Crim Pro Cases

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
Espino v. People [G.R. No. 188217. July 3, 2013.]

Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 189343. July 10, 2013.]
Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 191411. July 15, 2013.]
People v. Odtuhan [G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013.]
Jose v. Suarez [G.R. No. 176111. July 17, 2013.]
Avelino y Bulawan v. People [G.R. 181444. July 17, 2013.]
People v. Marvin Cruz [G.R. 201728. July 17, 2013.]
Anita Mangila v. Judge Pangilinan et.al. [G.R. 160739. July 17, 2013.]
People v. Victorino Reyes [G.R. 173307. July 17, 2013.]
People v. Clara [GR No. 195528. July 24, 2013.]
People v. Roman [G.R. No. 198110. July 31, 2013.]
Lihaylihay and Vinluan v. People [G.R. No. 191219. July 31, 2013.]
Lee v. Lee [GR No. 181658. August 7, 2013.]
Chavez v. Fria [GR No. 183014. August 7, 2013.]
Neri v. Sandiganbayan [GR No. 202243. August 7, 2013.]
Hasegawa v. Giron [G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013.]
People v. Pepino-Consulta [G.R. No. 191071. Aug. 28, 2013.]
People v. Amistoso y Broca [G.R. No. 201447. August 28, 2013.]
Republic (PCGG) v. Bakunawa [G.R. NO. 180418, AUGUST 28, 2013.]
People v. Manalili y Jose [G.R. No. 191253. August 28, 2013.]
Punzalan v. Plata [G.R. No. 160316. September 02, 2013.]
Kummer v. People [G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013.]
Disini v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. 169823-24/174764-65. September 11, 2013.]
People v. De Los Reyes [G.R. No. 197550. September 25, 2013.]
Singian vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos.195011-19. September 30, 2013.]
Chua v. Executive Judge-MTC Manila [G.R. No. 202920. October 2, 2013.]
Ramirez v. People [G.R. No. 197832. October 2, 2013.]
People v. Cuaycong [G.R. No. 196051. October 2, 2013.]
Carbajosa v. Judge Patricio [A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834. October 02, 2013.]
Jadewell Parking v. Judge Lidua Sr. [G.R. No. 169588. October 7, 2013.]
People v. Dizon [G.R. No. 199901. October 9, 2013.]
People v. Galicia [G.R. No. 191063. October 9, 2013.]
People v. de Jesus y Mendoza [G.R. No. 190622. October 7, 2013.]
People v. Hadji Socor Candidia [G.R. No. 191263. October 16, 2013.]
People v. Jose y Lagua [G.R. No. 200053. October 23, 2013.]
Century Chinese v. Ling Na Lau [G.R. No. 188526. November 11, 2013.]
People v. Castillo y Alignay [G.R. No. 190180. November 27, 2013.]
People v. Roberto Velasco [G.R. No. 190318. November 27, 2013.]
People vs. Montevirgen [G.R. No. 189840. December 11, 2013.]
Antiquera y Codes v. People [G.R. No. 180661. December 11, 2013.]
Criminal Procedure Cases

(July-December 2013)
Espino v. People [G.R. No. 188217. July 3, 2013]

FACTS:
Accused- Espino, being then the Senior Sales Executive of the complainant Kuehne and Nagel Inc. herein represented by
Honesto Raquipiso, tasked with liasoning with the import coordinators of the complainants various clients including the
delivery of their commissions, said accused received in trust from the complainant Metrobank check no. 1640443816 in the
amount of P12,675.00 payable to Mr. Florante Banaag, import coordinator of Europlay, with the obligation to deliver the
same but said accused failed to deliver said check in the amount of P12,675.00 and instead, once in possession of the same,
forged the signature of Mr. Banaag and had the check rediscounted and far from complying with his obligation, despite
demands to account and/or remit the same, with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the proceeds thereof to his own personal use and benefit,
to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant, in the amount of P12,675.00.39
On 14 October 2002, the Fiscals Office of Paranaque charged the accused with six (6) counts of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) for allegedly rediscounting checks that were meant to be paid to the companys import coordinators.
Upon trial, accused in his testimony claimed that what precipitated the charges was his employers discontent after he had
allegedly lost an account for the company. He was eventually forced to resign and upon submission of the resignation, was
asked to sign a sheet of paper that only had numbers written on it. He complied with these demands under duress, as
pressure was exerted upon him by complainants and later on filed a case for illegal dismissal,in which he denied having
forged the signature of Mr. Banaag at the dorsal portion of the checks.
RTC convicted the accused of Estafa under article 315 paragraph 2a. In response, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, arguing that the trial court committed a grave error in convicting him of estafa under paragraph 2(a),
which was different from paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 under which he had been charged. He also alleged that there was no
evidence to support his conviction. Thus, he contended that his right to due process of law was thereby violated. RTC
Denied the motion, CA also denied his appeal, stating that the alleged facts sufficiently comprise the elements of estafa as
enumerated in Article 315, paragraph 2(a).25 His subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was likewise dismissed.
Accused filed petition for Review under rule 45. Specifically claiming that he was denied due process when he was
convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) despite being charged with estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)
ISSUE/s:
WON a conviction for estafa under a different paragraph from the one charged is legally permissible.
HELD:
Article 3, Section 14, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, requires the accused to be "informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him" in order to adequately and responsively prepare his defense. The prosecutor is not required,
however, to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal name in the law. As explained by the Court in
People v. Manalili:
It is hornbook doctrine, however, that "what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is
the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or
1|P a ge

complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law."
This doctrine negates the due process argument of the accused, because he was sufficiently apprised of the facts that
pertained to the charge and conviction for estafa.
First, while the fiscal mentioned Article 315 and specified paragraph 1(b), the controlling words of the Information are
found in its body. Accordingly, the Court explained the doctrine in Flores v. Layosa as follows:
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be deemed sufficient if it states, among others,
the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts of omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
However, the Court has clarified in several cases that the designation of the offense, by making reference to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing, it [sic] is not controlling; what actually determines the nature and character of the crime
charged are the facts alleged in the information. The Courts ruling in U.S. v. Lim San is instructive:
Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we ought to say and hold that the
characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts
stated in the body of the pleading must determine the crime of which the defendant stands charged and for which he must
be tried. The establishment of this doctrine is permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord
with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the
crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its result
is to enable the accused to vex the court and embarrass the administration of justice by setting up the technical defense that
the crime set forth in the body of the information and proved in the trial is not the crime characterized by the fiscal in the
caption of the information. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be
most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and
specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it
is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime
which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged
in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has
a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is
of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights... If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner,
stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefore. It is the province of the court alone
to say what the crime is or what it is named.
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that the Information in this case may be interpreted as charging the accused
with both estafa under paragraph 1 (b) and estafa under paragraph 2(a). It is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal
law that one act can give rise to two offenses,41 all the more when a single offense has multiple modes of commission.
Hence, the present Petition cannot withstand the tests for review as provided by jurisprudential precedent. While the
designation of the circumstances attending the conviction for estafa could have been more precise, there is no reason for
this Court to review the findings when both the appellate and the trial courts agree on the facts. We therefore adopt the
factual findings of the lower courts in totality, bearing in mind the credence lent to their appreciation of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 24 February
2009 and Resolution dated 25 May 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31106 are AFFIRMED.SO
ORDERED.
2|P a ge

Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 189343. July 10, 2013.]

FACTS:
ALAN C. GAVIOLA, EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, BENILDA N. BACASMAS and EDNA J. JACA, public officers, being
then the City Administrator, City Treasurer, Cash Division Chief and City Accountant, respectively, of the Cebu City
Government are accused of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. commonly involving willful, intentional, and conscious acts or
omissions when there is a duty to act on the part of the public official or employee.
The Sandiganbayan held that the accused were all guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. Claiming that it was the practice
in their office, they admittedly disregarded the observance of the law and COA rules and regulations on the approval and
grant of cash advances. The anti-graft court also stated that the undue injury to the government was unquestionable because
of the shortage amounting to P9,810,752.60.
Gaviola, Cesa, Bacasmas, and Jaca individually filed their Motions for Reconsideration of the 7 May 2009 Decision. Their
motions impugned the sufficiency of the Information and the finding of gross inexcusable negligence, undue injury, and
unwarranted benefit.
The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution promulgated 27 August 2009 denied the Motions for Reconsideration of the accused.
It ruled that the Information was sufficient, because the three modes of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 commonly
involved willful, intentional, and conscious acts or omissions when there is a duty to act on the part of the public official or
employee. Furthermore, the three modes may all be alleged in one Information.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the Information was sufficient.
HELD:
An information is deemed sufficient if it contains the following: (a) the name of all the accused; (b) the designation of the
offense as given in the statute; (c) the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; (d) the name of the
offended party; (e) the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and (f) the place where the offense was
committed. c
The Information is sufficient, because it adequately describes the nature and cause of the accusation against
petitioners, namely the violation of the aforementioned law. The use of the three phrases "manifest partiality," "evident
bad faith" and "inexcusable negligence" in the same Information does not mean that three distinct offenses were thereby
charged but only implied that the offense charged may have been committed through any of the modes provided by the
law. In addition, there was no inconsistency in alleging both the presence of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence,
because the latter was not simple negligence. Rather, the negligence involved a willful, intentional, and conscious
indifference to the consequences of one's actions or omissions.
Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 191411. July 15, 2013.]

FACTS:
Coscolluela was governor of the Province of Negros Occidental (Province) which ended on June 30, 2001. During his
tenure, Nacionales served as his Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales' subordinate, and Malvas as
Provincial Health Officer. The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas received a letter-complaint requesting for
assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment which allegedly happened around a
month before Coscolluela stepped down from office.
3|P a ge

A Final Evaluation Report was issued which upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against petitioners. On March 27,
2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Caares (Caares) prepared a Resolution (March 27, 2003
Resolution), finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,
otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," and recommended the filing of the corresponding
information. On even date, the Information was prepared and signed by Caares and submitted to Deputy Ombudsman for
the Visayas Primo C. Miro (Miro) for recommendation. Miro recommended the approval of the Information on June 5,
2003. However, the final approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro (Casimiro), came only on May 21, 2009,
and on June 19, 2009, the Information was filed before the SB.
Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information only when they received a copy
of the latter shortly after its filing with the SB.
On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, among others, that his constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases was violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since
the complaint was instituted. Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted Coscolluela's motion. In reply, the
respondents filed their Opposition explaining that although the Information was originally dated March 27, 2003, it still
had to go through careful review and revision before its final approval. It also pointed out that petitioners never raised any
objections regarding the purported delay in the proceedings during the interim. The Sandiganbayan denied their Motion to
Quash for lack of merit as well as their respective Motions for Reconsideration.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the SB gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases was not
violated.
HELD:
A person's right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution (Constitution) which provides:
SEC. 16.All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
Jurisprudence dictates that the right is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. The following factors
may be considered and balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
The Court holds that petitioners' right to a speedy disposition of their criminal case had been violated.
First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete.
Section 4, Rule II of the Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990, otherwise known as the "Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman," reveals that there is no complete resolution of a case under preliminary investigation until
the Ombudsman approves the investigating officer's recommendation to either file an Information with the SB or to dismiss
the complaint. Therefore, in the case at bar, the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners were not
terminated upon Caares' preparation of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information but rather, only at the time
4|P a ge

Casimiro finally approved the same for filing with the SB. In this regard, the proceedings were terminated only on May 21,
2009, or almost eight (8) years after the filing of the complaint.
Second, the above-discussed delay in the Ombudsman's resolution of the case largely remains unjustified.
Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under the mantle of the Constitution, mandated to be the "protector of
the people" and has the inherent duty not only to carefully go through the particulars of case but also to resolve the same
within the proper length of time. Its dutiful performance should not only be gauged by the quality of the assessment but
also by the reasonable promptness of its dispensation.
Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy disposition
of cases.
They were only informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information against them only after the lapse of six (6)
long years, or when they received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on June 19, 2009. In this regard, they
could have reasonably assumed that the proceedings against them have already been terminated. This serves as a plausible
reason as to why petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether. Being the respondents in the preliminary
investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was
the Office of the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its
mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it.
Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the petitioners by the lengthy delay in the proceedings against
them.
Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety
and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with
the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This looming unrest as well as the
tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual. For
the SB's patent and utter disregard of the existing laws and jurisprudence surrounding the matter, the Court finds that it
gravely abused its discretion when it denied the quashal of the Information. Perforce, the assailed resolutions must be set
aside and the criminal case against petitioners be dismissed.
While the foregoing pronouncement should, as matter of course, result in the acquittal of the petitioners, it does not
necessarily follow that petitioners are entirely exculpated from any civil liability, assuming that the same is proven in a
subsequent case which the Province may opt to pursue.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that an acquittal in a criminal case does not bar the private offended
party from pursuing a subsequent civil case based on the delict, unless the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. As explained in the case of Abejuela v.
People, citing Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.:
The Rules provide: "The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner
provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for
the damage suffered."
5|P a ge

xxx xxx xxx

In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., we declared:
"While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it
is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise
to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused
to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be
punishable by law." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Based on the violation of petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases as herein discussed, the present case stands to be
dismissed even before either the prosecution or the defense has been given the chance to present any evidence. Thus, the
Court is unable to make a definite pronouncement as to whether petitioners indeed committed the acts or omissions from
which any civil liability on their part might arise as prescribed under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, absent this pronouncement, the Province is not precluded from instituting a subsequent civil case based on
the delict if only to recover the amount of P20,000,000.00 in public funds attributable to petitioners' alleged malfeasance.
People v. Odtuhan [G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013.]

