8.

3
VOLUME

Understanding
Chinas Foreign Policy
Under Xi-Jinping:

Towards New
Sino-Philippine
Relations

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Understanding
Chinas Foreign Policy
Under Xi-Jinping:

Towards New
Sino-Philippine
Relations
CHINA DREAM

To realize the China Dream, Xi Jinping heads both a new commission on national
security and a group on deepening military reforms while also being the chairman of
the China Military Commission.

Earlier this month, China held a grand parade in

Beijing to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end
of World War II. Considered by many as one of
the most ostentatious displays of military prowess
by China, it seems that the speech of Xi Jinping,
Chinas top leader, in this event is a paradox: while
tanks, planes and guns were paraded, peaceful
development was professed as still the
central theme of Chinas foreign policy.

Under Xi, who took Chinas helm in 2012 and will

step down in 2022, two important issues have
already emerged that might challenge Chinas peace
narrative. Xi has propounded a vision he calls the
China Dream, which makes military strength in
equal priority with economic development. To realize
the China Dream, Xi heads both a new commission on national security and a group on deepening
military reforms while also being the chairman of

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* The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Institute.

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the China Military Commission (CMC). Furthermore,

in a bid to have more control of the military, Xi has
gone after more than ten Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA) officials for corruption and has announced an
increase in the defence budget. These suggest important efforts from Xi to consolidate and strengthen
the role of the military in Chinas foreign policy.
At the same time, China has been more aggressive
in its reclamation activities in the East China Sea
and West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) disputes
under Xis watch. It has moved from a low-profile
posture in the 1950-60s, to assertion in 1970s90s, to constraint in the late 1990s to the late
2000s and back to assertion since 2009.
Together, these have been widely seen to contradict
the virtues espoused in the peace narrative that had
focused on economic development to achieve
Chinas goals and that was espoused
staunchly by prior Chinese leaders.
To the Philippines and other claimant states in the
territorial and maritime disputes, the paradox lies not
in the parade of Chinas arsenal in Beijing but much
closer to home: Chinas increasingly assertive and
continued reclamation and island-building
in the disputed areas.

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The Urgency: A Mutual Misunderstanding

in Sino-Philippine Relations
This paradox is simply part of a bigger mutual
misunderstanding between China and many
countries, including the Philippines. Among
relations between the claimant states, Sino-Philippine relations have been much more mired with
misunderstanding because the Philippines has
refused to engage China despite Chinas many and
recent invitations. It can be argued that the fact that
the Philippines refuses to engage already exhibits
this deep misunderstanding. Bilateral
engagement does not mean a concession of the
disputed islands. It is simply a tool to reduce
uncertainty and promote more understanding.
The prevailing view of many countries, including the
Philippines, is that China is a state that seeks to
calculatedly diminish the national security of other
states and to achieve great power status and world
hegemony through violent means. Chinas recent
activities in the territorial disputes in the Northeast
and Southeast Asian regions do not help
dispel this view either.
This misunderstanding is of course not a one-way
street. China misunderstands the Philippines too

because it assumes that the Philippines simply

parrots whatever foreign policy strategy the United
States adopts. This is of course a very inaccurate
picture. The Philippines has at least deviated from
many things that the United States and the ASEAN
does. For example, the United States has been
engaging China and it will in fact host Xi Jinping in a
few weeks. The Philippines has stopped talking with
China despite Chinas multiple and recent invitations
to do so. While the merit of this non-engagement
strategy may be questionable, the fact remains, the
Philippines has a foreign policy of its own.
Understanding China should be a top priority. The
kind of strategy China has should be calculated into
our own China policy. In a situation where two states
are unsure of each others intentions, each will seek
to increase its security through an increase in material power. The pursuit of power by each of the two
states will be perceived by the other as threatening,
thereby prompting both to continue increasing their
power in a vicious cycle until war breaks out. This is
what is called the security dilemma1. The only way
to alleviate this dilemma is through understanding.
The danger of uninformed and exaggerated
claims from both sides could lead to strategic
miscalculations that can draw us closer to conflict
when it could have been prevented.

