4th Exam Article 80 113 Case Digests and Special Laws

4th Exam Coverage (Article 80-113 RPC)
[CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS+ SPECIAL LAWS]
Art 80. Suspension of Sentence of Minors
under suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the
child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order
execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until
the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of
age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying Rep. Act
9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his
case is concerned.
Rennie Declarador vs Hon. Gubaton et. Al.

GR 159208 (August 18, 2006)
Facts:
Accused was 17 years old when he stabbed his female teacher in high school 15
times which resulted to the latters death. Based on the evidence and his plea of guilt, accused
was convicted of murder with qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation but the court
considered accuseds minority as a special mitigating circumstance thus his sentence was
lowered. Instead of reclusion perpetua, the maximum term of imprisonment of reclusion temporal
was given in view of the mitigating circumstance. Further the sentence was suspended and
commitment to youth rehabilitation center was ordered. This is pursuant with PD 603 as
amended.
People of the Philippines vs. Richard Sarcia

GR 169641 (September 10, 2009)
Facts:
Petitioner, however, claimed that under Art. 192 of PD 603 and AM 02-1-18-SC, the
sentence should not have been suspended since the juvenile convicted committed an offense
punishable by death, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua.
Accused was 17 years old when he raped the victim who was then a minor. He was
convicted of rape with a penalty of death which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 2005.
During the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court, RA 9344 took effect. Before the
promulgation of SC decision, accused was already 31 years old.
ISSUE
ISSUE
Whether the accuseds sentence should be suspended since the crime committed is
punishable by reclusion perpetua but due to the mitigating circumstance of minority the sentence
given was reduced to reclusion temporal given the fact that RA 9344 took effect.
Whether SEC 38 and 40 of RA 9344 to the suspension of sentence apply to the

instant case.
HELD
The application of suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. Sec 38 does
not distinguish as to which crimes the suspension of sentence is applicable. It applies even to
heinous crimes such as in this case even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of
age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his guilt. However, Sec. 40 limits the
suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21.
HELD
No. The basis of the exclusion of suspension of sentence is the imposable penalty for
the crime regardless of the actual penalty given. Under the RPC, the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua to death. RA 9344 superseded PD 603 but retained the provisions regarding
disqualifications in the suspension of sentence such as the case at bar. Thus, the suspension of
sentence was improper.
Though the accused is already 31 years old, he is entitled to appropriate disposition

under Sec. 51 of RA 9344 where in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, he may be
ordered to serve in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Michael Padua vs People of the Philippines
The civil liability remains the same and unaffected.
GR 168546 (July 23, 2008)

Facts:
Robert Remiendo vs. People of the Philippines GR 184874 (October 9, 2009)
Petitioner, who was then 17 years old, was involved in selling illegal drugs. Initially in
his arraignment he pleaded not guilty but re-entered his plea of guilty to avail the benefits of firs
time offenders. Subsequently, he applied for probation but was denied. In his petition for
certiorari, the court said that probation and suspension of sentence are different and provisions
in PD 603 or RA 9344 cannot be invoked to avail probation. It is specifically stated that in drug
trafficking, application for probation should be denied. As a side issue, the court discussed the
availment of suspension of sentence under RA 9344.
Facts:
ISSUE
Issues:
Petitioner was a minor whose age is above 15 but below 18 years old when he raped
a minor when the latter was left alone in her house. In violating the minor, he threatened to kick
the latter if she would shout for help. Petitioner was convicted of rape but on appeal invoked a
suspension of sentence pursuant to RA 9344. By the time he was convicted by the trial court
and before the case was elevated to the CA, he was already 22 years old.
Whether petitioner is exempt from criminal liability.
Whether suspension of sentence under RA 9344 can still be invoked given the fact
that the accused is now 21 years old.
Whether petitioner is entitled to a suspension of sentence under Sec. 38 and 40 of RA
HELD
9344.
NO. The suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no
longer be retroactively applied for petitioners benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides
that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law
Held:
No. Since his age is above 15 and below 18, the finding of discernment is necessary
to determine if he would be exempt from criminal liability. In this case, his act of waiting for the
victims parents to leave the house before defiling the latter and threatening to kick her if she
should shout prove that petitioner can differentiate what is right and wrong.
and he boxed the victim to weaken her defense. These are indicative of then 17 year-old
appellants mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of his unlawful action.
Furthermore, Sec. 38 and 40, suspension of sentence, can no longer be availed since
by the time his sentence was imposed by the trial court, he was already 22 years old. Sec 40
provides that If the child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while
under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence
for a certain period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
To give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a
child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of
twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The
offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance
with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a
productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of
the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender
committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HERMIE M. JACINTO, AccusedAppellant.
RA No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of
conviction is pronounced. According to the law, the appellant may be confined in an agricultural
camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Hermie Jacinto, is charged and convicted in the lower courts of
raping a 5-year old child, AAA.
Jacinto is neighbors with the family of AAA for a long time and he was friends with the
victims father. The victim AAA knew Jacinto well, as she calls him kuya.
People vs Urban Salcedo et al
On January 2003, the victims father sent his other daughter, CCC, to the store to buy
cigarettes and the victim followed her older sister but did not return with the latter. The father
thought that she was left behind to watch television at another house. A witness saw Jacinto with
the victim later on, at the store where the latter was seated in his lap.
Facts: On June 1, 2001, Shiela Tabuag, Reina Malonzo, and Ediborah Yap, were serving their
duty shift as nurses at Jose Maria Torres Memorial Hospital in Lamitan, Basilan. Joel Guillo, the
hospital accountant, on the other hand, had just finished his duty and decided to rest in the
doctors quarter.
The victim testified that when she left the store with the accused Jacinto, he had
carnal knowledge of her. She went home crying after the incident.
At around 12:30 past midnight of June 2, 2001, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG for brevity) led by
Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Sabaya, with 30 armed followers entered and took control over said
hospital. Previously,however, another group of ASG with 60 followers led by Abu Umran hiked
towards Lamitan for the sole purpose of reinforcing the group of Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu
Sabaya. However, upon reaching the vicinity of the hospital, a firefight had already ensued
between the military forces and the group of Janjalani and Sabaya. Simultaneously, the band
also became entangled in a firefight with a civilian group led by one retired Col. Baet, who was
killed during the encounter. Moments later, the band fled to different directions, with its members
losing track of one another.
The victims father confronted Jacinto and called the police. AAA underwent a physical
check-up which leads to findings that she had been raped.
For his defense, Jacinto interposed an alibi, that he attended a birthday party at the
time of the incident and that the victim merely followed him when he went to the store.
The RTC found Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Thereafter, the defense
moved to reopen the trial for reception of newly discovered evidence. It is stated that appellant
Jacinto was born on March 1, 1985. This means that at the time of the alleged commission of
the crime, he was merely 17 years old.
Pandemonium ensued in the hospital on that early morning, as the people were thrown into a
frenzy by the shouting, window glass breaking, and herding of hostages from one room to
another by the ASG. The group was also looking for medicine and syringes for their wounded
comrades as well as food and clothing. The firefight lasted until the afternoon of June 2,
2001. Finally, at around 6:00 in the evening, the ASG and the hostages, including those from the
Dos Palmas Resort, were able to slip out of the hospital through the backdoor, despite the
intense gunfire that was ongoing. Hence, the long and arduous hiking towards the mountains
began.
The RTC appreciated the new evidence and reduced the penalty. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused appellant Jacinto should be convicted of rape.
What is the imposable penalty on the appellant?
HELD/RATIO: Yes, SC confirms conviction. However due to the retroactive effect of RA
9344, and it being proven that Jacinto was a minor at the time the crime was committed
The rape that took place has been sufficiently proven in the court. Therefore, the
Supreme Court found sufficient ground for conviction.
On June 3, 2001, at about noontime, the group of Janjalani and Sabaya met with the group of
Abu Ben in Sinagkapan, Tuburan. The next day, Himsiraji Sali with approximately 60 followers
also joined the group. It was only on the third week on July that year that the whole group of Abu
Sayaff was completed, when it was joined by the group of Sattar Yacup, a.k.a. Abu Umran.
In 2003, at the time of the commission of the crime, Jacinto was 17 years old. Though
the RA 9344 took effect only in 2006, it is given a retroactive effect.
Subsequently, new hostages from the Golden Harvest plantation in Tairan, Lantawan were
abducted by the Hamsiraji Sali and Isnilun Hapilon.
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18) years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with
discernment, in which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be
observed.
On June 12, 2001, Abu Sabaya informed the hostages that Sobero had been beheaded and
was warned of the consequences should said hostages fail to cooperate with the ASG. Hence,
the ASG formed a striking force that then proceeded to behead 10 innocent civilians.
In the present case, Jacinto showed discernment in committing the crime as proven by
the facts that he choose an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection
On October 1, 2001, Reina Malonzo was separated from the other hostages and taken to
Zamboanga City by Abu Arabi with two other ASG members on board a passenger watercraft to
stay at a house in Sta. Maria. Later on October 13, 2001, a firefight broke out between the ASG
and the military, giving Joel Guillo and 3 other hostages the opportunity to escape from their
captors. On even date, Sheila Tabuag was released together with 2 other hostages from Dos
Palmas, allegedly after paying ransom. Reina Malonzo was soon after also released by order of
Khaddafy Janjalani on November 1, 2001.
It should be emphasized that at the time the trial court was hearing the case and even at the
time it handed down the judgment of conviction against accused-appellants on August 13, 2004,
Finally, after a shootout between the ASG and the military on June 7, 2002, at Siraway,
Zamboanga del Norte, Ediborah Yap, died at the hands of her captors. Thereafter, a manhunt by
the military was conducted, where the accused-appellants were subsequently captured and held
for trial.
R.A. No. 9344 had not yet been enacted into law. The procedures laid down by the law to prove
the minority of accused-appellants were not yet in place. Hence, the rule was still that the burden
of proving the minority of the accused rested solely on the defense. The trial court, in the
Issue:
absence of any document stating the age of the aforementioned four accused-appellants, or any
Ruling: he Court sustains the trial court's and the appellate court's ruling regarding the minority
corroborating testimony, had to rely on its own observation of the physical appearance of
of accused-appellants Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar. Iblong claimed he was born on
accused-appellants to estimate said accused-appellants' age. A reading of the afore-quoted
August 5, 1987; Mandangan stated his birth date as July 6, 1987; Salcedo said he was born on
Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 shows that this manner of determining accused-appellants' age is
January 10, 1985; and Jaafar claimed he was born on July 13, 1981. If Jaafar's birth date was
also sanctioned by the law. The accused-appellants appeared to the trial court as no younger
indeed July 13, 1981, then he was over 18 years of age when the crime was committed in June
than twenty-four years of age, or in their mid-twenties, meaning they could not have been under
of 2001 and, thus, he cannot claim minority. It should be noted that the defense absolutely failed
eighteen (18) years old when the crime was committed.[13] As discussed above, such factual
to present any document showing accused-appellants' date of birth, neither did they present
finding of the trial court on the age of the four accused-appellants, affirmed by the CA, must be
testimonies of other persons such as parents or teachers to corroborate their claim of minority.
accorded great respect, even finality by this Court.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that:
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the four accused-appellants were indeed less than
Sec. 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of
eighteen years old at the time the crime was committed, at this point in time, the applicability of
minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven
R.A. No. 9344 is seriously in doubt. Pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 are as follows:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is
found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the
court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application: Provided, however, That the suspension of
sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years
(18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's
birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of
other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of
doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor
If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate
xxxx
court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same court where the
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. -
case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be
xxxx
suspended.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period
or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.[14]
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other

government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age
of the child in conflict with the law.[12]
If accused-appellants' claim are true, that they were born in 1985 and 1987, then they have
found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the marked
already reached 21 years of age, or over by this time and thus, the application of Sections 38
money, two pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the ground.
and 40 of R.A. No. 9344 is now moot and academic.[15]