FACTS:
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina). On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A.
Alagon (Alagon). Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. On February
23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent's petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab
initio for lack of a valid marriage license. On November 10, 2003, Alagon died.
In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent's previous marriage
with Modina. She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with Bigamy.
On February 5, 2008, Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not
charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. RTC Denied the motion.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of
Appeals and for which said court granted.
ISSUE/S:
WON the grant of Motion to Quash by Court of Appeals proper.
HELD:
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in
the face of the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in
determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which
are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or
matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered. To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in
the information which is evident on its fact. Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground
6|P a ge

that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect
by amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be
filed except when the information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.
An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein to
constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Thus, as held in Antone:
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter
contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the
information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be
interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the
allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.
Jose v. Suarez [G.R. No. 176111. July 17, 2013.]

FACTS:
Carolina filed two Affidavit-Complaints for estafa against Purita before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu, one
concerning 14 Chinabank checks totalling P1.5 million and the other pertaining to 10 Chinabank checks in the aggregate
amount of P2.1 million. However, the checks were dishonored upon presentment. Hence, the complaint for estafa.
In her two Counter-Affidavits, Purita claimed that her transactions with Carolina are civil in nature; they are mere loans
and the checks were issued only to guarantee payment.
In a Joint Resolution dated December 7, 2004, the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Purita for estafa. The
corresponding Information was filed against her.
Stressing that her transactions with Carolina did not constitute estafa, Purita promptly filed a Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ). THAICD
The DOJ found merit in Purita's Petition for Review. It ruled that the transactions between Purita and Carolina do not
constitute estafa and are merely contracts of loan because Carolina was not deceived into parting with her money. On the
contrary, Carolina parted with her money on the expectation of earning interest from the transactions. Hence, the DOJ
reversed and set aside the Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutor in its July 5, 2005 Resolution Carolina moved for
reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated October 27, 2005.
Thus, pursuant to the DOJ's directive, City Prosecutor Nicolas C. Sellon moved for the withdrawal of the
Information before the RTC.
RTC, in its December 9, 2005 Order, denied the motion by simple stating that the motion in unmeritorious.
The CA ruled that the RTC Judge failed to personally assess or evaluate the Resolution of the DOJ. The December 9, 2005
Order of the RTC merely stated that the motion to withdraw was 'unmeritorious' while the March 10, 2006 Order only
declared that Purita's defense was 'a matter that must be addressed to the trial court'.||
7|P a ge

ISSUE/S:
WON RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Withdraw Information without stating its reason for the
denial.
HELD:
The RTC failed to make its independent evaluation of the merits of the case when it denied the Prosecutor's Motion to
Withdraw Information.
When a trial court is confronted to rule on "a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information", it is its "bounden
duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing
of the motion."
Avelino y Bulawan v. People [G.R. 181444. July 17, 2013.]

FACTS:
At around two in the afternoon at the Baseco Compound, Tondo, Manila, Chairman Hispano was gunned down by three
men wearing bonnets. Manalangsang, who was in a tricycle which was at the scene, and a Mary Ann Canada, was able to
recognize Bobby Avelino as one of the gunmen. During the trial testimonies of PO2 Galang, Bantiling and SOCO PSI
Cabamongan were presented in favor of Avelino. Avelino contended that he was at the LTO of Pasay City when the
incident happened. RTC found Avelino guilty of the crime of murder qualified by treachery and the CA upheld the said
decision as well.
ISSUE/S:
1.
Does the defense of denial and alibi prevail over the witness positive identification of the accused-appellants?
2. Was the expert opinion of SOCO PSI Cabamongan, who was considered as ordinary witness, rightfully determined by
the CA as immaterial?
HELD:
1. NO. According to the Supreme Court, for denial or alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that appellant was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such
defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification, is
inherently weak and if uncorroborated regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative
evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. Pharaoh Hotel, where petitioner claims to have stayed with his wife at the time of the commission of
the crime, is in Sta. Cruz, Manila is not far from the scene of the crime, which is in Baseco Compound in Tondo, Manila.
Indeed, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. These, the
defense failed to do.
2. Yes. SC held that expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise, and
(b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. In this case, counsel for the petitioner failed to make the necessary
8|P a ge

qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial. In the case, the defense failed to provide the qualifications needed
for him to be of such.
People v. Marvin Cruz [G.R. 201728. July 17, 2013.]

FACTS:
Marvin Cruz was filed with three criminal cases of rape. The victim was one of AAA, a minor of 17 years old. They got to
know each other through the exchange of text messages which then eventually led to a relationship. The victim said that
she consented with the relationship because Cruz told her that he was dying of leukemia. The prosecution contended that
she was forced by Cruz on the three separate incidents, and presented the following pieces of evidence:
(1)
Cruz threatened AAA that he will circulate a copy of their sex video to her family and schoolmates if she refused
to go to his house and meet him in order to assure sexual congress. Alarmed by the consequence of his threat, AAA had no
choice but to go to his place as he wanted, in the hope that he would keep his word that he will give her the disk containing
their sex video;
(2)
When Cruz and his friends were having a drinking spree in his house, he threatened AAA that he will ask them to
rape her if she puts her clothes back on. Again, AAA had no choice but to do what he demanded, and thereafter repeatedly
sexually molested her; and,
(3)
Cruz held a lighted cigarette near her chest and warned her that he will burn her skin if she continues to resist his
sexual advances. Helpless, AAA had no choice but to succumb to his demand.
However, the defense denied the contention of the prosecution by saying that Cruz professed his love for AAA and that
AAA consented to the sexual acts, or sweetheart defense. Cruz was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The RTC
acquitted Cruz in one of the three criminal cases of rape. CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE/S:
Did the Court rightfully determined that the testimony of AAA positively identified the accused as the one who sexually
abused her?
HELD:
Yes. The Court held that the clear, consistent and spontaneous testimony of AAA unrelentingly established how Cruz
sexually molested her on November 6, 2007 with the use of force, threat and intimidation. Indeed, [a] rape victim is not
expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and painful that she might in fact be trying to
obliterate it from her memory. Thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of
the offended party.
As to the sweetheart defense, it is said that love is not a license for lust. A love affair does not justify rape for a man
does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires against her will. Cruzs argument that they
are lovers may be true; however, the sexual incidents between him and AAA on November 6, 2007 have not been proven
to be consensual.
9|P a ge

Anita Mangila v. Judge Pangilinan et.al. [G.R. 160739. July 17, 2013.]
FACTS:
On June 16, 2003, seven complaints of syndicated estafa were filed against petitioner and four others. These involved the
modus of the petitioner of recruiting persons for employment as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada without
acquiring from the POEA a permit to do so. The next day, Judge Pangilinan conducted a preliminary investigation. After
examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and
her cohorts without bail. On the next day, the entire records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to
the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City. She was then apprehended on June 18, 2003. Petitioner contends that Judge
Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation; that the preliminary investigation he
conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest.
ISSUE/S:
Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention?
HELD:
No. According to the Supreme Court, there is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila
and her cohorts on June 16, 2003, Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct
preliminary investigations involving all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
His authority was expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. The following may conduct preliminary
investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a)
It further explained by saying that under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its conclusion
should he find after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers that a probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. In the context of this rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the
warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangilas petition for habeas
corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a
judicial officer undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so.
10 | P a g e

People v. Victorino Reyes [G.R. 173307. July 17, 2013.]

FACTS:
On December 26, 1996, Reyes allegedly raped minor AAA while she and her sister BBB were on the way to their home
from school. AAA was dragged to the sala of his house and therein, he was able to perform sexual acts which include the
insertion of his penis into her vagina, which created a slight penetration to the latter, and made push and pull movements.
ISSUE/S:
1. Did the CA and RTC erred in ruling that the testitmonies of AAA and BBB were credible and reliable?
2. Did the evidence adduce by the State competently proved that the crime reached the consummated stage?
HELD:
1. No. The Supreme Court held that consequently there was a good reason or cause to have us depart from the age-old rule
of according conclusiveness to the findings of the RTC that the CA affirmed. The Court is not a trier of facts, and has to
depend on the findings of fact of the trial court by virtue of its direct access to the witnesses as they testified in court. Only
when the appellant convincingly demonstrates that such findings of fact were either erroneous, or biased, or unfounded, or
incomplete, or unreliable, or conflicted with the findings of fact of the CA would the Court assume the rare role of a trier of
facts. But that convincing demonstration was not done here by Reyes.
2. Yes. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, the law applicable at
the time of the rape of AAA, defined and punished rape thusly:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
The Supreme Court reiterated that the breaking of the hymen of the victim is not among the means of consummating rape.
All that the law required is that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman under the circumstances described in the
law. By definition, carnal knowledge was "the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman." This
understanding of rape explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the crime.
People vs. Clara [GR No. 195528. July 24, 2013.]

FACTS:
This case involves a buy-bust operation which led to the arrest of the accused JOEL CLARA Y BUHAIN (Joel). Upon the
presentation of the prosecution witnesses, it was evident that there were contradictions between the versions of the
testimonies of the police officers who claimed to have conducted the buy-bust operation. The testimony of PO3 Ramos,
which apparently was given as proof of all the elements that constitute an illegal sale of drug is however, inconsistent on
material points from the recollection of event of PO3 Ramos, SPO2 Nagera and PO1 Jimenez regarding the marking,
handling and turnover of the plastic sachet containing the dangerous drug of shabu.
ISSUE/S:
11 | P a g e

Was there failure in the part of the prosecution to establish with certainty the chain of custody of evidence?
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court defines Chain of Custody as the duly recorded authorized movement and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court and finally for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
To establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation, the prosecution must establish the following links, namely: First,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by apprehending officer; Second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; Third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
In Mallillin v. People, it was explained that the chain of custody rule includes testimony about every link in the chain, from
the moment the item was picked up to the time it was offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the
exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
In view of these guiding principles, we rule that the prosecution failed to present a clear picture on how the police officers
seized and marked the illegal drug recovered by the apprehending officer and how the specimen was turned over by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer. Accused is acquitted.
People v. Roman [G.R. No. 198110. July 31, 2013.]

FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Wilson Roman, was charged with murder.
The incident happened in the morning of June 22, 1995, at the wedding party when the accused-appellant hacked Vicente
Indaya, the victim, with his bolo. The victim was hit on his head, nape, right shoulder, base of the nape and right elbow
before he fell on the ground and then died. There were several witnesses including Elena Romero, Asterio Ebuenga, Martin
Borlagdatan, Elisea Indaya, Ramil Baylon, SPO1 Medardo Delos Santos and Dr. Teodora Pornillos. Each testimonies were
positive, clear and consistent in all material points.
However, there was a different version of the incident according to the accused-appellant. He said that on that day, he went
to the house of his parents-in-law to bring the bamboos. On his way back, he met his close friend who invited him to come
to the wedding party. At the venue, he pacified his brother-in-law and Indaya, the victim who were having a heated
exchange of words and told the victim to leave. After 20 minutes, the victim came back. He got mad because he was
pacified by the accused-appellant and threatened to kill him. But he simply stood up and turned to leave the place. As he
was leaving, he heard a shout that he was about to be hacked. Then, he saw the victim, aiming to hit him with a bolo, but
he was able to get the bolo. He lost control of himself, he hacked the victim instead. His testimony was supported by Delia
Tampoco.
12 | P a g e

The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals rendered a decision, finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the accused-appellant may invoke self-defense.
2.
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery exists.
HELD:
1. No. Self-defense was used as an alibi, an inherently weak defense for it is easy to fabricate. In order for self-defense to
be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that, for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, unlawful aggression as a
condition sine qua non must be present. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim commits
an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. There is unlawful aggression when the peril to ones life,
limb or right is either actual or imminent. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon.
Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must
be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack
or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression.
Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that
positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is
impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary,
but must be offensive and positively strong. Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the
victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or
like aiming to throw a pot.
Unfortunately for the accused-appellant, his claim of self-defense shrinks into incredulity. It is worth noting that the
incident transpired in broad daylight, within the clear view of a number of guests. Thus, it is of no wonder that the
testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses are consistent in all material points. They all confirmed that before the crime
was consummated, the victim was only walking in the yard, unarmed. There was not the least provocation done by the
victim that could have triggered the accused-appellant to entertain the thought that there was a need to defend himself. The
victim did not exhibit any act or gesture that could show that he was out to inflict harm or injury. On the contrary, the
witnesses all point to the accused-appellant as the unlawful aggressor who mercilessly hacked the unwary victim until he
collapsed lifeless on the ground.
Moreover, the severity, location and the number of wounds suffered by the victim are indicative of a serious intent to inflict
harm not merely that he wanted to defend himself from an imminent peril to life. Also, in the incident report executed by
the police officers, only one bolo, specifically that which was used in the hacking, was reported to have been recovered
from the crime scene. This belies the accused-appellants claim that the victim was also armed at the time of the incident.
1.
Yes. There was treachery and accused-appellant contention that he should be convicted only of homicide, not
murder was dismissed.
13 | P a g e

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person, employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. It takes place when the following elements concur: (1) that at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular
means of attack employed.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressors on unsuspecting victims, depriving the
latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressors, and without
the slightest provocation on the part of the victims. But, in the case, the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to
retaliate. He was then unarmed and unsuspecting, was deprived of any real chance to mount a defense, thereby ensuring the
commission of the crime without risk to accused-appellant.
This is also buttressed by the fact that the wounds sustained by the victim were all located at the back. At the time that the
crime was about to be committed, the victim does not have the slightest idea of the impending danger to his person. He was
not facing the accused-appellant and unarmed, hence, lacked the opportunity to avoid the attack, or at least put up a defense
to mitigate the impact. On the one hand, the accused-appellant was armed and commenced his attack while behind the
victim.
Lihaylihay and Vinluan v. People [G.R. No. 191219. July 31, 2013.]
FACTS:
Acting on the special audit reportsubmitted by the Commission on Audit, the Philippine National Police (PNP) conducted
an internal investigation on the purported "ghost" purchases of combat, clothing, and individual equipment (CCIE) worth
P133,000,000.00 which were allegedly purchased from the PNP Service Store System (SSS) and delivered to the PNP
General Services Command (GSC). As a result of the internal investigation, an Information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan, charging 10 PNP officers, including, among others, Vinluan and Lihaylihay, for the crime of violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019
Gen. Nazareno in his capacity as Chief, PNP and concurrently Board Chairman of the PNP Service Store System,
surreptitiously channeled PNP funds to the PNP SSS through "Funded RIVs" valued at P8 [M]illion and Director
Domondon released ASA No. 000-200-004-92 (SN-1353) without proper authority from the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) and Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and caused it to appear that there were purchases and
deliveries of combat clothing and individual equipment (CCIE) to the General Service Command (GSC), PNP, by
deliberately and maliciously using funds for personal services and divided the invoices of not more than P500,000.00 each
ISSUE/S:
WON evidence was admissible.
HELD:
Finally, on the matter of the admissibility of the prosecutions evidence, suffice it to state that, except as to the checks,the
parties had already stipulated on the subject documents existence and authenticity and accordingly, waived any objections
thereon. In this respect, petitioners must bear the consequences of their admission and cannot now be heard to complain
against the admissibility of the evidence against them by harking on the best evidence rule. In any event, what is sought to
be established is the mere general appearance of forgery which may be readily observed through the marked alterations and
14 | P a g e

superimpositions on the subject documents, even without conducting a comparison with any original document as in the
case of forged signatures where the signature on the document in question must always be compared to the signature on the
original document to ascertain if there was indeed a forgery.
Lee v. Lee [G.R. No. 181658. August 7, 2013.]

FACTS:
Petitioner Paul Lee is the President of Centillion Holding, Inc. (CHI), affiliated with Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC
Group). Respondent Chin Lee is the elected treasurer of CHI. Paul lee filed a verified petition for the issuance of an
Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), covering a property owned by CHI. He claims he
originally had in his possession an owners duplicate copy of the TCT but subsequently lost it. In a Complaint-Affidavit,
respondent Chin Lee alleges that as treasurer of CHI, she was tasked with the duty of keeping all vital financial documents
including the said TCT. She claims that Paul Lee knew of this fact and made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood
in his verified petition, thereby accusing him of perjury. Paul Lees counsel then moved in open court that respondent Chin
Lee and her counsel should be excluded from participating in the case, since perjury is a public offense, and there is no
private person injured by the crime.
ISSUE/S:
WON there is a private offended party in the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest.
HELD:
YES. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "[e]very person
criminally liable . . . is also civilly liable." Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person
commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State,
whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property
was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:
SECTION 1.Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
|||
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private prosecutor is allowed under Section 16
of Rule 110:
SEC. 16.Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of
the offense.
Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an offended party as "the person
against whom or against whose property the offense was committed.
It has also been held that Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party
may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by
the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the
15 | P a g e

delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of
the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has
the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must
not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on
a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering CHI's property and its loss
through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to respondent's personal credibility and reputation
insofar as her faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI.
Chavez v. Fria [GR No. 183014. August 7, 2013.]

FACTS:
A case was decided in favor of the plaintiff, wherein the Law Firm of Chavez Miranda ans Aseoche (The Law Firm for
brevity), herein petitioner, acted as counsel. A writ of execution was to be issued to enforce said judgment. Atty. Fria,
respondent in the case at bar, was the Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, and refused to do her ministerial
duty if issuing said writ. She posited that the draft writ was addressed to the Branch Sheriff who was on leave, and she did
not know who was appointed as special Sheriff on his behalf. The prosecutor then issued a memorandum recommending
that she be indicted for the crime of Open Disobedience. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) dismissed the case for lack of
probable cause. It ruled that not all the elements of the crime were present, especially the second element, that there is a
judgment, decision, or order of a superior authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued with all legal
formalities. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) upheld the MTCs ruling.
ISSUE/S:
WON the RTC erred in upholding the MTCs decision.
HELD:
NO. Under Section 5 (a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court judge may immediately dismiss a
criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause|||
Sec. 5.When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If
he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information
was filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.|||
16 | P a g e

It must, however, be observed that the judge's power to immediately dismiss a criminal case would only be warranted when
the lack of probable cause is clear. A clear-cut case of lack of probable cause exists when the records readily show
uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged.
it must be stressed that the judge's dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on
record plainly fails to establish probable cause that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus,
established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if
the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In
doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence.
In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating
the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the
case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit
additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause.
MTCs dismissal should be sustained.
The second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that there is a judgment, decision, or order of a superior
authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued with all legal formalities. In this case, it is undisputed that all
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 have been regarded as null and void due to Branch 203's lack of jurisdiction over
the said case. The third element of the crime, i.e., that the offender, without any legal justification, openly refuses to
execute the said judgment, decision, or order, which he is duty bound to obey, cannot equally exist. Indubitably, without
any jurisdiction, there would be no legal order for Atty. Fria to implement or, conversely, disobey. Besides, as the MTC
correctly observed, there lies ample legal justifications that prevented Atty. Fria from immediately issuing a writ of
execution.
Neri v. Sandiganbayan [GR No. 202243. August 7, 2013.]

FACTS:
Petitioner Romulo L. Neri (Neri) served as Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) during the administration of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In connection with the botched
Philippine-ZTE National Broadband Network (NBN) Project, the Ombudsman filed two criminal informations, the first
against Abalos, and the second against Neri. The Office of the Special Prosecutor then moved for the two cases
consolidation, to promote a more expeditious and less expensive resolution of of the controversy of cases involving the
same business transaction.
ISSUE/S:
WON Consolidation of the two cases is proper.
17 | P a g e

HELD:
NO. Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so
that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously while providing justice to the parties. Toward this end,
consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court's docket or consolidation of issues within those cases are
permitted by the rules.
The term "consolidation" is used in three (3) different senses or concepts, thus: a
(1)Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment [in one] trial is
conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi consolidation)
(2)Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single action in which a single
judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the same parties stating
claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)
(3)Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a
separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one
action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)
To be sure, consolidation, as taken in the above senses, is allowed, as Rule 31 of the Rules of Court is entitled
"Consolidation or Severance." And Sec. 1 of Rule 31 provides:
Section 1.Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may
order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all actions consolidated; and it
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
The counterpart, but narrowed, rule for criminal cases is found in Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court stating:
Sec. 22.Consolidation of trials of related offenses. Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a
series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of the court. (Emphasis added.)
As complemented by Rule XII, Sec. 2 of the Sandiganbayan Revised Internal Rules which states:
Section 2.Consolidation of Cases. Cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or involving common
questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the Division to which the case bearing the lowest docket number is
raffled.
The prosecution anchored its motion for consolidation partly on the aforequoted Sec. 22 of Rule 119 which indubitably
speaks of a joint trial.|||
Joint trial is permissible "where the [actions] arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues,
and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be
consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of
the parties." More elaborately, joint trial is proper where the offenses charged are similar, related, or connected, or are of
the same or similar character or class, or involve or arose out of the same or related or connected acts, occurrences,
transactions, series of events, or chain of circumstances, or are based on acts or transactions constituting parts of a common
scheme or plan, or are of the same pattern and committed in the same manner, or where there is a common element of
substantial importance in their commission, or where the same, or much the same, evidence will be competent and
18 | P a g e

admissible or required in their prosecution, and if not joined for trial the repetition or reproduction of substantially the same
testimony will be required on each trial.
|||
Criminal prosecutions primarily revolve around proving beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the elements of the
crime charged. As such, they mainly involve questions of fact. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference
arises from the truth or the falsity of the allegations of facts. Put a bit differently, it exists when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the inquiry invites calibration of the whole gamut of evidence
considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as
well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.|
A consolidation of the Neri case to that of Abalos would expose petitioner Neri to testimonies which have no relation
whatsoever in the case against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute thereby delaying the resolution of his case.
Consolidation here would force petitioner to await the conclusion of testimonies against Abalos, however irrelevant or
immaterial as to him (Neri) before the case against the latter may be resolved a needless, hence, oppressive delay in the
resolution of the criminal case against him.
Hasegawa v. Giron [G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013.]

