Like many of you. I approach most discus = sions of archaeological theory with trepida E* tion, The language can be ponderous, the = points esoteric. and you may need scorecard =o know which philosopher is the current darling-of-the-month. “Is any of this relevant to my particular archaeological project. col lections, and/or deadlines?.” 1 have won dered. In my more petulant moods | even question why I should heed someone who may have never directed an archaeological excavation or conducted ethnoarchacologi cal fieldwork. Theory just doesn’t have the same panache when you are mapping a tricky feature late Friday afternoon in the rain, So I appreciate the strong temptation to respond to yet another theoretical paper with an exasperated eye roll and a dismissive “Whatever!” After all, aren't some of these exchanges just tit-fortat posturing? Well, yes, they certainly can be, but the sour taste ‘of bombast is not the most serious problem. A larger concern stems from far more prag matic realities. Most archaeologists are look: ing for ideas and insights to improve their research activities. If those insights are ren- dered incomprehensible by tortured lan Buage or appeals to obscure thinkers, we are tempted to close the book and simply keep digging The Middle-Range Program (MRP) origi nally proposed by Binford (1977, 1978. 1981) suffers from such a reaction. The MRP 6 Back to Basics: The Middle-Range Program as Pragmatic Archaeology Puitie J. ARNOLD IIT includes Middle-Range Research (MRR) and Middle-Range Theory (MRT}, exo distiner activities united within a single strategy to aid archaeological explanation. The MRP was developed to identify causal relationships in the present and nse thar knowledge asa frame of reference with respect (0 the archaeologi cal record, The MRP advocated tactics fami iar to archaeology (ie., radiocarbon dating, use-wear analysis) and sought to identify ad ditional cause-and-effect relationships and extend them to new archaeological domains Bur somewhere along the way the MRP was blown off-course. After a promising maiden voyage, it was becalmed within the Latitudes of Ethnoarchaeology. where all ac tualistic research was commandeered under the same Jolly Roger (see discussions in Kent 1987:33-39). Later, huffs of humanism fouled its riggings and challenged its struc tural integrity (e.g., Hodder 1982a, 1986, 1991; Shanks and Tilley 1987). Could the MRP weather the antiprocessual maelstrom? Most recently, theory-wielding shipwrights recommissioned the MRP, refitting its deep cutting bow of science with a flat-botcom, shallow hull of relativism (Kosso 1991 Tschauner 1996; VanPool and Vaniool 1999546) ‘Obviously, I believe that the MRP has been poorly served over the last twenty-five years ‘My goal. therefore, is to redirect attention to- ward the original purpose of MRR and MRT;Pati J. ARNOLD UI] namely, to establish more secure methods to transform a mute material record into inde pendently verifiable statements about past human behavior. Bur this discussion will nor review all attempts to use the middle-range moniker (eg. Raab and Goodyear 1984: Schiffer 1988: see Tschauner 1996 for an overview), Rather. in the spirit of going back to basies. I concentrate on the MRP as origi nally outlined by Binford (1977. 1981). My goal is to serve up a more digestible discus: sion chan the entrées now available, one fla vored wih more method :nd less theory than the usual fare (e.g.. Carr 1995b). The following presentation falls into three parts. Accepting thar those who ignore the past are condemned ro repeat it, I briefly re trace how the MRP came into existence, This section recounts the New Archacology’s early emphasis on a research program whereby hy potheses about the past were ested against the archaeological record. It also notes that such attempts were doomed to failure. Most contemporary archaeologists already know this, as it was the lack of results stemming from this misplaced application of science that prompted antiprocessual_ movements during the early 1980s (e.g., Dunnell 1986: Hodder 1982a, 1985). Many archaeologists may not realize. however. that this same dis. satisfaction prompted initial calls for the MRP. The theme of the second section is “If it ain't broke, don't fix it.” This discussion addresses recent misrepresentations of the MRP; it specifically concerns those state- ments that equate the MRP with the hermen- eutic circle of contextualism (eg.. Kosso 1991; Tschauner 1996), The conflation of these two strategies is serious, as it unneces- sarily agitates and muddies the methodologi cal waters of archaeological research. In this section I discuss the dual criteria of coherence and correspondence on the one hand and the confusion over ethnographic analogy and echnoarchaeology on the other. I suggest that. despite superficial similarities. the likeness between the MRP and hermeneutics is con siderably more apparent than real The final section explores how the MRP is, supposed to work. Like a datum point used to map an archaeological site, the MRP pro: vides a fixed point of reference to frame behavioral variation. Without reference to a secure standard, identifying and explaining variation becomes increasingly problematic. I suggest that much of what currently passes for basic, business-as-usual archaeology makes use of MRP principles. By way of ex ample I discuss my own foray into middle range research, BACKGROUND TO THE MIDDLE-RANGE PROGRAM Most historical treatments of the New Ar chaeology agree—its proponents opposed the notion that archaeological interpreta tions should be evaluated through appeals to a scholar’s personal credentials. This reaction prompted a search for a more “scientific” ap proach—in this case an inordinate fondness for deductively derived hypotheses. These hypotheses, in turn, were ro be tested against the archaeological record. Hypothesis testing became the battle cry of the New Archaeol ogy. Unfortunately, despite its mantra-like in vocation, there was a general failure to spec ify what was meant by testing and how it should proceed. Consequently, researchers sympathetic to the cause adopted the most fa- miliar testing protocols: namely hypothesis testing modeled after controlled laboratory experiments (eg, Fritz and Plog 1970) Thus, by