Issue:
However, just for the guidance of the bench and bar, it should be borne in mind that if indeed, an
Ruling:
accused was under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, then
The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the
as held inPeople v. Sarcia,[16] such offenders, even if already over twenty-one (21) years old at
said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the
the time of conviction, may still avail of the benefits accorded by Section 51 of R.A. No. 9344
RTC's Decision.
People vs Mantalaba
Facts:
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its
decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The
he Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City
RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and
received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years
Youth Welfare Code[31] and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
old at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a
with the Law,[32]the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of
buy-bust team was organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2)
judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life
poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2) pieces of P100 marked bills to be used in the
imprisonment to death.
purchase.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked
sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application,
money, proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust
thus:
operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is
under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine
and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended
sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each
other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the
latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police
officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon
rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the place.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various

circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence
of barangay officials Richard S. Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and
xxxx
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at
the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which
they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from
the retroactive application of this Act. x x x
Article 81-85 Death Penalty

R.A. 9346
AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES

However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia[33] that while Section 38 of
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic
Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the
Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand
Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all
other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly.
RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict
with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.
reaches the maximum age of 21. The provision states:

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court
finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child
in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with
the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition
or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought
before the court for execution of judgment.
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.
SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will
be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
SEC. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause the publication at least one a week for
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation of the names of persons
convicted of offenses punished withreclusion perpetua or life imprisonment by reason of this Act
who are being considered or recommend for commutation or pardon; Provided, however, That
nothing herein shall limit the power of the President to grant executive clemency under Section
19, Article VII of the Constitutions.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail
of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because
such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the
CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The
records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when
RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been
elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he
was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the
suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the
provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.[34]
Article 89. Modes of Extinguishing Criminal Liability
People vs Amistoso
Facts:
People vs Bayotas
Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Broca (Amistoso) was charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. 10106, with the rape of his
daughter, AAA,1 alleged to be 12 years old at the time of the incident. The
Information2 specifically charged Amistoso with statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph
(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Facts: Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June19, 1991.
While the appeal was pending, Bayotas died. The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect
of the appeal; however, it required the Solicitor-General to comment with regard to Bayotas civil
After trial, on March 23, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Decision3 finding Amistoso guilty, not of
statutory rape, but of qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Article
266-B, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The dispositive portion of the
RTC judgment reads:
liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the SolicitorGeneral expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil
liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. This comment was opposed by the
conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both criminal and civil penalties, he cited in support
WHEREFORE, accused ANASTACIO AMISTOSO, having been convicted of Qualified Rape,

he is hereby sentenced to the capital penalty of DEATH; to pay the victim the sum of Seventy[]Five Thousand Pesos (PhP75,000.00) as indemnity; to pay the said victim the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (PhP50,000.00) as for moral damages, and to pay the costs. 4cralaw
and invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo, which was held that the civil
Issue:
counsel of accused-appellant, arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of the
obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal responsibility and therefore civil liability is
Ruling: Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. 19cralaw virtualaw library
extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

Issue: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his civil liability.
Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court of
its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still
pending and unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistosos appeal only because it was not
immediately
informed
of
his
death.
Ruling:Yes. The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil
liability because tire liability is based solely on the criminal act committed. Corollarily, the claim
for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be
Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders the Courts Decision dated January 9, 2013,
even though affirming Amistosos conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision
has not yet become final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.
predicted as one source of obligation other than delict. Moreover, when a defendant dies before
judgment becomes executory, there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or
WHEREFORE,
not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists, for the simple reason that there is
the
Court RESOLVES to:cralawlibrary
(1) NOTE PIS Lansangans letter dated June 20, 2013 providing the Court with a certified true
copy
of
Amistosos
Death
Certificate;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary
no party defendant. The Rules of Court state that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final
after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or
(2) SET ASIDE its Decision dated January 9, 2013 and DISMISS Criminal Case No. 10106
before the RTC of Masbate City, Branch 48 by reason of Amistosos death on December 11,
2012;
and
totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. In
addition, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
(3) NOTE WITHOUT ACTION the Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts Decision dated
January 9, 2013 filed by the PAO given the Courts actions in the preceding paragraphs.
extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that
death supervenes before final judgment. As in this case, the right to institute a separate civil
action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover both the criminal
and the civil aspects of the case. The accused died before final judgment was rendered, thus,
he is absolved of both his criminal and civil liabilities based solely on delict or the crime
committed. Appeal dismissed.
Article 90. Prescription of Crimes
Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only
by information." However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the
prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with said courts.
Reodica vs CA
Facts:
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive

law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter
prevails.
On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doa
Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her
recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant
sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.
Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of
Complaint against petitioner with the Fiscal's Office.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal
Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus,
the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the
filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap
and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore,
uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the
information in this case.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge

Issue: Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.
Ruling:
I.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenge decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision
was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting

in slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the
other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount
of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.
Art 91. Computation of Prescription of Offenses

Cabral vs Puno
FACTS:
Petitioner Eugenio Cabral was accused of Falsification of Public Documents for allegedly
falsifying on August 14, 1948 the signature of private respondent Silvino San Diego in a deed of
sale of a parcel of land. Cabral moved to quash the Information on the ground of prescription of
the crime charge, since the said document of sale was notarized on August 14, 1948 and
registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on August 26, 1948. The said notarization
caused the cancellation of the original certificate of title and a new transfer certificate of title was
then issued. On March 25, 1975, the motion to quash was granted on the ground of prescription.
Private prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Resolution. However, according
to petitioner Cabral, respondent San Diego can no longer intervene in the criminal case, having
filed a civil action against the same accused (Cabral) on the basis of the same factual averments
contained in the criminal information. The Fiscal, upon the order of respondent Judge Puno,
submitted his comment expressing the view that the crime, has not prescribed as Silvino San
Diego stated that he only discovered the crime sometime in October 1970, and that in the
interest of justice, arraignment and trial is proper to ventilate the respective evidence of both
parties in their total meaning.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it
is necessary to determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's
office three days after the incident in question tolled the running of the
prescriptive period.
Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint of information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or
are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis
supplied)
Two (2) days later, respondent Judge set aside the grant of motion to quash. Petitioner Cabral
moved for reconsideration of the Order on the ground that (a) "the judgment of acquittal which
became final immediately upon promulgation and could not, therefore, be recalled for correction
or amendment"; and (b) by instituting Civil Case No. 120-V-74, respondent San Diego lost his
right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case. This motion was denied, as well as the
second motion for reconsideration.
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period "shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information," does not distinguish
whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or
for an action on the merits. Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals and People
v. Cuaresma, this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's
office suspends the running of the statute of limitations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Resolution of March 25, 1975 (granting the motion to quash and
dismissing the Information) based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense
We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides

that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, "the prosecution commences by the
filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without
need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in
HELD:
YES. The Resolution of March 25, 1975 dismissing the Information on the ground of prescription
of the crime became a bar to another charge of falsification, including the revival of the
Information. This is more so, because said Resolution had already become final and executory.
When the Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on May 21, 1975, or about two (2) months from
receipt of a copy of the order of dismissal, the same had already long been final.
The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code also
provides that "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal
liability." Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs
(1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code, which carries an imposable penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00. This
crime prescribes ten (10) years. Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the
alleged forgery after the document was registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.
The trial court granted the petition, stating that:

...The title, once registered, is a notice to the world. x x x
If registration is a notice to the whole world, then registration is in itself a notice and therefore,
the prescriptive period of registered document must start to run from the date the same
was annotated in the Register of Deeds.
The CA affirmed the RTCs decision, further stating that:
The rule on constructive notice has been applied in the interpretation of a provision in the Civil
Code on the prescription of actions for annulment of contracts which is parallel to Art. 91 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Civil Code provision states:
Art. 391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years. This period shall begin:
xxx
In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same [Emphasis supplied].
While it is true that the offended party, San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion
'for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not stop the
running of the period for appeal. He (private prosecutor) did not have the legal personality to
appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his (San Diegos) behalf. The prosecution in a
criminal case through the private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and
only the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period
for appeal.
In Armentia v. Patriarca, x x x the Court, interpreting the phrase "from the time of the discovery"
found in the aforequoted provision of the Civil Code, ruled that "in legal contemplation, discovery
must be reckoned to have taken place from the time the document was registered in the
Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice to the whole world . . ."
More important, he lost his right to intervene in the criminal case. Prior to the filing of the criminal
case on September 24, 1974, the spouses Silvino San Diego and Eugenia Alcantara, on the
basis of the same allegations that San Diego's signature on the deed of August 14, 1948 was a
forgery, filed on May 2, 1974 an action against Eugenio Cabral and Sabina Silvestre, with the
Bulacan Court of First Instance (Civil Case No. 120-V-74) for the recovery of the same property
and damages. It appearing, therefore, from the record that at the time the order of dismissal was
issued there was a pending civil action arising out of the same alleged forged document filed by
the offended party against the same defendant, the offended party has no right to intervene in
the prosecution of the criminal case and consequently cannot ask for the reconsideration of the
order of dismissal, or appeal from said order.
Petitioner contends that Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code which states that "the period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party,
the authorities, or their agents. . . cannot be construed in the same manner because the rule on
constructive notice is limited in application to land registration cases.
ISSUES:
(1) W its discovery may be deemed to have taken place from the time the document was
registered with the Register of Deeds. YES
(2) W the rule on constructive notice may be applied to criminal cases. YES
RULING:
The crime of falsification of a public document carries with it an imposable penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00. Being
punishable by a correctional penalty, this crime prescribes in ten (10) years. The ten (10) year
prescriptive period commences to run "from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . ."
People vs Reyes
FACTS:
Spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a land. Both are now deceased. Julio died on
September 6, 1970 and his wife on August 7, 1977. They were survived by the following
children: the accused Mizpah R. Reyes (Petitioner) and the complainants Cristina R. Masikat,
Julieta R. Vergara and Aurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.
Citing Cabral vs Puno, x x x This crime prescribes in ten (10) years.

