1
Alvero vs. Dizon [GR L-342, 4 May 1946]
En Banc, de Joya (J): 4 concur, 4 acting justices
concur
Facts: On 12 February 1945, while the battle
for Manila was raging, soldiers of the United
States Army, accompanied by men of Filipino
Guerrilla Forces, placed Aurelio S. Alvero under
arrest, having been suspected of collaboration
with the enemy, and seized and took certain
papers from his house in Pasay, Rizal. On or
about 4 October 1945, Alvero was accused of
treason, in criminal case 3 of the People’s
Court; after which, on 1 December 1945, he
filed a petition, demanding the return of the
papers allegedly seized and taken from his
house. Alvero also filed a petition for bail, at the
hearing of which the prosecution presented
certain papers and documents, which were
admitted as part of its evidence, and said
petition was denied. At the trial of the case on
the merits, the prosecution again presented
said papers and documents, which were
admitted as part of its evidence, and were
marked as exhibits. On 26 February 1946, the
judges issued an order denying the petition for
the return of the documents, and admitted as
competent evidence the documents presented
by the prosecution. On the same date that said
order was issued, denying the petition for the
return of said documents, Alvero asked for the
reconsideration of said order, which was also
denied. Alvero filed a petition for certiorari with
injunction with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the documents seized by
United States Army personnel at Alvero’s home
can be used as evidence against the latter.
Held: The right of officers and men of the
United States Army to arrest Alvero, as a
collaborationist suspect, and to seize his
personal papers, without any search warrant, in
the zone of military operations, is
unquestionable, under the provisions of article
4, Chapter II, Section I, of the Regulations
relative to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land of the Hague Conventions of 1907,
authorizing the seizure of military papers in the
possession of prisoners of war; and also under
the proclamation, dated 29 December 1944,
issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, as
Commander in Chief of the United States Army,
declaring his purpose to remove certain citizens
of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid
and comfort to the enemy, in violation of the
allegiance due the Governments of the United
States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, when apprehended, from any
position of political and economic influence in
the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for
the duration of the war. The purpose of the
constitutional provisions against unlawful
searches and seizures is to prevent violations of
private security in person and property, and
unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home,
by officers of the law acting under legislative or
judicial sanction, and to give remedy against
such usurpations when attempted. But it does
not prohibit the Government from taking
advantage of unlawful searches made by a
private person or under authority of state law.
Herein, as the soldiers of the United States
Army, that took and seized certain papers and
documents from the residence of Alvero, were
not acting as agents or on behalf of the
Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines; and that those papers and
documents came into the possession of the
authorities of the Commonwealth Government,
through the Office of the CIC of the United
States Army in Manila, the use and presentation
of said papers and documents, as evidence for
the prosecution against Alvero, at the trial of his
case for treason, before the People’s Court,
cannot now be legally attacked, on the ground
of unlawful or unreasonable searches and
seizures, or on any other constitutional ground,
as declared by the Supreme Court of the United
States in similar cases. (See Burdeau vs.
McDowell, 256 U. S., 465; Gambino vs. United
States, 275 U. S., 310.)
People vs. Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18
January 1991]
Third Division, Bidin (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his
common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the
booth of the Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex,
Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-
wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the
proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes)
attended to them. Marti informed Anita Reyes
that he was sending the packages to a friend in
Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract
necessary for the transaction, writing therein
his name, passport number, the date of
shipment and the name and address of the
consignee, namely, “WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr
II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland.” Anita Reyes did
not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who
assured the former that the packages simply
contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Marti’s
representation, the 4 packages were then
placed inside a brown corrugated box, with
styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of
the packages, and sealed with masking tape.
Before delivery of Marti’s box to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes),
following standard operating procedure, opened
the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar
odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the
2
opening of one of the gloves, and took several
grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes
forthwith prepared a letter reporting the
shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from
the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics
Section of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), the box containing Marti’s packages was
opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or
cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The
NBI agents made an inventory and took charge
of the box and of the contents thereof, after
signing a “Receipt” acknowledging custody of
the said effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents
tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch
as the latter’s stated address was the Manila
Central Post Office. Thereafter, an Information
was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila
(Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the
decision, convicting Marti of violation of Section
21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article
11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed.
Issue: Whether an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of the accused’s
constitutional rights, be invoked against the
State.
Held: In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the
State. The contraband herein, having come into
possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing the accused’s rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court
sees no cogent reason why the same should not
be admitted against him in the prosecution of
the offense charged. The mere presence of the
NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected by Reyes into a warrantless
search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that
which is in plain sight is not a search. Having
observed that which is open, where no trespass
has been committed in aid thereof, is not
search. Where the contraband articles are
identified without a trespass on the part of the
arresting officer, there is not the search that is
prohibited by the constitution. The
constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against
the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed. If the search is made upon the
request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test
of constitutionality. However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the
proprietor of a private establishment for its own
and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities,
the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individual, not the law enforcers, is
involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-
32409, 27 February 1971]
En Banc, Villamor (J): 7 concur, 1 filed a
separate concurring opinion to which 1 concurs,
1 concurs in result
Facts: On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a
letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz
requesting the issuance of a search warrant
against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E.
Seggerman for violation of Section 46(a) of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in
relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof,
particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209,
and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de
Leon to make and file the application for search
warrant which was attached to the letter. In the
afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his
witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with
them the following papers: Vera’s letter-
request; an application for search warrant
already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon;
an affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De
Leon; a deposition in printed form of Logronio
already accomplished and signed by him but
not yet subscribed; and a search warrant
already accomplished but still unsigned by
Judge. At that time the Judge was hearing a
certain case; so, by means of a note, he
instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the
depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the
session had adjourned, the Judge was informed
that the depositions had already been taken.
The stenographer, upon request of the Judge,
read to him her stenographic notes; and
thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to take the
oath and warned him that if his deposition was
found to be false and without legal basis, he
could be charged for perjury. The Judge signed
de Leon’s application for search warrant and
Logronio’s deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-70
was then signed by Judge and accordingly
issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR agents
served the search warrant to the corporation
and Seggerman at the offices of the corporation
on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. The
corporation’s lawyers protested the search on
the ground that no formal complaint or
transcript of testimony was attached to the
3
warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded
with their search which yielded 6 boxes of
documents. On 3 March 1970, the corporation
and Seggerman filed a petition with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal praying that the
search warrant be quashed, dissolved or
recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that
the search warrant be declared null and void,
and that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be
ordered to pay the corporation and Seggerman,
jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s
fees. After hearing and on 29 July 1970, the
court issued an order dismissing the petition for
dissolution of the search warrant. In the
meantime, or on 16 April 1970, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue made tax assessments on the
corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97,
partly, if not entirely, based on the documents
thus seized. The corporation and Seggerman
filed an action for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus.
Issue: Whether the corporation has the right to
contest the legality of the seizure of documents
from its office.
Held: The legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties. In
Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550,
19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the Supreme Court
impliedly recognized the right of a corporation
to object against unreasonable searches and
seizures; holding that the corporations have
their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of the corporate
officers, regardless of the amount of shares of
stock or the interest of each of them in said
corporations, whatever, the offices they hold
therein may be; and that the corporate officers
therefore may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents,
papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them
in their individual capacity. The distinction
between the Stonehill case and the present
case is that: in the former case, only the officers
of the various corporations in whose offices
documents, papers and effects were searched
and seized were the petitioners; while in the
latter, the corporation to whom the seized
documents belong, and whose rights have
thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On
that score, the corporation herein stands on a
different footing from the corporations in
Stonehill. Moreover, herein, the search warrant
was void inasmuch as First, there was no
personal examination conducted by the Judge of
the complainant (De Leon) and his witness
(Logronio). The Judge did not ask either of the
two any question the answer to which could
possibly be the basis for determining whether
or not there was probable cause against Bache
& Co. and Seggerman. The participation of the
Judge in the proceedings which led to the
issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus
limited to listening to the stenographer’s
readings of her notes, to a few words of warning
against the commission of perjury, and to
administering the oath to the complainant and
his witness. This cannot be consider a personal
examination. Second, the search warrant was
issued for more than one specific offense. The
search warrant was issued for at least 4 distinct
offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the
violation of Section 46(a), Section 72 and
Section 73 (the filing of income tax returns),
which are interrelated. The second is the
violation of Section 53 (withholding of income
taxes at source). The third is the violation of
Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or
occupation); and the fourth is the violation of
Section 209 (failure to make a return of
receipts, sales, business or gross value of
output actually removed or to pay the tax due
thereon). Even in their classification the 6
provisions are embraced in 2 different titles:
Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II
(Income Tax); while Sections 208 and 209 are
under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and
Occupation). Lastly, the search warrant does
not particularly describe the things to be seized.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 tends to defeat the
major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the
elimination of general warrants, for the
language used therein is so all-embracing as to
include all conceivable records of the
corporation, which, if seized, could possibly
render its business inoperative. Thus, Search
Warrant 2-M-70 is null and void.
Stonehill vs. Diokno [GR L-19550, 19 June
1967]
En Banc, Concepcion (CJ): 6 concur
Facts: Upon application of the officers of the
government, Special Prosecutors Pedro D.
Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal Jr.
and Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes; Judge
Amado Roan (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge
Roman Cansino (Municipal Court of Manila),
Judge Hermogenes Caluag (Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and
Judge Damian Jimenez (Municipal Court of
Quezon City) issued, on different dates, a total
of 42 search warrants against Harry S. Stonehill,
Robert P. Brooks, HJohn J. Brooks, and Karl
Beck, and/or the corporations of which they
were officers, directed to any peace officer, to
search the said persons and/or the premises of
4
their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and
to seize and take possession of the following
personal property to wit: “Books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)” as “the subject of
the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds
or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to
be used as the means of committing the
offense,” which is described in the applications
adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”
Alleging that the search warrants are null and
void, as contravening the Constitution and the
Rules of Court, Stonehill, et. al. filed with the
Supreme Court the original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction. On 22
March 1962, the Supreme Court issued the writ
of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated 29 June
1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved,
insofar as the papers, documents and things
seized from the offices of the corporations are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained
as regards the papers, documents and things
found and seized in the residences of Stonehill,
et. al.
Issue: Whether Stonehill, et. al. can assail the
legality of the contested warrants that allowed
seizure of documents, papers and other effects
in the corporate offices, and other places
besides their residences.
Held: Stonehill, et. al. maintained that the
search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures
effected upon the authority thereof are null and
void. No warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to
be seized. None of these requirements has been
complied with in the contested warrants. The
grave violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein
made of the effects to be searched for and
seized. The warrants authorized the search for
and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all
records of the corporate officers and the
corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of
our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending
to defeat its major objective: the elimination of
general warrants. However, the documents,
papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be
split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those
found and seized in the offices of the
corporations and (b) those found seized in the
residences of Stonehill, et. al. As regards the
first group, Stonehill, et. al. have no cause of
action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of
Stonehill, et. al., regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of
them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, and that the objection
to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al. may not
validly object to the use in evidence against
them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right
to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them
in their individual capacity. With respect to the
documents, papers and things seized in the
residences of Stonehill, et. al., the 29 June 1962
Resolution of the Supreme Court, denying the
lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by the Court on the
documents, papers and things seized in the
residences, in effect, restrained the prosecutors
from using them in evidence against Stonehill,
et. al. Thus, the Court held that the warrants for
the search of 3 residences are null and void;
that the searches and seizures therein made
are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the
documents, papers and other effects thus
seized in said residences is made permanent,
that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as
the documents, papers and other effects so
seized in the residences are concerned; and
that the petition herein is dismissed and the
writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in
the 29 places, offices and other premises.
Zurcher vs. Stanford Daily [436 US 547, 31
May 1978]
White (J): 3 concur, 1 filed a separate
5
concurring opinion, 2 filed separate dissenting
opinions, to which 1 joined, 1 took no part.