the early 19708 one finds references to the archaeological record as a “labora: tory” in which scientific research and testing are carried out (e.g., Bayard 1969:337: Plog 1974:353 Watson et al. 1971:24). Proper testing includes two distinct stages (e.g., Binford and Sabloff 1982:137). The first is the acquisition of data with respect to a specified hypothesis. The second is the evalu: ation of thar hypothesis in terms of the ac quited data. Many archaeologists began 10 fixate on the former goal, apparently believ ing that controlled data collection necessarily led to scientifically sound results. Thus, conplores how the MRP is, ke a datum point used ical site, the MRP pro of reference to frame Without reference to a tifying and explaining reasingly problematic. what currently passes asusual archaeology inciples. By way of ex wn foray into middie IND TO THE GE PROGRAM nents of the New Ar. proponents opposed racological interpreta ted through appeals to sdentials, This reaction ‘a more “scientific” ap. 1n inordinate fondness ed hypotheses. These ere ro be tested against ord. Hypothesis testing of the New Archaeol- dite its mantea-like in general failure to spec: by resting and how it ssequently, researchers se adopted the most fa ols; namely hypothesis controlled laboratory fitz and Plog 1970). 10s one finds references record as a “labors: fic research and testing Bayard 1969:337; Plog 1971:24). ides two distinct stages off r982:137). The first data with respect to @ “he second is the evalu- sis in terms of the ac cchaeologists began to coal. apparently believ collection necessarily tnd results, Thus, con. trolled data collection became a proxy for hy pothesis evaluation. In other words, the two Boner tages were conflated Consistent with this attitude, discussions of data collection dominared the method logical literature of the 1970s. Sampling was a particularly common topic, Excava- tion and survey as a controlled experiment became the way to operationalize a scientific archaeology (e.g. Ingersoll etal. 1577). Con. siderations of the appropriate methods for hypothesis evaluation, however, remained few and far between The now-obvious reality is that this testing program is simply untenable. Archaeological fieldwork will never be a controlled experi ment of the “white lab-coat” variety. The conditions that brought about the material patterns cannot be directly observed. Thus. results that appear £0 support a hypothesis may instead move us toward the fallacy of affirming the consequent. In other words, in the absence of necessary causal connections, logic does not allow us to argue that @ specified effect was the product of a hypothe- sized cause. ‘As an example, suppose that we want to know ifit has rained in the last few hours. We have observed rainstorms on numerous occa~ sions and we are satisfied that, where side walks occur, rain invariably results in a wet sidewalk. $0 we look outside our window, observe a wet sidewalk, and conclude that it has recently rained. Is this conclusion logically valid? No, And why not? Because rain is but one of many possible reasons why a sidewalk may become ‘wet. Our neighbors may have just eurned on their lawn sprinklers, the street cleaner may have recently passed, or a nearby fre hydrant may be leaking. These various possibilities are know as antecedent conditions, and are often subsumed under the term equifinality. Thus, rain is sufficient to make the sidewalk wet, but it is not the only antecedent condi tion—thar is, it is not necessary to bring about a wer sidewalk, According to the logic of inferential arguments we cannot validly reason “backwards” from a deduced result Back TO Basics: THE MIDDLE-RANGE PROGRAM AS PRAGMATIC ARCHAEOLOGY to its cause if the links berween the nwo do not include a necessary causal connection. For archaeologists the conclusion is in. escapable, Without an understanding of nec essary causal relationships, we cannot use the archaeological record (as the consequent) to substantiate statements about past behavior (as the antecedent) in a logically reasoned manner. Furthermore, we cannot derive these causal principles from the archaeological record itself. since that register offers only the results of some unknown behavior. This scenario contributes to the “interpretive dilemma” discussed by Wylie (19892). This same dilemma led directly to Binford’s (197. 1981, 1982, 1983a:12-15) call for a middle range progeam of investigation. Thus. the MRP proposed by Binford is re ally quite simple. perhaps deceptively so. Ina nutshell, the MRP seeks to establish neces- sary causal relationships in the present and apply them to the past. The MRP is actualis: tic because it involves those contexts in which both cause and effect can be monitored. ‘These necessary causal relationships are used to support the uniformitarian assumptions that must be made when explaining the ar- chaeological record (Wylie 1985). If we can- not support a claim that in some way the past was like the present, then the past becomes inaccessible to any but the most imaginative and fictitious enterprise. MIDDLE-RANGE CONFUSION Seen from this perspective, a middle-range program of research should be an indispensa ble part of archaeological practice, Recent discussions, however, characterize the MRP as little more than a ratchet in the post modern toolbox (e.g., Kosso 1991: Tschuner 1996). Swinging a mallet of relativism. such {re}do-it-yourselfers incessantly hammer home the contextual nature of the discipline (see Kaplan 1964:28-29, on the Law of the Instcument). Perhaps deafened by their own pounding, they seem unaware that most of the discipline abandoned hyper-objectivity long ago (eg.. Arnold and Wilkens 2001). Other critics insist on “Dealer's Choice” and +Patuip J. Arwoto Ul bid the faulty assumption thar the MRP cre ates the past in terms of cultural universal Their crump is the anthropological wild card that cultural behavior is different across space and through time. Clearly, such games: manship says more about the players them: selves than it does about the MRP. ‘While these misrepresentations can be eas- ily dismissed, other charges are potentially more damning and merit closer inspection. ‘Two claims are among the most prominent. The frst suggests char