Here, San Diego had
actual if not constructive notice of the alleged
forgery after the document was registered in
the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.
In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of the Register of Deeds
that the property had already been transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes, the conveyance
was allegedly effected through a notarized deed of sale executed and signed on May 19, 1961
by their parents Julio and Patricia. The deed of sale was registered with the ROD on May 26,
1961. The complainants found out that the signature of their parents were allegedly falsified and
that Reyes also made an untruthful statement that she was single although she was married to
one Benjamin Reyes on May 2, 1950. The document was examined by the NBI experts, and a
report was returned with the finding that the signature of Julio Rizare was genuine but that of
Patricia Pampo was forged. Upon complaint by the sisters of the accused and after conducting
an investigation, the fiscal filed with the RTC on October 18, 1984 2 informations both for
falsification of public document and for making an untruthful statement by stating that accused
was single.
The rule is well-established that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world.
The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable,
included therein.
The Court does not subscribe to the conclusion that the presumptions and rules of interpretation
used in the law on prescription of civil suits, including the rule on constructive notice, can not be
applied in criminal actions.
The considerations in providing for prescription of civil suits are based mainly on practical and
equitable grounds. The lapse of a considerably long period of time obscures the surrounding
circumstances of a particular claim or right and erodes the integrity of whatever evidence may be
presented in support of an action to enforce or contest such claim or right. Moreover, where a
particular right has accrued in favor of a party, the enjoyment of such right cannot forever be left
on a precarious balance, always susceptible to possible challenge by an adverse party.
Before arraignment, Reyes filed a motion to quash both informations on ground that the action
has prescribed

would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the
celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its
registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and
those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them
that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous
marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known
to be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the
discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore
reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the
day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their
agency (sic).
In the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is most favorable to the
accused is to be adopted. The application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of
Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to the accused since the
prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, i.e., from the time the
notarized deed of sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds. In the instant case, the notarized
deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961. The criminal informations for falsification of a
public document having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or more than ten (10) years from
May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was charged has prescribed. The Court of
Appeals, therefore, committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's order quashing the
two informations on the ground of prescription.
Sermonia vs CA
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the prescriptive
period for the offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of registration thereof, the
prosecution of the violators of the said offense would almost be impossible. The interpretation
urged by the petitioner would encourage fearless violations of a social institution cherished and
protected by law.
FACTS: Jose Sermonia entered into a subsequent marriage in 1975 during the subsistence of a
previous marriage. Upon the knowledge of a second marriage, his first wife filed an information
charging Sermonia with bigamy.
People vs Maneja
Facts: Accused is on trial for the offense of false testimony
Issue: whether the period of prescription for the offense of false testimony which, in the instant
case, is five years (art. 180, No. 4, in relation to art. 90, Revised Penal Code), should commence
from the time the appellee, Dionisio A. Maneja, adduced the supposed false testimony in
criminal case No. 1872 on December 16, 1933, as the lower court held, or, from the time the
decision of the Court of Appeals in the aforesaid basic case became final in December, 1938, as
the prosecution contends.
Ruling:
The theory of the prosecution is the correct one. The period of prescription shall commence to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their
agents. (Art. 91, Revised Penal Code.) With regard to the crime of false testimony, considering
that the penalties provided therefor in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code are, in every case,
made to depend upon the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the principal case, the act of
testifying falsely does not therefore constitute an actionable offense until the principal case is
finally decided. (Cf. U. S. v. Opinion, 6 Phil., 662, 663; People v. Marcos Et. Al., G. R. No.
47388, Oct. 22, 1940.) And before an act becomes a punishable offense, it cannot possibly be
discovered as such by the offended party, the authorities or their agents.
Sermonia moved to quash said information contending that his criminal liability for bigamy has
been extinguished by prescription, since bigamy is punishable by an afflictive penalty, it
prescribes in 15 years. The information had been filed only in 1992, seventeen years after he
contracted the said marriage.
The RTC denied the motion to quash, as well as the consequent motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, the appellate court, however, dismissed his petition for lack of merit, hence the
present recourse.
Petitioner avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of
the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus
constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to have had
constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to
run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the corresponding
information for bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
ISSUE: whether the prescriptive period is deemed to have taken place from the time the
offended party actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the document evidencing
the subsequent marriage was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the rule on
constructive notice.
If the period of prescription is to be computed from the date the supposed false testimony is
given, it would be impossible to determine the length of such period in any particular case,
depending, as it does depend, on the final outcome of the basic case. For instance, a witness
testifies falsely against an accused who is charged with murder. If the accused is found guilty,
the penalty prescribed by law for the perjurer is reclusion temporal (art. 180, No. 1, Revised
Penal Code), in which case the period of prescription is twenty years (art. 90, idem). On the
other hand, if the accused is acquitted, the penalty prescribed for the perjurer is only arresto
mayor (art. 180, No. 4, idem), in which case the period of prescription is only five years. Upon
these hypotheses, if the perjurer is to be impossible to determine the period of prescription
whether twenty years or five years as either of these two periods is fixed by law on the basis
of
conviction
or
acquittal
of
the
defendant
in
the
main
case.
RULING: Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent

marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
Bigamy carries with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being punishable by an afflictive
penalty, this crime prescribes in fifteen (15) years. The fifteen-year prescriptive period
commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents.
Moreover, the Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be applied
in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous
marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous
subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is generally entered into in a place where the
offender is not known to be still a married person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to
contract another marriage.
The mere fact that, in the present case, the penalty for the offense of false testimony is the
name, whether the defendant in criminal case No. 1872 were convicted or acquitted, is of no
moment, it being a matter of pure co-incidence. The four cases enumerated in article 180 of the
Revised Penal Code and the instant case falls on one of them uniformly presuppose a final
judgment of conviction or acquittal in the basic case as a prerequisite to the action ability of the
crime of false testimony.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary
to the well-entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the
accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof

Sec. 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as
follows:
Act No. 3326
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY

SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION
SHALL BEGIN TO RUN
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint
with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation
therein;
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
(a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than
one month, or both;
(b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less
than two years;
(c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less
than six years; and
(d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more,
except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years. Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's
office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed
only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the
institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility
should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but
a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced
from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11,
1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial
proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the
information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2,
1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations
of the law not included in the Penal Code.
Zaldivia vs Reyes
Facts:
petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in
violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of
Rizal.
PCGG VS Desierto (2007)

Facts:
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating
the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was
tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever
appropriate
actions
to
be
pursued
thereby.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-complaint of the police
was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The
corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2,
1990. 3
On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the
functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans,
whether
behest
or
non-behest.
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed. She
then invokes Act. No. 3326. Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge
against her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription
The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit: "a) it
is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect
endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders,
officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of
loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility
of the project for which financing is being sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the
loan
release
was
made."
Issue: w/n crime has prescribed

Ruling: YES
The prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the
complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent
judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, providing as follows:
Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan
transactions
between
NOCOSII
and
PNB.
After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan transactions, the
10
Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of
NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's
investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of
Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value from the offered collateral
or an excess of 85% from the required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the
collaterals was a public land contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal
note of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the public
land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paidup capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6%
of
its
obligation.
showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be
Cawili's business associate.8
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable
cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial
appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed
before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was
possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his
signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of
the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner alleges that
respondents violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of
merit.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the Ombudsman, prompting
Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the
available evidence. In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO DiazSalcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or
lack of probable cause against the respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman
Desierto approved the recommendation on May 21, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999, which
was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.
Issue: w/n offense has prescribed.
Ruling: NO. Records show that the act complained of was discovered in 1992. The complaint
was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 5, 1995,1[17] or within three (3) years from
the time of discovery. Thus, the filing of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period of
15 years.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga)
dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief
State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, 11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, 12 which provides that violations penalized by
B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on
the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of
the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative
proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already
elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.
Panaguiton Jr. vs DOJ

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. 16
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003, 17 the DOJ,
this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and
declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the
prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file
three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 19 On 8 July 2003,
the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21
Facts: Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00
from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson
(Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans.
Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon
presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency
of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of
the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson 4 for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the
preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson
claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had
lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent
various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, 22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and
ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against
Tongson.
Ruling: Crime did not YET PRESCRIBE
From the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City
Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an
aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's
control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24
August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its
misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their
rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further
simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the
delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies. . We rule and so hold that the offense has
not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business
associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his
signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's
signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks. 7 He also
11
Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the
offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of
probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any
impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.