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Therefore, a bid to understand China especially from

the Philippine audience should be in order. When
we do this, we can see that while there are significant shifts in Chinas foreign policy under Xi Jinping,
these shifts are not fundamental rifts from the
strategies of Chinas past leaders.

Understanding Chinas Foreign Policy:

From Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao
Since Deng Xiaopings tour of some Southeast
Asian states in 1978, Chinas foreign policy strategy
has been aimed at dissolving the China threat
theory. Dengs tour revealed to him that neighbouring countries have trust issues towards China largely
because of the remnants of Chinas support for domestic Communist movements in the region during
the Mao regime. More importantly, Deng
realized that Chinas interactions with other
countries, which create trust or mistrust, have a
greater bearing to its security than Chinas perception of the intrinsically untoward intentions of other
countries against it. Under Deng, Chinas perceptions shifted from a suspicion of the troublesome
ulterior motives of great powers, under whom it
suffered during its century of humiliation, to a
newfound realization that it could manage the intentions and beliefs of other states through managing
interactions. This shift is a milestone that has had
a lasting effect in its foreign policy. This lesson was
carried over by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao in the

immediate pre- and post-Asian Financial Crisis decade. China finally understood that its own actions
could be viewed as threatening or benign and so it
must take concrete steps to reduce uncertainty
and ensure that it is being viewed as nonthreatening by others.
Moreover, if China is ever to achieve great power
status, an aspiration that was conjured up by Sun
Yat-Sen, the father of modern China, it must achieve
economic growth and development first and
foremost. This goal of economic development and
managing interactions with other countries can be
seen as complimentary: only a peaceful and
accommodating international environment
can enable Chinas development.
The famous dictum of Deng to coolly observe,
calmly deal with things, hold your position, hide your
capacities, bide your time, accomplish things where
possible exemplifies the strategy. So although
Chinas peace narrative as a diplomatic statement
has only been more pronounced in the beginning
of the 21st Century, specifically under Hu Jintaos
peaceful rise and peaceful development, it has
some origins from Deng. In March 24, 1985,
Deng remarked to a group of Japanese guests that
there are only two fundamental problems in the
world: peace and development, where peace is
an east-west problem, and development
a north-south problem.2

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Professor Shiping Tang, a Distinguished Professor at

Fudan University in Shanghai, China and currently a
Fulbright Visiting Professor at the University of
California in San Diego in the United States, argues
that China since Deng Xiaoping believes that while
there are some conflicts of interest, these conflicts
can be solved through cooperative and peaceful
means and that conflict is preventable and may
not be needed.3 This is contrary to many perceptions on the way that China thinks: that alliance is
temporary and that conflict is a necessary feature of
international politics. Most fundamentally, many think
that China adheres to the notion that it can achieve
security through intentionally decreasing
another states security.

the ASEAN like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),

the ASEAN + 3 dialogue (3 stands for Japan, South
Korea and China), the ASEAN + 1 dialogue (1 for
China) and Chinas creation of the Boao Asia Forum.
While in the economic arena, Chinas move to not
devalue its currency in the context of the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis is a bid to help the ASEAN get out of
the crisis. China has also initiated the China-ASEAN
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) which was aimed
to dispel the competitive fears from Chinas rapid
economic rise among neighbouring countries.

A continuity of efforts to dispel a security dilemma in

Chinas environment can be seen from Deng Xiaoping, to Jiang Zemin, and to Hu Jintao. In the security
dimension, there are about six notable foreign policy
examples that reflect its bid to be seen as a
responsible great power: the creation of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in a bid
to create partnerships with Central Asian countries;
the resolution of territorial and border disputes
among some states; the Peoples Liberation Armys
(PLA) participation in joint military drills with many
neighbouring countries; Chinas new security concept which emphasized greater military
multilateralism; Chinas accession to ASEANs Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation; and, finally, Chinas
participation with other cooperative security with

China has a rich and storied modern repository of

foreign policy strategies. These are then solidified
into domestic institutions. Because institutions constrain the future decisions of policy elites, decisions
may thus be described as path-dependent. While
past and existing institutions constrain, sometimes
powerful leaders or institutional entrepreneurs are
able to break free and change institutions. Among
other modes of change, they can use old ideas and
put them at the forefront. Leaders can also re-use
or create new ideas and put them alongside existing ones or reinterpret and reuse existing ideas in a
different strategic setting.

