The Need for Better Theories PAUL A. SABATIER ‘The process of public policymaking includes th conceptualized and brought to government for tions formulate alternatives and select policy solutions; and those solutions get jmplemented, evaluated, and revised. SIMPLIFYING A COMPLEX WORLD Fore vay of reatons, the policy proces involve an exrerely comple set of policy preferences. 2 This proms uma iis tine spans of ec or mor tht and Jenkins-Smith, 199% able understanding ofthe 3levels of government that are operating, or being proposed for opera- tion, in any given locale, such as the state of California or the city of Los Angeles. Since these programs deal with interrelated subjects and in. volve many of the same actors, many scholars would argue that the ap- ‘Propriate unit of analysis should be the policy subsystem or domain, rather than a specific governmental program (Hijern and Porter, 1981, Ostrom, 1983; Sabatier, 1986; Rhodes, 1988; Jordan, 1990). 4, Policy debates among actors in the course of legislative tion, and proposed administrative regulations technical disputes over the severity of a proble probable impacts of alternative policy soluti policy process requires attention to the role the overall process. 5. A final complicating factor in the policy process is that most disputes involve deeply held valuesfinterests, large amounts of mo: some point, authoritative coercion. Given these stakes, seldom resemble polite academic debates. Inst to present evidence selective the position of their opponents, to coerce and discredit generally to distort the situation to their advantage 1990a,b; Schlager, 1995), t such debates play in yonents, and 1986; Moe, In short, understanding the policy process requires a knowledge of the goals and perceptions of hundreds of actors throughout the country involving possibly very technical scientific and legal issues over periods of a decade or more when ‘most of those actors are actively seeking to propagate their specific “spin” on eveats, Given the staggering complexity of the policy process, the analyst must find ‘some way of simplifying the situation in order to have any chance of understand- {ng it. One simply cannot look for, and see, everything. Work in the philosophy of tegories, for examy administrative agencies, and interest groups (Shepsle, 1989; Schar In contrast, the advocacy coalition framework tells the analyst to assume (1) that Paul A. Sabatier ciel “The Neo for Bester Theorie are more important than institutional oat curating a wide varity of objectives, which Bera) mar 1 researchers and I nl (3) hat one Must add reseaches a sty gmportant policy actors (Sabatir and Jeni iy pe qwo diferent penpectives look atthe same situation through quite feo eens and thus re likly 1st quite diferent thing—t lst nally aa tat we havelite choice but to look atthe word trough lens cons ae tof simplifying presuppositions atleast wo quite diferent sateaies in ope developing such Tens. On the one hand, the analyst can approach the Sinan implica hoc fashion, sing whatever categories and asumptions oarten fom hs or er experience. This is sentially the method of common sere easy be reasonably accurate for situations important to the analysts wel- ‘tein which se or be has considerable experience. In sch stations the ana- putas bth the incentive and the experience to ciminate cer invalid propo- Uffons Beyond that limited scope, th commonsense strategy by internal inconsistencies, ar propositions precisely becanse the trategy does not for enor correction, Since its assimptons and propo Inve enknown they ae unlikely to be subjected to imply avumes they are, by and large, correct insofar a he o ant oftheir com “an aerate strategy that of since. ts fundamental ontological assumption is tha smaller eof ei elationshps undeles the beridering complexity of ‘Phenomena, For exampl,acentury ago Darin provided a relitiely simple expla fution summarized under the process of natural section—for the thousends of specs he encountered on his voyaps. Te erical characteristics of sence are that (1) is methods of data acquisition and analysis should be presented in aff deny public manner that they canbe replicated by others, (2) ts concepts and Dropastions should be clearly defined and logialy consistent and should giv cise to empirical flifable propositions; 3) those propositions shuld be as general 2 posible and should explity addres relevant uncertainties and (4) both the methods and concepts should be se consciously subjected to criticism and evalu ‘Hin by experts in