FACTS:
Respondent Giron filed a Complaint Affidavit for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against petitioner Masayuki
Hasegawa and several John Does. Leila Giron and Leonarda Marcos were allegedly kidnapped by orders of Masayuki
Hasegawa. The kidnapping were done to threaten them as Giron and Marcos filed a case against Hasegawa for illegal
salary deductions, non-payment of 13th month pay, and non-remittance of SSS contributions. Prior to the complaint of
kidnapping, respondent had also filed separate complaints for grave threats, grave coercion, slander and unjust vexation
against petitioner. Hasegawa denied the accusations and asserted that Giron and Marcos only want to extort money from
him.
The State prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. Respondent then filed a Petition for Review to the
Department of Justice praying for reversal of the prosecutors resolution. The Department of Justice found no basis to
overturn the findings of the Investigating Prosecutor and affirmed its decision that there was a lack of probable cause. She
then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, reversed and set
aside the Resolutions of the DOJ and ordered the filing of an Information for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
against petitioner. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner asserts that the Secretary of Justice clearly and sufficiently explained the reasons why no probable cause exists in
this case. Petitioner argues that a review of facts and evidence made by the appellate court is not the province of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Finally, petitioner contends that the appellate court should have dismissed outright
respondent's petition for certiorari for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for being the wrong mode of appeal.
ISSUE/S:
1.
Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction?
2.
Was there probable cause?
3.
What kind of evidence is needed for preliminary investigation?
HELD:
19 | P a g e

1. YES. The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the accused depends on the sound discretion
of the prosecutor. Courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations, or reinvestigations, or in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information against an
offender. Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch. Differently stated, as
the matter of whether to prosecute or not is purely discretionary on his part, courts cannot compel a public prosecutor to
file the corresponding information, upon a complaint, where he finds the evidence before him insufficient to warrant the
filing of an action in court. In sum, the prosecutor's findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by
the courts, unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion. We find such reason for
judicial review here present. We sustain the appellate court's reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of the DOJ
2. YES. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded on
such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or
entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common
sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to
whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. In order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of the crime
charged should be present. All elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code were sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavit in this case and were sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime may have been committed and petitioner may have committed it.
3. Only evidence to support a finding of probable cause, not a conviction, is needed for preliminary
investigation. All elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code were sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavit in this case and were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime may have been committed and petitioner may have committed it. Respondent, an office worker, claimed that
she and her friend were taken at gunpoint by two men and forcibly boarded into a vehicle. They were detained for more
than 24 hours. Whether or not the accusations would result in a conviction is another matter. It is enough, for purposes of
the preliminary investigation that the acts complained of constitute the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
The Investigating Prosecutor, however, ruled that the kidnapping and serious illegal detention charge is a mere fabrication.
The Supreme Court said that the Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. Her findings
dealt mostly with what respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was committed. She delved into
evidentiary matters that could only be passed upon in a full-blown trial where testimonies and documents could be fairly
evaluated in according with the rules of evidence. The issues upon which the charges are built pertain to factual matters
that cannot be threshed out conclusively during the preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the
presentation of prosecutions evidence in support of the charge. The validity and merits of a partys defense or accusation,
as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level.
20 | P a g e

People v. Pepino-Consulta [G.R. No. 191071. Aug. 28, 2013.]

FACTS:
Prosecution evidence showed that on February 7, 2005 at 5:10 in the afternoon or thereabouts, a buy-bust operation was
conducted in front of Akim Restaurant located at Cleofers building City of San Fernando against a certain Manang who
was later identified as the accused Rogelia Jardinel Pepino-Consulta. The operation yielded a positive result 5 sachets of
shabu weighing 0.3001 gram were recovered from the poseur buyer. The substance confiscated from the accused turned
out to be positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu (Exhibit C).On the other hand, the accused denied that
there was a buy-bust operation conducted against her and that she was only framed up. She, however, failed to establish by
convincing proof any motive or reason why the arresting officers will falsely impute the crime charged on her. The RTC
found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of accused-appellant
in its assailed Decision. The Court of Appeals held that accused-appellant was validly arrested after she was caught in
flagrante delicto selling shabu to the confidential informant who acted as the poseur buyer. We found that the police
officers indeed committed serious lapses in procedure in the conduct of the buy-bust operation on February 7, 2005.
Additionally, the prosecution adduced evidence that fell short of the exacting degree of proof beyond reasonable doubt
required under our criminal laws.
ISSUE/S:
Did the chain of custody sufficiently prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the accused to be convicted?
HELD:
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody. The Supreme Court here held that while there were indeed five sachets
of suspected shabu sold to the poseur-buyer, there were still more broken links in the chain of custody. In this case, one
broken link was that of the turnover of the seized items from the buy-bust team to the police investigator, SPO1 Doria. PO2
Dizon testified that after he placed the marking on the five sachets of suspected shabu, he turned them over to SPO1 Doria
and the specimens were submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. However, SPO1 Doria did not testify before the
trial court so as to shed light on this matter. Still another broken link was that involving the transfer of the drug specimens
from SPO1 Doria to the crime laboratory. P/Sr. Insp. Perez testified that the request for laboratory examination and drug
specimens were first received by PO2 Bagaoisan, the Duty Desk Officer. The latter then called her to physically receive the
same. However, P/Sr. Insp. Perez stated that she did not actually see if it was SPO1 Doria who transmitted the specimens.
She merely relied on the stamp of PO2 Bagaoisan. Furthermore, PO2 Bagaoisan was not presented in court to prove that it
was indeed SPO1 Doria who delivered the drug specimens to the crime laboratory. In view of the evident breaks in the
chain of custody, very serious doubts arise as to the identity of the seized illegal drugs in this case. Apparently, there can be
no absolute certainty if the sachets of shabu seized from the informant were the very same drugs handed by accusedappellant, or, later on, the same drugs transmitted to the crime laboratory and eventually presented before the trial court.
Accused-appellant was thus acquitted of the crime charged.
People v. Amistoso y Broca [G.R. No. 201447. August 28, 2013.]

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Broca (Amistoso) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Masbate City, with the rape of his daughter alleged to be 12 years old at the time of the incident. The
Information2 specifically charged Amistoso with statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(d) of the Revised Penal
21 | P a g e

Code, as amended. After trial, on March 23, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Decision3 finding Amistoso guilty, not of
statutory rape, but of qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph (1), of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Court of Appeals affirmed Amistosos conviction for qualified rape but
modified the penalties imposed in accordance with Republic Act No. 93466 and the latest jurisprudence on awards of
damages. Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to this Court. In its Decision dated January 9, 2013, the Court
affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction against Amistoso, expressly making him liable for interest on the
amounts of damages awarded.
However, in a letter dated February 7, 2013, Ramoncito D. Roque (Roque), Officer-in-Charge, Inmate Documents and
Processing Division of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Amistoso had died on December 11, 2012 at the
New Bilibid Prison (NBP), Muntinlupa City.
ISSUE/S:
Is the Civil and Criminal liability extinguished upon death of the accused?
HELD:
Extinguishment of criminal liability by the death of the accused prior to final judgment; effect of death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction on his civil liability ex delicto. Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code states
that, Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Given the
foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as
well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to
stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal case. Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by
the Supreme Court (SC) of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the SC was still
pending and unresolved. The SC ruled upon Amistosos appeal only because it was not immediately informed of his death.
Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders the SCs Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming
Amistosos conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final, and the SC still has
the jurisdiction to set it aside.
Republic (PCGG) v. Bakunawa [G.R. NO. 180418, AUGUST 28, 2013.]

FACTS:
Civil Case No. 0023 is an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages brought by the Republic
against respondents Luz Reyes-Bakunawa, Manuel Bakunawa, Jr., Manuel Bakunawa III, President Marcos and First Lady
Imelda R. Marcos for having allegedly acquired and accumulated ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other property
in unlawful concert with one another and in flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers,
with grave abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines,
thus resulting in their unjust enrichment.The complaint alleged that respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa (Luz Bakunawa)
had served as Imelda Marcos Social Secretary during the Marcos administration; that it was during that period of her
incumbency in that position that Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel Bakunawa had acquired assets, funds and other
property grossly and manifestly disproportionate to her salaries and their other lawful income;and that Luz Bakunawa, by
herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of
her position, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, for their benefit and unjust enrichment and in
22 | P a g e

order to prevent disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained, engaged in devices, schemes and
stratagems,particularly:
1) acted as dummies, nominees, and/or agents of the Marcos spouses and, with the active collaboration, knowledge and
willing participation of the other defendants, established several corporations engaged in a wide range of economic
activities, such as construction and cattle ranching;
2) secured favorable contracts with the Department of Public Works and Communications for the construction of
government projects through grossly undercapitalized corporations and without complying with such usual requirements as
public bidding, notice and publication of contractors;
3) unlawfully acquired heads of cattle from the government dispersalprogram and raised them on ranch lands encroaching
on forest zones;
4) unlawfully encroached upon a mangrove-forested section in Masbate, and converted it into a fishpond;
5) unlawfully amassed funds by obtaining huge credit lines from government financial institutions, and incorporating into
their contracts a cost-escalation adjustment provision to justify collection of grossly arbitrary and unconscionable amounts
unsupported by evidence of increase in prices;
6) unlawfully imported hundreds of brand-new units of heavy equipment without paying customs duties and other allied
taxes amounting to millions of pesos, by falsely representing said heavy equipment to be for official government use and
selling them at very low prices to avoid paying the required taxes.
ISSUE/S:
Are the properties and assets of the accused considered as ill-gotten wealth and the holding of the position in the Marcos
administration proved the guilt of the accused?
HELD:
The mere holding of a position in the Marcos administration did not necessarily make the holder a close associate of
Marcos. There are two concurring elements that must be present before assets or properties can be considered as ill-gotten
wealth, namely: (a) they must have originated from the government itself, and (b) they must have been taken by former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal means. As can be gleaned from the
above, evidentiary substantiation of the allegations of how the wealth was illegally acquired and by whom was necessary.
For that purpose, the mere holding of a position in the Marcos administration did not necessarily make the holder a close
associate within the context of E.O. No.1.
Indeed, a prima facie showing must be made to show that one unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of a close
association or relation with President Marcos and/or his wife. It would not suffice, then, that one served during the
administration of President Marcos as a government official or employee. In this case, the Republic particularly insists that
Luz Bakunawa served as the Social Secretary or the Assistant Social Secretary of First Lady Marcos, and mentions several
other circumstances that indicated her close relationship with the Marcoses. However, Luz Bakunawa maintains that she
was not First Lady Marcos Social Secretary, but a mere member of the staff of the Social Secretary; and that the assets of
the Bakunawas were honestly earned and acquired well within the legitimate income of their businesses. Thus, the
Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that the evidence of the Republic was able to establish, at best, that
Luz Bakunawa had been an employee in Malacaang Palace during the Marcos administration, and did not establish her
having a close relationship with the Marcoses, or her having abused her position or employment in order to amass the
23 | P a g e

assets subject of this case. Consequently, Luz Bakunawa could not be considered a close associate or subordinate of the
Marcoses within the context of E.O. No. 1 and E.O. No. 2.
People v. Manalili y Jose [G.R. No. 191253. August 28, 2013.]

FACTS:
According to the prosecutions evidence, the offense transpired on 16 March 1998 at around 7 oclock in the evening in the
house of Manalili located on YYY Street.
AAA, the victim who was then barely 11 years old narrated what transpired during that night Manalili was drinking with 3
of his friends in front of his house on ZZZ Street. While AAA was chatting with the son of the store owner asked her to go
to his other house on YYY street, to get a dustpan because one of his drinking mates vomited. AAA readily complied and
went to Manalilis house. No one was around at that time and it was dark inside the house. When inside the house, accused
proceeded in committing acts of lasciviousness and thereafter attempted to rape the victim by trying to insert his penis into
the vagina of the victim, when this became unsuccessful, the accused inserted his finger into the victims vagina and
thereafter directed the victim to hold his penis. Manalili also kissed her neck and breasts. After Manalili satisfied his lust,
AAA was directed to go home and was instructed not to let anyone see her leave the house of Manalili.
The next day, CCC, AAAs mother, saw the marks on AAAs neck and breast and asked AAA what happened. AAA kept
quiet, refused to answer and left for school. Eventually, AAA confided to her aunt, DDD, what actually happened on the
night of 16 March 1998. This prompted CCC and DDD to file a complaint before investigator. AAA was subjected to a
medico genitalia examination conducted by a Medico Legal Officer of the Medico Legal Division of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), Manila. AAA also executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 18 March 199812 assisted by her
mother, CCC. According to the victim, she was molested more than three (3) times by Manalili before the incident at hand.
AAA claimed that she never told anybody because she was scared.
The RTC rendered a decision convicting Manalili of statutory rape.
The CA affirmed with modification the judgement of conviction of the RTC. The CA ruled that the prosecution was able to
prove the existence of all the essential elements of statutory rape beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE/S:
WON the trial court erred in rendering a verdict of conviction despite the fact that the identification of the accusedappellant as the alleged perpetrator of the offense charged was not clear, positive, and convincing.
HELD:
The Court finds no reason to disturb the decisions of the courts below.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court had always been guided by the well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can
be made with facility and while accusation of rape is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult to disprove; (2) considering
that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant
should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
24 | P a g e

The trial court noted that during AAAs cross-examination, her testimony bore the hallmarks of truth, as she remained
consistent on material points. The trial courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. Moreover, this Court has held
time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no
young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts,
and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice
for the wrong committed against her.
Although she failed to report the incident immediately, such reaction is deemed normal considering that she was only 10
years old at that time.
With regard to the results of the medical examination, this Court holds that the absence of laceration and semen does not
preclude the fact that rape has been committed. In the crime of rape, complete or full penetration of the complainants
private part is not at all necessary. Neither is the rupture of the hymen essential. What is fundamental is that the entry or at
the very least the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum is proved. The mere introduction of the
male organ into the labia majora of the complainants vagina, consummates the crime. 32 Likewise, the absence of semen in
AAAs vaginal area would not preclude a finding of rape. The presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial because
the presence of spermatozoa is not an element of rape. Moreover, it has been held that the absence of spermatozoa in the
vagina could be due to a number of factors, such as the vertical drainage of the semen from the vagina, the acidity of the
vagina or the washing of the vagina immediately after sexual intercourse.
The first element of statutory rape, (a) that the victim is a female under 12 years or is demented, was substantiated by the
presentation of the Birth Certificate of the victim, while the second element, (b) that the offender had carnal knowledge of
the victim, was evidenced by the testimony of the victim herself. Thus, the lower court was correct in sentencing accusedappellant to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Punzalan v. Plata [G.R. No. 160316. September 02, 2013.]