Facts: On 9 April 1971, officers of the Palo Alto
Police Department and of the Santa Clara
County Sheriff’s Department responded to a call
from the director of the Stanford University
Hospital requesting the removal of a large
group of demonstrators who had seized the
hospital’s administrative offices and occupied
them since the previous afternoon. After several
futile efforts to persuade the demonstrators to
leave peacefully, more drastic measures were
employed. The police chose to force their way
in at the west end of the corridor. As they did
so, a group of demonstrators emerged through
the doors at the east end and, armed with
sticks and clubs, attacked the group of nine
police officers stationed there. All nine were
injured. The officers themselves were able to
identify only two of their assailants, but one of
them did see at least one person photographing
the assault at the east doors. On April 11
(Sunday), a special edition of the Stanford Daily
(Daily), a student newspaper published at
Stanford University, carried articles and
photographs devoted to the hospital protest
and the violent clash between demonstrators
and police. The photographs carried the byline
of a Daily staff member and indicated that he
had been at the east end of the hospital hallway
where he could have photographed the assault
on the 9 officers. The next day, the Santa Clara
County District Attorney’s Office secured a
warrant from the Municipal Court for an
immediate search of the Daily’s offices for
negatives, film, and pictures showing the
events and occurrences at the hospital on the
evening of April 9. The warrant issued on a
finding of “just, probable and reasonable cause
for believing that: Negatives and photographs
and films, evidence material and relevant to the
identity of the perpetrators of felonies, to wit,
Battery on a Peace Officer, and Assault with
Deadly Weapon, will be located [on the
premises of the Daily].” The warrant affidavit
contained no allegation or indication that
members of the Daily staff were in any way
involved in unlawful acts at the hospital. The
search pursuant to the warrant was conducted
later that day by 4 police officers and took place
in the presence of some members of the Daily
staff. The Daily’s photographic laboratories,
filing cabinets, desks, and wastepaper baskets
were searched. Locked drawers and rooms were
not opened. The search revealed only the
photographs that had already been published
on April 11, and no materials were removed
from the Daily’s office. A month later the Daily
and various members of its staff brought a civil
action in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.
1983 against the police officers who conducted
the search, the chief of police, the district
attorney and one of his deputies, and the judge
who had issued the warrant. The complaint
alleged that the search of the Daily’s office had
deprived respondents under color of state law
of rights secured to them by the First, Fourth,
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. The District Court denied
the request for an injunction but, on the
newspaper staff’s motion for summary
judgment, granted declaratory relief. The court
did not question the existence of probable
cause to believe that a crime had been
committed and to believe that relevant
evidence would be found on the Daily’s
premises. It held, however, that the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments forbade the issuance
of a warrant to search for materials in
possession of one not suspected of crime unless
there is probable cause to believe, based on
facts presented in a sworn affidavit, that a
subpoena duces tecum would be impracticable.
The District Court further held that where the
innocent object of the search is a newspaper,
First Amendment interests are also involved
and that such a search is constitutionally
permissible “only in the rare circumstance
where there is a clear showing that (1)
important materials will be destroyed or
removed from the jurisdiction; and (2) a
restraining order would be futile.” Since these
preconditions to a valid warrant had not been
satisfied, the search of the Daily’s offices was
declared to have been illegal. The Court of
Appeals affirmed per curiam, adopting the
opinion of the District Court. Zurcher, et. al.
filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the Fourth Amendment is to be
construed and applied to the “third party”
search, the recurring situation where state
authorities have probable cause to believe that
fruits, instrumentalities, or other evidence of
crime is located on identified property but do
not then have probable cause to believe that
the owner or possessor of the property is
himself implicated in the crime that has
occurred or is occurring.
Held: First, a State is not prevented by the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments from
issuing a warrant to search for evidence simply
because the owner or possessor of the place to
be searched is not reasonably suspected of
criminal involvement. The critical element in a
reasonable search is not that the property
owner is suspected of crime but that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the “things” to
be searched for and seized are located on the
property to which entry is sought. Second, the
District Court’s new rule denying search
warrants against third parties and insisting on
subpoenas would undermine law enforcement
efforts since search warrants are often used
6
early in an investigation before all the
perpetrators of a crime have been identified;
and the seemingly blameless third party may be
implicated. The delay in employing a subpoena
duces tecum could easily result in
disappearance of the evidence. Nor would the
cause of privacy be served since search
warrants are more difficult to obtain than
subpoenas. Lastly, properly administered, the
preconditions for a search warrant (probable
cause, specificity with respect to the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, and
overall reasonableness), which must be applied
with particular exactitude when First
Amendment interests would be endangered by
the search, are adequate safeguards against
the interference with the press’ ability to
gather, analyze, and disseminate news that
respondents claim would ensue from use of
warrants for third-party searches of newspaper
offices.
Wilson vs. Layne [526 US 603, 24 May
1999]
Rehnquist (CJ)
Facts: In early 1992, the Attorney General of
the United States approved “Operation
Gunsmoke,” a special national fugitive
apprehension program in which United States
Marshals worked with state and local police to
apprehend dangerous criminals. This effective
program ultimately resulted in over 3,000
arrests in 40 metropolitan areas. One of the
dangerous fugitives identified as a target of
“Operation Gunsmoke” was Dominic Wilson, the
son of Charles and Geraldine Wilson. Dominic
Wilson had violated his probation on previous
felony charges of robbery, theft, and assault
with intent to rob, and the police computer
listed “caution indicators” that he was likely to
be armed, to resist arrest, and to “assault
police.” The computer also listed his address as
909 North StoneStreet Avenue in Rockville,
Maryland. Unknown to the police, this was
actually the home of Dominic Wilson’s parents.
Thus, in April 1992, the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County issued three arrest
warrants for Dominic Wilson, one for each of his
probation violations. The warrants were each
addressed to “any duly authorized peace
officer,” and commanded such officers to arrest
him and bring him “immediately” before the
Circuit Court to answer an indictment as to his
probation violation. The warrants made no
mention of media presence or assistance. In the
early morning hours of 16 April 1992, a
Gunsmoke team of Deputy United States
Marshals and Montgomery County Police
officers assembled to execute the Dominic
Wilson warrants. The team was accompanied by
a reporter and a photographer from the
Washington Post, who had been invited by the
Marshals to accompany them on their mission
as part of a Marshal’s Service ride-along policy.
At 6:45 a.m., the officers, with media
representatives in tow, entered the dwelling at
909 North StoneStreet Avenue in the Lincoln
Park neighborhood of Rockville. Charles and
Geraldine Wilson were still in bed when they
heard the officers enter the home. Charles
Wilson, dressed only in a pair of briefs, ran into
the living room to investigate. Discovering at
least 5 men in street clothes with guns in his
living room, he angrily demanded that they
state their business, and repeatedly cursed the
officers. Believing him to be an angry Dominic
Wilson, the officers quickly subdued him on the
floor. Geraldine Wilson next entered the living
room to investigate, wearing only a nightgown.
She observed her husband being restrained by
the armed officers. When their protective sweep
was completed, the officers learned that
Dominic Wilson was not in the house, and they
departed. During the time that the officers were
in the home, the Washington Post photographer
took numerous pictures. The print reporter was
also apparently in the living room observing the
confrontation between the police and Charles
Wilson. At no time, however, were the reporters
involved in the execution of the arrest warrant.
Charles and Geraldine Wilson sued the law
enforcement officials in their personal
capacities for money damages, and contended
that the officers’ actions in bringing members of
the media to observe and record the attempted
execution of the arrest warrant violated their
Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court
denied the police officers’ motion for summary
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. On
interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals, a
divided panel reversed and held that the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The
case was twice reheard en banc, where a
divided Court of Appeals again upheld the
defense of qualified immunity. The Court of
Appeals declined to decide whether the actions
of the police violated the Fourth Amendment. It
concluded instead that because no court had
held (at the time of the search) that media
presence during a police entry into a residence
violated the Fourth Amendment, the right
allegedly violated by petitioners was not
“clearly established” and thus qualified
immunity was proper. 141 F. 3d 111 (CA4
1998). Five judges dissented, arguing that the
officers’ actions did violate the Fourth
Amendment, and that the clearly established
protections of the Fourth Amendment were
violated.
Issue: Whether the police officers were justified
to bring along the Washington Post reporters in
the execution of the warrant inside the house of
Charles and Geraldine Wilson.
Held: No. Although the officers undoubtedly
were entitled to enter the Wilson home in order
7
to execute the arrest warrant for Dominic
Wilson, they were not entitled to bring a
newspaper reporter and a photographer with
them. While it does not mean that every police
action while inside a home must be explicitly
authorized by the text of the warrant (Fourth
Amendment allows temporary detainer of
homeowner while police search the home
pursuant to warrant), the Fourth Amendment
does require that police actions in execution of
a warrant be related to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion (The purposes justifying a
police search strictly limit the permissible
extent of the search). Certainly the presence of
reporters inside the home was not related to
the objectives of the authorized intrusion.
Inasmuch as that the reporters did not engage
in the execution of the warrant and did not
assist the police in their task, the reporters
were not present for any reason related to the
justification for police entry into the home–the
apprehension of Dominic Wilson. This is not a
case in which the presence of the third parties
directly aided in the execution of the warrant.
Where the police enter a home under the
authority of a warrant to search for stolen
property, the presence of third parties for the
purpose of identifying the stolen property has
long been approved by this Court and our
common-law tradition. The claim of the officers,
that the presence of the Washington Post
reporters in the Wilsons’ home nonetheless
served a number of legitimate law enforcement
purposes ignores, the importance of the right of
residential privacy at the core of the Fourth
Amendment. It may well be that media ride-
alongs further the law enforcement objectives
of the police in a general sense, but that is not
the same as furthering the purposes of the
search. Were such generalized “law
enforcement objectives” themselves sufficient
to trump the Fourth Amendment, the
protections guaranteed by that Amendment’s
text would be significantly watered down.
Although it may be claimed the presence of
third parties could serve in some situations to
minimize police abuses and protect suspects,
and also to protect the safety of the officers,
such a situation is significantly different from
the media presence in this case, where the
Washington Post reporters in the Wilsons’ home
were working on a story for their own purposes.
Taken in their entirety, the reasons advanced
by the officers fall short of justifying the
presence of media inside a home. Thus, it is a
violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to
bring members of the media or other third
parties into a home during the execution of a
warrant when the presence of the third parties
in the home was not in aid of the execution of
the warrant.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP [GR 64261,
26 December 1984]
En Banc, Escolin (J): 10 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani
Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal
[Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where
the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business
addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We
Forum” newspapers, respectively, were
searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and
other articles used in the printing, publication
and distribution of the said newspapers, as well
as numerous papers, documents, books and
other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr.
publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper,
were seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months
following the raid to question the validity of said
search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge
Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of
Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles
seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782
of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).
Issue: Whether allegations of possession and
printing of subversive materials may be the
basis of the issuance of search warrants.
Held: Section 3 provides that no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge,
or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. Probable cause
for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. In
mandating that “no warrant shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce”; the Constitution
requires no less than personal knowledge by
the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant
may be justified. Herein, a statement in the
effect that Burgos “is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of
8
committing the offense of subversion
punishable under PD 885, as amended” is a
mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such
particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant. Further, when the search
warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection
with the publication of subversive materials, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must
contain a specification, stating with particularity
the alleged subversive material he has
published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.
Chandler vs. Miller [520 US 305, 15 April
1997]
Ginsburg (J): 6 concur, 1 filed separate
dissenting opinion.
Facts: The Libertarian Party nominated Walker
L. Chandler for the office of Lieutenant
Governor, Sharon T. Harris for the office of
Commissioner of Agriculture, and James D.
Walker for the office of member of the General
Assembly. In May 1994, about one month
before the deadline for submission of the
certificates required by §21-2-140, Chandler,
Harris, and Walker filed an action in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia. They asserted, inter alia, that the drug
tests required by §21-2-140 violated their rights
under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution,
naming Governor Zell D. Miller and two other
state officials involved in the administration of
§21-2-140, as defendants. Chandler, et .al.
requested declaratory and injunctive relief
barring enforcement of the statute. In June
1994, the District Court denied Chandlers’
motion for a preliminary injunction. The
provision in the statute of the State of Georgia
required candidates for designated state offices
to certify that they have taken a drug test and
that the test result was negative. Chandler, et.
al. apparently submitted to the drug tests,
obtained the certificates required by §21-2-140,
and appeared on the ballot. After the 1994
election, the parties jointly moved for the entry
of final judgment on stipulated facts. In January
1995, the District Court entered final judgment
for Miller, et. al. A divided Eleventh Circuit
panel, relying on the US Court’s precedents
sustaining drug testing programs for student
athletes, customs employees, and railway
employees, the United States affirmed and
judged the Georgia’s law to be constitutional.