C 2015 ADRiNSTITUTE for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Xi Jingping and his China Dream:

Why China Will Still Be Benign

While there are significant changes in Chinas foreign

policy under Xi Jinping indeed, they should not be

seen in an isolated fashion: there are other policies past and present that may support the benign
stance of China. Thus while Xi has indeed made a
strong military at par with economic development, it
can still be considered willing to compromise
and avoid conflict through understanding
and reducing uncertainty.
This can be seen in four ways. First and most
fundamentally, China has exhibited its willingness
to compromise and cooperate in light of conflict of
interest among states that have a stake at the South
China Seaa hallmark of a state willing to compromise. On one hand, China has repeatedly invited
regional states for a dialogue to resolve the territorial disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan
and other claimant states. Regardless of whether
it is bilateral or multilateral or of the fact that there
is a huge asymmetry between China and individual
states in bilateral talks, the gesture of inviting others
to dialogue is an important one. Vietnam and Japan,
the two most aggressive regional states that have
conflicts with China have heeded these talks and
we have not seen a breakdown of these talks as of
writing. At the same time, China has invited claimant
states to explore the option for joint exploration.
Secondly, China has increased its cooperative and
coordinative efforts in many parts of the world. It has
stepped-up its economic partnerships through the
Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road
which aims to promote more trade and investments.

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China Dream is a mixture of the

desire to be a great power,
a reframed version of Deng Xiaopings
economic development
focus and of Maos more offensive
realist militarized stance.
It also spearheaded the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) which is a joint effort with Brazil,
Russia, India and South Africa (the other countries
in the BRICS). It has also created the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (AIIB) which boasts the
principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs
of its member statesa clear contrast with existing
Western-led multilateral development institutions.
Thirdly, while the East China and South China Sea
disputes have become core interests of China,
China has never said that these are non-negotiable
interests4. There therefore is room for some compromise, however asymmetric they may be, in the
disputes. Moreover, Chinas behaviour in its border
disputes with other neighbouring countries like India
and Russia before the eruption of the maritime dis-

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putes in Southeast Asia are instructive to its

defensive realist behaviour. Since 1949, China has
had about twenty-three (23) territorially disputes
with its neighbouring countries but has
substantially conceded and compromised in about
seventeen (17) of these disputes.5
Finally, it is willing to engage in repeated dialogues
with what many think is Chinas top rival: the United
States. Top American leaders have visited and held
dialogues with their Chinese counterparts: Hilary
Clinton, John Kerry and Barack Obama. China has
also sent its top leaders to the United States and will
continue this as Xi Jinping and Fan Chanlong, the
Vice Chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) will visit Washington this year.

Overall, there is a revival and a recombination of

Chinas foreign policy principles. There is continuity
with Deng, and a revival of Sun Yat Sens and Mao
Zedongs ideas: the China Dream is a mixture of the
desire to be a great power, a reframed version of
Deng Xiaopings economic development focus and
of Maos more offensive realist militarized stance.
It is thus both institutional layering and conversion:
layering because the peace principles of Deng and
Hu were combined with some elements of the desire to be a great power and Maos militaristic stance
towards how to achieve it; and conversion because
Deng and Hus peace principle were appropriated
differently to exclude its core interests where
Maos militaristic stance can be seen to
have been strategically applied.

