was consummated and the victim, Bernardo Cutamora was the unlucky guy
overcome by their respective bladed weapons. 1
In an investigation conducted by the Investigation Section of the New Bilibid Prisons on November 20,
1971, all the accused executed statements admitting their participation in the slaying of Bernardo
Cutamora. 2 Consequently, an Information for Murder was filed against them on April 24, 1973 with
the then Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal. The delay in filing was due to the separation from the
service of a principal investigator.
Upon arraignment on July 5, 1973, accused Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Loreto Rivera (who died
on August 15, 1974, p. 46, Rollo), and Rodolfo Torres, all with the assistance of counsel de officio,
pleaded Guilty, while the other two accused Federico Basas and Rolando Aunor, alias Rolando Amor,
alias Rolando Anor, alias Tagalog, entered pleas of Not Guilty. 3 The Information was amended to
correct the name of Rolando Aunor to Rosendo Anor, alias Negro, alias Tagalog. Thereafter, evidence
was adduced.
At the presentation of evidence for the defense, accused Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, and Rodolfo
Torres withdrew their pleas of Guilty. 4 Accused Corpuz and Ribadajo also denied their participation in
the killing of Bernardo Cutamora, and repudiated their confessions, claiming that they had signed the
same under duress. Accused Federico Basas and Rodolfo Torres admitted having executed their
respective confessions, 5 while accused Rosendo Anor changed his plea of Not Guilty to Guilty of the
lesser offense of Homicide. 6
On November 28, 1974, the Trial Court pronounced a verdict of guilty, as follows:

WHEREFORE, after determining the degree of culpability of all the accused, namely:
Tobias Ribadajo, Romeo Corpuz, Federico Basas, Rosendo Anor and Rodolfo Torres, the
Court finds them GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder, as defined
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, and hereby
sentences each one of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of
the victim the amount of P12,000.00, jointly and severally; to pay moral damages in the
amount of P10,000.00 and another P10,000.00, as exemplary damages, jointly and
severally, and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs. 7
Appellants claim infirmity of the Trial Court Decision on the following grounds:
I
The Trial Court erred in admitting as evidence, and in giving weight to the supposed
extrajudicial confession of the accused.
II
The Trial Court erred in finding the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation and recidivism.
III
The Trial Court erred in convicting the accused and in imposing the death penalty.
Appellants submit that their extrajudicial confessions were extracted by force; that they had been
exposed for more or less one day to the heat of the sun and the wetness and coldness of the rain, and
had been subsequently beaten up and placed in a "bartolina "
On their face, however, the individual confessions do not show any suspicious circumstance Casting
doubt on their integrity. On the contrary, they are replete with details only appellants could have
supplied. In those statements, they called their co-accused by their nicknames, not knowing their true
names, like "Lilat" for Basas, "Manok" for Anor and "Bukid" for Torres. The investigators could not
have concocted that on November 18, 1971, at around 1:00 P.M., appellants had planned to kill any
prisoner from Brigade 3-a during the distribution of the "rancho"; that they are members of the SigueSigue Commando Gang and their leader is accused Ribadajo; that, as planned, on the same date at
around 8:00 P.M., Ribadajo using a false key tin can opened the door of their dormitory and an the
accused rushed towards the place where the inmates from Brigade 3-a were waiting for their food; that
they stabbed the victim with their "matalas"; and their motive was to avenge the throwing of human
waste on them by inmates of Brigade 3-a.
What is more, during the presentation of evidence by the defense, they were all admitting their guilt but
for the lesser offense of Homicide, as manifested by their de officio counsel.
Atty. Galvan
Your Honor, inasmuch as I have also conferred with all the accused and
that having appointed me as counsel de oficio before when Fiscal
Guerrero was here and after a long conference with the accused, and if the
Fiscal will not object if all the accused will change their former plea of
not guilty to that of guilty, as that was their proposal and they were very
insistent, that if the Court will allow them to withdraw their former plea
of not guilty and substitute with a plea of guilty to a lesser of homicide,
your Honor. 8
Despite counsel's appeal for "humanity sake," the prosecution, however, opposed the change of plea

because it had already finished with the presentation of its evidence.

We find no sufficient basis, therefore, to destroy the presumption of voluntariness of appellants'
confessions. The presumption of the law is in favor of the spontaneity and voluntariness of an
extrajudicial confession of an accused in a criminal case, 9 for no sane person would deliberately
confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience. 10 The burden
of proof is upon the declarant to destroy this presumption. 11 Mere repudiation of confession by the
accused at the trial is not sufficient to disregard his confession. 12 Concrete evidence of compulsion or
duress must be presented to sustain their claim of maltreatment. No such evidence has been put
forward. No report of such maltreatment was made to the prison authorities nor to the Fiscal who
conducted the preliminary investigation. During cross-examination, Corpuz admitted that he was not
maltreated. 13 Ribadajo himself did not protest when he was brought to Exequiel Santos,
Administrative Officer III, Bureau of Prisons, who, in his own words, was "like a father to me." 14
As to appellants' claim that they have not been informed of their right to silence and to counsel during
custodial investigation, suffice it to state that the proscription against the admissibility of confessions
obtained from an accused during the period of custodial interrogation, in violation of procedural
safeguards, applies to confessions obtained after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. 15 No law
gives the accused the right to be so informed before the enactment of the 1973 Constitution, 16 even if
presented after January 17, 1973. 17 That Constitutional guaranty relative to confessions obtained
during custodial investigation does not have any retroactive effect. 18 The Trial Court committed no
reversible error either in finding the existence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, evident
premeditation and recidivism.
Treachery was present because the attack on the victim was sudden and unexpected. 19 When the
inmates from Brigade 3-a went out to get their food ration appellants immediately rushed out of their
own cell and attacked, with their improvised weapon, the unsuspecting victim. There was a collective
effort on appellants' part, who were all armed, in assaulting the victim who was unarmed, 20 and who
was completely deprived of an opportunity to prepare for the attack or to defend himself, 21 or to
prepare for a fight or retreat. 22 Evident premeditation was also present because the plan to kill any
prisoner from Brigade 3-a was hatched around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of November 18, 1971,
and the plan was consummated at about 8:00 in the evening of the same day. Evident premeditation is
present when murder was contemplated at least one hour prior to its execution. 23 Appellants had
ample time to desist from the execution of the offense but they clung to their determination to achieve
their criminal intent.
The aggravating circumstance of recidivism has to be considered because all the accused at the time of
the commission of the offense, were serving their respective sentences by virtue of a final judgment for
other crimes embraced in the same Title of the Revised Penal Code (Corpuz for Homicide; Ribadajo for
Murder; Basas for Murder; Anor for Murder; and Torres for Homicide).
No error either was committed by the Trial Court in imposing the death penalty. The penalty for murder
isreclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. 24 Considering that appellants committed the
present felony after having been convicted by final judgment and while serving their respective
sentences, they should be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the
new felony. 25 Given this circumstance, Anor's change of plea from Guilty to Not Guilty will not
change his liability besides the fact that it was made after the prosecution had rested its case. 26
The defense contention that appellants should be held guilty only for "Death Caused in a Tumultuous
Affray" and sentenced to prision mayor under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the
allegation that the commotion was spontaneous, lacks merit. There was no confusion and tumultuous
quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression between both parties. 27 Appellants rushed out

