Professional Documents
Culture Documents
NEGLIGENCE ................................................................................... 26
DEFENSES (PLAINTIFFS NEGLIGENCE) ................................ 41
Picart vs. Smith ......................................................... 26
Manila Electric Co. vs Remonquillo ............................ 41
BPI v. CA .................................................................... 31
Juntilla vs. Fontanar ................................................... 45
INTOXICATION .............................................................................. 35
US vs. Baggay ............................................................ 35
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
PRESCRIPTION .............................................................................. 54
Kramer vs. Court of Appeals ...................................... 54
Allied Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals ....... 55
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
DEFAMATION.............................................................................. 110
MVRS vs. Islamic ..................................................... 110
INTEREST......................................................................................139
Crismina Garments, Inc. vs. CA ................................ 139
MITIGATION OF LIABILITY.....................................................140
Cerrano vs. Tan Chuco ............................................. 140
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
In this case, the parents chose the second type of action since it is
more practical to file for damages against the employer, who is more solvent
than his employee.
The other action is under Article 1903 of the Civil code (quasidelict or culpa aquiliana) wherein the negligent employer is held
primarily liable, subject to the defense that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
engagement of his employees.
NOTE: The Barredo case was decided by the Supreme Court prior to the
effectivity of the new Civil Code. The principle enunciated in said case (that
responsibility for fault or negligence under a quasi-delict is separate and
distinct from the negligence penalized under the Revised Penal Code) is now
specifically embodied in Art. 2177 of the New Civil Code.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
10
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
11
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills
that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil
wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the AngloAmerican law on torts.
Where a man's promise to marry is the proximate cause for the
woman to give herself unto him in sexual congress, and there is proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a
subtle scheme or deceptive device to obtain her consent to the sexual act,
the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 is in order. The court took
notice that Gonzales is an innocent barrio lass and a typical Filipina, who
under our customs would not have gave in to sexual congress with Baksh
much more lived-in with him, were it not for his promise to marry.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
12
Issue: Whether or not the trial court is correct in the award of damages?
Held: As to moral and to actual damages, yes. As to compensatory damages,
no. Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense,
or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the
pecuniary consequences, which the law imposes for the breach of some duty
or the violation of some right.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction
of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained, whereas moral damages
may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish,
serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had
furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender's
wrongful act or omission.
Facts: Carmelo Agliam, his half-brother Eduardo and Ronnel Tolentino along
with Vidal Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi
and Marcial Barid went to the barangay hall to attend a dance. The group did
not stay long because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his
companions who were giving them dagger looks. The group had barely left
when, within fifty meters from the dance hall, their owner jeep was fired
upon from the rear. The precipitate attack upon the jeep left two people
dead (Eduardo and Jerry) and four others injured.
Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam, warrants for
the arrest of Ballesteros, Galo and Bulusan were issued for the crime of
double murder with multiple frustrated murder. The trial court found the
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
13
favor of Mabasa. The construction of the adobe fence is a natural use and
enjoyment of ones property in a general and ordinary manner. Nobody can
complain of being injured here, because the inconvenience arising from said
use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life.
Held: Firstly, the Custodios are barred from questioning the grant of the right
of way, because they failed to appeal the decision. The decision has become
final. As to the award of damages, the CA erred in awarding damages in favor
of private respondents Mabasa. The mere fact that Mabasa suffered losses
does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of
damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by
Custodio, and damage resulting to Mabasa. Wrong without damage, or
damage without wrong does not constitute a cause of action, since damages
are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or
wrong. In the case at bar, there were no previous easements existing in
Held: Kalaw had authority to execute the contracts without need of prior
approval due to the nature of his position as general manager. Also, doubts
were only thrown when the contracts turned out to be unprofitable for
NACOCO.
Rightfully had it been said that bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty
thru some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.
Applying this precept to the given facts herein, we find that there was no
"dishonest purpose," or "some moral obliquity," or "conscious doing of
14
Held: The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a
right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must
be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and
damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or
damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages
are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or
wrong.
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal
injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be
said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the
principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be
applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant
should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or
injury to the plaintiff.
Facts Supra
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that the
accident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus
driver.
Respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a
motion to dismiss arguing that the petitioners had no cause of action for on
August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for
damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in a criminal case already
for "double serious and less serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence," by the Chief of Police. Hence, with the filing of the criminal
case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal
case has been finally adjudicated. Therefore, the filing of the instant civil
action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary
and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the
driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence.
15
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners may recover damages under a
separate and independent action while a criminal case is pending.
Held: Yes. Petitioners may recover damages for liability arising from quasidelict. Under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. I of Rule III of the Revised Rules of
Court, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil
Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil
action, may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it
separately. But it should be noted, however, that neither Sec. 1 nor Sec. 2 of
Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made.
Held: A careful examination of the complaint shows that the action is one
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the
elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must
use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights
and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and
maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to
adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of
nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or
a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage
suffered.
16
Held: The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, the negligence
of the defendant of leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the
proximate cause of the injury. When the immediate cause of an accident
resulting in an injury is the plaintiffs own acts, he cannot recover damages
for the injury.
The immediate cause of the explosion, which resulted in plaintiffs
injury, was his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap. True,
David Taylor may not have known and probably did not know the precise
nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the
contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries
which he incurred, but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion
might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly
produced the explosion
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity
and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself
when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that his age and his
experience qualified him to understand the necessity for the exercise of that
degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from
his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to
have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act,
so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred
but for the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal
cause of the accident which inflicted the injury
NOTE for undergraduates: Read the analysis of US turn-table case in the
original.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
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Facts:(Supra)
Issue: Whether or not plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against
Fausto Barredo, making him primarily and directly, responsible under article
1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
Held: Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa
aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording
and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility
of employers may be safely anchored.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and
the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only
of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the
criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification,
merely repairs the damage.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
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Held: Yes. When a person was acquitted of a crime, it does not follow that he
is free from civil liability, since only preponderance of evidence is required in
a civil action for damages.
The judgment of acquittal can extinguish the civil liability of the accused
only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. In the instant case, a preponderance of
evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil liability of
Gabat arises. Gabat, by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused
damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done. Gabats
willful act of calling the victim to the middle of a busy street to buy two sticks
of cigarettes set the chain of events which led to the death of the victim.
Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from
moving forward while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help the
victim while the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did
not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the
drivers act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured
victim.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
Held: Yes it is valid. Civil liability is not extinguished where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the crime charged.
No separate civil action is necessary considering that the facts to be proved
in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceeding. To
require a separate civil action would only clod the court dockets and
unnecessary duplication of litigation. A separate civil action may be
warranted where additional facts have to be established.
19
voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from
the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution
on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other
th
circumstances regarding persons, time and place. The 4 element is lacking
in the case at bar.
The material damage was not proved to be the result of the reckless
imprudence. In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion
of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the
surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death
of his patient. As shown by the experts presented by both parties, the death
of Lydia may have been caused by DIC (clotting defect). Therefore, the cause
of death cannot be attributed to petitioner's fault or negligence.
Furthermore, whether or not a physician has committed an
"inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be
determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of
the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind
the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present
state of medical science. In the case at bar, no physician was asked to testify
to show the standard care that needed to be observed given the present
circumstances. Therefore, the conviction is not supported by the evidence.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
worth mentioning that Section 8, rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes
the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the
defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction
independently of the accused.
HELD: No. The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested
within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them. While at large,
they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived
the appeal. In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and
refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have
abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become
final and executory.
Petitioner admits helping the accused employee, hence, it
participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that
the employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to
appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are
subsidiarily liable for the civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the
latters insolvency. To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a
criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment
rendered by a competent court.
By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of
their employees without the latters consent would also result in improperly
amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision convicting an
employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not
only with respect to the formers civil liability, but also with as to its amount.
The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.
20
1. Whether or not Manila Railroad can excuse its liability upon the ground
that the breach was due to the negligence of their servant.
Held: (1) No. Failure to perform a contract cannot be excused upon the
ground that the breach was due to the negligence of a servant of the obligor,
and that the latter exercised due diligence in the selection and control of the
servant. It cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad company
were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner
above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted
from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the
defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless
recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving
this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit,
the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the
defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for
the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of
that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its
performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing
essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the
negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which
can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and
supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations
arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the
technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and
not to culpa contractual.
(2) No. it is not negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a
slowly moving train. As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are to be
noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than
that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps
of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on
the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to
stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement
material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to
alight.
21
2.
Held: While the sale, without the required approval, is still valid and binding
between the parties, approval of the Public Service Commission is necessary
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
for such sale, as provided for by Sec. 20 of the Public Service Act
(Commonwealth Act 146).
As to the second issue, the award of moral damages is not proper. It has
been held that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions
predicated on a breach of contract of transportation, in view of Art. 2219 and
2220 of the new Civil Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following analogous
cases:
1.
2.
ART. 2220. Willfull injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances,
such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
The exceptional rule in Article 1764 provides that where the injured
passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is
proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. The mere
carelessness of the carriers driver does not per se constitute or justify an
inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier, as in the case at
bar.
In the absence of statutory provision, it is presumed that the
lawmakers intended in article 2220 to limit recovery of moral damages to
breaches of contract in bad faith. The fact that negligence may be so gross as
to amount to malice, must be shown in evidence, and a carriers bad faith is
not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached
though negligence of the carriers employees. The award for moral
damages is eliminated.
22
FEBTC was forthwith informed. Due to bank policy, petitioner recorded the
lost card, along with the principal card as a hot card or a cancelled card.
In October, Luis used his card to pay for lunch at the Hotel Intercontinental
Manila. However, after verifying with the bank, the card was not honored
and Luis had to pay cash. He was embarrassed by this incident. Luis, through
counsel, wrote to petitioner and asked for the payment of damages. The VP
of the bank wrote a letter to Luis and expressed his apologies in their failure
to inform the latter of the bank's security policy. Also, the VP sent a letter to
the hotel to assure the latter that the private respondents were very valued
clients. Still feeling aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint for
damages in the RTC. The RTC ruled in their favor and ordered FEBTC to pay
moral and exemplary damages. CA affirmed the said decision.
Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
Held: NO. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the
defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of
contract. (Art. 2220 NCC) While it is true that the bank was remiss in
neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation, there is no
finding that there was deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm
to Luis. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to
Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do
a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from
the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. Thus, the
award of moral damages is inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis.
Exemplary or corrective damages are awarded, in the case of quasidelicts, if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence
as to approximate malice. And in case of contracts and quasi-contracts, it is
awarded when the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Thus, the award of exemplary
damages is improper.
NEVERTHELESS, the bank's failure to honor its credit card issued to
Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under
Article 2221 of the Civil Code:
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
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Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
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Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
25
fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the
tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Petitioners claim that the vault provided by private respondent was
not sealed, that is, not waterproof. In this regard SC held that there was no
stipulation in the Deed of Sale and in the Rules and Regulations of the private
respondent that the vault would be waterproof. Seal" is defined as any of
various closures or fastenings that cannot be opened without rupture and
that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening." It is
therefore clear that "sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof".
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." In the absence of
stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be
observed in the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a
good father of a family. The circumstances surrounding the commission of
the assailed act boring of the hole negate the allegation of negligence.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
Held: No. There was a contract of carriage between the parties, which was
violated, hence, proximate cause is immaterial.
The Supreme Court found Calalas guilty of violating the contract of
carriage as a driver failed to transport Sunga safely to her destination, being
negligent in (1) not properly parking the jeepney; (2) taking more passengers,
than the allowed capacity; and (3) the fact that Sunga was seated in an
extension seat placed in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed.
The determination of the proximate cause of the damage incurred,
whether it was the collision between the jeepney and the truck or the
negligence of the driver is immaterial. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions of quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. Where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between parties
it is the parties themselves that create the obligation and the law will merely
regulate the relation created. (Since there was a contract of carriage here in
the case at bar).
Negligence
Picart vs. Smith
37 Phil 809 (March 15, 1918)
Facts: Plaintiff, Picart was riding a pony on Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando.
He pulled his pony over the bridges railing on the right instead of left upon
seeing the automobile rapidly approaching. His pony was unfortunately
frightened when the automobile passed so close to them. The horse was
struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb
was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence.
As a result of its injuries the horse died. Picart received contusions which
caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for
several days. Picart seeks to render the sum of Php31,000 as damages. CFILa Union absolved Smith.
26
Issue: Whether or not defendant was negligent and if the concept of last
clear chance is attributable to him?
Held: The defendant Smith is negligent and liable under the doctrine of
last clear chance even though the plaintiff was on the wrong side of the
bridge. Defendant has had the opportunity to avoid the accident after
realizing that the negligence by the plaintiff could not have placed him in a
position of better safety.
The last clear chance was passed unto the defendant driving the
automobile. It was his duty to bring the car to an immediate stop or upon
seeing no other persons were on the bridge to take the other side and pass
far away from the pony to avoid collision. Instead of doing this, Smith ran
straight on until he was almost upon the horse. When Smith exposed the
horse and rider to this danger he was negligent in the eye of the law. Under
the circumstances, the law is that the person who has the last clear chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to
the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court, and
rendered judgment that Picart recover of Smith the sum of P200, with costs
of both instances. The court held that the sum awarded was estimated to
include the value of the horse, medical expenses of Picart, the loss or
damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the
whole to the date of this recovery.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
27
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the court denied the same.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1.
2.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
28
Facts: Private respondent Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary
School, a public school in Tayug, Pangasinan, while Private respondent
Aquino was a teacher therein. During the happening of the events which led
to the filing of the case, there were several concrete blocks in the school
which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World
War II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the
schoolchildren, Sergio Banez, also a teacher therein, started burying them.
Aquino, in order to help, gathered eighteen of his male pupils after class and
ordered them to dig an excavation pit wherein the stone can be buried. It
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was continued the following day by four of the original eighteen pupils.
Among them is the son of the petitioners, Novelito. When the depth was
right enough to accommodate the concrete block, Aquino and his pupils got
out of the hole. Aquino left to borrow a key to the workroom from Banez to
get a rope, he instructed the pupils not to touch the stone. Three of the four
kids, including Novelito, playfully jumped into the pit. The other kid, without
any warning jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down
towards the opening.
Except for Novelito, the other kids were able to go out of the pit. The
concrete block pinned Novelito to the wall in a standing position. As a result
thereof, he sustained injuries. Novelito died 3 days after. Petitioner-parents
filed a suit for damages against both private respondents. Petitioners base
their action against Aquino on Article 2176 NCC for his alleged negligence
that caused their son's death while the complaint against Soriano as the head
of school is founded on Article 2180 NCC. The lower court dismissed the
complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is
in line with their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the demise of
Novelito was due to his own reckless imprudence. This was affirmed by CA
on appeal. Hence the present petition.
Issues: (1)Whether or not Soriano is liable for damages under Art. 2180. (2)
Whether or not Aquino is liable for damages under Art. 2176.
Held: 1. No. The Court based their ruling on the doctrine enunciated in the
case of Amadora vs. CA, Article 2180 applies to all schools, academic as well
as non-academic. It provides further that teachers in general shall be liable
for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature,
in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Thus, Soriano,
as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is
an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly
admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not
give any instruction regarding the digging.
29
30
Negligence (Experts/Professionals)
Cullion Ice, Fish and Electric Company vs. Philippine
Motors Corporation
GR No. 32611 (November 3, 1930)
Facts: Culion Ice, Fish & Electric Co. Inc. owned a motor schooner named
Gwendoline. H.D. Cranston, the representative of Cuilion in Manila, decided
to have the engine on the Gwendoline converted from gasoline consumer to
a crude oil burner. He had a conference with C.E. Quest, the manager of Phil.
Motors, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding that payment
shall be made upon completion of the work.
The work began and conducted under the supervision of Mr. Quest,
and chiefly by a mechanic whom Quest took with him to the boat. Cranston
also directed the members of the crew of the Gwendoline to assist in the
work, placing them under the command of Quest.
Upon inspection of the engine, Quest concluded that a new
carburetor was needed, hence one was installed. The next problem was to
introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel. A temporary tank to contain the
mixture was placed on deck above and at a short distance from the
compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected with the
carburetor by a piece of tubing, which was apparently not well fitted at the
point where it was connected with the tank. The fuel mixture leaked from
the tank and dripped down into the engine compartment. To paraphrase, a
device was made where the engine can be converted from gasoline to crude
oil, switching back and forth.
Later, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the
gasoline, or other fuel, was dripping freely from the lower part to the
carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he said
that, when the engine had gotten to running well, the flooding would stop
The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The engine
stopped a few times during the first run, owing to the use of an improper
mixture of fuel. As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine stopped,
and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new
start. After this had been done, the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the
tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a back fire occurred
in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the
carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered
with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to
subdue. A case for damages was filed.
Issue: Whether or not the loss of the boat is chargeable to the negligence
and lack of skill of Quest.
Held: YES. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do
things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he
fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular
work which he attempts to do.
The temporary tank in which the mixture was prepared was
apparently at too great an elevation from the carburetor, so that when the
fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was greater
than the delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. This was the cause of
the flooding of the carburetor; and the result was that; when the back fire
occurred, the external parts of the carburetor, already saturated with
gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly communicated to the
highly inflammable material near-by. The leak along the pipe line and the
flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a
prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken
precautions to avoid.
Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the
engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was
experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. Possibly the dripping of
the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not
convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. Quest did
not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in
repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, on the part of Quest, a
blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this
constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have
resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable
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accident. It would not have occurred but for Quest's carelessness or lack of
skill.
US v. Pineda
37 Phil 456 (January 22, 1918)
Facts: Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist and the owner of a drug
store. Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a
prescription to Pineda. On other occasions, Santos had given the medicine
prescribed to his horses with good results. Under the supervision of Pineda,
the drugs were prepared and given Santos.
Santos, under the belief that he had purchased potassium chlorate,
placed two of the packages in water and gave the doses to two of his sick
horses. Another package was mixed with water for another horse, but was
not used. The two horses, who took the drugs, died afterwards. Santos took
the drug packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. It was found
that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate (a
poison). When sued Pineda alleges that he did not intentionally sold the
poison and that what the law (to which he is indicted) forbids is the sell any
drug or poison under any "fraudulent name.
ISSUES: Whether or not Pineda can be held liable for the death of the horses,
assuming he did not deliberately sold poison.
HELD: Yes. In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public
from the careless sale of poison and medicine, we do not deem it too rigid a
rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for
another whether it be through negligence or mistake. The care required
must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed
must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law
demands.
As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs
and poison he sells. If were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of
the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree of
certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that it was false;
31
that when he made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without
any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; that he made it with
the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the
purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the purchaser suffered injury.
Such a construction with a literal following of well-known principles on the
subject of fraud would strip the law of at least much of its force. It would
leave the innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust in the good
faith and vigilance of the pharmacist, at the mercy of any unscrupulous
vendor.
We should not, therefore, without good reason so devitalize the law. The
rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The
vendor and the vendee in this case do not stand at arms length as in
ordinary transactions. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an
examination of a compound of which he can know nothing. Consequently, it
must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for.
BPI v. CA
216 SCRA 51 (November 26, 1992)
Facts: A person purporting to be Eligia G. Fernando, who had a money
market placement evidenced by a promissory note with a maturity date of
November 11, 1981 and a maturity value of P2,462,243.19, called BPI's
Money Market Department. The caller wanted to pre-terminate the
placement. However, Reginaldo Eustaquio, Dealer Trainee in BPI's Money
Market Department, told her that "trading time" was over for the day
(Friday). He suggested that she call again the following week. The promissory
note the caller wanted to preterminate was a roll-over of an earlier 50-day
money market placement that had matured on September 24, 1981.
Later that afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request for
pretermination to the officer who before had handled Fernando's account,
Penelope Bulan, but Eustaquio was left to attend to the pretermination
process.
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It was, in fact Rosemarie who got the two checks from the
dispatcher, as shown by the delivery receipt. As it turned out, the same
person impersonated both Eligia G. Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando.
Although the checks represented the termination proceeds of Fernando's
placement, not just a roll-over of the placement, the dispatcher failed to
require the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the placement.
There is also no showing that Fernando's purported signature on the letter
requesting the pretermination and the latter authorizing Rosemarie to pick
up the two checks was compared or verified with Fernando's signature in
BPI's file. Such purported signature has been established to be forged
although there 0was a "close similarity" to the real signature of Eligia G.
Fernando.
On a different day, a woman who represented herself to be Eligia G.
Fernando applied at China Banking Corporation's Head Office for the opening
of a current account. She was accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco
Cuaso, Cash Supervisor, by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have
opened, earlier that year, an account. What Cuaso indicated in the
application form, however, was that Fernando was introduced by Valentin
Co, and with her initials on the form signifying her approval, she referred the
application to the New Accounts Section for processing. The application
form shows the signature of "Eligia G. Fernando", "her" date of birth, sex,
civil status, nationality, occupation ("business woman"), tax account number,
and initial deposit of P10,000.00. This final approval of the new current
account is indicated on the application form by the initials of the cashier,
who did not interview the new client but affixed her initials on the
application form after reviewing it.
The woman holding herself out as Eligia G. Fernando deposited the
two checks in controversy. Her endorsement on the two checks was found to
conform with the depositor's specimen signature. CBC's guaranty of prior
endorsements and/or lack of endorsement was then stamped on the two
checks, which CBC forthwith sent to clearing and which BPI cleared on the
same day. Two days after, withdrawals began.
The maturity date of Eligia G. Fernado's money market placement
with BPI came and the real Eligia G. Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of
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33
The records show that petitioner BPI, as drawee bank and CBC as
representing or collecting bank were both negligent resulting in the
encashment of the forged checks.
The Arbitration Committee in its decision, analyzed the negligence
of the employees of BPI involved who are involved in the processing of the
pre-termination of Fernando's money market placement and in the issuance
and delivery of the subject checks. A) The impostor could have been readily
unmasked by a mere telephone call, which nobody in BPI bothered to make
to Fernando; b) The officer who used to handle Fernando's account did not
do anything about the account's pre-termination; c) Again no verification
appears to have been made on Fernando's purported signature on the letter
requesting the pretermination and the letter authorizing her niece to pick-up
the checks, yet, her signature was in BPI's file; and d) the surrender of the
promissory note evidencing the money market placement that was
supposedly pre-terminated. The Arbitration Committee, however, belittled
BPI's negligence compared to that of CBC which it declared as graver and the
proximate cause of the loss of the subject checks to the impostor.
Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the
very nature of their work the degree of responsibility, care and
trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than
those of ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious reasons, the banks are
expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
In the present case, there is no question that the banks were
negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees. The Arbitration
Committee, the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower court, however
disagree in the evaluation of the degree of negligence of the banks. While
the Arbitration Committee declared the negligence of respondent CBC
graver, the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower courts declared that BPI's
negligence was graver. To the extent that the degree of negligence is
equated to the proximate cause of the loss, we rule that the issue as to
whose negligence is graver is relevant. No matter how many justifications
both banks present to avoid responsibility, they cannot erase the fact that
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34
the impostor's name as payee and the impostor's negotiating the said forged
checks by opening an account and depositing the same with respondent CBC
is not controlling. It is not unnatural or unexpected that after taking the risk
of impersonating Eligia G. Fernando with the connivance of BPI's employees,
the impostor would complete her deception by encashing the forged checks.
There is therefore, greater reason to rule that the proximate cause of the
payment of the forged checks by an impostor was due to the negligence of
BPI. This finding, notwithstanding, we are not inclined to rule that BPI must
solely bear the loss. Due care on the part of CBC could have prevented any
loss.
The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed
their eyes to the suspicious circumstances of huge over-the-counter
withdrawals made immediately after the account was opened. The opening
of the account itself was accompanied by inexplicable acts clearly showing
negligence. And while we do not apply the last clear chance doctrine as
controlling in this case, still the CBC employees had ample opportunity to
avoid the harm which befell both CBC and BPI. They let the opportunity slip
by when the ordinary prudence expected of bank employees would have
sufficed to seize it.
Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their
employees resulting in the encashment of the forged checks by an impostor.
Both banks were not able to overcome the presumption of negligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees. It was the gross negligence of
the employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud and the subsequent
loss. While it is true that BPI's negligence may have been the proximate
cause of the loss, CBC's negligence contributed equally to the success of the
impostor in encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. Under these
circumstances, we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while
CBC may recover its losses, such losses are subject to mitigation by the
courts.
BPI's contention that CBC alone should bear the loss must fail. The
gap of one (1) day between the issuance and delivery of the checks bearing
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35
Intoxication
E.M. Wright V Manila Electric R.R. & Light Co.
28 Phil 122 (October 1, 1914)
unsure footing and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such
force as to break a wheel, might be sufficient to throw a person from the
vehicle no matter what his condition; and to conclude that, under such
circumstances, a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did,
is to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork.
Wright was not negligent. No facts to merit a higher award of damages to
plaintiff
US vs. Baggay
20 PHIL 142 (September 1, 1911)
Facts: Several persons were assembled in Baggay's house to hold a song
service called "buni." The Non-Christian Baggay without provocation,
suddenly attacked a woman named Bil-liingan with a bolo, inflicting a serious
wound on her head from which she died immediately. With the same bolo,
he likewise inflicted various wounds on the women named Calabayan,
Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother, Dioalan.
The trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that
plaintiffs negligence was not as great as defendants. It awarded Wright
damages.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not an insane person, exempt from criminal liability
can still be civilly liable. (2) Can the heirs of Baggay be held civilly liable?
HELD: (1) YES. Civil liability accompanies criminal liability, because every
person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for
reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done.
A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a
portion of the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the
Civil liability may arise from acts ordinarily punishable under the
penal law, although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from
criminal liability. Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite
of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged
mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the
consequences of his acts, even though they be performed unwittingly. His
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fellows ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts
inspite of his unfortunate condition.
Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his
illness and so when he is declared to be liable with his property for
reparation and indemnification, he is still entitled to the benefit of what is
necessary for his decent maintenance, but this protection does not exclude
liability for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer
the consequences of his acts.
(2) Yes. The persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or
imbecile are those who have them under their authority, legal guardianship
or power, unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on their
part.
Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal
guardian, or power, if such person be insolvent, the lunatic shall answer with
his own property, excepting that part which is exempted for their support in
accordance
with
the
civil
law.
Degrees of Negligence
Marinduque vs.Workmens Compensation
99 PHIL 48 (June 30, 1956)
36
HELD: YES. Marinduque Iron Mines alleged that the criminal case sentencing
Macunat to indemnify the heirs of Mamador was a suit for damages against a
third person, thereby having the effect of releasing the employer from
liability. The criminal case, however, was not a suit for damages against third
persons because the heirs did not intervene therein and they have not
received the indemnity ordered by the court. At any rate, even if the case
was against a third person, the court already decided in Nava vs. Inchausti
that criminal prosecution of the "other person" does not affect the liability of
the employer.