On August 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the decision in the court of origin.
Despite due notice, counsel for the petitioner did not appear. Notice to petitioner was returned
unserved with the notation that he no longer resided at the given address. As a consequence,
he also failed to appear at the scheduled promulgation. The court of origin issued an order of
arrest against the petitioner.
Article 93. Computation of Prescription of Penalties

Jovendo del Castillo vs Rosario Torrecampo
The petitioner was detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24, 2000, petitioner
filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and contended that his arrest was illegal and
unjustified on the grounds that:
Facts:
In Barangay Ombao, Camarines Norte the accused unlawfully conducted himself in a
disorderly manner, by striking the electric bulb and two (2) kerosene petromax lamps lighting the
room where voting center no. 24 is located, during the counting of the votes in said voting center
plunging the room in complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the proceedings of
the Board of Election Tellers.
He was declared guilty by the RTC. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of
Appeals which eventually affirmed the decision of the trial court. Execution of judgment was
scheduled on October 14, 1987. His counsel motioned to reset the execution of judgment which
was denied. During the execution petitioner failed to appear. The court was prompted to issue
an order for his arrest. He was never apprehended and he remained at large.
Ten years later petitioner filed before the trial court a motion to
quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the penalty imposed
upon him. He asserts that that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the date
when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. The Court of Appeals, in its
interpretation of the said provision, engaged in judicial legislation when it added the phrase by
escaping
during the term of the sentence.
(a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years
under No. 3, Article 93 of the RPC
(b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his
criminal liability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 of the RPC
Petitioner claims that:The period for the computation of penalties under Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code begins to run from the moment the judgment of conviction becomes final
and the convict successfully evades, eludes, and dodges arrest for him to serve sentence.
ISSUE
Whether or not the crime charged with a penalty of arresto mayor has already prescribed.
Issue: Whether the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has prescribed?
HELD
Held:
NO. The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the petitioner that the penalty imposed on
him in the decision adverted to above had already prescribed, hence, his detention is illegal for
under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Court held, that in order for prescription to take place the following elements must
concur:
1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence; 2. That the convict evaded the service of the
sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence; 3. That the convict who escaped from
prison has not given himself up, or been captured, or gone
to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty or committed another crime; 4. That
the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time form the date of the evasion of the
service of the sentence by the convict.
Article 93. The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the
culprit should evade the service of sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should
give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has
no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of
prescription.
The elements of prescription are:1. That the penalty is imposed by final judgment;
From the elements, it is clear that the penalty imposed has not prescribed because the
circumstances of the case failed to satisfy the second element, That the convict evaded the
service of the sentence by escaping during the service of his sentence. As a matter of fact, the
petitioner never served a single minute of his sentence.
2. That convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence;
3. That the convict who had escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been captured, or
gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty, or committed another crime;
Pangan vs Gatbalite
FACTS
4. The penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time from the date of the evasion of the
service of the sentence by the convict.
The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction in a criminal case in Angeles City MTC.During
the trial of the case, Atty. Pineda, counsel for petitioner, submitted the case for decision without
offering any evidence, due to the petitioners constant absence at hearings.
In this case, the essential element of prescription which is the evasion of the service of sentence
is absent. It was cited in the case of Infante v. Warden that There was no evasion of the service
of the sentence in this case, because such evasion presupposes escaping during the service of
the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.
On September 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was sentenced to
serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, the RTC on October
12
It appears that the Infante ruling imposes that, as an essential element, the convict must serve at
least a few seconds, minutes, days, weeks or years of his jail sentence and then escapes before
the computation of prescription of penalties begins to run.
The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring and of special time allowance for
loyalty shall also be prospective in application as these privileges are likewise subject to the
management, screening and evaluation of the MSEC.
The period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence
by escaping during the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty
before his arrest on January 20, 2000 and as a consequence never evaded sentence by
escaping during the term of his service, the period for prescription never began.
RULE II
OBJECTIVE
Section 1. Objectives. The credit for preventive imprisonment, as well as the increase in the
time allowance granted for good conduct and exemplary services rendered or for loyalty, seek
to:
Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his sentence of two months and one day of
arresto mayor and should forthwith be released unless he is being detained for another offense
or charge.
a. Redeem and uplift valuable human material toward economic and social usefulness;
b. Level the field of opportunity by giving an increased time allowance to motivate prisoner to
pursue a productive and law-abiding life; and
c. Implement the state policy of restorative and compassionate justice by promoting the
reformation and rehabilitation of prisoner, strengthening their moral fiber and facilitating their
successful reintegration into the mainstream of society.
Article 94. Partial Extinction of Criminal Liability
R.A. 10592
AMENDING ARTICLES 29, 94, 97, 98 AND 99 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE
RULE III
DEFINITION OF TERMS
ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability. Criminal liability is extinguished

partially:
Section 1. Definition of Terms. As used herein, the following terms shall means:
1. By conditional pardon;
a. Act - Shall refer to Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revise penal code, as amended;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
b. Accused - An offender who is under detention and against whom a Criminal Complaint or
prosecutors information has been filed in a court of law;
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing
preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence.
c. BJMP - Bureau of Jail Management and Penology;
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10592
d. BUCOR - Bureau of Corrections;
RULE I
GENERALS PROVISIONS
e. Chief - Chief of BJMP;
Section 1. Title. These Rules shall be referred as the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592.
f. Commitment Order - A written order of a court of law or any other competent authority
committing a person to jail or prison for confinement;
Section 2. Scope and Application. These rules shall apply to any prisoners, whether under
detention or convicted by final judgment, in a local, rehabilitation or detention center or in a penal
institution.
g. Convicted Prisoner - A person who has undergone trials and who has been convicted by a
final judgment by a court of law or tribunal, for the felony or offense he committed;
h. Correctional Facility - A prison or Jail
Section 3. Construction. These Rules shall be constructed liberally in favor of a detained or

convicted prisoner.
i. Counsel - A lawyer tasked or requested to assist a detention prisoner in explaining the

provisions of the Article 29 of the Revise Penal Code regarding the benefit of credit for
preventive imprisonment;
Section 4. Prospective Application. Considering these Rules provide for new procedures
and standards of behavior for the grant of good conduct time allowance as provided in Section 4
of Rule V hereof and require the creation of a Management Screening and Evaluation
Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the same Rule, the grant of good conduct time
allowance under Republic Act No. 10592 shall be prospective in application.
j. Destierro - A penalty in which a person shall not be permitted to enter the place or places
designated in the sentence, or within radius therein specified, which shall not be more than 250
and not less than 25 kilometer from place designated;
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k. Detainee - An offender who is accused before a court of law or competent authority who is
under preventive imprisonment or temporarily confined in jail or prison while undergoing
investigation or trial or awaiting final judgment;
x. Proper Authority - Shall refer either to;

a) The Secretary of the Department of Justice (for the BUCOR), or
b) The Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (for the BJMP), or
c) The Provincial Governor (for Provincial Jails).
l. Detainees Manifestation - A written declaration of a detained prisoner, with the assistant of

a counsel, stating his refusal to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon a convicted
prisoner for the purpose of availing the full credit of the period of his preventive imprisonment;
y. Recidivist - A person who, at the time his trial for one crime, shall have been previously
convicted by final judgment of other crime embraced and the same title of the Revise Penal
Code, as amended;
m. Detainees Waiver - A written declaration of a detained prisoner, with the assistant of a

counsel, stating his refusal to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon a prisoner
convicted by final judgment and thus be entitled to a credit of four-fifths (4/5) of the time during
preventive imprisonment;
z. Special Time Allowance for Loyalty (STAL) - A privilege granted to a prisoner, whether
detained or convicted by final judgment, who has evaded preventive imprisonment or service of
sentence under the circumstances cited in article 158 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and surrendered to the authorities within forty-eight (48) hours following the proclamation
announcing the passing away of the calamity and the catastrophe referred to in the said article in
the form of the deduction of one fifth (1/5) from his preventive imprisonment or service of
sentence or a deduction of two fifth (2/5) if prisoner opted to stay in jail or prison during the
calamity;
n. Director - Director of the BUCOR;

o. Felony - An act or commission defined and penalized under the provisions of the Revise
Penal Code as amended;
aa. Time Allowance for Study, Teaching and Mentoring (TASTM) - A privilege granted to a
prisoner, whether detained or convicted by final judgment, as a reward for having earned a post
post-graduate degree or collage degree, a certificate of completion of a vocational or technical
skills or values development course, a high school or elementary diploma or to one serving his
fellow prisoner as a teacher or mentor while incarcerated, equivalent to a deduction of a
maximum of fifteen (15) days for every month of study or mentoring services; and
p. Good Conduct - Refers to the conspicuous and satisfactory behaviour of a detention or

convicted prisoner consisting of active involvement in rehabilitation programs, productive
participation in authorized work activities or accomplishment of exemplary deeds coupled with
faithful obedience to all prison/jail rules and regulations;
q. Good Conduct Time Allowance - A privilege granted to a prisoner, whether detained or
convicted by final judgment, entitling him to a reduction of his jail or prison term for every month
of actual detention or service of sentence as a reward for good conduct and exemplary behavior;
bb. Warden - The head of the district, municipal and city jails under the BJMP or of the
provincial and sub-provincial jails under the office of the Provincial Governor.
r. Habitual Delinquent - A person who, within the period of ten (10) years from the date of
release from prison or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries,
robbery, theft, estafa, and falsification, is found guilty of any said crimes a third time of oftener;
RULE IV
THE BENEFITS OF CREDIT FOR PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT (CPI)
Section 1. Duty to Inform Detainees of the Credit for Preventive Imprisonment. It shall be
the duty of the chief of the BJMP, Jail Warden or the Director of the BUCOR having custody the
detention prisoner to inform that the period of his preventive imprisonment shall be deducted
from the term of his imprisonment in accordance with Article 29 of the Revise Penal Code, as
amended.
s. Jail - A detention or correctional facility managed by the BJMP or the local government unit
mandated by law to safekeep and rehabilitate a prisoner who is under preventive of
imprisonment or who is sentenced to not more than three (3) years of imprisonment by order of
a court of a law or competent authority;
Section 2. Who are Entitled. An accused who has undergone preventive imprisonment shall
be credited, either full or four-fifths (4/5) term, for his actual detention or service of his sentence,
provided he is not disqualified under article 29 of the Revise Penal Code, as amended, and
under the following section.
t. Offense - A criminal act defined and penalized by special laws;

u. Operations Manual - Also referred to as Manual of Operations, a document of all
pertinent issuance and laws which deal with the administration and management of jail or prison
and the treatment and discipline of prisoner in a detention or correctional facility;
Section 3. Who are Disqualified. The grant of credit of preventive imprisonment shall not
apply to the following;<
v. Preventive Imprisonment - Is a temporary confinement in jail or prison while undergoing

investigation or trial or awaiting final judgment;
a. An accused who is recidivist as defined under Article 14 (9), Chapter 111, Book 1 of the
Revise Penal Code;
b. An accused who has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and
c. An accused who, upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence, has failed to
surrender voluntarily before a court of law.
w. Prison - Any correction facility managed by the BUCOR to safekeep and rehabilitate the
prisoner convicted by the final judgment, whose sentence exceeds three (3) years, or who is
sentenced to serve two (2) or more prison terms and who aggregated sentences exceed three
(3) years;
14
Section 4. Effect of Detainees Manifestation. An accused who has undergone preventive

imprisonment shall be credited with the full time during which he has undergone preventive
imprisonment if;
a. A detention prisoner qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment for his good conduct
and exemplary behaviour; and
b. A prisoner convicted by the final judgment in any penal institution, rehabilitation or
detention center or any other local jail for his good conduct and exemplary behaviour.
a. He agrees voluntarily, in writing, to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners; if
b. Such undertaking is executed with the assistance of the counsel.
Section 2. Deductible Good Conduct Time Allowance. A qualified prisoner, whether

detained or convicted by final judgment, shall be entitled to the following deduction from his
sentence for good conduct:
Section 5. Effect of Detainees Waiver. An accused who has undergone preventive

imprisonment and who does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
prisoners convicted by final judgment shall be credited by the service of his sentence with fourfifths (4/5) of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment if;
a. During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty days
for each month of good behavior during detention;
b. During the third to fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a reduction
of twenty-three days of each month of good behavior during detention;
c. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive for his imprisonment he shall be
allowed a reduction of twenty-five days for each month of good behavior during detention; and
d. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of thirty days of his month of good behavior during detention.
a. He shall do in writing
b. With the assistance of counsel.
Section 6. Provisional Release while under Preventive Imprisonment -
Section 3. Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC).

a. Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the
imposable maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he my be sentenced and his
case is not yet decided, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of
the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review, except for the
following:
1) Recidivist
2) Habitual Delinquent
3) Escapee
4) Person charged with heinous crimes
a. The Director of the BUCOR, Chief of the BJMP and Wardens of various provinces, cities,
districts and municipalities are mandated to assess, evaluate and grant time deduction to
deserving prisoner, whether detained or convicted by final judgment, in the form of GCTA, STAL
and TASTM as prescribed by these Rules through the creation of the MSEC.
b. The composition of the MSEC shall be determined by the Director of the BUCOR, Chief of
the BJMP or Wardens of Provincial and Sub-Provincial, District, City and Municipal Jails,
respectively. Membership shall not be less than five (5) and shall include a Probation and Parole
Officer, and if available, a psychologist and a social worker.
c. The MSEC shall prepare minutes of every meeting to record each proceeding.
b. If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be
released after thirty (30) days of imprisonment.
Section 4. Procedures for the Grant of Good Conduct Time Allowance. The following
procedures shall be followed in the grant of GCTA;
The computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release shall be the
actual period of detention with good conduct time allowance; provided, however, that if the
accused is absent without motu propio order the re-arrest of the accused.
a. The BUCOR, BJMP and Provincial Jail shall give special considerations to satisfactory
behaviour of a detention or convicted prisoner consisting of active involvement in rehabilitation
programs, productive participation in authorized work activities or accomplishment of exemplary
deeds. It is understood that in all instances, the detained or convicted prisoner must faithfully
obey all prison/jail rules and regulations;
b. The BUCOR, BJMP and Provincial Jails shall each create the MSEC of such appropriate
number of MSECs tasked to manage, screen and evaluate the behaviour or conduct of a
detention or convicted prisoner;
c. After due commendation of the behaviour or conduct shown by a detained or convicted
prisoner, the MSEC shall then recommended to the appropriate official the appropriate GCTA
that may be credited in favor of said prisoner ranging from the minimum of the allowable credit to
the maximum credit thereof;
d. Acting on the recommendation of the MSEC, the appropriate official named in Section 1 of
Rule VII hereof shall either;
1. Approve the recommendation and issue a certification granting GCTA to the prisoner
for the particular period;
2. Disapprove the recommendation if the prisoner recommended is not qualified to be
granted the benefit or that errors or irregularities attended the evaluation of the prisoner; or
3. Return the recommendation, without action, for corrections as regards to the name,
prison number or other clerical or inadvertent errors, or the further evaluation of the conduct or
behaviour of the prisoner concerned.
Section 7. GCTA of an Accused Qualified for CPI. An accused who is qualified for credit for
preventive imprisonment shall also be qualified to avail the benefit of good conduct time
allowance provided for under Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and pursuant
to the procedures laid down in Rule V hereof.
Section 8. Deduction for Credit for Preventive Imprisonment when Impossible Penalty is
Reclusion Perpetua. Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be deducted from thirty (30) years.
RULE V
GOOD CONDUCT TIME ALLOWANCE
(GCTA)
Section 1. Who are Entitled. The good conduct for the following shall be entitle them to the
deductions describe in Section 2 hereunder from their sentence as good conduct time allowance
(GCTA) Pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and to Section 2 to 8
hereof:
15
e. The appropriate official concerned shall ensure that GCTAs are processed each month
and that there is proper recording of a prisoners good behavior in the jail or prison records.
a. By conditional pardon;
b. By commutation of sentence; and
c. For good conduct time allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing
preventive imprisonment or serving sentence.
Section 5. Computer Template and Manual. The BUCOR, BJMP and Provincial Jails shall
design and use a computer-generated or automated template to monitor the progress of
detainees or prisoners convicted by final judgment capable of incorporating time allowances
that may be grated to each of them. In addition, a written computation table or manual of
preventive imprisonment or service of sentence incorporating time allowances shall be prepared
and used as the primary official reference by the BUCOR, BJMP and Provincial Jails.
RULE VIII
OFFICIALS AUTHORIZED TO GRANT TIME ALLOWANCES
Section 1. Who Grants Time Allowances. Whenever lawfully justified, the following officials
shall grant allowances for good conduct:
Section 6. Time Allowance for Study, Teaching and Mentoring (TSTM). At any time during
the period of imprisonment, an accused or prisoner convicted by final judgment shall be allowed,
in addition to the benefits provided for Under Section 2, Rule V, another deduction of Fifteen
(15) days, for each month of his time rendered for
a. Study
b. Teaching; or
c. Mentoring Services
a. Director of the Bureau of Corrections

b. Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology; and/or
c. Warden of a Provincial, District, City or Municipal Jail
Article 95. Obligations Incurred by Persons granted Conditional Pardon

Section 7. Procedures for the Grant of TASTM.
a. The BUCOR, BJMP and Provincial Jails shall each keep a master list of detainees or
prisoners convicted by final judgment, who have been allowed, subject to their respective jail or
prison rules, to study, teach or perform mentoring activities within their respective detention or
prison facility;
b. The MSEC shall be tasked to monitor and certify whether said prisoner, for the period
covered, has actually studied, taught or performed mentoring duties;
c. If the prisoner is qualified, the MSEC shall recommend to the concerned officials the grant
of TASTM who shall approve the same by issuing a corresponding certification.
Torres vs Gonzales
FACTS:
In 1979, Torres was convicted of estafa and was pardoned by the president with the condition
that if he shall violate any penal law again, his sentence will be carried out. Petitioner accepted
the conditional pardon and was released from prison. However, by 1982, the Board of Pardons
and Parole recommended to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to
Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of
sedition. His pardon was cancelled. He appealed the issue before the Supreme Court. He
contended that his pardon should not have been cancelled since the judgment on the new
estafa cases were still on appeal. Through his wife and children, he petitioned to be released
from prison alleging that he was denied due process, and that his constitutional rights to be
presumed innocent and to a speedy trial were violated upon his recommitment to prison.
Section 8. Effect When Case of an Accused is on Appeal. An appeal by the accused shall
not deprive him of his entitlement to the time allowances.
RULE VI
SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR LOYALTY (STAL)
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before
the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his
conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
Section 1. Special Time Allowance for Loyalty.

RULING: Where a conditional pardonee has allegedly breached a condition of a pardon, the
President who opts to proceed against him under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative
Code need not wait for a judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his
conviction therefore by final judgment, in order to effectuate the recommitment of the pardonee
to prison.
a. A deduction of one-fifth (1/5) of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any
prisoner who, having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of his sentence under
the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of Revised Penal Code, gives himself up to the
authorities within forty-eight (48) hours following the issuance of the proclamation announcing
the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article.
b. A deduction of two-fifth (2/5) of the period of his sentence shall be granted in case said
prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding the existence of a
calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of the Revised Penal Code.
It did not matter that Torres was allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed
against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending for
thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial.
Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as
illegal or unlawful. The incarceration of Torres is legal since he would have served his final
sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000, had he not violated the conditions of the
pardon and had thus had it revoked.
Provided that he has not committed other offense or any act in violation of the law or the act.
RULE VII
PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Lastly, only the President has the prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own
judgment.Courts have no authority
Section 1. Partial Extinction of Criminal Liability. Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
16
to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal.A final judicial
pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine
whether or not there has been a breach
Section 63 (i) of the Administrative Code, by virtue of which the petitioner was granted parole,
gives the Governor-General the following powers and duties:
To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial,
conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and
order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions
as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person
who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his
pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.
Tesoro vs Director of Prisons
Facts: On October 10, 1934, petitioner, Eufemio P. Tesoro, was convicted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila of the crime of falsification of a public document and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from two (2) to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21)
days, to pay a fine of one hundred pesos (100), or undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. This penalty was to expire on October 28, 1937. On November 14, 1935, the then
Governor-General Frank Murphy granted the petitioner a parole, which the latter accepted,
subject to the following conditions:
Paragraph 6, section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, provides as follows:
The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of
impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he
may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of the National Assembly.
1. That he will live in the City of Manila and will not change his residence without first
obtaining the consent of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence;
Issue: Appellant contends that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, above quoted, in
so far as it confers upon the Chief Executive the power to grant and revoke paroles, has
been impliedly repealed by the aforecited constitutional provision, as the latter omitted to
specify such power in connection with the powers granted therein to the President of the
Philippines.
2. That he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly
manner;
3. That he will report, during the period of his parole, to the Executive Secretary of the
Board of Indeterminate Sentence, during the first year, once a month, and thereafter,
once every three months.
Ruling: Contention is untenable. The power to pardon given the President by the Constitution,
"upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to
impose," includes the power to grant and revoke paroles. (20 R.C.L., 577; 46 C.J. 1205.) If the
omission of the power of parole in the Constitution is to be construed as a denial thereof to the
President, the effect would be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who, before the adoption of
the Constitution, have been released conditionally by the Chief Executive.
Should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall again be
in full force and effect.
On December 3, 1937, petitioner was charged in the justice of the peace court of San Juan,
Rizal, with the crime of adultery alleged to have been committed with one Concordia Dairo, wife
of petitioner's brother-in-law, Jose Nagar. To the complaint were attached the affidavits of the
complainant Jose Nagar, of Luz Nagar and of Epimaco Nagar. The case was thereafter
forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the provincial fiscal filed the
corresponding information which, however, was dismissed for non-appearance of the
complainant.
Article 97, 98, 99 (Amended by R.A. 10592)
ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. The good conduct of any offender qualified for credit
for preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of any convicted prisoner in
any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail shall entitle him to
the following deductions from the period of his sentence:
Sometime in the month of February, 1938, the same Jose Nagar lodged a complaint with Board
of Indeterminate Sentence, and upon the same facts supporting the criminal action
aforementioned, charged the petitioner with violation of the conditions of his parole. On February
3, 1938, petitioner was summoned to appear before the board for a hearing on the aforecited
complaint, but petitioner asked for postponement until the day following. On February 4, 1938,
petitioner addressed a letter to the board denying the charge of illicit relations with the
complainant's wife the included therewith the supposed retraction of Epimaco Nagar of what the
latter had stated in his former affidavit. On the same date Simeon Figalang, a parole officer
assigned to investigate the case, submitted his report to the board, and, on the strength thereof
and papers supporting it, the acting chairman of the board addressed a communication to the
President of the Philippines, recommending the arrest and reincarceration of the petitioner. And
on February 19, 1938, the President issued the following order:
1. During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty days for
each month of good behavior during detention;
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
reduction of twenty-three days for each month of good behavior during detention;
3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for each month of good behavior during detention;
By virtue of this order, the petitioner was arrested and recommitted to the custody of the Director
of Prisons. Thereupon, petitioner sued for a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of
Prisons, and upon denial thereof by the trial court, took the present appeal.
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of thirty days for each month of good behavior during detention; and
17
5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another deduction of
fifteen days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each month of study, teaching or
mentoring service time rendered.
any time of said defendant, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may
deem best.
An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above allowances for good
conduct.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a

fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to
the appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The
filing of the application shall be deemed a waver of the right to appeal, or the
automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. A deduction of one fifth of the period of his
sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive imprisonment or
the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this Code, gives
himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing
the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of twofifths of the period of his sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the
place of his confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated
in Article 158 of this Code.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.

