Pageiii

CognitiveScience
AnIntroduction
SecondEdition
NeilA.Stillings,
StevenE.Weisler,
ChristopherH.Chase,
MarkH.Feinstein,
JayL.Garfield,and
EdwinaL.Rissland
ABradfordBook
TheMITPress
Cambridge,Massachusetts
London,England

Pageiv

1995MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyformbyanyelectronicormechanicalmeans(includingphotocopying,recording,orinformation
storageandretrieval)withoutpermissioninwritingfromthepublisher.
ThisbookwassetinPalatinobyAscoTradeTypesettingLtd.,HongKongandwasprintedandboundintheUnitedStatesofAmerica.
LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData
Cognitivescience:anintroduction/NeilA.Stillings...[etal.].
2nded.
p.cm.
"ABradfordbook."
Includesbibliographicalreferences.
ISBN0262193531
1.Cognition.2.Cognitivescience.I.Stillings,NeilA.
BF311.C55231995
153dc209429553
CIP
Secondprinting,1998

Pagev

Toourparents

Pagevii

Contents
ListofAuthors

xi

PrefacetotheSecondEdition

xiii

PrefacetotheFirstEdition

xv

NotetotheTeacher

xvii

Chapter1WhatIsCognitiveScience?
1.1TheCognitiveView

1.2SomeFundamentalConcepts

1.3InformationProcessesCanBeAnalyzedatSeveralLevels

1.4ComputersinCognitiveScience

11

1.5AppliedCognitiveScience

12

1.6TheInterdisciplinaryNatureofCognitiveScience

13

SuggestedReadings

14

References

14

Chapter2CognitivePsychology:TheArchitectureoftheMind

15

2.1TheNatureofCognitivePsychology

15

2.2TheNotionofCognitiveArchitecture

16

2.3AGlobalViewoftheCognitiveArchitecture

18

2.4PropositionalRepresentation

26

2.5SchematicRepresentation

32

2.6CognitiveProcesses,WorkingMemory,andAttention

37

2.7MentalImages

42

2.8AutomaticandControlledProcesses

55

2.9TheAcquisitionofSkill

58

2.10TheConnectionistApproachtoCognitiveArchitecture

63

SuggestedReadings

83

References

83

Pageviii

Chapter3CognitivePsychology:FurtherExplorations
3.1ConceptsandCategories

87

3.2Memory

99

3.3Reasoning

116

3.4ProblemSolving

129

SuggestedReadings

135

References

136

Chapter4ArtificialIntelligence:KnowledgeRepresentation

139

4.1TheNatureofArtificialIntelligence

139

4.2KnowledgeRepresentation

151

SuggestedReadings

173

References

174

Chapter5ArtificialIntelligence:Search,Control,andLearning

177

5.1SearchandControl

177

5.2Learning

192

SuggestedReadings

212

References

213

Chapter6Linguistics:TheRepresentationofLanguage

215

6.1TheStudyofLinguisticKnowledge

215

6.2Phonology

220

6.3Syntax

241

6.4Universals

260

SuggestedReadings

267

References

267

Chapter7Neuroscience:BrainandCognition

87

269

7.1IntroductiontotheStudyoftheNervousSystem

269

7.2OrganizationoftheCentralNervousSystem

270

7.3NeuralRepresentation

291

7.4Neuropsychology

306

7.5ComputationalNeuroscience

323

SuggestedReadings

325

References

326

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Chapter8Philosophy:FoundationsofCognitiveScience
8.1PhilosophyinCognitiveScience

331

8.2TheEnterpriseofCognitiveScience

335

8.3OntologicalIssues

345

8.4EpistemologicalIssues

367

8.5TheStateofCognitiveScience

373

SuggestedReadings

374

References

375

Chapter9LanguageAcquisition

379

9.1MilestonesinAcquisition

380

9.2TheoreticalPerspectives

392

SuggestedReadings

405

References

406

Chapter10Semantics

409

10.1SemanticsandCognitiveScience

409

10.2MeaningandEntailment

410

10.3Reference

411

10.4Sense

418

10.5ProblemsinPossibleWorldsSemantics

424

10.6CognitiveandComputationalModelsofSemanticProcessing

426

SuggestedReadings

432

References

433

Chapter11NaturalLanguageProcessing

331

435

11.1Preliminaries

435

11.2OntheRoleofGrammarinLanguageProcessing

436

11.3ConnectionistModels

445

11.4OntheRoleofDiscourse

447

11.5MoreontheRoleofGeneralKnowledge

452

11.6Production

454

11.7Conclusion

458

SuggestedReadings

458

References

458

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Chapter12Vision
12.1TheProblemofVision

461

12.2LowLevelVisualProcesses

464

12.3IntermediateProcessesandRepresentationsinVision

479

12.4HighLevelVisualProcesses

490

12.5TheArchitectureofVisualComputation

502

SuggestedReadings

512

References

512

Index

461

517

Pagexi

ListofAuthors
NeilA.Stillings
Ph.D.inpsychology,StanfordUniversity.ProfessorofPsychologyintheSchoolofCommunicationsandCognitiveScience,HampshireCollege.Afoundingmember
ofHampshire'scognitivescienceprogramwithovertwentyyearsofteachingexperience.Organizerofthe1986nationalworkshoponteachingcognitivescience,
fundedbytheSloanFoundation,andthe1993nationalworkshoponundergraduatecognitivescience,fundedbytheNationalScienceFoundation.Coeditorofthe
entiretextbookandprimaryauthorofchapters1,2,3,and12.
StevenE.Weisler
Ph.D.inlinguistics,StanfordUniversity.AssociateProfessorofLinguisticsintheSchoolofCommunicationsandCognitiveScience,HampshireCollege.Researchand
publicationsinsyntaxandsemantics.Coorganizerofthe1993nationalworkshoponundergraduatecognitivescience,fundedbytheNationalScienceFoundation.
Coeditoroftheentiretextbook,primaryauthorofchapter9,andcoauthorofchapters6and10.
ChristopherH.Chase
Ph.D.inneuroscience,UniversityofCaliforniaatSanDiego.AssociateProfessorofCognitiveScienceintheSchoolofCommunicationsandCognitiveScience,
HampshireCollege.Researchandpublicationsincognitiveneuroscience,particularlyreadingdevelopmentanddevelopmentaldyslexia.Primaryauthorofchapter7.
MarkH.Feinstein
Ph.D.inlinguistics,CityUniversityofNewYork.ProfessorofLinguisticsintheSchoolofCommunicationsandCognitiveScience,HampshireCollege.Memberof
theHampshirefacultysince1976.Researchandpublicationsinphonology,mammalianvocalization,animalcognition,andevolutionofcognitionandbehavior.Primary
authorofchapter11andcoauthorofchapter6.
JayL.Garfield
Ph.D.inphilosophy,UniversityofPittsburgh.ProfessorofPhilosophyintheSchoolofCommunicationsandCognitiveScience,HampshireCollege.Researchand
publicationsinfoundationsofcognitivescience,philosophyofmind,philosophyoflanguage,metaphysics,epistemology,andBuddhistphilosophy.Directs
Hampshire'sexchangeprogramwiththeTibetanuniversitiesinexileinIndia.AuthorofBeliefInPsychology(MITPress)andauthororeditorofotherbooks.
Primaryauthorofchapter8andcoauthorofchapter10.

Pagexii

EdwinaL.Rissland
Ph.D.inmathematics,MIT.ProfessorofComputerScience,UniversityofMassachusettsatAmherstandLectureronLaw,HarvardUniversityLawSchool.
Researchandpublicationsonknowledgerepresentation,casebasedreasoning,artificialintelligenceandthelaw,andmachinelearning.FellowoftheAmerican
AssociationforArtificialIntelligenceandVicePresidentoftheInternationalAssociationforArtificialIntelligenceandLaw.Primaryauthorofchapters4and5.

Pagexiii

PrefacetotheSecondEdition
ThesecondeditionofCognitiveScience:AnIntroductionretainstheorganizationalformatandthelevelofpresentationofthefirstedition.Manychaptersofthe
bookhavebeensubstantiallyrevised,however,andseveralnewchaptersectionshavebeenadded.ThechangesaredetailedintheNotetotheTeacher.Theteamof
authorswhowrotethefirsteditionremainslargelyunchanged.DavidRosenbaumandLynneBakerWardhavegoneontootherpursuits.Wehaveparticularlymissed
David'scolleagueshipandhisabilitytoputhisloveofthefieldintowords.Fortunately,ChristopherChasejoinedtheHampshireCollegefacultyatjusttherighttime
andvolunteeredtotakeoverthechapteronneuroscience.
Oneortwopeoplewereprimarilyresponsibleforeachchapter:Stillings,chapters1,2,3,12,andseveralpassagesonneuralcomputationinchapter7Rissland,
chapters4and5FeinsteinandWeisler,chapter6Chase,chapter7Garfield,chapter8Weisler,chapter9GarfieldandWeisler,chapter10andFeinstein,
chapter11.NeilStillingsandStevenWeislereditedtheentiremanuscript.
Manypeopledeserveourthanksforhelpingwiththepreparationofthesecondedition.Theauthorsarepartofthecognitivesciencecommunityinthefivecollege
areacenteredinAmherst,Massachusetts.Itisimpossibletomentionallofthecolleaguesandstudentswhocontributedtoourwork,butwethankthemfortheirhelp.
Weappreciatethesuggestionsandcorrectionsofpeoplewhowrotetousaboutthefirstedition.PatriciaChurchland,RichardThompson,LeeSpector,JamieCallan,
PaulUtgoff,andJodyDanielsreviewedpartsofthemanuscriptforthesecondeditionandmademanyhelpfulsuggestions.ConversationswithGaryMarcus,Sean
Stromsten,SeanHill,AndyBarto,andRichardYeewerealsoveryhelpful.RebeccaNeimarkpreparedthenewfigureswithadmirablepatienceandprofessionalism.
MichaelZenner,MichaelPatterson,andStaceyGuesshelpedwithreferencesandwiththecomputerizedscanningofthefirstedition.LeniBowenhelpedwith
permissions,typing,andeditingatseveralcrucialpoints,andshekeptHampshireCollege'scognitivescienceprogramonanevenkeelthroughoutourwork.
WecouldnothaveseenthisrevisionthroughwithoutBettyStanton'sgenerosity,faith,andfriendlypersistenceandTeriMendelsohn'sprofessionalismandunfailing
goodcheer.Thecopyeditors,AnneMarkandDavidAnderson,caughtourlapsesinclarityandourstylisticimperfectionswithalmostfrighteningaccuracy,andthey
evencorrectedourantiquatedBeethovenscholarship.
KatherinePfisterandMonicaandTimStillingsdeservespecialthanksfortheirsupportforNeilStillingsduringthepreparationofthisedition.

Pagexv

PrefacetotheFirstEdition
Thesevenauthorsofthisbookhaveworkedtogetherformanyyearsinthecognitivesciencecommunitythathasgrownupinthefivecollegeareasurrounding
Amherst,Massachusetts.Sixofus(Stillings,Feinstein,Garfield,Rosenbaum,Weisler,andBakerWard)teachinHampshireCollege'sSchoolofCommunicationsand
CognitiveScience(BakerWardrecentlymovedtoNorthCarolinaStateUniversity).Theseventh,EdwinaRissland,isamemberoftheComputerandInformation
ScienceDepartmentattheUniversityofMassachusetts.Wehaveallalsobeenmembersoftheinterdepartmentalgraduateprogramincognitivescienceatthe
UniversityofMassachusetts.
ThecognitivescienceprogramatHampshireCollegeisauniqueeducationalexperiment.Hampshirewasplannedduringthe1960sasanexperimentingcollege,and
cognitivesciencewasoneoftheinnovativeprogramsitofferedwhenitopeneditsdoorsin1970.In1972asingleacademicdepartment(thencalledtheSchoolof
LanguageandCommunication)wasformedtohousethecognitivesciencefacultyalongwithfacultymembersincomputerscienceandcommunications.Theauthors
wouldliketothankthecollegeanditsleadershipforallowingustodevelopourcommitmenttotheideathatcognitivesciencecouldbeanexcitingareaof
undergraduatestudy.WewouldalsoliketothankWilliamMarsh,whowasthecofounderandformanyyearstheleaderoftheprogram.
Althoughweworkedjointlytolayoutthebookandreworkthemanuscript,oneortwopeoplewereprimarilyresponsibleforeachchapter:Stillings,chapters1,2,3,
and12Rissland,chapters4and5FeinsteinandWeisler,chapter6Rosenbaum,chapter7Garfield,chapter8Weisler,chapter9GarfieldandWeisler,chapter
10Feinstein,chapter11andBakerWard,thecognitivedevelopmentsectionofchapter3.NeilStillingseditedtheentiremanuscript.
BecausesevenpeoplecontributedtothebookandbecauseitisrootedinfifteenyearsofcurricularexperimentationanddevelopmentatHampshireCollegeandthe
UniversityofMassachusetts,itisimpossibletomentioneveryonewhocontributedtoitsdevelopment.Wethankallofthefriendsandcolleagueswhohelpedbringthe
bookintoexistence.
ThefirstdraftofthebookwaswrittenwiththesupportofafacultydevelopmentgranttotheauthorsfromtheCharlesA.Danafoundation.Thecompletionofthe
bookwouldhavebeenimpossiblewithouttheenthusiasticsupportofBettyStantonofTheMITPress.
Thefollowingpeoplereviewedvariouspartsofthemanuscriptatvariouspointsinitspreparation.GaryDell,StevanHarnad,KeithHolyoak,andZenonPylyshyn
deserveparticularthanksforreadinglargechunksofthemanuscript.MichaelArbib,KevinAshley,RobertBerwick,CharlesBriggs,CarolChristensen,Charles
Clifton,BoDahlbohm,WillemDeVries,MichaelGazzaniga,AllenHanson,NorbertHornstein,

Pagexvi

JohnHaugeland,HaymHirsch,DavidKelley,JudithKroll,DavidLeBeaux,WendyLehnert,KenLivingston,DanLloyd,LynnNadel,MartyRingle,PenniSibun,
CatherineSophian,DevikaSubramaniam,PaulUtgoff,MarieVaughn,RobertWall,ThomasWasow,SandyWaxman,andBonnieWebberallreadoneormore
chapters.Allofthesepeopleexercisedtheirprofessionalexpertisewithcare,andinadditionmanyofthemsharedtheirthoughtsonthenatureofcognitivescienceand
thechallengeofteachingittoundergraduates.
WeoweagreatdebttoAnneMark,whoservedasmanuscripteditor.Hersenseofexpositoryandorganizationalclarityandhereyeforbothconceptualand
typographicalerrorarestaggering.NeldaJansenturnedourideasforfiguresintofinishedartworkwithefficiencyandunfailinggoodhumor.ErikAntelmanandJohn
Guntheralsoprovidedinvaluableassistanceinpreparingthefigures.
DavidRosenbaum'spreparationofchapter7waspartiallysupportedbyaResearchCareerDevelopmentAwardfromtheNationalInstituteofNeurologicaland
CommunicativeDisordersandStroke(1K04NS0094201)andbyagrantfromtheNationalScienceFoundation(BNS8408634).Thepreparationofchapter12
waspartiallysupportedbyagrantfromtheNationalScienceFoundation(SER8163019)toNeilStillings.
RuthHammenandLeniBowenkepttheSchoolofCommunicationsandCognitiveScienceatHampshireCollegerunningsmoothlythroughoutthepreparationofthe
bookandlentahandatseveralcrucialpoints.Thefamilymembersandfriendsoftheauthorshelpedwiththespecialstressesoftextbookwriting.KatherinePfister
deservesspecialthanksforhersteadfastsupportandgoodadvicewhileNeilStillingswaseditingthemanuscript.