Marunduque also contended that the amicable settlement entered
into by Mamador's widow and Macunat barred the widow's claim against the
employer because she has already elected one of the remedies. This
contention cannot be sustained because what the widow waived was the
offender's criminal prosecution and not all civil action for damages.
2. NO. Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not
negligence, ordinarily. It couldn't be, because transportation by truck is not
dangerous per se. Although the employer prohibited its employees to ride
the haulage trucks, its violation does not constitute negligence per se, but it
may be an evidence of negligence.
Under the circumstance, however, it cannot be declared negligence because
the prohibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of the riders.
Notorious negligence means the same as gross negligence which implies
"conscious indifference to consequences, or "pursuing a course of conduct
which would naturally and probably result in injury."
FACTS: Pedro Layugan testified that while he and his companion were
repairing the tire of their cargo truck that was parked along the right side of
the National Highway, Godofredo Isidros truck, recklessly driven by Daniel
Serrano bumped Layugan. As a result, Layugan had his left leg amputated.
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37
Defendant Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in
the accident. Isidro said that Layugan was merely a bystander, not a truck
helper being a brother-in-law of the driver of said truck; that the truck
allegedly, while being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right
lane right after the curve; that the proximate cause of the incident was the
failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device.
Daniel Serrano, defendant driver, said that he knew the
responsibilities of a driver; that before leaving, he checked the truck. The
truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. He bumped the
truck being repaired by Layugan, while the same was at a stop. Serrano also
testified that, When I was a few meters away, I saw the truck which was
loaded with round logs. I stepped on my foot brakes but it did not function
with my many attempts. I have (sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the
rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not function. Layugan, on the
other hand, claims that a warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene
lamp was placed 3-4 Meters from the back of the truck.
Isidro points to the driver of parked truck as negligent, and says that absent
such proof of care, it would, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, there
exists a presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked
cargo truck as well as his helper.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not defendant driver Serrano was negligent.
2. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case.
HELD: 1. NO. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then
he is guilty of negligence.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do. Applying the definition and the test, it is clear
that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by
clear and convincing evidence. Whether the cargo truck was parked along
the road or on half of the shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into
account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed 34m from the back of the truck. But despite this warning, the Isuzu truck
driven by Serrano, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct
consequence of such accident, Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm
and left foot.
2. NO. In our jurisdiction, Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to
the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof
of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a
mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine merely
determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and
facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care.
The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
So, it is inapplicable where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents
evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury,
or where theres direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and
all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear.
And once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, no
presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when
the circumstances show that no inference of defendant's liability can
reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence. In this case, it is
inapplicable because it was established by clear and convincing evidence the
negligence of the defendant driver.
(Note: The discussion in this case of res ipsa loquitur is merely stated in the
obiter dictum.)
Ramos vs. CA
321 SCRA 584 (December 29, 1999)
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Facts: Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except for occasional complaints
of discomfort due to pains caused by the presence of a stone in her gall
bladder. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of the
stone in her gall bladder. She underwent a series of examinations which
included blood and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surgery.
She and her husband, Rogelio, met Dr. Hozaka, one of the
defendants in this case, for the first time. They agreed on the date of the
operation and the doctor decided that she undergo a cholecystectomy
operation. Erlinda was admitted in the hospital and was accompanied by her
sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz. At the operating room, Cruz saw about two or
three nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to
administer the anesthesia. Although not a member of the hospital staff,
Herminda Cruz introduced herself as the Dean of the College of Nursing at
the Capitol Medical Center and was allowed to stay inside the operating
room.
Hours later, Cruz, who was inside the operating room with the patient, heard
somebody say Dr. Hosaka is already here. As she held the hand of Erlinda,
she then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter
heard Dr. Gutierrez say, ang hirap maintubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan. Due to the remarks of Dr. Gutierrez,
she focused her attention on what Dr. Gutierrez was doing. She noticed a
bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of Erlinda. Cruz then
heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another
anesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon arrived in the operating room, Cruz saw
him trying to intubate Erlinda. Erlindas nailbed became bluish and the
patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. Immediately, thereafter, Cruz
went out of the operating room, and told Erlindas husband (her brother)
that something wrong was happening. Cruz immediately rushed back, and
saw Erlinda was still in trendelenburg position. On that fateful day, she saw
Erlinda taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Erlinda stayed for about four
months in the hospital and has been in a comatose condition.
When asked by the hospital to explain what happened to the
patient, Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka explained that the patient had
bronchospasm. After being discharged from the hospital, she has been
staying in their residence, still needing constant medical attention, with her
38
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39
three hours late for the latters operation. Because of this, he had little or no
time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
(3) We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital. The unique practice
(among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and
visiting consultants, who are allegedly not hospital employees, presents
problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical malpractice
cases. The truth is, Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over
their attending and visiting consultant staff. While consultants are not,
technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying
all responsibility for the patients condition, the control exercised, the hiring,
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an
employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of
wages.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the
negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of
others based on the formers responsibility under a relationship of patria
potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned
prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent damage. In other words, while the burden of proving negligence
rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the
respondents (parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that
they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its
responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and
supervision of the latter. Upon these disquisitions we hold that private
respondents are solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code.
Batiquin vs. CA
258 SCRA 334 (July 5, 1996)
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
Facts: Mrs. Villegas consulted Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care. Dr. Batiquin,
along with other physicians and nurses, performed a caesarian operation on
Mrs. Villegas and successfully delivered the latters baby. After leaving the
hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of
being feverish. She also gradually lost appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin
at the latter's polyclinic who prescribed certain medicines for her. However,
the pains still kept recurring. She then consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho. After
examining her, Dr. Kho suggested that Mrs. Villegas submit to another
surgery.
When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitishyellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries
which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber
which appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. This was the cause of the
infection of the ovaries the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas.
The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court.
There were also doubts as to the whereabouts of the piece of rubber, as 2
versions arose from Dr. Khos testimony: 1) that he sent it to a Pathologist in
Cebu and (2) he threw it away. But aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the
Medical Certificate, the Progress Record, the Anesthesia Record, the Nurse's
Record, an the Physician's Discharge Summary mentioned the piece of
rubber. The trial court, however, regarded these documentary evidence as
mere hearsay, since those who prepared them did not testify in court.
The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. The CA reversed the decision.
Issues: Whether or not Dr. Batiquin could be held liable under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur.
Held: While Dr. Batiquin claims that contradictions and falsities punctured
Dr. Kho's testimony, a reading of said testimony reveals no such infirmity and
establishes Dr. Kho as a credible witness. Dr. Batiquin failed to impute any
motive for Dr. Kho to state any untruth, leaving her trustworthiness
unimpaired.
Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness,
the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. In the instant case, all the
40
requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the entire
proceedings of the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr.
Batiquin. In this light, the Dr. Batiquin were bereft of direct evidence as to
the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into
private respondent Villegas' body, which, needless to say, does not occur
unless through the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside from the
cesarean section, Villegas underwent no other operation which could have
caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to
reason that such could only have been a byproduct of the cesarean section
performed by Dr. Batiquin. Dr. Batiquin failed to overcome the presumption
of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr.
Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in
private respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
Held: YES. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to
the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof
of negligence. It is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in
charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause
of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the
plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of
the accident in order to establish negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of
necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available,
provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind
which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part
of the person injured.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the
basement while performing work in a construction site unless someone is
negligent; thus, the first requisite is present. As explained earlier, the
construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely
caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of
appellant; thus, the second requisite is also present. No contributory
negligence was attributed to the appellees deceased husband; thus, the last
requisite is also present. A reasonable presumption or inference of
appellants negligence arises. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any
evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from
the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the
incident.
41
Facts: Efren Magno went to the house of Antonio Pealoza, his stepbrother,
to repair a leaking media agua. The media agua was just below the
window of the third floor of his stepbrothers house. Standing on said media
agua, Magno received from his son thru the window a galvanized iron sheet
to cover the leaking portion. The lower end of the iron sheet came into
contact with the electric wire of Manila Electric Company parallel to the
media agua, causing his death by electrocution.
Magnos widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the
company. Trial court rendered judgment in their favor. Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.
The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary
wire stretched between poles on the street and carrying a charge of 3600
volts. It was installed there some two years ago before Pealozas house was
constructed. During the construction of said house a similar incident took
place, with less tragic consequences. The owner of the house complained to
the defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and defendant
moved one end of the wire farther from the house by means of a brace, but
left the other end where it was. Regulations of the City required that all
wires be kept three feet from the building.There was no insulation that
could have rendered it safe, because there is no insulation material in
commercial use for such kind of wire (according to appellant, and this was
not refuted).
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is guilty of negligence.
HELD: NO. It was the victim who was guilty of negligence. The liability of
electric companies for damages or personal injury is governed by the rules of
negligence. Nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety of the
public.
The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence,
and in some measure by the too close proximity of the media agua to the
electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit
given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of
the media agua.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
42
PLDT vs. CA
Facts: Fortunata Enverso with her daughter, Purificacion Bernal went to
Tacloban, Leyte to attend the procession on Holy Friday. After the
procession, accompanied by two other persons, they passed along a public
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
FACTS: The jeep of Spouses Esteban ran over a mound of earth and fell into
an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
installation of its underground conduit system. The Spouses Estebans
complaint alleged that Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench
which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of
any warning light or signs. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her
arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the
respondent husband suffered cut lips. The windshield of the jeep was also
shattered.
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the
injuries sustained by Spouses Esteban were the result of their own
negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible, if at all, is
L.R. Barte and Company, an independent contractor which undertook the
said construction work. The trial court ruled in favor of Esteban spouses
whereas the CA reversed the ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the Estebans can claim damages from PLDT.
Held: NO. A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the
burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof.
The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by
competent evidence.
The accident was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio Esteban
and was not imputable to the negligent omission on the part of petitioner
PLDT. The jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had
remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the accident mound. That
plaintiffs jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the accident
mound could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to
the south of the accident mound. Plaintiffs jeep was not running at 25
kilometers an hour as plaintiff husband claimed. At that speed, he could have
stepped on the brakes the moment it struck the accident mound.
43
44
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
45
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would do.
Picart v. Smith, provides the test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular case which may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms.
Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing
all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring
fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the
self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of
deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself.
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the
part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms.
Mabayad. This was exemplified in the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio,
then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its VicePresident, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the
incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in
total disregard of the bank's validation procedures.
During the entire period, PBCom had been regularly furnishing RMC
with monthly statements showing its current account balances.
Unfortunately, it was never the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these
monthly statements reposing complete trust and confidence to PBCom and
to his secretary. Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from
petitioner bank the return of its money.
Issue: Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of RMC.
Held: In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by
the private respondent (plaintiff in the trial court) RMC in the amount of
P304,979.74. It is in ascribing fault or negligence which caused the damage
where the parties point to each other as the culprit.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
had fourteen (14) passengers in the back and three (3) at the front, one of
whom was Juntilla. Upon reaching Mandaue City, the right rear tire of the
jeepney exploded causing the vehicle to fall into a ditch and turn turtle. As
consequence, Juntilla was thrown out of the jeepney and sustained
lacerations to his right palm and suffered other injuries. Juntilla, still shocked,
went back to Danao City for medical help but on his way discovered that his
watch is missing.
Juntilla then filed a case for breach of contract of carriage with
damages before the City Court of Cebu, which found the respondents (the
driver, the franchise operator and owner) liable for the accident ordering the
latter to pay damages, including the value of watch lost by petitioner during
the incident. Upon appeal, the CFI, relying on a case decided by the Court of
4
Appeals (Rodriguez case), exonerated respondents on grounds that the
blowing of tire is a fortuitous event, and therefore beyond the control of the
latter.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the blowing of the tire a fortuitous event (2)
Whether or not the respondents should be held liable for breach of contract
of carriage.
Held: No. A fortuitous event has the following essential characteristics:
(a) The cause of the unforeseen or unexpected occurrence, or the
failure of the obligor to comply with his obligation must be
independent of human will.
(b) The event must be impossible to foresee or if it can be foreseen, it
must be impossible to avoid.
(c) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
obligor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner.
(d) The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation if
the injury resulting to the oblige
The Supreme Court held that the cause of the incident was NOT
independent from human will. The accident was caused EITHER by the
negligence of the driver or because of the mechanical defects in the tire.
46
that he would be back in Ternate by about 2:00PM. For some reason, the
processing of the checks was delayed and was completed only at 3:00PM.
Despite realizing that he would not reach ternate in time to distribute the
salary of the workers, Hernandez nevertheless decided to encash them. He
thought he had to do this for the benefit of the laborers, otherwise they
would have to wait until the following Tuesday, when the main office would
reopen. And so, on the same afternoon he collected the cash value of the
checks and left the main office a substantial amount of money.
Hernandez realized that had two choices, to (1) return to Ternate,
Cavite, the same afternoon and arrive there in the early evening; or (2) take
the money to his house in Marilao, Bulacan, spend the night there, and leave
for Ternate the following morning. He opted for the second, thinking it the
safer one. And so, he took a passenger jeep bound for his house in Bulacan.
While the vehicle was along EDSA, two persons boarded with knives
in hand. One pointed his weapon at the Hernandez side while the other slit
his pocket and forcibly took the money he was carrying. The two then
jumped out of the jeep and ran. Hernandez, after the initial shock,
immediately followed in desperate pursuit. He caught up with Virgilio Alvarez
and overcame him after a scuffle. Hernandez sustained injuries in the lip
arms and knees. Alvarez was subsequently charged with robbery and
pleaded guilty, but the robber who had the money escaped.
On July 5, 1983, Hernandez filed a request for relief from money
accountability under Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Deespite favorable endorsement by Philippine Tourism Authority and the
NCR Regional Director of the Commission on Audit, the Commission on
Audit, through then Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, jr. denied the
Hernandez request. According to Tantuico, the loss of the P10,175.00 under
the accountability of Mr. Hernandez can be attributed to his negligence
because had he brought the cash proceeds of the checks (replenishment
fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate, Cavite, immediately after encashment for
safekeeping in his office, which is the normal procedure in the handling of
public funds.
Issue: Whether or not the COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in
holding Hernandez negligent.
47
Applying the letter and spirit of the above-mentioned laws, and after
considering the established facts in the light of the arguments of the parties,
this Court inclines in favor of the petitioner.
It is pointless to argue that Hernandez should have encashed the vouchers
earlier because they were dated anyway on June 29, 1983. He was not
obliged to encash the checks earlier and then again there might have been
any number of reasons why he did so only on July 1, 1983. The point is that
he did encash the checks on that date and took the money to Marilao and
not Ternate in view of the lateness of the hour. The question before us is
whether these acts are so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to justify
the denial of the petitioner's request for relief from accountability for the
stolen money.
It seems to us that the petitioner was moved only by the best of motives
when he encashed the checks on July 1, 1983, so his co-employees in Ternate
could collect their salaries and wages the following day. Significantly,
although this was a non-working day, he was intending to make the trip to
his office the following day for the unselfish purpose of accommodating his
fellow workers. The other alternative was to encash the check is on July 5,
1983, the next working day after July 1, 1983, which would have meant a 5day wait for the payment of the said salaries and wages. Being a modest
employee himself, Hernandoz must have realized the great discomfort it
would cause the laborer who were dependent on their wages for their
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
sustenance and were anxious to collect their pay as soon as possible. For
such an attitude, Hernandez should be commended rather than faulted.
As for Hernandez's choice between Marilao, Bulacan, and Ternate, Cavite,
one could easily agree that the former was the safer destination, being
nearer, and in view of the comparative hazards in the trips to the two places.
It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court feels he should not
be blamed for that. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and
was one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. And if,
as it happened, the two robbers attacked him in broad daylight in the jeep
while it was on a busy highway, and in the presence of other passengers, it
cannot be said that all this was the result of his imprudence and negligence.
This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions,
something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although it could
have happened, and did.
48
damages, actual damages, attorney's fees, plus the cost of the suit. The CA
affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the collapse of the ceiling was due to an act of God or
Force Majeure?
Held: No. The collapse of the ceiling was not due to Force Majeur. Mr. Jesus
Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling
collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that
the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have collapsed
without a cause. The fact that Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does
not imply force majeure.
Facts: Gloria E. Chatto and her 15-year old daughter, Lina, went to see the
movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco
Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then were
unable to find seats. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the
ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and
pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, the mother and daughter
managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get
out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were
confined and treated for one (1) day.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
49
It should also be pointed out that in the Bill of Lading (BOL) existing
on the cargoes, the responsibility of the carrier has been limited as provided
by Clause 14.:
Not unless the loss or damage is caused by the negligence of the
carrier, the common carrier shall not be liable for such caused by
force majeures, accidents of sea, war and public enemies.
This is a mere reiteration of Article 1174.
Common carriers have the duty to observe extraordinary diligence from the
moment the goods are unconditionally placed in their possession until the
same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the
consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them, without
prejudice to the provisions of Article 1738
It held that the delivery to the Bureau of Customs is not the constructive
delivery as contemplated in Article 1736, thus the common carrier continues
to be responsible.
Issue: Whether or not FIRE is a fortuitous event, absolving Respondents of
any liability?
Held: Yes. The burning of the warehouse was an extraordinary event
independent of the will of the respondents. The following characteristics of
caso fortuito are present. 1. the cause of the unforeseen event must be
NAPOCOR vs. CA
GR Nos. 103442-45 (1993)
Facts: The controversy stemmed from separate complaints filed by several
residents of Norzagaray, Bulacan against petitioner, National Power Corp.
The residents seek to recover actual and other damages for the loss of lives
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
due to the inundation of their town. The flooding was allegedly caused by
NAPOCORs acts of negligently releasing water in the spillways of Angat Dam
(hydroelectric plant). NAPOCOR, in its defense, maintains that (1) they
exercised due care and diligence in maintaining the power plant; (2)
petitioners duly notified the residents about the impending release of water
with the onset of typhoon kading and advised them to take necessary
precautions; and (3) that the damages incurred by private respondents were
caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure.
The lower court dismissed the complaints for lack of sufficient
evidence. The CA reversed the decision and awarded actual and moral
damages (plus litigation expenses) to the residents. The judgment was based
on a patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence
in the management and operation of Angat Dam. The unholiness of the hour,
the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the water
released, are all but products of NAPOCORs headlessness, slovenliness, and
carelessness. The resulting flash flood and inundation of even areas (sic) one
(1) kilometer away from the Angat River bank would have been avoided had
NAPOCOR prepared the Angat Dam by maintaining a water elevation, which
would allow room for the expected torrential rains.
The CA also rejected the NAPOCORs plea that the incident was caused by a
fortuitous event.
Issue: Whether or not the incident was caused by a fortuitous event.
Held: The SC rendered its decision based on the same errors in G.R. No.
96410, entitled National Power Corporation, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al,
according to the Court, the proximate cause of the damage incurred by
private respondents was due to negligence of the NAPOCOR. The early
warning notice was insufficient. The SC cannot rule otherwise because its
decision is now binding.
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 (Acts of God)
of the Civil Code, the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of
the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event
must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a moral manner;
50
and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of
the injury to the creditor
Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God,
there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or
contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in
Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor
cannot escape liability
The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires
that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature
and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the
cause of the mischief. Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a
person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not
exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage
was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of
God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which
that loss or damage may have been occasioned.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
actual, moral and exemplary damages, including attorneys fees and costs
from petitioners. In their answer, Southeastern averred that the building
withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past
without its roofing giving way, and that typhoon Saling was an act of God.
In giving credence to the ocular inspection, the Trial court ruled in
favor of the Dimaanos and ordered the Southeastern to pay the decreed
damages sought. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision but reduced the
award of moral damages.
Issues: Whether or not the Southeastern College is liable for the damage.
Held: No. The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the
Partidas which defines it as an event which takes place by accident and could
not have been foreseen. In order that a fortuitous even may exempt a person
from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or
misconduct by reason which the loss may have been occasioned
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous even, a
natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any
amount of foresight, diligence or care. From these premises, we proceed to
determine whether Southeastern was negligent, such that if it were not the
damage caused to private respondents house could have been avoided? At
the outset it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the
negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or
negligence. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively
established by competent evidence, not merely by presumption or
conclusions without basis of fact. The Dimaanos merely relied on the ocular
inspection, however by this basis, the relationship of cause and effect has
NOT been clearly shown.
On the other hand, petitioner elicited from private respondents city
building official, Jesus Reyna, that the original plans and design of
petitioners school building were approved including the certificate of
occupancy. Having obtained both, these are, at the least, prima facie
evidence of the regular and proper construction of a subject school building.
As to the damages, it is not enough that the damage be capable of
proof but must be actually proved with reasonable degree of certainty,
51
pointing out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory damages are borne.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Afialda vs. Hisole
85 Phil 67 (November 29, 1949)
Facts: Loreto Afialda was employed by Hisole spouses as caretaker of their
carabaos. While tending to the animals, he was gored by one of them and
later died as a consequence. His sister then filed a complaint against the
spouses Hisole. The spouses filed a motion to dismiss, which the court
granted. Plaintiff now seeks to hold defendants liable under art. 1905 of the
Civil Code which states that The possessor of an animal or the one who uses
the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should
escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case the
damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who
may have suffered it.
Issue: Whether or not the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is
caused to its caretaker.
Held: No. The owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to
a stranger, and that damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner
would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under art. 1902 of
the Civil Code. In the case at bar, the animal was in the custody of the
caretaker. It was the caretakers business to try to prevent the animal from
causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. Being injured by the
animal was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily
assumed and for which he must take the consequences. There was no
allegation of negligence on the part of the Hisole spouses. Thus, they are not
liable.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
Facts: In the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967,
typhoon 'Gening' buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte and brought heavy
rains and flooding. Between 5:30-6:00AM, Isabel Lao Juan (Nana Belen) along
with Aida Bulong and Linda Estavillo ventured out of her house and traversed
waist-deep flood to proceed to a store, which she owns to check if her
merchandise have been damaged. Suddenly, Nana Belen screaamed 'ay!' and
quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help but fear
dissuaded them because on the spot where the deceased sank, they saw an
electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the
water. Ernesto dela Cruz tried to go to Nana Belen but he turned back
because the water was grounded. Ernesto informed Antonio Yabes that his
mother in law had been electrocuted and together they went to the City Hall
of Laoag to request the police to ask INELCO to cut off the current.
Subsequently, the search for the body began and such was found two meters
from an electric post.
In another place at about 4:00 A.M., Engineer Antonio Juan of the
NAPOCOR noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated
such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. He then went out for
inspection and saw grounded and disconnected lines which were hanging
from posts to the ground. Since there were no INELCO linemen in sight, he
decided to go to the INELCO office but it was closed. On the way to INELCO,
he passed by Guerrero St. and saw and electric wire about 30 meters long
and the other end of the wire was seeming to play with the current of the
water. At about 8:00 A.M., he went out for inspection again and learned
about the death of Nana Belen. He tried to help revive the deceased but his
efforts proved futile. He also noticed a hollow wound on the left palm of the
victim. In the afternoon, he went on an inspection trip again and the wire
that he saw on Guerrero St. earlier was no longer there.
Dr. Castro examined the body of the deceased at around 8:00 A.M.
and noted that the skin was grayish or cyanotic which indicated death by
electrocution. The wound on the left palm was an electrically charged wound
or a first degree burn. The certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro stated
the cause of death as 'circulatory shock electrocution'.
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased.
INELCO, through its officers and employees who testified, claims that on and
52
even before June 29, their electric system did not suffer from any defect that
might constitute hazard to life and property. Moreover, it was alleged that
the lines and devices were newly installed and they had installed safety
devices to prevent injuries to persons and damage to property in case of
natural calamities. INELCO also alleged that they had 12 linesmen charged
with the duty of checking the areas assigned to them. Fabico Abijero even
testified that in the early morning of June 29, he passed by the intersection
of Guerrero and Rizal streets and did not see any broken wires. He said that
what he saw were many people fishing out the body of the deceased. INELCO
also presented Dr. Briones who said that without an autopsy, no doctor or
medico-legal can speculate the cause of death. Moreover, he said that
cyanosis (lack of oxygen circulating in the blood) appears only in a live
person. INELCO also said that the deceased was negligent because she
installed a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the
iron gate, thus charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch
is on. INELCO then conjectures that the switch must have been left on,
causing the deceased electrocution when she tried to open her gate.
The CFI ruled in favor of INELCO. CA reversed.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the deceased died of electrocution. (2) Whether
or not petitioner INELCO may be held liable for the death of Isabel Lao Juan.
(3) Whether or not the maxim volenti non fit injuria can be applied in the
case at bar.
Held:
(1) YES. The nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw
them can lead to no other conclusion than that they were burns and there
was nothing else in the street where the victim was wading thru which could
cause a burn except the dangling live wire of petitioner company. In the issue
of the burglar deterrent, the suggestion of petitioner that the switch was left
on is mere speculation, not backed up with evidence.
(2) YES. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God
for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality
which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of
petitioner's negligence that death took place. As stated by Engr. Juan in his
testimony, he saw no INELCO lineman and that the office of INELCO was
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
DUE DILIGENCE
Ramos, et al vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., et al
53
Issue: Whether or not Pepsi Cola exercised due diligence in the selection of
its driver.
Held: Yes. When it was proven that the employer had carefully examined the
erring driver as to his qualifications, experience and record of service, such
evidence is sufficient to show that the employer exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection of the driver and rebuts the juris
tantum presumption that the employer was negligent. Juan Anasco,
personnel manager of Pepsi stated that before Bonifacio was hired, his
background, experience, physical capacity was checked. Also, he was asked
to submit clearance and also asked to take theoretical and practical driving
examination. Pepsi was also a member of the Safety Council.
Petitioner can no longer assail the credibility of Anasco. Findings of
CA are binding on SC. A motion for reconsideration was made stating that
respondents violated the Motor vehicle law. It was said that the truck was
overweight and running beyond the speed limit and that it was not equipped
with a rear vision mirror and with a helper. Such allegations failed to show
their basis. Patrolman Pahate did not affirm such allegations. Also, a special
permit may be granted for overweight trucks and the absence of such permit
was not proven. In Quasi delicts, the motor vehicle owner is not an absolute
owner against all damages caused by its driver. The owners responsibility
ceases once it proves that it has observed the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damages.
Facts: The car owned by Placido Ramos, while being driven by his son
Augusto, collided with a truck-tractor and trailer of Pepsi Cola, driven by i
Andres Bonifacio. Ramos filed a case at the CFI of Manila against Pepsi. CFI
found Bonifacio negligent and declared that Pepsi Cola failed to exercise the
due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Pepsi and
Bonifacio are held solidarily liable to pay P2,638.50 actual damages, P2,000
moral damages, P2000 exemplary damages and P1,000 Atty. fees.