Issue: Whether the suspicionless searches,
required in Georgia’s drug testing for
candidates for public offices, is reasonable.
Held: Georgia’s drug testing requirement,
imposed by law and enforced by state officials,
effects a search within the meaning of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Collection
and testing of urine to meet Georgia’s
certification statute “constitutes a search
subject to the demands of the Fourth
Amendment”). As explained in Skinner,
government ordered “collection and testing of
urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that
society has long recognized as reasonable.”
(Skinner and Von Raab, 489 U.S., at 617). To be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a
search ordinarily must be based on
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. But
particularized exceptions to the main rule are
sometimes warranted based on “special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”
When such “special needs”–concerns other than
crime detection–are alleged in justification of a
Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts must
undertake a context specific inquiry, examining
closely the competing private and public
interests advanced by the parties. In limited
circumstances, where the privacy interests
implicated by the search are minimal, and
where an important governmental interest
furthered by the intrusion would be placed in
jeopardy by a requirement of individualized
suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite
the absence of such suspicion. Our precedents
establish that the proffered special need for
drug testing must be substantial–important
enough to override the individual’s
acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital
to suppress the Fourth Amendment’s normal
requirement of individualized suspicion. Miller,
et. al.’s defense of the statute rests primarily on
the incompatibility of unlawful drug use with
holding high state office; but notably lacking
therein is any indication of a concrete danger
demanding departure from the Fourth
Amendment’s main rule, and nothing in the
record hints that the hazards Miller, et. al.,
broadly describe (i.e. the use of illegal drugs
draws into question an official’s judgment and
integrity; jeopardizes the discharge of public
functions, including antidrug law enforcement
efforts; and undermines public confidence and
trust in elected officials) are real and not simply
hypothetical for Georgia’s polity. Further,
Georgia’s certification requirement is not well
designed to identify candidates who violate
antidrug laws; nor is the scheme a credible
means to deter illicit drug users from seeking
election to state office. What is left, after close
review of Georgia’s scheme, is the image the
State seeks to project. By requiring candidates
for public office to submit to drug testing,
Georgia displays its commitment to the struggle
against drug abuse. The need revealed, in
short, is symbolic, not “special,” as that term
draws meaning from our case law. Thus,
however well meant, the candidate drug test
9
Georgia has devised diminishes personal
privacy for a symbol’s sake. The Fourth
Amendment shields society against that state
action. In fine, where the risk to public safety is
substantial and real, blanket suspicionless
searches calibrated to the risk may rank as
“reasonable.” But where, as herein, public
safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth
Amendment precludes the suspicionless search,
no matter how conveniently arranged.
People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17
June 1999]
En Banc, Davide Jr. (CJ): 13 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: In response to reports of rampant
smuggling of firearms and other contraband,
Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the
Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began
patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his
officers. While monitoring the coastal area of
Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he
intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m.
from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of
Barangay Tammocalao requesting police
assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat
the latter had spotted, which looked different
from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of
the area and was poised to dock at
Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of his men led
by his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua,
proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach,
conferred with Almoite, and observed that the
speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. When
the speedboat landed, the male passenger
alighted, and using both hands, carried what
appeared a multicolored strawbag, and walked
towards the road. By this time, Almoite, Cid and
Badua, the latter two conspicuous in their
uniform and issued side-arms, became
suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed
direction and broke into a run upon seeing the
approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man
from fleeing by holding on to his right arm.
Although Cid introduced themselves as police
officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking
in English, then in Tagalog, and later in Ilocano,
Cid then requested the man to open his bag,
but he seemed not to understand. Cid then
resorted to “sign language,” motioning with his
hands for the man to open the bag. The man
apparently understood and acceded to the
request. A search of the bag yielded several
transparent plastic packets containing yellowish
crystalline substances. As Cid wished to
proceed to the police station, he signaled the
man to follow, but the latter did not
comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm around
the shoulders of the man and escorted the
latter to the police headquarters. At the police
station, Cid then “recited and informed the man
of his constitutional rights” to remain silent, to
have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting
no response from the man, Cid ordered his men
to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese
to act as an interpreter. In the meantime,
Badua opened the bag and counted 29 plastic
packets containing yellowish crystalline
substances. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan,
finally arrived, through whom the man was
“apprised of his constitutional rights.” When the
policemen asked the man several questions, he
retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely
showed his ID with the name Chua Ho San
printed thereon. Chua’s bag and its contents
were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp
Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union
for laboratory examination. In the meantime,
Chua was detained at the Bacnotan Police
Station. Later, Police Chief Inspector and
Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid
(wife of Cid), conducted a laboratory
examination of 29 plastic packets, adn in her
Chemistry Report D-025-95, she stated that her
qualitative examination established the
contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7
kilos, to be positive of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. Chua
was initially charged with illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride before the
RTC (Criminal Case 4037). However, pursuant
to the recommendation of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La
Union, the information was subsequently
amended to allege that Chua was in violation of
Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended by
RA 7659 (illegal transport of a regulated drug).
At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, where the
amended complaint was read to him by a
Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua entered a
plea of not guilty. Trial finally ensued, with
interpreters assigned to Chua (upon the RTC’s
direct request to the Taipei Economic and
Cultural Office in the Philippines, after its failure
to acquire one from the Department of Foreign
Affairs). Chua provided a completely different
story, claiming that the bags belong to his
employer Cho Chu Rong, who he accompanied
in the speedboat; that they decided to dock
when they were low on fuel and telephone
battery; that the police, with nary any spoken
word but only gestures and hand movements,
escorted him to the precinct where he was
handcuffed and tied to a chair; that the police,
led by an officer, arrived with the motor engine
of the speedboat and a bag, which they
presented to him; that the police inspected
opened the bag, weighed the contents, then
proclaimed them as methamphetamine
hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10
February 1997, the RTC convicted Chua for
transporting 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine
hydrochloride without legal authority to do so.
Chua prays for the reversal of the RTC decision
and his acquittal before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether persistent reports of rampant
smuggling of firearm and other contraband
10
articles, Chua’s watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas,
Chua’s illegal entry into the Philippines, Chua’s
suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee
when he saw the police authorities, and the
apparent ease by which Chua can return to and
navigate his speedboat with immediate
dispatch towards the high seas, constitute
“probable cause.”
Held: No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the
inviolable right to privacy of home and person.
It explicitly ordains that people have the right to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary
or incidental to said right and equally hallowed
in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary
principle which decrees that any evidence
obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. The
Constitutional proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures does not,
of course, forestall reasonable searches and
seizure. This interdiction against warrantless
searches and seizures, however, is not absolute
and such warrantless searches and seizures
have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence. The Rules of Court recognize
permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1)
arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected
in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped
prisoners. The prosecution and the defense
painted extremely divergent versions of the
incident, but the Court is certain that Chua was
arrested and his bag searched without the
benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on
record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative
of Chua’s participation in an ongoing criminal
enterprise that could have spurred police
officers from conducting the obtrusive search.
The RTC never took the pains of pointing to
such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on
the finding that “accused was caught red-
handed carrying the bagful of shabu when
apprehended.” In short, there is no probable
cause. Persistent reports of rampant smuggling
of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua’s
watercraft differing in appearance from the
usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over
the Bacnotan seas, Chua’s illegal entry into the
Philippines, Chua’s suspicious behavior, i.e. he
attempted to flee when he saw the police
authorities, and the apparent ease by which
Chua can return to and navigate his speedboat
with immediate dispatch towards the high seas,
do not constitute “probable cause.” None of the
telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating
the pungent odor of marijuana or other
prohibited drug, 20 confidential report and/or
positive identification by informers of courier(s)
of prohibited drug and/or the time and place
where they will transport/deliver the same,
suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious
bulge in the waist — accepted by the Court as
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in
the case. There was no classified information
that a foreigner would disembark at
Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on
the date in question. Chua was not identified as
a drug courier by a police informer or agent.
The fact that the vessel that ferried him to
shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats
of the area did not automatically mark him as in
the process of perpetrating an offense. The
search cannot therefore be denominated as
incidental to an arrest. To reiterate, the search
was not incidental to an arrest. There was no
warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did
not fall under the exemptions allowed by the
Rules of Court as already shown. From all
indications, the search was nothing but a fishing
expedition. Casting aside the regulated
substance as evidence, the same being the fruit
of a poisonous tree, the remaining evidence on
record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to
sustain Chua’s conviction.
People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19
February 2001]
En Banc, Ynares-Santiago (J): 14 concur
Facts: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3,
Matina, Davao City, received an information
regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana
pusher in Davao City. The first time he came to
see the said marijuana pusher in person was
during the first week of July 1996. SPO1
Paguidopon was then with his informer when a
motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to
the motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula y
Malagura (@”Boboy”), as the pusher. As to
Nasario Molina y Manamat (@ “Bobong”), SPO1
Paguidopon had no occasion to see him prior to
8 August 1996. At about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August
1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information
that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA,
Maa, Davao City any time that morning.
Consequently, at around 8:00 a.m. he called for
assistance at the PNP, Precinct 3, Matina, Davao
City, which immediately dispatched the team of
SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2
Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed
to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where
they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass
by. At around 9:30 a.m., while the team were
positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a
“trisikad” carrying Mula and Molina passed by.
At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to
Mula and Molina as the pushers. Thereupon, the
team boarded their vehicle and overtook the
“trisikad.” SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his
house, 30 meters from where Mula and Molina
11
were accosted. The police officers then ordered
the “trisikad” to stop. At that point, Mula, who
was holding a black bag, handed the same to
Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona
introduced himself as a police officer and asked
Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, “Boss, if
possible we will settle this.” SPO1 Pamplona
insisted on opening the bag, which revealed
dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula
and Molina were handcuffed by the police
officers. On 6 December 1996, the accused
Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly filed a
Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the
marijuana allegedly seized from them is
inadmissible as evidence for having been
obtained in violation of their constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The demurrer was denied by the trial court. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the
accused, but this was likewise denied. The
accused waived presentation of evidence and
opted to file a joint memorandum. On 25 April
1997, the trial court rendered the decision,
finding the accused guilty of the offense
charged, and sentenced both to suffer the
penalty of death by lethal injection. Pursuant to
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule
122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case
was elevated to the Supreme Court on
automatic review.
Issue: Whether Mula and Molina manifested
outward indication that would justify their
arrest, and the seizure of prohibited drugs that
were in their possession.
Held: The fundamental law of the land
mandates that searches and seizures be carried
out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or
on the strength of a search warrant predicated
upon the existence of a probable cause.
Complementary to the foregoing provision is
the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III,
Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and
solidifies the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The foregoing
constitutional proscription, however, is not
without exceptions. Search and seizure may be
made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws;
(4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when
the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search). The first
exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest)
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest
which must precede the search. Still, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before
a search can be made — the process cannot be
reversed. Herein, Mula and Molina manifested
no outward indication that would justify their
arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, they
could not be said to be committing, attempting
to commit or have committed a crime. It
matters not that Molina responded “Boss, if
possible we will settle this” to the request of
SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response
which allegedly reinforced the “suspicion” of
the arresting officers that Mula and Molina were
committing a crime, is an equivocal statement
which standing alone will not constitute
probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto
arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon, Mula and Molina could not be the
subject of any suspicion, reasonable or
otherwise. Further, it would appear that the
names and addresses of Mula and Molina came
to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after
they were arrested, and such cannot lend a
semblance of validity on the arrest effected by
the peace officers. Withal, the Court holds that
the arrest of Mula and Molina does not fall
under the exceptions allowed by the rules.
Hence, the search conducted on their person
was likewise illegal. Consequently, the
marijuana seized by the peace officers could
not be admitted as evidence against them.