Pagexvii

NotetotheTeacher
WewroteCognitiveScience:AnIntroductionbecausewebelievethatundergraduatecognitivescienceprogramsoughttobeofferedtostudentsandthatan
introductorycourseoughttobepartofthecognitivesciencecurriculum.Attheundergraduatelevel,wefeelthatcognitivescienceisbestconceivedofasabroad
interdisciplinaryfieldthatdrawsprimarilyonpsychology,artificialintelligence,linguistics,philosophy,andneuroscience.Thedisciplinesaretosomeextentdistinctin
theirmethods,theories,andresults,yettheyarestrikinglyunifiedbytheconvergenceoftheircorequestionsandbytheemergenceineachofthemofacomputational,
orinformationprocessing,view.Inthistextwetrytomaintainaconsistentcomputationalviewpoint,whilehonoringthedistinctivecontributionsofeachofthe
disciplines.
Inourviewtheclaimthatcognitivescienceisdistinguishedbyacomputationalorinformationprocessingapproachshouldnotbetakentoonarrowly.Theterm
computationalshouldnotbetakentomeanthatartificialintelligenceoughttobethecentralordominantdisciplineincognitivescienceratherthananequalpartner.
Theterminformationprocessingshouldnotberestrictedtoaparticularkindofprocessmodelingthathasbeenpopularincognitivepsychology.Asexplainedin
chaptersIand2,weusethesetermstorefertoanyresearchthatconcernscognitivephenomena,suchasperception,thought,orlanguage,andthatincludesabstract
levelsofanalysisthataredesignedtoexplainthefunctionalsignificanceoftheinnerworkingsofintelligentsystems.Inthisbooklinguisticcompetencetheories,
productionsystems,paralleldistributedprocessingmodels,theanalysisoffunctionalneuralpathwaysinperceptualsystems,andawiderangeofotherresearchisall
consideredcomputational.
Chapters2through8haveexplicitdisciplinaryorigins.Thereasonsformaintainingsomedegreeofdisciplinaryidentityareboththeoreticalandpractical.Onthe
theoreticalside,thereisnotyetaunifiedviewofcognitivesciencethatiswidelyacceptedandthaterasesdisciplinaryboundaries.Wefeelthatstudentsdeserveearly
exposuretotheactualdiversityandtheoreticalfermentincognitivescience.Wehavetriedtowriteabookthatisnotapolemicforaprematureandunstable
unificationofthefield.Onthepracticalside,theinstitutionalstructureofcognitivesciencecontinuestoreflectitsoriginsinthecontributingdisciplines.Mostcognitive
scienceprogramsareinterdepartmental.Mostfacultymembersholddegreesinoneofthecontributingdisciplines.Manystudentsgravitatetowardcognitivescience
afteraninitialinterestinoneofthedisciplinesandgoontograduatestudyindisciplinarydepartments.Forthetimebeing,then,mostteachingstaffsandstudentsare
comfortablewithanintroductorycoursethatcontainssomecleardisciplinarysignposts.Cognitivesciencegroupsshouldfinditeasytobuildtheirlocallydeveloped
emphasesandsynthesesintoacoursebyemphasizingcertainchaptersinthetextoverothers,stressingselectedissuesinlectures,andpossiblyincludingsome
supplementaryreading.

Pagexviii

Thetwelvechaptersofthebookreflecttwousefulthemesforcourseplanning.First,emphasizingthedisciplinesthatcontributetocognitivescience,thebookconsists
ofanintroductorychapter,followedbysevenchapterswithdisciplinaryorientations,followedbyfourchaptersoninterdisciplinaryresearchtopics.Second,
emphasizingthecoretopicsofcognitivescience,chapters1through5presentaunifiedintroductiontorepresentationandthought,chapters6,9,10,and11treat
language,chapter12treatsvision,andchapters7and8treattheneuralandphilosophicalfoundationsofthefield.Acoursethatemphasizedtopicsmightclusterthe
chaptersonlanguageandalsoshiftchapters7,8,or12outoforder.Thefollowingremarksaboutthechapterscanbeusedasaninitialguidetocourseplanning.The
varyinglengthsofthechaptersshouldbetakenintoaccountindecidinghowmuchtimetodevotetothem.
Instructorswhoarefamiliarwiththefirsteditionofthebookshouldpayparticularattentiontothechangesthathavebeenmadeforthesecondedition.Thenew
editionisabouttwentypercentlongerthanthepreviousone.Althoughtheorganizationalformatofthefirsteditionhasbeenretained,significantrevisions,notedinthe
remarksbelow,havebeenmadeinmostchapters.
1.''WhatIsCognitiveScience?''Theconceptsofrepresentationandformalsystemarebrieflyintroduced.Thenotionoflevelsofanalysisiscoveredmore
thoroughlythaninthefirstedition.Theroleofcomputersincognitivescienceisdiscussed.Theinterdisciplinarynatureofcognitivescienceisoutlined(although
theexampleanalyzingthewordthehasbeendroppedfromthisedition).Thematerialintroducedinthischapterisexpandedandreviewedthroughoutthe
book.
2."CognitivePsychology:TheArchitectureoftheMind"Thischapterwassubstantiallyrevisedforthesecondedition.Theclassicalviewofthecognitive
architecture,organizedaroundtheconceptofphysicalsymbolsystems,isexplicitlycomparedtotheconnectionist,orparalleldistributedprocessing,view,of
thecognitivearchitecture.Thefoundationalmaterialinchapter1isdeepenedconsiderablyinsections2.3and2.10,whicharenewtothisedition.Inthe
contextoftheclassicalview,propositionalnetworks,schemas,workingmemory,imagery,andskillacquisitionareintroducedinsomedepth.Thepresentation
issimilartothefirstedition.Section2.10introducesboththemechanicsofconnectionistnetworksandthecontroversyovertherelationbetween
connectionismandtheclassicalview.ChaptersIand2constituteanintroductiontothefoundationsofcognitivescienceandshouldbecoveredinsequenceat
thebeginningofthecourse.
3."CognitivePsychology:FurtherExplorations"Inthischaptertheclassicalandconnectionistnotionsofcognitivearchitecturedevelopedinchapter2are
appliedtothestudyofconcepts,memory,reasoning,andproblemsolving.Thetreatmentinthefirsteditionhasbeensubstantiallyrevisedtoreflect
connectionistresearchandothernewdevelopments.Thechaptercanbetaughtoutoforder,andthesectionswithinitarelargelyindependentofeachother.
Unfortunately,thesectiononcognitivedevelopmenthadtobedroppedfromthiseditiontoholddownthelengthofthebook.
4."ArtificialIntelligence:KnowledgeRepresentation"ThechapterbeginswithseveralcasestudiesofAIprograms,whichgivebeginningstudentsafeelforAI.
Severalapproachestoknowledgerepresentationarethenintroducedand

Pagexix

compared,buildingonchapter2.Semanticnetworks,framesandscripts,productionrules,andformallogicarecovered.Thepresentationislargelythe
sameasthatinthefirstedition.
5."ArtificialIntelligence:Search,Control,andLearning"ThischaptercontinuestheexplorationofAI,beginningwithanintroductiontosearchandcontrol.
Searchalgorithmsarecoveredinsomedetailinordertointroducebeginningstudentstoalgorithmicthinking.Symbolicapproachestolearningaretreatedin
somedetail,establishingausefulcontrastwiththematerialinsection2.10.Thefirstfivechapterscanbetaughtasaunifiedintroductiontocentralcognitive
representationsandprocesses.
6."Linguistics:TheRepresentationofLanguage"Linguisticcompetencetheoriesareintroducedastheoriesoflinguisticrepresentation.Thesectionon
phonologyhasbeensubstantiallyrevisedtoreflectrecentdevelopments.Thematerialonsyntaxislargelyunchanged,althoughthepresentationhasbeen
strengthenedinvariousways.Thefinalsectiononlinguisticuniversalshasbeenexpandedanddeepened.Oneormoreofchapters9,10,andIIcanberead
immediatelyfollowingthischapter.
7."Neuroscience:BrainandCognition"Thischapterhasbeenentirelyrewritten.Theintroductorymaterialonneurosciencehasbeenexpanded,reflectingour
viewthatitisincreasinglyimportantforcognitivesciencestudentstobefamiliarwithbasicconceptsinneuroscience.Wedecidedtoputmoreemphasison
fundamentalknowledgethanontheverylatestdevelopments,althoughthetreatmentofneuralrepresentationandcomputationandofneuropsychologyhas
beendeepenedconsiderablyaswell.Thechaptershouldbeassignedafterchapters1and2andbeforechapter12.
8."Philosophy:FoundationsofCognitiveScience"Thechapterbeginswithareviewandextensionofthefoundationalconceptsintroducedinchapters1and2
andgoesontocoverphilosophicalissuesconcerningfunctionalism,propositionalattitudes,qualia,andknowledgerepresentation.Thepresentationislargely
thesameasthatinthefirstedition,althoughseveralpassagesonphilosophicalissuesraisedbyconnectionismhavebeenadded.Thechaptershouldbe
assignedafterchaptersIand2.
9."LanguageAcquisition"Adescriptionofthestagesoflanguageacquisitionisfollowedbyanintroductiontothetheoreticalperspectivesthathavearisenout
oflinguisticinnatenesstheoriesandrecentformalworkonlearnabilityandparsing.Thechapterhasbeenrevisedandexpandedtoincludemorerecent
research.
10."Semantics"Thischapterisarelativelyinformalintroductiontoformalsemanticsasitisstudiedbylinguistsandphilosophers.Itbeginswithatreatmentof
quantifiers,names,tense,andscope.Possibleworldsandtheirapplicationtotheanalysisofnecessityandpropositionalattitudesarethenintroduced.The
chaptercloseswitharevisedsectionontheroleofformalsemanticsinpsychologyandAI.Althoughthechapterisselfcontained,manyofthebasicideasinit
areintroducedinchapters1through4andchapter6.
11."NaturalLanguageProcessing"Therolesofgrammar,discourse,andgeneralknowledgeinhumanandmachinelanguageunderstandingarediscussed.The
chapteralsoincludesnewsectionsonconnectionistmodelsandonlanguageproduction.

Pagexx

12."Vision"Theformatofthischapterisunchanged.Low,intermediate,andhighlevelvisionareallcoveredinsomedepth.TheperspectivesofAI,
psychology,andneuroscienceareintegrated.Althoughmostofthematerialfromthefirsteditionhasbeenretained,severalrecentlinesofresearchhavebeen
added.Thefinalsectionofthechapteronthearchitectureofvisualcomputationhasbeencompletelyrewrittentoreflectnewresultsinneuroscienceand
connectionism.
Webelievethattheintroductorycourseincognitivescienceshouldbeofferedtostudentsintheirfirstorsecondyearofcollegelevelstudy.Thecoursewilltypically
containamixofbeginningstudentsandolderstudentswhohavesomeexperiencewithone(orpossiblymore)ofthecontributingdisciplines.Wehavetriedtomake
thebookaccessibletocommittedfirstyearstudents.Wehavealsoincludedmaterialthatischallengingtothesestudentsandatthesametimeholdstheinterestof
older,moresophisticatedstudents.Lectures,discussions,andassignmentsshouldalsobegearedtowardarangeofintellectualsophistication,coveringthe
fundamentalsaswellaspushingintomoredifficultmaterial.
Wealsobelievethatanintroductorycourseisausefulcomponentofgraduateprogramsincognitivescience.Becauseitprovidesaquickintroductiontothemultiple
theories,results,andmethodsofcognitivescience,thisbookshouldbeusefulingraduatecourses,particularlywhenitissupplementedbymoreadvancedreadings.
Althoughtheinitialinvestmentoftimecanbesubstantial,planningandteachingacognitivesciencecoursecanbeanintellectuallyexcitingexperiencethatinvolves
reflectingonthefoundationsofone'sfield,learningsomenewareas,andworkingcloselywithcolleagues.Thefieldofcognitivesciencedependsonthestrengthofits
introductorycourses.Weurgeourcolleaguesaroundtheworldtomakethenecessaryinvestmentinundergraduateinstruction.
Writingthesecondeditionofthistexthasbeenanevenmorehumblingexperiencethanwritingthefirst.Cognitivesciencehaschangedatadazzlingrateinrecent
years.Pleasewritetothefirstauthorattheaddressbelowwithyourcommentsandsuggestions.YoucanalsorequestacopyoftheNationalScienceFoundation
sponsoredreportonundergraduatecognitivescience.
NEILSILLINGS
NSTILLINGS@HAMP.HAMPSHIRE.EDU
SCHOOLOFCOMMUNICATIONSANDCOGNITIVESCIENCE
HAMPSHIRECOLLEGE
AMHERST,MA01002

Page1

Chapter1
WhatIsCognitiveScience?
Oneofthemostimportantintellectualdevelopmentsofthepastfewdecadeshasbeenthebirthofanexcitingnewinterdisciplinaryfieldcalledcognitivescience.
Researchersinpsychology,linguistics,computerscience,philosophy,andneurosciencerealizedthattheywereaskingmanyofthesamequestionsaboutthenatureof
thehumanmindandthattheyhaddevelopedcomplementaryandpotentiallysynergisticmethodsofinvestigation.Thewordcognitivereferstoperceivingand
knowing.Thus,cognitivescienceisthescienceofmind.Cognitivescientistsseektounderstandperceiving,thinking,remembering,understandinglanguage,learning,
andothermentalphenomena.Theirresearchisremarkablydiverse.Itincludes,forexample,observingchildren,programmingcomputerstodocomplexproblem
solving,analyzingthenatureofmeaning,andstudyingtheprinciplesofneuralcircuitryinthebrain.
1.1TheCognitiveView
Likeallintellectualdisciplines,cognitivescienceinvolvestheadoptionofadefiniteperspective.Cognitivescientistsviewthehumanmindasacomplexsystemthat
receives,stores,retrieves,transforms,andtransmitsinformation.Theseoperationsoninformationarecalledcomputationsorinformationprocesses,andtheviewof
themindiscalledthecomputationalorinformationprocessingview.
Theperspectiveofcognitivescience,althoughitisnecessarilypartial,providesauniqueandrichsetofinsightsintohumannatureandthehumanpotential,including
ourpotentialtodevelopmorepowerfulinformationtechnologies.Thecognitiveviewarosefromsomequitenaturalpuzzlesthatfascinateallofusatonetimeor
another.OnehistoricaloriginofcognitivesciencewastheGreekphilosophers'interestindeductivereasoning,theprocessbywhichoneassumessomeinformationto
betrueandderivesfurtherinformationthatfollowslogicallyfromtheassumptions.Forexample,fromthepremisesAlldogshavefleasandFidoisadog,onecan
logicallyderivetheconclusionFidohasfleas.Inhistheoryofsyllogisticreasoning,Aristotleshowedthatdeductivelyvalidargumentsoftentakeoneofasmallnumber
ofgeneralforms.Learningtoreasondeductively,then,canbeviewedaslearninganinformationprocessbywhichvalidformsofargumentcanberecognizedand
produced.BytheseventeenthcenturythephilosophersLeibnizandHobbeswerearguingthatallthoughtwasakindofcalculationwithnonnumericalinformation.
Today,aswewillseeinthechaptersthatfollow,linguistsandphilosopherscontinuetostudythelogicalpropertiesoflanguage,cognitivepsychologistscompare
people'sactualreasoningprocessestotheidealizedsystemsdevisedbyphilosophersandmathematicians,andresearchersinartificialintelligencewritecomputer
programstodologicalreasoning.