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54
was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or
documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the
testimony. MMTC only gave oral testimonies as its evidence, no
documentary proof was submitted upon request to further bolster its
defense. The mere formulation of various company policies on saftey
without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to
exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees.
The SC does not find the evidence presented by petitioner
sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a good father of a family.
Hence, applying Art. 2180 in relation to Art. 2176, petitioner is held solidarily
liable with the other defendants.
PRESCRIPTION
Kramer vs. Court of Appeals
178 SCRA 518 (October 13, 1989)
Facts: On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners
was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near
Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat collided with an inter-island
vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines, owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia
Shipping Lines, Inc.
F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch. The captains of both
vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine
Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation
for the purpose of determining the proximate cause of the maritime
collision. On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B
Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the
employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia
Philippines during the collision. The findings made by the Board served as the
basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast
Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia
Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine officer.
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for
damages against the private respondent in the RTC. The private respondent
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55
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56
because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said
rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect
the rescue requested from them.
In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be
expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the
trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is
more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence
of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor.
According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the
road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must
have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline
could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in
and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled,
specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance,
and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned
or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near
the bus.
Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not
the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including
himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it.
Facts: Morta, market master of Agdao Public Market requested with the
City Treasurer Office the emptying of a Septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to
bid was issued to Bertulano, Catarsa, Bascon, Bolo and Suner. Bascon won
the bid and signed the purchase order. Prior to the signing of purchase
order, Bertulano with four other companions- Liagoso, Fernando and Fajardo
Jr. was found dead inside the septic tank.
Held: The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the
bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but
completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch
was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but
most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
years which resulted in the accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas, and was
therefore the proximate cause of the death of the laborers. They further
contend that the market master failed to supervise the area where the tank
was located as a further reflection of the public respondents negligence.
Petitioners also insisted on the application of Article 24 of the New Civil
code. Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the
parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must
be vigilant for his protection.
Issue: WON proximate cause of death is the own negligence of the
plaintiffs?
Held: Yes. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in the natural and
continuous sequence unbroken by and efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.
While it may be true that the public respondent had been negligent
in the re emptying of the septic tank annually since 1956, the negligence is
not a continuing one. The public respondents have immediately responded
to such issue upon invitation to bid on the service of emptying the tank.
Public Respondents have also shown in court that people in the market have
been using the toilet for their necessities and remained uninjured.
As proven by Respondents, the septic tank was air-tight as provided
for by regulations. The accident of toxic gas leakage from the tank is unlikely
to happen unless one removes its covers. The accident occurred because the
victims have ontheir own and without authority opened the tank.
Bertulano who has offered his services to clean the septic tank is presumed
to know the hazards of his job. His and his mens failure to take
precautionary measures for their safety is the proximate case of the
accident. The Court also cited Culion vs. Phil Motors Corp. When a person
holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill,
he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the skill of one
ordinarily skilled in the particular work he attempts to do. Furthermore, the
surreptitious way the victims did the job without clearance from the market
master and or the security jobs goes against their good faith.
57
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58
the way of incoming traffic. There were neither lights nor any so-called "early
warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear.
The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner
Armando Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer
Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following
morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his
car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As
a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including
some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold
bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause
of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the
dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and
Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of
Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the
accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and
without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised
due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident is the negligence
of the driver or the negligence of Dionisio.
Held: It was the negligence of the truck driver. The legal and proximate cause
of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent
manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence
of petitioner Carbonel. , the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck
was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision
between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an
probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew
without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the
dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver
must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the
accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's
"lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover
damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts
TRIVIA: Did the headlights of Dionisio really turned off unexpectedly,
as he claims? Remember, this happened during Martial law years
when curfews were in effect. It was 1:30 AM and Dinisio was drunk.
Excellent!
Pilipinas Bank v. CA
G.R. No. 105410 (1994)
Facts: As payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes,
Florencio Reyes issued postdated checks to Winner Industrial Corporation
and Vicente Tui with due dates on October 10 and 12, 1979, respectively.
To cover the face value of the checks, plaintiff, on October 10,
1979, requested PCIB Money Shop's manager Mike Potenciano to effect the
withdrawal of P32,000.00 from his savings account therein and have it
deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank (then Filman Bank),
Bian Branch. Roberto Santos was requested to make the deposit. In
depositing in the name of FLORENCIO REYES, he inquired from the teller the
current account number of Florencio Reyes to complete the deposit slip he
was accomplishing.
He was informed that it was "815" and so this was the same current
account number he placed on the deposit slip below the depositor's name
FLORENCIO REYES. Nothing that the account number coincided with the
name Florencio, Efren Alagasi, then Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas
Bank, thought it was for Florencio Amador who owned the listed account
number. He, thus, posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing that
the depositor's surname in the deposit slip was REYES. On October 11, 1979,
the October 10, check in favor of Winner Industrial Corporation was
59
presented for payment. Since the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated that his
account had only a balance of P4,078.43, it was dishonored and the payee
was advised to try it for next clearing. On October 15, 1979, the October 10,
1979 check was redeposited but was again dishonored. Likewise, the October
12, 1979 check in favor of Vicente Tui when presented for payment on that
same date met the same fate but was advised to try the next clearing. Two
days after the October 10 check was again dishonored, the payee returned
the same to Florencio Reyes and demanded a cash payment of its face value
which he did if only to save his name. The October 12, 1979 check was
redeposited on October 18, 1979, but again dishonored for the reason that
the check was drawn against insufficient fund. Furious over the incident, he
immediately proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate verification of
his account. Upon verification, the bank noticed the error. The P32,000.00
deposit posted in the account of Florencio Amador was immediately
transferred to the account of Reyes upon being cleared by Florencio Amador
that he did not effect a deposit in the amount of P32,000.00. The transfer
having been effected, the bank then honored the October 12, 1979, check.
Issue: WON the proximate cause of the mis-posting of deposit was due to
the error of the representative of Reyes
Held: No. For Article 2179 of the Civil Code to apply, it must be established
that private respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury. The concept of proximate cause is well defined in our
corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result
complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it
ought to have been forseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of
ordinary case that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would
4
result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence." In the case at
bench, the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of petitioner's
employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in
the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. As held by the
trial court:
Applying the test, the bank employee is, on that basis, deemed to have
failed to exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his
duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee posted the cash deposit in the
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
account of Florencio Amador from his assumption that the name Florencio
appearing on the ledger without, however, going through the full name, is
the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip. He should have continuously
gone beyond mere assumption, which was proven to be erroneous, and
proceeded with clear certainty, considering the amount involved and the
repercussions it would create on the totality of the person notable of which
is the credit standing of the person involved should a mistake happen. The
checks issued by the plaintiff in the course of his business were dishonored
by the bank because the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated a balance
insufficient to cover the face value of checks.
60
1.
2.
3.
HELD: (1) NO. Art. 2189 NCC capsulizes the responsibility of the city
government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it
exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the petitioner
to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is
tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable.
Petitioner pointed out that Fulgencio was driving at the speed of 60kph
which was above the maximum limit of 30kph when he met the accident, so
he can be presumed negligent based on Art. 2185. Such a matter was not
raised at any time during the trial and was only raised for the first time in
their Motion for Reconsideration. The SC held it was too late to raise such
issue .
(2) NO. Art. 2219(2) NCC specifically allows moral damages to be recovered
for quasi-delicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries.
There can be no recovery or moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted
in physical injury. In the case at bar, Fulgencio testified that he suffered a
deep cut on his left arm. However, no other evidence such as a medical
certificate, was presented to prove such bare assertion of physical injury.
Thus, there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral
damages. Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to
compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury inflicted on a person. Moral
damages cannot be awarded in the absence of proof that the person
experienced emotional and mental suffering. Mere allegations do not suffice,
clear and convincing proof is necessary.
(3) YES. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, it is
subject to the discretion of the courts but cannot be awarded unless
claimants show their entitlement to moral, temperate or actual damages. In
the case at bar, petitioner's negligence was the proximate cause of the
incident, thereby establishing his right to actual damages. Art. 2231 NCC
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61
horses head and fix the bit, an appreciable interval of time elapsed. The act
of Araneta is too remote from the accident to be considered as the
proximate cause.
By getting off and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver
was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal. Also,
evidence shows that the bridle was old and the leather is weak and easily
broken.
Held: There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus
may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the
petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo,
et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in
the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was
not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of
the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
Issue: Whether or not the act of Araneta is the proximate cause of the
death of Gayetano.
Held: No. The mere act of Araneta of stopping the horse will not make him
liable. Evidence shows that when Pagnaya got out of the carromata to go the
Facts: Supra
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62
Subido which was coming from the opposite direction sideswiped the LTB
bus and injured Custodio who died as a result thereof. Both drivers were
found negligent- the LTB bus driver for having allowed a passenger to ride on
the running board of the bus and the driver of the truck for running at a
considerable speed while negotiating a sharp curb and running on the middle
instead of on the right side of the road. The owner and the driver of the truck
contended that the proximate cause of the death of Custodio was the
negligence of the driver of the LTB bus who allowed Custodio to ride on the
running board of the LTB bus.
Issue: Is there concurrent liability here in this case at bar? How does the
negligence of both parties affect the liability of both?
Held: Although the negligence of the carrier (LTB bus) and its driver is
independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its
owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of death of Agapito
Custodio. In fact the negligence of the first two(2) would not have produced
this result without the negligence of petitioners herein (the owner and driver
of the truck). What is more, petitioners negligence was the last, in point of
time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carriers bus sometime
before petitioners truck came from the opposite direction, so that, in this
sense petitioners truck had the last clear chance. The owner and the driver
of the truck were held jointly and severally liable, together with the LTB bus
and its driver, to the heirs of Custodio.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his
death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A
satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It
is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as
a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.
63
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
Held: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the
jeepney operator for failure to exercise precautions needed. The carrier is
presumed to have been at fault unless it is caso fortuito or that he has
observed extra-ordinary diligence as provided in Articles 1733,55-56.
Negligence was proven based on the testimony-evidences adduced by the
trial court.
Last clear chance cannot be applied. It does not aride where a
passenger demands responsibility under culpa contractual. A negligent
driver and its owner cannot be exempted on the ground that the other party
was likewise guilty of negligence. The substantial factor test is testing
whether the actors conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to
another. THE FACT THAT THE ACTOR NEITHER FORESAW NOR SHOULD HAVE
FORESEEN THE EXTENT OF HARM OR MANNER IN WHICH THE EVENT
OCCURRED DOES NOT PREVENT HIS LIABILITY. However, this test does not
apply. The court does not fault Reyes for not having avoided such sicne no
other options are available to him. The other lane even though empty was
narrow and covered with tall grass. The wheels of the bus were also clear of
the roadwasy except the outher left that hit the jeep. This clearly shows the
attempt to hit the jeep. Inability to avoid the jeep must have been due to
the limitations of options.
IAC decision is set aside. The Trial Court decision is Reinstated with
Modification that only the Operator and the Insurance Company is liable for
the victims and heirs. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable
64
with the carrier in Breach of Contract as provided in Article 2180 and to make
driver jointly and severally liable is to make the carriers liability a personal
one and not explicit.
Cause v. Condition
Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
148 SCRA 353 (Mar 10, 1987)
Facts: Supra
Held: Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between
the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that
cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition
which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But
so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is
quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other
active forces which have gone before.
The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition,"
but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark
ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the
fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has
created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a
considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be
liable to another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause" and
"condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction
is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must
refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant
have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force
intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause"
and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the
character of the intervening cause.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
Facts: Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of his stepbrother to repair
a "media agua" said to be in a leaking condition. The "media agua" was just
below the window of the third story. Magno received from his son thru that
window a galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around
and in doing so, the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the
electric wire of the Manila Electric Company. He died by electrocution.
His widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the
electric company.
Issue: Were the acts of Magno the proximate or the remote cause of the
incident.
Held: Magnos acts were the proximate cause. It is clear that the principal
and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently
a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning
around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any
precaution. Magno was expected, as a person who is deemed a professional
in his line of work, to have looked back toward the street and at the wire to
avoid contacting with the iron sheet, the same being length of 6 feet. For a
better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause with
respect to injuries, the following citation is helpful:
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is
the proximate cause." (45 C. J. pp. 931-332.).
65
distance between its wires and said construction, and after finding that said
distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to change the stringing or installation of
its wires so as to preserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City,
or rather it is its duty, to be ever on the alert and to see to it that its
ordinances are strictly followed by house owners and to condemn or
disapprove all illegal constructions.
Of course, in the present case, the violation of the permit for the
construction of the "media agua" was not the direct cause of the accident. It
merely contributed to it. And contrary to the case of Astudillo vs. Manila
electric, in the case at bar, the construction cannot be said to be a public
place as it is a private construction. The deceased person was also a person
of age who is expected to be more careful and knowledgeable as to what he
is doing.
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Issue: Who should be liable?
Held: Manila Railroad should be liable. Whether or not the fire may have
been communicated through Rodriguezas house, or directly from the
locomotive is immaterial. With regards to the position of Rodriguezas house,
there is no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon the railroads
property in the act of building his house. Rodrigueza may have assumed the
risk of loss that might have resulted from fires occasioned by the defendants
locomotives if operated and managed with ordinary care. But he cannot be
held to have assumed the risk of any damage that might result from the
unlawful negligent acts of Manila Railroad. Nobody is bound to anticipate
and defend himselfagainst the possible negligence of another. The
circumstances cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence
destructive of his right of action because, a) that condition was not created
by himself, b) his house remained on the ground by toleration and therefore
with the consent of the Railroad co., and c) even supposing the house to be
improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant company in
negligently destroying it.
so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the
truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge. The said collision
resulted to the death of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee, and Loida Bondoc, and
physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee, and Araceli
Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort. In the statement of Ruben
Galang to the investigating police officers immediately after the accident, he
admitted that he was travelling at 30 miles per hour (48 kph).
Two civil cases for damages were filed before the CFI of Pampanga.
The first civil case was for damages for the death of Jose Koh. The second
civil case, on the other hand, was for the damages for the death of one and a
half year old Kim Koh McKee and the physical injuries sustained by George
and Araceli. About a month later, a charge of reckless imprudence resulting
to multiple homicide, physical injuries and damage to property was filed
against Ruben Galang and was raffled in the same court where the second
civil case was assigned. In their Answer with Counterclaim for the first civil
case, private respondents asserted that it was the Ford Escort car which
"invaded and bumped the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang and, as
counterclaim, prayed for the award of attorney's fees, actual and liquidated
damages, moral damages and business losses.
In the second civil case, private respondents first filed a motion to
dismiss on grounds of pendency of another action and failure to implead an
indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver; they also filed a motion
to consolidate the case with the first civil case pending before Branch III of
the same court, which was opposed by the plaintiffs. Both motions were
denied by Judge Capulong. In the criminal case, a judgment of conviction was
rendered against Ruben Galang. Subsequently, Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr.
dismissed the two (2) civil cases and awarded the private respondents moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Ruben Galang appealed
the judgment of conviction but it was affirmed. Plaintiffs (McKee) on the
other hand, appealed the dismissal of the civil cases to the appellate court.
The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. The
decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings that it
was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused
the accident. The appellate court further said that the law presumes
negligence on the part of the defendants (private respondents), as employers
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unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence." Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all
negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the
same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a
sufficient intervening cause, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was
the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck
would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency
signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to
go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far
right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the
given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car.
Moreover, the truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records.
He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per
hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge
is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person
driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation. Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's
subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures and degree of
care necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of the
resulting accident.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear
chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of
torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will
not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by
the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the
person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in
law solely responsible for the consequences thereof
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Held: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is
the proximate cause. (45 C.J. p. 931.)
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hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible
conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant,
the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently,
Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound
could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural,
and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
(People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct
and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
69
The driver and owner of the truck appealed, the Court of Appeals, in
resolving the motion for reconsideration, absolved the owner and driver of
the truck based on the doctrine of last clear chance, saying that the bus
driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident and that it is his
negligence which was the proximate cause of mishap.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is correctly applied.
Held: NO. The doctrine of Last Clear Chance is not applicable in this case.
The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is thatthe
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude recovery for the negligence of
the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable
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70
Phoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they refer to as the
"last clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while the
petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had
the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and
that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own
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injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was
imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for debate
whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
The historical function of that doctrine of last clear chance was to
mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine that of
contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence
prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if
the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant.
The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to
grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.
Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear
chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept
of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has
itself been rejected, as it has been in article 2179 of the civil code.
Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may
be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in
negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so.
Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine
whose negligence-the plaintiff's or the defendant's-was the legal or
proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an
exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use
of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in
the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or
omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account.
Of more fundamental importance is the nature of the negligent act
or omission of each party, and the character and gravity of the risks created
by such act or omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge
that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from
responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff
failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to
avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or
omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the
fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the foreseeable
consequences of his own negligent act or omission (NOTE: Parking the truck
askew facing incoming traffic). Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the
risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the
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believe that the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account
when, in fact, they were being deposited in the account of her husband.
During the entire period, PBCom had been regularly furnishing RMC
with monthly statements showing its current account balances.
Unfortunately, it was never the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these
monthly statements reposing complete trust and confidence to PBCom and
to his secretary. Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from
petitioner bank the return of its money.
Issue: Whether the proximate cause of the loss is the bank's negligence or
that of RMCs.
Held: It was the negligence of PBComs teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad,
coupled by the negligence of the bank in the selection and supervision of its
bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss. Proximate cause is
that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.
The bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating,
officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips presented by Ms. Yabut,
notwithstanding that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished
contrary to PBComs SOP. In this case, were it not for the act of Ms.
Mabayad, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have had the facility with which to
perpetrate her fraudulent scheme.
Lastly, under the doctrine of "last clear chance" where both parties
are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than
that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last
clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is
chargeable with the consequences thereof.
In this case, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the
opportunity to defraud the company, the bank, thru its teller, had the last
clear opportunity to avert the injury by faithfully observing their selfimposed validation procedure.
Considering, however, that the fraud was committed in a span of
more than one (1) year covering various deposits, it cannot be denied that
RMC was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of
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account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted of the series
of frauds being committed by its secretary. Such omission by RMC is to be
considered contributory negligence on its part, which shall mitigate the
damages that may be awarded. AWARD: Of actual damages, RMC shall
shoulder 40% of the loss, while PBCom shall pay 60% of the loss.
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Both drivers had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance
of one hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of
approximately thirty kilometers per hour. The survivors of the jeep admitted
that the truck was already at a full stop when they collided with it. The
logical conclusion is that the driver of the jeep had the last clear chance to
avoid the accident, while at that distance of thirty meters away from the
truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either
of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty
kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that
opportunity to avoid the mishap, not merely rely on a supposed right to
expect the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.
The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as a valid and
complete defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and
applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs Smith.
In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David
Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the
approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve
the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that
the bus driver will return to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approach
from the opposite direction.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time
of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. At the time
David Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning to its own lane, it
was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an
accident.
The Court held that the last clear chance doctrine "can never apply
where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury
cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is
or should have been discovered"
Facts: Metropolitan Water District owns and operates three swimming pools
in Balara, Quezon City. It allows the public to use the pools for a fee.
Dominador Ong, a 14-year old boy, went to the pool with his two
brothers. At about 4:35 p.m., Dominador told his brothers that he was going
to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon
hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio Ong went to the bigger pool leaving
Dominador in the small pool. Later that day, a bather reported that a person
was underwater for too long. Upon hearing this, the lifeguard on duty dove
into the pool to retrieve Ongs lifeless body. Applying first aid, the lifeguard
tried to revive the boy.
Soon after, nurse Armando Rule came to render assistance,
followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who, after being called by
phone from the clinic by one of the security guards, boarded a jeep carrying
with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected
the boy with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in
order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines. Meanwhile,
Abao continued the artificial manual respiration, and when this failed to
revive him, they applied the resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were
exhausted.
The investigation revealed that the cause of death is asphyxia by
submersion in water. The parents of Ong brought this action for damages
against Metropolitan, alleging negligence on the selection and supervision of
its employees and if not negligent, they had the last clear chance to revive
Ong.
74
a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who
are available always in case of emergency.
The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was
retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the employees of Metropolitan did
everything possible to revive him. When they found that the pulse of the boy
was abnormal, the inspector immediately injected him with camphorated oil.
When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they applied the
oxygen resuscitator until its contents were exhausted. And while all these
efforts were being made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the
Philippines who however arrived late. All of the foregoing shows that
Metropolitan has done all that is humanly possible under the circumstances
to restore minor Ongs life. For that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his
death
THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS
CASE. The record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming
pool. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a
claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where
it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence. Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming
pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in
violation of pool regulations and it appearing that lifeguard Abao responded
to the call for help as soon as his attention was called and immediately
exhausted all efforts to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room
for the application of the doctrine.
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The heirs of the dead and injured passengers filed a case against the
respective drivers and owners of the truck and of the jeepney to recover
damages. The Court of First Instance absolved the driver of the jeepney and
its owners, but it ordered the truck driver and the owners to pay damages.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals insisting that the driver and the
owners of the jeepney should also be made liable for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the driver and owners of the jeepney should also be
made liable.
HELD: YES. It must be remembered that the degree of diligence required of a
carrier in transporting its passengers is utmost diligence (Art. 1755) and
consequently, they are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary
diligence (Art. 1756). In this instance, this legal presumption of negligence is
confirmed by the appellate courts finding that the jeepney driver parked the
vehicle improperly. It must follow that the driver and the owners of the
jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers.
Obiter dictum on Application of Principle of Last Clear Chance: The
principle of last clear chance applies in a suit between the owners and
drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its obligations under a
contract of carriage. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent
driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was
likewise guilty of negligence. This principle does not apply in this case.
75
CANLAS vs. CA
G.R. No. 112160 (February 28 2000)
Facts: In August 1982, Osmundo S. Canlas, and Vicente Maosca, decided to
venture in business and to raise the capital needed therefor. Canlas executed
a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Maosca to mortgage two parcels of
land situated in BF Homes, Paranaque. Each lot has a semi-concrete
residential house in the name of the Canlas and his wife. Spouses Canlas
agreed to sell the two lots to Maosca, for and in consideration of PhP
850,000.00, P500,000.00 of which payable within one week, and the balance
of PhP 350,000.00 shall serve as serve as Canlas investment in the business.
Canlas delivered to Maosca the transfer certificates of title of the two lots
sold. Maosca, on his part, issued two postdated checks in favorof Osmundo
As to who shall bear the loss, The doctrine of last clear chance is
applicable, the respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. In essence, the
doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time
than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had
the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is
chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. The respondent bank
did not observe the required diligence in verifying the real identity of the
couple who introduced themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and
Angelina Canlas. Not a single identification card was presented by the
impostor-loan applicants to show their true identity. And yet the bank
approved the loan on sheer finding that the signatures affixed on a deed of
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allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the
hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank should be reduced.
ENGADA vs. CA
G.R. No. 140698 (June 20, 2003)
FACTS: On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Edwin Iran
was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. On board
was Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw. The Tamaraw
passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pickup, driven by Rogelio Engada. When it was just a few meters away from the
Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-ups right signal light flashed, at the same time, it
swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed
towards a head-on collision course with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the
pick-up. Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right.
Thus, the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right
front passenger side. The impact caused the head and chassis of the
Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw
and landed on a ricefield. Seyan incurred P130,000 in medical expenses.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Last Clear Chance doctrine is applicable in favor of
Engada.
HELD: No. It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the
purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty
to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do
so in safety. For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on
drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane, petitioner must be held liable.
Edwin Iran could not be faulted when, in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he
swerved to his left.
Engadas acts placed Iran in an emergency situation which forced
him to act quickly. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of
danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his
own negligence.
77
The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the
last clear chance or opportunity to avoid an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident. However, the doctrine cannot be interposed
in cases where the emergency rule applies. Iran swerved to the left only to
avoid Engadas pickup, which was already on a head-on path towards Irans
Tamaraw jeepney. No convincing proof was adduced by Engada that Iran
could have avoided a head-on collision.
Strict liability
Vestil vs. IAC
G.R. No. 74431 (November 6, 1989)
Facts: On July 29, 1975, Theness Tan Uy was bitten by a dog while she was
playing with a child of Purita and Agustin Vestil in the house of the late
Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita. Thenese was rushed to the Hospital,
where she was treated for "multipte lacerated wounds on the forehead" and
administered an anti-rabies vaccine. She was discharged after nine days but
was readmitted a week later due to "vomiting of saliva." On August 15, 1975,
the child died. The cause of death was certified as bronchopneumonia.Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result
of the dog bites, and asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, a complication of rabies,
which ultimately caused her death.
The Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable as
the possessors of the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The
Uys claim that the Vestils are liable for the death of Theness, since they own
the dog that bit her. While the Vestils contend that the dog belonged to the
deceased Vicente Miranda, and that it was a tame animal, and that in any
case no one had witnessed it bite Theness.
Issue: Whether or not the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the
dog.
Held: ART. 2183 states The possessor of an animal or whoever may make
use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it
may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage
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should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage.
The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based
on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or
user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on
the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility,
pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may
cause.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which
was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her
husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. The
Vestils contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote
control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code
holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and
so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that the dog
was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does
not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they
cause injury. As for the belated allegations that Theness provoked the dog,
the Vestils forget that the deceased was only three years old at the time she
was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to
the animal.
There is evidence showing that Theness and her family regularly
went to the house of the Vestils once or twice a week. The Court finds that
the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been
satisfactorily established. The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil
Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of
the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on
natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which
such animal may cause.
78
Facts: The Dingcong brothers leased the upper floor of house owned by
Emilia Saenz, where they established and managed the Central Hotel. A
guest by the name of Francisco Echivarria occupied Room No. 10 of the hotel
for P30. Kanaan, on the other hand, occupies the ground floor the house of
Saenz and where they established a store named
"American Bazaar"
dedicated to the buy and sell of articles and merchandise.
Echivarria, before going to bed, let his faucet leak while the pipes of
the hotel were undergoing repairs. A bucket was placed underneath the
leaking faucet to catch the dripping water, but still the bucket overflowed.
Water seeped through the floor and the merchandise in the bazaar below
got wet and caused damages worth around P1,000.00 (considerable amount
in 1941). The Kanaans brought an action for damages against the managers,
the brothers Dingcong, and Echivarria. During trial one of the Dingcong
brothers died, but suit continued against the surviving Dingcong.
Issue: Whether or not Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable
for damages.
Held: Francisco Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable for being the one who,
by his negligence in leaving the faucet open, caused the water to spill on the
ground and wet the articles and merchandise of the Kanaans.