People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19
April 2001]
Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar
applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, Dasmariñias, Cavite, to search the
residence of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan
St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as
his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified
that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase
2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale
took place in Salunguit’s room, and Badua saw
that the shabu was taken by Salunguit from a
cabinet inside his room. The application was
granted, and a search warrant was later issued
by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Español. At about
10:30 p.m. of said day, a group of about 10
policemen, along with one civilian informer,
went to the residence of Salunguit to serve the
warrant. The police operatives knocked on
Salanguit’s door, but nobody opened it. They
heard people inside the house, apparently
panicking. The police operatives then forced the
door open and entered the house. After showing
the search warrant to the occupants of the
house, Lt. Cortes and his group started
searching the house. They found 12 small heat-
sealed transparent plastic bags containing a
white crystalline substance, a paper clip box
also containing a white crystalline substance,
and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared
to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a
total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A
receipt of the items seized was prepared, but
Salanguit refused to sign it. After the search,
12
the police operatives took Salanguit with them
to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City,
along with the items they had seized. PO3
Duazo requested a laboratory examination of
the confiscated evidence. The white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and
those contained in a small box with a total
weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the
other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one
weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams,
were found to be marijuana. Charges against
Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic
Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and
marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-
95-64358, respectively) were filed on 28
December 1995. After hearing, the trial court
rendered its decision, convicting Salanguit in
Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for
violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively, RA
6425, and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence with a minimum of 6
months of arresto mayor and a maximum of 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional, and
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700,000.00, respectively. Salanguit appealed;
contesting his conviction on the grounds that
(1) the admissibility of the shabu allegedly
recovered from his residence as evidence
against him on the ground that the warrant
used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the
admissibility in evidence of the marijuana
allegedly seized from Salanguit to the “plain
view” doctrine; and (3) the employment of
unnecessary force by the police in the
execution of the warrant.
Issue: Whether the warrant was invalid for
failure of providing evidence to support the
seizure of “drug paraphernalia”, and whether
the marijuana may be included as evidence in
light of the “plain view doctrine.”
Held: The warrant authorized the seizure of
“undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia.” Evidence was presented
showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The
fact that there was no probable cause to
support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion
that the search warrant is void. This fact would
be material only if drug paraphernalia was in
fact seized by the police. The fact is that none
was taken by virtue of the search warrant
issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is
void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of
drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the
seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as
to which evidence was presented showing
probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with
respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguit’s
residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly
issued, such warrant being founded on probable
cause personally determined by the judge
under oath or affirmation of the deposing
witness and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized. With
respect to, and in light of the “plain view
doctrine,” the police failed to allege the time
when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether
prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu
subject of the warrant, or whether it was
recovered on Salanguit’s person or in an area
within his immediate control. Its recovery,
therefore, presumably during the search
conducted after the shabu had been recovered
from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua
in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court
affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-
64357 only.
Sta. Rosa Mining Company vs. Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Zabala [GR L-44723, 31
August 1987]
En Banc, Bidin (J): 12 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 21 March 1974, Sta. Rosa Mining
Company filed a complaint for attempted theft
of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the
installations on its mining property at Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte against Romeo
Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then
headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. The
case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal
Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary investigation
who, after conducting said investigation, issued
a resolution dated 26 August 1974
recommending that an information for
Attempted Theft be filed against Garrido and
Alapan on a finding of prima facie case which
resolution was approved by Fiscal Ilustre.
Garrido and Alapan sought reconsideration of
the resolution but the same was denied by
Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated 14 October
1974. On 29 October 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed
with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Camarines Norte an Information dated 17
October 1987 (Criminal Case 821), charging
Garrido aand Alapan with the crime of
Attempted Theft. In a letter dated 22 October
1974, Garrido and Alapan requested the
Secretary of Justice for a review of the
Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
dated 26 August 1974 and 14 October 1974. On
6 November 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor
ordered the Provincial Fiscal by telegram to
“elevate entire records PFO Case 577 against
Garrido et al., review in five days and defer all
proceedings pending review.” On 6 March 1975,
the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the
records, reversed the findings of prima facie
case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said
prosecuting officer to immediately move for the
dismissal of the criminal case. The Company
sought reconsideration of the directive of the
Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the
13
same in a letter dated 11 June 1975. A motion
to dismiss dated 16 September 1975 was then
filed by the Provincial Fiscal but the court
denied the motion on the ground that there was
a prima facie evidence against Garrido and
Alapan and set the case for trial on 25 February
1976. Garrido and Alapan sought
reconsideration of the court’s ruling but in an
Order dated 13 February 1976, the motion filed
for said purpose was likewise denied. Trial of
the case was reset to 23 April 1976. Thereafter,
Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the CFI of
Albay and Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-
charge of the Provincial Fiscal’s Office of
Camarines Norte. On 19 April 1976, Fiscal
Zabala filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the
case. This second motion to dismiss was denied
by the trial court in an order dated 23 April
1976. Whereupon, Fiscal Zabala manifested
that he would not prosecute the case and
disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear
therein. Hence, the Company filed a petition for
mandamus before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the fiscal can refuse to
prosecute the case if the Secretary of Justice
reversed the findings of prima facie case by the
fiscal.
Held: If the fiscal is not at all convinced that a
prima facie case exists, he simply cannot move
for the dismissal of the case and, when denied,
refuse to prosecute the same. He is obliged by
law to proceed and prosecute the criminal
action. He cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. At least what he can do is to continue
appearing for the prosecution and then turn
over the presentation of evidence to another
fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his
direction and control. Where there is no other
prosecutor available, he should proceed to
discharge his duty and present the evidence to
the best of his ability and let the court decide
the merits of the case on the basis of the
evidence adduced by both parties. The mere
fact that the Secretary of Justice had, after
reviewing the records of the case, directed the
prosecuting fiscal to move for the dismissal of
the case and the motion to dismiss filed
pursuant to said directive is denied by the trial
court, is no justification for the refusal of the
fiscal to prosecute the case. Once a complaint
or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. The Court is the best
and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed
by the fiscal should he addressed to the Court
who has the option to grant or deny the same.
It does not matter if this is done before or after
the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
Paderanga vs. Drilon [GR 96080, 19 April
1991]
En Banc, Regalado (J): 14 concur
Facts: On 16 October 1986, an information for
multiple murder was filed in the Regional Trial
Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion,
Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie
Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe,
for the deaths on 1 May 1984 of Renato Bucag,
his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato
Bucag II. Venue was, however, transferred to
Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative Matter
87-2-244. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and
found guilty as charged. The rest of the accused
remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however,
escaped from detention and has not been
apprehended since then. In an amended
information filed on 6 October 1988, Felizardo
Roxas, alias “Ely Roxas,” “Fely Roxas” and
“Lolong Roxas,” was included as a co-accused.
Roxas retained Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga as his
counsel. As counsel for Roxas, Paderanga filed,
among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to
Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the
Arraignment on 14 October 1988. The trial court
in an order dated 9 January 1989, denied the
omnibus motion but directed the City
Prosecutor “to conduct another preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant
the accused all the opportunity to adduce
whatever evidence he has in support of his
defense.” In the course of the preliminary
investigation, through a signed affidavit,
Felizardo Roxas implicated Atty. Paderanga in
the commission of the crime charged. The City
Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited
himself from further conducting the preliminary
investigation against Paderanga at the instance
of the latter’s counsel, per his resolution dated
7 July 1989. In his first indorsement to the
Department of Justice, dated 24 July 1989, said
city prosecutor requested the Department of
Justice to designate a state prosecutor to
continue the preliminary investigation against
Paderanga. In a resolution dated 6 September
1989, the State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon,
who was designated to continue with the
conduct of the preliminary investigation against
Paderanga, directed the amendment of the
previously amended information to include and
implead Paderanga as one of the accused
therein. Paderanga moved for reconsideration,
contending that the preliminary investigation
was not yet completed when said resolution
was promulgated, and that he was deprived of
his right to present a corresponding counter-
affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the
determination of his alleged “linkage” to the
crime charged. The motion was, however,
14
denied by Gingoyon in his order dated 29
January 1990. From the aforesaid resolution and
order, Paderanga filed a Petition for Review with
the Department of Justice. Thereafter, he
submitted a Supplemental Petition with
Memorandum, and then a Supplemental
Memorandum with Additional
Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed,
attaching thereto an affidavit of Roxas dated 20
June 1990 and purporting to be a retraction of
his affidavit of 30 March 1990 wherein he
implicated Paderanga. On 10 August 1990, the
Department of Justice, through Undersecretary
Silvestre H. Bello III, issued Resolution 648
dismissing the said petition for review. His
motion for reconsideration having been likewise
denied, Paderanga then filed the petition for
mandamus and prohibition before the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether there is no prima facie
evidence, or probable cause, or sufficient
justification to hold Paderangato a tedious and
prolonged public trial.
Held: A preliminary investigation is defined as
an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The
quantum of evidence now required in
preliminary investigation is such evidence
sufficient to “engender a well founded belief” as
to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A burned the seized materials in public at the
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for
the full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence; it is for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender a well
grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. Preliminary investigation is
generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It
is not a trial of the case on the merits and has
no purpose except that of determining whether
a crime has been committed and whether there
is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof, and it does not place the person
against whom it is taken in jeopardy. The
institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has the
quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether
or not a criminal case should be filed in court.
Hence, the general rule is that an injunction will
not be granted to restrain a criminal
prosecution. The case of Brocka, et al. vs.
Enrile, et al. cites several exceptions to the rule,
to wit: (a) To afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (b) When
necessary for the orderly administration of
justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions; (c) When there is a prejudicial question
which is sub-judice; (d) When the acts of the
officer are without or in excess of authority; (e)
Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation; (f) When double
jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where the
court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h)
Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; (i) Where the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and (j) When there is clearly no
prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been
denied. A careful analysis of the circumstances
obtaining in the present case, however, will
readily show that the same does not fall under
any of the aforesaid exceptions.
Pita vs. Court of Appeals [GR 80806, 5
October 1989]
En Banc, Sarmiento (J): 10 concur, 3 concur in
result, 1 on leave
Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing
an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor
of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing,
elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group,
Auxiliary Services Bureau, Western Police
District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of
Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers,
distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers
along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications
and other reading materials believed to be
obscene, pornographic and indecent and later
University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue,
Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and
several officers and members of various student
organizations. Among the publications seized,
and later burned, was “Pinoy Playboy”
magazines published and co-edited by Leo Pita.
On 7 December 1983, Pita filed a case for
injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing
and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of
Western Police District of the City of Manila,
seeking to enjoin and or restrain Bagatsing,
Cabrera and their agents from confiscating his
magazines or from otherwise preventing the
sale or circulation thereof claiming that the
magazine is a decent, artistic and educational
magazine which is not per se obscene, and that
the publication is protected by the
Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech
and of the press. On 12 December 1983, Pita
filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a
temporary restraining order against
indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning
of plaintiffs “Pinoy Playboy” Magazines, pending
hearing on the petition for preliminary
injunction in view of Mayor Bagatsing’s
pronouncement to continue the Anti-Smut
15
Campaign. The Court granted the temporary
restraining order on 14 December 1983. On 5
January 1984, Pita filed his Memorandum in
support of the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, raising the issue as to
“whether or not the defendants, and or their
agents can without a court order confiscate or
seize plaintiff’s magazine before any judicial
finding is made on whether said magazine is
obscene or not.” The restraining order lapsed
on 3 January 1984, Pita filed an urgent motion
for issuance of another restraining order, which
was opposed by Bagatsing on the ground that
issuance of a second restraining order would
violate the Resolution of the Supreme Court
dated 11 January 1983, providing for the Interim
Rules Relative to the Implementation of Batas
Pambansa 129, which provides that a
temporary restraining order shall be effective
only for 20 days from date of its issuance. On
11 January 1984, the trial court issued an Order
setting the case for hearing on 16 January 1984
“for the parties to adduce evidence on the
question of whether the publication ‘Pinoy
Playboy Magazine’ alleged (sic) seized,
confiscated and or burned by the defendants,
are obscence per se or not.” On 3 February
1984, the trial court promulgated the Order
appealed from denying the motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case
for lack of merit. Likewise, the Appellate Court
dismissed the appeal, holding that the freedom
of the press is not without restraint, as the state
has the right to protect society from
pornographic literature that is offensive to
public morals, as indeed we have laws
punishing the author, publishers and sellers of
obscene publications; and that the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures recognizes
certain exceptions, as when there is consent to
the search or seizure, or search is an incident to
an arrest, or is conducted in a vehicle or
movable structure. Pita filed the petition for
review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the Mayor can order the seizure
of “obscene” materials as a result of an anti-
smut campaign.