Page2

Totakeanotherexample,considerLouisArmstrong'sbrilliantimprovisedsoloonhis1927recordingof"PotatoHeadBlues,"whichwasalandmarkinhisdecisive
contributiontothedevelopmentofjazz.Wecouldadoptmanydifferentperspectivesonthisevent.AphysicistandbiologistmightcollaboratetostudyhowArmstrong
shapedhisnotesintermsoftheproductionofanairstreambycertaincomplexmusclecontractionsandthephysicalpropertiesofthevibratingtrumpet.Amusicologist
mightstudyhowtheAfricanAmericancommunityinNewOrleanscombinedpropertiesofAfricanandEuropeanmusicduringthelatenineteenthandearlytwentieth
centuries.Amusictheoristmightstudyhowjazzimprovisationisgovernedbytheharmonicstructure,orchord"changes,"ofatune.Butthemusictheorist'sanalysis
raisesfascinatingquestionsabouthumaninformationprocessing.HowwasArmstrongabletolearntherulesandcreativepossibilitiesofharmonywithoutanyformal
traininginmusictheory?Inhisimprovisationhewasessentiallycomposingmusicwhileheplayed.Howcouldhepossiblycreatecompositionsofgreatstructural
elegancesoquickly?Partoftheanswermustbethatthehumanmindhasgeneralcharacteristicsthatmakeitpossibletolearntherulesofimprovisationandtoapply
themwithgreatfacility.Recentresearchonskillacquisition,describedinchapter2,hasuncoveredsomeofthesecharacteristics.Theresultsoftheresearchcouldbe
usedtohelpdesignnewmethodstoteachmusicianstoimprovise.
Manyotherexamplescouldbegivenofthenaturalnessoftheinformationprocessingview.Whateverelsepeoplearedoing,theyarealwaystakingin,storing,
retrieving,transforming,transmitting,andactingonthebasisofinformation.Ourknowledgeofthegeneralcharacteristicsofhumaninformationprocessingalways
providesoneinterestingperspectiveonhumanactivity.Thisknowledgeisequallyrelevantasweconfronttheintellectualpotentialofcomputers,wonderingwhattheir
specialstrengthsandlimitationsmightbe.
1.2SomeFundamentalConcepts
Understandinghowthecomputational,orinformationprocessing,viewofthemindhasledtoasignificantbodyofscientificresearchrequiresamoredetailed
understandingofwhatitmeanstosaythatsomethingisacomputationalsystem.Tosetthestageforthefollowingchapters,wewillbegintoexplainandillustratesome
fundamentalconceptshere.Wewillillustratetheseconceptswiththeexampleofafamiliarinformationprocess,doingarithmetic.Specifically,wewillanalyzethe
multiplicationofnonnegativewholenumbers.
InformationProcessesAreContentfulandPurposeful
Thefirstconceptisthatanimportantpartofunderstandinganinformationprocessisunderstandingitssignificance,orthepurposethatitserves.Aninformation
processtypicallyallowsanorganismorsystemtomakesystematicresponsestosomerangeofenvironmentalconditions.Theresponsesaretypicallyadaptiveorgoal
oriented.Theinformationprocesshasaqualityofmeaningfulnessaboutit.Thatis,wethinkoftheinformationinthesystemasbeingabouttheworld,ashaving
content,significance,ormeaning.Suchcontentfulqualitiesarealsosometimescalledsemantic,orintentional,qualities.Wefinditnaturaltoascribeunderstanding,
beliefs,orknowledgetoanysystemthatactsadaptivelyinresponsetoinformationthatittakesinfromitsenvironment.Anunderstandingofaninformationprocess(or
informationprocessingsystem)

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willthusincludeanaccountofthecontentoftheinformationitdealswithaswellasanaccountofitscompetencetoemploythatinformationintheserviceofcertain
goals.
Letusconsiderasimple,butinstructive,example,wholenumbermultiplication.Withoutphilosophicalpause,wewillstipulatethatthereisaworldofnumbersand
relationsamongthemthatexistsindependentlyofanyorganismordevicethatcarriesoutnumericalcomputations.Theproductoftwonumbersisathirdnumberthatis
determinedbyafunction,ormapping,frompairsofnumbersontosinglenumbers.Thisfunction,callit,isdefinedbythefollowingcharacteristics,whichmusthold
forallnumbersx,y,andz:x0=0x1=xxy=yxx(yz)=(xy)zandifz>0andx>y,thenxz>yz.Also,themultiplicationandadditionfunctions
arerelated.Ifwecalladdition+,thenforallx,y,andz,x(y+z)=xy+xz.
Foradevicetoqualifyasamultiplieritmustpossessrepresentationsorsymbolsthatstandfornumbers.Itmustbeabletoacceptandproducethesesymbols,andit
mustbeabletotransformtheminawaythatfaithfullyrepresentstheproductfunctionasitwasjustdefined.Thatis,whenthedeviceisfedtwosymbols,representing
twonumbers,itmustproducethesymbolthatrepresentstheproductofthetwonumbers.Noticethatbyfocusingonthepurposeofaprocess,onthecompetence
thatithastodisplay,wehaveachievedacertainkindofpurity.Wehavespecifiedwhatamultipliermustdo(itsresponsefunctionorinputoutputbehavior)without
specifyinghowitmightdoit,beyondrequiringthatitpossesssomekindofrepresentationofnumbers.
Ananalysisconcernedwiththestructureofasystem'senvironment,withtheinformationthatthesystemhasatitsdisposal,andwiththegoalsitcansatisfythroughits
deploymentofthatinformation,canbecalledasemanticanalysis,acompetencetheory,aknowledgelevelanalysis,oranecologicaltheory(ifthereisaspecial
emphasisonananalysisoftheenvironmentandadaptivenesstoit).Weallusethiskindofexplanationinoureverydaylives.Wemakeassumptionsaboutwhatpeople
knowandwhattheirgoalsare,andweassumethattheycan,forthemostpart,usetheirknowledgerationallytomeettheirgoals.Thisfolkpsychologyisquite
successful.Itisacrucialpartofourlivesthatweareabletopredictandexplainourownandothers'behaviorattheknowledgelevelmuchofthetime.
Givenourconsciousawarenessofourownbeliefsandgoals,andoureverydaymethodsofdiscoveringotherpeople's,itmightbeimaginedthatanalyzingthehuman
mindattheknowledgelevelisnotasignificantscientificproblem.However,cognitivescientistshavefoundthatinseveralimportantareasourawarenessofthe
informationwepossessislimitedandevenmisleading.Anexampleofthelimitationsofawarenessisourjudgmentofthedistancefromusofanobjectinourvisual
field.Weknowthatwepossessdepthperception.Inscientificresearchonvision,however,itbecomesimportanttoknowjusthowaccuratedepthjudgmentsare,
whethertheyareaffectedbythefamiliarityoftheobject,whethertheydependonthepresenceofotherobjectsinthesceneoronthevisibilityoftheground,andso
on.Wecannotanswersuchquestionsjustbyconsultingourvisualawareness.Carefullaboratorystudiesaswellascarefulstudiesofthevisualenvironmentare
required.Bystudyingtheenvironment,wemightfindthatthepresenceofotherobjectsinascenecanprovideinformationaboutdepth.Forexample,anearerobject
canpartlyoccludethevisibilityofamoredistantobjectbecauseitblocksthelightreflectedfrompartofthatobject.Occlusionisthusapossiblecuetodepth.We
couldthenstudyinthelaboratorywhetherourdepthjudgmentsmakeuseofocclusioninformation,and,ifso,howthatinformationinteractswithotherinformation
aboutdepth.

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Anexampleofhowawarenesscanbemisleadingisourfeelingthatwehaveauniformlyvividimpressionofthevisualworldthatisnearly180degreeswide.Itisrather
easytodemonstratethatthisimpressionisanillusionandthatwearenotable,forexample,toperceivemuchdetailintheperipheryofthevisualfieldwithoutmoving
oureyes.Giventhatourawarenessisapoorguidetotheinformationthatisimmediatelyavailableindifferentpartsofthevisualfield,carefullaboratoryresearchis
againtheonlyroutetodiscoveringourvisualcompetence.Inlinewiththeseexamplesfromvision,itwillbeshowninchapter6thatwearelargelyunawareofour
competencewiththesoundandgrammaticalstructuresofournativelanguages.
If,ratherthantryingtounderstandanexistingsystem,wearetryingtoconstructasystemtocarryoutaprocess,itisobviouslyalsoveryhelpfultobeginwithaclear
understandingofwhatwearetryingtoaccomplish.Itwouldbeunfortunate,forexample,ifthedesignersofanelectroniccalculatordidnotfullyunderstandthecorrect
behaviorofthearithmeticfunctionsthattheirmachinewassupposedtocalculate.Forthisreason,asurprisingamountoftheresearchinartificialintelligenceinvolves
tryingtofigureoutjustwhatknowledgeisinvolvedincertaintypesofintelligentbehavior.
InformationProcessesareRepresentational
Tocharacterizeananalysisattheknowledgelevel,wehavealreadyinvokedoursecondkeyconcept,representation.Theinformationthatfiguresinacomputation
mustberepresentedinsomeway.Furtherunderstandingofacomputationrequiresanunderstandingofhowtheinformationisrepresented.Returningtotheexample
ofmultiplication,wehavesofarsaidthatamultipliermustrepresentnumbers,butwehavenotsaidhow.Todevelopmoredetail,letussupposethatthe
representationisthefamiliardecimalplacevaluenotation.Inthisnotationtherearetendigitsymbols,"0,""1,""2,''...''9,"whichrepresentthenumbers0through9.
Noticethatwedistinguishherebetweensymbols,suchas"5,"whicharepartoftherepresentation,andnumbers,suchas5,whicharebeingrepresented,byplacing
quotationmarksaroundthesymbols.ThedistinctioncanbebroughtoutmoreclearlybyrecallingtheRomannotationsystem,inwhich"V"isthesymbolfor5,thereis
nosingledigitsymbolforthenumber2,thereisasingledigitsymbolforthenumber50,namely,"L,"andsoon.Indecimalnotationnumberslargerthan9are
representedbyconcatenatingthedigitsymbolsintostrings,suchas"65,"whichisastringoflength2with"5"inthefirstpositionand"6"inthesecondposition.The
assignmentofanumbertoasymbolicstringisdeterminedsystematicallybythedecimalplacevaluefunction,inwhichthecontributionofeachdigitsymboltothe
assignmentisdeterminedjointlybyitsbasicassignmentanditspositioninthestring.Forexample,knowingthatthebasicassignmentsof"6"and"5"are6and5and
knowingtheplacevaluefunction,onecandeterminethattheassignmentof"65"is6101+5100,whichequals60+5,or65.Thedecimalplacevaluefunction
establishesaonetoonecorrespondence,ormapping,betweendigitstringsandnumbers.NotethatalthoughtheRomansystemalsousesstringsofdigitsymbolsto
representnumbers,themappingbetweenstringsandnumberscannotbedefinedasaplacevaluefunction(consider,forexample,thesignificanceofthedigitsymbol
"I"intheleftpositionofthestrings"II"and"IV").
Placevaluerepresentationillustratessomepropertiesthatcangiverepresentationsgeneralityandpower.First,apotentiallyinfinitesetofsymbolscanbeconstructed
bybeginningwitharelativelysmallstockofbasicsymbolsandusingoneormorerulesofconstruction,orsyntax,tobuildnew,complexsymbols.Inthecaseof
wholenum

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bersthetendigitsymbolsarethebasicsymbols,andconcatenationisthesolesyntacticrule.Allowingstringsofdigitstobeofunlimitedlengthproducesapotentially
infinitestockofsymbols.Representationalschemesthatincluderulesforbuildingcomplexsymbolicstructuresoutofsimpleronesarecalledcombinatorial,
generative,orproductive.Second,themeaning,orsemanticinterpretation,ofacomplexsymbolisbuiltupfromthemeaningsofthesyntacticpartsofthesymbol.
Typically,eachbasicsymbolhasafixedmeaning,andeachsyntacticruleisassociatedwithasemanticrulethatcontributestotheinterpretationofthecomplex
symbol.Forwholenumbers,thenumbers0through9arethefixedinterpretationsofthetenbasicdigitsymbols"0"through"9."Thesyntacticruleofconcatenationis
associatedwiththeplacevalueruleofinterpretation.Forexample,ifwealreadyhaveadigitstring"xyz,"andweconcatenate''5"ontoittomake"5xyz,''thenthe
placevaluerulesaysthatthenumericalinterpretationof"5xyz"is5103(or5,000)plusthenumericalinterpretationof"xyz."Representationalschemesinwhichthe
interpretationofcomplexsymbolicstructuresisdeterminedbytheinterpretationsoftheirsyntacticpartsaresaidtohaveacompositionalsemantics.Third,
informationprocessesthattransformsymbolicinputstructuresintosymbolicoutputscanbedefinedintermsofsyntacticstructuresoftheinputsandoutputs.Such
informationprocessesanalyzethesyntacticstructuresofinputsandbuildsyntacticallystructuredoutputs.Suchinformationprocessesarealsocalledalgorithms.
Becausethemeaningsofsymbolicstructuresareafunctionoftheirsyntax,informationprocessesthatoperateonsyntaxcanproducemeaningfulresultsandrepresent
meaningfuloperationsinthedomainthatisrepresented.
Thesepropertiesofalgorithmscanbeillustratedbytheexampleofmultiplication.Wehavetodefineaprocessthatoperatessyntacticallyondecimalplacevalue
representationinsuchawaythattheprocesssucceedsinrepresentingthemultiplicationfunction,.Thewellknownprocessformultiplyingnumberswithpaperand
pencil,callit ,willserveourpurposes.Itisillustratedinthefollowingexample:
65
32
130
195
2080

Thedecimalmultiplicationalgorithmisafairlycomplicatedinformationprocess.Itrequires,amongotherthings,amemoryfortheproductsofallofthepairsofdigits
(e.g.,"2" "3"yields"6"),anabilitytoprocesscolumnsinconcatenationorderstartingwiththe"ones"column,anabilityto"carry,"anabilitytosavepartialresults
untilallcolumnsareprocessed,andanabilitytocarryoutpaperandpencildecimaladdition.
Aswesaidintheprevioussection,thealgorithmcanbesaidtorepresenttheproductfunctionifitoperatesinsuchawaythattherepresentationalmappingbetween
symbolsandnumbersismaintained.Letusexplorethisinmoredetailbylookingattheexampleabove.Therepresentationassignsthestring"65"tothenumber65,
"32"to32,and"2,080"to2,080.Theproductof65and32is2080.Therefore,whenthelonghanddecimalmultiplicationalgorithmisappliedto"65"and"32,"the
outputmustbe"2,080."Moregenerally,ifwemapanytwoinputnumbersontodigitstrings,applythealgorithm,andmaptheresultingstringbacktoanumber,that
numbermustbetheproductoftheinputnumbers.Ifthealgorithmalwaysmimics