Jose Dingcong, the surviving co-renter and manager of the hotel,
had complete possession of the house, and consequently must also be
responsible for the damages caused. As a co-lessee and manager of the
hotel, the Dingcongs have to answer for the damage caused by things that
thrown or falling from the hotel (Art. 1910 of the Codigo Civil).
The Dingcongs likewise failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family to prevent the damages. They knew that the pipes of the
hotel were under repair, as managers, they should have presumed that the
guest Echivarria would use the faucet, but only provided a bucket to deal
with the problem of the leaks.
79
"The words 'arising out of' refer to the origin or cause of the
accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words 'in the course
of' refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident
takes place. By the use of these words it was not the intention of the
legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries
which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment,
but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to
Because of this, the canteen had to close down due to the big drop
in its sales of soft drinks. On Geronimo filed a complaint for damages against
Coca cola. Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. According to
Coca-Cola, under the law on sales on breach of warranty, more particularly
Article 1561 , the action should have been brought within six months from
the delivery of the goods.
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80
Facts: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. Gilchrist was the owner of
a theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to
Gilchrist a movie entitled Zigomar for exhibition in his theatre for a week
for PhP125.
Days before the delivering the film, Cuddy returned the money already paid
by Gilchrist so that he can lease the film to cinema owners Espejo and
Zaldarriaga, who offered to pay a higher price for lease of the film.
Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance with prayer for
damages against Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga.
Issue: Whether such acts of Espejo and Zaldariaga were actionable and if so
under what legal principle. Can Espejo and Zaldariaga their lack of evil motive
use as defense by alleging that their intention was purely for business?
Held: The only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist - Cuddy contract
on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the
film in their theater.There was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact
does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract
and causing its breach. Hence, they are liable to Gilchrist for the damages
caused by their acts.
The liability of the Espejo and Zaldriagga arises from unlawful acts
and not from contractual obligations, as they were under no such obligation
to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of
Gilchrist had been one for damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title
16, book 4 of the Civil Code.
Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or
omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall
be obliged to repair the damage so done.
There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition
precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a
person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the chapter wherein this article
is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in order that the
injured party may recover for the damage suffered.
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81
FACTS: In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its Managing Director So Pek Giok,
entered into a lease agreement with Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI )
covering four stalls in Binondo. The terms of the contract were initially for
one year but after its expiry, they continued on a month to month basis.
In 1976, Tek Hua Trading was dissolved with the original members
forming a new corporation named Tek Hua Enterprises, with Manuel Tiong as
one of the incorporators. So Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So
Pek Giok (Managing director of defunct Tek Hua Trading), occupied the same
stalls for his own textile business under the name, Trendsetter Marketing.
In 1989, the lessor, DCCSI sent letters to Tek Hua Enterprises
advising that it will be increasing rent. Enclosed in both letters were new
lease contracts for signing. While the letters contained a statement that the
leases will be terminated if the contracts were not signed, the same were not
rescinded. In 1991, Manuel Tiong (incorporator of Tek Hua Enterrises) wrote
a letter to So Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four stalls:
Dear Mr. So,
Due to my closed (sic) business associate (sic) for three decades with your
late grandfather Mr. So Pek Giok and late father, Mr. So Chong Bon, I
allowed you temporarily to use the warehouse of Tek Hua Enterprising
Corp. for several years to generate your personal business.
Since I decided to go back into textile business, I need a warehouse
immediately for my stocks. Therefore, please be advised to vacate all your
stocks in Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. Warehouse. You are hereby given 14
days to vacate the premises unless you have good reasons that you have
the right to stay. Otherwise, I will be constrained to take measure to protect
my interest.
Please give this urgent matter your preferential attention to avoid
inconvenience on your part.
But instead of vacating the stalls, So Ping Bun was able to secure lease
agreements in favor Trendsetter Marketing from D.C. Chuan. Tek Hua
Enterprises filed a suit for injunction and pressed for the nullification of the
lease contracts between DCCSI and So Ping Bun and as well prayed for
damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference
of contract.
HELD: Yes. The elements of tort interference are (a) existence of a valid
contract (b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence (c)
interference of the third party is without legal justification or excuse. Since
there were existing lease contracts between DCCI and Tek Hua Enterprises,
the latter had property rights over the leased stalls. The action of Trendsetter
in asking DCCSI to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful
interference.
As to the question of whether the interference may be justified, the
Supreme Court stated that it is sufficient that So Ping Buns conduct lies in a
proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives to conclude.
Nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on the
part of So Ping Bun. Hence, while there is tortuous interference, this lack of
malice precludes the award of damages.
But while the lower courts did not award damages. It does not
relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing
breach of existing ones. The Court of Appeals correctly confirmed the
permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI
and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved
the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioners
interference. But due to So Ping Buns action of interference, Tek Hua was
forced to seek relief through the Court and thereby incur expenses to protect
his interests. Attorneys fees are in order.
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Government. While the lower court held the City of Dagupan liable, the
appellate court reversed the ruling on the ground that no evidence was
presented to prove that the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision"
over the Boulevard, where the manhole is located.
Issue: Whether or not the City of Dagupan is liable for damages?
Ruling: Yes. The City of Dagupan is liable for damages. The liability of public
corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians by
reason of the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Art. 2189 of
Civil Code, which states:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death
of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition
of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under
their control or supervision.
For liability to attach, it is not even necessary for the defective road or street
to belong to the province, city or municipality. The article only requires that
either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of
Dagupan City and is exercised through the City Engineer. This function of
supervision over streets, public buildings, and other public works is coursed
through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although
these last two officials are employees of the National Government, they are
detailed with the City of Dagupan and receive instruction and supervision
from the city through the City Engineer.
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or
injuries sustained by persons or property due to the failure of any city officer
to enforce the provisions of the charter, cannot be used to exempt the city
from liability. The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability
of the city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in particular to the liability
arising from "defective streets, public buildings and other public works.
82
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the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act. The person injured may
sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole
damage caused by all, and altogether jointly liable for the whole damage. It is
no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the
wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for
him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with that
of the others. Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot
be apportioned among them, except among themselves. They cannot insist
paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the full
amount.
83
Held: A careful examination of the record leads to the conclusion that the
Underwoods driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the
plaintiff. He was passing an incoming car upon the wrong side. The plaintiff,
out to board the car, was not obliged to observe whether a car was coming
upon him from his left hand. He had only to guard against those coming from
the right. He knew that, according to the law of the road, no automobile or
other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side of the car. He
needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the only
ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car.
Underwood, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his
driver, under the facts and circumstances of this case. As stated in the case of
Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the driver does not fall within the list of
persons in article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would
be responsible. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to
drive up to Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any
effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so,
becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results
produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a
sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable
opportunity to prevent the acts or its continuance, injures a person or
violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present
therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly
or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the
presence of the owner for such a length a time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.
In this case, it DOES NOT appear that, from the time the automobile
took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient
time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to correct the act of
his driver. Instead, it appears that the interval between the turning out to
meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small
as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver.
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Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly
moderate speeds, their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance.
Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by
Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short
rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the
other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.
Bernardo tried to overtake the carretela, instead of slowing down or
stopping behind the carretela until the lane was clear. Its rear bumper caught
the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose, and the car skidded to the
other lane. Caedo tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going
farther to the right, but was unsuccessful.
Caedo and his family members were injured. They filed a suit for
recovery of damages from the defendants. The CFI Rizal rendered judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael
Bernardo.
ISSUE: Is Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, solidarily liable with the
driver?
HELD:
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if
he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but
rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely
correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order
to prevent injury or damage.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo
had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been
employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten
84
years. During that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and
regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to
his master.
The time element was such that there was no reasonable
opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver
accordingly.
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain
measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the
observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his
intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that
which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid
the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level
imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one
passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another.
Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment
of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have
real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.
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ISSUES: (1) Did the court err in reducing the amount of unearned income? (2)
Should the award for attorney's fees have legal interest?
HELD: (1)The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on two factors, namely: (a)
that the deceased Roberto R. Luna could have lived for 30 more years; and
(b) that his annual net income was P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00
annual gross income less P20,000.00 annual personal expenses. The CA
sustained the trial court's conclusion with respect to Lunas life expectancy of
30 years and his annual income and expense.
In reducing Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 years, the CA said that
his habit and manner of life should be taken into account, i.e. that he had
been engaged in car racing as a sport both here and abroad - a dangerous
and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy. That Luna had
engaged in car racing is not based on any evidence on record. That Luna was
engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-kart racing
cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low
slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly larger than foot-pedalled four
wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part of the Court of Appeals to
have disturbed the determination of the trial court which it had previously
affirmed.
Similarly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual
income of the deceased by increasing his annual personal expenses but
without at the same time increasing his annual gross income. It stands to
reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the
"escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social
standing" [a statement which lacks complete basis], it would not be
unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the
manifold sources thereof.
(2) Yes. The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a
quasi-delict case and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may
be adjudicated at the discretion of the court. (See Art. 2211, Civil Code.) As
with the other damages awarded, the interest should accrue only from the
date of the trial court's decision.
85
Facts: Dante Capuno, the 15 year old minor son of Delfin Capuno and Boy
Scout Organization member, attended a parade upon the instruction of the
City schools supervisor. Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and
drove the same when it ran with the driver in his left. Shortly after, Dante
sent the jeep tumbling, killing two of its passengers.
Issue: Whether or not the father is liable for the acts of his son in a parade?
Held: Yes. The civil liability imposed upon the father and mother for any
damages that may be caused by the minor children is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them, which
imposes upon parents the duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their
means, while, on the other hand, gives them the right to correct and
punish them in moderation. The only way to relieve them is if they prove
that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family. This
defendant failed to do.
Salen vs Balce
G.R.No. L-14414 (April 27 1960)
Facts: Gumersindo Balce, 14 years old, was convicted of homicide and was
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the amount of P2,000. The
amount was not realized by the heirs after execution because Gumersido had
no property in his name so they demanded the father of the minor to
indemnify them.
Issue: Whether or not the father is liable for obligations arising from criminal
acts?
Held: Yes. While the court agrees with the theory that, as a rule, the civil
liability arising from a crime shall be governed by the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, it disagrees with the contention that the subsidiary
liability of persons for acts of those who are under their custody should
likewise be governed by the same Code even in the absence of any provision
governing the case, for that would leave the transgression of certain right
without any punishment or sanction in the law. Such would be the case if we
would uphold the theory of appellee as sustained by the trial court.
Exconde vs .Capuno
G.R. No. L-10134 (June 29, 1957)
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86
caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused
with criminal intent.
FUELLAS v CADANO
G.R. No. 14409 (October 31, 1961)
Facts: Rico Fuellas took the pencil of one of his classmates. Pepito returned
the pencil which angered Rico who then held Pepitos neck and pushed him
on the floor. Their teacher separated them and ordered them to go home.
Rico met Pepito outside and repeated what he did earlier which broke
Pepitos right arm. Rico was later convicted for intentional felony with
discernment,and his father held subsidiarily liable for damages.
Issue: Whether or not the father is liable should his minor child act with
discernment in a criminal offense?
Held: Yes. Since Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code is silent as to the
subsidiary liability in case a minor child acts with discernment and become
criminally liable so the resort should be referring to the general law which is
the Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the
pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." To hold that this provision does not
apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from
quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would
result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage
Rodriguez-Luna v IAC
135 SCRA 241 (1985)
Facts: Luis dela Rosa, 13 years of age and without a drivers license, at that
time while driving a Toyota car negligently killed Roberto Luna who was
driving a Go-Kart in a practice run. Later, Luis already became of age,
married, with two children, and living in Madrid says that he has no
properties so a writ of execution cannot be enforced against him.
Issue: May the father still be held liable despite the attainment of majority by
his son at the time the decision was promulgated?
Held: Yes. Notwithstanding emancipation, he is still liable but as a matter of
equity, the liability shall become merely subsidiary.
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Facts:Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13 years old, together
with three other classmates were assigned to weed the grass in the school
premises. Monfort pulled a prank to scare Cuadra by throwing a plastic
headband at her face and making it appear that it was an earthworm.
Unfortunately, the headband hit Cuadras right eye, blinding the same.
Issue: Is the father liable for his daughters acts?
Held: No. In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred
that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of
due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it.
On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to
send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under
the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused
the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among
children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any
special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which
would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could
be attributed to her parents.
Libi v. IAC
87
Issue: Is the father liable for Wendells acts?
Held: Yes. The father of Wendell did not exercise due diligence when he did
not prevent the kid from having access to the key which opens his safety
deposit box. The court did not give credence to the story of the Libis.
Amelita Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband,
Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a
drawer in their bedroom. Each of the Wendells parents holds a key to the
safety deposit box and Amelita's key is always in her bag, all of which facts
were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or
using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was
no longer in the safety deposit box. In view of these circumstances, it can be
deduced that the spouses Libi have not exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not
have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box
was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his
mother where the other key was.
Tamargo vs CA
G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992.
Facts: A case based on quasi-delict was filed against the natural parents of
Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, who shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
which caused her death. Prior to the incident, Adelberto has been the subject
of adoption proceedings filed by Rapisura spouses and after the incident, the
same was granted. In the Bundocs answer, they said that the Rapisuras are
the ones who should be liable since parental authority had shifted to the
adopting parents from the moment a successful petition was filed.
Issue: Who should be liable for the minors acts?
Held: Parental authority is not retroactively transferred to the adopting
parents especially with regard to quasi-delicts. The New Civil Code states
that, The father and the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company. The basis of the vicarious
liability rests upon the negligence in the obligation to supervise and control
the minor, and since the ones exercising parental authority and had physical
custody pending the adoption proceedings are still the natural parents over
the child, they should be the ones liable for any damage caused.
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88
pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that control, direction and
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. Such a situation does
not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school
hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over.
Similarly, paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children, cannot apply.
The claim of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must,
therefore, be held to be without merit.
As to the amount of moral damages, the Court held that while moral
damages included physical suffering, the decision of the court below does
not declare that any of the cases specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in
which moral damages may be recovered, has attended or occasioned the
physical injury. The only possible circumstance in the case at bar in which
moral damages are recoverable would be if a criminal offense or a quasidelict has been committed. It does not appear that a criminal action for
physical injuries was ever presented. Further, the offender was nine years old
and did not appear to have acted with discernment when he inflicted the
physical injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.
Further, even if we assume that the CA considered Mercado guilty
of a quasi-delict when it imposed moral damages, the facts found by said
court indicate that Augusto's resentment, was occasioned by the fact that
Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of
Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato." It is, therefore, apparent that the
proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own
fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the
pitogo from another boy.
Palisoc vs. CA
G.R. No. L-29025 (October 4, 1971)
Facts: Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were
classmates and, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the
laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the classes were in
recess, Cruz and Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador
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Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect
that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped
slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat
blow on the face, followed by other fist blows to the stomach. Palisoc
retreated, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc
stumbled on an engine block causing him to fall face downward. Palisoc
became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not
revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained
consciousness.
Trial ensued, with the trial court giving credence to Cruzs version of
the incident. The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi
delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. It held that "(T)he act of Daffon in
giving the deceased strong fist blows in the stomach which ruptured his
internal organs and caused his death falls within the purview of this article of
the Code."
The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other
defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute, holding that Article
2180 of the Civil Code does not apply, as decided in Mercado v. CA.
Defendant was ordered to pay a) 6,000 for the death of Palisoc, b) 3,375 as
actual and compensatory damages, c) 5,000 as moral damages, d) 10,000 for
loss of earning capacity and e) 2,000 as attorneys fees. Appeal is raised on a
purely legal question.
Issue: Did the trial court err in absolving the defendants-school officials
instead of holding them jointly and severally liable with defendant Daffon,
for the damages awarded them as a result of their son's death?
Held: Yes. The Court ruled that the lower courts decision to absolve was
based on Mercado v. CA, which was based in turn on another dictum in the
earlier case of Exconde vs. Capuno, The dictum in such earlier case that "It is
true that under the law above-quoted, teachers or directors of arts and
trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody, but this applies to an institution of arts and
trades and not to any academic educational institution." The case at hand
was instituted directly against the school officials and squarely raises the
issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under Article 2180, Civil
89
Code, for damages caused by their pupils and students against fellow
students on the school premises.
There is no question, either, that the school involved is a nonacademic school, the Manila Technical Institute being admittedly a technical
vocational and industrial school. With this in mind, the Court holds that
under the cited codal article, defendants head and teacher of the Manila
Technical Institute ( Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly
and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's
minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room.
In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective
custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that
of the parents. It becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself
to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole
time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well
as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody
from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including
injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through
negligence on their fellow students.
There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to
attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and
board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in
Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to
have been set aside by the present decision.
Amadora vs. CA
G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988
Facts: Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972,
and while in its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, a
civil action for damages was filed against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos,
its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher,
together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective
parents.
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latter can be traced from history, back when schools of arts and trades were
engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who
personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their
craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such, a master, and was
personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually even
boarded with him and came under his constant control, supervision and
influence.
As regards the second issue, the Court held that while the custody
requirement does not mean that the student must be boarding with the
school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the
control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. The student is deemed to be in the custody of the
school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the
school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or
has already ended. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the
school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the
exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student
continues.
Facts: On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner
Pasco, together with two companions, while walking inside the campus of
the private respondent Araneta University, after attending classes in said
university, was accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by
Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim group were also students of
the Araneta University. Petitioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul and as
a consequence he was hospitalized at the Manila Central University (MCU)
Hospital where he underwent surgery to save his life.
Petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco, filed a complaint for damages
against Abdul Karim Madidis and herein private respondent Gregorio Araneta
University which was docketed as Civil Case No. SM-1027. Said school was
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Facts: Supra
Issue: Whether or not under Art. 2176 and 2180, both the teacher and the
principal can be held liable for damages
Held: As to the principal, he cannot be made responsible for the death of the
child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of
arts and trades. In line with the ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals,
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of
an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their
students. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is
only the head of the school who can be held liable. Soriano, as principal,
cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic
school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by
private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give any
instruction regarding the digging.
From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent Aquino can
be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of
the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to
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HELD: No. Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code,
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for
"damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the
student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain
extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the
phrase used in [Art. 2180 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody
means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads
and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time."
In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at attendance in the
school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced
in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of
temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains
within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises,
or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature
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does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being
in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending
school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in
the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be
held solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
Facts: Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis
High School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class
I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, spouses Dr.
Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow
their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the
picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so.
Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the
female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including
Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, Ferdinand drowned.
The spouses Castillo filed a complaint against St. Francis High
School, represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula,
Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito
Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for
Damages. The trial court decided against teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas,
Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz, for failing to exercise the diligence required of
them by law under the circumstances to guard against the harm they had
foreseen. It dismissed the case against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin
Illumin and Aurora Cadorna for failing to show that they were responsible for
Castillo's death.
On appeal, the CA ruled that St. Francis HS and Illumin were liable
under Art 2176 taken together with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, who had satisfactorily
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explained why they were late in going to the picnic site were absolved of
liability.
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ISSUES: (1) Were the school and their teachers negligent? (2)Is Art. 2180, in
relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable? (3) Is the award of
exemplary and moral damages is proper?
PSBA vs. CA
HELD: The school and the principle are neither guilty of their own negligence
or guilty of the negligence of those under them. They cannot be held liable
for damages of any kind.
Under Article 2180, par. 4, before an employer may be held liable for the
negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or
prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of
his assigned tasks. Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic
by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner
show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application
therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by
any jurisprudence.
No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant
the award of damages to the respondents-spouses. Arquio, class adviser of IC, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded
in favor of respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not fall under any of
the grounds to grant moral damages.
Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are not guilty of
any fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages can be assessed against
them. While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to
their son to join the picnic, this does not mean that the petitioners were
already relieved of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good
father of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar,
petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required
PSBA sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are
being sued under Art 2180 of the Civil, the complaint lacks a cause of action
because they, as an academic institution, were beyond the ambit of the rule .
The courts denied the motion.
ISSUE: Is the PSBA liable under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code?
HELD: Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
establishes the rule of in loco parentis. Article 2180 plainly provides that the
damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or
students while in its custody. This material situation does not exist in the
present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not
students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
However, it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is exculpated from liability.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment,
there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. The school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably
suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
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at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan,
which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the
bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could
not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings
amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.
The case was dismissed based on the ground that Balingit as the
manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., which together with Fernando
Pineda and Balingit, was sued for damages in an action based on quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana, is not the manager of an establishment contemplated in
article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Do the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise" (dueos o directores de un establicimiento o
empresa) used in article 2180 of the Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the
old Code, embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless
operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which
the damage arose?
Held: No. Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may
be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager"
("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer".
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasidelictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already
mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or
dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief, injected a
new factual issue which was not alleged in their complaint. They argue that
Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business conduit of Balingit. That
argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should be treated as
one and the same civil personality. This issue was not raised in the lower
court. The legal issue, which Philippine Rabbit and Pangalangan can ventilate
in this appeal, is one which was raised in the lower court and which is within
the issues framed by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule 46, Rules of Court).
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97
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or
employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of the claim. The award of "P200,000.00 as death indemnity" not
as compensation for loss of earning capacity. There is no evidence on the
victim's earning capacity and life expectancy. Only indemnity for death under
Article 2206 is due, which is fixed at P50,000.
This court has applied par. 5 to cases where the employer was
engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks. The
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98
Held: Yes. In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the
direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride.
Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of
his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by
the petitioner school. Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that
the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in
behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any
responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial
duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of
raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by
an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the
account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage.
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor
Code, on which the petitioner anchors its defense, was promulgated only for
the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code
on conditions of employment. It is merely a guide to the enforcement of the
substantive law on labor.
The reliance on said rule is misplaced. An implementing rule on
labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the
substantive provisions of the Civil Code. There is evidence to show that there
exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation arising from the
negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an
absolute or limited control over (him)."
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. The fact that
Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his
janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the
selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The
petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required
diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
FIlamer thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising
from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the
absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it
the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. The liability of
the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the
employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever
damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.
NPC vs. CA
G.R. No. 119121 (August 14, 1998)
Facts: On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four (4) dump trucks owned by the
National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi city bound for Iligan city.
Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the trucks with plate no
RFT-9-6-673 driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision
with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three (3)
persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to
seventeen other passengers.
The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC
and PHESCO before the then CFI of Lanao del Norte, Marawi City. The trial
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court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability and holding PHESCO,
Inc. and Gavino Ilumba jointly and severally liable. On Appeal, the CA
reversed the trial courts decision and held that as Phesco is a labor only
contractor, of Napocor the statute itself establishes an employer-employee
relationship between the employer (Napocor) and the employee (driver
Ilumba) of the labor only contractor (Phesco). NPC is therefore liable and not
Phesco.
Issue: As between NPC and PHESCO, who is the employer of Ilumba, driver of
the dumptruck which figured in the accident and which should, therefore,
would be liable for damages to the victims?
Held: Under the Memorandum, NPC had mandate to approve the "critical
path network and rate of expenditure to be undertaken by PHESCO.
Likewise, the manning schedule and pay scale of the workers hired by
PHESCO were subject to confirmation by NPC. Then too, it cannot be ignored
that if PHESCO enters into any sub-contract or lease, again NPC's
concurrence is needed. Another consideration is that even in the
procurement of tools and equipment that will be used by PHESCO, NPC's
favorable recommendation is still necessary before these tools and
equipment can be purchased. Notably, it is NPC that will provide the money
or funding that will be used by PHESCO to undertake the project.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the project being undertaken by
PHESCO, i.e., construction of power energy facilities, is related to NPC's
principal business of power generation. In sum, NPC's control over PHESCO in
matters concerning the performance of the latter's work is evident. It is
enough that NPC has the right to wield such power to be considered as the
employer.
Under this factual milieu, there is no doubt that PHESCO was
engaged in "labor-only" contracting vis--vis NPC and as such, it is considered
merely an agent of the latter. In labor-only contracting, an employeremployee relationship between the principal employer and the employees of
the "labor-only" contractor is created. Accordingly, the principal employer is
responsible to the employees of the "labor-only" contractor as if such
employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. Since
PHESCO is only a "labor-only" contractor, the workers it supplied to NPC,
including the driver of the ill-fated truck, should be considered as employees
of NPC. After all, it is axiomatic that any person (the principal employer) who
enters into an agreement with a job contractor, either for the performance
of a specified work or for the supply of manpower, assumes responsibility
over the employees of the latter.
99
It is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor
Code, as NPC argues, that will determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for
damages instituted by an injured person for any negligent act of the
employees of the "labor only" contractor. With respect to the liability of NPC
as the direct employer, Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and
the driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall
have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence
which gave rise to the action.
(1) Is LRTA liable? (2)Is Roman an employee of LRTA and also liable?
Held: (1)Yes. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both
from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened
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Facts: Supra
Issues: (1) Did Galangs negligence cause the collision? (2) Were Tayag and
Manalo liable for damages?
Held: Yes. The lower court held that Jose Koh was negligent for improperly
invading the lane of the truck. This is unwarranted because it is manifest that
no negligence can be imputed to Koh. In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813)
the Court held that:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that (reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation?) If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
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101
for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability
ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of
a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees.
It is up to this point, however, that our agreement with the respondent court
ends. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, hence, the court is of the opinion that Li's employer,
Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage
caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
102
Issue: Whether the government is liable for the damages sustained by the
claimant under article 1903 of the Civil Code (now Article 2180)
Ruling: The pertinent provision reads as follows:
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is
enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions but also for
those persons for whom another is responsible.
The state is liable in the scene when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom it
properly pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of
the preceding article shall be applicable.
The court citing Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands held that the
state is not liable for damages suffered by private individuals by government
employees in the discharge of their responsibilities unless such act was
committed by a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose
which gives rise to the claim. Since the officers of the ECA did not act as
special agents and there is no negligence imputable to a special agent, the
government is not liable for the damages resulting from the negligence
complained of.
Act No. 327, authorizing the filing of claims against the Government
with the Insular Auditor, does not make any and all claims against the
Government allowable or the Government responsible for such claims.
Facts: Marcos Mendoza was the highest bidder for the lease of an exclusive
ferry privilege in the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, and was duly
awarded the privilege under the provisions of Act No. 1643 of the Philippine
Commission. After a little more than a year, the municipal council of Villasis,
Pangasinan, through a resolution, awarded the franchise for the same ferry
to another person, forcibly ejecting Mendoza therefrom. The council claimed
that the ferry Mendoza was operating was not the one leased to him.
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FACTS: Francisco Fontanilla, son of the spouses Jose and Virginia Fontanilla,
died as a result of an accident when a pickup owned and operated by the
National Irrigation Administration, a government agency, driven by Hugo
Garcia (a regular employee of said agency) bumped the bicycle he was riding.