of their cell with the common purpose of attacking the victim of a rival group, which unity of purpose
indicates appellants' common responsibility for the consequences of their aggression. 28
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED. However, for lack of the necessary
votes, the penalty to be imposed on all the accused-appellants is reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased is hereby raised to P30,000.00. Proportionate costs
against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr.,* J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:
I concur in the result, there being sufficient evidence other than the challenged extrajudicial confession
for affirmation of the judgment of conviction. I write this brief concurrence to maintain my dissenting
view in the case of Magtoto vs. Manguera (63 SCRA 4, 27) and subsequent cases that "(T)here is no
room for interpretation and the plain mandate of the Constitution expressly adopting the exclusionary
rule as the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against such confessions
obtained in violation of one's constitutional rights by outlawing their admission and thereby removing
the incentive on the part of state and police officers to disregard such rights (in the same manner that
the exclusionary rule bars admission of illegally seized evidence) should be strictly enforced,' and
'(T)he outlawing of an such confessions is plain, unqualified and without distinction whether the invalid
confession be obtained before or after the effectivity of the Constitution." I take exception to the
statement in the main opinion that no law gives the accused the right to be so informed of his right to
silence and to counsel before the enactment of the 1973 Constitution, which does not have any
retroactive effect. I maintain, as in Magtoto, that such a law was enacted as of June 15, 1954 when
Republic Act 1083, authored by the late Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco, inserted the second paragraph
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code authorizing the right of a detained person to counsel in any
custodial investigation, thus: "In every case the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed upon his request to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel. "
I had expressly joined the vigorous dissent of the late Chief Justice (then Associate Justice) Fred Ruiz
Castro inMagtoto that "the majority of my brethren are of the literal view that the only right granted by
the said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the cause of his detention,' and that a
detained person 'must make a request for him to be able to claim the right to communicate and confer
with counsel at any time.' I regard this interpretation as abhorrent because it gravely offends against the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution as well as of the 1973 Constitution that guarantee equal protection
of the laws to every person in the realm. ... An accurate paraphrase of the majority view may be stated
in the following words: 'If this detained wretch asserts his right to counsel, I will allow him to
communicate and confer with a lawyer of his choice. But if he says none because he is unlettered or
uninformed, I am under no moral or legal obligation to help him because, standing mute, he has no
right to counsel.' The absurdity so implicit in these words strikes terror in me at the same time that it
saddens me, for it not only denies the poor and the unschooled the equal protection of the laws but also

inflicts a horrendous indignity on them solely because of their poverty, ignorance or illiteracy. The
cogent remark of the late Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco, truly a man of wisdom and experience, when
Republic Act 1083 as a bill was under discussion in the Senate, that a detained person in every
custodial interrogation should, under the proposed amendment, be informed beforehand of his right to
counsel, was therefore not a mere wisp of wind, but was indeed a warning most pregnant with meaning.
"
It seems clear that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as inserted by
Republic Act 1083 makes it the duty on the part of any police or military officer to inform the person
detained of his right to counsel at the start of any custodial interrogation and that this duty was made a
statutory one as early as 1954 upon the enactment of the aforesaid Act.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, CJ., concurring:
I concur in the result, there being sufficient evidence other than the challenged extrajudicial confession
for affirmation of the judgment of conviction. I write this brief concurrence to maintain my dissenting
view in the case of Magtoto vs. Manguera (63 SCRA 4, 27) and subsequent cases that "(T)here is no
room for interpretation and the plain mandate of the Constitution expressly adopting the exclusionary
rule as the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against such confessions
obtained in violation of one's constitutional rights by outlawing their admission and thereby removing
the incentive on the part of state and police officers to disregard such rights (in the same manner that
the exclusionary rule bars admission of illegally seized evidence) should be strictly enforced,' and
'(T)he outlawing of an such confessions is plain, unqualified and without distinction whether the invalid
confession be obtained before or after the effectivity of the Constitution." I take exception to the
statement in the main opinion that no law gives the accused the right to be so informed of his right to
silence and to counsel before the enactment of the 1973 Constitution, which does not have any
retroactive effect. I maintain, as in Magtoto, that such a law was enacted as of June 15, 1954 when
Republic Act 1083, authored by the late Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco, inserted the second paragraph
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code authorizing the right of a detained person to counsel in any
custodial investigation, thus: "In every case the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed upon his request to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel. "
I had expressly joined the vigorous dissent of the late Chief Justice (then Associate Justice) Fred Ruiz
Castro inMagtoto that "the majority of my brethren are of the literal view that the only right granted by
the said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the cause of his detention,' and that a
detained person 'must make a request for him to be able to claim the right to communicate and confer
with counsel at any time.' I regard this interpretation as abhorrent because it gravely offends against the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution as well as of the 1973 Constitution that guarantee equal protection
of the laws to every person in the realm. ... An accurate paraphrase of the majority view may be stated
in the following words: 'If this detained wretch asserts his right to counsel, I will allow him to
communicate and confer with a lawyer of his choice. But if he says none because he is unlettered or
uninformed, I am under no moral or legal obligation to help him because, standing mute, he has no
right to counsel.' The absurdity so implicit in these words strikes terror in me at the same time that it
saddens me, for it not only denies the poor and the unschooled the equal protection of the laws but also
inflicts a horrendous indignity on them solely because of their poverty, ignorance or illiteracy. The
cogent remark of the late Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco, truly a man of wisdom and experience, when

Republic Act 1083 as a bill was under discussion in the Senate, that a detained person in every
custodial interrogation should, under the proposed amendment, be informed beforehand of his right to
counsel, was therefore not a mere wisp of wind, but was indeed a warning most pregnant with meaning.
"
It seems clear that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as inserted by
Republic Act 1083 makes it the duty on the part of any police or military officer to inform the person
detained of his right to counsel at the start of any custodial interrogation and that this duty was made a
statutory one as early as 1954 upon the enactment of the aforesaid Act.
.R.No.L50884March30,1988CASEOFCOMPLEXCRIME
THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,plaintiffappellee,vs.FILOMENO
SALUFRANIA,defendantappellant.
FACTS:On7May1976,FilomenoSalufraniayAlemanwaschargedbefore
theCFIofCamarinesNorte,withthecomplexcrimeofparricidewith
intentionalabortion.Itwasallegedthatonthe3rddayof
December,1974,theaccusedFilomenoSalufraniayAlemandidthenand
there,willfully,unlawfully,andfeloniouslyattack,assaultanduse
personalviolenceonhiswife,MARCIANAABUYOSALUFRANIAbythenand
thereboxingandstrangingher,causinguponherinjurieswhich
resultedinherinstantaneousdeath;andbythesamecriminalact
committedonthepersonofthewifeoftheaccused,whowasatthe
time8monthspregnant,theaccusedcausedthedeathoftheunborn
child,committingbothcrimesofPARRICIDEandINTENTIONALABORTIONas
definedandpunishedunderArt.246andArt.256,paragraphI,ofthe
RevisedPenalCode.
Atthetrialcourt,Dr.JuanL.DyquiangcoJr.,PedroSalufrania
testifiedthat,hewascalleduponbytheMunicipalJudgeofTalisay
toexaminethecorpseofMarcianaAbuyoSalufraniathatwasexhumed
fromitsgraveinwhichthecauseofdeathwascardiacarrest.
Dr.Dyquiangcotestifiedthatafterconductingthepost
mortemexamination,heissuedacertificationthereof(Exhibit"A");
thatheissuedadeathcertificate(Exhibit"B")forthedeceased
MarcianoAbuyoSalufrania,bearingthedateof5December1974,made
onthebasisoftheinformationrelayedbyacertainLeonilaLomato
hisnursebeforetheburial,withoutmentioningthecauseofdeath;
thatthecauseofdeath,ascardiacarrest,wasindicatedonsaid
deathcertificateonlyafterthepostmortemexaminationon11
December1974.Thelowercourtallowedthesonoftheaccused,Pedro
Salufrania,Thelowercourtstatedthat,byreasonofinterestand
relationship,beforePedroSalufraniawasallowedtotestifyagainst
hisfatheraccusedFilomenoSalufrania,aftercarefulexaminationby
theprosecutingofficerandthedefensecounselunderthecareful
supervisionofthecourtaquo,todeterminewhether,athisageof
13yearsold,hewasalreadycapableofreceivingcorrectimpressions
offactsandofrelatingthemtrulyand,also,whetherhewas

