LEE VS ILAGAN

FACTS:
Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data against Joy, her former common law
partner.
According to him, sometime in July 2011, he visited Joys condominium and rested for a while. When he arrived at
his office, he noticed his digital camera missing. On August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported
sex video she discovered from the digital camera showing him and another woman.
He denied the video and demanded the return of the camera, but she refused. They had an altercation where Neri
allegedly slammed Joys head against a wall and then walked away.
Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including a case for violation of Republic Act 9262 and
administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilising the said video.
The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of the other woman, thus he had no
choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ of habeas data.
RTC issued the writ and directed Joy to appear before the RTC and produce Neris digital camera, as well as the
original and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days from receipt. In her return,. Joy admitted
keeping the memory card of the digital camera and reproducing the video but only for use as evidence in the cases
she filed against Neri. Neris petitions should be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at suppressing the
evidence in the cases she filed against him; and she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data
regarding the person of Neri. The RTC granted Neris petition and ordered the turn-over of the video to
Neri and enjoined Joy from reproducing the same. It disregarded Joys defense that she is not engaged in the
collection, gathering and storage of data, and that her acts of reproducing the same and showing it to other persons
(Napolcom) violated Neris right to privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling only on the return of the
video and not on its admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court.
HELD:
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response,
given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances[1]. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most
especially the right to informational privacy of individuals[2], which is defined as the right to control the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself[3].
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially
requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, [t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. In other words, the
petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand,
and the right to life, liberty or security on the other[4]. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be
supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim[5]. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect
purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are
vague and doubtful[6].
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in
life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video
which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption he
to failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security.