The deceased was thrown 50 meters from the point of impact, while his
companion, who survived the incident, was thrown a bit further away.
Nevertheless, the NIA employees did not stop to assist the victims and
instead sped away.
The trial court directed respondent National Irrigation
Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to
petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasidelict against the NIA
Ruling: The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of
special agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects where it becomes liable as an ordinary
employer.
There was evident negligence on the part of NIA when its supervisor
within the group allowed the driver to travel at a high speed.
Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay
herein petitioners-spouses the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of
Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses of the
aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as
exemplary damages and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.
104
conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works
under their control or supervision.
Liability of employees
Araneta vs. De Joya
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective
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Applying Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, it is proper that the
other joint tortfeasors be made solidarily liable and shoulder their
proportional responsibility.
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Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasidelict is solidary
Facts: Pantaleon Malijan was walking with his companion Leonardo Amante
when he was hit by a gasoline tanker, got thrown to the ground and was ran
over by the tankers right wheel that got detached. Although he was brought
to the hospital, Malijan died that night from "possible traumatic cerebral
hemorrhage due to vehicular accident."
The gasoline tanker at that time was driven by Ernesto Labsan and
was used and owned by Lily Lim Tan for her gasoline business. The mother
and minor siblings of Malijan filed a complaint for damages against Tan and
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter
8
Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from
the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim
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Labsan. The trial court ruled that Labsan was primarily liable to pay the
damages, and in case he would not be able to do so, Tan would be
subsidiarily liable.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in ruling Labsan as primarily liable for
damages, and Tan as subsidiarily liable.
Held: The court ruled that the trial court correctly denied the motion to set
aside order of default and for new trial; however, the trial court erred in
holding Tan subsidiarily liable.
The action was based on quasi-delict and not to demand civil
liability arising from a crime, since the complaint makes no mention of a
crime. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise for damages caused by their
employees is primary and direct, not subsidiary.
Therefore, the employer, Lily Lim Tan, must be held primarily and
directly, not subsidiarily, liable for damages awarded in the decision of the
lower court, without prejudice to the right to demand reimbursement from
damages from Ernesto Labsan for whatever she would have to pay the
relatives of the deceased.
Viluan vs. CA
G.R. Nos. L-21477-81 (April 29, 1966)
Facts: The bus owned by Francisca Viluan, and driven by Hermenigildo
Aquino raced with the overtaking bus driven by Gregorio Hufana and owned
by Patricio Hufana. Aquino lost control of the bus, hitting a post and crashing
into a tree, after which it burst into flames wherein seven persons were killed
and thirteen others were injured.
In the complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages
filed by the heirs of those who perished in the incident and Carolina Sabado,
an injured passenger, Vilaun and Aquino filed third party complaints against
Gregorio Hufana and his employer, Patricio Hufana, contending that the
incident was their fault.
The lower court found that the accident was due to the concurrent
negligence of the drivers of the two buses and held both the two drivers and
their employers jointly and severally liable for damages.
106
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Facts: Jikil Taha sold a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL" to Alberto
Timbangcaya but a year later Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal that Taha forcibly took the motor launch.
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon in his capacity as Acting Provincial
Fiscal of Palawan, filed an information for Robbery with Force and
Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha and instructed Orlando Maddela,
Detachment Commander of Balabac to impound and take custody of the
motor launch, which was already sold to Delfin Lim. Fiscal de Leon informed
Maddela that the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could not
prevent the court from taking custody of the same.
Lim filed a complaint for damages against Fiscal de Leon and Maddela. Lim
contended that there was a violation of his constitutional rights when the
motor launch was seized without a search warrant. As defense, de Leon and
Maddela contended that the motor launch was the corpus delicti in an
ongoing investigation and filed a counterclaim for malicious and groundless
filing of the complaint by Lim and Taha.
The trial court upheld the validity of the seizure of the motor launch
and ordered Taha and Lim to pay for damages.
Issue: Whether the constitutional rights of Jakil Taha and Delfin Lim was
violated, and if so, whether they are entitled to damages
Held: The taking of the motor launch was ruled to be in violation of the
constitutional right of the parties against unreasonable searches and seizure
as provided in the Bill of Rights since it was effected without a search
warrant, the authority of which lies with a magistrate or judge and not a
fiscal.
With respect to damages, Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha were entitled to
damages under Article 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code for the violation of
their constitutional right. Good faith is not a defense against liability under
Article 32 of the NCC. To be liable it is enough that there was a violation of
the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that the act
was attended with bad faith or malice.
Therefore, Fiscal de Leon was liable to pay damages to Delfin Lim for
violating his constitutional right; but Orlando Maddela cannot be held
accountable because he acted upon the order of his superior officer believing
that there was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch.
107
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108
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event. It further ruled that criminal negligence was wanting and that Paje
was not even guilty of civil negligence.
The court dismissed the civil case against Paje and Victory Liner
ruling that they could not be held civilly liable after it had ruled in the
criminal action that negligence was wanting and that the collision was a case
of pure accident.
Issue: Whether the acquittal in the criminal case would result in the dismissal
in the civil case
Held: The judgment of acquittal included a declaration that the fact from
which civil liability may arise did not exist. In acquitting Paje, the court ruled
that the event was an accident and that Paje was without fault, and it is only
proper that the civil case be dismissed.
Furthermore, the charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide
and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence
resulting in homicide and physical injuries. They are not one of the three (3)
crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, which provides:
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Therefore, it was only proper that the court dismiss the civil case against Paje
and Victory Liner since Paje was acquitted of the fact from which the civil
case arose.
109
Sec. 2.
Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles
31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent
civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.)
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries,
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Madeja v. Caro
GR No 135306 (2003)
On the second night, she was almost raped again by the same man,
Catalino Arafiles. However, the bellboy and the security guard noticed
something suspicious as Emelita was fighting back while they were checking
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in the Flamingo Hotel, thus the bellboy followed them to their room. Arafiles
rushed to leave as soon as he paid money to the bellboy and the security
guard not to report the same.
Emelita reported the same information to the police and she was
interviewed by Romy Morales, a journalist of Peoples Journal Tonight.
During the following day, the news was part of the headlines in the said
newspaper. After a year of publication, Arafiles filed a complaint for damages
arising from the said publication against the journalist and its employer.
Arafiles alleged that on account of the grossly malicious and overly
sensationalized reporting in the news item prepared by respondent
Morales, edited by respondent Buan, Jr., allowed for publication by
respondent Villareal, Jr. as president of Philippine Journalists, Inc., and
published by respondent Philippine Journalists, Inc., aspersions were cast on
his character; his reputation as a director of the NIAS at the Philippine
Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration
(PAGASA) was injured; he became the object of public contempt and ridicule
as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist; and the news
item deferred his promotion to the position of Deputy Administrator of
PAGASA. The RTC of Quezon City ruled in favor of Arafiles granting him
awards for damages. 1.) P1,000,000.00, as nominal damages; 2.) P50,000.00,
as exemplary damages; 3.) P1,000.000.00, as moral damages; 4.) P50,000.00,
as attorneys fees; and 5.) Costs of suit. .
CA reversed RTCs decision. MR from CA made by Arafiles was denied. Hence
they elevated it to the SC.
110
action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and
entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal
action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not
by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the
civil liability arising therefrom
In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published
work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a
whole. The article must be construed as an entirety including the headlines,
as they may enlarge, explain, or restrict or be enlarged, explained or
strengthened or restricted by the context. Whether or not it is libelous,
depends upon the scope, spirit and motive of the publication taken in its
entirety.
Arafiles brands the news item as a malicious sensationalization of
a patently embellished and salacious narration of fabricated facts involving
rape and attempted rape incidents. For, so petitioner argues, the police
blotter which was the sole basis for the news item plainly shows that there
was only one count of abduction and rape reported by Emelita.
The presentation of the news item subject of petitioners
complaint may have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per se
illegal. In determining the manner in which a given event should be
presented as a news item and the importance to be attached thereto,
newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion.
Defamation
Issue: Whether or not the publication of the news item was not attended
with malice, hence, must free respondents of liability for damages.
Held: Yes. There was no malice in the article. Art. 33. In cases of defamation,
fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages
that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil
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Fraud
Salta v. De Veyra
111
112
Physical Injuries
Capuno v. Pepsi Cola
G.R. No. L-19331 (1965)
Facts: The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred on January 3,
1953 in Apalit, Pampanga. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven
by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision proved fatal to
the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and
Rizalina Paras.
Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence;
the information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by
the heirs of the three victims. While the criminal case was pending, the
Intestate Estate of the Buan spouse and their heirs filed a civil case. Included
in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly
paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
On June 11, 1958 the parties in Civil Case No. 838 entered into a
"Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up its
claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of
P2,623.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's
Compensation Act." The Court approved the compromise and accordingly
dismissed the case on the following June 17.
At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered
only on April 15, 1959, wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the
charges against him. Prior thereto, or on September 26, 1958, however,
herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the PepsiCola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. This is the action
which, upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo in its order
of February 29, 1960, from which order the present appeal has been taken.
Issue: Whether or not the action had already prescribed.
Held: Yes. The action has prescribed. The civil action for damages could have
been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their
decedent, Cipriano Capuno, on January 3, 1953 or thereabouts, and the same
would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide
through reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was filed only on
September 26, 1958, or after the lapse of more than five years.
In the case of Diocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia, et al., G.R.
No. L-10542, promulgated July 31, 1958, SC held that an action based on a
quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the question of
when the prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is, "from
the day (the action) may be brought," which means from the day the quasidelict occurred or was committed.
The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that
the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing
of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived
the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such
reservation was not then necessary; without having made it they could file
as in fact they did a separate civil action even during the pendency of the
criminal case and consequently, as held in Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the
institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the
institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict."
Corpus v. Paje
G.R. No. L-26737 (1969)
Facts: On December 23, 1956, a passenger bus of the Victory Liner
Transportation Co., Inc., driven by Felardo Paje, collided within the
municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia,
resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to two other persons.
An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje. In 1962, the heirs of
Clemente Marcia reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for
damages. Paje was convicted and pending appeal, the heirs of the Clemente
Marcia filed a separate civil action for damages based on the criminal act and
praying that Victory Liner pay jointly and severally the damages claimed by
the heirs. Paje was acquitted by the CA. During the pre-trial of the civil case,
the Court dismissed the same because the cause of action being a quasidelict has prescribed.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the case is proper by reason of
prescription
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Held: Yes. The trial courts finding was correct that the cause of action has
prescribed in 1962. An action upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within
four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). The four-year prescriptive period
began to run from the day the quasi-delict was committed, or from
December 23, 1956, and the running of the period was not interrupted by
the institution of the criminal action for reckless imprudence. Six years have
already lapsed.
Dulay v. CA
GR No 108017 (1995)
Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and
Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty
at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
The widow of Atty. Dulay filed an action for damages against the
employer and the security guard and prayed to be awarded actual,
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. She
alleges that the Secuity agency has concurrent negligence as Torzuela, their
employee:
Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm
issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed
to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision
and control of its employee to avoid the injury.
SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint
does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's
act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the
alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil
liability therefore is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which
states:
"ARTICLE 100.
Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
1.
113
2.
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114
Issues: Whether or not Shell acted in bad faith and betrayed the trust and
confidence of the creditors of CALI. Whether or not by reason of betrayal of
trust, Shell should be liable for damages.
Saudi Arabia v. CA
Held: Yes. Chapter 2 of the preliminary title of the Civil Code on Human
relations provides:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
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and had breakfast in their hotel room. While there, Allah left and Thamer
attempted to rape her.
She was saved by hotel security personnel who heard her cries for help.
She later filed a case against them. The two were arrested and detained by
Jakarta police. When Morada returned to Jeddah (the base of operations of
petitioner), she was asked to go to Jakarta to arrange for the release of the
two men. She proceeded to Jakarta but she refused to cooperate. She was
eventually allowed to return to Jeddah but barred from Jakarta flights. The
Indonesian authorities eventually deported the 2 men, through the
intercession of the Saudi govt., after 2 weeks of detention. They were put
back in service while respondent Morada was transferred to Manila.
Two years later, she was asked by her superiors to see Mr. Miniewy, the
Chief Legal Officer of Saudi Air, in Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to
the police station where her passport was taken and she was questioned
about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy merely stood as the police put pressure
on her to drop the case against the two men. Not until she agreed to do so
did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch a later flight out
of Jeddah.
A year and a half later, she was again asked to go to Jeddah to see
Miniewy. When she did, a certain Khalid of Saudia brought her to a Saudi
court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. She was
told that it was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it
turned out, she signed a document to appear before the court a week later.
When the date of appearance came, she complied but only after being
assured by Saudias Manila manager that the investigation was a routine and
posed no danger to her.
She was brought before the court and was interrogated by a Saudi judge
and let go, however, just as she was about to board a plane home, she was
told that she had been forbidden to take flight. She was later told to remain
in Jeddah and her passport was again confiscated.
A few days later, she was again brought before the same court where
the Saudi judge, to her astonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5 months
imprisonment and 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court
had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah for what happened in Jakarta.
The court found her guilty of adultery; going to a disco, dancing and listening
to music in violation of Islamic laws; and socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition.
115
Facing conviction, she sought help from her employer, petitioner Saudi
Arabian Air but she was denied assistance of any kind. She asked the Phil.
Embassy to help her. Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of
Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi
Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the
service by Saudi Arabian Air without being informed of the cause.
She then filed a complaint for damages against Saudi Arabian Air and Mr.
Al-Balawi, its country manager. Saudi Arabian Air filed a motion to dismiss
raising the issues of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
Issues: Whether or not Morada had a cause of action (2) Which law should
govern, Phil. Law or Saudi Law?
Held: YES, she has a cause of action. She aptly predicated her cause of action
on Art.19 and Art.21 of the CC. As held in PNB v CA, the aforecited
provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts
in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold no. of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide
in the statutes.
Although Art.19 merely declares a principle of law, Art.21 gives flesh to its
provisions.
She was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including
adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition. Saudi Arabian Air may
have acted beyond its duties as employer in turning her over to Jeddah
officials. Its purported act contributed to or even proximately caused
additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent, Morada.
Saudi Air allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of
Morada under the guise of petitioners authority as employer, taking
advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As
purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and
imprisonment of Morada was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm
allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could
be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs
done, once duly proven.
2. Philippine Law should be applied. Choice of law rules invariably consist of a
factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting
factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of
celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
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116
Globe Mackay v. CA
176 SCRA 778 (August 25, 1989)
Facts: Restituto M. Tobias, the private respondent, was employed by
petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a
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Albenson v. CA
G.R. No. 88694 (January 11, 1993)
Facts: Albenson Enterprises delivered to Guaranteed Industries mild steel
plates and as payment, it was paid with a check amounting to P2,575 drawn
against the account of E.L Woodworks.
The check was dishonored, Albenson, traced the origin of the check. The
result from the SEC shows that the president of Guaranteed Industries and
the owner of E.L Woodworks were one and the same with the name of
Eugenio S. Baltao. Albenson made extrajudicial demand but Eugenio Baltao
denied that he issued a check, urging the petitioner to file a complaint
through Fiscal Sumaway for violation of BP 22.
Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity
to submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and
therefore, was deemed to have waived his right.
Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him,
immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for
reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that he had been given an
opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation conducted by Fiscal
Sumaway, and that he never had any dealings with Albenson.
The complaint of Albenson was dismissed and Baltaos complaint was given
merit and the RTC ruled in favor of him.
Issue: Whether or not Eugene Baltao is entitled to such damages for abuse of
rights and malicious prosecution.
117
Held: No, the SC found no cogent reason to award such damages in favor of
Eugene Baltao.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed
not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.
The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights:
that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19
must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible . . . ."
What prompted petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their failure to collect
the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly
believed was issued to them by private respondent.
It appears however, that there was a mistake in identity as there
were three (3) men having the name Eugenio Baltao that were all doing
business in the building where E.L Woodworks was situated. It was most
probably the son, Eugene Baltao III who issued the check to Albenson, which
Mr. Eugene Baltao never during the investigation.
The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution
does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. An award of damages
and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith.
If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum
absque injuria.
Nor is he entitled to compensatory damages because he did not
present proof of the cost of the medical treatment which he claimed to have
undergone as a result of the nervous breakdown he suffered, nor did he
present proof of the actual loss to his business caused by the unjust litigation
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Amonoy v. Gutierrez
351 SCRA 731 (2001)
Facts: The house of spouses Gutierrez was situated in a lot foreclosed and
bought by Sergio Amonoy. In April and May 1986, an Order of Demolition of
the house was issued by the trial court but was enjoined by a temporary
restraining order (TRO) granted to respondents on June 2, 1986.
In 1988, the TRO was made permanent by the Court, but the house
of respondents had already been destroyed. The Court of Appeals held
petitioner liable to respondents for P250,000.00 for actual damages thereof.
Hence, the appeal to the SC where petitioner asserted the principle of
damnum absque injuria.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that the
Amonoy was liable to the respondents for damages
Held: Yes. Amonoy invokes the principle of damnun absque injuria, the
maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a person's
rights is a loss without injury for which the law gives no remedy. In other
words, one who merely exercises one's rights does no actionable injury and
cannot be held liable for damages.
The SC finds damnum absque injuria not applicable to this case.
Amonoy did not heed to the TRO issued by the Court. He was already in bad
118
faith when he continued the demolition despite the issuance of a TRO. The
demolition of respondents' house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the
TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right.
Amonoys liability is premised on the obligation to repair or to make
whole the damage caused to another by reason of one's act or omission,
whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by
law.
UE v. Jader
G.R. No. 132344 (2000)
Facts: Romeo Jader, a law student enrolled in the University of the East,
failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he
was given an incomplete grade in the 1st semester of his last year (19871988). After completing his 2nd semester, Jader filed an application for the
removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega. This
was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after paying the required fee. He
took the examination, and on May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega
submitted his grade, a five (5).
Deliberations were held, with Jaders name appearing in the
tentative list of candidates for graduation, but annotated with his
deficiencies. Invitations were also made, with Jaders name appearing as one
of the candidates, albeit annotated as to the tentative nature of the list.
Jader attended the said graduation ceremony, vested with all the rites
symbolic of his graduation from law school. Believing he had successfully
graduated, he took a leave of absence without pay to prepare for the bar
examination. Upon his enrollment in the pre-bar review of the Far Eastern
University, however, Jader learned of his deficiency, dropped out of the same
and ultimately did not take the bar examination.
Jader sued UE for damages for suffering moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and
sleepless nights arising from the latters negligence. Awards of moral and
exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorneys fees, and costs of suit
were also prayed for.
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119
to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs, impossible for human foresight to provide
specifically in statutory law.
UE failed to act seasonably and cannot feign ignorance that Jader
will not prepare himself for the bar exams, since that is precisely the
immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. Liability arose from
its failure to promptly inform him of the exam results and in misleading the
latter into believing that he had satisfied all course requirements.
While UE was guilty of negligence and liable to Jader for actual
damages, he should not have been awarded moral damages. At the very
least, it behooved on Jader to verify whether he has completed all necessary
requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student,
he should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs were in
order. The Court fails to see how he could have suffered untold
embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review
classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If Jader was indeed
humiliated, he brought this upon himself by not verifying all the
requirements including his school records, before preparing himself for the
bar examination.
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written contract. Upon Garcianos arrival from Austria, and after several
inquiries about the matter, the Board of Directors without the consent of the
school founder signed a letter, reinstating Garciano to her former position,
with a statement declaring the previous communication received had been
declared null and void for not bearing the sanction or authority of the Board.
Subsequently, the president, vice president, secretary, and three members of
the Board of Directors resigned from their positions "for the reason that the
ICI Faculty, has reacted acidly to the Board's deliberations for the
reinstatement of Garciano.
A complaint for damages was filed in the RTC-Cebu against Fr.
Wiertz, Emerito Labajo, and some members of the faculty of the school for
discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal. After trial, the lower court
ruled in favor of Garciano, ordering Wiertz and Co. to pay 200,000 as moral
damages, 50,000 exemplary damages, 32,400 as lost earnings for 9 years and
10,000 as litigation and attorneys fees. On appeal, the Appellate Court
reversed the ruling of the lower court, dismissing the complaint and
absolving Wiertz and Co. Following the denial of their motion for
reconsideration, Garciano seeks redress in the High Court.
Issues: Did the CA err in absolving Wiertz and Co. from liability by faulting
Esteria Garciano for her failure to report back to work? Should they be held
liable for damages?
Held: The High Court ruled in the negative. It held that the board of directors
of the Immaculate Concepcion Institute, which possesses the authority to
hire and fire teachers and other employees of the school, did not dismiss the
Garciano, but merely directed her to report for work. While the Wiertz and
Co. sent her a letter of termination through her husband, as discovered by
the CA, Wiertz and Co. were aware of their lack of authority to do so. The
letter of termination they sent to Garciano through her husband had no legal
effect, and did not prevent her from reporting for work. There was no reason
why she could not continue with her teaching in the school.
No evidence had been presented to show that defendantsappellants prevented her from reporting for work. An acidic reaction made
by Wiertz and Co. can be seen as nothing more than a reaction to what they
perceived as an affront to their collective prestige. It would appear,
120
Barons vs. CA
G.R. No. 126486 (1998)
Facts: Phelps Dodge, Philippines, Inc. (PDPI), appointed Barons Marketing,
Corporation (BMC) as one of its dealers of electrical wires and cables. The
latter was given 60 days credit for its purchases of plaintiff's electrical
products, to be reckoned from the date of delivery by Phelps Dodge of its
products.
For the period covering December 1986 to August 17, 1987, BMC
purchased, on credit, from PDPI various electrical wires and cables in the
total amount of P4,102,438.30, which were subsequently sold to MERALCO.
Sales invoices issued by PDPI to BMC stipulate a 12% interest on the amount
due for attorneys fees and collection. On September 7, 1987, defendant paid
plaintiff the amount of P300,000.00 out of its total purchases, leaving an
unpaid account on the aforesaid deliveries of P3,802,478.20. Demand for
payment was made several times by PDPI, which was responded to by BMC
with a request that it be able to pay its obligation in monthly installments of
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
500,000 at 1% interest per annum. The offer was rejected by PDPI, who
reiterated its demand for full payment.
A complaint was filed by PDPI before the Pasig RTC against BMC for
the recovery of the unpaid balance for made deliveries worth 3,108,000, as
well as interest, exemplary damages of at least 100,000, the cost of the suit,
as well as attorneys fees at the rate of 25% of the amount demanded. In
response, BMC, although admitting that the said purchases were theirs,
disputed the amount claimed by PDPI, asserting that the acts were
perpetrated to induce humiliation and in abuse of PDPIs rights.
121
With this in mind, BMCs prayer for moral and exemplary damages
must also be rejected, in lieu of Article 2219 (10).
As to the second issue, the Court ruled that the stipulation provided
constitutes a penal clause, and thus, BMC is required to pay interest,
attorneys fees and collection fees. However, given the power of the courts
to reduce the penalty whenever it is found to be iniquitous or
unconscionable, the Court believes that 10% of the principal amount is
adequate to cover both attorneys and collection fees.
BPI vs. CA
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of PDPI, ordering BMC
to pay for the unpaid balance of their purchases at 12% interest per annum,
attorneys fees at 25% of the preceding obligation, exemplary damages
worth 10,000 and the cost of the suit.
On appeal, the judgment was modified to adopt the original amount of
unpaid deliveries (3,802,478.20) at 12% per annum and 5% of the said
obligation as attorneys fees.
Issue/s: Is PDPI guilty of abuse of right? If not, can PDPI recover interest and
attorneys fees?
Held: The Court held that BMCs theory that PDPI abused its rights by
rejecting the formers offer of settlement, subsequently followed by the filing
of the present complaint was untenable. To invoke Article 19 of the Civil
Code, the defendant must act with bad faith or intent to prejudice the
plaintiff. Quoting Tolentino, abuse of right exists when it is exercised for the
only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another.
Given this premise, the Courts held that PDPIs act of rejecting
BMCs offer to settle was not made to prejudice or injure BMC. It is also a
fundamental rule that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving
bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. BMC, in this case, has failed
to prove the bad faith of PDPI. On the contrary, the Court finds the reasons
of PDPI to be legitimate. As pointed out, the corporation had its own "cash
position to protect in order for it to pay its own obligations."
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122
harm which results from the injury, while damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
In order to maintain an action for the injury, one must establish that
such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which a defendant owed to a
plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by
the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is
the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus,
there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for
that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty
should be the proximate cause of the injury.
A complaint for damages against BECC was filed before the Makati
RTC. After trial, the lower court ruled in favor of Marasigan, finding BECC had
abused its right in contravention of Article 19 of the Civil Code. It ordered
BECC to pay a) 100,000 as moral damages, b) 50,000 as exemplary damages
and c) 20,000 as attorneys fees. On the other hand, the lower court ordered
Marasigan to pay for his outstanding obligation worth 14,439.41.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed but modified, ordering BECC
to pay a) 50,000 as moral damages, b) 25,000 as exemplary damages and c)
10,000 as attorneys fees.
Issue: In canceling Marasigans credit card, did BECC abuse his right under
the terms and conditions of their contract?
Held: BECC did not abuse its right. To find the existence of an abuse of right
under Article 19 the following elements must be present: (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.
No.
L-15526
(1963)
Facts: Allied Technologists, Inc. (ATI) and the Republic of the Philippines
entered into a contract for the construction of the Veterans Memorial
Hospital in September 11, 1950. Ruiz and Herrera were stockholders of ATI.
The construction of the said hospital was halted in 1955, followed by the
filing of 2 civil cases in succession by Ruiz and Herrera against ATI, the
Secretary of National Defense, Col. Nicolas Jimenez, the head of the
Engineering Group of the DND and Pablo Panlilio, as Auditor of the DND.
The first case (CC No. 23778) was dismissed by the CFI on October 12, 1954
as affirmed by the high Court on July 7, 1955. Civil Case No. 26601 was also
dismissed on September 13, 1955. On appeal, the high Court reversed the
order of dismissal, under the impression that the real controversy was
confined merely between Panlilio, Ruiz and Herrera over the 15% of the
contract price, which was retained by the DND, which was originally made to
answer for any claim or lien that might arise, in the course of the
construction. Civil Case No. 26601 was remanded to its court of origin for
further proceedings.
Panlilio and ATI filed their amended answers, stating that the amount
retained by the DND was already paid to ATI, as sought for by the Ruiz and
Herrera in their complaint. In view of this development, the trial court invited
the parties to a conference, in which the Ruiz and Herrera indicated their
conformity, to the dismissal of the complaint with respect to the retention of
the 15% of the contract price; but insisted upon the hearing of the second
question, which sought the declaration and recognition of Ruiz and Herrera,
as two of the three architects of the hospital. The trial court dismissed the
complaint, for being moot and academic.