compelledand/orthreatenedbyanybodytotestifyagainsthisfather
accused.HestatedthathisfatherFilomenoSalufraniaandhismother
MarcianaAbuyoquarrelledatabout6:00o'clockintheeveningof3
December1974,hesawhisfatherboxhispregnantmotheronthe
stomachand,oncefallenonthefloor,hisfatherstrangledherto
death;thathesawbloodoozefromtheeyesandnoseofhismother
andthatshediedrightonthespotwhereshefell.His
brother,EduardoAbuyoandhadrefusedandstillrefusedtolivewith
hisfatheraccused,becausethelatterhasthreatenedtokillhimand
hisotherbrothersandsistershouldherevealthetruecauseofhis
mother'sdeath.Thebrotherinlawandsisterofthedeceased
victim,NarcisoAbuyoalsodeclaredthataftertheburialofMarciana
Abuyo,thethree(3)childrenofhisdeceasedsisterrefusedtogo
homewiththeirfatherFilomenoSalufrania;thatwhenaskedwhy,his
nephewAlexSalufraatoldhimthattherealcauseofdeathoftheir
motherwasnotstomachailmentandheadache,rather,shewasboxedon
thestomachandstrangledtodeathbytheirfather;thatimmediately
afterlearningofthetruecauseofdeathofhissister,hebrought
themattertotheattentionofthepoliceauthorities.
TheCFIfoundhimguiltybeyondreasonabledoubt,ofthecomplex
crimeofParricidewithIntentionalAbortion,heisherebysentenced
tosufferthepenaltyofDEATH,toindemnifytheheirsofthe
deceasedMarcianoAbuyointhesumofP12,000.00andtopaythe
costs."Forunselfish,valuableandexemplaryservicerenderedby
counseldeoficio,Atty.MarcianoC.Dating,Jr.,acompensationof
P500.00isherebyrecommendedforhimsubjecttotheavailabilityof
fund.Sincetheaccusedwassentencedtodeath,thisbecomesan
automaticreviewbeforetheSupremeCourt.
ThedefensehadforwitnessesGeronimoVillan,JuanitoBragais,
AngelesLilingBalceandtheaccusedFilomenoSalufrania.Geronimo
VillantestifiedthathewasaneighborofFilomenoSulfraniawhio
triedtohelphimadministeranativetreatmentaround6aminthe
morningofDecember4,1974,butshediedaround7am.WitnessJuanita
BragaistestifiedthathewasfetchedbyFelipeSalufrania,another
sonofFilomenoSalufraniaMarcianaAbuyowasalreadydeadsohejust
helpedFilomenoSalufraniaintransferringthebodyofhiswifeto
thehouseofthelatter'sbrotherinlaw.AngelesLilingBalce,who
claimedtobeaformerresidentshearrivedinthehouseofFilomeno
Salufraniaatabout6:00o'clockinthemorningMarcianastillina
comalyingonthelapofherhusbandwhoinformedherthatMarciana
wassufferingfromanoldstomachailment.Theaccusedadmittedthat
hewasthatlawfulhusbandofthedeceasedMarcianaAbuyo;thathe
sentrJuanitoBragaisbutthelatterwasnotabletocurehiswife,
thattherewasnoquarrelbetweenhimandhiswifethatprecededthe
latter'sdeath,andthatduringthelifetimeofthedeceased,they

lovedeachother;thatafterherburial,hissonPedroSalufraniawas
takenbyhisbrotherinlawNarcisoAbuyoandsincethen,hewasnot
abletotalktohissonuntilduringthetrial;andthatatthetime
ofdeathofhiswife,asidefromthemembersofhisfamily,Geronimo
VillanFranciscoRepuyaandLilingAngelesBalcewerealso
present.Appellantallegesthatthetrialcourtfailedtodetermine
thecompetenceofPedroSalufraniabeforehewasallowedtotestify.
HealsoquestionsthecompetenceofDr.Dyquiangcoasanexpert
witness,andallegesthatthefindingsofDr.Dyquiangcoandthe
testimonyofPedroSalufraniadonottally.Butthiscontentionis
withoutmerit.TheCourtnotes,firstofall,thatappellantdidnot
evenbothertodiscusshisdefenseinordertorefutethemassive
evidenceagainsthim.Thisistantamounttoanadmissionthathe
couldnotadequatelysupporthisversionofMarcianaAbuyo's
death.Lastly,appellantallegesthat,assumingheindeedkilledhis
wife,thereisnoevidencetoshowthathehadtheintentiontocause
anabortion.Inthiscontention,appellantiscorrect.Heshouldnot
beheldguiltyofthecomplexcrimeofParricide
withIntentionalAbortionbutofthecomplexcrimeofParricide
withUnintentionalAbortion.TheelementsofUnintentionalAbortion
areasfollows:
1.Thatthereisapregnantwoman.2.Thatviolenceisuseduponsuch
pregnantwomanwithoutintendinganabortion.3.Thattheviolenceis
intentionallyexerted.4.Thatasaresultoftheviolencethefoetus
dies,eitherinthewomborafterhavingbeenexpelledtherefrom.
ISSUE:Whetherornotthetrialcourterredinitsrulingofcomplex
crimewithparricideandintentionalabortion?
HELD:AccordingtotheSupremeCourt,
Trialjudgesareinthebestpositiontoascertainthetruthand
detectfalsehoodsinthetestimonyofwitnesses.ThisCourtwill
normallynotdisturbthefindingsofthetrialcourtonthe
credibilityofwitnesses,inviewofitsadvantageinobservingfirst
handtheirdemeanoringivingtheirtestimony.Suchruleappliesin
thepresentcase.
TheSolicitorGeneral'sbriefmakesitappearthat
appellantintendedtocauseanabortionbecauseheboxedhispregnant
wifeonthestomachwhichcausedhertofallandthenstrangledher.
Wefindthatappellant'sintenttocauseanabortionhasnotbeen
sufficientlyestablished.Mereboxingonthestomach,takentogether
withtheimmediatestranglingofthevictiminafight,isnot
sufficientprooftoshowanintenttocauseanabortion.Infact,
appellantmusthavemerelyintendedtokillthevictimbutnot
necessarilytocauseanabortion.Theevidenceonrecord,therefore,
establishesbeyondreasonabledoubtthataccusedFilomenoSalufrania

