PHILOSOPHICAL

ZOMBIE

POSSIBLE THEORIES

The universe is a single unified stuff.

Idealism All things are mental. All things are spiritual.

Materialism All things are physical.

TRADITIONAL AND MOST LOGICAL OPTIONS:

1. Dualism: Two kinds of substance Mind and Body (brain)

that Interact or are coordinated in some way.

Monism: One kind of substance.

2. Materialism - only material substance exists, there is no

spirit.

3. Idealism - only spiritual substance exists, there is no

matter.

VARIATIONS

Interactionism - minds and bodies exist and interact in some way

Epiphenomenalism - body acts on mind but minds do NOT act on bodies

Double Aspect Theory - there is one substance with two aspects (mind/body)

Parallelism -minds and bodies exist in separate dimensions and are coordinated

i. Pre-Established Harmony - minds and bodies are set in motion and

coordinated from the beginning of time by a deity that creates the
universe

ii. Occasionalism - on the occasion of the mind making a decision the

body is moved by the creator (deity) to do whatever the mind has decided
to make the body do.

Monism : Materialism - only Body exists there are no minds. The brain
accounts for the activities previously associated with the Mind. Among those
who have thought this way: B.F. SKINNER, DENNENT

FUNCTIONALISM

Functionalism tries to move beyond both Behaviorism and

Identity Theory by taking elements from both.

Like those two theories, Functionalism is generally taken to

be a materialist theory.

However, it differs from the other two theories in the

following ways:

HOW IS FUNCTIONALISM DIFFERENT?

Functionalism agrees that brain

states are responsible for mental
states, but disagrees that they are
identical with them.

To do this, it argues that

neurological states or brain activity
help to realize mental states, which
then lead to behavior.

In this way it solves the main

problems with the other two
theories by proposing that brain
states are "low level" activities that
help realize "high level" mental
states.

FUNCTIONALISM CONTINUED

To help understand this idea, consider the

usual Functionalist example of a computer.

Imagine that you ask a computer to add the

numbers 3 and 7. On one level - at a low
level - what is happening in the computer is
dependent on the hardware; on another
level - a high level - the computer's software
is calculating the answer.

Since, historically, computers have had

different hardware that works in different
ways, we cannot describe the process of
calculation as the activity of hardware.

Instead, the Functionalist argues, the

process of calculation is simply realized by
the hardware.

Therefore, the software is a function of the

hardware.

PHILOSOPHICAL
ZOMBIE

CONCEIVABILITY AND EXPLANATIONS

The general argument on which this lecture is based is the

following:

Suppose we can conceive of some state of the world which does not
actually exist. Then and only then we are entitled to ask for an
explanation of why this state does not exist or what causes the
difference between the state we have conceived and the corresponding
state which does exist.

Who does this remind you of?

CONCEIVABILITY AND EXPLANATIONS

Conceive of here meaning more or less the same as

imagine needs to be considered more carefully than I can
do in this lecture.

Can I conceive of a square circle drawn on a flat piece of

paper? No. Why not?

Because nothing, real or imaginary, can be described as such a

square circle.

The meaning of square and circle are incompatible in this

context.

THE HARD PROBLEM OF

CONSCIOUSNESS AND ZOMBIES

The so-called hard problem of

consciousness asks for an
explanation of how the
properties and behavior of a
physical device the meat
machine which comprises a
human brain result in
subjective experiences which
are taken to be non-physical in
the sense that they cannot be
explained by the laws and
principles which apply to
physical objects.

PHILOSOPHICAL ZOMBIE

A zombie is a critter that is physically and behaviorally exactly

like a human being (or any being that we consider to be
conscious) but lacks consciousness.

That is a stipulative definition, so don't argue with me about

it. Just accept it.

I'll use 'zombie' to refer to human zombies and won't worry

about cat zombies, etc

PHILOSOPHICAL ZOMBIE

Cut a zombie open, and you find exactly what you would find were
you to cut a human being open. And in terms of linguistic and
nonlinguistic behavior, there is no way to tell a human being from a
zombie. (So don't think of something sleepy, or drugged, or
comatose.)

When a zombie sees a tree, what is going on internal to the zombie's

brain is a 'visual' computational process, but the zombie lacks
subjectivity.

There is no irreducible subjectivity, no qualitative feel to the 'visual'

processing; there is nothing it is like for a zombie to see a female
zombie or to desire her.

(What's it like to be a zombie? There is nothing it is like to be a

zombie.)

ARE ZOMBIES CONCEIVABLE?

Surely, zombies are conceivable.

To conceive one, start with yourself. You are not a zombie.

You have feelings. Right now, perhaps, you feel bored or
puzzled by what you are reading. Slap yourself across the face
to wake up. You felt something, a stinging sensation.

Do it again just to be sure. Now subtract off (in thought) the

conscious experiences leaving behind your body, its behavior,
its environment and all the causal processes disporting
themselves between body and environment.

What you are now conceiving is a zombie.

IN GROUPS

Discuss how each philosopher would

answer the question Are we
Zombies?

Descartes

Russell

Ryle

Armstrong

Dennett

Each group will share their answer

and argument to support their answer.