appeals co the hermen- eutic twin eriteria of coherence and corre spondence also regulate the MRP, therefore hermeneutics and the MRP are essentially identical. The second suggests that any ob servations made in the present day serve a middle-range end. These charges are wrong on both counts and are discussed below: Coberence and Corvespondence One of the current strategies used to equate hermeneutics and the MRPis to call upon the hero twins of coherence and correspondence (Kosso 1991: Tschauner 1996). Coherence in this case refers to the internal logic of the argument; asking if the argument “makes sense” such that the derived conclusions are consonant with the original premise (e.g. Hodder r99ra:t00). Correspondence. its brother in arms. asks to whar degree the available facts mesh wich the argument’s ex pectations. Both a hermeneutic approach and the MRP profi from appeals to consistency and reference to noncontradictory data Thus, “doing archaeology” under the banner of either program has been presented as es sentially the same procedure (Kosso 1991 626; also see David and Kramer 2001:37: Tschauner 1996:28; VanPool and VanPool 1999346). Despite such claims, the similarity be tween hermeneutics and the MRP is more ap- parent than real. Let us frst consider coher ence. Assertions that coherence provides a significant defining criterion are merely plat tudes: it would be remarkable to take seri ously a statement that wes internally incon: sistent. In other words, given a rational thought process. ic is amusing to imagine a situation in which a premise is supported because a contradictory conclusion was reached! 1 doubt most readers would find such argumentation compelling Bur does this concession mean that hermeneutics and the MRP constitute identi cal forms of archaeological practice? Cer tainly not. It simply means that, on a very general level, both strategies make use of in ferential arguments. And, as such, their steve tures are specified by definition: “There is an important characteristic of all inferential ar sguments, simply that we cant never reason in valid manner from premises toa conchision that contradicts the premises with which we start” (Binford 1981:25. original emphasis) Kosso (2991) is certainly correct when he notes this superficial. similarity. berween hermeneutics and the MRP. Nonetheless, the fact that both deal with inferences in no way corroborates his conclusion that the MRP and hermeneutics are “fundamentally the same method” (Kosso 1991:636) The real issue, of course, is how one goes about evaluating such inferential statements. In other words, what resting procedures are employed and/or considered appropriate? The desice to evaluate competing ideas is the cue for correspondence to make an entrance Correspondence provides an assessment of validity by comparing our expectations to the facts as understood. But correspondence is more than a bit player with the single line “Is there a good fi between expectations and the available data?” Correspondence also man ages the backdrop of accountability by ask ing “How was that fit achieved? The hermeneutic circle advocated by postprocessualists achieves correspondence by firting expectations to the data. Hodder {r99ra:187) describes it as moving “back wards and forwards berween theory and data, trying to fir or accommodate one to the other.” The strategy is to build up a scenario based on one’s understanding of the archaco. logical information. This approach “artaches meaning to a particular piece of data by em bedding ir more and more fully in the sur rounding data. searching for a theory that makes al che daa ‘fir and makes sense of thepremise is supported story conclusion was 34 vst readers would find compelling. foncession mean that MRP constitute ident alogical practice? Cer. means that, on a ve ategies make use of in .nd, as such, thetrstruc- definition: “There is an tic of all inferential a. ‘we can never reason in remises toa conclusion remises with which we 29, original emphasis) uinly correct when he A similarity between MRP. Nonetheless, the h inferences in no way fusion that the MRP © “fundamentally the 1991:626). ourse. is how one goes inferential statements testing procedures are nsidered appropriate? competing ideas isthe eto make an entrance. ides an assessment of ourexpectations tothe 5 Bat correspondence is with the single line “Is ‘expectations and the espondence also man- accountability by ask: achieved?” circle advocated by sieves correspondence sto the data. Hodder it as moving “back- between theory and commodate one to the to build up a scenario nding of the archaco- ais approach “attaches 4 + piece of data by em: more fully in the sur ing for a theory chat and makes sense of the Back TO Basics: THE MIDDLE-RANGE PROGRAM AS PRAGMATIC ARCHAEOLOGY Bole in terms of the parts and the parts in mms of the whole” (Tchauner 1996:18). As jou can readily appreciate, such “hypothesis ‘fring” invariably promotes a closer corre = gpondence between expectations and data Br The fact that expectations are fit to the data may satisfy some archaeologists. but it figes not constitute a scientific evaluation of those expectations. This lack of accountabil: ity could prove to be a real show-stopper if ideas are confronted with unexpected dara Bur not to worry; at this point in the script ™ the deus ex machina of accommodative ar ~ gument descends from above, arriving in fhe nick of ime to preserve the premise in the face of contradictory evidence. Fans of the hermeneutic passion play loudly applaud this cameo since, as Hodder (19912:10¢) affirms = “Archaeology uses accommodative argu ~ ments; it has no other viable options.” ‘Across the aisle, however, proponents of the MRD jeer the overly contrived finale, not: = * ing that correspondence is not rantamount to evaluation. In fact, this very sicuation pro: > vided a fol for critiques of traditional archae ological practice: The only source of statements on dynam ics at that time rested with our imagina tions,..Of course we were generally + smart enough co imagine conditions that would accommodate the statics known. We weee literally locked into a very weak form of argument. the rose hoc accommodative argument. The only test isthe "goodness of fit” between our imag, 5, ined