Section 5. Post-sentence Investigation. No person shall be placed on probation
except upon prior investigation by the probation officer and a determination by the
court that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as that of the
defendant will be served thereby.
This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving
sentence.
Section 6. Form of Investigation Report. The investigation report to be submitted by

the probation officer under Section 5 hereof shall be in the form prescribed by the
Probation Administrator and approved by the Secretary of Justice.
ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and/or the
Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall grant allowances for good conduct.
Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.
Section 7. Period for Submission of Investigation Report. The probation officer

shall submit to the court the investigation report on a defendant not later than sixty
days from receipt of the order of said court to conduct the investigation. The court
shall resolve the petition for probation not later than five days after receipt of said
report.
P.D. 968 Probation Law
Pending submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the petition, the
defendant may be allowed on temporary liberty under his bail filed in the criminal case;
Provided, That, in case where no bail was filed or that the defendant is incapable of
filing one, the court may allow the release of the defendant on recognize the custody
of a responsible member of the community who shall guarantee his appearance
whenever required by the court.
Section 2. Purpose. This Decree shall be interpreted so as to:

(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with
individualized treatment;
(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be
less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and
(c) prevent the commission of offenses.

Section 3. Meaning of Terms. As used in this Decree, the following shall, unless the
context otherwise requires, be construed thus:
Section 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. In determining whether an

offender may be placed on probation, the court shall consider all information relative,
to the character, antecedents, environment, mental and physical condition of the
offender, and available institutional and community resources. Probation shall be
denied if the court finds that:
(a) the offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most
effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(a) "Probation" is a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and

sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the
supervision of a probation officer.
(b) there is undue risk that during the period of probation the offender will commit
another crime; or
(b) "Probationer" means a person placed on probation.

(c) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.
(c) "Probation Officer" means one who investigates for the court a referral for
probation or supervises a probationer or both.
Section 9. Disqualified Offenders. The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended
to those:
Section 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application at
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;
18
(b) convicted of any offense against the security of the State;
Section 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. A probation order shall take effect upon
its issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences
thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply with any of the conditions
prescribed in the said order or his commission of another offense, he shall serve the
penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation.
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense

punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine
of not less than Two Hundred Pesos;
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of
this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
Section 12. Modification of Condition of Probation. During the period of probation,

the court may, upon application of either the probationer or the probation officer,
revise or modify the conditions or period of probation. The court shall notify either the
probationer or the probation officer of the filing such an application so as to give both
parties an opportunity to be heard thereon.
Section 10. Conditions of Probation. Every probation order issued by the court shall
contain conditions requiring that the probationer shall:
The court shall inform in writing the probation officer and the probationer of any
change in the period or conditions of probation.
(a) present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at
such place as may be specified in the order within seventy-two hours from receipt of
said
order;
(b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as
specified by said officer.
Section 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. The probationer and his
probation program shall be under the control of the court who placed him on probation
subject to actual supervision and visitation by a probation officer.
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of

another court, control over him shall be transferred to the Executive Judge of the
Court of First Instance of that place, and in such a case, a copy of the probation order,
the investigation report and other pertinent records shall be furnished said Executive
Judge. Thereafter, the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the probationer is
transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was previously possessed by
the court which granted the probation.
The court may also require the probationer to:

(a) cooperate with a program of supervision;
(b) meet his family responsibilities;
Section 14. Period of Probation.

(c) devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said employment
without the prior written approval of the probation officer;
(a) The period of probation of a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not

more than one year shall not exceed two years, and in all other cases, said period
shall not exceed six years.
(d) undergo medical, psychological or psychiatric examination and treatment and enter
and remain in a specified institution, when required for that purpose;
(b) When the sentence imposes a fine only and the offender is made to serve
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the period of probation shall not be
less than nor to be more than twice the total number of days of subsidiary
imprisonment as computed at the rate established, in Article thirty-nine of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
(e) pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training;

(f) attend or reside in a facility established for instruction, recreation or residence of
persons on probation;
(j) reside at premises approved by it and not to change his residence without its prior
written approval; or
Section 15. Arrest of Probationer; Subsequent Disposition. At any time during

probation, the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer for violation of
any of the conditions of probation. The probationer, once arrested and detained, shall
immediately be brought before the court for a hearing, which may be informal and
summary, of the violation charged. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending
such hearing. In such a case, the provisions regarding release on bail of persons
charged with a crime shall be applicable to probationers arrested under this provision.
If the violation is established, the court may revoke or continue his probation and
modify the conditions thereof. If revoked, the court shall order the probationer to serve
the sentence originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of probation or modifying
the terms and conditions thereof shall not be appealable.
(k) satisfy any other condition related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not
unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of conscience.
Section 16. Termination of Probation. After the period of probation and upon
consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation officer, the court may
(g) refrain from visiting houses of ill-repute;

(h) abstain from drinking intoxicating beverages to excess;
(i) permit to probation officer or an authorized social worker to visit his home and place
or work;
19
order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms
and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is deemed terminated.
Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction,"
The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost
or suspend as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine
imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted.
In the case at bar, the petitioner perfected an appeal upon raising it to the RTC.
Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable.
Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the
probationable period.
The probationer and the probation officer shall each be furnished with a copy of such
order.
The petitioner in the case contended that the appeal made is for the court to lessen the penalty
for him to avail of the probation (which limits it to the penalty of imprisonment not exceeding 6
years) and not on asserting his innocence.
The court found the petitioners contention untenable. The penalty imposed by the MTC is
probationable. The petitioner does not have to appeal for reduction of penalty. The court
provided the following guidelines in computing for the maximum period to qualify in a probation:
Section 17. Confidentiality of Records. The investigation report and the supervision
history of a probationer obtained under this Decree shall be privileged and shall not be
disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other than the Probation Administration or the
court concerned, except that the court, in its discretion, may permit the probationer of
his attorney to inspect the aforementioned documents or parts thereof whenever the
best interest of the probationer make such disclosure desirable or helpful: Provided,
Further, That, any government office or agency engaged in the correction or
rehabilitation of offenders may, if necessary, obtain copies of said documents for its
official use from the proper court or the Administration
Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in one
decision are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms
imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his
disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if
none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law,i.e., not more than six (6) years,
then he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified.
Francisco vs CA
P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word maximum not total when it says that "[t]he benefits of this
Decree shall not be extended to those . . . . sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years." Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the penalties
imposed but to take each penalty separately and distinctly with the others.
FACTS:
Petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, upon humiliating his employees, was accused of multiple grave
oral defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five of his employees, each
Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12
April 1980.
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties imposed
by the MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that petitioner
appealed his conviction to the RTC not for the sole purpose of reducing his penalties to make
him eligible for probation since he was already qualified under the MeTC Decision but
rather to insist on his innocence. In such case, makes the petitioner disqualified in availing
probation.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61,
found petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, guilty of grave oral defamation, in four (4) of the five (5)
cases filed against him, and sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date
of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended
parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00
as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit. However, he was
acquitted in for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law.
This is vital way beyond the period allowed by law and crucial.
From the records it is clear that the application for probation was filed "only after a warrant for
the arrest of petitioner had been issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the
Decision" of the RTC. This is a ground of disqualification as provided in Sec 4 of PD 968:
Unsatisfied with the decision of MeTC, the petitioner appealed to the RTC.
After failure to interpose an appeal, the RTCs decision became final.
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after
it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal. . . . place the defendant on probation
Before he was arrested, we filed a certiorari to the CA, and dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Soriano vs CA
Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his conviction to the
RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.
Facts:
Petitioner Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to
homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property on December 7, 1993.i[2] His
application for probation was granted on March 8, 1994, and among the terms and conditions
imposed by the trial court were the following:
HELD:
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits cannot extend to those not
expressly included.
20
7. He shall meet his family responsibilities.
its orders. Nor did it abuse gravely its discretion in issuing said orders. Hence, we are
in full agreement with respondent appellate courts decision as well.
8. He shall devote himself to a specific employment and shall not change employment without
prior notice to the supervising officer; and/or shall pursue a prescribed secular study or
vocational training.
2)
11. He is to indemnify the heirs of the victim Isidrino Daluyong in the amount of P98,560.00 as
ordered by the Court
Article 100. Every Person Criminally Liable is also Civilly Liable
On April 26, 1994, Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin A. Fadera filed a motion to cancel petitioners
probation due to his failure to satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and a
supplemental motion alleging petitioners commission of another crime for which at that time he
was awaiting arraignment. The Zambales Parole and Probation Office filed a comment
recommending that petitioner be allowed to continue with his probation and that he be required
instead to submit a program of payment of his civil liability.
Jose Garcia vs CA
FACTS:
Guevarra spouses seeks recovery of one (1) ladys diamond ring 18 cts. White gold
mounting, with one (1) 2.05 cts. Diamond. Solitaire, and four (4) brills 0.10 cts. Total weight
which she brought on October 27, 1947 from R. Rebullida, Inc. Mrs. Guevara lost her ring on
February 1952. On October 11, 1953, while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia, owner of La
Bulakena restaurant recognized her ring in the finger of Mrs. Garca and inquired where she
bought it, which the defendant answered from her Comare. Spouses Garcia together with Lt.
Cementina and their Attorney proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida who examined the ring,
Rebudilla confirmed that indeed it was her ring. Mrs. Garcia refuted that the said ring was
purchased by her from Mrs. Miranda who got it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in turn got it
from the owner , Aling Petring who was boarding in her house; that the ring might be similar but
not the same with that she bought from Rebudilla.
On June 20, 1994, the trial court denied the prosecutors motion and directed petitioner to submit
a program of payment of the civil liability imposed upon him.
Thereafter, probation officer Nelda Da Maycong received information that petitioners father, who
owned the vehicle involved in the accident which killed Daluyong, received P16,500.00 as
insurance payment. This amount was not turned over to the heirs of Daluyong and Da Maycong
considered this a violation of the terms and conditions of the probation. She submitted a
manifestation to the trial court praying that petitioner be made to explain his non-compliance with
the courts order of June 20, 1994, or that he be cited for contempt for such non-compliance. Da
Maycong also asked that petitioner be made to submit a program of payment as soon as
possible. The trial court granted her prayers in an order dated August 15, 1994. Petitioner was
once again ordered to submit his program of payment. Petitioner instead filed a motion for
reconsideration explaining that he did not receive any notice of the order dated June 20, 1994.
His counsel received a copy of said order on June 23, 1994 but failed to notify petitioner. Thus,
the latter failed to comply with said order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mrs. Garcia is liable for the lost ring of Mrs. Guevara
HELD:
Yes, according to Article 559 of the Civil Code, recovery of the lost possession even
though the one who got it is in good faith. But in the case at bar, Mrs. Garcia cannot invoke good
faith since she ought to know that the said ring is a property in question. The Court found out
that Aling Petring is a mysterious and ephemeral figure. The testimony of Mr. Rebullida was
reliable. Therefore, Mrs. Garcia will pay Attorneys fee and Exemplary damage.
On October 4, 1994, the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner in contempt of court for
his failure to comply with its orders of June 20, 1994 and August 15, 1994. The court likewise
revoked the grant of probation to petitioner and ordered that he be arrested to serve the
sentence originally imposed upon him. According to the trial court, among the violations
committed by petitioner as regards his probation are his failure to (1) meet his responsibilities to
his family, (2) engage in a specific employment, and (3) cooperate with his program of
supervision.
Article 103. Subsidiary and Civil Liability of other Persons

