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MANGA RESERVOTR RECORD FLOOD IN RIVER JHELUN OF 10-93-41 ee oe Resume of Flood On 9-9-1992 at 0600 hours the inflows in Muugla Reservoir slightly increased when the level rose up to 1202.75 SPD, whereas the outflow was 32000 cusecs from Power Station only. Although it was felt o flashet but even then at 0912 jwote main spillway gates were opened for @ maximum discharge of 1,08,000 at reservoir a was received from Flood Warning Station at 1000f hours that a flood discharge of 3.5 lac to 4.5 lac cusecs is oD Ey Subsequently wireless wessege |) reaching Hengle Reservoir. Schematic disgrau of River Jhelua ‘is attached at Exhibiv<2, Actually ‘first peak of high flood of 9,287,075 cuseos reached Hengla on 9-9-1992 at 1700 hours when the spille way was discharging 5,25,010 cusecs at clevation 1 the level was kept at elevation 1206.93 SPD upto the spillway discharge of 5,89,500 cusecs. way outflows were steadily increased to the uaxiuua disgharge the epill- of 9 lec cusecs at O430 hours on 10-9-1952 when the reservoir ion 1207.83 SPD. This was the nd UL val level rose upti peak of record flood cf 10,90,000 cusecs which entered the reservoir, The full arge from spillway was in addition to the 33,000 cusecs frow the Power Station, The erodible bund is at elevation 7120900°SPD end yas raised frow elevation 1206.00 SPD a uonth before to cater for the reised conservation level of 1204' SPD. Although this heavy discharge of 9 lac cusecs from wain spillwey wes within the permissible values which was also agreed on telephone both by General Manager (D&C)and Chief Engineer DSO but even then it brought great havoc and catastrophe in Jhelum Town on downstream of Mangla Dam, The horrific flood water gushing through fully opened main spillway rushed down, destroying, crops, bridges and buildings in the river course of about 30 wiles below the reservoir, The violent beating of the waves washed awey the hamilton bridge and the clay beds of both the abutments exe posing them and thereby widened the tailrace channel on both sides of the bridge. ‘There was no other way to control the high flood in Jhelum River of 9,87,015 cusecs at 1700 houra~ on 9-9-92 followed by another record high flood or 10,90,000 | cusecs at 0430 hour: on 10-9-1992 as sxplained below. By the Grace of God this high flood was controlled with the operation of Hain Spillway and Power Station et 0600 hours on 14-9=$2 when the spillway discharge was reduced to 1,26,000 susece. Hydrograph of major historic flood in River Jhelum at Bxhibit-3, Emergency Spililwey The flood storage zone of 1207.83" to 1228.7' SPD was not utilized during this bigh flood due to the non-operation of Euergency Spillway for the following reasons: (4) In absence of a permanent access bridge over River Thelua the communication between A.K. territory and ing of Bara Kes Nalleh and was aleo not advisable from Punjab would have been disrupted due to the flo. defence point of view, Cont ae... 3/~ Be se (4i) fhe main spillway alone was capable of passing of 9 lec cusece flood water without sigaificent sur- charge above 1209" SPD i.e, top of efrodible bund. (4di) The emergency spillway would have discharged only 25,000 cusecs at the reservoir level of 1208" SPD which is a meager discharge being catered by the main spillway. (iv) the operation of emergency spillway could have caused severe damages to the different installe- tions, residential and non-residentiel buildings, ¥.G.Gollege, Grid Station, Stores both of Army Corps HQ and. WAPDA located in the channel of ewergency spillway, (v) In addition to the above the defence installation would have been exposed to the flood water in the energency spillway channel. (vi) It would have flooded the 4.K. territory beyond 1210'SPD for which payment has never been wade, Pak Arey The Station Commander Pek Army Mangla Cantt was immediately informed by Resident Engineer(Civil) at 1020 hours on 9-9-1992. Soon after he received a wireless message from the Flood Werning Station that @ high flood is going to enter Mengla Reservoir and that they should remove their valuable property/installations ete from the exergency channel to so: other safer place. A plan/drewing showing the flood limits, due to the operation of caergency spillway channel at