committedandshouldbeheldliableforthecomplexcrimeof
parricidewithunintentionalabortion.Theabortion,inthiscase,
wascausedbythesameviolencethatcausedthedeathofMarciana
Abuyo,suchviolencebeingvoluntarilyexertedbythehereinaccused
uponhisvictim.Ithasalsobeenclearlyestablished(a)that
MarcianaAbuyowasseven(7)toeight(8)monthspregnantwhenshe
waskilled;(b)thatviolencewasvoluntarilyexerteduponherbyher
husbandaccused;and(c)that,asaresultofsaidviolence,Marciana
Abuyodiedtogetherwiththefoetusinherwomb.Inthisafternoon,
Article48oftheRevisedPenalCodestatesthattheaccusedshould
bepunishedwiththepenaltycorrespondingtothemoreseriouscame
ofparricide,tobeimposedinitsmaximumperiodwhichisdeath.
However,byreasonofthe1987Constitutionwhichhasabolishedthe
deathpenalty,appellantshouldbesentencedtosufferthepenaltyof
reclusionperpetua.
Inthepresentcase,theSupremeCourtmodified,thejudgment
appealedfromwasAFFIRMED.Accusedappellantwassentencedtosuffer
thepenaltyofreclusionperpetua.TheindemnityofP12,000.00
awardedtotheheirsofthedeceasedMarcianaAbuyoisincreasedto
P30,000.00inlinewiththerecentdecisionsoftheCourt.With
costs.
Peoplevs.Mangalino182SCRA329(February15,1990)Facts:
SemionMangalinoinsertedhisfingerandlateronforcibly
introducedhissexualorganintoMarichelles,sixyrold,undeveloped
genitalia.PhysicalexaminNBIconcludedthatbruisesonMarichelles
vagina:causedbyahardobjectlikeanerectedpenisand
anindicationofanunsuccessfulpenetration.
Theydiscountedtheprobabilityofanaccidentsincetherewasno
contusiononthelabia.Semiondeniedthechargesandargued
thatbruisesmaybeselfinflicted.Shewasconstantlyrunningand
mighthavebumpedherpelvisagainstachairwhichexplainedthe
absenceofcontusionsonthelabia.
Ruling:
Heisguiltyofstatutoryrape.For
r a p e t o b e c o m m i t t e d , f u l l penetrationisnotrequired.Itis
enoughthatthereisproofofentranceofthemaleorganwithinthe
labiaorpudendumofthefemaleorgan.Eventheslightest
penetrationissufficienttoconsummatethecrimeofrape.
AccordingtotheNBIreport,rapecouldhavebeenperpetrated.Dr.
Garciacertifiedtheexistenceofindicationsofrecentgenital
trauma.Vestibularmucosawasdarkredandnormally,itwassupposed
tobepinkish.Theforcibleattemptofanerectedpeniscausedthe3.5
cmcontusionpriortothehymen.Thepenilevaginalcontact
withoutpenetrationwasdueto1cmdiameteropening
ofMarichelleshymen.Thevictimbeingyoung,thepenetrationcould

onlygoasdeepasthelabia.Offenderandvictimbeingneighbors
explaintheabsenceofvisiblesignsofphysicalinjuries.Thereason
whyMarichelledidnotcrywasthatshedidnotfeelanypainduring
theattemptedsexualintercourse.
Doctrine:
Thevictimbeingyoung,thepenetrationcouldonlygoasdeepasthe
labia.Forrapetobecommitted,fullpenetrationisnot
required.Itisenoughthatthereisproofofentranceofthemale
organwithinthelabiaorthepudendumofthefemaleorgan
Peoplevs.Atento196SCRA357(April26,1991)Facts:
GlendaAringo,a16yrolddevelopmentallychallengedperson,
claimsthatCesarAtento,herneighbor,rapedher5x.fromApril1986.
Shesaidshewasraped4moretimes.Itwasatthistimethatshefelt
tickledanddescribed
theactasmasarap.Shecouldnotanymoreconcealhercondition
becauseshewasalready5monthspregnant.
Ruling:
Glendahastheintellectualcapacityofa9and12yroldandis
withinamentallydefectivelevel.Herjudgmentunsound
andhercapacity
forhigherperceptualprocessesisunsatisfactory.Althoughitis
notcleartheCesaremployedforce,heisstillguiltyunder
Paragraph2(whenthewomanisdeprivedofreasonor
isotherwiseunconscious)becauseGlendaisdeprived
ofreasonbybeingmentallydeficient.Heisalsoliableunderpar.
3(whenthevictimisunder12)becauseshehasthementalityofa
girllessthan12yrsoldatthetimeshewasraped.Theabsenceof
willdeterminestheexistenceoftherape.Suchlackofwillmay
existnotonlywhenthevictimisunconsciousor
totallydeprivedofreason,butalsowhensheissufferingsome
mentaldeficiencyimpairingherreasonorfreewill.
Thedeprivationofreasonneednotbecomplete.Mentaldeficiency
orabnormalityissufficient.
Doctrine:
Paragraph3doesnotonlyrefertochronologicalagebutalso
tomentalage.Note:SCmighthavebeenconfused.Par2referstoa
situationwhereinthewomanisdruggedordrunk,etc
Peoplevs.Campuhan329SCRA270(March30,2000)Facts:
CorazonPamintuanheardher4yrolddaughter,Crysthel,cryandshe
rushedtothebedroomwhereshesawPrimoCampuhankneeling
beforeCrysthelwhosejoggingpantswerealreadyremovedwhilehis
shortpantswerealreadydowntohisknees.AccordingtoCorazon,
PrimowasforcinghispenisintoCrysthelsvagina.Accordingtothe
physicalexam,therewasnoevidentsignofextragenitalphysical
injury.Herhymenwasintactandherorificewasonly.

05indiameter.
Ruling:
Meretouchingoftheexternalgenitaliabythepenisissufficient
toconstitutecarnalknowledge.Buttheactoftouchingshouldbe
understoodasinherentlypartoftheentryofthepenisintothe
labiasandnotthemeretouchingaloneofthemonspubisor
thepudendum.Theremustbesufficientandconvincing
proofthatthepenisindeedtouchedthelabiasorslidintothe
femaleorgan,andnotmerelystrokedtheexternal
surfacethereof,fortheaccusedtobeconvictedofconsummated
rape.Absentanyshowingoftheslightestpenetrationofthefemale
organ,itcanonlybeattemptedrape,ifnotactsof
lasciviousness.Primoskneelingpositionrenderedanunbridled
observationimpossible.P r o s e c u t i o n w a s n o t a b l e t o p r o v e t h
a t a n y i n t e r g e n i t a l c o n t a c t w a s achieved.Alltheelements
forattemptedrapearepresent;hence,theaccusedshouldbe
punishedonlyforit.
Doctrine:
Meretouchingdoesnotmeanstroking.Theremust
beintenttopenetrate