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theoperationintheworld,wesaythattheyhavethesamestructure,orareisomorphic.Notice,again,thatitiscriticaltodistinguishbetweentheoperationon
symbolsandtheoperationinthedomainofnumbersthatitrepresents.Manydifferentalgorithmscouldbeusedtorepresentmultiplication.Forexample,repeated
additionisapossiblealgorithmformultiplication.Tomultiply"65"by"32"usingthisapproach,wewouldapplyanalgorithmforadditionto32copiesof"65."
InformationProcessesCanbeDescribedFormally
Thethirdbasicconceptresultsfromfurtherattentiontothenotionofalgorithmthatwasjustdeveloped.Analgorithmisdefinedcompletelyintermsofprocessesthat
operateonarepresentation.Theprocessesdonotoperateonthedomainbeingrepresented.Theyarenotevendefinedintermsofthemeaningoftherepresentation,
whichiscarriedseparatelybythesemanticmappingfromtherepresentationtothedomain.Analgorithmisaformalprocedureorsystem,becauseitisdefinedin
termsoftheformoftherepresentationratherthanitsmeaning.Itispurelyamatterofmanipulatingpatternsintherepresentation.
Thealgorithmforpaperandpencildecimalmultiplication,forexample,isentirelyamatterofmanipulatingstringsofdigitsymbolsaccordingtocertainrules.Aperson
withnoknowledgethatthestringsstandfornumberscouldbetaughttocarryouttherulescorrectly.Infact,mostofusprobablycarryouttheseruleswithoutthinking
aboutwhytheyleadtocorrectresults.Why,forexample,doescarryingthe1whenmultiplying65by2leadtoacorrectresult?Exactlywhyisthe195placedone
spacetotheleftbeforeaddingittothe130?Answeringthesequestionsrequiresreferringtotheplacevaluemappingthatdeterminesthemeaningofdecimalnotation.
Butoneneednotknowabouttheplacevaluemappingtocarryouttheprocess.Theprocessismeaningful,butitacquiresitsmeaningindirectly.
Anappreciationoftheformalnatureofinformationprocessesbringsouttwofurtherpoints.First,sincealgorithmscanbecarriedoutwithoutanyhigherknowledge
abouttheirmeanings,theycanbecarriedoutbyphysicalsystems,whichcanbebiologicalorengineered.Thisinsightisoneoftheintellectualfoundationsforcomputer
scienceandforthebeliefthatascientificunderstandingofmindcanbeachieved.Second,aformalanalysisofaninformationprocessprovidesaparticularly
convincingdemonstrationthatweunderstanditsinnerworkings.Becauseitmakesnoreferencetothemeaningofaprocess,analgorithmicanalysisofaprocess
showsexactlyhowitisdonewithoutleaningonourunderstandingofitsmeaning.
Insummary,thecognitivescientistapproachesinformationprocessesbydistinguishingbetweenformaloperationsonsymbolsandtherepresentationalrelations
betweensymbolsandwhattheystandfor.Therealizationthatanorganismormachinecanproducemeaningfulbehaviorbyperformingformaloperationsonsymbolic
structuresthatbeararepresentationalrelationshiptotheworldisakeyinsightofcognitivescience.
Ourchoiceofexampleshouldnotbetakentomeanthatcognitivescienceiseasy.Caseslikethemultiplicationalgorithmortypicalcomputerprogramsaregood
illustrations,becausetheyshowthatthestrategyofcognitivesciencemakessense.Acomputerprogramthatmultipliesnumbersordoesdatabasemanagementis
obviouslyperformingformaloperationsoninformationthathasawelldefinedrepresentationalrelationshiptoaparticulardomain.Justasobviously,thesuccessofthe
programsis

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dueentirelytothefactthattheformaloperationspreservetherepresentationalrelationship.Noinaccessibleformofintelligenceorunderstandingispresent.Thingsare
notsosimplewithbiologicalorganisms,however.Thehumanmindwasnotbuiltbyateamofengineersandprogrammerswhocanjusthandovertheblueprintsand
programs.Theinformationprocessesandrepresentationalrelationshipsrequiredforhumanintelligenceareextremelycomplex,andtheycanonlybediscoveredby
carefulandcreativeresearch.
CognitiveScienceIsaBasicScience
Afourthpointabouttheinformationprocessingviewisthattheconceptsjustintroducedareemployedbycognitivescientistsinthepursuitofbasicscientific
knowledge.Cognitivescientistsseektodiscoverhighlygeneralandexplanatoryfundamentalprinciplesofinformationprocessing.Thisgoalcollideswiththe
tremendousvariabilitythatweseeinhumanthoughtandbehavior.Wemightdoubtthatanyprinciplesofhumaninformationprocessingcanbefoundthatholdacross
allculturesandhistoricalepochs.Certainlywewillhavetodigdeeperthanoursimpleexampleofthedecimalmultiplicationalgorithm,whichisarelativelyrecent
humaninventionthatisspottilydistributedamongtheworld'speopleandmayslowlydisappearfromhumancognitionaselectroniccalculatorsbecomemorecommon.
Totakeanotherexamplethatisexploredindetailinchapters6and9,althoughpeopleseemtocommunicatebymakingnoiseswiththeirvocaltractsinallofthe
world'ssocieties,languagesshowtremendousvariation.Dotheformalstructuresandprocessesofalloftheworld'slanguageshaveanythingincommon?Research
suggeststhatimportantlinguisticuniversalsdoindeedexistandthattheyplayanimportantroleinchildren'sacquisitionoftheirnativelanguages.Ofcourse,the
hypothesizeduniversalsmustalsoexplainhowthegreatsurfacevarietyintheworld'slanguagesispossible.
1.3InformationProcessesCanBeAnalyzedAtSeveralLevels
Thedistinctionbetweenstudyingthecompetenceorknowledgeofasystemandstudyingitsformalinformationprocessescanbethoughtofasadistinctionbetween
levelsofanalysis.Theformalanalysisisatalowerlevel,providinganaccountoftheinformationprocessesthatunderliethecompetencethatisvisibleatahigher,
behaviorallevel.Theanalysisofthesemanticmappingfromtheformalrepresentationstothedomaincanbethoughtofasabridgebetweentheformalandknowledge
levels.Itexplainswhyaformalsystemisasuccessfulimplementationofaparticularcompetence.Althoughtheformalanalysiscanbethoughtofasdeeperthana
knowledgelevelanalysis,itdoesnotreplaceit.Eachlevelofanalysiscontributesitsowninsightstotheoverallpicture.Withouttheknowledgelevelanalysis,including
theunderstandingoftherepresentationalmapping,wewouldn'thaveanunderstandingofwhatthealgorithmaccomplishes,andwewouldn'tbeabletocapturethefact
thattwodifferentalgorithmswithdifferentrepresentationsbothcomputethesamefunction.Withouttheformalanalysiswewouldknowwhatasystemdoesbutnot
howitdoesit.Reviewingtheexampleofdecimalmultiplication,theabstractcompetenceanalysis(x0=0,etc.)tellsuswhattheproductfunctionis,the
representationalanalysisshowsthatdecimalnotationsystematicallyrepresentsnumbers,andtheformalanalysisfullyspecifiesthemechanicsofthealgorithm.Ifwe
ignorealevelofanalysis,wemissanimportantpartofthepicture.

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Theuseofmultiplelevelsofanalysistostudyintelligentsystemsisoneofthehallmarksofcognitivescience.Researchonatopiccanbefocusedononeoranother
levelofanalysisatagiventime,dependingonthemostpromisingavenuesofstudy,andfindingsatonelevelcaninfluenceunderstandingatotherlevels.Thegoalisto
developanevermoreinsightfulandcompletepictureofcognitionatalllevelsofanalysis.
InformationProcessesMustBePhysicallyImplemented
Theanalysisofsystemsattheknowledgelevelandtheformallevel,andtheuseoftheconceptofrepresentationtotietheselevelstogether,distinguishcognitive
science(includingcomputerscience)fromothersciences.Toasurprisingextentinformationprocessescanbestudiedattheknowledgeandformallevels
independentlyoftheirphysicalimplementations.Thisissomewhatremarkablebecauseaninformationprocesscannotactuallyoccurunlessitisimplementedinsome
physicalmedium.Foranyactualinformationprocessingsystemthereobviouslyarephysicallevelsofanalysisaimedatuncoveringitsbiologyorphysics.Further,there
mustbesomerelationshipbetweenthephysicalandformallevelsofanalysis,becausetheabilityofaphysicalsystemtocarryoutaformalinformationprocess
dependscompletelyonitsphysicalconstruction.Justasbiologistsconcludedinthenineteenthcenturythatlifearisesfromparticularorganizationsofmatterandenergy
andnotfromaspeciallifeforce,socognitivescientistsproceedfromtheassumptionthatcognitionarisesfrommaterialstructureandprocessesandnotfromany
mysteriousextraphysicalpowers.Theseconsiderationsraisethequestionofwhatrolephysicallevelsofanalysisshouldplayincognitivescience.
Theanswertothequestionmustproceedfromanunderstandingoftherelationshipbetweentheformalandphysicallevels.Justasarepresentationalmappingtiesthe
knowledgeandformallevelsofanalysistogether,sotheformalandphysicallevelsaretiedtogetherbyanimplementationalmapping.Theformallydefined
representationsandprocessesmustbemappedontoarrangementsofsomephysicalmediumandtransformationsofthatmedium.Themappingmustestablishan
isomorphismbetweentheformalandphysicallevels,sothatthestatesandchangesinthephysicalmediumfaithfullypreservealloftheinformationalrelationshipsinthe
formalsystem.Toreturntoourmultiplicationexample,anyphysicalsystemthatimplementsthestandarddecimalmultiplicationalgorithmmustbearaprecise
correspondencetothealgorithm.Considerthestateofhavingamultiplicandof"65."Ahumanbeingwithpencilandpaperphysicallyimplementsthisstateby
inscribingcertaintwodimensionalshapesinaparticularlefttorightorderinaparticularpositiononthepaper.Inanelectroniccalculatoramultiplicandof"65"might
beimplementedbythedistributionofelectricalchargeincertaincircuitcomponents.Inbothcasesthereisaprecisecorrespondencebetweenphysicalstatesand
transformationsinthecomputingsystemandtheformalstructureofthealgorithm.
TheNecessityofHigherLevelsofAnalysis
Wemightimaginethatourultimategoalistounderstandthephysicalworkingsofaninformationprocessingsystemandthathavingaphysicalunderstandingwould
rendertheunderstandingattheformalandknowledgelevelsunnecessary.Consideranelectroniccalculatorthatcanmultiplyasanexample.Thereisasenseinwhich
itsbehaviorcanbecompletelyunderstoodintermsofthemovementofelectricalcurrentthrough

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circuitsmadeupofconductorsandsemiconductors.Thephysicalanalysiswouldmakeuseofthecircuitdiagram,lawsgoverningelectricalcircuits(e.g.,Ohm'sand
Kirchhoff'slaws),andperhapssomemoredetailedelectronphysicsneededtounderstandthebehaviorofthesemiconductors.
Themostimmediateproblemwithstickingwiththephysicalanalysisisthat,bydispensingwiththeknowledgelevel,weloseanyaccountofthesignificanceofthe
calculator'sbehavior.Thephysicaldescriptiondoesnotcapturethefactthatthecalculatorisamultiplier.Thislossofmeaninghasmanyconsequences.Amistakein
thecircuitdesign,forexample,wouldnotbereflectedinthephysicaldescription,sincethecircuitlawsgiveequallynicedescriptionsofusefulanduselesscircuits.
Further,atthephysicallevelwecouldnotexpressthefactthattwocalculatorsofdifferentdesignbothmultiply,becausetheirphysicaldescriptionscouldbearbitrarily
different(e.g.,anelectroniccalculatorandanoldfashionedmechanicaladdingmachine).Thiskindofinadequacyisgenerallyreferredtoasthefailureofalevelof
analysistocaptureageneralization.Theknowledgelevelisneededtocapturegeneralizationsthatinvolvethesignificanceorpurposeofaninformationprocessorthe
contentofitsrepresentations.Thephysicallevelofanalysisobviouslycapturesothergeneralizationsthatcannotbeexpressedattheknowledgelevel,suchasOhm's
law.
Acknowledgingtheneedfortheknowledgelevel,wemightstillhopetodispensewiththeformallevelofdescription.Giventhatwehavearepresentationalmapping
fromtheworldtotheformalsystemandanimplementationalmappingfromtheformalsystemtoaphysicalmedium,wecouldimaginebypassingtheformalleveland
workingwithasingledirectmapfromtheworldtothephysicalmedium.Forexample,wecouldmaptheworldofnumbersandtheproductfunctiondirectlyonto
chargedistributionsandtheirfluctuationsinthecircuitsofanelectroniccalculatorwithoutbotheringwiththeformalanalysisofplacevaluenotationandthe
multiplicationalgorithmdefinedoverit.Onceagain,however,theformallevelcapturesgeneralizationsthatcannotbeexpressedoneithertheknowledgelevelorthe
physicallevel.Inthiscasethegeneralizationshavetodowiththealgorithmsasystemisusing.Physicaldescriptionsarefullofphysicaldetailthatisirrelevanttothe
algorithminquestion,and,worse,theycannotexpressthefactthattwosystemsofdifferentphysicalconstructioncomputethesamealgorithm(e.g.,apersonandan
electroniccalculatorbothdoingdecimalmultiplication).Algorithmicconcernsalsocannotbeexpressedattheknowledgelevel,becausetheknowledgelevelabstracts
awayfromtheformaldetailofcomputationinordertolumptogetherprocessesthathavethesamesemanticsinspiteofhavingdifferentalgorithms.Thegeneralizations
thatcanbecapturedattheformallevelareprofound,formingagoodpartofthedisciplineofcomputerscience.Wewillseeinsection5.1,forgoodexample,thatitis
possibletodefineandcomparedifferentalgorithmsforsearchingthroughlargesetsofalternativeswithoutanyconsiderationofeitherthesemanticsorthephysical
implementationofthealternatives.
Eachlevelofanalysis,then,hasitsownfocusanddescriptivevocabulary,allowingaconceptuallyclearexplanationofsomeaspectofcomputationalsystemsthatis
obscuredorevenlostatotherlevelsofdescription.Theconceptsateachlevelexpressdifferentgeneralizationsandimposedifferentcategorizationsoninformation
processingsystems.
Inadditiontothisconceptualreasonformaintaininghigherlevelsofanalysis,therearemethodologicalreasonsaswell.Itisobviousthatthedesignofengineered
computationalsystemscanbeprofitablyguidedbyhighleveldecisionsaboutwhatsortsof