past and the empirical archaeologi- cal present. This is the very form of argu ment that I and others bad argued was snadequate, where the important step of “esting” had not been performed. (Bin ford 19836:67) eis nor the “kind of testing” that Kosso (1991 624) claims, Instead, it more closely re sembles plausibility. an understudy. who stands on shaky knees and delivers lines fed from the wings. Unfortunately. several recent discussants have uncritically perpetuated this conflation of hypothesis testing with hypothesis fitting {eg Kuznar 1995:167: VanPool and Van Pool 1999:36). An inability to distinguish the two ts explicit in Tschauner’s (1996::.4) characterization of contextual archacology: Hodder’s contextual analysis clearly isa hypothesis-testing or -ftting procedure.” In fact, these two procedures are not synony mous and hermeneutics falls squarely in the latter camp rather than the former Perhaps 2 quick illustration will nail down the distinction. A wonderful example of the difference achieved by the ewo programs is provided by Dart’s early hominid research in South Africa. Dart (197) proposed the well known “osteodontokeratic” culture. based oon the presence of animal skeletal remains as sociated with hominid fossils. In the absence of evidence for stone tools, certain animal re mains were interpreted as tools and weapons used by australopichecine hunters. In terms of coherence, Dart’s model pro vides an internally consistent scenario. After all. no stone tools were recovered. and, given the assumption of tool use, the bones, teeth. and horn made for excellent technological substitutes. Dart’ reconstruction, created by working “backwards and forwards berween theory and data” (e4g., Hodder 1991a:187), was internally consistent. ‘And whar of correspondence? Well, since the model was fitted to the evidence, expecta. tions and data correspond closely. Bur what about unanticipated patterns? For example, how was Dart to account for the consistent, unexpected absence of certain animal parts from the assemblage, such as the tail sections (caudal vertebrae) of bovids? He responded with an elegant accommodative argument, noting the tails are imbued with religious and symbolic meaning within hunter gatherers and complex society alike: To “tail” anything still signifies to “track it down”... Tails spontaneously form flexible whips or flagella for beating thickers and grass-lands after game. The flagellum was one of the badges of the Pharaoh!...Horse-tails used to be em blems of rank formerly in Turkey Every South African witch-doctor carriesPutuir J. Axwoto Ill an animal's brush preferably that ot @ wildebeest as every European witch car ried a broom. Ir seems likely trom the sig, nificance attached to tals universally by mankind in myth and history chat theit disappearance from the Makipansgat breccia is significant: they were all proba bly in great demand as signals and whips in organized group-hunung outside the cavern, (Dart 1957:167-168: cited in As cher 1961°520-321) Although rarely presented as such. Dart's (1957) interpretation is an excellent example of the hermeneutic circle in operation. estab lished vith the criterion of coherence and supported \1a the criterion of correspon dence Ofcourse. the reader is well aw are that the osteodontokeratic model is no longer consid: ered viable. And why not? Nor because the hermeneutic cirele is self-correcting. Rather, a number of scholars sought to resolve these and other unexpected faunal patterns in terms of the MRP (eg.. Behrensmever and Hill 1980: Binford 1981; Brain 1969). This research determined that the association of Dart’s hominids and animal skeletal remains was a function of mostly nonhominid agents. Based on actualistic studies that securely linked the formation and character of faunal assemblages with the activities of natural predators and scavengers. investigators gained insight into how bone deposits come into existence under different circumstances. Thus, che MRP was used to discount the role of early hominids in accumulating the faunal assemblage at Makapansgat. a scenario that otherwise appeared imminently reasonable according to the coherence and correspon: dence criteria of the hermeneutic circle Ethnographic Analogy and Ethnoarcheeology A second tactic used by those who equae hermeneutics and the MRP confuses the methods that link the present ro the past. Be cause the MRP is informed by contemporary behavior. the assumption appears to he that any argument from ethnogeaphic analogy oF the citation of ethnoarchaeological findings constitutes middle-range argument. In point of fact. MRR occupies a very small and specific subset of what currently passes tor ethnoarchaeology. Thus. while all MRR and MRT derive from analogical reasoning and are ethnoarchaeological in a general sense, very litle use of ethnographic analogy and ethnoarchaeology can be reasonably consid ered as part of the MRP. Perhaps this confusion 1s understandable, as rarely has there been an explicit account ing of similarities and differences. Many of Binford’s (1977. 1978. 1982) initial state ments regarding the MRD are relatively am biguous on this account. as they were mostly concerned with justifying the need for both ‘MRR and MRT. Apart from acknowledging the actualistic character of the research, dis cussions that set our the specific modus oper: andi were practically non-existent (but see Binford 1981:289-297). As long as the dis cussion focused on the MRD"s theoretical un. derpinning as opposed to its pragmatic appli cations, the MRP was destined to sufter from misreadings at the hands of critics and revi sionists alike Kosso's (1991) conclusion that the MRP and hermeneutics are essentially the same methods provides a case in point. As an ex ample of “middle-range theories in action. hhe argues that the distribution of potsherds in areas of Greece can serve as the basis for are construction of ancient Greek farming prac: The light scatter of sherds can be taken as evidence of cultivation in ight of middle range theories that describe a pattern of rural Greeks disearding old pots near their houses where the broken bits get advertently mixed into the manure of farm animals kept at the place of rest dence. .. Where manuring has been done. the link between offsite sherds and cult ‘ation can he exploited as a middle range theory. (Kosso 1991:6:5) Apparently. Kosso (1991) believes that 2 description of ethnographic behavior pro vides the sole basis for middle-range theoryvarchaeological findings ange argument. In poine ies a very small and aat currently passes for 4 bus. while all MRR and ralogical reasoning and ical in a general sense, nographic analogy and n be reasonably consid RP. ssion is understandable, zen an explicit account. 