that ld (Nagel, 19615 Lave and March, 1975; Kin, Keohane, td Verbs, 194). The overriding strategy can be summarize in the injunction: “Te dear enough tobe proven wrong” Unlike “common sense scence is dexgned tobeseléconseousyeror secking,and thus self-coreting ‘cstcal component of that stategy—derived from ‘that scientists should develop clear and logically interrelated sets of propositions, some of them empicically falsifiable, to explain fairly general sets of phenomena. ‘Such coherent sets of propositions have traditionally been termed theories. In several recent papers (including Chapter 3 of this volume and Ostrom et al, 1994), Elinor Ostrom has developed some very useful distinctions ai different sets of propositions. In her view, a conceptual framework ide6 Paul A. Sabato, of variables and the relationships among them that presumably account for ase oF Phenomena, The framework can provide anything from ¢ modest set of vat ables to something as extensive as a paradigm. It need not id among relationships, although more developed frameworks some hypotheses A theory provides a “denser” and more logically coherent set cy relationships. It applies values to some of the variables and usually specifies hay ‘elionships may vary depending upon the values of critical variables Numer, ‘ous theories may be cot f th the same conceptual framework A modelis 2 assum the under and models can be conceptualized as operat {eonga continuum involving increasing logical interconnectedness and spec ficity, but decreasing scope, One final point: Scientists should be aware of, and capabl different theoretical perspectives—not just a si Knowledge of several different perspectives forces «ences in assumptions across frameworks, rather than Set. Second, multiple perspectives encourage the dev otheses that should lead ideally to “strong inference” the accumulation of evi rent of competing hy- t, 1964)—or atleast to ce in favor of one perspective more than another. F- ion of multiple perspectives should gradually lar. ‘one perspective is more useful than another, t with this multiple-lens st volume discusses seven con- tional rational choice—have all have spawned a variety of virtu models seeking to explain specific situations. ‘THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF THE POLICY PROCESS The Stages Heuristic Until recently, the most influential framework for understanding the poi Process particularly among American scholars—~has been the “sages heuistic™ fi that Nakarnuza (1987) termed the “textbook approach.” As developed by Jones (1970), Anderson (1975), and Brewer and deLeon (1983) lating some excellent research within specific ‘tages—partcularly agenda setting (Cobb, Ross, and Ross, 1976; Kingdon. 19814 Nefon, 1984) and policy implementation (Pressman and Wildavsy, 1973; Hjern ; Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) in the past decade, however, the stages heuri rather devestati Ene smith, 1999): specific situation, It is usually much narrower in scope, and ig theory. Ideally, itis mathe. 7 “Tue Nee for Better Theories has been subjected to some es, 1991; Sabatier and Jen- iticisms (Nakamura, 1987; eae ee Se ce esearch in other stages. In addition, without causal a een rc ees on peat wa ak cms ee iis tively inaccurate. For gear can og Pear ees ero policy formolation/legiimation occurs as bureaucrats attempt 10 im- olen Perry eee tic 4. Theuinpuo tine ba i "piece of le islation oversimplifies the ust rete rz using nun pley propor nd ese sal iro goverment or ample stn ais oe oreo wedi ie erect lt oar ae Pay pons Wand om inner {Pas opiate an nee oes nine aon calc panne rT ena raisin connate pen esha Siomanhih common foeasing on plcy ele makes very sense lived its useful- .euristie has 1¢conelusion seems inescapable: The stages heuristic Saas replaced with better theoretical framewor = ‘ ae More Promising Theoretical Frame = Fortunately, over the past fiten yrs a mumiber of ew theoreti ameworks of the policy proces have been either developed or extensively modified, This book seeks to present some of the more promising ones and to as engin an limitations ech? a * Tolowing re the ees ullaein secting the framewocs te diced ‘They strike meas relatively straightforward, although reasonable people may cer- tainly disagree with my application of them:Paul A. Sabatier | Each framework must do a reasonably good job of meeting the criteria ‘of a scientific theory; that is its concepts and propositions must be rel- st identify clear causal driv- 2s, it must give rise to falsifiable hypotheses, and it must be fairly broad ply to most of the policy process in a variety of political Each framework must be the subject of a fair amount of recent concep- tual development and/or empirical testing, A number of currently ac- tive policy scholars must view it as a viable way of understanding the policy process. 