Pangonorom vs CA
Facts: July 10, 1989 at around 9:00 P.M. Carlos R. Berba was driving an Isuzu Gemini car
bearing Plate No. NAR-865 L Pil. 89 belonging to his mother Mary Berba. With him inside the
car were his mother Mary Berba who was seated in front beside him and his auntie Amelia
Berba who was at the back seat. They were cruising along EDSA coming from the direction of
Makati and headed towards the intersection of EDSA and Quezon Boulevard but upon nearing
680 Appliances along EDSA, Quezon City, their car was bumped from behind by MMTC
Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. NVJ-999 TB Pil. 89 driven by herein accused Olimpio
Pangonorom thereby causing damages to their car which was estimated at P42,600.00 (Exhs. F,
F-1). The front and rear portions of their car incurred damages because by reason of the strong
impact at the rear portion of their car, it was pushed forward and bumped the car in front of it,
then it rested near the island. The bus driven by the accused still travelled a distance of 20
meters from the point of impact. The accused left his bus but they came to know his name is
Olimpio Pangonorom. Their car was a total wreck as shown in its photographs (Exhs. B and C).
Ruling: He violated his probation terms

1)
Petitioners continued refusal to submit a program of payment, along with his prayer for
the deletion of the requirement of payment of civil liability from his probation order,
creates the impression that he wants to completely avoid paying his civil liability. This
he cannot do. He cannot escape payment of his civil liability, with or without a program
of payment.
Petitioners counsel has not been shown to be grossly irresponsible as to cause

prejudice to petitioners rights.ii[13] Moreover, we note that petitioner later on
discovered that such a court order was received by his counsel. He could have
endeavored to comply with the order then. In the June 20, 1994 order, he was given
10 days from receipt of the order within which to comply. The same period was given
him in the order of August 15, 1994. Petitioner does not claim that he failed to receive
notice of the latter order. In fact, he submitted a motion for reconsideration of said
order, but still without the required program of payment.
No justifiable reason has been given by petitioner for ignoring those two orders. The
trial court could not be faulted for citing him in contempt for his failure to comply with
21
Carlos Berba noticed this bus following them closely at Nepa Q-Mart up to the point of collision.
His car was running along the second lane of EDSA from the island. The MMTC bus driven by
the accused was running very fast, kept on switching lane until it finally occupied the second
lane and bumped his car. Carlos Berba sustained cuts on his shoulder and back because of
broken glasses and was treated at East Avenue Medical Center. He incurred P1,000.00 for
medication (Exhs. G to G-3). Mary Berba sustained contusion, hematoma and abrasion (Exh.
H). Amelia Berba sustained abrasion on his right elbow (Exh. K). Both were also treated at East
Avenue Medical Center.
execution against the employee cannot be satisfied, execution against the employer will not
issue as a matter of course.[37] The procedure for the enforcement of a judgment will have to be
followed. Once the judgment of conviction against Olimpio becomes final and executory, and
after the writ of execution issued against him is returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency,
only then can a subsidiary writ of execution be issued against the MMTC after a hearing set for
that precise purpose. It is still too early to hold the MMTC subsidiarily liable with its
accused-employee considering that there is no proof yet of Olimpios insolvency.
Edward Campos and Enrico Bantique Estupigan, passengers of MMTC Bus driven by the
accused explained that their bus was running at 70-80 kph when it swerved to the right to avoid
hitting a van stranded at the left side of the island but in the process it hit and bumped an Isuzu
Gemini car in front of it. The rear portion of the Isuzu Gemini car was smashed and the front part
was also damaged as it hit the Lancer car running ahead. The bus driver, herein accused, fled
from the scene.
Yonaha vs CA
Facts:
Accused Elmer Ouano, while driving a Toyota Tamaraw sporting Plate No. GCX-237 duly
registered in the name of Raul Cabahug and owned by EK SEA Products, did then and there
unlawfully and feloniously maneuver and operate it in a negligent and reckless manner, without
taking the necessary precaution to avoid injuries to person and damage to property, as a result
thereof the motor vehicle he was then driving bumped and hit Hector Caete, which caused the
latters instantaneous death, due to the multiple severe traumatic injuries at different parts of his
body. When arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty and, on 09 March 1992, the trial court
pronounced its judgment. So a writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of the monetary
award. Sheriff stated that he had served the writ on accused Elmer Ouano but that the latter had
manifested his inability to pay the money obligation. The sheriff went to petitioners residence to
enforce the writ, and it was then, allegedly for the first time, that petitioner was informed of
Ouanos conviction. Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to recall the subsidiary writ of execution
principally anchored on the lack of prior notice to her and on the fact that the employers liability
had yet to be established.
The training officer of MMTC, Milagros Garbo, testified on the procedure of the company in
hiring an applicant driver and the requirements to be submitted by the applicant. An applicant for
a driver of MMTC as what had been done to the accused before he was admitted as company
driver of MMTC must pass an interview, seminars, written examination, actual driving test,
psycho-physical test, road test, line familiarization test, defensive driving seminar, drivers
familiarization seminar, and traffic rules and environment seminar. Documents they required to
be submitted by an applicant driver were NBI Clearance, Residence Certificate, Professional
Drivers License, and Official Receipts of payment of required fees for drivers license (Exhs. 1 to
15).
Issue: W/N employer is subsidiarily liable for employees civil liability
Petitioner additionally reminds the Court that Ouanos conviction was not the result of a
finding of proof beyond reasonable doubt but from his spontaneous plea of guilt
Ruling: No.
Pursuant to Article 103, an employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employees civil liability in
a criminal action when there is adequate evidence establishing (1) that he is indeed the
employer of the convicted employee; (2) that he is engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the
employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (4) that the execution
against the employee has not been satisfied due to insolvency.[31]
Ruling: Statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code.ii[5] This Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in
the same criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty,ii[6] on the thesis that it
really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the execution process of the judgment. But,
execution against the employer must not issue as just a matter of course, and it behooves the
court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a
hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of the employers liability. The
requirement is mandatory even when it appears prima facie that execution against the convicted
employee cannot be satisfied. The court must convince itself that the convicted employee is in
truth in the employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged in an industry of some kind; that
the employee has committed the crime to which civil liability attaches while in the performance of
his duties as such; and that execution against the employee is unsuccessful by reason of
insolvency.ii[7]
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102 and 103 are
deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive
portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the
employer.[32]
The subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in the
criminal action.[33] In the present case, there exists an employer-employee relationship
between petitioners, the MMTC is engaged in the transportation industry,[34] and Olimpio has
been adjudged guilty of a wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge
of his duties.[35] However, there is no proof here of Olimpios insolvency. The judgment of
conviction against Olimpio has not attained finality. This being so, no writ of execution can issue
against him to satisfy his civil liability. Only after proof of the accused-employees insolvency may
the subsidiary liability of his employer be enforced.[36]
The assumption that, since petitioner in this case did not aver any exculpatory facts in
her motion to stay and recall, as well as in her motion for reconsideration, which could
save her from liability, a hearing would be a futile and a sheer rigmarole is unacceptable.
The employer must be given his full day in court. Petitioner shall be given the right to a
hearing on the motion for the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution filed by private
respondents, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings
In short, there is as yet no occasion to speak of enforcing the employers subsidiary civil
liability unless it appears that the accused-employees primary liability cannot in the first
instance be satisfied because of insolvency. This fact cannot be known until some time after
the verdict of conviction shall have become final. And even if it appears prima facie that
22
Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines vs Heirs of Mangawang
LG Food Corp vs Hon. Agraviador
Facts: Ernesto Ancheta was employed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) as
driver of one of its passenger buses. Being then the driver and person-in-charge of a Philippine
Rabbit Bus while cruising the MacArthur Highway towards the south direction, bumped the left
rear side of a Toyota jeep riven by Eduardo Mangawang towards the north direction, and as a
result thereof said Eduardo Mangawang ultimately died and the jeep he was then driving
sustained damages. He was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
For the civil liability of the accused, Ernesto Ancheta is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Eduardo Mangawang the amounts of P28,600.00 as actual or compensatory damages and
P1,436,466.30 representing loss of earning capacity. The accused is similarly ordered to pay the
amounts of P50,000.00 by way of indemnification for the death of Eduardo Mangawang
Facts: On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino
Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven
at the time by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the
accident.
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the
driver before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 67787, entitled People of the Philippines v. Vincent Norman Yeneza.
PRBLI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order, claiming that it was not served
with a copy of the decision of the RTC convicting the accused of the crime charged;
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide,
evidently bothered by conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of
September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal case.
Ruling: The petitioner (Rabbit Bus), as the employer of the said accused, had no right to
appeal from the said decision because, in the first place, it was not a party in the said
case. While the subsidiary liability provided for by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised
Penal Code may render the petitioner a party in substance and, in effect, it is not, for this
reason, entitled to be furnished a copy of the decision of the RTC, as well as the
resolution and decision of the CA.
On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint 3 for
damages against the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as
such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10845, the complaint was raffled to Branch
43 of the court.
Indeed, the petitioner was entitled to protect its interest by taking actual participation in the
defense of its employee, Ancheta, by providing him with counsel. It cannot leave its employee to
his own fate because his failure is its failure.[17] The petitioner, as the employer of the accused,
would thereby be apprised of the progress of the case and the outcome thereof from time to time
through the said counsel. The failure of such counsel to apprise the petitioner of the progress of
the case is thus not equivalent to lack of due process.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,4 the petitioners as defendants denied liability for
the death of the Vallejeras' 7-year old son, claiming that they had exercised the required due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, including the deceased driver.
They thus prayed in their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action on
the part of the Vallejera couple.
To allow an employer to dispute its civil liability in the criminal case via an appeal from
the decision of the RTC would be to annul, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court.
During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners insisted that their dismissal prayer be resolved. Hence,
the trial court required them to file within ten days a memorandum of authorities supportive of
their position.
The right of the petitioner as the employer of the accused to due process occurs during the
hearing of the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, on the basis of the sheriffs
return that the writ of execution issued by the court for the enforcement of its decision on the civil
liability of the accused was not satisfied because of the latters insolvency, the sheriff being
unable to locate any property in the name of the accused. Such return is prima facie evidence of
the insolvency of the accused. Petition is denied.
Instead, however, of the required memorandum of authorities, the defendant petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary
liability against an employer" under the provision of Article 1035 of the Revised Penal Code.
Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first be a judgment of conviction against
their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable. Ergo, since the driver died during the
pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not
fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs. They further argue that
since the plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute a separate action for damages when
the criminal case was filed, the damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted with the
criminal action which was already dismissed.
Issue: whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action is founded on Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, as maintained by the petitioners, or derived from Article 2180 of the
Civil Code
23
Ruling: Action is not founded on Article 103 of the RPC
Article 104-111. Civil Liability