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Changing Philippine Foreign Policy

The Philippines is responding to Chinas more assertive stance through the pursuit of power through
military alliances with the United States and many
other neighbouring countries including Japan, South
Korea and Australia. It has also launched a legalistic
policy. The case is simply that the Philippines has0
misunderstood China. Most fundamentally, among
many other things, the Philippines assumes that
China is not open to compromise and it has not
inquired about important questions about the
shift in Chinas foreign policy under Xi Jinping.
China is responding by militarizing itself as well. This
is largely borne out of Chinas incorrect reading or
misconception of Philippine foreign policy, specifically in how it has perceived the Philippines as a
dependent of the United States without assessing
its domestic context6. This misconception is amplified because of the Philippines policy to disengage
in bilateral talks that China has repeatedly
offered to do in many occasions.
A situation that we described above as the security
dilemma is fast becoming a reality in SinoPhilippine relations. To avoid this we can
move forward in two ways:

First, as can be gleaned previously, China is willing

to engage the Philippines. It understands that war
might break out if misunderstandings will continue to
exist. The Philippines should welcome this invitation.
Engagement does not mean concession.
Simultaneously, the Philippines should continue
to engage its other strategic partners.
Finally, the Philippines must reconsider its policy of
joining the AIIB and take advantage of other economic partnerships with China especially in light
of Chinas Maritime Silk Road project. Not only will
there be more understanding among the two
nations, but also the Philippines can benefit from the
economic development potentials of such
partnerships. The Philippines must balance
both security and economic development
Since an assessment of any states foreign policy
can directly lead to war or peace, it is a vitally
important exercise to get this reading correctly. I
argue that a correct reading must consider both
changes and continuities and how these two create
a holistic picture of a states foreign policy especially
because the social world is very complex. A careful
understanding of intentions can go a long way.

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ENDNOTES:

On the security dilemma see The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis
in Tang, Shiping (2010) A Theory of Security Strategy of Our Time: Defensive Realism,
Chapter 2, pp. 34-71

Xiao, Ren (2000). The International Relations Discourse in China: A Preliminary

Analysis. Asia Paper No. 9 (Sigur Center for Asia Studies, The George Washington
University)

See primarily Tang, Shiping (2008) From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social
Evolutionary Interpretation of Chinas Security Strategy in Ross, Robert and Feng, Zhu
(eds.) Chinas Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics. (Cornell
University Press). See also Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping (2005). Chinas Regional
Strategy in Shambough, David (eds.) Power Shift: China and Asias New Dynamics.
(University of California Press)

Kaishen, Li (2015) Beyond The Territorial Disputes: The Old Conception and
New Framework of China-Philippines Relations. Paper presentation at the 1st Asian
Politics and Policy Conference, July 24-25 2015, The Asian Center, University of the
Philippines in Diliman

pp. 1.
6

Fravel, Taylor (2008) Strong Borders, Secure Nation. Princeton University Press
Li (2015)

Image Credit: newfederalist.eu

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8.3
VOLUME

ABOUT
Robin Michael Garcia

is currently a Doctoral Candidate in Political Science at the School of International Relations

and Public Affairs (SIRPA) of Fudan University in Shanghai, China under a Full Chinese
Government Doctoral Scholarship. He specializes in evolutionary theory in international
relations and comparative politics. He is writing a dissertation on evolutionary institutional theory
and economic transformations in Northeast and Southeast Asia under the supervision of
Professor Shiping Tang, the pioneer of the Social Evolution Paradigm (SEP). He holds a Master
of Public Administration with a specialization in public policy from UP-National College of Public
Administration and Governance (NCPAG) and a BA in Development Studies from De La Salle
University. He is also currently a Lecturer at the UP-Asian Center and was lecturer at
De La Salle University. He worked as speechwriter for Speaker Sonny Belmonte Jr.
and as analyst for the Liberal Party of the Philippines.

Stratbases Albert Del Rosario Institute

is an independent international and strategic research
organization with the principal goal of addressing the
issues affecting the Philippines and East Asia
9F 6780 Ayala Avenue, Makati City
Philippines 1200
V 8921751
F 8921754
www.stratbase.com.ph
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