3 ad differences. Many of 78, 1982) initial state. MRP are relatively am. ant. as they were mostly fying the need for both art from acknowledging ter of the research, dis- # the specific modus oper- ¥ non-existent (bur see 97). As long as the dis te MRP’s theoretical un droits pragmatic appli destined to suffer from ands of critics and revi- 4a nelusion that the MRP re essentially the same ribution of potsherds in ve as the basis for are int Greek farming prac sherds can be taken as ion in light of middle describe a pattern of ueding old pots near the broken bits get in into the manure of at the place of resi suring has been done, site sherds and cult: ited asa middle-range 623) » (1991) believes that a ‘graphic behavior pro~ or middle-range theory: 4 back To Basics: THe Mipptt-RANGE PROGRAM AS PRAGMATIC ARCHAEOLOGY HE, ding and its simple application to a pre soi conest presen an example of MRT "Unfortunately, Kosso’s (1991) vignette is Senor MIT, oF ever MRR, i unaulert Fd ethnographic analogy, pure and simple. © Scontemporary rural Greek farmers exhibit 4 certain behavior with respect to potsherds Jad fertilization,” goes the reasoning, “thus. when we find ancient Greek porsherds ‘of ~ ste’ we are justified in concluding that the same behavior occurred in the past.” This ~ statement is a simple assertion that ancient Greek farmers acted like contemporary Greek farmers. Asnoted above. a basic requirement of any MRP isthe identification of necessary causal relationships berween the behavior observed and the resultant material pattern (e-g., Bin ~ ford 1981:26). So a reasonable question is =, “Are there other means by which potsherds B.S might be introduced into areas surrounding * residential occupation?” Kosso (1991-623) cites studies by Wilkinson (1982) and Bhinnff and Snodgrass (1988) ro support his analogy: Ironically, a. quick perusal of both works < shows that these authors would respond to >< the above question with a resounding affir- ‘ative. Wilkinson (1982:331~332)speciical- “ly mentions nomad encampments and plow. ing ancient burial mounds as possibilities, while Blintiff and Snodgrass (1988 507-508) 22 efecto nonagricultural offsite activiies in general. Given this array of possible ante cedent conditions, where are the necessary causal connections between manusing and Sherd distributions? Pur another way, where ate the signatures of sherds deposited specif instance of direct historical analogy (c.g.. AS- cher 1961; Wylie 1985) Koso (199t) is nor alone in the failure to lifferentiate ethnographic analogy from the ‘MRP, although his discussion enjoys frequent E citation in the literature (e.g., David and EE Keamer 2001:37: Kusnar 19952167: Saitta 1992888: VanPool and VanPoo! 1999:46) Tschauner's (1996) recent treatment of the MRP and postempiricist philosophy of sci ence offers a similar confusion, He presents Braichwaite's (1984) investigation of ritual and social differences in ancient Wessex as being “essentially identical to processualist. MRT-based procedures” (Tschauner 1996 13). On what evidence is this conclusion reached? According to Tschauner (1996:10), Braithwaite’s “entice inferential edifice 1s in fact built on a number of generalizations culled from ethnographic analogies: The source of her generalizations is typi cally ethnographic analogy... MRTlike cross cultural generalizations (cf. Binford 1987. p. 401) and analogical reasoning form the backbone of Braithwaite's re construction, (Tschauner 1996:1:) Like Kosso (1991), Tschauner (1996) erro. neously equates the MRP with simple ethno graphic analogy and cross-cultural general inations, How do we account for such fundamental misunderstanding? Afterall. Binford (r983a) is fairly explicit that his reservations with simple analogical arguments prompted his dissatisfaction with the traditional methods of archaeological reasoning. If argument from analogy was the method used by archaeologists to war rant their interpretations of the past. the implication was clear: Archaeologists lacked appropriate methods for making accurate statements about the past based ‘on archaeological observations. (Binfurd 1983a:8, original emphasis) As noted earlier, it was the search for more appropriate methods that led to the original suggestion of the MRP as a vehicle for archaeological investigation (Binford 1977. 1981). Thus, some attempts to equate the MRP with hermeneutics stem from an inability to distinguish ethnographic analogy. ethnoar- chaeology. and the MRP. We have already noted that most ethnographic analogy is not to be confused with the MRP. What about ethnoarchaeology? Where does i fit in?Pauuiy J. ARNOLD IIL Both ethnoarchacology and the MRP be- long within the category of actualistic re search by virtue of the fact that they monitor present-day activities. Moreover, it is fair to say that ethnoarchaeology; like the MRP. de- veloped out of a desire to improve assump. tions about the archaeological record (e.. Gould r978b: Kramer 1979). And of course, Binford’s (e.g., Binford and Binford 1968) emphasis on ethnoarchacology was an im: portant part of the New Archacology as ini tially formulated Bur that's about the extent of any similari ties. By he mid 1980s. at the same time thar antipeocessual movements were gaining steam, ethnoarchaeology began to back off from its commitment co link the present and the pase. The Gould and Watson (1982) dialogue on ethnoarchaeology signaled the gathering storm, Neither participant suggested that ethnoarchacology could serve to anchor the past to the present. Instead, Gould (1978a: Gould and Watson 1982:375-376) argued thar actualistic research should be used to highlight seemingly anomalous situations. In contrast, Watson (Gould and Watson 198: 363) stayed the course of the early New Ar chaeology and suggested that ethnoarchacol- ogy should provide hypotheses that are rested against the archaeological record. Neither approach to ethnoarchaeology was consis tent with the MRP outlined by Binford (1977. 