FACTS:
At around 11:00 p.m. of August 13, 1997, Dencio dela Pea, a house boarder of the Platas, met the group of Rainier
Punzalan, Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, and several others. Because of verbal
exchanges, this irked Jose Gregorio and slapped Dela Pea while Rainier punched him in the mouth. In the course of the
melee, Alex "Toto" Ofrin kicked Dela Pea and tried to stab him with a balisong but missed because he was able to run.
The group chased him.
While Dela Pea was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun from Cagara and pointed it to the
group chasing him in order to scare them. Michael Plata, who was nearby, tried to wrestle the gun away from Dela Pea.
The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalan on the thigh. Shocked, Dela Pea, Cagara and Plata ran and
proceeded to the police station to seek assistance.|||
Thereafter, Rainier filed a criminal complaint for Attempted Homicide against Michael Gamaliel Plata (Michael) and one
for Illegal Possession of Firearms against Robert Cagara (Cagara). On the other hand, Michael, Ruben Plata (Ruben) and
25 | P a g e

several others filed several complaints against petitioners Rosalinda, Randall, Rainier, and several individuals before the
Office of the City Prosecutor.
On July 28, 1998, the Office of the City Prosecutor, in its Joint Resolution, dismissed the complaints filed against the
petitioners for lack of sufficient basis both in fact and in law.
On March 23, 2000, the DOJ modified the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor and ordered
the filing of separate informations for Slight Oral Defamation, Light Threats, Attempted Homicide, Malicious Mischief,
and Theft against Rosalinda, Rainier, Randall and the other respondents in the above cases.
Upon review, the DOJ reconsidered its findings and ruled that there was no probable cause. In its Resolution, dated June 6,
2000, the DOJ set aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to withdraw the
informations.||
On January 11, 2001, the complainants elevated the matter to the CA by way of certiorari ascribing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary which ordered the withdrawal of the separate informations.
On September 29, 2003, the CA annulled and set aside Resolutions of the DOJ. According to CA that probable cause exists
in the subject complaints for malicious mischief and theft.
ISSUE/S:
WON the court committed grave abuse of discretion when the court interfere the DOJ in determining the existence of
probable cause?
HELD:
YES, the court committed grave abuse of discretion.
The conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is a function that
belongs to the public prosecutor.
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
Section 5.Who must prosecute criminal action. All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public
prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of
the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the court. Once so
authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to end of the trial
even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
The rule is that this Court will not interfere in the findings of the DOJ Secretary on the insufficiency of the evidence
presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
26 | P a g e

Kummer v. People [G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013.]

FACTS:
On one fateful night, the evidence of the prosecution reveals, Johan Kummer, a minor, the son of Leticia Kummer, shot a
certain Jesus Mallo, Jr. According to the eyewitness, Amiel Malana, he and Jesus Mallo went to the house of Krummers.
Jesus knocked on the door of the Krummers house, declaring that he is Boy Mallo. Then, according to the testimonies of
Malana, Johan shot Mallo dead with a shotgun.
Being a minor, Johan was released at the cognizance of his father. Then he left the country without notifying the court. In
defense, Leticia Kummer produced another version of the story which shows that they were sleeping innocently in their
house on that fateful night, when there was a commotion outside their house, admitting however that, when they were
practically disturbed by the said commotion, Johan got a shotgun and fired outside their house, without intention to kill or
injure anybody, especially Jesus.
An Information was filed with the Court on January 12, 1989, which was later on modified. This modification was about
the date of the commission of the crime. The modification, however, happened after she was arraigned.
The RTC convicted her and Johan, who was out of the Philippine Legal Systems reach. She appealed the case to the CA,
which denied them and affirmed the RTC decision, arguing, among others, that by virtue of the amendment of the
Information, she should have been arraigned again; and, since she was not, there was a blatant violation of her right to be
informed of the nature of her case, since an amended Information is a new Information. Hence, all proceedings which the
case had undergone were void.
ISSUE/S:
Does she have to be arraigned again?
HELD:
No. She does not have to be arraigned again.
Note that only the date was amended. Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that, [a]
complaint or an Information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during trial, a formal amendment may only be done with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
Accordingly, a change in time in the commission of the crime, when the disparity is not so great, is only a formal
amendment. In view of the foregoing, the amendment was from July to June can only be regarded as formal
amendment.
Moreover, it does not and could not prejudice the rights of the accused, because (1) it does not change the nature of the
crime, and (2) it does not render the defenses prepared for the former Information as it stood invalid.
Having said all these, a formal amendment does not require a subsequent arraignment as the purpose of which is to
INFORM THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION. Since the nature and cause of the accusation are not
changed by a formal amendment, a re-arraignment is not necessary, as she was already informed of these things. Hence,
there has been no violation of her rights as accused.
27 | P a g e

Thence, no, she does not have to be arraigned again.
Disini v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. 169823-24/174764-65. September 11, 2013.]

FACTS:
Disini, and company were charged with corruption of public officials by the Sandiganbayan, penalized under Art. 212, in
relation to Art. 210 of the RPC and violation of Sec. 4(a) of RA 3019, for having allegedly conspired with the former
President Ferdinand Marcos, in appropriating public funds for their personal use amounting to billions of pesos. Disini
filed a motion to quash, arguing among others, that the criminal Informations filed against him failed to comply with the
required substance and form of information, thereby violating his right to be informed as the accused.
ISSUE/S:
Did the Information comply with the required substance and form?
HELD:
Yes. the Informations filed complied with the required substance and form.
An Information must state every single fact or circumstance that constitutes an element of the offense charged; otherwise, a
motion to dismiss or to quash may be properly sustained. Included in the things that must be in the Information are: (1) the
name of the accused, (2) the designation of the offense given by the statute, (3) the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, (4) the name of the offended party, (5) the approximate date of the commission of the crime, and (5) the place
where the crime was committed. Note that, when the offense has been committed by more than one person, all of them
must be included in the Information.
After factual examination, the SC held that the Informations filed against him and his companions were able to comply
with the prescribed forms and substance of an Information. Hence, his motion to quash could not be properly sustained.
Withal, the Informations filed against Disini and company complied with the required substance and form.
People v. De Los Reyes [G.R. No. 197550. September 25, 2013.]

FACTS:
The accused has been charged for violation of the comprehensive dangerous drugs act of 2002. Two separate information
was charged against the accused. The prosecutors version is as follows. SPO2 David received reports from the barangay
office about drug-dealing activities. SPO2 David together with his team on a weekly basis conducted a surveillance on the
area. They were able to confirm that indeed the accused was conducting drug-dealing activities. Thereafter SPO2 David
with his team conducted a test-buy. David together with a civilian asset conducted a test buy and was able to obtain P200
worth of shabu from the asset. Afterwards the team of SPO2 David conducted a buy-bust operation. SPO2 David went to
Enriquez who was at the sari-sari store. The team were right across the sari-sari store hiding behind a dump truck. SPO2
David immediately gave to Enriquez P200 without saying anything. Enriquez thereafter went to get a sealed pack of shabu
and handed it over to SPO2 David. SPO2 David after receiving the shabu signaled his team and arrested the accused. The
version of the defense on the facts are as follows. Enriquez was eating alone where suddenly a team of police officers in
28 | P a g e

civilian clothing asked him if he knew anyone selling Shabu, this was done while a gun was poking at the accused. He
denied having knowledge and was afterwards arrested. The sari-sari girl corroborated with the testimony of the accused.
The RTC however found accused guilty.
ISSUE/S:
WON the ruling of the RTC was correct based on the current evidence
HELD:
No. The SC ruled that as a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to
be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up
to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The following are the requirements in the
chain of custody of a buy bust operation. First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court. In the case at bar the prosecutor failed to prove that the seizure of items made by Enriquez were
already marked or was marked by his representative. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the
integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires.
Second, the chain of custody in the turnover of the illegal drug by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer.
They failed to identify as to who they gave the illegal drug to. Therefore it is not shown what happened to the illegal drug
after it was handed over by the apprehending officer. Third, the chief of police was not presented to testify the court. The
testimony of Chief of Police Erese is indispensable because he could have provided the critical link between the testimony
of SPO2 David, and the tenor of the testimony of P/Insp. Dizon, which the parties have stipulated on. The unaccounted for
whereabouts of the seized items from the time they were brought to the police station to the time they were submitted to
P/Insp. Dizon for examination constitutes a clear break in the chain of custody. Moreover, no one testified as to how the
confiscated items were handled and cared for after the laboratory examination. The failure of the prosecution to establish
the evidence's chain of custody is fatal to the case as we can no longer consider or safely assume that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drugs were safely preserved.
Singian vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos.195011-19. September 30, 2013.]

FACTS:
Atty. Salvador held several positions such as the Presidential Commission on Good Government Consultant as well as
being the coordinator of the Technical Working group. He was to study the reports and recommendations of the asset
privatization trust relating to loan accounts in all government financing institutions. One of the accounts which acted by the
committee were the loans granted to Intergrated Shoe. Inc (ISI). ISI applied for a letter of credit on January 18, 1972 which
amounted to $2,500,000 which was to finance its purchase of a complete line of machinery and equipment. The letter of
credit was recommended by the Board of Directors of PNB. The loan was subsequently approved and it was secured by
several collaterals. ISI further extended more loans and the committee upon investigation found that the loans of ISI bore
characteristics of behest loans specifically for not having been secured with sufficient collaterals and obtained with undue
29 | P a g e

haste. As a result Atty. Salvador filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against petitioners and his co-accused for
violation of Sec3 paragraphs (e) and (g) of RA#3019.
On January 27, 2004, petitioner entered the plea of not guilty during arraignment. All other accused also entered into
arraignment except for Bautista who died prior to the scheduled arraignment. Several of the petitioners had died which
forced the Sandiganbayan to issue a resolution to dismiss the case. Afterwards the remaining criminal case initiated where
the prosecution presented all its witnesses and evidence. Later the petitioner filed a demurer to evidence.In response the
prosecution opposed the demurer to evidence of petition. The Sandiganbayan thereafter denied the demurer of evidence of
petitioner.
ISSUE/S:
WON the Sandiganbayan was correct in denying the demurer of evidence.
HELD:
Yes. The Sandiganbayan was correct. First a demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to
the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is in sufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a
case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The
court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. Second, sufficient evidence for
purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial
or official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove:
(a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused. The SC ruled therefore
that the Sandiganbayan found sufficient evidence to establish that there was violation of sec 3(g) of RA#3019. It was
shown that petitioner connived with his co-accused. The loan transactions entered into by ISI and PNB were discovered to
be disadvantageous to the government. Lastly the SC also ruled that a lower court's order of denial shall not be disturbed ,
that is, appellate courts will not review the prosecution's evidence and decide whether such evidence has established guilt
beyond reasonable doubt unless the accused has established that such judicial discretion has been gravely abused, thereby
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegation of such abuse will not suffice. Petitioner was unable to prove
abuse of discretion.
Chua v. Executive Judge-MTC Manila [G.R. No. 202920. October 2, 2013.]

