Epiphenomenal Qualia

Frank Jackson
Jackson is a qualia freak. He thinks that no
amount of physical information can
include certain features of bodily
sensations and perceptual experiences.
Whatever I know about the physical brain,
its states and their functional roles and
relations, is not enough to tell me
anything about the itchiness of itches or
the experience of smelling a rose, etc.

Quale

The felt quality of a conscious experience.

Quale is singular, Qualia is plural.

There is something that its like to be conscious, to

have a sensation, to see an after- image.

Qualia is a word introduced to help us talk about

what its like to be conscious.

Jacksons claim

1) The existence of qualia is incompatible with the truth

of physicalism.

2) But qualia exist.

3) So, physicalism must be false.

Terminology: Jackson uses physicalism to describe a

specific version of materialism.

What is physicalism?

The theory that all information [truth] is ultimately physical

information [truth]information [truth] about physical states
and physical events, couched exclusively in physical terms.

I.e., the view that

1) everything that exists is physical (material) (this is simply

what materialism says) , and that

2) everything can, in principle, be fully described and

explained by physical (material) theories.

I.e., a completed physics could explain everything.

Physicalism vs. Materialism

As Jackson uses these terms:

MaterialismThe metaphysical claim that the only

fundamental substance is matter.

Materialism involves a rejection of dualism.

PhysicalismThe above plus the claim that everything

can (in principle) be explained by the laws of physics.

So, for Jackson, physicalism is a specific version of

materialism.

The knowledge argument for qualia

1) Suppose that one knew everything there is to know

about the make-up of the physical world and the
physical theories explaining it.

2) One would still not (in virtue of this knowledge)

know what it was like to feel pain, smell a rose, etc.

3) Therefore, knowing all this is not knowing

everything .... There is something that physicalism
leaves out.

The Argument
An Illustration

Knowledge Argument (1)

Jacksons primary argument for qualia is the knowledge argument.

He asks us to consider the case of Fred, whose color vision is such that he
can discern more colors than any other human.

That is, he can discern two colors of red (call them red1 and red2) where
all other humans see just one.

He does so reliably (we can test to see that he always chooses the same
color examples as red1 and red2), and research shows a physiological
basis for the ability.

However, even if we were to learn every physical fact about Fred and
color, we would not know what it is like to see red1 and red2.

The physical facts leave something out (viz., the qualia), and therefore the
claim that all information is reducible to physical information is false.

Moreover, were we to develop a surgical procedure that

would alter peoples brains such that they could see
red1 and red2 beforehand, even had they known all of
the physical facts about red1 and red2 beforehand.

Thus, physical information fails to capture something.

Knowledge Argument (2)

Imagine that Mary is raised in a completely black-and-white

environment and that she learns through lectures on black-andwhite TV all the physical facts about the real world.

If physicalism is true, then Mary knows all there is to know.

But it seems that she doesnt know all there is to know.

In particular, when she gets let out of the room, she will learn
what it is like to see red and, hence, learn something new about
others experiences that she did not know before.

Thus physicalism is false.

Group Question

Knowledge
Argument
Do you agree with the physicalist that
complete physical knowledge is
complete knowledge?
When Mary comes out of her room, do
you agree that she comes to know
something that she didn't know before?

Jacksons conclusion:

... one can have all the physical information without [thereby]
having all the information there is to have (without, that is,
knowing what it feels like to have a given experience).

Physicalism says that everything can be explained in terms of

physical explanations.

But, we have just shown that we can know all the physical
explanations there are to know without knowing everything,
i.e., without knowing what qualia are like.

So, the existence of qualia proves that physicalism must be false.

Qualia vs. Physicalism:

Physicalism:

1) everything that exists is physical (material); and

2) everything can, in principle, be fully described and

explained by physical (material) theories.

The existence of qualia, Jackson argues, conflicts with 2),

but not necessarily with 1).

That is, rejecting 2) doesnt necessarily imply

substance dualism.

Group Question

Frank Jackson
How damaging do you think Jacksons
knowledge argument is against the
physicalist?

How I use Sonar to Navigate the World

Daniel Kish
Daniel Kish has been blind since he was 13 months old,
but has learned to see using a form of echolocation.
He clicks his tongue and sends out flashes of sound
that bounce off surfaces in the environment and return
to him, helping him to construct an understanding of
the space around him.
In a rousing talk, Kish demonstrates how this works
and asks us to let go of our fear of the dark unknown.
http://www.ted.com/talks/daniel_kish_how_i_use_sonar_to_navigate_the_world

Jackson:
Dualism is not the only alternative to Physicalism

Jackson thinks that physicalism is false but does not

therefore infer that substance dualism must be true.

That is, he rejects physicalism but does not reject

materialism.

So, what is the alternative?

How can he accept materialism and deny physicalism?

The Bogey of Epiphenomenalism

Epiphenomenalism: ... the idea that qualia are causally

impotent with respect to the physical world.

i.e., the view that even though qualia exist and are
caused by events in the physical world (e.g., the way the
world interacts with our sense organs and central
nervous system),

qualia do not themselves cause changes in the physical

world (i.e., they are causally impotent with respect to
it).

Definitions:

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are

caused by physical events in the brain, but have no
effects upon any physical events. Behavior is caused by
muscles that contract upon receiving neural impulses,
and neural impulses are generated by input from other
neurons or from sense organs. On the epiphenomenalist
view, mental events play no causal role in this process.
[Stanford Encyclopedia of Phil.]

Epiphenomenalism

There is something its like to be conscious, to feel

pleasure or pain; something that it feels like to be happy
or sad, etc.

But none of this has any causal impact on the world.

That is, nothing would be any different if we were all

zombies, if we had no inner life.

So, yes, we have an inner life, but this has no effect on

anything.