Held: The Court is not convinced that
Bagatsing and Cabrera have shown the required
proof to justify a ban and to warrant
confiscation of the literature for which
mandatory injunction had been sought below.
First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful
court order: (1) finding the said materials to be
pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry
out a search and seizure, by way of a search
warrant. The fact that the former Mayor’s act
was sanctioned by “police power” is no license
to seize property in disregard of due process.
Presidential Decrees 960 and 969 are, arguably,
police power measures, but they are not, by
themselves, authorities for high-handed acts.
They do not exempt our law enforcers, in
carrying out the decree of the twin presidential
issuances, from the commandments of the
Constitution, the right to due process of law and
the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, specifically. Significantly, the Decrees
themselves lay down procedures for
implementation. It is basic that searches and
seizures may be done only through a judicial
warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable
and subject to challenge. The Court finds
greater reason to reprobate the questioned
raid, in the complete absence of a warrant,
valid or invalid. The fact that the present case
involves an obscenity rap makes it no different
from Burgos vs. Chief of Staff AFP, a political
case, because speech is speech, whether
political or “obscene.” Although the Court is not
ruling out warrantless searches, the search
must have been an incident to a lawful arrest,
and the arrest must be on account of a crime
committed. Here, no party has been charged,
nor are such charges being readied against any
party, under Article 201, as amended, of the
Revised Penal Code. There is no “accused” here
to speak of, who ought to be “punished”.
Further, to say that the Mayor could have
validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-
smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant
because, in his opinion, “violation of penal laws”
has been committed, is to make the Mayor
judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one.
Thus, the court mae a resume, to wit: (1) The
authorities must apply for the issuance of a
search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion,
an obscenity rap is in order; (2) The authorities
must convince the court that the materials
sought to be seized are “obscene”, and pose a
clear and present danger of an evil substantive
enough to warrant State interference and
action; (3) The judge must determine whether
or not the same are indeed “obscene:” the
question is to be resolved on a case-to-case
basis and on His Honor’s sound discretion. (4) If,
in the opinion of the court, probable cause
exists, it may issue the search warrant prayed
for; (5) The proper suit is then brought in the
court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (6) Any conviction is subject to
appeal. The appellate court may assess whether
or not the properties seized are indeed
“obscene.” The Court states, however, that
“these do not foreclose, however, defenses
under the Constitution or applicable statutes, or
remedies against abuse of official power under
the Civil Code or the Revised Penal code.”
Abdula vs. Guiani [GR 118821, 18 February
2000]
Third Division, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 24 June 1994, a complaint for murder
(IS 94-1361) was filed before the Criminal
Investigation Service Command, ARMM
16
Regional Office XII against Mayor Bai Unggie D.
Abdula and Odin Abdula and 6 other persons in
connection with the death of a certain Abdul
Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of
Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. The complaint
alleged that the Abdulas paid the 6 other
persons the total amount of P200,000.00 for the
death of Dimalen. Acting on this complaint, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao, Salick U.
Panda, in a Resolution dated 22 August 1994,
dismissed the charges of murder against the
Abdulas and 5 other respondents on a finding
that there was no prima facie case for murder
against them. Prosecutor Panda, however,
recommended the filing of an information for
murder against one of the respondents, a
certain Kasan Mama. Pursuant to this
Resolution, an information for murder was
thereafter filed against Kasan Mama before the
sala of Judge Japal M. Guiani. In an Order dated
13 September 1994, the Judge ordered that the
case (Criminal Case 2332), be returned to the
Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. In
this Order, the judge noted that although there
were 8 respondents in the murder case, the
information filed with the court “charged only 1
of the 8 respondents in the name of Kasan
Mama without the necessary resolution required
under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Court to show how the investigating
prosecutor arrived at such a conclusion.” As
such, the judge reasons, the trial court cannot
issue the warrant of arrest against Kasan Mama.
Upon the return of the records of the case to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for
Maguindanao, it was assigned to 2nd Assistant
Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw for further
investigation. In addition to the evidence
presented during the initial investigation of the
murder charge, two new affidavits of witnesses
were submitted to support the charge of murder
against the Abdulas and the other respondents
in the murder complaint. Thus, Prosecutor
Dimaraw treated the same as a re-filing of the
murder charge and pursuant to law, issued
subpoena to the respondents named therein.
On 6 December 1994, the Abdulas submitted
and filed their joint counter-affidavits. After
evaluation of the evidence, Prosecutor
Dimaraw, in a Resolution dated 28 December
1994, found a prima facie case for murder
against the Abdulas and 3 other respondents.
He thus recommended the filing of charges
against the Abdulas, as principals by
inducement, and against the 3 others, as
principals by direct participation. Likewise in
this 28 December 1994 Resolution, Provincial
Prosecutor Salick U. Panda, who conducted the
earlier preliminary investigation of the murder
charge, added a notation stating that he was
inhibiting himself from the case and authorizing
the investigating prosecutor to dispose of the
case without his approval. The reasons he cited
were that the case was previously handled by
him and that the victim was the father-in-law of
his son. On 2 January 1995, an information for
murder dated 28 December 1994 was filed
against the Abdulas and Kasan Mama, Cuenco
Usman and Jun Mama before Branch 14 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, then the
sala of Judge Guiani. This information was
signed by investigating prosecutor Enok T.
Dimaraw. A notation was likewise made on the
information by Provincial Prosecutor Panda,
which explained the reason for his inhibition.
The following day, the judge issued a warrant
for the arrest of the Abdulas. Upon learning of
the issuance of the said warrant, the Abdulas
filed on 4 January 1995 an Urgent Ex-parte
Motion for the setting aside of the warrant of
arrest on 4 January 1995. In this motion, the
Abdulas argued that the enforcement of the
warrant of arrest should be held in abeyance
considering that the information was
prematurely filed and that the Abdulas intended
to file a petition for review with the Department
of Justice. A petition for review was filed by the
Abdulas with the Department of Justice on 11
January 1995. Despite said filing, the judge did
not act upon the Abdulas’ pending Motion to Set
Aside the Warrant of Arrest. The Abdulas filed
the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the judge may rely upon the
findings of the prosecutor in determining
probable cause in the issuance of search or
arrest warrant.
Held: The 1987 Constitution requires the judge
to determine probable cause “personally,” a
requirement which does not appear in the
corresponding provisions of our previous
constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent
of the framers to place a greater degree of
responsibility upon trial judges than that
imposed under previous Constitutions. Herein,
the Judge admits that he issued the questioned
warrant as there was “no reason for (him) to
doubt the validity of the certification made by
the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary
investigation was conducted and that probable
cause was found to exist as against those
charged in the information filed.” The statement
is an admission that the Judge relied solely and
completely on the certification made by the
fiscal that probable cause exists as against
those charged in the information and issued the
challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of
the prosecutor’s findings and
recommendations. He adopted the judgment of
the prosecutor regarding the existence of
probable cause as his own. Clearly, the judge,
by merely stating that he had no reason to
doubt the validity of the certification made by
the investigating prosecutor has abdicated his
duty under the Constitution to determine on his
own the issue of probable cause before issuing
17
a warrant of arrest. Consequently, the warrant
of arrest should be declared null and void.
Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin [GR
45950, 20 June 1938]
First Division, Laurel (J): 6 concur
Facts: On 10 November 1934, Mariano G.
Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board,
obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac,
Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any
officer of the law to search the person, house or
store of Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia at Victoria,
Tarlac, for “certain books, lists, chits, receipts,
documents and other papers relating to her
activities as usurer.” The search warrant was
issued upon an affidavit given by the said
Almeda “that he has and there is just and
probable cause to believe and he does believe
that Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals
in her house and store at Victoria, Tarlac,
certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents,
and other papers relating to her activities as
usurer, all of which is contrary to the statute in
such cases made and provided.” On the same
date, Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the
Philippine Constabulary, went to the office of
Pasion de Garcia in Victoria, Tarlac and, after
showing the search warrant to the latter’s
bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without Pasion
de Garcia’s presence who was ill and confined
at the time, proceeded with the execution
thereof. Two packages of records and a locked
filing cabinet containing several papers and
documents were seized by Almeda and a
receipt therefor issued by him to Salas. The
papers and documents seized were kept for a
considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury
Board and thereafter were turned over by it to
the provincial fiscal Felix Imperial, who
subsequently filed, in the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Tarlac, 6 separate criminal cases
against Pasion de Garcia for violation of the
Anti-Usury Law. On several occasions, after
seizure, Pasion de Garcia, through counsel,
demanded from the Anti-Usury Board the return
of the documents seized. On January 7, and, by
motion, on 4 June 1937, the legality of the
search warrant was challenged by Pasion de
Garcia’s counsel in the 6 criminal cases and the
devolution of the documents demanded. By
resolution of 5 October 1937, Judge Diego
Locsin (CFI) denied Pasion de garcia’s motion of
June 4 for the reason that though the search
warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the
latter’s part. A motion for reconsideration was
presented but was denied by order of 3 January
1938. Pasion de Garcia registered her
exception.
Issue: Whether the lack of personal
examination of witnesses renders the warrant
void.
Held: Freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures is declared a popular right and for
a search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be
issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable
cause must be determined by the judge himself
and not by the applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued
must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized.
These requirements are complemented by the
Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly with
reference to the duration of the validity of the
search warrant and the obligation of the officer
seizing the property to deliver the same to the
corresponding court. Herein, the existence of
probable cause was determined not by the
judge himself but by the applicant. All that the
judge did was to accept as true the affidavit
made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for
himself. It does not appear that he examined
the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even
accepting the description of the properties to be
seized to be sufficient and on the assumption
that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed
within the meaning of the law, the properties
seized were not delivered to the court which
issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead,
they were turned over to the provincial fiscal
and used by him in building up cases against
Pasion de Garcia. Considering that at the time
the warrant was issued there was no case
pending against Pasion de Garcia, the averment
that the warrant was issued primarily for
exploration purposes is not without basis. The
search warrant was illegally issued by the
justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac. In any
event, the failure on the part of Pasion de
Garcia and her bookkeeper to resist or object to
the execution of the warrant does not constitute
an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is, as
Judge Cooley observes, but a submission to the
authority of the law. As the constitutional
guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative
act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an
officer’s authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that
a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is
not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is
merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law.
Yee Sue Koy vs. Almeda [GR 47021, 15
June 1940]
Laurel (J): 3 concur, 1 concurs in result
Facts: In response to a sworn application of
Mariano G. Almeda, chief agent of the Anti-
Usury Board, dated 5 May 1938, the justice of
the peace of Sagay, Occidental Negros, after
taking the testimony of applicant’s witness, Jose
18
Estrada, special agent of the Anti-Usury Board,
issued on the same date a search warrant
commanding any peace officer to search during
day time the store and premises occupied by
Sam Sing & Co., situated at Sagay, Occidental
Negros, as well as the person of said Sam Sing
& Co., and to seize the documents, notebooks,
lists, receipts and promissory notes being used
by said Sam Sing & Co. in connection with their
activities of lending money at usurious rates of
interest in violation of law, or such as may be
found, and to bring them forthwith before the
aforesaid justice of the peace of Sagay. On the
same date, at 10:30 a. m., search was
accordingly made by Mariano G. Almeda, Jose
Estrada, 2 internal revenue agents and 2
members of the Philippine Army, who seized
certain receipt books, vales or promissory
notes, chits, notebooks, journal book, and
collection list belonging to Sam Sing & Co. and
enumerated in the inventory receipt issued by
Mariano G. Almeda to the owner of the
documents, papers and articles seized.