FACTS:
On 13 January 2012, herein petitioner Richard Chua tiled before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila, a
complaint charging one Letty Sy Gan of forty (40) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 or the
Bouncing Checks Law. After conducting preliminary investigation, the OCP found probable cause and, on 22 March 2012,
filed forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 before the MeTC. Consequently, the MeTC informed petitioner that he
has to pay a totalof P540,668.00 as filing fees for all the forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22. Finding the said
amount to be beyond his means, petitioner consulted with the MeTC clerk of court to ask whether he could pay filing fees
on a per case basis instead of being required to pay the total filing fees for all the BP Blg. 22 cases all at once. The MeTC
clerk of court opined that petitioner could not. Petitioner was thus unable to pay any filing fees. Due to non-payment of the
required filing fees, the MeTC designated the forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 as undocketed cases under UDK
Nos. 12001457 to 96. Subsequently, the OCP moved for consolidation of the said cases. On 18 April 2012, petitioner filed
30 | P a g e

before the Executive Judge of the MeTC a motion entitled "Urgent Motion to Allow Private Complainant to Pay Filing Fee
on a Per Case Basis" (Urgent Motion).
ISSUE/S:
Was the motion filed by the petitioner entitled Urgent Motion to Allow Private Complainant to Pay Filing Fee on a Per
Case Basis the correct remedy?
HELD:
No. The correct remedy for the petitioner, in view of the unavailability of an appeal or any other remedy in the ordinary
course of law, is a certiorari petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. But then again, the petitioner should have filed
such a petition, not directly with this Court, but before the appropriate Regional Trial Court pursuant to the principle of
hierarchy of courts. In the weightier interest of substantial justice, however, this Court forgives such procedural lapses and
treats the instant appeal as a certiorari petition filed properly before this Court. To this Court, the grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Executive Judge was patent on the undisputed facts of this case and is serious enough to warrant a
momentary deviation from the procedural norm. Thus, we come to the focal issue of whether the Executive Judge of the
MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion, in light of the facts and circumstances herein obtaining, in refusing petitioners
request of paying filing fees on a per case basis.
We answer in the affirmative. We grant the petition. In proposing to pay filing fees on a per case basis, petitioner was not
trying to evade or deny his obligation to pay for the filing fees for all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 filed
before the MeTC. He, in fact, acknowledges such obligation. He, in fact, admits that he is incapable of fulfilling such
obligation in its entirety. Rather, what petitioner is asking is that he at least be allowed to pursue some of the cases, the
filing fees of which he is capable of financing. Petitioner manifests that, given his current financial status, he simply cannot
afford the filing fees for all the forty (40) BP Blg. 22 cases. We see nothing wrong or illegal in granting petitioners
request.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated 26 June 2012 and 26
July 2012 of the Executive Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, in UDK Nos.12001457 to 96 are ANNULED
and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, is hereby directed to accept payments of tiling fees in UDK Nos.
12001457 to 96 on a per information basis.
Ramirez v. People [G.R. No. 197832. October 2, 2013.]

FACTS:
Anita Ramirez (herein petitioner) and Josephine Barangan were convicted of Estafa. The judgment was promulgated on
March 25, 2009 after several re-settings and warrants of arrest were accordingly issued.
According to petitioner, she failed to attend the promulgation of judgment because she had to attend to the wake of her
father.
On June 6, 2009, three months after the promulgation, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest
and to Reinstate Bail Bond. This was denied by the RTC.
31 | P a g e

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion to admit notice of appeal and to post bond with the CA, asking for the reversal of the
RTC Order. She subsequently filed her notice of appeal on November 17, 2010.
CA denied the omnibus motion. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner did not also prosper, denying her
application for provisional liberty in view of the finality of the judgment of conviction against her. The CA denied the said
petition on the ground of failure to file the motion within the reglementary period.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioners motion on the ground of to lapse of time
2. Whether or not petitioner can rely on the ground of substantial justice in failing to abide by the rules on reglementary
period of filing an appeal
HELD:
Petition is denied for lack of merit.
1. When appeal to be taken. Section 6, Rule 122 of the RRCP provides: xxx An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15)
days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. xxx"
In the case, the judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime of Estafa was promulgated on March 25, 2009. Instead of
filing a notice of appeal within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of judgment, the petitioner filed with the
RTC a motion to lift warrant of arrest and to reinstate bail bond three (3) months later. It was only in November 2010 or
more than a year later since the RTC denied her motion that the petitioner filed with the CA her motion to admit notice of
appeal. At that point, her judgment of conviction has already attained finality and cannot be modified or set aside anymore
in accordance with Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error in denying the petitioner's motion inasmuch as by the time the petitioner
filed the same, the appellate court was already bereft of any jurisdiction to entertain the motion.
The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege. The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks to
avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
2. Period of perfecting an appeal may be relaxed on the grounds of substantial justice or other special meritorious
circumstances and issues.
In the case, petitioner, however, failed to present any exceptional, special or meritorious circumstance that will excuse the
belated filing of her notice of appeal.
Her assertion that her counsel failed to communicate to her the status of her case is a "tenuous and implausible" excuse.
The rule is that the omission or negligence of counsel binds the client. Petitioner did not also show that she took steps to
show her diligence to be updated by the status of the case. Lastly, petitioner did not even inform the judge about the demise
of her father. At the very least, she should have filed a motion to reset the promulgation of judgment.
32 | P a g e

People v. Cuaycong [G.R. No. 196051. October 2, 2013.]

FACTS:
In this case, two (2) Information were filed charging Appellant Jade Cuaycong of having carnal knowledge with the 7-year
old daughter of his live-in partner. At the end of the trial, the RTC convicted appellant on two counts of statutory rape
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 6(5) of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed appellants conviction of the felony of statutory rape in the first case. However, it did not uphold
the conviction in the second case because, while the Information alleged rape by carnal knowledge, the prosecution was
able to prove rape by sexual assault since the rape incident at issue involved penile penetration of the victims anus. Hence,
in the second case the CA ruled that instead of statutory rape, appellant should be convicted for acts of lasciviousness as
defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ISSUE INVOLVED:
Whether the ruling of the Court of Appeals, which downgraded the charge of rape in the second criminal case to act of
lasciviousness, is correct.
HELD:
Yes, the downgrading was correct. In upholding the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court referred to the case
of People v. Abulon which held that:
In view of the material differences between the two modes of rape, the first mode is not necessarily included in the second,
and vice versa. Thus, since the charge in the Information in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is rape through carnal knowledge,
appellant cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault although it was proven, without violating his constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
However, following the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal
Procedure, appellant can be found guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. Said provisions read:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Indeed, acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos are necessarily included in rape.
33 | P a g e

Carbajosa v. Judge Patricio [A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834. October 02, 2013.]

FACTS:
Carbajosa is the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 2540 for grave coercion against accused Dolores Bieles
(Bieles), heard and tried before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of President Roxas-Pilar, President Roxas,
Capiz, in the sala of then Presiding Judge Geomer C. Delfin. The charge stemmed from Bieles menacing and intimidating
attitude in preventing Carbajosa from bringing to Iloilo City fifteen (15) sacks of milled corn by removing and unloading
the same out of the latters Efren Bus Liner. In a Decision dated August 6, 2002, the MCTC convicted Bieles of the crime
charged and sentenced her to imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6)
months of arresto mayor as maximum, and ordered her to pay: (1) a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency; and (2) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the fifteen (15) sacks of milled corn or its equivalent value as
the first lien on judgment. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 18,affirmed Bieles
conviction but modified her sentence by increasing the maximum penalty imposed to two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional. This modified judgment was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) in a Decision
dated October 26, 2006 and eventually by this Court when Bieles petition for review on certiorari was denied in a
Resolution dated August 13, 2008 for late filing and for absence of reversible error in the appealed judgment. Likewise
denied was Bieles ensuing motion for reconsideration. The Court thereafter issued an Entry of Judgment stating that the
Resolution of August 13, 2008 has become final and executory on January 15, 2009. Undeterred, Bieles filed a Motion to
Set Aside Entry of Judgment but the same was denied in the Resolution dated June 1, 2009. Meanwhile, Carbajosa filed a
motion before the RTC for the remand of the case to the court of origin for proper execution. The motion was granted in
the RTCs Order dated December 21, 2009. Carbajosa thereafter filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment before the
MCTC presided by herein respondent Judge Patricio. Bieles opposed the motion stating that she sent a letter addressed to
the Chief Justice, Honorable Reynato S. Puno asking for a review of her case on the merits. She claimed that the letter was
favorably acted upon as evidenced by the first endorsement dated January25, 2010 requesting the Clerk of Court of the
Third Division to include the case in its agenda. Judge Patricio resolved the conflict by issuing an Order11 dated April 7,
2010 wherein he reckoned that it will be best to hold in abeyance the resolution of Carbajosas Motion for Execution of
Judgment and await the result of the referral/endorsement made by the Chief Justice before a ruling on the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of execution is made. On April 19, 2010, Carbajosa manifested his objection to the foregoing order and
insisted on the issuance of a writ of execution averring that in the absence of any restraining order, its issuance is
imperative so as not to unduly delay the administration of justice.
ISSUE/S:
Was the action of the respondent judge in violation of his responsibilities as a judge?
HELD:
Yes. Any delay in the full execution of a final and executory decision is repugnant to the ideal administration of justice.
Hence the rule that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of
such judgment should not be hampered or evaded; for the immediate enforcement of the parties rights, confirmed by final
judgment, is a major component of the ideal administration of justice. Our penal laws and rules of procedure, in particular,
enjoin that when the judgment of conviction is already final and executory its execution is ministerial. Respondent Judge
Patricio, however, demonstrated ignorance of the above rule by repeatedly refusing to execute the final and executory
judgment of conviction against Bieles. The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge not to know how to
apply them or to be confused by any auxiliary incidents. The issuance of a writ of execution for a final and executory
judgment is ministerial. In other words, a judge is not given the discretion whether or not to implement the judgment. He is
to effect execution without delay and supervise implementation strictly in accordance with the judgment. Judge Patricios
actuations unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance of the law.
34 | P a g e

Jadewell Parking v. Judge Lidua Sr. [G.R. No. 169588. October 7, 2013.]
FACTS:
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the
parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City
Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.
Respondents Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the
left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure owned by Edwin Ang and on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car belonging to
Jeffrey Walan. Both cars were considered illegally parked. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was
allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is 26,250.00 pesos.
In Lieu of this, Jadewell filed two criminal cases against herein respondents for violation of such ordinances.
Respondents filed a Motion to Quash on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash sought the quashal of the two
Informations on the ground that the criminal liability is already extinguished by prescription as stated in Act No. 3326, as
amended by Act No. 3763, which provides that violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribed after two
months.
The Information was filed on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged commission of the offense charged.
Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case, if any, was already extinguished by prescription when the Information
was filed.
ISSUE/S:
WON the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of
the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."
HELD:
The Petition is denied.
Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and
municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other
distinction.
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive
period was interrupted.
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense charged under
City Ordinance 003-2000. The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the
petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and as provided in the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime
charged is involved in an ordinance.
35 | P a g e

Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without
need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not
prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation.
This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not
on any date before that.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already
prescribed.
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the case
against the private respondents.
People v. Dizon [G.R. No. 199901. October 9, 2013.]