theactasmasarap.Shecouldnotanymoreconcealhercondition
becauseshewasalready5monthspregnant.
Ruling:
Glendahastheintellectualcapacityofa9and12yroldandis
withinamentallydefectivelevel.Herjudgmentunsound
andhercapacity
forhigherperceptualprocessesisunsatisfactory.Althoughitis
notcleartheCesaremployedforce,heisstillguiltyunder
Paragraph2(whenthewomanisdeprivedofreasonor
isotherwiseunconscious)becauseGlendaisdeprived
ofreasonbybeingmentallydeficient.Heisalsoliableunderpar.
3(whenthevictimisunder12)becauseshehasthementalityofa
girllessthan12yrsoldatthetimeshewasraped.Theabsenceof
willdeterminestheexistenceoftherape.Suchlackofwillmay
existnotonlywhenthevictimisunconsciousor
totallydeprivedofreason,butalsowhensheissufferingsome
mentaldeficiencyimpairingherreasonorfreewill.
Thedeprivationofreasonneednotbecomplete.Mentaldeficiency
orabnormalityissufficient.
Doctrine:
Paragraph3doesnotonlyrefertochronologicalagebutalso
tomentalage.Note:SCmighthavebeenconfused.Par2referstoa
situationwhereinthewomanisdruggedordrunk,etc.
Peoplevs.Campuhan329SCRA270(March30,2000)Facts:
CorazonPamintuanheardher4yrolddaughter,Crysthel,cryandshe

rushedtothebedroomwhereshesawPrimoCampuhankneeling
beforeCrysthelwhosejoggingpantswerealreadyremovedwhilehis
shortpantswerealreadydowntohisknees.AccordingtoCorazon,
PrimowasforcinghispenisintoCrysthelsvagina.Accordingtothe
physicalexam,therewasnoevidentsignofextragenitalphysical
injury.Herhymenwasintactandherorificewasonly.
05indiameter.
Ruling:
Meretouchingoftheexternalgenitaliabythepenisissufficient
toconstitutecarnalknowledge.Buttheactoftouchingshouldbe
understoodasinherentlypartoftheentryofthepenisintothe
labiasandnotthemeretouchingaloneofthemonspubisor
thepudendum.Theremustbesufficientandconvincing
proofthatthepenisindeedtouchedthelabiasorslidintothe
femaleorgan,andnotmerelystrokedtheexternal
surfacethereof,fortheaccusedtobeconvictedofconsummated
rape.Absentanyshowingoftheslightestpenetrationofthefemale
organ,itcanonlybeattemptedrape,ifnotactsof
lasciviousness.Primoskneelingpositionrenderedanunbridled
observationimpossible.P r o s e c u t i o n w a s n o t a b l e t o p r o v e t h
a t a n y i n t e r g e n i t a l c o n t a c t w a s achieved.Alltheelements
forattemptedrapearepresent;hence,theaccusedshouldbe
punishedonlyforit.
Doctrine:
Meretouchingdoesnotmeanstroking.Theremust
beintenttopenetrate.
Peoplevs.Gallo315SCRA461(September29,1999)Facts
:In1998,anRTCdecisionfoundRomeoGalloguiltyofthecrime
ofqualifiedrapewiththepenaltyofdeath.In1999Gallofileda
MotiontoReOpentheCaseseekingmodificationofthedeath
sentencetoreclusionperpetuainlinewiththenewcourtrulings
ontheattendantcircumstancesinSec11ofRA7659.Accordingto
Peoplevs.Garcia:theadditionalattendantcircumstances
introducedinRA7659shouldbeconsideredasspecialqualifying
circumstancesdistinctlyapplicabletothecrimeofrapeandif
notp l e a d e d a s s u c h , c o u l d o n l y b e a p p r e c i a t e d a s g e n e r i c
a g g r a v a t i n g circumstances.Theinformationfiledagainst
GallodoesnotallegehisrelationshipwiththevictimMarites
Gallo(hisdaughter),thusitCANNOTbeconsideredasaqualifying
circumstance.
Ruling
:Judicialdecisionsapplyingorinterpretingthelaworthe
constitutionformpartofthelegalsystemofthelandandsothe
doctrineformspartofthepenalstatutesandthereforemaybeapplied
retroactivelybeingfavorabletotheaccusedwhoisnota
habitualcriminal,notwithstandingthatfinalsentencehasalready
beenpronouncedagainsthim.ThedoctrineofPeoplevs.Garciamaybe

retroactivelyappliedasitisfavorabletohim.Thecaseisreopened
andthejudgmentismodifiedfromdeathtoreclusionperpetua.
Doctrine:
Specialqualifyingcircumstanceshavetobeallegedinth
e informationforittobeappreciated.
Peoplevs.Berana311SCRA664(July29,1999)Facts:
Earlymorning,14yroldMariaElenaJarciawasawakenedby
herb r o i n l a w , R a u l B e r a n a . H e p o i n t e d a b u n t o t p a g e
( l o n g w i t h s o m e protrudingpartsandwithlongandpointedtip)at
herneckandwarnedhernottomakeanynoiseorelseshewillbe
killed.ShewasmadetoliedownandBeranaraisedherdusterand
removedhershortsandunderwear.Hemashedherbreastsandlaidon
topofher.Heinsertedhispenistohervaginaandshefelt
muchpain.Hekissedherandmadeseveralpushandpullmovements
andthen,MariaElenafeltsomethingliquidinherorgan. After
this,BeranasatdownandtoldMariaElenanottotellanyone.He
thendiditagain.AccusedclaimshewasseducedbyElena.
Ruling:
Physicalresistanceneednotbeestablishedinrapecases
whenintimidationisexerciseduponherandshesubmitsherself
againstherwilltotherapistslustbecauseoffearforlifeand
personalsafety.Relationshipqualifiesthecrimefrom
reclusionperpetuatodeathunderRA7659.
ToeffectivelyprosecuteBeranaforthecrimeofrapecommitted
byarelativebyaffinitywithinthe3rdcivildegree,itmust
beestablishedthat:1.heislegallymarriedtoElenas
sister2.ElenaandBeranaswifearefullorhalf
bloodsiblingsProsecutionestablishedrelationshipbythetesti
moniesofElena(sayingthatheknowsBeranabecauseheisthe
husbandofmysister)andhermother(sayingthatheknowsBerana
becauseheisthehusbandofherdaughter,RosaJarcia).Itbasedits
convictiononBeranasletteraddressingElenasparentsasmamaat
papaandhisuseofthephraseanyinyongmanugang,Raul.Since
relationshipqualifiesthecrimeofrape,theremustbeclearer
proofofrelationshipandinthiscase,itwasnot
adequatelysubstantiated.Evidencepresentedisnotsufficient
todispeldoubtsaboutthetruerelationship.Although
heclaimsthatElenainitiatedtheact,henevermentionedthis
onhislettersandinstead,unceasinglyasksfor
forgiveness,admittingcategoricallytheoffensecharged.
Doctrine:
Relationshipmustbeprovenforittobeappreciatedasa
specialqualifyingcircumstance.
Notes:Thelettersmayshowremorseforacompletelydifferentthing
(likeImsorryIgaveintotheseduction)andnotanapologyfor