Issue: Did the lower court err in ordering the dismissal of the case?
Held: The trial court made no error. Ruiz and Herrera contend that the only
ground relied upon by the trial court to dismiss the case without trial is the
allegation that the amount retained by the DND had already been paid, yet
except for this bare allegation, no evidence was adduced to prove the truth
of the same. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the same is true,
nevertheless the first part of the first cause of action still remains, for which
they had insisted upon a hearing to establish their right to be recognized as
two of the three architects of the hospital; that because the pleadings do not
show any ground which might legally justify the action taken by the lower
court, the latter should not have ordered the dismissal of the entire case but
should have ordered only the striking out of the moot portion of appellants'
first cause of action, based upon Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This cannot be given merit. As found by the trial court, Ruiz and Herreras
first cause of action is composed of: a) judicial declaration or recognition that
Ruiz and Herrera, together with Panlilio, were the architects of the Veterans
Hospital; and b) injunction restraining government officials paying Panlilio
the sum retained, as per stipulation contained in the contract.
By discarding the Secretary and other officials of the DND, as defendants,
Ruiz and Herrera could not expect the trial court to order them to recognize
and declare them co-architects in the construction of the hospital. And, as
the amount retained by the Department on the contract price, which
retention was authorized by the contract, was, as sought by the appellants,
already paid to the ATI, there is nothing more for the trial court to decide,
even without first ruling on the special defenses of Panlilio and ATI.
123
Ruiz and Herreras reliance on Article 21 of the Civil Code is unfounded. They
contend that the word "injury" in the said article, refers not only to any
indeterminate right or property, but also to honor or credit. However,
although this article envisions a situation where a person has a legal right
which is violated by another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy, it presupposes loss or injury, material or otherwise, which
one may suffer as a result of said violation. The pleadings do not show that
damages were ever asked in connection with this case, predicated upon the
said article. Under the facts and circumstances in this case, one cannot
plausibly sustain the contention that the failure or refusal to extend the
recognition was an act contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
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Velezs appeal to the high Court. In support of his "motion for new trial and
reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The
reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an
action for breach of promise to marry. As stated in Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals, a mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
Issue: Should the lower courts decision be set aside, removing Wassmers
right to claim damages?
Held: The lower courts decision must be affirmed, as what was done by the
high Court in this case. The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code
provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that Wassmer and Velez applied for a license to
contract marriage, set a wedding day for September 4, 1954, Printed and
distributed wedding invitations to relatives, friends and acquaintances,
purchased dresses and other apparel for the important occasion and the like.
And then, with but two days before the wedding, Velez simply left.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As
stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation
and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to
good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Velez also contends that the moral damages awarded were
excessive, and should be totally eliminated. This argument, however is
devoid of merit. Under the above-narrated circumstances of this case
defendant clearly acted in a "wanton, reckless and oppressive manner." The
high Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular
circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is
deemed to be a reasonable award.
124
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her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her
parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the
proposed article (now Article 21), she and her parents would have
such a right of action.
Indeed, the CA overlooked the fact that the memorandum referred to a tort
upon a minor who has been seduced, which connotes essentially the idea of
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded.
Given the circumstances of this case, the facts stand out that for one
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, Santos, a woman of adult age, maintained
intimate sexual relations with Tanjanco with repeated acts of intercourse.
Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. There is
voluntariness and mutual passion in this case, for had the she been deceived,
had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and
wiles of the Tanjanco, she would not have again yielded to his embraces,
much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage, and would have cut all sexual relations upon finding
that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that
no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of
action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint.
The dismissal, however, must be understood to be without
prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child of Tanjanco. On
that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own rights
are not here involved.
Bunag vs. CA
G.R. No. 101749 (1992)
Facts: Conrado Bunag, Jr. and Zenaida Cirilo, after reaching a hotel/motel
and having sexual intercourse, went to Pamplona in Las Pias, where they
lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, even filing an application for
a marriage license in Cavite. Bunag, Jr., however, withdrew the application
on October 1, 1973.
125
Cirilos version of the case recites that she and Bunag were lovers.
She also states was brought to the hotel/motel against her will where Bunag
succeeded in raping her, and that thereafter, she was allowed to go home
only after they were married. They then went to Bunags grandmothers
house in Las Pias where they lived as husband and wife, but on September
29, 1973, Bunag left and never returned, bringing Cirilo humiliation and
shame because of Bunags deception. This was corroborated by Cirilos uncle,
Vivencio, who added that Bunags father, Bunag, Sr. wanted to settle things
and have the couple wed.
Bunag, Jr., on the other hand, insists that he did not rape Cirilo. In
fact, he and Cirilo had plans to elope and get married. However, due to bitter
disagreements over money and threats to his person, Bunag, Jr. broke off the
engagement.
A complaint for damages was filed by Cirilo for Bunag, Jr.s broken
promise of marriage. In finding that Bunag, Jr. had forcibly abducted and
raped Cirilo, the trial court ruled for Cirilo ordering Bunag, Jr. to pay
P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for and as
attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved
from any and all liability. On appeal, the CA ruled to affirm the decision of the
lower court. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Is Bunag, Jr. correct in asserting that since the action involved breach
of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages?
Held: The high Court held that while it is true that in this jurisdiction, the
time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no
standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.
The award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively,
under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to Article 2219 (10), any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral
damages. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the
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statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the
statutes.
Under the prevailing circumstances, the acts of Bunag, Jr. in forcibly
abducting Cirilo and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and
thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to
renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days,
constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly
insensate and reprehensible transgressions which justify the award of moral
and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3
and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code. Further, the
dismissal of the criminal case against Bunag, Jr. for rape did not carry with it
the extinction of the civil action.
126
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with Quimiguing several times by force and intimidation, and without her
consent. As a result, she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs
supplied by Icao, forcing her had to stop studying. Hence, she now claims
support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees. Icao, on the
other hand, moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint
did not allege that the child had been born. After hearing arguments, the trial
judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Quimiguing moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the
intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court,
sustaining Icao's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since
the original complaint averred no cause of action. Hence the appeal directly
to this Court.
127
two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts
not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a
barrio school. Eventually, Lolitas parents found out and forbade Alfonso
from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and
sisters at their residence at 54-B Espaa Extension, Quezon City. On April 14,
1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and
sisters checked her things and found that Lolita's clothes were gone.
However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside
Lolita's aparador. The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police
authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is no news or trace of her
whereabouts.
Pe vs. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396 (1962)
Facts: The case originates from the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita
Pe, who had gone missing on April 14, 1957 and at that time, was a single, 24
year old woman. Sometime in 1952, Alfonso frequented the house of Lolita
on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The
This prompted the filing of the current action with the CFI-Manila to
recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the
amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up
as a defense that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a
valid cause of action.
The lower court, finding that Alfonso had carried on a love affair
with Lolita Pe, being a married man himself, declared that Alfonso cannot be
held liable for moral damages, it appearing that Lolitas relatives failed to
prove that Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection.
So it rendered a decision dismissing the complaint
Issue: May the parents and siblings of Lolita Pe recover damages based on
the fact that defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with
Lolita Pe thereby causing them injury in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy?
Held: The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
Conversely, the trial court considered the complaint not actionable for the
reason that they failed to prove that Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith
tried to win Lolita's affection.
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
The high Court refused to align itself to this view. The circumstances under
which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other
conclusion than that it was he who seduced the latter to the extent of
making her fall in love with him, as shown by the fact that defendant
frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach
him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the
latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral
relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually
fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in
Gasan but also in Boac.
Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events
than that Alfonso, through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the
affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her.
The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an
injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
Malicious Prosecution
Lao vs. Associated Anglo American Tobacco
G.R. No. 47013 (2000)
Facts: The Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (AATC) entered
into a "Contract of Sales Agent" with Andres Lao. Under the contract, Lao
agreed to sell cigarettes manufactured and shipped by the AATC to his
business address in Tacloban City. Lao would in turn remit the sales proceeds
to AATC. For his services, Lao would receive commission depending on the
kind of cigarettes sold, fixed monthly salary, and operational allowance. As a
guarantee to Lao's compliance with his contractual obligations, his brother
1
Jose and his father Tomas executed a deed of mortgage in favor of AATC in
the amount of P200,000.00.
Lao regularly remitted the proceeds of his sales to AATC, generating,
in the process, a great deal of business. However, in February 1968 and until
about seven (7) months later, Lao failed to accomplish his monthly sales
report. He was reminded of his enormous accounts and the difficulty of
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During the pendency of civil case, Esteban Co, as vice-president of AATC filed
a criminal case for estafa against Lao. Without awaiting the determination of
the criminal case, Lao lodged a complaint for malicious prosecution. The
court ruled in favor of Lao declaring that the estafa case was filed without
probable cause and with malice and ordered AATC and Esteban Co to jointly
and severally pay Lao: a) P30,000 as actual damages, b) P150,000.00 as moral
damages, c)P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and, d) P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees and costs.
Issue: Is AATC liable for malicious prosecution?
Held: No. A reading of the complaint reveals that the complaint for malicious
prosecution was founded on the filing of estafa against Lao. As such, it was
prematurely filed and it failed to allege a cause of action.
The Court ruled that the complaint for damages based on malicious
prosecution and/or on Articles 20 and 21 should have been dismissed for lack
of cause of action. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the
trial court. It should be stressed, however, that the dismissal of subject
complaint should not be taken as an adjudication on the merits, the same
being merely grounded on the failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action.
Malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages
brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal
proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after
the termination of such prosecution, suit or other proceeding in favor of the
defendant therein.
129
articles sold which Que had not corrected. Que for his part argued that the
allegedly defective articles were never returned to him until after he had
filed the charge for estafa and that Nicolas had earlier merely ignored his
complaints about the dishonored checks.
Que filed a complaint for estafa against Nicolas in the office of the city fiscal
of Caloocan City for the issuance of several dishonored checks upon
presentment. The charge was dismissed for lack of merit, the investigating
fiscal holding that the controversy was an accounting matter that did not
necessarily involve deceit on the part of Nicolas. Subsequently, Nicolas filed
his own complaint for damages against Que with the CFI-Bulacan, for what
he claimed was his malicious prosecution by the latter. Que now claims
harassment. In his counterclaim, he averred that Nicolas had maliciously filed
the complaint in Bulacan although he was a resident of Caloocan City; that
the private respondent was really indebted to him in any case and that it was
he who had suffered damages as a result of the unwarranted suit.
Originally, the lower court held in favor of Antonio and awarded him the
total amount of P80,500.00 in moral, exemplary, and nominal damages plus
a P4,000.00 attorney's fee and the costs of the suit, finding was that Que had
acted maliciously in filing the estafa charge and in alleging that the plaintiff
had issued the dishonored checks with deceit.
Ques motion for reconsideration was denied. A second motion for
reconsideration was filed after a motion to stay the running of the period of
appeal was filed. This second motion found merit, and reversed the original
decision, awarding Que 10,000 as moral damages.
On appeal, the IAC reinstating the original decision of the trial court in favor
of Nicolas.
Facts: The origin of this dispute goes back to when Que and Nicolas were still
in amicable terms. In July and August of 1975, Nicolas ordered from Que
certain amounts of canvass strollers which were delivered to and accepted
by Nicolas, who issued five checks therefore to Que worth P7,600. Nicolas,
however, ordered the bank to stop payment because of defects in the
Held: The high Court ruled in the negative. It is evident that Que was not
motivated by ill feeling but by anxiety to protect his rights when he filed the
criminal complaint for estafa with the fiscal's office. If he averred that the
Antonio had no funds in the bank when he issued the postdated checks and
intended to cheat him, it was because the circumstances of the case as Que
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saw them led him to this conclusion. Even if the fiscal found that no deceit
was involved and that the petitioner's claim was unfounded, the mistaken
charge was nonetheless, in the legal sense, not malicious. As previously held
in Manila Gas Corporation v. Court of Appeals, To constitute malicious
prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately
by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities
for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.
The criminal complaint filed by the petitioner was not a mere ploy to enforce
the payment of his account by Nicolas. There was here a genuine protest
over the abrupt and suspicious order to stop the encashment of the checks
issued to him by the private respondent. On the contrary, there is a stronger
suggestion of malice on the part of Nicolas when he filed his suit for damages
against Que in Bulacan, notwithstanding that the place of business was in
Caloocan. However, inasmuch as good faith is presumed, and applying this
presumption both to the petitioner and the private respondent, we hereby
rule that, absent sufficient rebuttable evidence, neither of them is guilty of
malice in their mutual relations.
Drilon vs CA
G.R. No. 107019 (March 20, 1997)
Facts: Drilon and company seek the reversal of the C.A. resolution
affirming the orders of Judge Macli-ing denying their motion to dismiss the
complaint of malicious prosecution filed by Homobono Adaza.
General Renato de Villa on March 20, 1990 requested the DOJ to
order the investigation of several individuals, including Adaza, which he
believed participated in the fail December 1989 coup dtat. Such was
referred to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors for inquiry. Said team
from sufficient basis for Adazas prosecution and their report became the
basis for the filing of a complaint for the crime of rebellion with murder and
frustrated murder on April 18, 1990 before the RTC of Quezon City. Adaza
then filed a complaint for damages on July 11, 1990 alleging that the
information filed against him was a clear case of wilful and malicious
130
prosecution and that the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated
murder was non-existent in the statute books.
Drilon and company filed a Motion to Dismiss Adaza's complaint on
the ground that it states no actionable wrong constituting a valid cause of
action on October 15, 1990. On February 8, 1991, Judge Macli-ing denied
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.
Drilon and Company then filed on June 5, 1991 a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals; alleging Judge Macli-ing
had committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to dismiss
Adazas complaint on the ground that the later had sufficient cause of action.
Issue: Whether or not Adazas complaint has sufficient cause of action.
Held: No, Adazas complaint does not have a sufficient cause of action. In
fact his complaint suffers a fatal infirmity as it does not state a cause of
action on its face and must thus be dismissed.
Malicious prosecution has been defined in the Philippine jurisdiction
as, An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal
prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The
gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the
mere purpose of vexation or injury (Cabasaan v. Anota, 14169-R, November
19, 1956).
The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious
prosecution are found in the provisions of the New Civil Code on Human
Relations and on damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35,
2217 and 2219 (8). To prove malicious prosecution the all the following
elements must be proven and concur: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the
further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the
action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the
prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was
actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive.
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Public Humiliation
Patricio vs. Leviste
131
Held: Yes, he is liable for damages. With respect to the deficiency in the
notice for the motion of reconsideration, the court deems the defect cured.
Despite the fact that the notice was mailed via regular service and not
registered mail, such technicality may be set aside because ultimately Fr.
Patricio was able to appear before the court and have his side heard. Such is
the spirit and purpose of the rule on notice and hearing.
As regards to the complaint for damages, the lower courts theory
that moral damages may only be awarded when actual damages are proven
is untenable. Moral damages may be awarded in appropriate cases referred
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the rat tail in his pocket and that he had the intention to pay for it. Neilia
then replied to the effect that that was the same thing all shoplifters say
when they are caught. This was done while people were lining up and paying
for the items they shopped. Espino was then made to pay a fine of 5 pesos,
which Nelia reasoned was a prize for the guard who apprehended him.
Espino then paid the fine and was made to line up at the cashier to pay for
the item. As he waited in line he was stared at and people were talking
about him. Extremely humiliated by the incident he immediately left the
premises after paying.
Espino filed a complaint on October 8, 1970 founded on article 21 in
relation to article 2219 of the New Civil Code and prayed for damages. The
CFI of Pasig, Rizal dismissed the complaint; but the Court of Appeals reversed
such. Espino was granted moral damages at P 75,000, exemplary damages of
P 25,000 Pesos, attorneys fees at P 5,000 and the return of the P 5 fine.
Grand Union Supermarket now appeals said decision citing that Espino was
guilty of theft and that their action of apprehending and fining him was
merely an exercise of their right to protect their property as enunciated in
article 429 of the New Civil Code. They also stated that there was probable
cause for his apprehension, that it was not done with malice or bad faith and
the proximate cause for such was Espinos own actions. They also argued
that even if damages were in order, the amounts awarded were
unconscionable.
Issue: Whether the act of apprehending Espino in such a manner would
render the supermarket liable?
Held: Yes, such actions do render the supermarket liable. The court
believes Espino committed an honest mistake when he forgot to pay for his
item. This was proven by the fact that he put it in his pocket while he was
preoccupied and that he apologised and immediately moved to pay for such
at the instance the guard alerted him. The fact that he was an engineer, an
executive of Proctor and Gamble, an esteemed member of society and a
regular customer of the supermarket also belies motive to steal an item of an
insignificant amount, which he was more than capable of paying for.
Further, he was also in the company of his family, a deterrent from criminal
activity.
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It is also evident from the facts of the case that Espino was falsely
accused of being a shoplifter in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy and thus may be awarded damages. His being identified as a
shoplifter in the incident report, being called such by Nelia and being made
to pay a fine with a threat to call the police and report the incident if he
would not do so, truly caused him humiliation and embarrassment.
However, the amount of damages should be modified. Espinos
forgetfulness was the proximate cause of the incident, and such contributory
negligence would work to reduce the damages awarded, as enunciated in
article 2214 of the New Civil Code. The court also considers the fact that the
presence of shoppers in the premises was merely coincidental as it is a public
place and their presence was not actively called for by the management in
order to humiliate Espino. The court also believes that the managements
policy to have Espino brought to the back of the supermarket to make a
report and to present him to one of the officers was not intentionally done to
humiliate him because the supermarkets business success would be
compromised if it was seen that their public relations with customers were
intentionally such. Moral damages are reduced to P 5,000, exemplary
damages are deleted, attorneys fees are reduced to P 2,000 and the P 5 fine
must be returned.
Unjust Dismissal
Singapore Airlines vs. Pano
Gr No. L-47739 June 22, 1983
Melencio-Herrera, J.
Facts: Carlos E. Cruz accepted employment as Engineer Officer with
Singapore Airlines on August 30, 1974. His contract included a bond binding
him for five years. He signed the contract with B.E. Villanueva as surety.
Later on Singapore airlines claimed that Cruz had breached the
contract by going on unauthorized leave without pay without the requisite
approval of his superiors. The airline sought payment of liquidated damages
of $53,968.00 or (P161,904.00); $883.91 or (P2,651.73) as overpayment in
salary; $61.00 or (P183.00) for cost of uniforms and accessories supplied by
133
the company plus $230.00, or (P690.00), for the cost of a flight manual; and
$1,533.71, or (P4,601.13) corresponding to the vacation leave he had availed
of but to which he was no longer entitled; exemplary damages attorney's
fees; and costs.
Cruz argued that there could not be any breach of contract as he
was not actually required to serve for five years straight. He further posited
that he had left the company on valid grounds which was accepted by the
company, and thus no damages may be awarded. Villanueva on the other
hand filled a cross-claim against Cruz for any damages the former may be
held liable against the airline. Villanueva argued that he was not a surety but
a mere guarantor.
On October 28, 1977, Judge Pano dismissed the complaint,
counterclaim and cross-claim for lack of jurisdiction; stating that the issue
stems from an employer-employee relationship and thus jurisdiction is
vested exclusively with the Labor Arbiter as enunciated in article 216 of the
Labor Code. Singapore airlines filed for reconsideration, which was
subsequently denied, thus their recourse to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the case is cognizable by the Civil Courts or the Labor
Arbiter?
Held: The Civil Courts hold jurisdiction over the case at bar. The case is
actually grounded on the breach of contract by Cruz and not on his
employer-employee relationship with the airline.
This was clearly
manifested by Cruzs refusal and failure to report for duty without just cause
and with malice and bad faith when he took his unauthorized leave which
was in contravention with the stipulations of his contract. It is evident that
the complaint was anchored on the effects of Cruzs abandonment of work,
which entitled the airline to damages.
Singapore Airlines does not seek the application of Labor laws but of
the Civil Code regarding liquidated damages for the breach of a contract.
Secondarily, the assertion of Villanueva that he is a mere guarantor is
definitely a civil issue outside of the Labor Arbiters jurisdiction.
Thus, the case must be remanded to the proper Regional Trial Court.
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134
Derelection of duty
Amaro vs. Sumanguit
Gr No. L-14986 (July 31, 1962)
Facts: On October 5, 1958 Jose amaro was assaulted and shot near the city
government building of Silay, Negros Occidental by a police officer. He,
together with his father and witnesses went to the office of Ambrosio
Sumanguit, the chief of police of the city to complain. However instead of
gaining assistance they were harassed terrorized and were forced to give up
prosecuting the crime. Amaro still persisted and obtained the aid of the city
attorney who was about to file an information for the illegal discharge of
firearm against one of the police officers. Because of this, the harassment by
the chief of police continued, trying to force the Amaros to give up and sign
prepared affidavits exculpating the police from dereliction of duty with
regard to the above said crime.
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Held: No, such dismissal was invalid. Although the complaint did not
specifically allege so, it was an action predicated on articles 21 and 27 of the
Civil Code. The facts presented although vague do constitute an actionable
dereliction of duty as enunciated in article 27 as the chief of police refused to
give them assistance without just cause, when it was said officers duty to
perform such.
Although the complaint was imperfectly drafted, ambiguous,
indefinite and uncertain, such are not grounds for dismissal of the case under
Rule 8. The proper procedure would be to ask for a bill of particulars under
Rule 16 to fix said curable defects.
The Amaros have recourse to file their complaint for illegal
discharge of firearm directly with the city attorney and/or file an
administrative complaint against the chief of police. Both of which do not
preclude an action for damages under article 27 of the Civil Code. Thus, the
dismissal is set aside and the case remanded to the appropriate court for
further proceedings.
135
Held: Yes, the case falls under said article which warrants the award of
damages to Dr. Aramil. Said article provides that "every person shall respect
the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling
with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another" and "similar
acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief". Such article was
violated when the corporation released an advertisement depicting Dr.
Armils home to be that of another, without Dr. Aramils permission. Further,
bad faith and negligence was evident as the corporation refused to publish a
rectification or apology despite demands.
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Concepcion v. CA
Gr No 120706 (January 31, 2000)
Facts: Nestor Nicolas and family were leases of an apartment owned by
Florence Conception located at San Joaquin, Pasig City. Nestor was engaged
in the business of supplying office equipment, appliances and other fixtures
to government agencies. He had convinced Florence to join in by inputting
capital in exchange for an equal division of profits earned.
The problem started when Florences deceased husbands brother,
Rodrigo Conception, suddenly confronted Nestor at his apartment on the
second week of July 1985. He accused Nestor of being an adulterer,
receiving P 100,000 from Florence to go to Baguio with his family, but
secretly returning to Manila to have a tryst with Florence. Nestor even
accompanied Rodrigo to ask the relatives whom the rumor allegedly came
from, they however denied any knowledge. Rodrigo again accused Nestor of
being an adulterer when they met Florence at the terrace of her residence
when the two confronted her about the rumor. Both Nestor and Florence
denied such. Rodrigo continued to harass Florence via phone, even saying
that he would kill her if anything should happen to his mother.
As a result Nestor felt ashamed and embarrassed to face his
neighbors as they had heard or had been present during Rodrigos
confrontation. His business was also in decline as Florence discontinued her
capital input. Moreover, his wife, Allem started to distrust him and constant
fighting ensued due to the rumor spread by Rodrigo. Nestor then demanded
that Rodrigo make a public apology and pay damages. Rodrigo refused to do
so and reasoned that he was only protecting his familys reputation. The RTC
and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Nestor, awarding him P 50,000 for
moral damages, P25,000 for exemplary damages, P 10,000 for attorneys fees
and the cost of suit.
Issue:
136
Held: Yes, such decision is with legal and factual basis. First, Rodrigos
claim that the awarding was without legal basis is bereft of merit. His actions
of confronting Nestor in the latters apartment and hurling accusations that
Nestor was an adulterer within view and hearing range of the public is
indeed a violation of articles 26 and 2219 of the Civil Code as such an act is
indeed a form of defamation and intrudes into the privacy of Nestors home
and family life. Further, under article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages
which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission. Such was manifest when Nestor was so humiliated that he could
not face his neighbours, his constant quarrels with his wife and the decline of
his business.
Rodrigos second contention that the facts and circumstances of the
case were manifestly overlooked misunderstood or glossed over by
respondent court which, if considered, would change the verdict. The court
sees no such error. The totality of the evidence and facts presented truly
show that Rodrigo had defamed Nestor. The minor inconsistencies of the
testimonies and affidavits of witnesses do not debunk Nestors case; in fact
they are a badge of its authenticity as experience would dictate that minor
inconsistencies are to be expected.
Rodrigos final contention is that the appellate court did not take
into account the fact that the lower courts judge who penned the decision
was not the original judge who heard his case; and is thus not in a position to
properly weigh the facts and circumstances of the case leading to a flawed
decision. The court finds this untenable. First off the Supreme Court as a
rule respects the finds of the lower court and shall not disturb such unless it
finds good reason to do so. No such reason in this case exists or has been
proven. The mere fact that the lower court judge who penned the decision
was not the one who heard the case does not destroy the presumption of
regularity of the judges performance. The judge is presumed and held to
have made his decision after reviewing the facts and circumstances which
are kept in the records of the case.
Thus the totality of the facts and circumstances lead the court to
believe that indeed Rodrigo had defamed Nestor and is thus liable for
damages. The damages previously awarded are affirmed.
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137
Concept of Damages
Heirs of Borlado vs. Vda. De Bulan
G.R. 114118 (2001)
Facts: A parcel of land owned by Serapio Borlado, grandfather of petitioners,
was sold for consideration to Francisco Bacero who in turn sold it to the
Spouses Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion Borbon, respondents herein. The
respondents had been in continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse and
exclusive possession of the lot until petitioners forcibly entered and wrested
physical possession thereof from them.
Respondents filed an ejectment suit against petitioners, which was
decided in their favour. The court ordered petitioners to vacate the land and
to pay to respondents a total amount of One Thousand One Hundred (1,100)
cavans of palay as well as attorneys fees and the cost of suit.
Issue:
lot.
Held: The defendants, Twao and Castro, are not entitled to moral damages.
The law on damages is found on Title XVII of the Civil Code but rules
governing damages laid down in other laws, and the principles of the general
law on damages are adopted in so far as they are not in consistent with the
Code.
Moral damages may be recovered, among others, in cases of malicious
prosecution. But in order that moral damages may be recovered in
connection with a writ of attachment, malice must exist.
The Rules of Court requiring the attachment plaintiff to provide a
bond from which the costs and all damages are to be enforced should the
court find that the plaintiff is not entitled to the attachment merely provides
recovery on the bond based on the undertaking and not from any tortious
act. Consequently, the appellees may recover only the actual damages and
not moral damages.