3. Each framework must be a positive theory seeking to explain much of the policy process. The theoretical framework may also contain some normative elements, but these are not required. tion flows, institutional arrangements, and variation in the socioeco- nomic environment. ‘By means of these criteria, seven frameworks have been selected for analysis, Following isa brief description and justification for each selection. The Stages Heuristic, Although I have doubts that the stages "heuristic meets Criteria 1 and 2 above, there is certainly room for disagreement on the second. In particular, implementation studies may be undergoing a revival (Lester and Gog- gin, 1998). Even were that not the case, Ihave spent so much time criticizing the stages heuristic that simple fairness requires me to provide a forum for its de- fense. Peter deLeon, one of the earliest proponents of the heuristic, has volun- twered to be the spokesperson, Institutional Rational Choice, I works focusing on how institut al individuals motivated by mater ‘ure on institutional rational choice focuses on rather specific sets of such as the relationships between Congress and administ United States (Moe, 1984; Shepsle, 1989; Miller, 1992), the extremely broad in scope and has been applied to important the United States and other countries (Ostro 1994; Scholz, Twombley, and Headrick, 1 1995; Chubb and M most developed of volume and is arguably the most utilized in the United States and perhaps in Germany, Elinor Ostrom has agreed to write the chapter for this volume. pula ° ‘The Need for Better Theories ‘the Mutipl-Sireams Framenork, ‘The maltipe-steams framework was dee : ‘can” model of organi- See eae eer Sa rt nd On, 108 vee hl are mem arrest scot gon probe me OD nee i Kc peponets of eolaices Pl oo citing ef clecion and elected of 20 ram nvaly rte independ of ech the st when a “window of opportunity” permits policy ee no search results in the policy process are commensurate with reduced research ce {ors in tht vein. propose a rather more positive response than Sabatier ord Jenkins-Smith’s gloomy prognostication of reduced research efforts, tha the ok i ontinue to serve asa valuable heuristic in both p Search and programmatic operations. First as Ihave suggested, and despite rotesiations, there is some doubt as to framework (ACE) have broken out of Search is stl tobe done within that framework as long as one can admit thatthe Policy process is not a model in the formal sense of the word Brewer and deleon (and other “policy processers” I suspect) prefer to reflect upon the policy process/stages heuristic as a basis for represents a “model,” a euristic” serves little purpose as long as we recognize its main. 2 means for categorizing policy actions as they vary from hhas a lack of predictive ca- ldman's (1995) masterly. appeal to the policy stages framework. ‘One can make the case that many of the more radi search—I mean the postpositivist themes, including and critical theory—could also be eaily incorporated into the policy process Paradigm (see Hawkesworth, 1988, and deLeon, 1997), Marie Dens made the case (drawing from Foucal policy analysis is little more cory, as an example, makes the case that “sys- ions” threaten the foundations of good policy and social legitimacy, that is, according to Jargen Habermas, “communicathee = Honality” (se, e.g, Forester, 1985, 1993). Itwould be an easy transition fom ert, a ste Stages Approach othe Policy Process scribe a movement encompassing greater subjectivity o going Ea : improved problem defini~ and deLeon, 1983) refer vsts, such a8 Fischer and Fo 4d. model as carefully structured as Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s ACE would fe unable fo encompass these newer policy approaches such as communicative and postpositivism, feed teed sie dk ak ae Ey ed negotiation, can also be fitted into the policy process model without under- ‘rining-—in fact, enhancing—its validity for understanding, working on, or, rmore to the point, improving the quality of information pri ‘ment, This last task, of course, was one of Laswell’ charges. In the above examples, if we atribute any credibilt approaches (and I propose few would entirely disown them) as Sebati