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Dizon was accused and convicted of the crime of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
popularly known as shabu, violation of RA 9165 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The prosecution posited that a certain PO2 Tuzon received telephone call from an unknown caller tipping him off that
accused-appellant is engaged in drug-pushing activity. Acting upon the information, he and his colleagues went to
investigate and engaged the help of a civilian to act as poseur-buyer when they decided to have a buy-bust operation and
said accused-appellant was eventually caught in said buy-bust operation and was brought to the San Nicolas Police Station.
There at the police station, PO2 Tuzon just marked the confiscated item with his initials EAT and prepared the
certification/inventory of seized/confiscated item. The defense countered that he never committed such crime of drugpushing and went on to say that he was framed-up by the police.
The RTC convicted said accused, and, on appeal at the instance of the accused-appellant, was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE/S:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the RTC.
HELD:
Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the RTC. In Reyes v. CA, the Court emphasized that a
"conviction must stand on the strength of the prosecutions evidence, not on the weakness of the defense which the accused
put up. Evidence proving the guilt of the accused must always be beyond reasonable doubt. If the evidence of guilt falls
short of this requirement, the Court will not allow the accused to be deprived of his liberty. His acquittal should come as a
matter of course."
In the instant case, Guzon was accused of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 which prohibits the sale of illegal
drugs. The elements of the crime include: (a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the
36 | P a g e

consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing. The Court explained in People v.
Bautista that in drug-related prosecutions, the State bears the burden not only of proving these elements of the offense
under R.A. No. 9165, but also of proving the corpus delicti , the body of the crime. The dangerous drug is itself the very
corpus delicti of the violation of the law. The prosecution committed the fatal error of committing a breach in the chain of
custody. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the
very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering
exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. Unfortunately for the part of the prosecution, there was significant
difference in the weight of the confiscated substance during the confiscation and during presentation.
Furthermore, the police officers who took part in the buy-bust operation failed to mark the seized item immediately after its
confiscation from Guzon. The Court explained in People v. Coreche the importance in the chain of custody of the
immediate marking of an item that is seized from an accused, to wit: Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of
the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the
starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference.
The Court has also determined that although a physical inventory of the items seized during the buy-bust operation forms
part of the case records, the buy-bust team failed to fully comply with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
for its preparation and execution. Under the law, the inventory must be made "in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom the items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof."
Besides these deficiencies in the preparation of the inventory, no photograph of the seized item, which is also required
under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, formed part of the case records.
In addition to the foregoing, the Court finds merit in Guzons argument that the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer to the
witness stand was fatal to the prosecutions cause. We emphasize that in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
the prosecution must convincingly prove that the transaction or sale actually transpired. However, in the instant case, the
civilian who acted as poseur-buyer was never presented as witness.
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is hereby acquitted.
People v. Galicia [G.R. No. 191063. October 9, 2013.]

FACTS:
Accused-appellant and his partner (who remain at large) were charged with the crime of murder and after trials of the
merits ensued, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was convicted by the RTC. Pertinent portion of the RTCs
decision reads as follows.
That on or about 11:45 in the morning of June 10, 2004, at N. Gonzales St., cor. F. Platon St., Barangay II, Poblacion,
Tanauan City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused conspiring and confederating
and mutually helping one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, one of the accused JUN ASUNCION y
NOBERO, armed with a firearm, and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
37 | P a g e

in an unexpected manner, shot Judge Voltaire Rosales, hitting the latter on his head and neck thus causing fatal injuries
which resulted to the instantaneous death of said Judge Rosales. Said accused escaped through the use of a motorcycle then
driven by the accused ALDRIN GALICIA y MICOSA.
Two civilians were presented by the prosecution as witnesses for said crime. One was able to talk to the perpetrators and
one was able to witness directly the shooting.
The defense on the other hand countered that the victim was shot by men in black bonnets and no one could identify the
perpetrators.
On appeal at the instance of the accused, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
ISSUE/S:
WON the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC
HELD:
No, the Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC.
Accused questions the credibility of the witnesses presented and further presented the discrepancies committed by the
witnesses in their affidavits and testimonies however the SC ruled that discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a
witness affidavit and testimony do not necessarily impair his credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often
incomplete or inaccurate for lack or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. What is important is, in the
over-all analysis of the case, the trial courts findings and conclusions are duly supported by the evidence on record.
This Court observes restraint in interfering with the trial courts assessment of the witnesses credibility, absent any
indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion, more so, when the
CA sustained such assessment, as in this case, where it affirmed the trial courts findings of fact, the veracity of the
testimonies of the witnesses, the determination of physical evidence and conclusions.
Decision by the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
People v. de Jesus y Mendoza [G.R. No. 190622. October 7, 2013.]

FACTS:
"AAA" was born on November 26, 1992. On July 24, 2004, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, then 11-year old
"AAA" went to the Pasig public market to buy a pair of slippers. However, "AAA" was not able to buy her pair of slippers
because appellant suddenly grabbed her left arm and pulled her towards the nearby Mega Parking Plaza. "AAA" was
surprised and confused. She cried and tried to free herself from the grasp of the appellant, to no avail. Upon reaching the
fourth floor of Mega Parking Plaza, appellant pulled "AAA's" shorts and panty down to her knees. Appellant likewise
pulled down his pants. Appellant then sat on the stairs, placed "AAA" on his lap, inserted his penis into her vagina and
performed push and pull movements. "AAA" was overcome with fear and she felt pain in her vagina.
Meanwhile, Boca, the security guard assigned at the Mega Parking Plaza, was conducting a roving patrol when he heard
the cry of "AAA." He went to the fourth floor of the building which was at that time unoccupied by any vehicle. He was
however surprised to see "AAA" seated on the lap of the appellant. Boca also saw appellant insert his penis into the vagina
38 | P a g e

of "AAA" and then perform sexual movements. Immediately upon seeing the sexual molestations, Boca grabbed
appellant's arm, handcuffed him and brought him to the barangay hall.
The defense, on his part, at the time of the incident, he was 63 years of age and worked as a porter at the Pasig public
market. He claimed that even before the July 24, 2004 incident, he already knew "AAA" as the latter used to ask money
from him. He denied having raped "AAA." He narrated that on July 24, 2004, he saw "AAA" urinating near the stairs of
the second floor of the Mega Parking Plaza while he was just standing nearby. Suddenly, Boca, the security guard, arrived
and handcuffed him. He was thereafter brought to the authorities. He could not think of any reason or motive why "AAA"
would file a rape charge against him.|||
RTC convicted him of statutory the victim being 11 years old at the time of the commission of the crime and was
subsequently affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of rape despite failure on the
part of the prosecution to prove that there was indeed a sexual intercourse between the accused-appellant and the private
complainant.
HELD:
No. The trial court did not err in convicting accused-appellant. Rape of a minor under 12 years of age is statutory rape. The
elements of statutory rape are that: (a) the victim is a female under 12 years or is demented; and (b) the offender has carnal
knowledge of the victim. Neither the use of force, threat or intimidation on the female, nor the females deprivation
of reason or being otherwise unconscious, nor the employment on the female of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of
authority is necessary to commit statutory rape. In statutory rape, there are only two elements that need to be established, to
wit: 1) carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse; and 2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. In this case, the
prosecution satisfactorily established the fact of carnal knowledge. It is likewise beyond dispute that AAA was only 11
years of age at the time she was raped. Her Certificate of Live Birth showed that she was born on November 26, 1992. The
lower courts therefore correctly held appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape and imposed upon him the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The present petition denied.
People v. Hadji Socor Candidia [G.R. No. 191263. October 16, 2013.]
FACTS:
Hadji Candidia was bound for Butuan City on board the Cebu Pacific Airline. At around 6:30 in the morning, upon her
entry at the departure area, prosecution witness Marilyn Trayvilla, while performing her duty as a female frisker, frisked
the accused Candidia and noticed something unusual and thick in the area of the latters buttocks. Upon inquiry, Cadidia
answered that it was only her sanitary napkin which caused the unusual thickness. Not convinced with Cadidias
explanation, Trayvilla and her female co-employee Leilani M. Bagsican brought the accused to the comfort room inside the
domestic airport to check. When she and Bagsican asked Cadidia to remove her underwear, they discovered that inside
were two sachets of shabu. The two sachets of shabu were turned over to their supervisor SPO3 Musalli I. Appang.
The accused, on the other hand, has another story to tell. She alleged that Trayvilla and Bagsican held her arms and asked
her if she was a Muslim. When she replied in the affirmative, the two women said that she might be carrying gold or
jewelries. Despite her denial, Trayvilla and Bagsican brought her to the comfort room and told her she might be carrying
39 | P a g e

shabu. She again denied the allegation but the two women told her to undress. When she asked why, they answered that her
back was bulging. In reply, she told them that she was having her menstrual period. Trayvilla and Bagsican did not believe
her and proceeded to ask her to remove her underwear. They later frisked her body but failed to recover
anything. Thereafter, the two women asked for money as they allegedly recovered two plastic sachets containing shabu
from her. At this moment, Cadidia became afraid and called her relatives for money. Her relatives arrived at the airport at
around 1 oclock in the afternoon of the same day but she failed to talk to them because she has already been brought to
Camp Crame for drug examination. She called her relatives again to ask forP200,000.00 and to bring the amount at 7
oclock in the morning of the next day. Her relatives arrived on the agreed day and time but managed to bring
only P6,000.00 which the police officers found unacceptable. As a consequence, Cadidia was subjected to inquest
proceedings.
After the arrest, the following Information was filed in Criminal Case No. 02-1464 for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of
Republic Act No. 9165. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the trial court found accusedappellant guilty as charged.
On appeal, the accused-appellant, contended that the trial court gravely erred when it failed to consider the conflicting
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Trayvilla and Bagsican as to who among them instructed the accused-appellant to
bring out the contents of her underwear. Another contradiction pressed on by the defense was the recollection of Bagsican
that when she and Trayvilla found the illegal drugs, Bagsican placed it inside her blazer for safekeeping, in contrast with
statement of SPO3 Appang that when Bagsican and Trayvilla went out of the comfort room, they immediately handed him
the shabu allegedly taken from the accused-appellant.
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that the inconsistencies of the prosecutions
witnesses did not touch on material points. Hence, they can be disregarded for they failed to affect the credibility of the
evidence as a whole. In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court ruled
that the alleged contradictory statements of the prosecutions witnesses did not diminish their credibility as they pertained
only to minor details and did not dwell on the principal elements of the crime. It emphasized that the more important matter
was the positive identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous
drug.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the conflicting
testimonies given by the witnesses.
HELD:
The contention of the accused is untenable. The Supreme Court ruled that in cases involving violations of Dangerous
Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are
police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the
contrary. Further, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose
conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe said
witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not. Applying the foregoing, the SC affirmed the
findings of the lower court in the appreciation of facts and credibility of the witnesses.
Upon review, the SC found no such inconsistency. Bagsican testified that after confiscation, she put the two plastic sachets
of shabu in her blazer for safekeeping. She further narrated that afterwards, she turned over the accused and the plastic
sachets to SPO3 Appang. SPO3 Appang, in turn, testified that when the two female friskers went out of the comfort room,
40 | P a g e

they handed to him what was taken from the accused. The statements can be harmonized as a continuous and unbroken
recollection of events. Minor inconsistencies do not negate the eyewitnesses positive identification of the appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. As long as the testimonies as a whole presented a coherent and believable recollection, the
credibility would still be upheld. What is essential is that the witnesses testimonies corroborate one another on material
details surrounding the commission of the crime.
Indeed, travellers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that
they are subject to search and if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
People v. Jose y Lagua [G.R. No. 200053. October 23, 2013.]

FACTS:
This case involves the accused being charged and convicted for the crime of kidnapping. The RTC as well as the CA
affirmed this conviction. The accused questions the validity of these convictions in which the Supreme Court affirmed.
However, an issue regarding the validity of imposing liability for civil indemnity and damages for the crime of kidnapping
was further looked into by the court in this case for the reason that the RTC and CA differed in their rulings regarding the
amount to be awarded as civil indemnity.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the accused is liable for civil indemnity and damages for the crime of kidnapping and if so, how much is
apt for civil indemnity
HELD:
The petition was denied. In People v. Bautista, the court ruled the following amounts to be imposed: PhP 75,000 as civil
indemnity which is awarded if the crime warrants the imposition of death penalty; PhP 75,000 as moral damages because
the victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, without need of proof; and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.
Even though the penalty of death was not imposed, the civil indemnity of PhP 75,000 was still proper because the said
award was not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense.
This Court ordered Bulauitan to pay Editha P75,000.00 as civil indemnity37 and an additional P35,000.00 as moral
damages. The CAs imposition of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages was sustained, but Mangahas was held to only be
solidarily liable with Bulauitan up to the amount ofP25,000.00 awarded by the RTC. The difference of P75,000.00 between
the RTC and the CAs awards shall be Bulauitans sole liability. The additional liabilities for civil indemnity and damages,
which this Court imposes solely upon Bulauitan, are in accordance with Section 11, Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
41 | P a g e