People vs Montesclaros
That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for the

negligence/imprudence of its employee since it failed to exercise the necessary
diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision
of his employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer which diligence if exercised,
would have prevented said incident.
Facts:
The information states that, on april 1, 1995 about 4:30pm in Lapulapu city with the jurisdiction of
the RTC Lapu-Lapu, the accused Tampus was in deep slumber due to drunkenness did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the then 13 yer old
victim against her will in conspiracy with Ida Montesclaros who gave permission to Tampus to
rape the minor.(2) on April 3, 1995 at about 1am, Tampus was armed with a wooden club and by
means of threat and intimidation did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with then 13 year old against her will.
Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely, that the herein petitioners
are being made to account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. As correctly pointed out by the trial court in its order of September 4, 2001 denying
the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, the complaint did not even aver the basic elements for the
subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior
conviction of the driver in the criminal case filed against him nor his insolvency.
The offended party is the daughter of montesclaros. Montesclaros started o rent a room in a
house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. Minor testified that she was in the house with her
mother and Tampus on April 1, 1995, that the two adults were drinking beer and forced her to
drink too. After having 3 bottles then she got sleepy and was lying on the floor when she
overheard Tampus requesting her mother to be permitted to have sexual intercourse with the
minor. Montesclaros agreed and told Tampus to leave as soon as he is finish with her daughter.
Montesclaros then left for work and left the minor along with Tampus. The minor fell asleep and
have woken up with pain and blood on her genitals. The minor cried to her mother but was
ignored by Montesclaros.
Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant
petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the
complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against the petitioners. To stress, the
plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the part of the driver
and the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees. The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly liable
for the negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary
diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their
employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that
resulted to the death of their 7-year old son.
Minor testified that the abuse was repeated on April 4, 1995. That then made her to seek from
her Aunt Nellie who reported the incident to the police. On May 9, 1995 the head of the medicolegal branch of the PNCLS conducted a physical examination of the minor and testified that the
result of the examination revealed a deep healed laceration.
On September 22, 1995 the minor filed 2 complaints against Tampus on rape and against
Montesclaros on conspiracy to the rape.
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, they would have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proven beyond
reasonable doubt; that such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the
defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their employee (driver) based
on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. 23 Since there was no
conviction in the criminal case against the driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the
termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses' recourse was, therefore, to sue the
petitioners for their direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict.
Issue: What are the civil liabilities for each of the accused.
Ruling: The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on the nature
and degree of his participation in the commission of the crime. The penalty prescribed by
Instead, the civil case is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 - Civil Code to recover
damages primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused by his employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged in
any business or industry.
the Revised Penal Code for a particular crime is imposed upon the principal in a consummated
felony.ii[68] The accomplice is only given the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed
by the law for the crime committedii[69] and an accessory is given the penalty lower by two
degrees.ii[70] However, a felon is not only criminally liable, he is likewise civilly liable. ii[71] Apart
from the penalty of imprisonment imposed on him, he is also ordered to indemnify the victim and
to make whole the damage caused by his act or omission through the payment of civil indemnity
and damages.
Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [i]f there are two or
more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each
must respond. Notwithstanding the determination of the respective liability of the principals,
accomplices and accessories within their respective class, they shall also be subsidiarily liable
24
for the amount of civil liability adjudged in the other classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that [t]he principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective
class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily
for those of the other persons liable.
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarily liable with the principal for
the entire amount of the civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous apportionment of the
civil indemnity. First, because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and
degree of participation between the principal, Tampus, versus the accomplice, Ida. Idas previous
acts of cooperation include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have
sexual intercourse with her daughter. But even without these acts, Tampus could have still raped
ABC. It was Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who should have the greater liability,
not only in terms of criminal liability, but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article 110 of
the Revised Penal Code states that the apportionment should provide for a quota amount for
every class for which members of such class are solidarily liable within their respective class,
and they are only subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The Revised Penal Code
does not provide for solidary liability among the different classes, as was held by the trial court in
the case at bar.
Thus, taking into consideration the difference in participation of the principal and
accomplice, the principal, Tampus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the
civil indemnity and moral damages and appellant Ida should be ordered to pay one-third (1/3) of
the amount. Civil indemnity for simple rape was correctly set at P50,000.00 and moral damages
at P50,000.00. The total amount of damages to be divided between Tampus and Ida is
P100,000.00, where Tampus is liable for P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00)
and Ida is liable for P33,333.33 (which is one-third [1/3] of P100,000.00). This is broken down
into civil indemnity of P16,666.67 and moral damages of P16,666.67. However, since the
principal, Tampus, died while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, his liability for civil
indemnity ex delicto is extinguished by reason of his death before the final judgment.ii[108] His
share in the civil indemnity and damages cannot be passed over to the accomplice, Ida,
because Tampus share of the civil liability has been extinguished. And even if Tampus were
alive upon the promulgation of this decision, Ida would only have been subsidiarily liable for his
share of the civil indemnity of P66,666.67. However, since Tampus civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished, Idas subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also eliminated, following the
principle that the accessory follows the principal. Tampus obligation to pay P66,666.67 his quota
of the civil indemnity is the principal obligation, for which Ida is only subsidiarily liable. Upon the
extinguishment of the principal obligation, there is no longer any accessory obligation which
could attach to it; thus, the subsidiary liability of Ida is also extinguished.
25

4th Exam Article 80 113 Case Digests and Special Laws

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4th Exam Article 80 113 Case Digests and Special Laws

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4th Exam Coverage (Article 80-113 RPC)

[CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS+ SPECIAL LAWS]

Art 80. Suspension of Sentence of Minors

Rennie Declarador vs Hon. Gubaton et. Al.

People of the Philippines vs. Richard Sarcia

Whether SEC 38 and 40 of RA 9344 to the suspension of sentence apply to the

Though the accused is already 31 years old, he is entitled to appropriate disposition

Michael Padua vs People of the Philippines

The civil liability remains the same and unaffected.

GR 168546 (July 23, 2008)

Robert Remiendo vs. People of the Philippines GR 184874 (October 9, 2009)

Whether petitioner is exempt from criminal liability.

Whether petitioner is entitled to a suspension of sentence under Sec. 38 and 40 of RA

4th Exam Coverage (Article 80-113 RPC)

[CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS+ SPECIAL LAWS]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HERMIE M. JACINTO, AccusedAppellant.

People vs Urban Salcedo et al

4th Exam Coverage (Article 80-113 RPC)

[CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS+ SPECIAL LAWS]

accused-appellants to estimate said accused-appellants' age. A reading of the afore-quoted

accorded great respect, even finality by this Court.

Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that:

In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other

4th Exam Coverage (Article 80-113 RPC)

[CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS+ SPECIAL LAWS]

and 40 of R.A. No. 9344 is now moot and academic.[15]

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various

4th Exam Coverage (Article 80-113 RPC)

[CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS+ SPECIAL LAWS]

Article 81-85 Death Penalty

AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.

reaches the maximum age of 21. The provision states:

4th Exam Coverage (Article 80-113 RPC)

[CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS+ SPECIAL LAWS]

Article 89. Modes of Extinguishing Criminal Liability

WHEREFORE, accused ANASTACIO AMISTOSO, having been convicted of Qualified Rape,

extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

Court RESOLVES to:cralawlibrary

4th Exam Coverage (Article 80-113 RPC)

[CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS+ SPECIAL LAWS]

Article 90. Prescription of Crimes

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge

Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting

Art 91. Computation of Prescription of Offenses

We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides

4th Exam Coverage (Article 80-113 RPC)

[CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS+ SPECIAL LAWS]

The trial court granted the petition, stating that:

Citing Cabral vs Puno, x x x This crime prescribes in ten (10) years.

4th Exam Coverage (Article 80-113 RPC)

[CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS+ SPECIAL LAWS]

RULING: Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent

4th Exam Coverage (Article 80-113 RPC)

[CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS+ SPECIAL LAWS]

Act No. 3326

AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY

PCGG VS Desierto (2007)

Issue: w/n crime has prescribed

4th Exam Coverage (Article 80-113 RPC)

[CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS+ SPECIAL LAWS]

Panaguiton Jr. vs DOJ

4th Exam Coverage (Article 80-113 RPC)