Immediately after the search and seizure thus
effected, Mariano G. Almeda filed a return with
the justice of the peace of Sagay together. With
a request that the office of the Anti-Usury Board
be allowed to retain possession of the articles
seized for examination, pursuant to section 4 of
Act 4109, which request was granted. Under the
date of 11 March 1939, Godofredo P. Escalona,
counsel for Sam Sing & Co. filed a motion with
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Occidental
Negros praying that the search warrant and the
seizure effected thereunder be declared illegal
and set aside and that the articles in question
be ordered returned to Sam Sing & Co., which
motion was denied in the order dated 24 July
1939. A similar motion was presented to the
justice of the peace of Sagay on 27 October
1939 but was denied the next day. Meanwhile,
an information dated 30 September 1939 had
been filed in the CFI Occidental Negros,
charging Yee Fock alias Yee Sue Koy, Y. Tip and
A. Sing, managers of Sam Sing & Co., with a
violation of Act 2655. Before the criminal case
could be tried, Yee Sue Koy and Yee Tip filed
the petition with the Supreme Court on 6
November 1939. The petition is grounded on
the propositions (1) that the search warrant
issued on 2 May 1938, by the justice of the
peace of Sagay and the seizure accomplished
thereunder are illegal, because the warrant was
issued three days ahead of the application
therefor and of the affidavit of the Jose Estrada
which is insufficient in itself to justify the
issuance of a search warrant, and because the
issuance of said warrant manifestly contravenes
the mandatory provisions both of section 1,
paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and
of section 97 of General Orders 58, and (2) that
the seizure of the aforesaid articles by means of
a search warrant for the purpose of using them
as evidence in the criminal case against the
accused, is unconstitutional because the
warrant thereby becomes unreasonable and
amounts to a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against compelling the accused to
testify against themselves.
Issue: Whether the application of the search
warrant is supported by the personal knowledge
of the witness, besides the applicant, for the
judge to determine probable cause in issuing
the warrant.
Held: Strict observance of the formalities under
section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders
58 was followed. The applicant Mariano G.
Almeda, in his application, swore that “he made
his own personal investigation and ascertained
that Sam Sing & Co. is lending money without
license, charging usurious rate of interest and is
keeping, utilizing and concealing in the store
and premises occupied by it situated at Sagay,
Occidental Negros, documents, notebooks, lists,
receipts, promissory notes, and book of
accounts and records, all of which are being
used by it in connection with its activities of
lending money at usurious rate of interest in
violation of the Usury Law.” In turn, the witness
Jose Estrada, in his testimony before the justice
of the peace of Sagay, swore that he knew that
Sam Sing & Co. was lending money without
license and charging usurious rate of interest,
because he personally investigated the victims
who had secured loans from said Sam Sing &
Co. and were charged usurious rate of interest;
that he knew that the said Sam Sing & Co. was
keeping and using books of accounts and
records containing its transactions relative its
activities as money lender and the entries of
the interest paid by its debtors, because he saw
the said Sam Sing & d make entries and records
of their debts and the interest paid thereon. As
both Mariano G. Almeda and Jose Estrada swore
that they had personal knowledge, their
affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, they
could be held liable for perjury if the facts would
turn out to be not as their were stated under
oath. That the existence of probable cause had
been determined by the justice of the peace of
Sagay before issuing the search warrant
complained of, is shown by the following
statement in the warrant itself, to wit: “After
examination under oath of the complainant,
Mariano G. Almeda, Chief Agent of the Anti-
Usury Board, Department of Justice and Special
Agent of the Philippine Army, Manila, and the
witness he presented, . . . and this Court,
finding that there is just and probable cause to
believe as it does believe, that the above
described articles, relating to the activities of
said Sam Sing & Co. of lending money at
usurious rate of interest, are being utilized and
kept and concealed at its store and premises
19
occupied by said Sam Sing & Co., all in violation
of law.”
Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of
Tayabas [GR 45358, 29 January 1937]
First Division, Imperial (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret
service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge
Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over
the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an
affidavit alleging that according to reliable
information, Narciso Alvarez kept in his house in
Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts,
lists, chits and other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as a moneylender,
charging usurious rates of interest in violation
of the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit,
the chief of the secret service stated that his
answers to the questions were correct to the
best of his knowledge and belief. He did not
swear to the truth of his statements upon his
own knowledge of the facts but upon the
information received by him from a reliable
person. Upon the affidavit the judge, on said
date, issued the warrant which is the subject
matter of the petition, ordering the search of
the Alvarez’s house at any time of the day or
night, the seizure of the books and documents
and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be
disposed of in accordance with the law. With
said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury
Board entered Alvarez’s store and residence at
7:00 p.m. of 4 June 1936, and seized and took
possession of the following articles: internal
revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, 1
ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order books,
4 notebooks, 4 check stubs, 2 memorandums, 3
bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4 stubs, 48 stubs of
purchases of copra, 2 inventories, 2 bundles of
bills of lading, 1 bundle of credit receipts, 1
bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, 2
packages of correspondence, 1 receipt book
belonging to Luis Fernandez, 14 bundles of
invoices and other papers, many documents
and loan contracts with security and promissory
notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of
used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC). The search for and
seizure of said articles were made with the
opposition of Alvarez who stated his protest
below the inventories on the ground that the
agents seized even the originals of the
documents. As the articles had not been
brought immediately to the judge who issued
the search warrant, Alvarez, through his
attorney, filed a motion on 8 June 1936, praying
that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other
agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the
seized articles in the office of the clerk of court
and that said agent be declared guilty of
contempt for having disobeyed the order of the
court. On said date the court issued an order
directing Siongco to deposit all the articles
seized within 24 hours from the receipt of
notice thereof and giving him a period of 5 days
within which to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt of court. On 10 June,
Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the
Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that
the order of the 8th of said month be set aside
and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to
retain the articles seized for a period of 30 days
for the necessary investigation. On June 25, the
court issued an order requiring agent Siongco
forthwith to file the search warrant and the
affidavit in the court, together with the
proceedings taken by him, and to present an
inventory duly verified by oath of all the articles
seized. On July 2, the attorney for the petitioner
filed a petition alleging that the search warrant
issued was illegal and that it had not yet been
returned to date together with the proceedings
taken in connection therewith, and praying that
said warrant be cancelled, that an order be
issued directing the return of all the articles
seized to Alvarez, that the agent who seized
them be declared guilty of contempt of court,
and that charges be filed against him for abuse
of authority. On September 10, the court issued
an order holding: that the search warrant was
obtained and issued in accordance with the law,
that it had been duly complied with and,
consequently, should not be cancelled, and that
agent Siongco did not commit any contempt of
court and must, therefore, be exonerated, and
ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in
Manila to show cause, if any, within the
unextendible period of 2 days from the date of
notice of said order, why all the articles seized
appearing in the inventory should not be
returned to Alvarez. The assistant chief of the
Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice
filed a motion praying, for the reasons stated
therein, that the articles seized be ordered
retained for the purpose of conducting an
investigation of the violation of the Anti-Usury
Law committed by Alvarez. On October 10, said
official again filed another motion alleging that
he needed 60 days to examine the documents
and papers seized, which are designated on
pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16,
23, 25-27, 30-31 , 34, 36-43 and 45, and
praying that he be granted said period of 60
days. In an order of October 16, the court
granted him the period of 60 days to investigate
said 19 documents. Alvarez, herein, asks that
the search warrant as well as the order
authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board
to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal
and set aside, and prays that all the articles in
question be returned to him.
Issue: Whether the search warrant issued by
the court is illegal because it has been based
upon the affidavit of agent Almeda in whose
oath he declared that he had no personal
20
knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a
basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he
had knowledge thereof through mere
information secured from a person whom he
considered reliable, and that it is illegal as it
was not supported by other affidavits aside
from that made by the applicant.
Held: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders
58 require that there be not only probable
cause before the issuance of a search warrant
but that the search warrant must be based
upon an application supported by oath of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In
its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of
attestation by which a party signifies that he is
bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully
and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an
outward pledge given by the person taking it
that his attestation or promise is made under an
immediate sense of his responsibility to God.
The oath required must refer to the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The
true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant
issuance of a search warrant is whether it has
been drawn in such a manner that perjury could
be charged thereon and affiant be held liable
for damages caused. The affidavit, which served
as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is
insufficient and fatally defective by reason of
the manner in which the oath was made, and
therefore, the search warrant and the
subsequent seizure of the books, documents
and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the
practice in this jurisdiction to attach the
affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant
to the application. It is admitted that the judge
who issued the search warrant in this case,
relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by
agent Almeda and that he did not require nor
take the deposition of any other witness.
Neither the Constitution nor General Orders 58
provides that it is of imperative necessity to
take the depositions of the witnesses to be
presented by the applicant or complainant in
addition to the affidavit of the latter. The
purpose of both in requiring the presentation of
depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of
probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge
may dispense with that of other witnesses.
Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was
insufficient because his knowledge of the facts
was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the
duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one
or more witnesses for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause to
warrant the issuance of the search warrant.
When the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant contains sufficient facts within his
personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if
the judge is satisfied that there exists probable
cause; when the applicant’s knowledge of the
facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or
more witnesses having a personal knowledge of
the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued
is likewise illegal because it was based only on
the affidavit of the agent who had no personal
knowledge of the facts.
Mata vs. Bayona [GR 50720, 26 March
1984]
Second Division, de Castro (J): 3 concur, 2
concur in result, 1 took no part
Facts: Soriano Mata was accused under
Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by
PD 1306, the information against him alleging
that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged
bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal
tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any
authority from the Philippine Jai Alai &
Amusement Corporation or from the
government authorities concerned.” Mata
claimed that during the hearing of the case, he
discovered that nowhere from the records of
the said case could be found the search warrant
and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire
from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to
which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona,
presiding Jufe of the City Court of Ormoc
replied, “it is with the court”. The Judge then
handed the records to the Fiscal who attached
them to the records. This led Mata to file a
motion to quash and annul the search warrant
and for the return of the articles seized, citing
and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion
was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979,
stating that the court has made a thorough
investigation and examination under oath of
Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote,
members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd
PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court
made a certification to that effect; and that the
fact that documents relating to the search
warrant were not attached immediately to the
record of the criminal case is of no moment,
considering that the rule does not specify when
these documents are to be attached to the
records. Mata’s motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid order having been denied, he
came to the Supreme Court, with the petition
for certiorari, praying, among others, that the
Court declare the search warrant to be invalid
for its alleged failure to comply with the
requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, and that all the articles confiscated under
such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the
case, or in any proceedings on the matter.
21
Issue: Whether the judge must before issuing
the warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce and take their depositions in
writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Held: Under the Constitution “no search
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to
be determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law
after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce”. More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional
injunction, The Rules provide that the judge
must before issuing the warrant personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce and take
their depositions in writing, and attach them to
the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him. Mere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce and to attach
them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able
to properly determine the existence or
nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be
found later that his declarations are false. We,
therefore, hold that the search warrant is
tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge
to conform with the essential requisites of
taking the depositions in writing and attaching
them to the record, rendering the search
warrant invalid.
Olaez vs. People of the Philippines [GR
78347-49, 9 November 1987]
First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur
Facts: Adolfo Olaes and Linda M. Cruz were
charged for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. Olaes and Cruz filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
challenging the admission by Judge Alicia L.
Santos (in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch
73) of evidence seized by virtue of an allegedly
invalid search warrant and of an extrajudicial
confession taken from them without according
them the right to assistance of counsel; and
thus seek to restrain further proceedings in the
criminal case against them and ask that they be
acquitted with the setting aside of the
questioned orders (the facts do not provide the
disposition of the said orders). Olaes and Cruz
claim that the search warrant issued by the
judge is unconstitutional because it does not
indicate the specific offense they are supposed
to have committed. There is, therefore,
according to them, no valid finding of probable
cause as a justification for the issuance of the
said warrant in conformity with the Bill of
Rights.
Issue: Whether the lack of specific section of
the Dangerous Drugs Act renders the caption
vague, and negate the claim that the specific
offense was committed to serve as basis for the
finding of probable cause.