1985:580-581). On the postprocessual side, Hodder (x982a, 1985) was an early advocate of eth: noarchaeology. Nonetheless, in just a few short years the honeymoon was over and the relationship turned rocky: “Ethnoarchaeo. Jogical studies are of interest in their own right but they cannot contribute directly 10 our understanding of the past” (Hodder r987a:424). But in the early 1990s, by the second edition of Reading the Past, we find evidence for a lukewarm reconciliation: Should ethnoarchaeology not disappear to be replaced by or integraced with the anthropology of material culture and social change?...In many ways [ethno: archaeology] isa stop-gap. caused by the lack of anthropological concern with the issues contra to archaeology ..It seems likely. chen. that ethnoarchaeologs, ide ally with a more ‘anthropological methodology, will retain a role in the immediate future. (Hodder 19912:108) By the boginning of the 19905 ethnoar chaeology no longer emphasized the impor: tance of causal relationships specified by the MRP. The MRP explicitly challenged re searchers to start with the archacological record: that is, devise research questions that stem from specific archacological patterns (eg,, Binford 1983c:39r). In contrast. eth noarchaeology. as Hodder suggested, became a “stop gap” version of material ethnogra phy. Ethnoarchaeology was increasingly de voted to “salvage studies,” justified because this-or-thar culture or such-and-such behav ior was disappearing fast. This fire-sale ap proach to ethnoarchaeology meant that the MRP's emphasis on archaeological relevance would have to be relaxed. This shift in emphasis is well represented in the current literature on ceramic ethnoar: chaeology (Arnold 2000). A single example will suffice. One of the best know ceramic ethnoarchaeological projects has been di rected by William Longacre among the Kalinga of the Philippines (Longacre and Skibo 1994b). This longitudinal study has dramatically increased our knowledge of contemporary ceramic production and con sumption. Moreover, Longacre (1970: Long, acre and Ayres 1968) was an early advocate of the use of ethnographic information to un: derstand the archaeological record. None theless, much of the Kalinga research does not appear co be directed toward any particu lar archaeological problem or deposit, per se For example, according to one participant, the real value of such studies is thar “data from ethnographic settings cannor help but stimulate the archaeological imagination (Stark 1994:197). This minimizing of ethnoarchaeology’s relevance to archaeology is also reflected in Longacte and Skibo's (1994a:xiti-xiv) com plaint that archaeologists often pay scant at tention to ethnoarchaeological research, ThisLeoncern with the veology...It seems archaeology. ide. ‘anthropological ain a role an the Ider 19912:108) the 1990s ethnoar. phasized the impor. nips specified by the itly challenged re. the archaeological rch questions that acological patterns ). In contrast. eth F suggested, became material ethnogra vas increasingly de ” justified because ch-and-such behav. t. This fire-sale ap. ogy meant that the teological relevance is well represented ‘ceramic ethnoar: A single example best know ceramic jects has been di- gicre among. the tes (Longacre and itudinal study has our knowledge of oduction and con gacte (1970: Long, + an early advocate information to un cal record. None. nga research does oward any particu- vor deposit, per se. © one participant, idies is chat “data ‘s cannot help but teal imagination thnoarchacology’s is also reflected in 94a:xili-xiv) com: often pay scant at ical research. This Back TO Basics: THE MiDDLE-RANGE PROGKAM a5 PRaGMatiC ARCHAEOLOGY Spray be true, but rather than demonstrate how ethnoarchaeology directly contributes to archaeological practice, they take the ar chaeological community to task: “Certainly. sherds are unavoidable ar many archacologi- tal sites, but prehistorians must frame their questions in cerms of whole vessels coaddress many behavioral ropics” (Longacre and Skibo ‘994aixiv). Should archaeologists stop deal ing directly with the archaeological record and begin to think more like ethnographers? This shift in focus may be comfortable for some scholars, but it represents a clear de parture from the MRP’s emphasis on the material record as originally outlined by Bin. ford (1977. 1978. 1983), ‘The above comments are not offered to condemn the Kalinga research as bad eth: noarchaeology. Quite the contrary, this re search is impressive and has immeasurably enriched our understanding of contemporary posters. The point is thar ethnoarchacology as currently practiced is not necessarily syn onymous with middle-range research (also see David and Kramer [2001:54~61] on “in terpretive ethnoarchaeology”) In sum, it should be clear that, despite the oft-cited comments by Kosso (1991) and Tschauner (1996), the MRP is not designed to apply ethnographic analogies to the past. Rather, the MRD is designed to establish causal relationships between behavior and archaeologically relevant patterns. More ‘ver, in the same way that hypothesis testing isnot “hypothesis fitting,” ethnoarchaeology and the MRP are not interchangeable. Much current ethnoarchaeology is in fact material ‘ethnography and its relevance to the archaeo. logical record is only a distant concern MAPPING THE PAST WITH A MIDDLE: RANGE DATUM Ac this point you might be thinking “OK, so the MRP is nor the New Archaeology of the 1960s and 1970s. And it’s not the hermencu tics of postprocessualism. Infact, it's not even ethnoarchaeology. So what is i? And more to the point, how do we use it? The MRP is a method. nothing more. tt provides researchers with a dependable in- strument to investigate variation as reflected in the archaeological record. But keep in mind that variation is not particularly mean. ingful without reference to some kind of stan dard. Any two things may vary in multiple ‘ways, o the important question is how to op erationalize variation so thar these differ ences can be explored effectively. The investi gation of