Held: The petition was denied since the issue involved was factual and did
not fall under the exceptions that the SC may not review factual findings of
the CA on appeal via certiorari. However, the court modified the judgment
with respect to the award of the cavans of palay as a form of damages in the
absence of legal basis since "Palay" is not legal tender currency in the
Philippines.
Facts: Plaintiff filed a civil action against defendant for injuries resulting from
an automobile collision due to the latters fault. At the time of the accident,
plaintiff sold the products of a distillery and made an average of P50 per
month. As a result of the collision, plaintiff incurred medical expenses, and
suffered business losses with only four out of his twenty regular customers
remaining.
The lower court refused to grant plaintiffs claim for injuries to his
business due to his enforced absence therefrom.
Issue: Whether the estate of Lazatin is liable to pay damages for the alleged
malicious attachment
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Actual damages include not only loss already suffered, but loss of profits
which may not have been realized. Under both American Law and the
Spanish Civil Code, actual damages for a negligent act or omission include
those foreseen at the time of the injury or its necessary consequence.
Evidently, plaintiff is entitled to recover damages resulting from his actual
incapacity. With respect to the damage to his business the court ruled that
the profits of an established business may be considered in calculating the
measure of damages for an interruption of it.
138
Attorneys fees
Quirante v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 73886 (January 31, 1989)
Facts: On June 18, 1983, herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial
court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to him, there was
an oral agreement between him and the late Dr.Casasola with regard to his
attorney's fees, which agreement was allegedly confirmed in writing by the
widow, Asuncion Vda. De Casasola, and the two daughters of the deceased,
namely Mely C. Garcia and Virginia C. Nazareno. Petitioner avers that
pursuant to said agreement, the attorney's fees would be computed as
follows:
A. In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the
attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be
P30,000.00.
B. In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the
P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of I.
Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.
The trial court granted the motion for confirmation in an order dated March
20, 1984, despite an opposition thereto. It also denied the motion for
reconsideration of the order of confirmation in its second order dated May
25, 1984. The Court of Appeals set aside the two orders and made the
previous restraining order permanent.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Quirante is allowed to recover his attorneys
fees even if the case has not yet been decided?
Held: What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is,
however, different from attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for
under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of
the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the
judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by
14
execution. Here, the petitioner's claims are based on an alleged contract
for professional services, with them as the creditors and the private
respondents as the debtors.
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139
Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees
may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of
said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure
gains added validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering
attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when
something is due to the client. Thus, it was ruled that:
... an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main
litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the
disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises
when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be
15
paid.
As regards to the effect of the alleged confirmation of the attorney's fees by
some of the heirs of the deceased. We are of the considered view that the
orderly administration of justice dictates that such issue be likewise
determined by the court a quo inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the
same contingencies in determining the propriety and assessing the extent of
recovery of attorney's fees by both petitioners herein. The court below will
be in a better position, after the entire case shall have been adjudicated,
inclusive of any liability of PHILAMGEN and the respective participations of
the heirs of Dr.Casasola in the award, to determine with evidentiary support
such matters like the basis for the entitlement in the fees of petitioner Dante
Cruz and as to whether the agreement allegedly entered into with the late
Dr.Casasola would be binding on all his heirs, as contended by petitioner
Quirante.
We, therefore, take exception to and reject that portion of the
decision of the respondent court which holds that the alleged confirmation
to attorney's fees should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto,
since it is also premised on the eventual grant of damages to the Casasola
family, hence the same objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding
may be pre-emptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may be
presented for consideration by the trial court. WHEREFORE, with the
foregoing observation, the decision of the respondent court subject of the
present recourse is hereby AFFIRMED.
Interest
Crismina Garments, Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No.128721 (March 9, 1999)
Facts: Petitioner (Crismina Garments) contracted the services of the
respondent (DWilmar Garments) for sewing 20,762 pairs of denims. The
total of which amounted to 76,410.
Petitioner failed to pay the aforesaid amount. As a result,
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for the collection of
payment. Trial Court ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered the
petitioner to pay the sum of 76,140 with interest at 12% per annum. CA
affirmed the trial Courts ruling. Hence, a Petition for review was filed.
Petitioner submits that the interest rate should be 6% pursuant to
Art. 2209 of the Civil Code. On the other hand private respondent maintains
that the interest rate should be 12% per annum in accordance with Central
bank Act, since the money sought to be recovered by her is in the form of
forbearance.
Issue: Whether or not it is proper to impose interest at the rate of 12% per
annum for an obligation that does not involve a loan or forbearance of
money in the absence of stipulation of the parties.
Held: Because the amount due in this case arose from a contract for a piece
of work, not from a loan or forbearance of money, the legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum should be applied.
Furthermore, since the amount of the demand could be established
with certainty when the complaint was filed, the six percent (6%) interest
should be computed from the filing of the said complaint. But after the
judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the
interest should be reckoned at twelve percent (12%) per year.
Private respondent maintains that the twelve percent (12%) interest
should be imposed, because the obligation arose from a forbearance of
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Mitigation of Liability
Cerrano vs. Tan Chuco
38 Phil 392 (August 1, 1918)
Facts: Tan Chuco, who was then the owner of casco No. 1033, rented it to
Vicencio Cerrano at a monthly rental of P70. Tan Chuco notified Vicencio
Cerrano that in the following month it would be necessary to send the casco
to Malabon for repairs. Cerrano then informed Tan Chuco that he would like
to rent the casco again after repairs had been completed. Tan Chuco
indicated that he was willing to rent it, but would expect P80 a month for it,
by which Cerrano acceded to the demand. About one week before the end of
the repair period, Tan Chuco sold the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Santos,
the man who had been employed by Cerrano, upon hearing of the said sale
went to the office of Siy Cong Bieng & Co. and asked for employment in the
same capacity. Cerrano, claiming that he was entitled to the possession of
the casco under his contract with Tan Chuco, regardless of its sale to Siy Cong
Bieng & Co. induced Santos to refuse to take orders from the new owners.
As a result Siy Cong Bieng & Co. were obliged to bring an action of
replevin against Santos for the recovery of the possession of their casco.
Upon this judgment was entered for the delivery of casco to Siy Cong Bieng&
Co. and for damages. Cerrano, paid the judgment in favor of Siy Cong Bieng&
Co. in the replevin suit, for which he had become liable under the terms of
the delivery bond.
Issue: Whether Tan Chuco is liable for damages for breach of contract.
140
Ruling: Yes. Under the terms of his contract Tan Chuco was bound to deliver
the casco to Cerrano for one month from the date upon which the repairs
were ended, but was under no obligation to renew the contract at the end of
the month. By selling the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. he broke his contract
with Cerrano and is responsible for the damages caused by his failure to give
Cerrano possession of the casco for the term of one month. The Court is of
the opinion that Cerrano is entitled to recover damages for the breach of
contract, the profit by which he would have been able to make had the
contract been performed.
Article 1106 of the Civil Code establishes the rule that prospective
profits may be recovered as damages, while article 1107 of the same Code
provides that the damages recoverable for the breach of obligations not
originating in fraud (dolo) are those which were or might have been foreseen
at the time the contract was entered into. Applying these principles to the
facts in this case, we think that it is unquestionable that defendant must be
deemed to have foreseen at the time he made contract that in the event of
his failure perform it, the plaintiff would be damaged by the loss of the profit
he might reasonably have expected to derive from its use.
Moral Damages
Kierulf vs. CA
G.R. No. 99301 (March 13, 1997)
Facts: The Pantranco bus was traveling along EDSA from Congressional
Avenue towards Clover Leaf, Balintawak. The driver lost control of the bus
along the way, causing it to swerve to the left, and then to fly over the center
island occupying the east-bound lane of EDSA. The front of the bus bumped
the front portion of an Isuzu pickup driven by Legaspi. Damages to both
vehicles occured and physical injuries were inflicted on Legaspi and his
passenger Lucila Kierulf, both of whom were treated at the Quezon City
General Hospital. The bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who was then
crossing EDSA. Despite the impact, said bus continued to move forward and
its front portion rammed against a Caltex gasoline station, damaging its
building and gasoline dispensing equipment. As a consequence of the
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141
affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has
suffered a direct and real personal loss. The loss is immediate and
consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal to the
spouse and separate and distinct from that of the injured person.
Whether Rodriguez may be cited as authority to support the award
of moral damages to Victor and/or LucilaKierulf for "loss of consortium,"
however, cannot be properly considered in this case.
Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to consortium, although
argued before Respondent Court, is not supported by the evidence on
record. His wife might have been badly disfigured, but he had not testified
that, in consequence thereof, his right to marital consortium was affected.
Clearly, Victor (and for that matter, Lucila) had failed to make out a case for
loss of consortium, unlike the Rodriguez spouse. Again, we emphasize that
this claim is factual in origin and must find basis not only in the evidence
presented but also in the findings of the Respondent Court. For lack of
factual basis, such claim cannot be ruled upon by this Court at this time. The
social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding
moral damages. The factual circumstances prior to the accident show that
no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude," no "supercilious
manner," no "abusive language and highly scornful reference" was given her.
The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may be
considered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was subjected to
contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social
and financial standing.
Be that as it may, it is still proper to award moral damages to
Petitioner Lucila for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety and wounded feelings. She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp,
limbs and ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to undergo several corrective
operations and treatments. Despite treatment and surgery, her chin was still
numb and thick. She felt that she has not fully recovered from her injuries.
She even had to undergo a second operation on her gums for her dentures to
fit. She suffered sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the
vehicular accident. In this light and considering further the length of time
spent in prosecuting the complaint and this appeal, we find the sum of
Basconcillo Batungbacal Base Buenaventura Clareza Daganta David Escucha Lingao Llave LucaylucayMalvar Mangrobang Porquez Quesada Rigor Rosal Salud
P400,000.00 as moral damages for Petitioner Lucila to be fair and just under
the circumstances.
142
delivered Account Nos. 8113 and 8114 to Miss. Gosioco and kept for herself
checks Nos. 8115 and 8112. On the same day, she also sold to the Bautistas 4
pieces worth P94,000.00. Bautista issued Bank of America Checks Nos. DD8106 forP12,000.00, DD-8111 for P12,000.00, DD-8110 for P35,000.00, and
DD-8107 for P35,000.00, all post dated June 23, 1968.
As some of the owners of the jewelry sold to the defendants by
Ribaya on April 23, 1968 and April 24, 1968 wanted to get back their jewelry,
Mrs. Ribaya on May 15, 1968 went back to the house of the Bautistas
accompanied by Gloria Duque bringing with her 3 pieces of jewelry in
exchange for some pieces previously sold to defendant Bautista. She left the
jewelry with Bautista but instead of exchanging the jewelry Bautista issued to
Mrs. Ribaya another Bank of America check No. DD-8130 for P45,000.00
postdated July 17, 1968.
Ribaya tried to contact Bautista when the checks matured, but were
unable to do so. She deposited the checks to her account but they were
dishonored by the bank for the reason that the accounts of the defendant
were closed.
Suspecting that the Bautistas might have pawned the pieces of jewelry
purchased from her, she went to the pawnshop section of the Manila Police
Department and discovered that most of the jewelry she had sold to the
defendants were pledged to various pawnshops in Manila.
Mrs. Ribaya confronted Marino Bautista, who assured her that he
would pay her their obligation. After failing to comply, Mrs. Ribaya
demanded from Bautista the surrender of the pawnshop tickets covering the
pledge of the jewelry he obtained from her. She was able to redeem part of
the jewelry she delivered to the Bautistas.
It was computed that Bautista's obligations amounted to
P125,460.79.
The trial court rendered judgment sentencing the Bautistas to pay
petitioners the sum of P125,460.79 with interest and 25% thereof for
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. The claim for moral and exemplary
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damages was denied on the ground that the evidence adduced by the
plaintiffs [was] insufficient to warrant its grant.
ISSUE: Are petitioners entitled to moral and exemplary damages?
HELD: Yes. In Francisco vs. Government Service Insurance System, the Court
had sustained the trial court's appealed decision denying the therein
prevailing plaintiff's claim for moral and exemplary damages "not only on
account of the plaintiff's failure to take the witness stand and testify to her
social humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., but primarily because a
breach of contract like that of defendant, not being malicious or fraudulent,
does not warrant the award of moral damages.
Here, the facts and circumstances are totally different. In that case,
therein plaintiff failed to take the witness stand and defendant's breach of
contract was held to be not malicious and fraudulent. In the present case,
petitioner took the witness stand and established by uncontradicted
testimony that due to respondents' deceitful and malevolent acts of
defraudation, she had suffered "extreme" anguish and "could not sleep for
three months," since she was forced to close her pawnshop, sell some of her
personal jewelries and borrow money in order to pay off the owners of the
jewelries wrongfully gotten by respondents from her. The evidence of record
shows the magnitude of respondents' wanton, fraudulent and malevolent
acts of defraudation.
Petitioners' testimonial evidence to the effect that she suffered
"extremely" and that for three months she could not sleep was a clear
demonstration of her physical suffering, mental anguish and serious anxiety
and similar injury, resulting from respondents' malevolent acts that show her
to be clearly entitled to moral damages.
Petitioners having established the more damages, are entitled in
addition thereto, to exemplary damages. The wantonness and malevolence
through which respondents defrauded petitioners, deceitfully incurring and
then evading settlement of their just liability certainly justifies the award of
exemplary damages by way of example and correction for the public good
and also to serve as a deterrent to the commission of similar misdeeds by
others, even if the transaction were viewed as a breach of civil contract.
143
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144
De la Torre, 55 SCRA 340 [1974.] and are allowable only when specifically
prayed for in the complaint. (San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Magno, 21 SCRA
292 [1968])
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145
that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of
the damage and its causal relation to defendant's acts."
There is a need of a full-blown trial on the merits.
The court reasoned that the denial in the answer of the charge of
reckless driving "did not affect the plaintiffs' positive allegation in their
complaint that the truck . . . did not have a current year registration plate . . .
for the year 1958 when the accident occurred that "this failure . . . has the
effect of admitting hypothetically that they operated ... the said truck
without proper license . . . when the accident occurred," and that "unless
there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation (article 2185, new Civil Code)." The court went on to
conclude that under the circumstances a judgment on the pleadings was
"irremediably proper and fitting."
Issue: Did the court act correctly in rendering judgment on the pleadings?
Held: No. The plaintiffs' claim for actual, moral, nominal and corrective
damages, was controverted by the averment in the answer to the effect that
the defendants "have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegations" as to such damages, "the truth of the
matter being that the death of Regino Raagas was occasioned by an
unforeseen event and/or by the fault of the small boy Regino Raagas or his
parents." Such averment has the effect of tendering a valid issue.
The court has previously held that we held even if the allegations
regarding the amount of damages in the complaint are not specifically
denied in the answer, such damages are not deemed admitted. It has also
declared in no uncertain terms that actual damages must be proved, and that
a court cannot rely on "speculation, conjecture or guesswork" as to the fact
and amount of damages, but must depend on actual proof that damage had
been suffered and on evidence of the actual amount.
Moreover, in Malonzo vs. Galang et. al., L-13851, July 27, 1960, the
court reaffirmed the rule that although an allegation is not necessary in
order that moral damages may be awarded, "it is, nevertheless, essential
Facts: Petitioner, Roque Enervida, filed a complaint against the defendantspouses de la Torre, praying that the deed of sale executed on December 3,
1957 by his deceased father, Ciriaco Enervida, over a parcel of land covered
by a Homestead Patent be declared null and void for having been executed
within the prohibited period of five years, in violation of Section 118 of
Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Law) and that he be allowed to
repurchase said parcel of land for being the legitimate son and sole heir of
his deceased father.
The defendants filed their answer, stating that the plaintiff has no
cause of action against them as his father, Ciriaco Enervida, is still living, the
petitioner is not only son of Ciriaco Enervida as he has also four other living
children and that the sale of the property in question did not take place
within the prohibited period provided for in Section 118 of the Public Land
Law, the sale having taken place on November 20, 1957, although ratified
and acknowledged on December 3, 1957, before a Notary Public.
During the pre-trial conference, petitioner admitted that his father
is still living and that he has four other living brothers and sisters who were
not joined as party-plaintiffs. He also admitted that the sale of the land in
question actually took place on November 20, 1957, but was formalized only
on December 3, 1957. He likewise admitted that the homestead patent was
issued on November 17, 1952 to his father, which was beyond the prohibited
period of 5 years. The CFI ruled that petitioner has no cause of action and
was prompted with malice and bad faith in taking his action to court by
alleging false statement in his complaint. The court dismissed the case and
ordered the petitioner to pay the defendants P2000 as actual moral and
exemplary damages and pay also the attorneys fees. On appeal to Court of
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Appeals, it certified the case to the Supreme Court for it involved purely
question of law.
Issue: Whether or not it is proper to award the defendant an actual moral
and exemplary damages when plaintiff filed unfounded civil case.
Held: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that with regard to the award of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS "in concept of actual, moral and exemplary damages ...",
the same is not proper for it would ran counter to the decision of this Court
9
in Deogracias Malonzo vs Gregoria Galang where it was ruled:
It will be observed that unlike compensatory or actual damages which are
generally recoverable in tort cases as long as there is satisfactory proof
thereof (Art. 2202), the Code has chosen to enumerate the cases in which
moral damages, may be recovered (Art. 2219). A like enumeration is made
in regard to the recovery of attorney's fees as an item of damage (Art.
2208). But the two enumerations differ in the case of a clearly unfounded
suit, which is expressly mentioned in Art. 2208 (par. 4), as justifying an
award of attorney's fees, but is not included in the enumeration of Art.
2219 in respect to moral damages. It is true that Art. 2219 also provides
that moral damages may be awarded in "analogous cases" to those
enumerated, but we do not think the Code intended" a clearly unfounded
civil action or proceedings" to be one of these analogous cases wherein
moral damages may be recovered, or it would have expressly mentioned
it in Art. 2219, as it did in Art. 2208; or else incorporated Art. 2208 by
reference in Art. 2219. Besides, Art. 2219 Specifically mentions "quasidelicts causing physical injuries", as an instance when moral damages may
be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in
physical injuries are excluded (Strebel vs. Figueras, 96 Phil. 321),
excepting, of course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309, par. 9, Art.
2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, and 34, 35 on the chapter on
human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).
146
Facts: Alberto Cauan and Leticia Yu Cauan got married on May 14, 1978. Out
of this marital union they begot 3 children: Albert, Honeylet and Arlene. They
separated in 1983. Albert and Arlene stayed with their mother Leticia while
Honeylet stayed with her grandmother Anita Yu. Leticia cohabited with the
accused Rodelio Bugayong and had one child, Catherine Bugayong.
On October 15, 1994 Bugayong had Arlene hold his penis inside the
room he shared with Leticia. At that time, Catherine Bugayong, who was 6
years old was also inside the same room and her father, the accused was
letting her sleep. Bugayong threatened to maim Arlene if she did not hold his
penis. When the penis was already hard and stiff, he placed it inside the
mouth of Arlene and a white substance came out from the penis. Catherine
saw this incident.
On the basis of a medico-legal examination conducted by the NBI,
and testimonies, Bugayong was convicted. Upon appeal, among other issued
involving the defects of the information, he questions the award of
PhP50,000.00 in damages ex-delicto in favor of the offended party:
Issue: Does the award damages by the trial court have basis?
Held: The court affirmed his conviction. The trial court correctly awarded
P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, an amount which is automatically granted
to the offended party without need of further evidence other than the fact of
the commission of rape.
Consistent with recent jurisprudence, appellant should also be ordered to
pay the victim the additional amount of P50,000 as moral damages. In People
v. Prades, the Court resolved that "moral damages may additionally be
awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the
Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof
as has heretofore been the practice."
147
Trinidad for a proposal for the payment of her indebtedness, since according
to GSIS the one-year period for redemption had expired.
Atty. Francisco protested against the GSIS request for proposal of
payment because of the existence of the agreed offer dated 20 February
1959. However, GSIS countered stating that the telegram should be
disregarded in view of its failure to express the contents of the board
resolution due to the error of its minor employees in couching the correct
wording of the telegram which provides that approval of the compromise is
subject to the condition that Mr. Vicente J. Francisco shall pay all expenses
incurred by the GSIS in the foreclosure of the mortgage.
GSIS moved for the consolidated the title to the compound in its name, and
gave notice thereof to the plaintiff and to each occupant of the compound.
Hence, the plaintiff instituted the present suit, for specific performance and
damages.
Both parties appealed. GSIS appealed the decision of declaring null and void
the consolidation of the lots, while Trinidad appealed because the trial court
did not award the P535,000.00 damages and attorney's fees she claimed.
Issue: Is the lower court correct in not awarding damages to plaintiff?
Held: YES. The court a quo correctly refused to award such actual or
compensatory damages because it could not determine with reasonable
certainty the difference between the offered price and the actual value of
the property, for lack of competent evidence. Without proof we cannot
assume, or take judicial notice, as suggested by the plaintiff, that the practice
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of lending institutions in the country is to give out as loan 60% of the actual
value of the collateral.
There was no error also denying moral damages, not only on
account of the plaintiff's failure to take the witness stand and testify to her
social humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., as the decision holds, but
primarily because a breach of contract like that of defendant, not being
malicious or fraudulent, does not warrant the award of moral damages under
Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
There is also no basis for awarding exemplary damages either, because this
species of damages is only allowed in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated, or compensatory damages, none of which have been allowed in
this case.
As to attorneys' fees, we agree with the trial court's stand that, in
view of the absence of gross and evident bad faith in defendant's refusal to
satisfy the plaintiff's claim, and there being none of the other grounds
enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, such absence precludes a
recovery. The award of attorneys' fees is essentially discretionary in the trial
court, and no abuse of discretion has been shown.
148
remitted to Expertravel through its then Chairperson, Ms. Ma. Rocio de Vega,
who was theretofore authorized to deal with the clients of Expertravel. The
payment was evidenced by a Monte de Piedad Check for P42,175.20 for
which Ms. de Vega, in turn, issued City Trust Check No. 417920 in favor of
Expertravel for the amount of P50,000.00, with the notation "placement
advance for Ricardo Lo, etc." Per its own invoice, Expertravel received the
sum on 10 October 1987.
The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, held that the
payment made by Lo was valid awarding moral damages, attorneys fees and
cost of the suit in favor of Lo. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Can moral damages be recovered in a clearly unfounded suit? Can
moral damages be awarded for negligence or quasi-delict that did not result
to physical injury to the offended party?
Held: NO. Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at
times be a legal justification for an award of attorney's fees, such filing,
however, has almost invariably been held not to be a ground for an award of
moral damages. The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The anguish suffered by a
person for having been made a defendant in a civil suit would be no different
from the usual worry and anxiety suffered by anyone who is haled to court, a
situation that cannot by itself be a cogent reason for the award of moral
damages. If the rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every time
be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful
plaintiff.
NO. An award of moral damages would require certain conditions
to be met; to wit: (1) First, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental
or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be
a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by
the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of
the cases stated in Article 2219.Under the provisions of this law, in culpa
contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when
the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting
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149
in the same place by Metro Drug, the total value of which amounted to
P32,034.42. In partial payment of these receivables, a check was drawn by
Silverio, Jr. under the account name Farmacia delos Remedios amounting to
P14,180.46. The check however was subsequently dishonored due to
insufficient funds.
Metro Drug filed a telegram addressed to Aklan Drug demanding full
payment of outstanding account for P27,938.06. Lamenta tried to collect
from Editha Mijares for the disputed claim, but Editha referred him to Mr.
Silverio as the new operator and concessionaire of the drugstore. She
informed him verbally that they have no more business inside the Ospital ng
Maynila as the cooperative drugstore has already stopped operations.
Despite said verbal notice, the demand telegram addressed to Aklan Drug
was still sent to Editha Mijares. On Lamenta's follow-up of said telegram,
Editha again directed Lamenta to see Solomon Silverio, the new owner of the
drugstore.
Unfounded suits
Editha and Glicerio Mijares vs. CA and Metro Drug, Inc.
G.R. No. 113558 (April 18, 1997)
Facts: Petitioners Editha Mijares and Glicerio T. Mijares owners of Aklan Drug
had been buying pharmaceutical products from private respondent Metro
Drug since 1976. Editha Mijares, aside from being the operator of Aklan Drug,
was also an officer of the Ospital Ng Maynila Consumers Cooperative, a
concessionaire of a small area right inside the hospital compound where it
operated a drugstore. The Ospital ng Maynila Cooperative also had some
transactions with Metro Drug as supplier of pharmaceutical products.
Subsequently, the Cooperative was dissolved and stopped its operations in
October 1986.
On November 1, 1986, a Contract of Lease was entered into
between the City of Manila as lessor and Solomon Silverio, Jr. as lessee.
Silverio, Jr. as the new lessee, put up a drugstore on the same area occupied
by the Cooperative. On November 26, 1986, Metro Drug delivered
pharmaceutical products to the said store thru Dioscoro Lamenta, its
salesman/collector. More deliveries of pharmaceutical products were made
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Held: No. The Mijareses have failed to show that Metro Drug was motivated
by bad faith when it instituted the action for collection. In China Banking
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held that:
x x x Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the
presence of two elements, to wit: a) malice; and b) absence of probable
cause. Moreover, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by
a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated
deliberately knowing that the charge was false and baseless (Manila Gas
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]). Hence, mere filing of
a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be
unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the
right to litigate (Ponce v. Legaspi, 208 SCRA 377 [1992]; Saba v. Court of
Appeals, 189 SCRA 50 [1990]); Rubio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488
[1986]). Settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that moral damages cannot
be recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against another in
good faith, or without malice or bad faith (Philippine National Bank v. Court
of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433 [1988]; R & B Surety and Insurance v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 736 [1984]). If damage results from the filing of
the complaint, it is damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electrical Company
v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).
For the same reasons, the award for attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation must likewise be deleted.
150
after its survey or else "lose his preferential right thereto." However, no such
application was filed.
Meanwhile, Ciriaco transferred his rights over another 1 hectare
portion of the lot to Michael Doble who in turn sold his rights to Ricardo Tan
(private respondents father).
When a survey of the lot was conducted, it was found out that the
lands occupied by de la Pena was bigger by hectare than what he actually
bought and paid for from Ciriaco and the land sold to Dobles (later acquired
by Tan) was very much smaller than what he actually bought. Although the
3/4-hectare portion was part of the area acquired by Doble, it was de la Pea
who cultivated the same without objection from Doble. However, when
Ricardo Tan acquired the lot, he built a fence to reclaim the portion, but de la
Pena kept destroying it; hence, the start of a boundary dispute.
On April 1977, de la Pena then filed a complaint for forcible entry
against Tan. The MTC which ruled in favor of de la Pena concluded that de la
Pena had prior possession of the land. The decision was affirmed by the CFI.