Held: No. The search warrant issued does not
come under the strictures of the Stonehill
doctrine. While in the case cited, there was a
bare reference to the laws in general, without
any specification of the particular sections
thereof that were alleged to have been violated
out of the hundreds of prohibitions contained in
such codifications, there is no similar ambiguity
herein. While it is true that the caption of the
search warrant states that it is in connection
with “Violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Acts of 1972,” it is clearly
recited in the text thereof that “There is
probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes
alias ‘Debie’ and alias ‘Baby’ of No. 628 Comia
St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in
their possession and control and custody of
marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes
and other regulated/prohibited and exempt
narcotics preparations which is the subject of
the offense stated above.” Although the specific
section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not
pinpointed, there is no question at all of the
specific offense alleged to have been
committed as a basis for the finding of probable
cause. The search warrant also satisfies the
requirement in the Bill of Rights of the
particularity of the description to be made of
the “place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Prudente vs. Dayrit [GR 82870, 14
December 1989]
En Banc, Padilla (J): 14 concur
Facts: On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin
Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special
Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police
District (WPD), filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over
by Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals, an application for the
issuance of a search warrant (Search Warrant
87-14) for violation of Presidential Decree 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled
“People of the Philippines vs. Nemesio E.
Prudente.” On the same day, the Judge issued
the Search Warrant, commanding Dimagmaliw
“to make an immediate search at any time in
the day or night of the premises of Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, more particularly
(a) offices of the Department of Military Science
22
and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms
at the ground floor; (b) office of the President,
Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and
other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith
seize and take possession of the following
personal properties, to wit: (a) M 16 Armalites
with ammunition; (b) .38 and .45 Caliber
handguns and pistols; (c) explosives and hand
grenades; and (d) assorted weapons with
ammunitions.” On 1 November 1987, a Sunday
and All Saints Day, the search warrant was
enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by
P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy Superintendent,
WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8
Commander. In his affidavit, dated 2 November
1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the
searching team, alleged that he found in the
drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr.
Prudente’s office a bulging brown envelope with
3 live fragmentation hand grenades separately
wrapped with old newspapers. On 6 November
1987, Prudente moved to quash the search
warrant. He claimed that (1) the complainant’s
lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no
personal knowledge of the facts which formed
the basis for the issuance of the search warrant;
(2) the examination of the said witness was not
in the form of searching questions and answers;
(3) the search warrant was a general warrant,
for the reason that it did not particularly
describe the place to be searched and that it
failed to charge one specific offense; and (4)
the search warrant was issued in violation of
Circular 19 of the Supreme Court in that the
complainant failed to allege under oath that the
issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday
was urgent. On 9 March 1988, the Judge issued
an order, denying Prudente’s motion and
supplemental motion to quash. Prudente’s
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
in the order dated 20 April 1988. Prudente filed
a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the allegations contained in the
application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and
the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his
deposition were sufficient basis for the issuance
of a valid search warrant.
Held: The “probable cause” for a valid search
warrant, has been defined “as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.” This probable
cause must be shown to be within the personal
knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses
he may produce and not based on mere
hearsay. Thus, for a valid search warrant to
issue, there must be probable cause, which is to
be determined personally by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. The probable cause must be in
connection with one specific offense,and the
judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and any witness he may
produce, on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted. Herein,
in his application for search warrant, P/Major
Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that “he has been
informed” that Nemesio Prudente “has in his
control and possession” the firearms and
explosives described therein, and that he “has
verified the report and found it to be a fact.” On
the other hand, in his supporting deposition,
P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as a
result of their continuous surveillance for
several days, they “gathered informations from
verified sources” that the holders of the said
firearms and explosives are not licensed to
possess them. In other words, the applicant and
his witness had no personal knowledge of the
facts and circumstances which became the
basis for issuing the questioned search warrant,
but acquired knowledge thereof only through
information from other sources or persons.
While it is true that in his application for search
warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated
that he verified the information he had earlier
received that petitioner had in his possession
and custody the firearms and explosives
described in the application, and that he found
it to be a fact, yet there is nothing in the record
to show or indicate how and when said
applicant verified the earlier information
acquired by him as to justify his conclusion that
he found such information to be a fact. He
might have clarified this point if there had been
searching questions and answers, but there
were none. In fact, the records yield no
questions and answers, whether searching or
not, vis-a-vis the said applicant. Evidently, the
allegations contained in the application of P/
Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the declaration
of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition
were insufficient basis for the issuance of a
valid search warrant.
Chia vs. Acting Collector of Customs [GR L-
43810, 26 September 1989]
First Division, Grino-Aquino (J): 4 concur
Facts: Acting on a verified report of a
confidential informant that assorted electronic
and electrical equipment and other articles
illegally imported into the Philippines by a
syndicate engaged in unlawful “shipside”
activities (foreign goods are unloaded from
foreign ships in transit through Philippine
waters into motorized bancas and landed on
Philippine soil without passing through the
23
Bureau of Customs, thereby evading payment
of the corresponding customs duties and taxes
thereon) were found inside “Tom’s Electronics”
and “Sony Merchandising (Philippines)” stores
located at 690 and 691 Gonzalo Puyat corner
Evangelista Street, Quiapo, Manila, a letter-
request dated 23 April 1976 was addressed to
the Collector of Customs by the Deputy Director
of the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center,
Manila Bay Area (RASAC-MBA) for the issuance
of warrants of seizure and detention. After
evaluation, the Collector of Customs issued
Warrants of Seizure and Detention 14925 and
14925-A, directing the Anti-Smuggling Action
Center to seize the goods mentioned therein,
i.e. various electronic equipments like cassette
tape recorders, car stereos, phonograph
needles (diamond), portable TV sets, imported
long playing records, spare parts of TVs and
radios and other electrical appliances. A RASAC
team was formed and given a mission order to
enforce the warrants, which it implemented
with the assistance of: (1) the National Customs
Police (augmenting the team with 2 members),
(2) the Detective Bureau of the Manila Western
Police District Headquarters (with 3 detectives),
as well as, (3) Precinct 3 of the Manila Western
Police District which exercised jurisdictional
control over the place to be raided. The
intended raid was entered in the respective
police blotters of the police detective bureaus.
On the strength of the warrants of seizure and
detention, the raid was conducted in the
afternoon of 25 April 1976 at the 2 stores of
Tomas Chia. ASAC team leader Gener Sula,
together with his agents Badron Dobli, Arturo
Manuel, Rodolfo Molina and Servillano Florentin
of Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, assisted by
two customs policemen, Val Martinez and
Renato Sorima, and Manila policemen Rogelio
Vinas and John Peralta, recovered from the
stores, assorted electronic equipment and other
articles, the customs duties on which allegedly
had not been paid. They were turned over to
the Customs Auction and Cargo Disposal Unit of
the Bureau of Customs. On 17 May 1976, in the
afternoon, the hearing officer of Acting Collector
of Customs Alfredo Francisco conducted a
hearing on the confiscation of the goods taken
by Gener Sula and his agents. 2 days later, Chia
filed the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the Supreme Court to enjoin
the Collector of Customs and/or his agents from
further proceeding with the forfeiture hearing
and prayed that the search warrants be
declared null and void, that the latter be
ordered to return the confiscated articles to
Chia, and to pay damages.
Issue: Whether the warrants issued by the
Collector of Customs partakes the nature of a
general warrants, and thus are invalid.
Held: Not only may goods be seized without a
search and seizure warrant under Section 2536
of the Customs and Tariff Code, when they (the
goods) are openly offered for sale or kept in
storage in a store as herein, but the fact is that
Chia’s stores — “Tom’s Electronics” and “Sony
Merchandising (Phil.)” — were searched upon
warrants of search and detention issued by the
Collector of Customs, who, under the 1973
Constitution, was “a responsible officer
authorized by law” to issue them. Sections 2208
and 2209 of the Tariff and Customs Code
provide when a search may be made without a
warrant and when a warrant is necessary.
Section 2208 provides that “For the more
effective discharge of his official duties, any
person exercising the powers herein conferred,
may at any time enter, pass through or search
any land or inclosure or any warehouse, store or
other building, not being a dwelling house. A
warehouse, store or other building or inclosure
used for the keeping or storage of articles does
not become a dwelling house within the
meaning hereof merely by reason of the fact
that a person employed as watchman lives in
the place, nor will the fact that his family stays
there with him alter the case.” On the other
hand, Section 2209 provides that “A dwelling
house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a Judge of the court or such
other responsible officers as may be authorized
by law, upon sworn application showing
probable cause and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to
be seized.” The warrants issued by the Collector
of Customs in this case were not general
warrants for they identified the stores to be
searched, described the articles to be seized
and specified the provision of the Tariff and
Customs Code violated. Upon effecting the
seizure of the goods, the Bureau of Customs
acquired exclusive jurisdiction not only over the
case but also over the goods seized for the
purpose of enforcing the tariff and customs
laws. Further, a party dissatisfied with the
decision of the Collector may appeal to the
Commissioner of Customs, whose decision is
appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals in the
manner and within the period prescribed by law
and regulations. The decision of the Court of
Tax Appeals may be elevated to the Supreme
Court for review. Since Chia did not exhaust his
administrative remedies, his recourse to this
Court is premature.
20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals [GR L-76649-51, 19
August 1988]
Third Division, Gutierrez J. (J): 4 concur
Facts: In a letter-complaint dated 26 August
1985, 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
through counsel sought the National Bureau of
Investigation’s (NBI) assistance in the conduct
24
of searches and seizures in connection with the
NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the
letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape
outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of
copyrighted films in videotape form which
constitute a flagrant violation of Presidential
Decree 49 (Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Property). Acting on the letter-
complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and
investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the
film corporation and subsequently filed 3
applications for search warrants against the
video outlets owned by Eduardo M. Barreto,
Raul Sagullo, and Fortune Ledesma. The
applications were consolidated and heard by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch
132. On 4 September 1985, the lower court
issued the desired search warrants, describing
the articles sought to be seized as”(c)
Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders,
rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipments and other machines used or
intended to be used in the unlawful
reproduction, sale, rental/lease, distribution of
the above-mentioned video tapes which she is
keeping and concealing in the premises above-
described.”. Armed with the search warrants,
the NBI accompanied by the film corporation’s
agents, raided the video outlets and seized the
items described therein. An inventory of the
items seized was made and left with Barreto, et.
al. Acting on a motion to lift search warrants
and release seized properties filed by Barreto,
et. al., the lower court issued an order dated 8
October 1985, lifting the 3 search warrants
issued earlier against them by the court, due to
the failure of the NBI to deliver the articles to
the Court, and thus ordered the return of the
articles to their respective owners. The lower
court denied a motion for reconsideration filed
by the film corporation in its order dated 2
January 1986. The film corporation filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
to annul the orders of the lower court. The
petition was dismissed. The 20th Century Fox
Film Corporation filed the petition for review
with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the inclusion of certain articles
of property which are usually connected to
legitimate business, and not involving piracy of
intellectual property or infringement of
copyright laws, renders the warrant to be
unreasonable.
Held: Television sets, video cassette recorders,
rewinders and tape cleaners are articles which
can be found in a video tape store engaged in
the legitimate business of lending or renting out
betamax tapes. In short, these articles and
appliances are generally connected with, or
related to a legitimate business not necessarily
involving piracy of intellectual property or
infringement of copyright laws. Hence, including
these articles without specification and/or
particularity that they were really instruments
in violating an Anti-Piracy law makes the search
warrant too general which could result in the
confiscation of all items found in any video
store. In fact, this actually happened in the
present case. Although the applications and
warrants themselves covered certain articles of
property usually found in a video store, the
Court believes that the search party should
have confined themselves to articles that are
according to them, evidence constitutive of
infringement of copyright laws or the piracy of
intellectual property, but not to other articles
that are usually connected with, or related to, a
legitimate business, not involving piracy of
intellectual property, or infringement of
copyright laws. So that a television set, a
rewinder, and a whiteboard listing Betamax
tapes, video cassette cleaners video cassette
recorders as reflected in the Returns of Search
Warrants, are items of legitimate business
engaged in the video tape industry, and which
could not be the subject of seizure. The
applicant and his agents therefore exceeded
their authority in seizing perfectly legitimate
personal property usually found in a video
cassette store or business establishment. The
search and seizure is unreasonable.
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano [GR L-69803, 8
October 1985]
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 7 concur, 1
concurs in the result, 1 took no part, 1 reserves
his vote
Facts: Prior to 6 August 1984, Mila Aguilar-
Roque was one of the accused of Rebellion in
Criminal Case SMC-1-1 before Special Military
Commission 1, and also one of the accused of
Subversion in Criminal Case MC-25-113 of
Military Commission 25, both cases being
entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma.