rape
REPUBLICACTNo.9262(AntiVAWC)
ANACTDEFININGVIOLENCEAGAINSTWOMENAND
THEIRCHILDREN,P R O V I D I N G F O R P R O T E C T I V E M E A S U R E S F O R
V I C T I M S , PRESCRIBINGPENALTIESTHEREFORE,ANDFOROTHER
PURPOSESWhatconstitutes
violenceagainstwomenandchildren
?
1.
causing
physicalharm
2.
threatening
tocause
physicalharm
3.
attempting
tocause
physicalharm
4.
placingthemin
fearofimminentphysicalharm
5.
attemptingtocompelorcompellingthemto
engageinconductwhichtheyhavearighttodesistfromor
desistfromconductwhichtheyhavearighttoengagein
or
attemptingtorestrictorrestrictingtheirfreedomofmovement
orconduct
byforceorthreatofforceorotherharmorthreatof
physicalorotherharmorintimidationdirectedagainstthewoman
orchildwhichincludes:
a.
threateningto
d e p r i v e o r a c t u a l l y d e p r i v i n g t h e m o f custody
tohis/herfamily
b.
deprivingorthreateningtodeprivethemoffinancialsupport
ordeliberatelyproviding
insufficientfinancialsupport
c.
deprivingorthreateningto
deprivethemofalegalright
d.
preventingthewoman
i n e n g a g i n g i n a n y l e g i t i m a t e profession,etcorcontrolling

thevictimsownmoneyorproperties,orsolelycontrollingthe
conjugalorcommonmoneyorproperties
6.
inflictingorthreateningtoinflict
physicalharmononeselfforthepurposesofcontrollingthewoman
7.
causingorattemptingtocausethemto
engageinanysexualactivitywhichdoesnotconstituterape
,byforceorthreatofforce,physicalharm,orthrough
intimidationdirectedatthemorher/hisimmediatefamily
8.
engagingin
purposeful,knowing,orrecklessconduct,p e r s o n a l l y o r t
h r o u g h a n o t h e r , t h a t a l a r m s o r c a u s e s substantial
emotionalorpsychologicaldistress
tothewomanorchild.Thisincludes:
a.
stalking
theminpublicorprivateplaces
b.
peeringinthewindoworlingeringoutside
theresidence
c.
enteringorremainingintheirdwelling
orontheirproperty
againsther/hiswill
d.
destroyingthepropertyandpersonalbelongingsorinflicting
harmtoanimalsorpets
o f t h e w o m a n o r h e r child
e.
engagingin
anyformofharassmentorviolence
9.
causing
m e n t a l o r e m o t i o n a l a n g u i s h , p u b l i c r i d i c u l e o r humil
i a t i o n t o t h e m , i n c l u d i n g r e p e a t e d v e r b a l a b u s e a n d emotion
alabuse,anddenialoffinancialsupportorcustody
ofminorchildrenofaccesstothewomanschild/childrenWhat
relationships
are
included
?
1.
married
relationship
2.

dating
relationshipthepartiesliveashusbandandwifewithout
thebenefitofmarriageORareromanticallyinvolvedovertimeandon
acontinuingbasisduringthecourseoftherelationship.
Acasualacquaintanceorordinarysocializationbetweentwo
individualsinabusinessorsocialcontextisNOTadating
relationship
3.
sexual
relationssinglesexualactwhichmayormaynotresultinthe
bearingofacommonchildWhatisa
protectionorder
?Itisanorderissuedforthe
purposeofpreventingfurtheractsofviolenceagainstawomanorher
childandgrantingothernecessaryrelief
.Thereliefgrantedunderaprotectionorderservethepurposeof
safeguardingthevictimfromfurtherharm,minimizinganydisruption
inthevictimsdailylife,andfacilitatingtheopportunityand
abilityofthevictimtoindependentlyregaincontrolofher
life.Whocanfile
apetitionforaprotectionorder?

1.
the
offendedparty
2.
parentsorguardian
oftheoffendedparty
3.
ascendants,descendantsorcollateralrelativeswithinthe4
th
civildegreeofconsanguinityoraffinity
4.
officersorsocialworkers
oftheDSWDorsocialworkersofLGUs
5.
policeofficers
,preferablythoseinchargeofwomenandchildrensdesks
6.PunongBarangayorBarangayKagawad
7.
lawyer,counselor,therapistorhealthcareprovider
o f t h e petitioner
8.
atleast2concernedresponsiblecitizens
o f t h e c i t y o r municipality
whohaspersonalknowledge
o f t h e o f f e n s e committed

Wherecanyoufile
foraprotectionorder?RTC,MTC,MCTCwithterritorialjurisdiction
orinafamilycourtifavailableinthearea.Note:Theprotection
ordertakestheshapeofapenaltyandviolates
theconstitutionalrightofpresumptionofinnocence.Itpresumesthe
perpetratorisguiltyevenbeforeheisheard
OLIVAREZVSCA
FACTS:
IsidroOlivareswaschargedwithviolationofRA7610fortouching
thebreastandkissingthelipsofCristinaElitiong,a16yearold
high school student employed by the former in making sampaguita
garlandsduringweekends.Thetrialcourtfoundhimguilty;affirmed
bytheCA.Petitionernowallegesthathisrighttobeinformedof
thenatureandcauseoftheaccusationagainsthimwasviolatedfor
failuretoallegeintheinformationtheessentialelementsofthe
offenseforwhichheisbeingcharged.
Issue:WONOlivarescanbechargedwithviolationofRA7610.
Held:
Yes.
Theelements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A.
7610areasfollows:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse

orlasciviousconduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitutionorsubjectedtoothersexualabuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age.
Thefirstelementobtainsinthiscase. Itwasestablishedbeyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner kissed Cristina and touched her
breasts with lewd designs as inferred from the nature of the acts
themselves and the environmental circumstances.The second
element,i.e.,thattheactisperformedwithachildexploitedin
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is likewise
present.
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the
childindulgesinlasciviousconductunderthecoercionorinfluence
ofanyadult.Inthiscase,Cristinawassexuallyabusedbecauseshe
wascoercedorintimidatedbypetitionertoindulgeinalascivious
conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse

occurredonlyonce. AsexpresslyprovidedinSection3(b)ofR.A.
7610, the abusemaybe habitualor not. Itmust beobserved that
Article III of R.A. 7610 is captioned as Child Prostitution and
Other Sexual Abuse because Congress really intended to cover a
situationwheretheminormayhavebeencoercedorintimidatedinto
lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit. The law
covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual
abuse.
AstothecontentionthattheminorityofCristinawasnotproperly
alleged in the information, the SC ruled that:Petitioner was
furnished a copy of the Complaint which was mentioned in the
information, hence he was adequately informed of the age of the
complainant.
G.R.No.147913January31,2007

CLEMENTJOHNFERDINANDM.NAVARRETE,
Petitioner,vs.
PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,
Respondent.Thispetitionforreviewoncertiorari
1
assailsthedecision
2
andresolution
3
oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)whichaffirmedthedecisionoftheRegional
TrialCourt(RTC)toconvictpetitionerofactsoflasciviousness.BBB,
fiveyearsold,wenttopetitionershousetowatchtelevision,whichwas
somethingsheoftendid.
9
BBBtestifiedthatitwasonthisoccasionthatpetitionersexuallyabused
her,"placedhispenis[inher]vagina"twice,pokedhervaginawitha"stick
withcotton"
11
andboxedherontherightsideofhereye.
12
Then,petitionerbroughthertothecomfortroomandpointedaknifeto
herthroat.
13
Afterwards,sheandpetitionerwatchedapornographicmovie
14
together.
15
AAA,BBBsmother,testifiedthataround10:30p.m.,BBBwentoutof
petitionershouse.Whiletremblingandcrying,BBBembracedhermotherand
toldherthat"