Century Chinese v. Ling Na Lau [G.R. No. 188526. November 11, 2013.]
FACTS:
Ling Na Lau, respondent, doing business under the name and style Worldwide Pharmacy, and, is the sole distributor and
registered trademark owner of TOP GEL & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap by the Intellectual Property
Office for a period of ten years. Ping Na Lau, her representative, wrote a letter to NBI requesting assistance for an
investigation on drugstores selling counterfeit whitening papaya soaps bearing the appearance of their products.
Petitioners were among of the listed drugstores which were selling fake whitening soaps. Agent Furing and Esmael
conducted an investigation and able to confirm Pings complaint that such counterfeit products are being sold to several
drugstores. Esmael added that the products seized were different from the genuine quality of the original whitening soap.
Agent Furing applied for search warrants before the RTC against the petitioners for violation of unfair competition and
trademark infringement. RTC granted and issued the Search Warrant for trademark infringement and unfair competition
against petitioners.
Petitioners filed for Motion to Quash the Search Warrants contending that it violated the rule against forum shopping, that
Benjamin Yu is the sole owner and distributor of TOP-GEL and not Ling Na Lau, and there was the existence of a
prejudicial question which was a pending case against Ling Na Lau.
Respondent filed her opposition arguing the non-existence of forum shopping; that the pending case is immaterial and
irrelevant in this case; and that Yu cannot be considered as the sole owner and distributor of TOP-GEL.
RTC issued its Order sustaining the Motion to Quash the Search Warrants finding that the issuance of the questioned
search warrants were not supported by probable cause, hence, the grant of the Motion to Quash.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied. Respondent then appealed with the CA. CA
rendered its decision by granting the appeal and setting aside the order issued by the RTC.
CA found that the search warrants were applied for and issued for violations of Sections 155 and 168, in relation to Section
170, of the Intellectual Property Code and that the applications for the search warrants were in anticipation of criminal
actions which are to be instituted against petitioners; thus, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure was applicable. It
also ruled that the basis for the applications for issuance of the search warrants on grounds of trademarks infringement and
unfair competition was the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF; that respondent was the registered owner
of the said trademark, which gave her the right to enforce and protect her intellectual property rights over it by seeking
assistance from the NBI.
Petitioners filed its motion for reconsideration but CA denied it. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
WON the CA erred in reversing the RTC's quashal of the assailed search warrants.
HELD:
We find no merit in the petition.
SDEITC
The applications for the issuance of the assailed search warrants were for violations of Sections 155 and 168, both in
relation to Section 170 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the
42 | P a g e

Philippines. Section 155, in relation to Section 170, punishes trademark infringement; while Section 168, in relation to
Section 170, penalizes unfair competition.
Thus, we agree with the CA that the Rules on the Issuance of the Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of
Intellectual Property Rights is not applicable in this case as the search warrants were not applied based thereon, but in
anticipation of criminal actions for violation of intellectual property rights under RA 8293. It was established that
respondent had asked the NBI for assistance to conduct investigation and search warrant implementation for possible
apprehension of several drugstore owners selling imitation or counterfeit TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya
whitening soap. Also, in his affidavit to support his application for the issuance of the search warrants, NBI Agent Furing
stated that "the items to be seized will be used as relevant evidence in the criminal actions that are likely to be instituted."
Hence, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure applies.
A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause, meaning "the existence of such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched." And when the law
speaks of facts, the reference is to facts, data or information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may
present. Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance
of a search warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance being,
in legal contemplation, arbitrary.
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with
probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a
full-blown trial.
The petition for review is DENIED.
People v. Castillo y Alignay [G.R. No. 190180. November 27, 2013.]

FACTS:
The trial court convicted Castillo Marissa Castillo y Castillo of violation of Section 5 and Section 11 (sale and possession
of illegal drugs, respectively), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Castillo seeks to appeal the Decision.
On or about October 24, 2006, Castillo not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly sell, deliver and give away to PO2 Thaddeus Santos, a police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic bag containing four centigram (0.04 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law. PO2 Santos had arrested accused
Castillo, he informed her of her rights and then put markings on the plastic sachets confiscated from the Castillo. The
accused was brought to the office of the SDEU while the plastic sachets confiscated from Castillo were brought to crime
laboratory for examination. The examination shows that the contents of the plastic sachets tested positive for shabu.
Castillo argues that the police officers who apprehended her failed to strictly comply with the procedural requirements of
Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, specifically, the failure to take photographs and to make an inventory
43 | P a g e

of the seized evidence, and the lack of participation of the representatives from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official in the operation.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was not properly established
HELD:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
First, it is important to note that Castillo did not raise the issue of the alleged non-compliance with Section 21 when the
case was still being heard in the trial court. This assertion must be argued before the trial court and not on appeal for the
first time. Nevertheless, the Court passed upon this question considering the gravity of its consequences on the liberty of
Castillo. We take this opportunity to reiterate jurisprudence which states that non-compliance with Section 21 does not
necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible because what is essential is that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused.
Second, despite the seemingly mandatory language used in the procedural rule at issue, a perusal of Section 21, Article II
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 reveals the existence of a clause which may render
non-compliance with said procedural rule non-prejudicial to the prosecution of drug offenses, to wit:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied.)
Third, Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 ensures that the chain of custody of the seized drugs to be used in evidence
must be complete and unbroken. We have defined "chain of custody" as the duly recorded authorized movements and
44 | P a g e

custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
We reiterated the importance of the chain of custody as a means of validating evidence in the recent case of People v. Del
Rosario, where we held:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which
it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same.
Lastly, while testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an
unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not
readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination
and even substation and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering
without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not dictates the level of strictness in the application of the
chain of custody rule.
With regard to the first link in the chain of custody, the testimony of PO2 Santos confirms the fact that three heat-sealed
plastic sachets each containing 0.04 gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu were seized from Castillo during
a buy-bust operation conducted by PO2 Santos, PO1 Chavez and an unnamed confidential informant. The seized drugs
were immediately marked at the place where Castillo was apprehended.
The illegal drugs seized from Castillo were then turned over to Police Senior Inspector Hoover SM Pascual (PSI Pascual),
the team leader and investigator of the buy-bust operation, who prepared and signed a Memorandum16requesting the
laboratory examination of the three plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance previously marked by PO2
Santos as "MCA-1," "MCA-2" and "MCA-3," respectively. This document together with the marked specimens was then
transmitted to the Eastern Police District (EPD) Crime Laboratory Office to determine if they contained dangerous drugs.
As per Physical Sciences Report No. D-486-06E,17 signed by Police Senior Inspector Isidro L. Carino (PSI Carino), the
qualitative examination of the contents of the three plastic sachets yielded a positive result for the presence of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The same marked specimens were later identified by PO2 Santos in open
court as the same items that he seized from Castillo when confronted with them by Prosecutor Conrado Tolentino
(Tolentino). After PO2 Santos positively identified them, Prosecutor Tolentino then requested the trial court that the three
plastic sachets containing shabu be marked as Exhibits "G," "G-1," and "G-2," respectively.18 From the foregoing narrative,
it is readily apparent that the other links in the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs have been sufficiently
established.
In the case at bar, we concur with Castillos assertion that the arresting officers involved were not able to strictly comply
with the procedural guidelines stated in Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. However, our affinity with
Castillos argument does not sway us towards granting her absolution because, notwithstanding the procedural error, the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in this case were duly preserved and the chain of custody of
said evidence was shown to be unbroken.
45 | P a g e

eople v. Roberto Velasco [G.R. No. 190318. November 27, 2013.]

FACTS:
Roberto Velasco was charged by the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA of three (3) counts of rape as charged in Crim.
Case Nos. 3579-M-02, 3580-M-02, and 3581-M-02 beyond reasonable doubt and of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in
Crim. Case No. 145-M-03.
Velasco was arraigned for the two charges of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 3580-M-2002 and 3581-M-2002; and one charge
of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 3579-M-2002 on February 3, 2003 to which he entered a plea of not guilty
on all charges. He was later arraigned on March 12, 2003 for the third charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 145-M-2003 to
which he likewise pleaded "not guilty."
Velasco now wants to appeal the case questioning the validity of his warrantless arrest.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Velasco is stopped from assailing the validity of his arrest if he fails to do so before arraignment
HELD:
With regard to purported irregularities that attended appellants warrantless arrest, we are of the same persuasion as the
Court of Appeals which ruled that such a plea comes too late in the day to be worthy of consideration.
Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or
to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment, thus, any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be made
before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
Nevertheless, even if Velascos warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a scenario would still not provide
salvation to Velascos cause because jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient
cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
People vs. Montevirgen [G.R. No. 189840. December 11, 2013.]

FACTS:
On July 18, 2005, P/Supt. Valerio of the Makati City Police received a report from an informant that appellant
Montevirgen was selling shabu in Malvar Street, barangay South Cembo, Makati City. Based on this information, he
immediately formed a buy-bust team. The buy-bust team went to the said location but could not locate appellant. The next
day, the team returned and found the appellant as the informer introduced him to the team as buyers. Shortly thereafter, the
team was able to buy 200 Pesos worth of Shabu from the appellant. Appellant was then taken to Police HQ where he was
booked and the evidence, after being subject to laboratory exam, tested positive for Shabu.
In his defense, Montevirgen avers that on the night of the supposed arrest, he was at home, sleeping with his wife and child
until several armed men entered his house, told him to board the vehicle and showed him the packet containing the white
46 | P a g e

crystalline substance. The RTC and the CA were not convinced. Hence this petition stating among others the Police
officers' non-compliance with the requirements for the proper custody of seized dangerous drugs under RA 9165.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the accused was validly searched after his arrest in flagrante delicto
HELD:
Yes. The two plastic sachets containing shabu subject of the case for the illegal possession of drugs were found in
appellant's pocket after a search on his person was made following his arrest in flagrante delicto for the illegal sale of shabu
. It must be remembered that according to Sec. 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a warrant.
Antiquera y Codes v. People [G.R. No. 180661. December 11, 2013.]

FACTS:
While several police officers were conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City during midnight, they
saw two unidentified men rush out of a certain house who immediately boarded a jeep. They suspected that a crime had
been committed and so they approached the house. Upon reaching the house, they peeked through a partially opened door
and saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and lighter. Thereafter, the police introduced themselves and
arrested Antiquera and his companion, Cruz. One of the police officers also inspected the immediate surroundings and was
able to confiscate several drug paraphernalia.
ISSUE/S:
1.
Whether or not the police officers conducted a valid warrantless arrest on the accused
2.
Whether or not the warrantless arrest gave the police officers the right to search the living room and seize the
paraphernalia found there
HELD:
On the first issue, the Supreme Court held that the arrest was not a valid warrantless arrest since no crime was plainly
exposed to the view of the arresting officers. Such is contrary to Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." In the case at bar, the
police clearly did not notice anything amiss going in the house from the street where they stood.
With regard to the second issue, the Supreme Court explained that considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and
seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers
allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure.
Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to
acquit the accused.
47 | P a g e

Crim Pro Cases

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Crim Pro Cases

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Espino v. People [G.R. No. 188217. July 3, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Espino v. People [G.R. No. 188217. July 3, 2013]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Criminal Procedure Cases

Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 189343. July 10, 2013.]

Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 191411. July 15, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Criminal Procedure Cases

Criminal Procedure Cases

xxx xxx xxx

People v. Odtuhan [G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Jose v. Suarez [G.R. No. 176111. July 17, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Avelino y Bulawan v. People [G.R. 181444. July 17, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

People v. Marvin Cruz [G.R. 201728. July 17, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Criminal Procedure Cases

People v. Victorino Reyes [G.R. 173307. July 17, 2013.]

People vs. Clara [GR No. 195528. July 24, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

People v. Roman [G.R. No. 198110. July 31, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Criminal Procedure Cases

Criminal Procedure Cases

Lee v. Lee [G.R. No. 181658. August 7, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Chavez v. Fria [GR No. 183014. August 7, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Neri v. Sandiganbayan [GR No. 202243. August 7, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Criminal Procedure Cases

Hasegawa v. Giron [G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Criminal Procedure Cases

People v. Pepino-Consulta [G.R. No. 191071. Aug. 28, 2013.]

People v. Amistoso y Broca [G.R. No. 201447. August 28, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Republic (PCGG) v. Bakunawa [G.R. NO. 180418, AUGUST 28, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Criminal Procedure Cases

People v. Manalili y Jose [G.R. No. 191253. August 28, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Punzalan v. Plata [G.R. No. 160316. September 02, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Criminal Procedure Cases

Kummer v. People [G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Thence, no, she does not have to be arraigned again.

Disini v. Sandiganbayan [G.R. 169823-24/174764-65. September 11, 2013.]

People v. De Los Reyes [G.R. No. 197550. September 25, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Singian vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos.195011-19. September 30, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Chua v. Executive Judge-MTC Manila [G.R. No. 202920. October 2, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Ramirez v. People [G.R. No. 197832. October 2, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases

Criminal Procedure Cases

People v. Cuaycong [G.R. No. 196051. October 2, 2013.]

Criminal Procedure Cases