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algorithmstheymustcomputeandwhatpartsoftheworldtheywillhavetodealwith.Itisperhapsnotsoobvious,butequallyimportant,thatourattemptsto
understandbiologicalinformationprocessingsystems,suchasthehumanmind/brain,atthephysicallevelcanbeguidedbyunderstandingattheknowledgeandformal
levels.Physically,thebrainisenormouslycomplex.Wecangetamuchbetterideaofwhattolookatinthebrainandhowtolookatitifwehaveagoodideaofwhat
thebrainiscomputingandwhatalgorithmsitisusingtodothecomputations.Inparticular,atheoryofsomementalprocessattheformallevelisasourceof
hypothesesabouttheimplementationalmappingfromformalrepresentationsandprocessestonervoustissue.Wewillseeinchapter7,forexample,thatanalysisof
auditorylocalizationinthebarnowlatthebehavioralandformallevelsguidedasystematicandsuccessfulsearchfortheneuralcircuitsthatcomputethedirectionofan
environmentalsoundfromtheacousticinputtotheears.
TheImportanceofthePhysicalLevelofAnalysis
Thefactthattheknowledgeandformallevelscaptureuniquegeneralizationsandthataparticularformalsystemcanbephysicallyimplementedinanynumberofways
suggeststhepossibilitythatcognitivesciencecouldbepursuedwithoutregardtothephysicallevelofanalysis,whichcouldbelefttobiologistsandengineers.Although
itistruethatthehigherlevelsofanalysisarethedistinctiveprovinceofcognitivescienceandthatmuchresearchinthefieldtakesplaceexclusivelyattheselevels,the
physicallevelcannotbeignored,largelyforpracticalreasons.
Understandingthephysicalimplementationofinformationprocessesisobviouslyacrucialpieceofanoverallunderstandingofcognition,sinceallcognitionoccursin
somephysicalmedium.Researchingmappingsbetweenthehigherlevelsofanalysisandthephysicallevelisgreatlyfacilitatedbyanunderstandingofbothlevels.Itis
thereforenotagoodideatoenforceacompletedivisionofscientificlaborbetweenpeoplewhoworkattheknowledgeandformallevelsandpeoplewhoworkatthe
physicallevel.
Ingeneral,resultsatonelevelofanalysiscanalwayspotentiallyaffectresearchatotherlevels,becausethelevelsaremutuallyconstraining.Wehavealreadypointed
outthataformaltheoryofaninformationprocessconstrainsitsphysicalimplementation,becausethephysicalimplementationhastobeafaithfulinstantiationofthe
formalprocess.Theconstraintsrunintheotherdirectionaswell.Discoveriesaboutthephysicalstructureofthebraincanstronglysuggestthatitiscomputingcertain
kindsofalgorithmsandnotothersorthatitrepresentsknowledgeincertainwaysandnotothers.Wewillseeinchapter2,forexample,thatinrecentyearsrelatively
simplefactsaboutthebrain,suchasthespeedwithwhichneuralcellscangeneratesignalsandthewayinwhichthecellsareinterconnected,havebeenusedbysome
researcherstodrawfarreachingconclusionsabouttherepresentationsandalgorithmsthatcharacterizecognitioninbiologicalorganisms.Intherealmoftechnology
theavailabilityofaparticularkindofhardwarecanspurresearchintonewrepresentationsandalgorithmsthatareparticularlysuitedtothathardware.Forexample,in
recentyearsithasbecomefeasibletobuildcomputersthathavethousandsofinterconnected,activeprocessorsratherthanjustone.Thispossibilitytriggeredawave
ofresearchonparallelalgorithmsthatcouldtakeadvantageofmanysimultaneouslyactiveprocessors.
Ideally,researchoncognitionshouldoccuratalllevelsofanalysis,andallfruitfulinteractionsamonglevelsshouldbeencouraged.Buildingbridgesbetweenthehigher

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levelsofanalysisandthephysicallevelhasbeen,andcontinuestobe,themostdifficultprobleminthecognitiveandneuralsciences.Inrecentyears,however,ithas
alsobeenoneofthemostactiveareasofnewresearch.
1.4ComputersInCognitiveScience
Itshouldbeclearfromthediscussionsofarthatanumberofconceptsanddistinctionsthatareimportantincomputersciencearepartoftheunderlyingassumptionsof
cognitivescience.Moregenerally,thegrowthofcomputersciencehasgreatlyacceleratedthedevelopmentofcognitivescience.Computersthushaveatendencyto
becomeametaphorforallinformationprocessing.Themetaphorisoftenuseful,butitispotentiallymisleadingaswell.
Theroughoutlineoftheanalogybetweencomputersandthehumanmindshouldalreadybeapparent.Ourstressontheindependenceofaninformationprocessfrom
itsphysicalimplementationisakintothecommondistinctionbetweensoftwareandhardwareinthecomputerworld.Forexample,whenweseethesameword
processingprogramrunningontwodifferentbrandsofcomputers,itisobviousthataninformationprocesscanberigorouslydefinedasaformalprocesswithout
referencetoanyparticularphysicaldevice.Currentcomputersoftwarealsomakesitclearthatformalinformationprocessescanbepowerfulandflexible.Highly
complexinformation,rangingfromdocumentstopersonnelrecordstosatellitephotographs,canberepresentedandstoredincomputers.Programminglanguages
allowfinitesetsofsimpleinstructionstobeflexiblycombinedtodefinecomplexoperationsonthestoredinformation.Today'scomputersandcomputersoftwareare
concreteexamplesofinformationprocessorsandprocessesthatmakeiteasiertounderstandwhatcognitivescienceisabout.
Ontheotherhand,computersareveryfarfromexhibitingsomeofthemostimpressive,yetmundane,aspectsofhumancognition,suchaslearningalanguage,
identifyingtheobjectsinanaturallyoccurringvisualscene,orsolvingsimpleproblemsviaanalogieswithothersituations.Therefore,itismisleadingtotakethe
computermetaphortomeanthatcurrentcomputerprograms,programminglanguages,andhardwarearegoodmodelsforhumancognition.Theusefulnessfor
cognitivescienceofanycurrentpieceofcomputerscienceortechnologyisamatterofresearch,notpriorstipulation.Researchisnowunderwayonnew
"generations"ofcomputersoftwareandhardwarethatmanyworkersinthefieldthinkwillbeneededtoadvancecomputerintelligence.
Thisresearchincludesthepartofcomputersciencecalledartificialintelligence,orAI,whichoverlapsconsiderablywithcognitivescience.ManyresearchersinAI
trytomodeltheircomputerprogramsafterhumanintelligence,andtheyderiveinspirationfrominsightsintohumaninformationprocessingthatcomefromother
disciplinesincognitivescience,suchaspsychologyandlinguistics.Theinsightsalsoflowintheotherdirection.AttemptsbyAIresearcherstoprogramsystemsthat
canunderstandlanguage,see,orsolveproblemshaveledtonew,testablehypothesesabouthumancognition.Initsinterplaywiththeothercognitivescience
disciplinesAIprovidesapowerfulalternativemethodologyforexploringandtestingtheoriesofcognitionthatsupplementstheempiricalmethodsofpsychologyand
linguistics.Chapters4and5ofthisbookareaboutAI.
Thetechniqueofexpressingacognitivetheoryasacomputerprogramandthenrunningtheprogramtoexploretheramificationsofthetheoryisnowanimportant

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toolthroughoutcognitivescience.Manytheoriesarecomplicatedenoughthatitisimpossibletofigureoutwhattheirpredictionsarewithoutsimulatingthemon
computers.TherearedifferencesofemphasisbetweenAIandthecomputersimulationoftheoriesofhumancognition.MuchAIresearchisorientedtowardpractical
results.Aprogramthatistooslow,forexample,mightbeofnouse.Ontheotherhand,ausefulAIprogrammightnotusethesamealgorithmsasahumanbeing
solvingthesameproblem.Researchersorientedtowardsimulationhavecomplementarygoals.Theirmeasureofsuccessiswhethertheirprogramsworkthesameway
ashuman(oranimal)cognitiveprocesses.Itdoesn'tmattertothemifthecomputersimulationisimpracticallyslow,orslowerthanthebiologicalprocessitsimulates,
aslongasitmakestherightpredictions.InspiteofthesedifferencesthereisnoabsolutelinebetweenAIandsimulationresearch.AnyAIprogrammightturnoutto
beagoodtheoryofhumancognition,andanysimulationprogrammightprovetohavepracticalapplications.
1.5AppliedCognitiveScience
Cognitivescientifictheoriesareleadingincreasinglytopracticalapplications.Manyoftheapplicationsareinthedomainofeducationandlearning.Ascognitive
psychologistshavecometounderstandtheinformationprocessesinvolvedinreading,forexample,theyhavebeguntodevelopnewwaysofdiagnosingandtreating
children'sreadingdifficulties.Linguistictheoryhasledtomuchmorepreciseknowledgeofthespeechimpairmentsthatfollowstrokesinthelefthemisphereofthe
brain.Thisnewknowledgepromisestobeusefulindesigningappropriatespeechtherapyandcomputerdrivenlinguisticprosthesesforstrokevictims.
Otherapplicationsofcognitivesciencearemoresurprising.Contemporarytheoriesofhumanmemoryhavebeenappliedtothequestionofthereliabilityoflegal
witnesses.Thisresearchhasalreadyledtoimportantchangesintheroleofeyewitnesstestimonyinthelegalprocess.Anotherexampleistheapplicationofnew
psychologicaltheoriesofskillacquisitionandvisualmotorimaginationtothedesignoftrainingprogramsforathletes.
Artificialintelligenceresearchisleadingtoapplicationsinexpertsystemsandrobotics.Expertsystemshavebeendevelopedtoaidinconfiguringcomputersystems,
exploringforoil,establishingthestructureofcomplexorganiccompounds,anddiagnosingdiseases.
Thesedevelopingapplicationsareexciting,particularlytothosewithinthefieldorthinkingofgoingintoit.Theexcitementshouldbetempered,however,byan
awarenessofthemoralandpoliticalquestionsraisedbyappliedcognitivescience.Justasphysicistsmustconfronttheimplicationsofnucleartechnology,and
biologiststheimplicationsofgeneticengineering,socognitivescientistsmustconfronttheimplicationsofknowledgetechnology.Thepotentiallycontroversial
applicationsofcognitivescienceresearchrangefromthepossibledevelopmentofanewgenerationofintelligencetests,whichmightbemisused,tothelargescale
introductionofintelligentrobotsinmanufacturingindustries,whichmightcauseamassivelossordisplacementofjobs.Asinothersciences,thelessandthemore
controversialapplicationsoftenflowfromthesameunderlyingtheoreticalresearch.Forexample,resultsincomputervisionmightbeusedtodesigneitheravisual
prosthesisfortheblindorthecontrolsystemofacruisemissilecarryinganuclearwarhead.Wehopethatthisbookwillprovidethebasicunderstandingofcognitive
scientifictheorythatisneededtothinkaboutthe

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policyissuesposedbynewinformationprocessingtechnologies.Wealsostronglyrecommendthestudyofrelevantaspectsofhistory,socialscience,andthe
humanities,becausetheperspectiveofcognitivescience,althoughcrucial,mustbesupplementedbyotherperspectives.
1.6TheInterdisciplinaryNatureofCognitiveScience
TheFiveDisciplines
Asnotedearlier,cognitivescienceisaninterdisciplinaryfieldthathasarisenfromtheconvergenceonacommonsetofquestionsbypsychology,linguistics,computer
science,philosophy,andneuroscience.Thefivecontributingdisciplineswillundoubtedlyretaintheirseparateidentities,becauseeachoftheminvolvesamuchlarger
setofconcernsthanthefocusonabasicscienceofcognition.Amoreinterestingquestioniswhethercognitivesciencewillbecomeadistinctacademicdisciplineinits
ownright,withinwhichthecontributionsofthefiveconvergingdisciplinesbecomesothoroughlyintermingledandtransformedthattheyarenolongeridentifiable.This
bookpresentscognitivescienceinitscurrentform.Thedistinctivecontributionsofeachofthefivedisciplinesarehighlighted,particularlyinchapters2through8.The
topicsselectedfordiscussion,however,arethosewherethedisciplineshavesharedthemostcommonground.Chapters9through12presentseveralexamplesof
researchareasinwhichtheinterdisciplinarycollaborationhasbeenparticularlycloseandhasbeguntoobscuresomeofthedifferencesamongdisciplines.
Obviously,nooneofthefivecontributingdisciplinesencompassestheentiresubjectmatterofcognitivescience,andeachdisciplinebringstothefieldafocuson
particularareas.Neuroscientistsareprimarilyconcernedwiththeorganizationofthenervoussystem.Linguistsareconcernedwiththestructureofhumanlanguageand
thenatureoflanguageacquisition.Philosophersareconcernedwithlogicandmeaning,andwithclarifyingthefundamentalconceptsofcognitivescience,suchas
informationandknowledge.Psychologistsareconcernedwithgeneralhumanmentalcapacities,suchasattentionandmemory.Computerscientistsareconcernedwith
thepossibilitiesforAI.Cognitivescienceencompassesalloftheseconcerns.Cognitivescientists,althoughtheyusuallyspecializeinoneortwoofthecontributing
disciplines,benefitgreatlyfromthecrossfertilizationofallofthem.
Themostimportantdifferencesamongthefivedisciplinesareintheresearchmethodsthattheyusetoaddressthenatureofmind.Psychologistsemphasizecontrolled
laboratoryexperimentsanddetailed,systematicobservationsofnaturallyoccurringbehaviors.Linguiststesthypothesesaboutgrammaticalstructurebyanalyzing
speakers'intuitionsaboutgrammaticalandungrammaticalsentencesorbyobservingchildren'serrorsinspeech.ResearchersinAItesttheirtheoriesbywriting
programsthatexhibitintelligentbehaviorandobservingwheretheybreakdown.Philosophersprobetheconceptualcoherenceofcognitivescientifictheoriesand
formulategeneralconstraintsthatgoodtheoriesmustsatisfy.Neuroscientistsstudythephysiologicalbasisofinformationprocessinginthebrain.
TheStudyandPracticeofCognitiveScience
Fromthestudent'spointofviewoneofthemainattractionsofcognitivescienceisthediversityofitsmethods.Thefieldaccommodatesawidevarietyofpersonal
intellectual

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stylesandpreferences.Thosewhoareattractedtolaboratoryworkcanpursueexperimentalpsychologyorneuroscience.Thosewhodislikelaboratoryworkbutwho
likeabstractproblemsandcarefullogicalanalysiscanpursuephilosophy.ThosewholovethechallengeofwritingcomputerprogramscanpursueAI,andthosewho
lovethinkingaboutlanguagecanpursuelinguistics.Thosewhoarefascinatedbythedevelopmentofchildrencanpursuecognitivedevelopment.Thislistcouldgoon,
butthegeneralpointisthatcognitivescienceneedsresearcherswhoaremotivatedbymanydifferentkindsofcuriosityandwholiketodomanydifferentkindsof
work.Thefieldthrivesonthepresenceofpeoplewhoaskthewidestpossiblevarietyofquestionsaboutthemind.
Yourownintellectualtasteswillprobablyleadyoutoprefersomeofthechaptersinthisbookoverothers.Itisnaturaltopickaspecialty,butweurgeyounottolet
yourpreferencesleadyoutoneglectotherchapters.Cognitivesciencedependsonacontinuingdialogueamongitsvariousspecialties,andtheintelligenceofthe
dialoguerequirespeoplewithagoodgroundinginthefundamentalsofthecontributingdisciplines.Today,anewgenerationofcognitivescientistsislearningthese
fundamentalsasundergraduatesandbeginninggraduatestudents.Theresultingincreaseinmutualunderstandingwillenhancethecollaborativeresearchofthefuture.
SuggestedReadings
Thematerialinthischapteriscoveredfromasimilarpointofviewandatasomewhatmoreadvancedlevelinchapter2ofNewell'sUnifiedTheoriesofCognition
(1990).AnadvancedtreatmentisgiveninthefirstfourchaptersofPylyshyn'sComputationandCognition:TowardaFoundationforCognitiveScience(1984).
Chapters8and9ofChurchland'sNeurophilosophy:TowardaUnifiedScienceoftheMind/Brain(1986)presentacaseforthecooperativepursuitofresearchat
differentlevelsofanalysisaswellasacaseforgivingneurosciencetheguidingrole.Gardner'sTheMind'sNewScience:AHistoryoftheCognitiveRevolution
(1985)presentsahistoryofcognitivescience.
References
Churchland,P.S.(1986).Neurophilosophy:Towardaunifiedscienceofthemind/brain.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Gardner,H.(1985).Themind'snewscience:Ahistoryofthecognitiverevolution.NewYork:BasicBooks.
Newell,A.(1990).Unifiedtheoriesofcognition.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.
Pylyshyn,Z.W.(1984).Computationandcognition:Towardafoundationforcognitivescience.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.