KuyaFerdiesinundotako.
"
16
PetitionerdeniedtheaccusationagainsthimandclaimedthatAAAmerely
concoctedthechargeagainsthim.Heallegedthatshehadillfeelings
againsttheNavarretesduetotheseparationofher(AAAs)sonfromthe
PhilippinePostalCorporationandtheirrefusaltoallowhertoplacea
"jumper"ontheirelectricalconnection.
18
TheRTCabsolvedpetitionerofstatutoryrapehowever,itconvicted
petitionerforactsoflasciviousnessunderArticle336oftheRevisedPenal
Code(RPC)inrelationtoSection5(b),ArticleIIIofRA7610.Onappeal,the
CAaffirmedthedecisionoftheRTC.Issue:WONpetitionercannotbe
convictedofactsoflasciviousness,acrimenotspecifically
allegedintheinformation.Decision:Petitionerwasfoundguiltyofviolating
Article336oftheRPCinrelationtoSection5(b),ArticleIIIofRA
7610:Sec.5.ChildProstitutionandOtherSexualAbuse.Children,whether
maleorfemale,whoformoney,profit,oranyotherconsiderationordueto
thecoercionorinfluenceofanyadult,syndicateorgroup,indulgeinsexual
intercourseorlasciviousconduct,aredeemedtobechildrenexploited
inprostitutionandothersexualabuse.Thepenaltyof
reclusiontemporal
initsmediumperiodto
reclusionperpetua
shallbeimposeduponthefollowing:xxxxxxxxx(b)Thosewhocommitthe
actofsexualintercourseorlasciviousconductwithachildexploited
inprostitutionorsubjectedtoothersexualabuse:Provided,Thatwhenthe
victimisundertwelve(12)yearsofage,theperpetratorsshallbe
prosecutedunderArticle335,paragraph3,forrapeandArticle336ofAct
No.3815,asamended,[or]the[RPC],forrapeorlasciviousconductasthe
case
G.R.No.147913January31,2007

CLEMENTJOHNFERDINANDM.NAVARRETE,
Petitioner,vs.
PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,
Respondent.Thispetitionforreviewoncertiorari
1
assailsthedecision
2
andresolution
3
oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)whichaffirmedthedecisionoftheRegional
TrialCourt(RTC)toconvictpetitionerofactsoflasciviousness.BBB,
fiveyearsold,wenttopetitionershousetowatchtelevision,whichwas
somethingsheoftendid.

9
BBBtestifiedthatitwasonthisoccasionthatpetitionersexuallyabused
her,"placedhispenis[inher]vagina"twice,pokedhervaginawitha"stick
withcotton"
11
andboxedherontherightsideofhereye.
12
Then,petitionerbroughthertothecomfortroomandpointedaknifeto
herthroat.
13
Afterwards,sheandpetitionerwatchedapornographicmovie
14
together.
15
AAA,BBBsmother,testifiedthataround10:30p.m.,BBBwentoutof
petitionershouse.Whiletremblingandcrying,BBBembracedhermotherand
toldherthat"
KuyaFerdiesinundotako.
"
16
PetitionerdeniedtheaccusationagainsthimandclaimedthatAAAmerely
concoctedthechargeagainsthim.Heallegedthatshehadillfeelings
againsttheNavarretesduetotheseparationofher(AAAs)sonfromthe
PhilippinePostalCorporationandtheirrefusaltoallowhertoplacea
"jumper"ontheirelectricalconnection.
18
TheRTCabsolvedpetitionerofstatutoryrapehowever,itconvicted
petitionerforactsoflasciviousnessunderArticle336oftheRevisedPenal
Code(RPC)inrelationtoSection5(b),ArticleIIIofRA7610.Onappeal,the
CAaffirmedthedecisionoftheRTC.
Issue:WONpetitionercannotbeconvictedofactsoflasciviousness,
acrimenotspecificallyallegedintheinformation.
Decision:PetitionerwasfoundguiltyofviolatingArticle336oftheRPCin
relationtoSection5(b),ArticleIIIofRA7610:Sec.5.ChildProstitution
andOtherSexualAbuse.Children,whethermaleorfemale,whoformoney,
profit,oranyotherconsiderationorduetothecoercionorinfluenceof
anyadult,syndicateorgroup,indulgeinsexualintercourseorlascivious
conduct,aredeemedtobechildrenexploitedinprostitutionandothersexual
abuse.Thepenaltyof
reclusiontemporal
initsmediumperiodto
reclusionperpetua
shallbeimposeduponthefollowing:xxxxxxxxx(b)Thosewhocommitthe
actofsexualintercourseorlasciviousconductwithachildexploited
inprostitutionorsubjectedtoothersexualabuse:Provided,Thatwhenthe

victimisundertwelve(12)yearsofage,theperpetratorsshallbe
prosecutedunderArticle335,paragraph3,forrapeandArticle336ofAct
No.3815,asamended,[or]the[RPC],forrapeorlasciviousconductasthe
casemaybe.Provided..
G.R. No. 186469
June 13, 2012
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOVER MATIAS y DELA FUENTE, Accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This resolves the appeal from the August 19, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02781 filed by appellant Jover Matias y Dela Fuente which affirmed his conviction for
the crime of "rape" under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610.2
The Factual Antecedents
Appellant Jover Matias y Dela Fuente and private complainant AAA3 were neighbors at Sto. Nio St.,
Barangay San Antonio, Quezon City. In the evening of June 6, 2004, AAA, a minor, having been born
on April 23, 1991, was on her way to the vegetable stall ("gulayan") of a certain "Manuela" to buy
something when, all of a sudden, appellant pulled her towards a house that was under construction.
There, he forced her to lie on a bamboo bed ("papag"), removed her shorts and underwear, and inserted
first, his finger, and then his penis into her vagina. Appellant threatened to kill her if she should report
the incident to anyone.
When AAA arrived home, she narrated to her mother and aunt what appellant did to
her.1wphi1 Together, they proceeded to the barangay to report the incident and, thereafter, to the Baler
District Police Station to file a complaint. A physical examination was conducted by Police Chief
Inspector Pierre Paul Figeroa Carpio upon AAA, who was found to have "[d]eep-healed lacerations at 3
and 7 oclock positions" and was in a non-virgin state physically at the time of examination.
Subsequently, appellant was charged with rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
in an Amended Information4 dated July 16, 2004.
In defense, appellant claimed that in the evening of the incident, he and his uncle, Romeo Matias, were
doing construction work at the house of his aunt, also located at Sto. Nino St., Barangay San Antonio,
Quezon City. He was therefore surprised when two policemen arrested him at around 6:30 in the
evening of even date and detained him at the Baler Police Station.
The RTC Ruling
In its April 19, 2007 Decision,5 the RTC convicted appellant for "rape" under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of
RA 7610 and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC likewise directed him to pay AAA
the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P30,000 as moral damages.
In convicting appellant, the RTC gave full credence to AAA's testimony, which was straightforward
and positive. On the other hand, it found appellants defenses of denial and alibi as weak, taking into
consideration that his aunt's house where he was allegedly doing construction work was just a few
meters away from the vegetable stall, clearly making it possible for him to be at the locus criminis at
the time of the incident.
The CA Ruling