different Cont'd... .4/~ 4 elevations of the reservoir level, was provided to the Station Commander alongwith the messege. The said plan was previously supplied to the Army HQ Mangla on similar eccasion during flood season. The high officers of ary rushed for the inspection of erodible bund, which was raised from 1205' SPD to elevation 1209' SPD in the emergency spillway in-take channel, at about 1415 hours on 9-9-92, The reservoir level was 1204.50" SPD and the outflow from reservoir was 1,84,000 cusecs against the inflow of 4,70,000 cusecs. The Corps Commander discussed flood situation with Resident Engineer(Civil) at site and also sdvised bis to avoid over topping. The Corps Commander also assured (verbally: that he will provide a temporary bridge in case of failure of Hamilton Bridge at a discharge exceeding 2,50,000 cusecs. The Aray Military Police was regularly watching the ‘flood situation and the behaviour of erodible bund. the Corps Commander was inquiring on telephone from Chief - Engineer Mangla the status of the flood situation. On 10-9-1992 two Brigadiers and a General visited Chief Engineer Mangla Office to observe the spillway operations in detail. The concerned high ups of Army Officers congradulated Chief Engineer Mangla for the gucceseful operation of flood routing when by the Grace of God this high flood was controlled, The Amy Officers fully concentrated ox the protection of the temporary erodible bund and its safety due to defence point of view i.e, to protect their defence installations Cont'd... 6S/= would have resulted in case of flooding of Bara Kes Nalleh and damage of the access bridge. ‘The situation was such that the high record flood of 10,90,000 cuseca | received in the reservoir was shaved off to 9,00,000 Os. | on the downstream of the Dam. This flooded the low lying erea and caused colossal damages to the people stated to be unaware and unprepared. The high floods received should have been controlled in a better way provided the inflows of the high floods were known to us, We only relied on our own discharges from the main spillway which were adjusted from time to time to over-come the increasing level in the Reservoir, Access Bridge end Link Roads The existing temporary haimilton bridge washed away at 2315 hours when the elevation of Reservoir was 1206.93' SPD and the spillway was discharging 5,89,500 cusecs, The tailrace channel was deeply scoured by about 30 Teet to 40 feet when the clay beds on both the abutments were washed away thus widening the river channel to approximately double of its previous size. This deep scour exposed the abutments and pier No. 1 was completely sunk down and tilted and the bridge washed sway. Drawing showing piers location at Exhibit-+. Re-alignment of Dina Mirpur Link rosd is « required above the high flood level. We have practically sentially noticed during high flood that the existing Dine - Mirpur Gont'd,.26/- Se ~6- road was flooded near Pendori bridge and the Army Astable near Baral Colony when the spillway wes discharging 3,81,000 cusecs at 1900 hours on 9-9-1992 and rewained submerged till 2000 hours on 10-9-1992 when the spillway discharges were reduced to 5,81,000 cusecs. Flocd Damages i) Callender hamilton bridge collapsed and washed away. di) Mangle Rawat Power Supply line ( Two No. Towers) (132 KV) completely up-rooted and washed away, iii) Exceasive cutting of both the banks of tailrace and the river channel down to right benk colony with deep scour at pier No. 1 of the bridge. iv) Water supply line of Colonies, Telecomuunication ) syatem between Mangla and outside stations was coupletely damaged. v) The Power House Machine Cooling System was badly affected by flood water being highly muddy which choked all filters and resulted in rise in temp: of the units for which the Power House was under loaded, vi) Drinking water of main colony was badly affected because of choking of filters due to muddy flood wate: vii) The high discharge of Main Spillvay flooded the toe of Main Dam resulting in choking of the filter bed (drainage uatress) under the dowstreeu shoulder at station 89400 to 90400, ‘The stored water in the filter bed was subsequently oozing out in the fora of piping and boiling in the low line area near the

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