archaeological variation is most effectively realized with reference to a rmiddle-range standard Most readers are familiar with the practice of mapping an archaeological site, The topo: graphic variation across space is rendered in telligible by relating distance and elevation to a point of reference. the site’ primary datum, ‘And although a number of different datum points may serve the purpose, the most im: portant requirement is that the position of any particular datam remains fixed. ic. its Jocation is constant. In this way the topo. ‘graphic representation obtained by using dif ferent datum points should be similar, assum. ing that comparable scales of measurement hhave been applied. In fact, one way to evalu- ate the accuracy of a map is to employ the same general techniques, only use a different datum as the point of reference. The degeee to which the versions correspond is a meas ure of the accuracy of the rendition, The role of the MRP is very much akin to the function of the site datum. The causal re- lationships derived from actualistie research underwrite our uniformitarian assumptions. These uniformitarian assumptions, in turn, serve as dependable points of reference. But in this case they are not spatial constants; rather, they are inferential constants. These points enable us to gauge archaeological vari ation in a behaviorally meaningful way. But, keep in mind that invoking these inferential datum points does not constitute a “test” of any hypothesis, As Binford (1981:290. origi nal emphasis) notes, “middle-range theory plays no sole in the explanations offered for the variability in the subject matter of inter est.” Such explanations require appeals to a separate body of general theory. The MRP simply provides an opportunity to monitor and evaluate departures from well-anchored 6Patuir J. Aenoto Ill points of reference. In this way we begin to ‘map” the behavioral circumstances that produced the archaeological record, “The MRP uses inferential standards to in vestigate behavioral variation as reflected in the material register. This point has been re peatedly misunderstood by critics who claim that the MRP is designed to expose cross: cultural generalizations or “universal laws of cultural process” (Hodder 1992a:107). This characterization is simply wrong, as the above discussion of ehrographic analogy should make cleat. “Does the use of a dacum point to map different archaeological sites mean that every site will look the same?” T don't think so. “Bur what about the ‘contex tual nature’ of research—will the datum point operate differently in Mexico vs. Mali vs, Outer Mongolia?” I certainly hope not. ‘OK. but aren't there multiple ways to con. struct a culturally meaningful map?” Of course there are. but the reason we use differ ent tools is because we need to complete dif ferent rasks. The last time | looked, my treas ure map didn’t help me navigate Chicago traffic and the “X” on my road atlas didn’t mark King Solomon's mine. The uniformirarian principles sought through the MRP do not insist that “every one does the same thing” or even that “every: one does a certain thing the same way.” The reliance on inferential standards simply rec ognizes that when certain activities occur. they produce an unambiguous, dependable material pattern. Again, the emphasis of the MRP has more to do with the creation of the archaeological record than the behavior, per se. Giving meaning to that behavior via ex- planation is a different activity entirely. As a preliminary example of a middle- range program, consider the following. In the 1980s, as part of a ream conducting archaeo: Jogical research at Comoapan, Mexico, I par- ticipated in the survey and excavation a 4-ha complex of kilns (Arnold et al. 1995; Santley er al. 1989). Archaeologists often cited kilns to infer nonresidential portery making (for a discussion see Stark 2985), s0 the presence of these features immediately raised questions about production scale and intensity. None- theless, contemporary potters in this part of Mexico were using kilns as part of their do. mestic ceramic-making tradition. Clearly, the kilns themselves could nor be indicative of the particular scale and organization of ce ramic production activities. Thus, the ques tion arose as to how we could differentiate kilns used as part of a larger-scale operation versus a series of individual firing facilities that had simply accumulated through the re peated use of an area In order to tackle this question | concen: trated on how contemporary pottery making was spatially organized within the domestic context (Arnold 1990, 1997). Inoted that the use of single kilns by individual potters in these residential settings resulted in a par cerned association of features and material by-products. This pattern consisted of a lone firing facility associated with an adjacent midden of large sherds. A review of the ethnographic literature lent additional sup port to this particular distribution of kilns and the associated waster dump. Ultimately, I was satisfied that the link between the pro: duction behavior and the patten I had ob- served was robust (see Arnold r99r for a thorough discussion of this linking process) Taking this pattern back to the original ar chaeological deposit, I encountered a very different arrangement of kilns and middens. Rather than finding each kiln associated with its cespective waster dump, kilns appeared to be clustered in groups of three to five facilities organized around a more centralized mid den. Furthermore, this pattern was repeated across the entire area So how was this pattern to be interpret ed? Based on additional information taken from studies of refuse management, task operations, and spatial organization, 1 ar- gued that the archaeological remains resulted from multiple, co-occurring firing activities (Amold 1991: Amold et al. 1993). My inter pretation of a nondomestic production con text was further supported with reference to independent evidence derived from formal and stylistic characteristics of the ceramic as semblages associated with the respective kiln clusterspotters in this pact of 1 as part of their do. tradition. Cleatly, the | not be indicative of id organization of ce. vities. Thus, the ques- we could differentiate larger