could be en a possibly initing the advance ces by clinging tenaciously tothe problematic tenets of po: A Stole, Coney tes aernaive concep can ready be apuredby th work. eed whit ” but whether ¢ more pressing question is not “whither the policy process” es ‘can be useful in moving the policy theories. The quest for a policy theory jer and Jenkins-Smith and of Elinor Os- nda queen, the anewer must be much move agnostic Lavell ed inaximization thee” anda (ee Brunnes 199, p. 7 acts in ways that axe perceived to ing forms are predisposed to complete acts in way hetero han iFhe had completed th ‘The postulate 1's own perception of th ve act completions ation. mnant with an empirical theory ‘However, the maximization postulate is less consonant ‘than it sounds. n the frst place it seems entirely too dependent on traditional economic reasoning; there are simply too many instances in which imperium economia—however convenient and enticing—does not prevail, as Amitai Et- infortunately, the standard disciplinary formulations are even more suspect Saas terms of theory bulling Por exmmple let us take the ce of ben efit-cost analysis: US. president Bill Clinton accepted an entirely new budget-a Peter det busting component in 1996 when he ordered expanded disalty benefits for ug have contracted prostrate cancer, basing his decisis See ee (1955) indicated that he sander tee i f the operations; harder than you might ‘Many of these activi not be numbered” These and numerous other instances emphasize the complexity ‘of policy actions that render analysis from a limited perspective les than used (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987) and, concomitantly, enhance the value ofthe poly process modi one can justifiably wonder if the pol served if they adopted more ofa systems analysis pers “model”) as opposed toa general systems perspective that iif they accepted tn. the policy stages/process for its constrained worth and leave it behind hen ‘and better things materialize. The systems model is certainly more hoi inits approach, searching for, perhaps stumbling tovrard, the “big pietze” | ite daunting big-picture complexities and linkages. In phy ‘general systems perspective would be known as a grand unifying theory in ‘words, most physicist’ Holy Grail. However, systems analysis (from the Greek, to Joosen or break apart) attempts to answer the question of the disageregated pais inliew ofthe forbidding whole. In its defense, we can y 4s important, what does not make up) the parts, Although this info ‘appear as little more than isolated and unrelated, we know from ' ‘scientific revolutions” Given ch, we might well be bet- 9f mid-range theories, $s, westill may be unable to grasp how the entire ‘fable (or if one prefers Karl Popper's terminology, falsif- th the assistance of, for example, Eugene Bardach (1977), we hhave a much better idea of how agendas are formulated and policy pestedly advised us over the yeas jugh Holy Grails are all wel good and fully warrant our lusting after them, still “usable knowledge? “lay probing,” and re sages proche Pl Pros i the * do provide a valuable ils dling through” do pro Me ls te famous prase of John Maynard Keynes I span cGely wrong eat manifested with great certitude into CONCLUSION epterstsacos earns ‘rely; and third, that even. ‘quest: a argues decisively or even very strongly for abandoning the pol a wradigm has never etn owe ned t ak ational questions: jnen us everything we might have esr ¥ jeu of alternative insights fan acta ternative to empty theo » ing. In tenting ober eves Tse own word (quoted in Banner, 199 oer pei he she po fines ot spy oft apc Bae stomatic compubion, or of on ftw a . 5: eo Fogel conta : or atally delude NOTES e 1 Inthe erly 198, when Gary Breve and Pete dela dations of Policy Analysis aso ie chose not to, explaining30 2. Perhaps of equal importance, these stages asisted inthe des = ; 5 asisted in the design of a numberof a é i engendering a larry of policy design, estimation, and evaluation eo be a representative rather than an exhaustive 6. The sours hes numeous converts wth rfeor Saar ‘ne can iy ce fesor Sts earar sry of aenenton ene vee that i sow of he oly proces eet sie eo REFERENCES Adeon Janes E178 Publi Poi Mais Ply Mab 24. Now Hol inh, & Win ‘(Originally published in 1975.) oe oo Barc apn 1977 The npemeation Gore Chie: Ua -lumgarines ak Rand Bran D Jones ah Jone 9% Agent and bye Po S ities, ee University of Chicago Press. * el lah, Robert eta 98 ai of he Her. 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