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Chapter2
CognitivePsychology:TheArchitectureoftheMind
2.1TheNatureofCognitivePsychology
Psychologistsformulateandtesttheoriesaboutthehumanmindandbehavior.Cognitivepsychologyconcernshumancognition,ourcapacitiesforsensoryperception,
memory,thinking,problemsolving,andlearning.Thecognitivepsychologistwhoisorientedtowardcognitivescienceviewsthehumanmindasaremarkable
informationprocessingsystemthatisextraordinarilypowerfulinmostcircumstancesandyetsurprisinglylimitedinothers.Asyoureadthisparagraph,themeaningof
eachwordiseffortlesslyactivatedwithinamentaldictionaryoftensofthousandsofwords.Butyouprobablydonotrememberthenamesofthesixcoauthorsofthis
book.Abookreadingcomputer,usingcurrenttechnology,wouldhaveamucheasiertimerememberingnamesthandeployingmeanings.
Webeginthisbookwithcognitivepsychologyfortworeasons.First,cognitivepsychologyfocusesonthehumanmind.Inordertofullyappreciateworkinartificial
intelligence(AI),itisnecessarytohavesomefamiliaritywiththeoriesofhumanintelligence.Second,inkeepingwiththeemphasisonbasicsciencewithincognitive
science,cognitivepsychologistshavetriedtodeveloptheoriesofhighlygeneralcognitivecapacities.Theyhaveaskedwhatsortofgeneralinformationprocessing
capacitiesamindmusthaveinordertodothemanythingsitdoes.Thatis,theyhavetriedtofigureoutwhattheoveralldesign,orarchitecture,ofthemindis.Itisa
goodideatobeginthestudyofcognitivesciencebyconfrontingsomeofthemostbasicquestionsabouthowitispossibleforthemindtoworkasitdoes.
Inordertomaintainthefocusonthemostgeneralcognitivecapacities,wewilldelaydiscussionoftwoofthemorespecializedinformationprocessingsubsystemsof
themind.Languagewillbeextensivelydiscussedinchapters6,9,10,and11.Visionwillbediscussedinchapter12.Linguisticandvisualinformationprocessinghave
manyspecificcharacteristicsthatrequireextensiveandinterdisciplinaryinvestigation.
Alongwiththedistinctivefocusonthegeneralpropertiesofthehumanmind,cognitivepsychologyhascontributedaparticularmethodofinvestigationtocognitive
science.Cognitivepsychologistsspecializeintestingtheoriesbymakingsystematic,preciseobservationsofhumanbehavior,oftenunderlaboratoryconditions.
Severaldiscussionsinthechapterincludedetailedexamplesoflaboratoryexperiments.Inlearningtothinklikeacognitivepsychologist,youshoulddomorethan
simplyabsorbthetheoryofcognitivearchitecturethatisbeingpresented.Youshouldalsoconsiderandtrytoevaluatetheexperimentalevidencediscussed.Whenthe
evidenceforatheoryseemsweaktocognitivescientists,theytrytodeviseafurtherexperimentthatwilleithersupportthetheoryorweakenitinfavorofsome
alternative.Cognitivepsychologydependsontheinterplayoftheoryandsystematicempiricalevidence.

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2.2TheNotionofCognitiveArchitecture
Afundamentalviewincognitivescienceisthatanintelligentsystemisnotcompletelyhomogeneous.Itmustconsistofanumberoffunctionalsubsystems,ormodules,
thatcooperatetoachieveintelligentinformationprocessingandbehavior.Thisviewissupportedbyresultsincognitivepsychology,someofwhicharepresentedinthis
chapterandthenext,andbydiscoveriesthatanimalbrainscontainnumerousspecializedregions,someofwhichwillbedescribedinchapter7.Itisalsosupportedby
attemptstobuildintelligentdevices.ComputerdesignersandAIresearchershavefoundthattheyhavetoimposeagreatdealofstructureontheirmachinesand
programsinordertoachievepowerfulinformationprocessing.
Ourparticularconcerninthischapterisakindofstructurecalledcognitivearchitecture.Cognitivearchitecturereferstoinformationprocessingcapacitiesand
mechanismsofasystemthatarebuiltin.Thearchitectureofasystemmayormaynotgiveitthepotentialtoacquireinformationprocessingcapacitiesthatarenot
specificallybuiltin.Forexample,thearchitectureofthesimplestelectroniccalculatorsfixestheirmathematicalcapacities,whereasthearchitectureofprogrammable
calculatorsallowsthemtoacquirenewcapacitiesbybeingprogrammed.Althoughthenewcapacitiesarenotfunctionaluntiltheprogramsareloadedintothe
machine'smemory,thepotentialforthemisinherentinitsarchitecture.Ifweunderstandthearchitecture,weunderstandnotonlywhatthemachinedoesnowbutthe
rangeofthingsitcanpotentiallydoandhowitisabletodothem.Giventheresponsivenessofhumancognitiontoexperience,thedesiretounderstandthehuman
cognitivearchitecturemakessense.Totheextentthatweunderstandit,weunderstandnotjustwhatsomeindividualorgroupiscapableofataparticulartimeand
placebutratherthehumancognitivepotential.
Sincemostadultcognitiveabilitiesdependonextensivelearningexperiences,itisdifficulttouncoverthecontributionofthecognitivearchitecturetotheseabilitiesand
separateitfromthecontributionofspecificexperiences.Thehighdegreeofflexibilityofhumancognitionrequiresthatwethinkofmuchofthehumancognitive
architecturenotasdeterminingspecificthoughtsandbehaviorsbutasanabstractsetofmechanismsthatpotentiatesavastrangeofcapabilities.Wemustget
underneathpeople'sbehaviorinparticularcircumstancestodiscoverthebasicinformationprocessingcapacitiesthatallowadaptiveresponsestoawiderangeof
situations.
IndividualDifferencesinCognitiveArchitecture
Itshouldbenotedthatwemakethesimplifyingassumptionherethatthehumancognitivearchitectureisuniformacrossindividuals.Infact,thereissomearchitectural
variationacrossindividuals.Thenervoussystemissubjecttogeneticvariation,itsearlydevelopmentcanbealteredbyvariouskindsofnutritionalorexperiential
deprivation,itcandeterioratewithage,anditcanbeinjured.Inprinciple,variationscanbequalitativeorquantitative.Qualitativelydifferentarchitectureshavedifferent
informationprocessingcomponentsorstructures.Forexample,apersonwhoistotallydeafandahearingpersondonothavethesamecognitivearchitecture.The
cognitivearchitectureofthehearingpersonincludesasubsystemthatprovidesacousticinput.Thatsubsystemisfunctionallyabsentinthedeafperson.Inother
respectsthetwopeoplemayhavethesamecognitivearchitecturalstructures.Infact,enoughofthedeafperson'sauditoryarchitecturemaybeintacttoallow
considerableauditorycognition,eventhoughthepersoncannotrespondtosound.AcaseinpointisLudwigvan

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Beethoven,whocomposedhislateworksaftergoingdeaf.Socalledcolorblindnessisamoresubtleexampleofastructuraldifference.Apersonwithnormalhuman
colorvisionpossessesthreevisualinputchannelsfordaylightvision,whichhavepeaksensitivitiesinthreedifferentregionsofthevisiblespectrum.Acolorblind
personmightbemissingoneoftheseinputchannelsandthereforebeunabletomakeasmanycolordiscriminationsasthepersonwiththreechannels(Nathans1989).
Anexampleofaquantitativedifferenceincognitivearchitectureisthedeteriorationofnightvisionwithage.Owingtoagingprocessesthatareuniversalandcurrently
irreversible,olderpeoplecannotseeaswellasyoungerpeopleinthedark.Thepartoftheirvisualarchitecturethatisresponsiblefornightvisionoperatesqualitatively
inthesamefashionasthatofyoungerpeople,buttheyaremuchlesssensitiveatlowilluminationlevelsandmuchslowertoadapttosuddenchangesinillumination.
Webypassvariationsinthearchitectureacrossindividualsfortworeasons.First,mosthumanbeingsappeartohavestructurallyverysimilararchitectures.The
variationismostlyquantitative.Onceastructureiswellunderstood,itsquantitativevariationstendtobeeasytounderstand.Second,understandingwhatmightbe
calledthegenerichumanarchitectureisagoodwaytobegintodiscoverandtrytounderstandthequalitativevariationsthatdoexist.Ofcourse,therearecaseswhere
theobservationofastructuralvariationcanleadtonewinsightsaboutcognitivearchitecture.Studiesofsocalledsplitbrainpatients(introducedinchapter7)areone
suchcase.
Thetendencyofcognitivescientiststofocusonthefundamentalstructureofthecognitivearchitecturetendstosurprisestudentswhoseinitialinterestinhuman
cognitionarisesfromcuriosityaboutcognitivedifferencesamongpeople.Differentpeoplehavedifferentabilitiesanddifferentstylesofthinking.Itisnaturaltobe
curiousaboutpossibleinborndifferencesthatfacilitatethedevelopmentofunusualcognitiveabilities,inthearts,sciences,practicalaffairs,andsoon.Incomplex
societies,whichcontainmanydemandingandcompetitiveenvironments,suchdifferencesarealsoofpracticalimportance.Tocognitivescientists,however,the
questionofinbornhumanuniformityisdeeperandmorefascinating.Akeycontributionofcognitivesciencehasbeentobringouttheinterestandscientificimportance
ofwhatwetendtotakeforgranted:thatalmostallpeoplehaveremarkablysimilarcognitivepotentialandevenremarkablysimilardevelopedcognitivecapacities.
Nearlyeveryoneisabletonegotiatethevisualworldwithgreatsuccess,learnanaturallanguage,andacquireavaststoreofknowledgethatcanbedeployedflexibly
tomeetthedemandsofaneverchangingenvironment.Althoughwedonotyetknoweverythingwewouldliketoaboutthelimitsandvariabilityofhumanskill
acquisition,itisalsosafetosaythatwithsuitablepracticenearlyeveryonecouldbecomecompetentatawiderangeofcognitiveandsensorymotorskills,from
baseball,tocooking,tomanagingapreschoolclassroom,tosolvingphysicsproblems,toleadinganomadiclifeinthedesert.
Thisperspectiveonhumancognitionalsoleadstowardaperspectiveonhumandifferencesthatdoesnotoveremphasizegeneticvariability.Toaverylargeextentthe
differencesinpeople'scognitiveabilitiesaretheresultofdifferinggoalsandexperiences.Itisnodoubttruethatifenvironmentandexperiencecouldbeheldconstant,
people'sachievementswouldvary,inpartbecauseofinborncognitivedifferences,butthesevariationscanbeseenasthewrinklesintherichandnevercompleted
tapestryofhumanaccomplishmentthatiswovenfromtheinteractionbetweenthebasiccognitivearchitectureandthevarietyofhumanenvironments.

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Inasense,therootproblemofcognitivescienceistounderstandhowthecognitivearchitecturemakesmundanehumancompetencepossible.Ananalogywiththe
historyofchemistryisusefulhere.Thealchemistsdidnotmakemuchprogresswhentheyfocusedtheirattentiononexoticproblemssuchastransmutingleadintogold.
Chemistryadvancedwhenthinkersbegantofocusontheunderlyingarchitectureofallmatter.Fromthispointofviewmundanesubstancessuchastablesaltand
waterareasinterestingasgold,andunderstandingordinarychemicalreactions,suchastheburningofacandle,holdsthekeytoprogress.Followingthislead,wewill
concentrateontheordinaryincognition.
2.3AGlobalViewofTheCognitiveArchitecture
Inordertofocusourdiscussioninthischapter,ourfirsttaskistobreakthecognitivearchitectureintosubsystems.Everydayintuition,evidenceaboutthebrain,and
evidencefromlaboratorystudiesincognitivescienceareingoodagreementaboutatleastsomeofthemajorcomponentsofcognition.Humanbeingscanreceive
informationthroughtheirsenses,think,andtakephysicalactionthroughvoluntarymuscularmovement.Asitisdepictedinfigure2.1,then,wecaninitiallyconceiveof
thehumaninformationprocessorasconsistingofacentralthinkingsystemthatreceivesinformationabouttheworldfromsensorysystemsandissuesmovement
commandstothemotorsystem.Inaddition,languageplaysalargeandbiologicallyuniqueroleinhumancognition.Itisshownasaspecializedsubsystemofthe
centralcognitiveprocessorinfigure2.1.Centralprocessesarethesubjectofthischapter.Thelinguisticcomponentofthecognitivearchitectureistreatedinchapters
6,9,and11.Inchapter12wetakeupvisionasanexamplesensorysystem.Chapter7concernstheneuralimplementationofthearchitecture.
Thedecompositionofthehumaninformationprocessingsystemshowninfigure2.1shouldbetakenasillustrativeandprovisionalatthispoint.Thesenses(vision,
audition,andsoon)couldberepresentedasseparatesubsystems,raisingquestionsaboutwhethertheyintercommunicatedirectlyoronlyviathecentralsystem.
Evidencemightleadustosplitthecentralsystemupintoanumberofcomponentswithdistinctivechannelsofinteraction.Ontheotherhand,itmustberecognizedthat
the

Figure2.1
Aglobalviewofthecognitivearchitecture.
(UsedwiththepermissionofNeilStillings.)