In its assailed Decision,6 the CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto, finding no compelling reason to
depart from its findings and conclusions. The appellate court held that if the RTC found AAA's
testimony to be credible, logical and consistent, then it should be given great respect, as the RTC had
the ability to observe firsthand the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses on stand.
Moreover, for appellant's alibi to prosper, he should be able to show that he was a great distance away
from the place of the incident and that it was impossible for him to be there or within its immediate
vicinity at the time of the commission of the crime. The CA ruled that it is highly unlikely for a young
girl to fabricate a story that would destroy her reputation and her familys life and endure the
discomforts of trial.
Issue Before The Court
The sole issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether the CA committed reversible error in
affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, which convicted appellant of "rape" under Sec. 5 (b), Article
III of RA 7610.
The Court's Ruling
Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; xxx7
In the case of People v. Pangilinan,8 which affirmed the doctrines enunciated in the cases of People v.
Dahilig9and People v. Abay,10 the Court explained:
Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is
below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape
under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the
other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse
under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised
Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right
against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for
a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610.
Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal
Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted appellant for "rape" under Sec. 5 (b), Article III
of RA 7610 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, upon a finding that AAA was a minor below 12
years old at the time of the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004. However, a punctilious scrutiny
of the records shows that AAA was born on April 23, 1991, which would make her 13 years old at the
time of the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004. Thus, appellant can be prosecuted and
convicted either under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 for sexual abuse, or under Article 266-A of the
RPC, except for rape under paragraph 1(d).11 It bears pointing out that the penalties under these two

laws differ: the penalty for sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion
temporal medium to reclusion perpetua, while rape under Article 266-A of the RPC is penalized
withreclusion perpetua.
On this score, it is worth noting that in its April 19, 2007 Decision,12 the RTC concluded that AAA
was the "victim of sexual abuse labeled 'rape',"13 considering the established fact that there was sexual
intercourse between him and AAA. Thus, appellant's conviction was clearly under Sec. 5 (b), Article III
of RA 7610 or sexual abuse and not for rape under Article 266-A of the RPC.
In the light of all the foregoing, there is a need to modify the penalty imposed upon
appellant.1wphi1 Following the pronouncement in the case of Malto v. People14 for sexual abuse,
and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the Court finds it appropriate to
impose the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, which has the range of 17 years, 4
months and 1 day to 20 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,15 therefore, the maximum term of the indeterminate
penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed under the law, which is 17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 20 years ofreclusion temporal, while the minimum term shall be within the range next lower in
degree, which is prision mayorin its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or a
period ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Similarly, the award of moral
damages is increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, pursuant to the Malto case.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The August 19, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02781 finding appellant Jover Matias y Dela Fuente guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to penalty and the amount of damages awarded. Appellant
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of 12 years of prision mayoras minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and ordered to pay the private complainant the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages. The rest of the assailed Decision stands.
Peoplevs.Ladjaalam
G.R.Nos.13614951.September19,2000
Appellee:PeopleofthePhilippines
Appellant:WalpanLadjaalamaliasWarpan
Ponente:J.Panganiban
FACTS:
FourInformationswerefiledagainstappellantWalpanLadjaalamin
theRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofZamboangaCity(Branch16),three
ofwhichhewasfoundguilty,towit:1)maintainingadrugdenin
violationofSection15A,ArticleIII,ofRepublicActNo.6425
(DangerousDrugsActof1972);2)illegalpossessionoffirearmand
ammunitioninviolationofPresidentialDecreeNo.1866asamendedby
RepublicAct.No.8294;and3)directassaultwithmultipleattempted
homicide.Thefollowinginformationwasprovidedbytheprosecution:
1)IntheafternoonofSeptember24,1997,morethanthirty(30)
policemenproceededtothehouseofappellantandhiswifetoserve
thesearchwarrantwhentheyweremetbyavolleyofgunfirecoming
fromthesecondfloorofthesaidhouse.Theysawthatitwasthe

appellantwhofiredtheM14rifletowardsthem.
2)Aftergainingentrance,twoofthepoliceofficersproceededto
thesecondfloorwheretheyearliersawappellantfiringtherifle.
Ashenoticedtheirpresence,theappellantjumpedfromthewindowto
theroofofaneighboringhouse.Hewassubsequentlyarrestedatthe
backofhishouseafterabriefchase.
3)Severalfirearmsandammunitionswererecoveredfromappellants
house.Alsofoundwasapencilcasewithfifty(50)foldedaluminum
foilsinside,eachcontainingmethamphetaminehydrochloride.
4)Aparaffintestwasconductedandthecaststakenbothhandsof
theappellantyieldedpositiveforgunpowdernitrates.
5)Recordsshowthatappellanthadnotfiledanyapplicationfor
licensetopossessfirearmandammunition,norhashebeengiven
authoritytocarryfirearms.
ISSUE:
Whetherornotsuchuseofanunlicensedfirearmshallbeconsidered
asanaggravatingcircumstance.
HELD:
No.Section1ofRA8294substantiallyprovidesthatanypersonwho
shallunlawfullypossessanyfirearmorammunitionshallbe
penalized,unlessnoothercrimewascommitted.Furthermore,if
homicideormurderiscommittedwiththeuseofanunlicensed
firearm,suchuseofanunlicensedfirearmshallbeconsideredasan
aggravatingcircumstance.Sincethecrimecommittedwasdirect
assaultandnothomicideormurder,illegalpossessionoffirearms
cannotbedeemedanaggravatingcircumstance.
CriminalLaw;SpecialPenalLaws:CELINOv.CA,G.R.No.170562June29,
2007
BriefFacts:
Two separate Information werefiled against the petitioner,
AngelCelino:oneforviolationoftheComelecgunban;theother,
forIllegalPossessionofFirearmunderR.A.8294.Afterpleadingnot
guilty to the former, he filed a Motion to Quash on the
lattercontending that he cannot be prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms xxxif he was also charged of having
committedanothercrimeof[sic]violatingtheComelecgunbanunder
thesamesetoffactsxxx.
Issue:
Whether the mere filing ofan informationfor gun ban
violation against him necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal
possession of firearmbecause of the provision of the law

that"Provided,

however,

That no other crime was committed by the

personarrested."
Ruling:
Ruling against the petitioner, the HighCourt explainedthat
he can be convictedofillegal possession offirearms, provided no
other crime wascommittedby the person arrested.The word
committed taken in its ordinary sense, and in light of the
Constitutional presumption of innocence,necessarilyimpliesa prior
determinationofguiltbyfinalconvictionresultingfromsuccessful
prosecutionorvoluntaryadmission.
CitingthecaseofPeoplev.Valdez(1999),theSupremeCourt
ruledthatallpendingcasesinvolvingillegalpossessionoffirearm
should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes
expresslyindicatedinRepublicActNo.8294areinvolvedxxx.
In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those
enumeratedunderR.A.8294,anyinformationforillegalpossessionof
firearmshouldbequashedbecausetheillegalpossessionoffirearm
would have to be tried together with such other offense, either
consideredasanaggravatingcircumstanceinmurderorhomicide,or
absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or
attemptedcoupdetat.Conversely,whentheotheroffenseinvolvedis
notoneofthoseenumeratedunderR.A.8294,thentheseparatecase
forillegalpossessionoffirearmshouldcontinuetobeprosecuted.