scale operation vidual firing facilis ulated through the re. 1s question I concen. rary pottery makin Fithin the domeseg (991). Inoted that the individual porters in 3s resulted in a pat eatures and material a consisted of a lone d with an adjacent |. A review of the lent additional sup- distribution of kilns #damp. Ultimately, ak between the pro he patten I had ob- Amold 1991 for a his linking process). ck to the original ar encountered a very kilns and middens. kiln associated with 'p, kilns appeared to three to five facilities re centralized mid attern was repeated ern to be interpret- information taken management, task organization, 1 ar zaltemains resulted ing fcing activities 1.1993). My inter ic production con- 4 with reference to rived from formal sof the ceramic as the respective kiln es "The actualistic research I undertook gave ae a standard against which I could evaluate B rhe archaeological pattern, This was not a se of direct historical analogy. since the Co. noapan pattern deviated from the one | ob ved among contemporary producers. My STaiance on local potters was admittedly for E> fuicous, but it was in no way necessary ro the study. Another ethnographic group who used kilns could have served. As an amusing aside. originally proposed to compare the organi zation of domestic pottery making to that of focal, larger-scale brick manufacture. but my fanding proposal was rejected. Ironically, one of the reviewers fele thar I was wasting my time, since the archaeological potters at Co. moapan were nor making bricks. While I was attempting to avoid a simple analogy, the re- viewer apparently thought it was essential! In sum, I used the ethnographically de. rived relationship between the spatial organi zation of domestic production and the ar chaeologically recoverable evidence of kilns and waster dumps as a standard. lemployed thar standard to monitor and evaluate varia tion in the archaeological record. | did not argue that the contemporary potters and the Precolumbian potters were behaving in a similar fashions in fact, I concluded the exact ‘opposite. Nor did argue that the Pre columbian porters were involved in intensive production simply because they used kilns ‘The ethnographic record clearly refutes that conclusion. Instead, I undertook a middle range exercise whereby causal connections established in the present were applied to an archaeological context. My conclusion, in turn, was supported with reference to inde pendently derived evidence. CONCLUSION In this paper [have adopted an in‘ormal rone to discuss current misconceptions about the Middle-Range Program. I adopt this rone be cause I believe that many discussions of ar chaeological philosophy and theory are their own worst enemy. All to often they take on the flavor of privare country club—without the secret buzzwords or appropriate name- dropping your chance of gaining entry and benefitting from the received wisdom is prac tically nil ‘This situation is simply unnecessary and has produced as much harm as good. The viability of the MRP provides an excellent case in point. Although originally proposed as a form of science, it was never meant to be “rocker science.” The concepts are not that problematic; in fact, archaeologists use rmiddle-range methods without giving them a second thought. Studies that invoke use-wear analysis on lithics and ceramics are excellent examples. Investigations that rely on tapho: nomic processes present additional instances, Research based on neutron activation analy sis and other elemental techniques provides a third case. These investigations rely on uni formitarian assumptions about the relation: ship between different phenomena. These uniformitarian links have been established in the present through actualistic research, whether conducted in a laboratory setting or “in the field.” Thus, a middle-range approach 1s implicit in much of what passes for good, contemporary archaeological method. So. what's the problem? Why the confu: sion? It seems that the MRP has become just ‘one more negotiation in the bitter divorce be- tween “humanistic” and “scientific” archae- ologies. But rather than agree that the two parties’ research goals are irreconcilably dif- ferent, some self-appointed judges insist that “we all just get along.” The MRP has been turned into the child whose best interests are seeved only if both parties kiss and make up. To force the issue and dismiss the suit, certain judges introduce doctored paternity data to link contextual archaeology with the MRP. On closer inspection no such bloodline ex: ists. Perhaps itis time to invoke the wisdom of Solomon—t would lay even money that if the judges moved to cut the MRP down the middle, the deconstructionist daddies wouldn't bar an eye (e.g., Hodder r99za: 109-109. 180). ‘The MRP offers a few basic principles. it says that archaeological research should ad. dress the material record ahead of inferred behavior. It says behavior should be linked to the material record via uniformicarian 6sassumptions. Itsays that uniformiarian links should be established in contemporary set tings. Finally it says that these links should serve as points of reference to investigate be havioral variation in the past. In sum, the MRP as originally proposed important archaeological method. All statements about the past rest on assump tions: given po competing statements, the fundamental question is how co evaluate the underlying assumptions. Some might use the scholar’s credentials, others might prefer the scholar's creativity, and just about every cone will appeal to coherence and correspon dence. The MRP opts for those assumptions with the greatest chance of holding steady be J. Anwoup UII tween the present and the past. In the spirit of a more pragmatic archaeology. I'll bet those odds every time ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thanks to Christine and Todd VanPoo! for the invitation to contribute to their volume and for their encouraging comments regard tng the direction of this paper. Others who also provided important feedback include Shannon Fie, Robert Pruecel, and an anony mous reviewer The research discussed here \was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, Sigma Xi, the Heinz Foundation, and the University of New Mexico.