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boundariesbetweenmodulesandthechannelsofcommunicationmaynotbesoclearcut.Theseparationbetweencentralprocessesandthesensoryandmotor
systems,forexample,isnotassharpasthefigureindicates.Aftersensoryinformationisinitiallyregistered,itisoperatedonandtransformedsuccessively,makingit
difficulttoidentifywheresensoryorperceptualprocessingstopsandcentralprocessingbegins,orwhatportionofthetransformationfromsensoryinputtomotor
outputistobedesignatedcentral.Similarly,theboundariesbetweenthelinguisticsystemandsensory,motor,andothercentralsystemsisnotcompletelyclear.Some
ofthefuzzinesswillprobablyberesolvedbyfutureresearch,butitmayalsobenecessarytorecognizethatanysimplepartitioningofthecognitivearchitectureispartly
anintellectualconveniencethatobscuressomeofthecomplexitiesofhumaninformationprocessing.
InputandOutputSystems
Eachmajorcomponentofthecognitivearchitecturehasparticularfunctions.Thefirstjobofasensorysystemisthetransductionofsomeformofphysicalenergy
impingingonthebodyintoaformthatusablebycognitiveprocesses.Atthephysicallevelofanalysis,theincomingphysicalenergyistransducedintoelectrochemical
activityinspecializednervecellscalledreceptors.Attheformallevelofanalysisthiselectrochemicalactivitycanbelookedatasacomplexsignalorcodethat
representsinformationcontainedintheincomingphysicalenergy.Typicallytheinitialencodingmustbetransformedinvariouswaystoproduceaclearrepresentation
ofthemostusefulinformation.Sensorysystemshaveelaboratearchitecturestoaccomplishtheinitialtransductionandfurtherprocessingofsensoryinput.Inthevisual
system,forexample,theretinasatthebacksofthetwoeyescontainmillionsofphotoreceptorcells.Theinitialencodingdeliveredbythephotoreceptorsisprocessed
extensivelybyseveralotherlayersofretinalcellsandbymanyspecializedregionsinthebrain.
Thespecializationofsensorysystemsisonesourceofevidenceforthemodularitythesisconcerningthecognitivearchitecture(Fodor1983).Aprominentfeatureof
thisthesisisthatsensorysystemsareinformationallyencapsulated.Thatis,asensorysystemtransformsaclassofenvironmentalinputsintooutputsthatareuseful
tocentralprocesses,butthecomputationofitsoutputisnotaffectedbycentralprocesses.Inputsystemsarethoughttohaveevolvedtorapidlydeliverreliable
informationtocentralprocesses,andtheirstructureandoperationisarguedtobegeneticallydeterminedandnotsubstantiallymodifiable.Themodularitythesis
amountstoaclaimthatsomeoftheboundariesamongthemajorcomponentsofthecognitivearchitectureinfigure2.1canbedrawninaprincipledwayusinga
combinationofcomputationalandbiologicalcriteria.
Fodor(1983)arguesthattheinitialprocessingofspokenlinguisticinputisalsomodular.Giventheintimateconnectionthatwesensebetweenlanguageandthought,it
seemsstrangeatfirsttothinkthattheprocessingoflinguisticinputcouldbeinformationallyencapsulated.Knowledgeandexpectationsthatareavailablecentrally
mightwellaffecttheperceptionoflanguage.Thereisconsiderabledebateaboutthisissue,butregardlessoftheoutcomeofthatdebatelaterchapterswillmakeclear
thatthereismuchthatisbiologicallyandcomputationallyspecialaboutlanguage.
Similarpointscouldbemadeaboutthemotorsystem.Italsoinvolvestransduction.Inorderforactualmovementtooccur,neuralcodesmustcausemuscular
contraction.Thistransformationisaccomplishedbyneurochemicaleventsataspecializedtypeofconnectionbetweenmotornervecellsandmusclecellscalleda
neuromuscularjunction.Aswithsensorysystems,severalpartsofthebrainarespecializedformotorcontrol.

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CentralSystems
Ourprimaryjobinthischapterandthenextistocharacterizethearchitectureofthecentralinformationprocesses.Wewillassumethatthesensoryandlinguistic
systemscandelivermeaningfulinputtothecentralprocesses.Forexample,weassumethatthevisualsystemcanreliablydeliverthespatiallocations,shapes,colors,
andidentitiesofcommonobjectsinthevisualfield.Andweassumethatthelinguisticsystemcanreliablyidentifythewordsandthegrammaticalstructureofincoming
sentences.Weassumethatthemotorsystemrespondsreliablytomotorcommandsequencesissuedbycentralprocessesbymovingthebodyintheappropriate
ways.Theexecutionofmotorcommandsincludesmovingthemusclesofthevocaltracttoproducespeech.So,giventhatthecentralsystemhasappropriateinputs
andoutputs,weaskhowitisorganizedtoaccomplishtheaspectsofcognitionthatweassociatedistinctivelywithit.
Everydaytermsforsomeofthecapabilitiesofcentralcognitionarelistedinfigure2.1.Firstandforemost,wecanthink.Thatis,wecanreasonfromknownfactsto
novelconclusions,wecansolveproblems,wecanplanouractivitiesandevaluatealternativeplans,andsoon.Furthermore,ourthinkingcapacityisremarkably
flexible.Itisoftennotcontrolledbyimmediatesensoryinputortheneedforimmediateaction.Thereisnoobviouslimittoourthinking,inthesensethatwedrawnew
conclusions,makenewplans,andsolvenewproblemsinremarkablydiversedomainseveryday.Thinkingisusuallycharacterizedbyafocusofattention.Thepositive
sideofattentionisthatitseemstomaintainthegoaldirectednessofthought.Thenegativesideisthatourattentionalcapacityseemstobelimitedandissometimes
overwhelmed.Inadditiontodrawingoncurrentperceptualinput,thoughtalsotakesinputsfrommemory.Humanmemory,thoughfarfrominfallible,seemsrelatively
unlimitedbothincapacityandinabilitytoyieldupinformationthatisrelevanttocurrentthoughtprocesses.Finally,thereisourcapacitytolearn.Weacquirethe
knowledgethatresidesinourmemories,andweareabletoacquiremanycognitiveandsensorymotorskillsduringourlifetimes.
Itisapparentthatcentralprocessesmusthavearathercomplexarchitectureoftheirown.Inthe1980saviewofthearchitectureofcognitioncametoakindof
maturityafteralongperiodofdevelopmentthatbeganinearnestinthe1950s.Wewillrefertothisview,perhapsabittoograndly,astheclassicalview(Fodorand
Pylyshyn1988).Intruth,itwouldbemoreaccuratetocallitafamilyofviews,sincetherehavebeenanumberofsomewhatdifferentarchitecturesproposedthatare
allrecognizablyclassical(Anderson1983Newell1990Simon1990areexamples).Muchofthischapterwillbedevotedtodevelopingagenericversionofthe
classicalview.Thechapterwillalsointroduceasignificantcritiqueoftheclassicalviewandafamilyofnewproposalsaboutcognitivearchitecturethathavearisenover
thelasttenyears.Theseviewsgounderanumberofnames,includingconnectionism,paralleldistributedprocessing,andartificialneuralnetworks.
PhysicalSymbolSystems
Akeyhypothesisintheclassicalviewofthecognitivearchitectureisthatthecentralprocessesofthehumanmindconstitute,amongotherthings,ageneralpurpose
computationalsystem,orphysicalsymbolsystem(Newell1980Newell,Rosenbloom,andLaird1989).Thehypothesisincludestheframeworkdevelopedin
chapter1.Thatis,itisassumedthatcognitioncanbeanalyzedasformalsymbolmanipulationprocesses,whichcanbegivenasemanticinterpretationthataccountsfor
theirmeaningfulness

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andadaptivenesstotheenvironment.Thesymbolsystemisphysicalbecausetheformalprocessesareimplementedinaparticularphysicalmedium,thebrain.The
additionalcontentofthehypothesishastodowiththerangeofsymbolicprocessesthataremadepossiblebythecognitivearchitecture.Theideaisthatthe
architecturecontainsbuiltinstructuresandoperationsthatmakecentralcognitiveprocessesprogrammable.Thearchitecturecontainsasetofbuiltininformation
processingfacilitiesthatendowitwiththepotentialtoacquireanunlimitedrangeoffurtherinformationprocesses.
UniversalMachinesResearchincomputerscienceandalliedmathematicalfieldshasledtoanunderstandingofpropertiesthataflexibleprogrammablesystem
seemstorequire.Thesystemmusthaveamemoryinwhichsymbolscanbestoredandfromwhichtheycanberetrieved.Maximumflexibilityrequiresthatthesizeof
thememorybearbitrarilyextendible,sincethereisnolimittotheamountofstoredinformationthatataskmightrequire.Extendibilityismadepossibleincomputers
throughtheprovisionforaddingevermoreorlargermassstorageunits,suchasdiskandtapedrives.Humanmemoryisextendiblethroughexternalstoragemedia
suchashandwrittennotes,books,tapes,andcomputerizedrecords.Thestoragecapacityofthehumanbrainisalsoextremelylarge,sothatitslimitsarenotexceeded
formanytasks.
Theprocessormustbeabletostoresymbolsinmemoryandretrievethem.Moreover,symbolicprocessingrequiresthatwhatisstoredinmemorycandependon
whathasrecentlybeenretrieved.Thisallowstheprocessortosystematicallyproducenewsymbolicstructuresinresponsetothosealreadyinmemoryortotransform
structuresalreadyinmemory.Forexample,acalculatormightbeabletoretrieveapairofsymbolsfrommemoryandproduceathirdsymbolaccordingtoan
algorithmthatrepresentsaddition.
Atrulyflexiblesystemisabletoacquirenewinformationprocessingprocedures.Inconventionalprogrammablesystemssomeofwhatisretrievedfrommemory
functionsasinstructionstoperformcertainoperationsratherthanmerelyasdatatobefedintooperations.Forexample,aprogrammablecalculatormightbeableto
retrieveatripleofsymbolsfrommemoryandtreatthefirstsymbolasaninstructiontoperformsomearithmeticoperationonthesecondtwosymbols.Incomputer
science,theprocessoftreatinginformationstoredinmemoryasinstructionsisoftenreferredtoasinterpretation,sincethesystemis,inasense,interpretingthe
informationasinstructions.Thissenseofinterpretationisobviouslydifferentfromthekindofsemanticinterpretationdiscussedinchapter1.Theinterpretationfunction
insidethemachineestablishesarelationbetweenformalsymbolsandformaloperations,whereassemanticinterpretationestablishesarelationbetweenformalsymbols
andoperationsandsomesignificantdomainexternaltothesystem.
Inthe1930sTuring(1937),anearlycomputationtheorist,gaveoneofthefirstgeneralcharacterizationsoftheclassofsymbolictransformationsthatcanbecomputed
byformalprocesses.Hedefinedaclassofdevices,nowcalledTuringmachines(describedinmoredetailinchapter8),eachofwhichcomputedsomeinputoutput
function.HecalledtheentireclassoffunctionscomputablebyTuringmachinesthecomputablefunctions.(Healsoprovedtheexistenceoffunctionsthatarenot
computable.)Theargument(knownasChurch'sthesis,Turing'sthesis,ortheChurchTuringthesis)thatthecomputablefunctionsareanaturalclasshasstoodthe
testoftimeinthesensethatallotherproposeduniversalcharacterizationsofcomputationhavebeen

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showntodefinethesameclassoffunctions.Adevicecapableofcomputinganycomputablefunctionisknownasauniversalmachine.Turingdefinedauniversal
Turingmachine,forexample,thatcouldmimicthecomputationsofanyotherTuringmachine.Themimicryofanothermachinewasaccomplishedbystoringa
descriptionofitontheuniversalmachine'smemorytapeandinterpretingthedescription.Thedescriptionoftheothermachineisessentiallyaprogram.Aconsequence
ofTuring'sresultsisthatifasystemhasamemoryandtheabilitytointerpretthecontentsofitsmemoryasinstructionstoperformoperations,therepertoireofbuiltin
operationsneededforuniversalityisextremelysimple.
TheuniversalTuringmachine,althoughaconvenientmathematicalfiction,isnotsuitableforpracticalcomputationandhencehasneverbeenbuilt.Itsextremely
inefficientmemoryretrievalschemerequiresscanningseriallythrougharbitrarilylongsectionsofitsmemorytapetolocateneededinformationortofindthecorrect
cellstowritein.Itsprimitiveoperationsaresosimplethatconsiderableprogrammingisrequiredtobuildupoperationssuchasadditionorcomparingtwostringsof
symbolsforequality.Becauseoftheinefficiencyofmemorystorageandretrieval,theserelativelyelementaryoperationswouldbeextremelyinefficient,making
complexprogramsthatdependedonthemfatallyslow.
Fromthelate1940sthroughthepresentthevonNeumannarchitecture,namedafterthemathematicianJohnvonNeumann,hasbeenemployedinmostpractical
generalpurposecomputers.ThehallmarkofavonNeumannmachineisalargerandomaccessmemory.Eachcellinthememoryhasauniquenumericaladdress,
whichcanbeusedtoaccessorreplacethecontentsofthatcellinasinglestep.Inadditiontoitsabilitytoaddressmemorylocationsdirectly,avonNeumannmachine
alsohasacentralprocessingunit(theCPU)thatpossessesaspecialworkingmemory(registermemory)forholdingdatathatarebeingoperatedonandasetof
builtinoperationsthatisrichincomparisonwiththeTuringmachine.Theexactdesignofthecentralprocessorvariesconsiderably,buttypicallyincludesoperations
suchasaddingtwobinaryintegers,orbranchingtoanotherpartofaprogramifthebinaryintegerinsomeregisterisequaltozero(socalledconditionalbranching).
TheCPUcaninterpretinformationretrievedfrommemoryeitherasinstructionstoperformparticularoperationsorasdatatoapplythecurrentoperationto.Thus,a
portionofmemorycancontainasequenceofinstructions,calledaprogram,andanotherportionofmemorycancontainthedatatobeoperatedonbytheprogram.
TheCPUrepeatedlygoesthroughafetchexecutecycle,inwhichthenextoperationanditsargumentsareretrievedfrommemoryandtheoperationisappliedtothe
arguments.AlthoughitcomputesthesameclassoffunctionsasauniversalTuringmachine,avonNeumannmachinerunsefficientlybecauseofitsrandomaccess
memoryandbecauseitsarchitecturecanbeimplementedinelectroniccircuitrythatmakesitsbasicoperationsextremelyfast(currentlyfrommillionstotensofmillions
ofinstructionspersecondindesktopcomputers).
Althoughitisimmenselypractical,avonNeumannmachine,liketheuniversalTuringmachine,mightbecalledanimmaculateuniversaldevice.Ithasthepotentialtodo
anything,butasitcomesoutofitsshippingcartonitactuallycandonothinguntilaprogramisloadedintoitsmemory.ThenoncommittalpurityofvonNeumann
machinesisamajorsourceoftheireconomicsuccess.Themachinesareengineeredpreciselytobebendabletothedemandsofanyinformationprocessingtaskand
thereforehavethewidestpossiblemarket.Themanufacturerwastesnomoneybuildinginfunctionsthatmanyuserswouldnotwant.TheflexibilityofavonNeumann