On July 1977, during the pendency of the forcible entry case, de la
Pena instituted the present action for reconveyance with damages against
Tan with the RTC. De la Pena alleged that Tan fraudulently registered the
hectare portion which was actually cultivated by the former. The trial court
ruled in favor of the Tan since the disputed hectare portion was not part of
the area bought and paid for by de la Pena. De la Pena was declared a mere
trespasser and planter in bad faith. His prayer for damages was likewise
denied. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court, hence this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the award for attorney's fees, moral damages and
expenses of litigation against the petitioner are proper.
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An award for attorney's fees and moral damages on the sole basis
of an action later declared to be unfounded in the absence of a deliberate
intent to cause prejudice to the other party is improper. The right to litigate
is so precious that penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise
it erroneously.
151
In the case at bar, petitioner filed for replevin case against private
respondent because of the latters own challenge that if he has a right over
the motorcycle petitioner should file a case in court. Therefore, it cannot be
said that the institution of the replevin suit was tainted with gross or evident
bad faith or was done to maliciously to harass, embarrass, annoy or ridicule
private respondent.
Moreover, the adverse result of an action dismissal of petitioners
complaint does not per se make an act unlawful and subject the actor to
the payment of moral damages. It is not a sound public policy to place a
premium on the right to litigate. No damages can be charged on those who
may exercise such precious right in good faith, even if done erroneously.
Further, the award of exemplary damages has no factual basis. It is
a requisite that the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton,
fraudulent or malevolent manner - circumstances which are absent in this
case. In addition, exemplary damages cannot be awarded as the requisite
element of compensatory damages was not present.
As to the attorneys fees, an adverse decision does not ipso facto
justify the award thereof to the winning party. Petitioner honestly thought
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152
property as soon as the full purchase price of the same is paid by the buyer.
Respondent HBI submitted the required affidavit purportedly executed by
Cometa as president of SITI (mortgagee).
Petitioner Cometa denied that he ever executed the affidavit. The
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) found Cometa's signature to be
forgery on the basis of which a complaint for falsification of public document
was filed against HBI president Guevara. However, the Rizal Provincial
Prosecutor's Office found no probable cause against Guevara and accordingly
dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, Secretary Drilon reversed the decision of the prosecutor
and ordered it to file information against Guevara. The trial court dismissed
the criminal case. Thereafter, Guevara and HBI file a complaint for malicious
prosecution against Cometa and SITI.
Issue: Whether or not the case for malicious prosecution states a cause of
action.
Held: A complaint for malicious prosecution sates a cause of action if it
alleges that (1) the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that at leas he
instigated the prosecution; (2) the prosecution finally terminated in the
plaintiff's acquittal; (3) that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted
without probable cause; and (4) that the prosecutor was actuated by
malice, i.e. by improper and sinister motives.
The mere allegation in a complaint for malicious prosecution that an
information was filed after preliminary investigation and that a warrant of
arrest was there after issued does not by itself negate allegations in the same
complaint that the prosecution was malicious. All criminal prosecutions are
by direction and control of the public prosecutor. To sustain petitioners'
stand that an allegation in a complaint for malicious prosecution that the
information in the criminal case was filed after appropriate preliminary
investigation negates a contrary allegation that the filing of the case was
malicious would result in the dismissal of every action for malicious
prosecution.
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153
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Osdana and taken in relation to the answer of petitioner show that indeed
there was breach of the employment contract and illegal dismissal
committed by petitioners principal.
Article 284 of the Labor Code is clear on the matter of termination
by reason of disease or illness, viz:
Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination An employer may terminate
the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any
disease and whose continued employment is prohibited bylaw or prejudicial
to his health as well as the health of his co-employees: x x x
154
While it would appear that the employment contract approved by the POEA
was only for a period of twelvemonths, Osdanas actual stint with the foreign
principal lasted for one year and seven-and-a-half months. It may be
inferred, therefore, that the employer renewed her employment contract for
another year. Thus, the award for the unexpired portion of the contract
should have been US$1,260 (US$280 x 4 months) or its equivalent in
Philippine pesos, not US$2,499 as adjudged by the labor arbiter and affirmed
by the NLRC.
As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential amounting to
US$1,076 representing seven months unpaid salaries and one month
underpaid salary, the same is proper because, as correctly pointed out by
Osdana, the no work, no pay rule relied upon by petitioner does not apply
in this case. In the first place,the fact that she had not worked from June 18
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to August 22, 1993 and then from January 24 to April 29,1994, was due to
her illness which was clearly work-related. Second, from August 23 to
October 5, 1993,Osdana actually worked as food server and cook for seven
days a week at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, but was not paid any salary
for the said period. Finally, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was
confined to quarters and was not given any work for no reason at all.
With respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the
same is likewise proper but should be reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule
that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee
was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor,
or was done in amanner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected
in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Finally, petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondents for holding it solely liable for the claims of Osdana
despite the fact that its liability with the principal is joint and several.
Petitioner misunderstands the decision in question. It should be noted that
contrary to petitioners interpretation, the decision of the labor arbiter which
was affirmed by the NLRC did not really. Petitioner was the only one held
liable for Osdanas monetary claims because it was the only respondent
named in the complaint and it does not appear that petitioner took steps to
have its principal included as co-respondent. Thus, the POEA, and later the
labor arbiter, did not acquire jurisdiction over the foreign principal.
Facts: Teodorico Cleopas and Florencio Pirame were both convicted by the
trial court for murder, the eye-witness Cipriano Supero saw them killing one
Pedro Torrenueva by hitting him with iron pipe while being held by the
accused Florencio Pirame. The trial court ordered to indemnify the surviving
spouse of the deceased victim Pedro Torrenueva in the amount of
P50,000.00 each and the amount of P23,214.00 representing burial and
incidental expenses and P50,000 representing moral and exemplary damages
and in all instances without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
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Pirame appealed the trial courts decision denying his participation in the
crime and alleging that the evidence against him was weak to begin with as
the eye-witness testimony was unbelievable, improbable and unreliable, as
he claims that Superos testimony were inconsistent and that he only
volunteered to testify two months after the crime. And so the case was
elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred regarding the conviction and
awarding of damages
Held: The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial court. Although
there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the
credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the
principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants. Slight
contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the sincerity of the witness
and prove that his testimony is not rehearsed. They are safeguards against
memorized perjury. As to the delay, it was a result of the fear that was
instilled upon him upon seeing the killing with his own eyes.
Regarding the amount of the damages awarded, the order to pay the
widow of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P23,214.00 as actual
damages, as well as the costs was AFFIRMED, but the award of P50,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages was DELETED, there being no legal and factual
basis. The award of P50,000.00 from each accused as moral and exemplary
damages, however, is unsupported. The widow of the victim did not testify
on any mental anguish or emotional distress, which she suffered as a result
of her husband's death. The absence of any generic aggravating circumstance
attending the crime likewise disqualified the award of exemplary damages.
The attendance of evident premeditation in the commission of the crime,
though alleged in the information, is not supported by the evidence, as there
is no showing as to when appellant and his co-accused determined to kill the
victim. Likewise, abuse of superior strength, being absorbed by
treachery, cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance in this case.
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Facts: In the evening of June 27, 1986, Napoleon Ong and Edgardo
Talanquines were walking along the national highway at Barangay Labog,
Brookes Point, Palawan, on their way home after coming from a birthday
party. When they were near the house of Jerry Boston, Edgardo heard a loud
thud. He turned around saw Napoleon slump to the ground. Suddenly,
someone hit Edgardo from behind with a piece of bamboo, causing him to
fall. He saw no one in the immediate premises except Carlos Arcona, the
petitioner. Edgardo then stood up and ran towards the house of Cesar
Umapas to ask for help.
Petitioner voluntarily surrendered. In his defense, petitioner alleged
that in the evening of June 27, 1986, he was walking alone when he met
Napoleon Ong and Edgardo Talanquines. Without any provocation, Napoleon
suddenly drew his bolo and swung the bolo at him twice but missed him. He
then drew out his knife and stabbed Napoleon. When he saw Edgardo
Talanquines rushing towards him, he grabbed a piece of bamboo from the
newly constructed culvert and hit the former on the left arm. Talanquines
ran away. Petitioner also left the premises and went home. On the way, he
met his brother, Benito, and together they proceeded to their house. After
trial, the court a quo rendered judgment convicting Carlos of Homicide and
acquitting Benito Arcona and ordered that the former pay the amount of
30,000 pesos for the death of Napoleon Ong and 10,000 pesos moral
damages. For the charge of Slight Physical Injuries Benito Arcona was found
guilty and Carlos was acquitted. On appeal, the Court affirmed the decision
of the lower court but increased the civil indemnity to the heirs of Napoleon
Ong to 50,000 pesos.
Petitioner Carlos Arcona y Moban and his brother Benito Arcona y
Moban were charged with Murder and Frustrated Murder in separate
informations. The charges arose from the death of Napoleon Ong after he
was attacked and stabbed by Carlos and Benito Arcona y Moban.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in increasing the civil
indemnity due to the heirs of Napoleon Ong.
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Held: Yes. The Court of Appeals was correct in increasing the amount of civil
indemnity to P50,000.00, in line with existing jurisprudence. In cases of
murder, homicide, parricide and rape, civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00 is automatically granted to the offended party or his heirs in case
of his death, without need of further evidence other than the fact of the
commission of the crime.
On the other hand, the award of moral damages in the sum of P
10,000.00 must be increased to P50,000.00. As borne out by human nature
and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family. It is inherently
human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes
the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not
only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them
forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the
gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason,
moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and
proof of the heirs emotional suffering.
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Court which ruled in his favor ordering PNB, among others, to pay the
amount of the checks dishonored plus moral damages in the amount of
1,000,000.00 pesos. The same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the award of P1,000,000.00 moral damages in addition
to actual claim of inordinately disproportionate and unconscionable
Held: YES. We concur with the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals as to the award of moral damages, however the amount of
P1,000,000.00 for moral damages in addition to Flores' actual claim of
P100,000.00 is "inordinately disproportionate and unconscionable." The
following factors were taken into consideration:
First, Flores' contention that he lost the opportunity to purchase a house and
lot in Baguio City due to petitioner's gross negligence is based solely on his
own testimony and a mere general statement at that. The broker he named
during his cross-examination, Mr. Nick Buendia was not even presented to
confirm the aforementioned allegation.
Second, the award of moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 is
obviously not proportionate to the actual losses of P100,000.00 sustained by
Flores. The moral damages awarded must be commensurate with the loss or
injury suffered. Moral damages though incapable of pecuniary estimations,
are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for
actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. It is not
intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are
awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or
amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone,
by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at the
restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante,
and it must be proportional to the suffering inflicted.
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countered that Fule could not have been fooled because he had vast
experience with jewelry. Nevertheless, Fule took back the $300 and
the jewelry he paid them.
Fule filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court against
Cruz and Atty. Bellarmino praying, among other things, that the
contract of sale over the Tanay property be declared null and void on
the ground of fraud and deceit. The lower court issued a temporary
restraining order directing the Register of Deeds of Rizal to refrain
from acting on the pertinent documents involved in the transaction.
However, the same court lifted its previous order and denied the
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision in favor of
Cruz and Atty. Bellarmino. In awarding damages to the defendants,
the lower court found that Fule acted in bad faith. The court awarded
Cruz and Atty. Bellarmino moral damages and exemplary damages.
The court also granted both P25,000.00 each as attorneys fees and
litigation expenses. A petition with the Court of Appeals yielded the
same result, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in awarding damages.
Held: No. In the instant case, the trial court awarded damages
analogous to malicious prosecution under Article 2219(8) of the NCC
for the following reasons:
The malice with which Fule filed the case is apparent. As an
experienced jeweler who thoroughly examined the earrings himself
and went so far as to sketch them earlier, it is illogical that he would
fail to exert extra effort to check its genuineness at the precise
moment of the exchange. His acts thus failed to accord with what an
ordinary prudent man would have done in the same situation.
As an experienced businessman and banker, he was shrewd
enough to bloat the propertys price from Php25,000.00 to
Php75,000.00 only a few days after he had purchased it for a far
lower cost, the value of which still fell short of the diamond earrings
price.
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to pay respondent Pantejo P300.00 which, due to the ordeal and anguish he
had undergone, the latter decline. The Regional Trial Court of Surigao City,
rendered judgment in the action for damages filed by Pantejo against
Philippine Airlines, Inc., ordering the latter to pay Pantejo among others,
P150,000.00 as moral damages. On appeal, respondent court affirmed the
decision of the court a quo, but with the exclusion of the award of attorney's
fees and litigation expenses.
Issue: WON the award of P 150,000.00 as moral damages was proper.
Held: Yes. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff
at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to allow the former
to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendant's culpable action and
must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted. However,
substantial damages do not translate into excessive damages. Under the
peculiar circumstances of this case, the awards for actual, moral and
exemplary damages granted in the judgment of respondent court, for the
reasons meticulously analyzed and thoroughly explained in its decision, are
just and equitable.
Valenzuela vs. CA
G.R. No. 115024 (February 7, 1996)
Facts: Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving along Aurora Blvd. when
she realized she had a flat tire. She parked along the sidewalk, put on
her emergency lights, and opened the cars trunk. She was at the left
side of the rear of her car. While she was talking to a man who will
help her fix the tire, she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by
defendant Richard Li which was registered in the name of Alexander
Commercial, Inc.
Because of the impact, Valenzuela was thrown against the
windshield of Lis car and fell onto the ground. The cars windshield on
the other hand, was also destroyed,. Valenzuela's left leg was severed
up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle
connected to the rest of the body. She was confined in the hospital
159
for 20 days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. She then
filed a claim for damages against Li.
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Ruling: In view of the foregoing, this Court cannot but concur with the
trial court and the Court of Appeals in finding the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Anent the award of
damages, however, this Court upholds the Court of Appeals' ruling on
the matter. Eliminating the award of actual or compensatory damages
in the form of hospitalization expenses and loss of income, the Court
of Appeals cited the failure of the complainant to offer any proof of
the same. To justify a grant of actual or compensatory damages, it is
necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised
upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the
injured party, the actual amount of loss.
Anent the increase in the amount of moral damages awarded,
suffice it to state that the nature of the injuries and the degree of
physical suffering endured by the complainant warrants the same.
The tragic incident caused a mutilation of complainant's left ear and a
permanent scar on his right forearm. These injuries have left indelible
marks on the complainant's body and will serve as a constant
reminder of this traumatic experience. The Court finds the award of
nominal and moral damages both in the amount of P10,000.00
justified under the circumstances.
Facts: Sen. Fernando Lopez, his wife, son-in-law, and his daughter
made reservations, through their agency, for first class
accommodations in the Tokyo San
Francisco flight of PAN-AM. PAN-AM's San Francisco head
office confirmed their reservations. Subsaquently, first class tickets
were issued, with the total fare having been previously paid.
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Held: The Court held that Spouses Chua are entitled to moral and
exemplary damages. Moral and exemplary damages may be awarded
without proof of pecuniary loss. In awarding both, the court shall take
into account the circumstances surrounding the case and assess
damages according to its discretion.
The dishonor of Chuas checks and the foreclosure case
initiated by the bank against Chua adversely affected his credit
standing, as well as his business dealings. Article 2217, in relation to
Article 2220, entitles Spouses Chua to moral damages. Obviously, the
bank's wrongful acts caused serious anxiety, embarrassment, and
humiliation to Chua.
The acts of the bank (the malicious and unwarranted
application for extrajudicial foreclosure done by the bank to harass,
embarrass, annoy, and ridicule Chua, as well as the bank's failure to
credit the deposit of Chua which constituted gross negligence in the
performance of the banks contractual obligation) were accompanied
by bad faith and done in wanton, fraudulent and malevolent manner
warranting the award of exemplary damages in favor of Chua, in
accordance with Article 2232 of the Civil Code.
Of course, a plaintiff need not prove the actual extent of
exemplary damages, for its determination is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court upon proof of the plaintiff's entitlement to
moral, temperate, or compensatory damages (Article 2234, Civil
Code).
Anent the award of actual damages, the injured party must
prove his case in order to recover. When the existence of a loss is
established, absolute certainty as to its amount is not required. The
benefit to be derived from a contract which one of the parties has
absolutely failed to perform is of necessity to some extent, a matter
of speculation, but the injured party is not to be denied for that
reason alone. He must produce the best evidence of which his case is
susceptible and if that evidence warrants the inference that he has
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164
sustained as result of willful act, unless such act was directed toward
person or property or person seeking recovery.
The rule on this point, as stated in the American Jurisprudence,
is: "In law mental anguish is restricted as a rule, to such mental pain or
suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as
distinguished from that form of mental suffering which is the
accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering or which
arises from a contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of
another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot recover
for mental suffering caused by his or her sympathy for the other's
suffering." It should be noted that plaintiff is not even related to Dr.
Hernandez. The latter's wife is a daughter of Mrs. Strebel by a previous
marriage. Hence Dr. Hernandez is merely related by affinity, not to
Strebel, but to a relative by affinity of said plaintiff.
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Del Rosario and ABS-CBN general manager, Eugenio Lopez III, met at
the Tamarind Grill Restaurant in Quezon City to discuss the package proposal
of Viva. Mr. Lopez testified that he and Mr. Del Rosario allegedly agreed that
ABS-CRN was granted exclusive film rights to fourteen (14) films for a total
consideration of P36 million; that he allegedly put this agreement as to the
price and number of films in a "napkin'' and signed it and gave it to Mr. Del
Rosario.
On the other hand, Del Rosario denied having made any agreement
with Lopez regarding the 14 Viva films; denied the existence of a napkin in
which Lopez wrote something; and insisted that what he and Lopez discussed
at the lunch meeting was Viva's film package offer of 104 films (52 originals
and 52 re-runs) for a total price of P60 million. Mr. Lopez promising to make
a counter proposal which came in the form of a proposal contract.
Thereafter, Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon discussed the terms and
conditions of Viva's offer to sell the 104 films, after the rejection of the same
package by ABS-CBN. On April 07, 1992, defendant Del Rosario received
through his secretary, a handwritten note from Ms. Concio, which reads:
"Here's the draft of the contract. I hope you find everything in order," to
which was attached a draft exhibition agreement a counter-proposal
covering 53 films, 52 of which came from the list sent by defendant Del
Rosario and one film was added by Ms. Concio, for a consideration of P35
million.
The said counter proposal was however rejected by Viva's Board of
Directors on the evening of the same day, April 7, 1992, as Viva would not
sell anything less than the package of 104 films for P60 million pesos and
such rejection was relayed to Ms. Concio. After the rejection of ABS-CBN and
following several negotiations and meetings defendant Del Rosario and
Viva's President Teresita Cruz, in consideration of P60 million, signed a letter
of agreement granting RBS the exclusive right to air 104 Viva-produced
and/or acquired films including the fourteen (14) films subject of the present
case.
Thereafter, ABS-CBN filed before the RTC a complaint for specific
performance with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order against private respondents Republic
Broadcasting Corporation, Viva Production and Del Rosario. RTC rendered a
165
decision in favor of RBS and VIVA and against ABS-CBN, ordering the latter to
pay, among others, P5 million as and by way of moral damages. On appeal,
respondent court found reasonable basis for the award of moral damages
holding that RBS's reputation was debased by the filing of the complaint and
denied VIVA and Del Rosario's appeal because it was "RBS and not VIVA
which was actually prejudiced when the complaint was filed by ABS-CBN."
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Nominal Damages
Ventanilla vs. Gregorio Centeno
G.R. No. 14333 (January 28, 1961)
Facts: Ventanilla instituted this action to recover damages against his lawyer,
Atty. Centeno for neglecting to perfect within the reglementary period his
appeal from an adverse judgment rendered by the CFI of Manila. Trial courts
facts showed that the required appeal bond was not filed by Atty. Centeno.
The fact that the record on appeal was admitted for filing is the best
evidence that Atty. Centeno had not in fact filed any appeal bond. The record
on appeal was disapproved because it was filed out of time and no appeal
bond had been filed by the plaintiff. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of
Ventanilla ordered Centeno to pay Ventanilla the sum of P200 as nominal
damages and the costs. Ventanilla appealed to the Court of Appeals and
claimed that the trial court erred, among others, in ordering Centeno to pay
only the sum of P200, and not P2,000 as nominal damages.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in the amount of the award of
nominal damages.
Held: No. Relative to the sufficiency of the sum of P200 as nominal damages
awarded by the trial court to the appellant, article 2221 of the new Civil Code
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People vs Gopio
G.R. No. 133925 (November 29, 2000)
Facts: Agustin Gopio was accused of committing statutory rape on Ma.
Princess Millano y, San Diego, an 11 year-old girl, against her will.
The incident was said to have taken place while the Brgy. San
Pascual, Obando Bulacan, was celebrating its town fiesta. The victim
allegedly went to Gopios store to buy cooking oil around 10:00 am but
instead was taken to the bedroom where she was raped. The victim kept
silent about the incident for fear of Gopio and of what her parents would
do to her. Likewise, the victim was ashamed and worried that her friends
would spread the news regarding her unfortunate experience.
On two other occasions, also in 1995, the victim related that she
was again raped by Gopio but remained silent about it.
It was only when the victim was examined Municipal Health
Clinic for complaints of pain in her navel that her mother, Luzviminda,
discovered that her daughter was no longer a virgin. Upon inquiry,
Princess admitted that Gopio had raped her.
The trial court convicted Gopio guilty of statutory rape,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The court
further ruled that Gopio is liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in
the amount of P3,727.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00, as moral
damages, and to pay the costs of the suit.
Issues: (1) Whether Gopio is liable of statutory rape and (2) whether
Gopio is liable to pay the heirs of the victim actual and moral damages
Held: (1) The Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court convicting the
accused of statutory rape. The testimony of the victim was clear and
categorical, positively identifying the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime.
(2) However, with respect to the award of actual damages, the
court ruled that the award of actual damages in the amount of P 3727.00
was deleted in the absence of proof as required in Article 219910.
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For their return flight, the Armovits arrived in the airport at 9:15
in the morning for their 10:30 AM flight, only to be rudely informed that
they cannot be accommodated because the 10:30 AM flight was
erroneous and that the 9:15 AM flight was already taking off.
The family was bumped off at the Manila International Airport.
Dr. Armovit complained that as a result of the bump off he was not
able to keep his appointments with his patients and that the family
suffered anguish, wounded feelings, and serious anxiety day and night
until they were informed that seats were available for them the following
day.
The trial court awarded the Armovits actual, moral, exemplary
and nominal damages; but on appeal the Court of Appeals deleted the
award of moral and nominal damages.
Issue: Whether the Armovits are entitled to moral and exemplary
damages arising from the breach of the contract of carriage
Held: The deletion of the moral damages on the ground that petitioners
did not take the witness stand to testify on "their social humiliation,
wounded feelings and anxiety, and that the breach of contract was not
malicious or fraudulent" was improper. Northwest Airlines was found
guilty of gross negligence in the issuance of the tickets with the
erroneous entry of date of departure and its failure to change the same
when the Armovits had reconfirmed their flight. The gross negligence of
the airline amounted to malice and bad faith and tainted the breach of
air transportation contract.
There was sufficient indicia of malice and bad faith on the part of
the airline when it issued the tickets, failed to correct the dates and
rudely informed the Armovits that they were not to be accommodated.
The petitioners are evidently entitled to moral damages. Their
failure to testify is of no moment since it was explained the assassination
of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. resulting to turmoil in the country
refrained the Armovits from coming back to testify; nevertheless, Atty.
Raymundo Armovit who was with the complainants at the time of the
incident, took the witness stand. By the same token to provide an
example for the public good, an award of exemplary damages is also
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Temperate Damages
People vs. Singh
G.R. No. 129782 (June 29, 2001)
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170
Facts: Leonor Fabula went out of her house in May-anao, Tigaon, Camarines
Sur to buy sugar at a nearby store. When she reached the store, she saw
appellant boxing her son Romeo Fabula and banging his head on the post of
the store, while asking him why he told the police about his brother and the
location of appellant's house. When Leonor sought to intervene, appellant
got angry at her.
She became afraid and asked for help but nobody went near them.
Romeo freed himself from the hold of appellant and ran away. Appellant
chased Romeo with a small bolo known locally as "gatab." Leonor shouted at
appellant to stop but the latter did not heed her pleas. Appellant caught up
with Romeo and stabbed him at the back causing Romeo to fall on the
ground. Appellant continued to stab Romeo in the upper and lower chest
area. Leonor continued shouting for help and eventually someone came to
help. However, when she saw her son no longer moving, she told the people
not to touch or move him because she was going to the Poblacion of Tigaon
to get a policeman.
When Patrolmen Virgilio Azucena and Jose Madera arrived at the
scene of the crime, they saw the fallen body of Romeo with a small bolo
imbedded on his chest and the detached handle of the bolo on the ground
near his body. On June 10, 1991, appellant was charged with the crime of
murder After trial, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellant
guilty of the crime of murder and ordered Plazo to indemnify the heirs of the
late Fabula for the latter's death the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00); the sum of Fifteen Thousand Seven Hundred Twelve Pesos
(P15,712.00) as actual damages; and the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) as moral damages.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in the award of actual damages.
Held: The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as
indemnity. However, the award of actual damages in the amount of
P15,712.00 was based solely on the bare assertions of the mother of the
victim. The Court can only grant such amount for expenses if they are
supported by receipts. In the absence thereof, no actual damages can be
awarded. However, in lieu of actual damages, TEMPERATE DAMAGES under
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Art. 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered where it has been shown that
the victim's family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof
cannot be proved with certainty. We find the award of P15,000.00 as
temperate damages reasonable. Moral damages cannot be awarded in the
absence of any evidence to support its award.
PNB vs.
CA11
Facts: private respondent Loreto Tan is the owner of the land which
has been expropriated by the government. After the proceedings, Tan
requested the release to him of the expropriation price of P32,
480.00. The trial court ordered the PNB to release the same to Tan as
deposited in it by the government. Petitioners Asst.branch manager,
Juan Tagamolilia, issued managers check for the said amount and
delivered it to Sonia Gonzaga without Tans knowledge. As a
consequence, Tan demanded the payment from PNB which refused
on the ground that they had already paid the same based on the SPA
allegedly executed in her favour by Tan. Tan therefore executed an
affidavit contending that he had never executed such SPA nor
authorized Gonzaga to receive it. PNB, on the other hand, failed to
produce the SPA as directed by the court. The TC ruled against the
PNB. CA affirmed the same but deleted the award of P5, 000.00 for
exemplary damages and P5, 000.00 for attorneys fees.
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Issues: (1) Whether or not an SPA existed. (2) Whether or not the
award of attorneys fees and exemplary damages is proper.
Held: (1) No. Under the best evidenced rule, only the original
document is the best evidence of the fact as to whether the creditor
authorized a third person to receive the payment from the debtor and
in the absence of such document, the debtors argument regarding
due payment must fail.
In this case, since PNB failed to prove the SPA as an evidence,
its contention that they paid petitioner must fail.
11