Sison, et al.” She was then still at large. At
around 9:00 a.m. on August 6, Lt. Col. Virgilio G.
Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search
Warrant from the Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño,
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in
Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon
Street, Quezon City, determined to be the
leased residence of Aguilar-Roque, after almost
a month of “round the clock surveillance” of the
premises as a “suspected underground house of
the CPP/NPA.” Aguilar-Roque has been long
wanted by the military for being a high ranking
officer of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, particularly connected with the MV
Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases. At 11:30 a.m.,
Aguilar-Roque and Cynthia D. Nolasco were
arrested by a Constabulary Security Group
(CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P.
Margall Street, Quezon City. The record does
not disclose that a warrant of arrest had
25
previously been issued against Nolasco. At
12:00 noon on the same day, elements of the
CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon
Street, Quezon City. Willie C. Tolentino, a
person then in charge of the premises, was
arrested by the searching party presumably
without a warrant of arrest. The searching party
seized 428 documents and written materials,
and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2
wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. On
August 10, Aguilar-Roque, Nolasco and
Tolentino, were charged before the Quezon City
Fiscal’s Office upon complaint filed by the CSG
against the former for “Subversion/Rebellion
and/or Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion/Subversion. On August 13, the City
Fiscal filed an Information for Violation of
Presidential Decree (PD) 33 (Illegal Possession
of Subversive Documents) against Aguilar-
Roque, et. al. before Branch 42 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Judge
Antonio P. Santos, presiding. On August 16, CSG
filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the City
Fiscal, praying that Aguilar-Roque and Nolasco
be charged with Subversion. The Motion was
denied on November 16. On September 10, the
CSG submitted an Amended Return in the
Search Warrant case praying, inter alia, that the
CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431
documents and articles, “in connection with
cases that are presently pending against Mila
Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal’s
Office and the court.” On December 13, Judge
Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled
that the seized documents “shall be subject to
disposition of the tribunal trying the case
against respondent.” A day before that, Aguilar-
Roque, et. al. filed a Motion to Suppress,
praying that such of the 431 items belonging to
them be returned to them. It was claimed that
the proceedings under the Search Warrant were
unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on 7
January 1985 on the ground that the validity of
the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the
other case, apparently unaware of the Order
issued by Judge Paño on December 13. Nolasco,
Aguilar-Roque, and Tolentino filed the Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus to
annul and set aside the (1) Search Warrant
issued by RTC Judge Paño; (2) his Order
admitting the Amended Return and granting the
Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of
MTC Judge Santos denying Aguilar-Roque, et.
al.’s Motion to Suppress.
Issue: Whether the description of the
personalities to be seized in the search warrant
is too general to render the warrant void.
Held: The disputed Search Warrant (80-84)
describes the personalities to be seized as
“Documents, papers and other records of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples
Army and/or the National Democratic Front,
such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of
these groups, Programs, List of possible
supporters, subversive books and instructions,
manuals not otherwise available to the public,
and support money from foreign or local
sources.” It is at once evident that the Search
Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all-embracing description
which includes everything conceivable
regarding the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the National Democratic Front.
It does not specify what the subversive books
and instructions are; what the manuals not
otherwise available to the public contain to
make them subversive or to enable them to be
used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent
a definite guideline to the searching team as to
what items might be lawfully seized thus giving
the officers of the law discretion regarding what
articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also
were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden
boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general
warrant and infringes on the constitutional
mandate requiring particular description of the
things to be seized. Search warrants of similar
description were considered null and void for
being too general. Notwithstanding the irregular
issuance of the Search Warrant and although,
ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid
search warrant should be returned, they cannot
be ordered returned to Aguilar-Roque. Some
searches may be made without a warrant.
Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, is
declaratory in the sense that it is confined to
the search, without a search warrant, of a
person who had been arrested. It is also a
general rule that, as an incident of an arrest,
the place or premises where the arrest was
made can also be search without a search
warrant. In this latter case, “the extent and
reasonableness of the search must be decided
on its own facts and circumstances, and it has
been stated that, in the application of general
rules, there is some confusion in the decisions
as to what constitutes the extent of the place or
premises which may be searched”. Considering
that Aguilar-Roque has been charged with
Rebellion, which is a crime against public order;
that the warrant for her arrest has not been
served for a considerable period of time; that
she was arrested within the general vicinity of
her dwelling; and that the search of her
dwelling was made within a half hour of her
arrest, the Court was of the opinion that, in her
respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street,
Quezon City, did not need a search warrant;
this, for possible effective results in the interest
of public order. Such being the case, the
personalities seized may be retained by CSG,
for possible introduction as evidence in the
Rebellion Case, leaving it to Aguilar-Roque to
object to their relevance and to ask Special
26
Military Commission 1 to return to her any all
irrelevant documents and articles.
Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines vs. Asuncion [GR 122092, 19
May 1999]
Third Division, Panganiban (J): 3 concur, 1 took
no part
Facts: On 25 January 1995, Police Chief
Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a
search warrant before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City, stating “(1)
that the management of Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP
compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del
Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President
Ricardo G. Santiago, is in possession or has in
its control high powered firearms, ammunitions,
explosives, which are the subject of the offense,
or used or intended to be used in committing
the offense, and which are being kept and
concealed in the premises herein described; (2)
that a Search Warrant should be issued to
enable any agent of the law to take possession
and bring to this Honorable Court the following
described properties: ‘Seventy (70) M16
Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles,
two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI
submachinegun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade
Launcher[s] cal 40mm., ten (10) cal. 45
pistol[s], ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s], two (2)
ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted
ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and
ten (10) handgrenades.’” The joint Deposition of
SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T.
Morito, as well as a summary of the information
and the supplementary statements of Mario
Enad and Felipe Moreno were attached to the
application. After propounding several
questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C.
Asuncion issued the contested search warrant.
On 4 February 1995, the police enforced the
search warrant at the PICOP compound and
seized various firearms and ammunition.
Believing that the warrant was invalid and the
search unreasonable, Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, Evaristo M.
Narvaez Jr., Ricardo G. Santiago, Roberto A.
Dormendo, Reydande D. Azucena, Niceforo V.
Avila, Florentino M. Mula, Felix O. Baito, Harold
B. Celestial, Elmedencio C. Calixtro, Carlito S.
Legacion, Albino T. Lubang, Jeremias I. Abad
and Herminio V. Villamil filed a “Motion to
Quash” 16 before the trial court. Subsequently,
they also filed a “Supplemental Pleading to the
Motion to Quash” and a “Motion to Suppress
Evidence.” On 23 March 1995, the RTC issued
the Order which denied PICOP, et. al.’s motions.
On 3 August 1995, the trial court rendered its
Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration.
PICOP, et. al. filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition.
Issue: Whether the fact that the warrant
identifies only one place, i.e. the “Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines,
located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon,
Bislig, Surigao del Sur,” satisfies the
requirements of the particularity of the place to
be search, and thus render the warrant valid.
Held: No. The fundamental right against
unreasonable searches and seizures and the
basic conditions for the issuance of a search
warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. Consistent with the
foregoing constitutional provision, Sections 3
and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, detail the
requisites for the issuance of a valid search
warrant. The requisites of a valid search
warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such presence is determined personally by the
judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he
or she may produce are personally examined by
the judge, in writing and under oath or
affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on facts personally known to them; and
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place
to be searched and the things to be seized. In
view of the manifest objective of the
constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
search, the Constitution and the Rules limit the
place to be searched only to those described in
the warrant. Thus, this Court has held that “this
constitutional right is the embodiment of a
spiritual concept: the belief that to value the
privacy of home and person and to afford it
constitutional protection against the long reach
of government no less than to value human
dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social
need, and then only under stringent procedural
safeguards.” Additionally, the requisite of
particularity is related to the probable cause
requirement in that, at least under some
circumstances, the lack of a more specific
description will make it apparent that there has
not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate
that the described items are to be found in a
particular place. Herein, the search warrant is
invalid because (1) the trial court failed to
examine personally the complainant and the
other deponents: (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who
appeared during the hearing for the issuance of
the search warrant, had no personal knowledge
that PICOP, et. al. were not licensed to possess
the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be
searched was not described with particularity.
As to the particularity of the place to be
searched, the assailed search warrant failed to
described the place with particularity. It simply
authorizes a search of “the aforementioned
premises,” but it did not specify such premises.
The warrant identifies only one place, and that
is the “Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, located at PICOP Compound,
Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur.” The
27
PICOP compound, however, is made up of “200
offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1
airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL
depots/quick service outlets and some 800
miscellaneous structures, all of which spread
out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares.”
Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers
unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all
the structures found inside the PICOP
compound. Because the search warrant was
procured in violation of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives and
other materials seized were “inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.”
Yousef Al-Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals [GR
126859, 4 September 2001]
Second Division, Quisumbing (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 31 March 1995, Judge Geronimo S.
Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-
95 and 55-95 for the search and seizure of
certain items in Apartment 2 at 154 Obiniana
Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. On 1
April 1995, the police searched Apartment 8, in
the same compound and found one (1) .45
caliber pistol. Found in Apartment 2 were 2 M-
16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16
ammunitions, 1 Bar of demolition charge, 1
Caliber Pistol with no. 634 and other nos. were
placed with magazine of Caliber .45 and 3 live
45 ammunitions, 1 22 Caliber handgun with 5
live ammunitions in its cylinder, 1 Box
containing 40 pieces of .25 caliber
ammunitions, 2 pieces of fragmentation
grenade, 1 roll of detonating cord color yellow,
2 big bags of ammonium nitrate suspected to
be explosives substance, 22 detonating cords
with blasting caps, ½ and ¼ pound of high
explosives TNT, 1 timer alarm clock, 2 bags of
suspected gun powder, 2 small plastic bag of
suspected explosive substance, 1 small box of
plastic bag of suspected dynamites, One
weighing scale, and 2 batteries 9 volts with
blasting caps and detonating cord. The
firearms, ammunitions, explosives and other
incendiary devices seized at the apartments
were acknowledged in the receipt signed by
SPO2 Melanio de la Cruz. Yousef Al Ghoul, Isam
Mohammad Abdulhadi, Wail Rashid Al-Khatib,
Nabeel Nasser Al-Riyami, Ashraf Hassam Al-
Yazori, and Mohammad Abushendi were
charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City, Branch 123, in informations
(Criminal Cases C-48666-67) accusing them
with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions
and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree
1866. Thereafter, they were arrested and
detained. They filed a motion for bail on 24 May
1995, the resolution of which was held in
abeyance by the RTC pending the presentation
of evidence from the prosecution to determine
whether or not the evidence presented is
strong. On 7 February 1996, at the hearing for
bail, the RTC “admitted all exhibits being
offered for whatever purpose that they maybe
worth” after the prosecution had finished
adducing its evidence despite the objection by
the petitioners on the admissibility of said
evidence. On 19 February 1996, the RTC denied
their motion for bail earlier filed. As their action
before appellate court also proved futile, with
the appellate court dismissing their special civil
action for certiorari, they filed the petition for
review before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the search and seizure orders
are valid, and the objects seized admissible in
evidence.
Held: As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to
be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor
amplified by the police. Policemen may not be
restrained from pursuing their task with vigor,
but in doing so, care must be taken that
constitutional and legal safeguards are not
disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized
evidence is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, the
search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and
the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is
inadmissible in evidence against Al-Ghoul, et.
al. In contrast, the search conducted at
Apartment 2 could not be similarly faulted. The
search warrants specifically mentioned
Apartment 2. The search was done in the
presence of its occupants, in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.
The articles seized during the search of
Apartment 2 are of the same kind and nature as
those items enumerated in the search warrant.
The items seized from Apartment 2 were
described with specificity in the warrants in
question. The nature of the items ordered to be
seized did not require a technical description.
Moreover, the law does not require that the
things to be seized must be described in precise
and minute details as to leave no room for
doubt on the part of the searching authorities,
otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for
the applicants to obtain a search warrant as
they would not know exactly what kind of things
they are looking for. Once described, however,
the articles subject of the search and seizure
need not be so invariant as to require absolute
concordance between those seized and those
described in the warrant. Substantial similarity
of those articles described as a class or species
would suffice.