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machine,however,canonlyberealizedbyanintelligentprogrammer.Itisatool,perfectlyadaptedtoanenvironmentofprogrammersbutlackinganyinnate
autonomy.Thecleanseparationbetweenhardwareandsoftware,wheretheresponsibilityofthehardwareistoprovideefficientandcosteffectivecomputational
potentialviaprogrammability,hasbeenaspectacularlysuccessfultechnologicalstrategy.
Thisstrategyobviouslywouldnotsufficeforbiologicalsuccess.Organismsmustbeinnatelyendowedwithspecificcomputationalcapacitiesthatarededicatedto
tasksnecessaryfortheirsurvival.Inaddition,moreintelligentorganisms,includinghumans,canacquirenewinformationprocessingabilitiesbyinteractingwiththeir
environments.Theycan,inasense,beprogrammedbyasequenceofgoalorientedexperiencesintheirenvironments.Neitherdedicatedcomputationalcapacitynor
learningfromexperienceistypicalofphysicalsymbolsystemsastheyhavebeendevelopedtechnologically.Thefactthatphysicalsymbolsystemsneedhavenobuilt
inactivesurvivalmechanismsdemonstratesthatsymbolsystemhoodisnotasufficientconditionforintelligence.Oneclaimoftheclassicalview,however,isthatbeing
aphysicalsymbolsystemisanecessaryconditionforintelligenceatthehumanlevel.Attheheartofthisclaimisthenotionthattheextraordinarybehavioralflexibility
demonstratedbyhumanbeingscanonlybeachievedbyaphysicalsymbolsystem.
Itseemsclearthatnervoussystemsthatfunctionasfullsymbolsystemsarenotwidespreadinthebiologicalworld.Solutionstoparticularcomputationalproblems
aboundinevolution,forexample,thefrog'svisualpreydetectionsystem,thebat'ssonarlocalizationsystem,theelectricsignalingsystemoftheelectricfish,the
housefly'sflightcontrolsystem,orthesongacquisitionmechanismsofvariousspeciesofsongbirds,butonlythehumannervoussystemseemstobeafullsymbol
system.Newell(1990)referstotheshiftfromdedicatedhardwareforspecificcomputationalfunctionstoageneralpurposephysicalsymbolsystemasthegreat
move.Itisnotclearjustwhyhumansexhibitsomuchmorecognitiveflexibilitythanotherintelligentanimals,suchastheotherprimates.Theircognitivearchitectures
areprobablybothqualitativelyandquantitativelydifferentfromours,butthedetailsofthedifferencesarefarfromclear.Justhowhumancognitiveflexibilityemerged
fromevolution'sgenerallymorefocusedwaysisalsonotclear.Giventhedifferencesbetweenbiologicalinformationprocessingandcomputingtechnologyasithas
developedsofar,wecannotlooktothedetailsofthevonNeumannarchitectureforinsightintothearchitectureofthehumancentralprocessor.Thereisnoevidence,
forexample,thathumanmemoryconsistsofdiscrete,numericallyaddressablelocationsorthattheprimitive,builtinoperationsofhumanthoughtarethesameas
thoseofavonNeumannmachine.Itisamatterofempiricalresearchtodiscoverhowaphysicalsymbolsystemisimplementedinthehumanmindandbrain.The
physicalsymbolsystemhypothesismakesnopriorcommitmentaboutthedetails.
ComputationinSymbolSystemsThehypothesisthatthemindis(amongotherthings)aphysicalsymbolsystemishighlyabstract.Therehasbeenconsiderable
discussionaboutjusthowitconstrainstheoriesofcognition.Abasicrequirementisthatthecognitivesystembeabletocomposenewfunctionsortransformations
overitsrepresentations.Newell(1990)haspointedoutthattherearemanywaysthatthiscapacitymightbeimplemented.ThevonNeumannsolutionofusingthe
samemediumforrepresentingbothdataandinstructionsiselegantbutonlyoneoption.Anotheroptionmightbetoimplementnewfunctionsdirectlyinreconfigurable
hardware,essentially

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buildingspecialpurposesubsystemstocomputenewfunctionsasneeded.Thenotionofinterpretationwouldshiftquiteradicallyinsuchasystem.Instructions,in
somesense,wouldbeneededtobuildthespecialpurposesubsystem,butoncebuiltthesubsystemwouldrundirectly,withouttheinterpretationofinstructions
retrievedfromamemory.SomepointsabouttheclassicalarchitecturemadebelowcanbeseenasaclaimthathumancognitionincludesbothvonNeumannstyle
interpretationandamechanismforconstructingnewfunctionsthatoperatewithoutinterpretation.
ThememoryretrievalprocessesinasymbolsystemallowwhatNewell(1990)callsdistalaccesstosymbols.Formally,whatthismeansisthattheprocessingofone
symbolorsymbolicstructurecanreliablyevoketheprocessingofothersymbolicstructuresthatareneededinthecurrentcomputation.Acommonexampleiswhena
singlesymbolservesasanindexorpointertoalargersymbolstructurewithwhichitisassociatedandwhichcanbebroughtintothecomputation.Instandard
computerprogramminglanguageswhenthenameofaprocedureorsubroutineisencounteredduringacomputation,ittriggerstheapplicationoftheentiresubroutine.
Inhumanlanguageunderstandingtheoccurrenceofanywellunderstoodcontentwordpotentiallytriggerstheprocessingofextensivesymbolstructuresthatrepresent
themeaningoftheword.Newellarguesthattheneedfordistalaccessreflectsaconstraintonthephysicsofcomputationaldevices.Thephysicalimplementationof
anyinformationprocessingsystemimposesalimitontheamountofinformationthatcanbeinvolvedinacomputationatanymoment.Thelimitcanbeovercomeby
passivelystoringlargeamountsofsymbolicstructureinregionsofthesystemthatarephysicallydistinctfromtheregionsthatareactivelysupportingthecomputation
andbyarrangingamechanismthatallowsthepassivestructurestobebroughtintothecomputationwhenneeded.
Theabilityofasymbolsystemtomaintaininternalrepresentationsoftheworld,toaccessthem,andtotransformthemwithprocessesthatarenotimmediatelydriven
bysensoryinputortieddirectlytomotoroutputiscrucialtoitsflexibility.Thephysicalsymbolsystemhypothesisismotivatedinpartbythehumancapacitiesfor
planning,problemsolving,andreasoningthatarenotdrivenbytheimmediatesensoryinputandthatmakenoveluseoflargestoresofknowledge.
Symbolsystems'abilitytoprocesssyntacticallystructuredsymbolsisalsowidelyconsideredtobecrucialtotheirflexibilityandpower.Althoughfacilitiesforhandling
complexsyntacticstructurearenottransparentlybuiltintothesimplestuniversalarchitectures,suchastheTuringmachine,orevenintostandardvonNeumann
computers,programsforbuilding,recognizing,andtransformingsymbolicstructurecanbebuiltupfromtheprimitiveoperationsinsucharchitectures.Universal
computationalcapacityseemstorequiresuchfacilities.FodorandPylyshyn(1988)arguethatstructuredsymbolsandstructuresensitivecomputationaredefining
characteristicsofhumancognitiveprocesses.Thehumancognitivearchitecture,theyargue,hasanintrinsiccapacitytobuildupcomplexsymbolsoutofsimplerones,
toidentifythepartsofcomplexsymbolsandtheirarrangement,andtocarryoutcomputationsthatdependonsymbolicstructure.Thesecapacitiesareveryapparent
innaturallanguages.Englishnounphrases,suchastheoldman,areaconvenientexample.Theoldmanisitselfacomplexsymbol,ascanbeseenfromrelated
structures,suchasthemanortheyoungman.ItcanalsoserveasaunitarypartoflargerstructuressuchasTheoldmankickedtheuncooperativedonkey,ascan
beseenfromrelatedstructuressuchasIrvingkickedthe

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uncooperativedonkey,Theuncooperativedonkeykickedtheoldman,orThedonkeywhotheoldmankickedwasuncooperative.Thestructuresensitivityof
naturallanguageprocessingisbroughtoutintheseexamplesbythefactthatwhodidthekickingandwhowaskickedcannotbedeterminedwithoutidentifyingthe
grammaticalstructureofthesentences.Kick,man,anddonkeyarepresentinthreeofthesentences,butthekickerandthekickeearenotthesameinallthree.(The
structureofnaturallanguagesistakenupindetailinchapter6.)
Structurebasedcomputationmakespossibletheproductivityandsystematicityofsymboliccomputation.Complexsymbolsarebuiltupandprocessedaccordingto
setsofrulesorconstraints.Therulescanbeappliedrepeatedlytoproduceoranalyzeevermorecomplexsymbolicstructures.Toreturntotheexampleinchapter1,a
systemthatcontainsrulesfordealingwitharithmeticexpressionscandealnotonlywithexpressions,suchas3+2,butalsowitharbitrarilycomplicatedexpressions,
suchas(3(5+7))+(69),inwhichtheorderofapplicationofthearithmeticoperationsdependsonthestructureoftheexpression.Similarly,therulesinnatural
languagesforformingnounphrasesandcombiningthemwithothertypesofphrasesallowforthegenerationandprocessingofanunlimitedstockofnovelsentences,
whichcanbearbitrarilycomplex.Claimsabouttheproductivityofasystemaresomewhatabstract,becausetheabilityofasystemtoapplyasetofrulesor
constraintsislimitedbyitsfinitecomputationalresources.Forexample,acalculatorwith64,000memorycellsandnoauxiliarystoragemightnotbeabletoprocessan
arithmeticexpressioncontaining100,000symbols.Similarly,thegrammaticalrulesforEnglishallowforsentencesthatwouldbetoolongtoproduceorprocessina
lifetime,andevensomerelativelyshortsentences,suchasTheoldmanwhotheuncooperativedonkeythatthecircustrainersoldkickeddied,raiseinteresting
questionsaboutlimitsonthecapacityofnaturallanguageprocessing.Inspiteoftheselimits,itcanbearguedthatindomainssuchasnaturallanguageormusical
compositionwithinastylehumancognitionisspectacularlyproductive.
Structurebasedcomputationisalsosystematic.Informationprocessesoperateonrepresentationsintermsoftheirstructure,guaranteeingthatrepresentationswith
similarstructureswillbeprocessedinthesameway.Asystemthatemploystherulesofarithmeticwillnotdealcorrectlywith3(5+7)butbalkat7(5+3)or(3+
2)(5+7),forexample.Similarly,apersonwhoknowsEnglishvocabularyandgrammareasilyunderstandsnovelsentences,suchasJohnkissedtheskunk,and,
havingunderstoodasentenceofaparticularform,willrarelyfailtounderstandotherutteranceswiththesamesyntacticform,suchasTheskunkkissedJohn.Even
nonsenseutterancesthatcontaincuestogrammaticalstructure,suchasThewugscroggedtheblap,receiveconsiderableprocessingrelativetosyntactically
unstructuredstringssuchaswugscrogblap.
Aswepointedoutinchapter1,themeaningsofstructuredrepresentationscanbespecifiedintermsoftheirsyntacticstructure.ThesemanticmappingfromJohn
kissedtheskunk,forexample,requiresthatthepersonspecifiedbythegrammaticalsubjectofthesentencemusthaveacertainrelationshiptoaskunkintheworld.
TherequiredrelationshipisreversedinTheskunkkissedJohn.Thistypeofcompositionalsemanticsishypothesizedtobecharacteristicofhumanlanguageand
thought.
Inrecentyearsthephysicalsymbolsystemhypothesishasbecomecontroversialincognitivescience.Aparticularsubjectofattackhasbeenthedetailedclaimthat

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rulegovernedprocessingofsyntacticallystructuredrepresentationsiscentraltohumancognition.Intherestofthischapterwewillfirstdeveloptheclassicalview
furtherandthensketchthealternativeviewsthathavearisenunderthenameofconnectionismorparalleldistributedprocessing.
2.4PropositionalRepresentation
TheLanguageofThought
PreliminaryArgumentsforPropositionalRepresentationWebeginourfurtherexplorationoftheclassicalviewofthecognitivearchitecturewithoneofthe
fundamentalquestionsthathasoccupieditsproponents.What''language''isourfactual,ordeclarative,knowledgerepresentedin?Inwritingacomputerprogram,
theprogrammerspecifiesarepresentationalformatforthedatastructures.Forexample,inanemployeeinformationsystemthefactsabouteachemployeemightbe
storedasarecord,containingslotsforname,address,phonenumber,title,monthlysalary,numberofdependents,seniority,andsoon.Theformatforarecordisan
abstractminilanguageforspecifyingtheinformationabouttheemployee.What,then,canwesayaboutthemuchmoregeneralabilityofthehumanmindtorepresent
anunlimitedvarietyoffactsinanunlimitedvarietyofsubjectareas?
Onepossibilityisthatfactsarerepresentedsolelyinthethinker'snativenaturallanguage,forexample,EnglishorChinese.Thispossibilityisattractive.Foronething,
weclearlydopossesslinguisticrepresentations,sinceweproduceandunderstandthemallthetime.Andnaturallanguagesareclearlypowerfulenoughtorepresentan
unlimitedvarietyoffacts,unlikeartificiallyrestrictedpersonnelrecordlanguagesandthelike.Introspectively,itoftenseemsthatwethinkinournativelanguagesas
well.Wewillnotembracethistheory,however.Instead,wewillassumethatfactsarealsoandprimarilyrepresentedinastillmorepowerfulinternalpropositional
representationthatislargelyunconsciousandthatistranslatedintonaturallanguagewhenwetalk.
Althoughitisdifficulttofullyjustifythisfundamentalassumptioninadvance,therearesomeintrospectiveargumentsandexperimentalevidencethatjustifyadoptingit
atleastprovisionally.Muchofthematerialintherestofthechaptercanalsobeseenasfurthersupportforit,althoughthatpointwillnotbeemphasized(seealso
Fodor1975).
Thetheoryofanunderlyingpropositionalrepresentationcorrespondstothefrequentintrospectivesenseofadistinctionbetweenhavinganideaandputtingitinto
words.Thedistinctionemergesbehaviorallyinthetipofthetonguephenomenon,wherewehaveaconceptclearlyinmindbutexperienceadelayinretrievingthe
appropriatewordforit.Furthermore,evenincaseswhereweeasilygeneratetheEnglishnameforaconcept(dog,chair,andsoon),weoftenarenotverygoodat
givingitsEnglishdefinition.Whenaskedtodefineeventhemostfamiliarconcepts,weoftenfindourselveslaboring.Thisphenomenonsuggeststhatthedefinitionsare
expressedinaninternalrepresentationthatisassociatedwithanEnglishword.Weretrievethewordeffortlessly,butafulltranslationofthedefinitionintoEnglishisnot
immediatelyavailableandrequiresconsiderablementaleffort.Afinalreasonforatleastinitiallyadoptingtheinternalrepresentationtheoryisthatitexplainshowyoung
childrencanbeginacquiringconceptsinspiteofthefactthattheyarenotbornknowinganaturallanguage.Whateverwemightthinkofadults'abilitiestodefine
conceptsintheir

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nativelanguages,childrenseemeasilyabletolearnconceptsthattheywillbecompletelyunabletoexplainuntiltheyhavebeentalkingforquitesometime.
ExperimentalEvidenceforPropositionalRepresentationAnowclassicexperimentbySachs(1967)isanexampleofthekindoflaboratoryevidencethat
supportsthetheoryofanunderlyingpropositionalrepresentation.Intheexperimentsubjectslistenedtoparagraphsonvarioustopics,suchasGalileo'sworkonthe
telescope.Thepassageswereinterrupted,andsubjectsweregivenarecognitionmemorytestforasentencethathadoccurred0,40,or80syllablesearlierinthe
passage.Inthetestthesubjectwaspresentedwithasentenceandaskedtojudgewhetheritwasthesameasasentenceinthepassageorchanged.FortheGalileo
passagethesubjectcouldbepresentedwithanyoneofthefollowingfoursentences.Theactualsentencewassentence(1).
(1)HesentaletteraboutittoGalileo,thegreatItalianscientist.
(2)HesentGalileo,thegreatItalianscientist,aletteraboutit.
(3)AletteraboutitwassenttoGalileo,thegreatItalianscientist.
(4)Galileo,thegreatItalianscientist,senthimaletteraboutit.
Noticethatsentences(2)and(3)havethesamemeaningassentence(1),althoughtheyhavedifferentgrammaticalforms.Sentence(4)hasadifferentmeaning.Ata
delayof80syllables(2025seconds)subjectsrarelymadetheerrorofthinkingthatsentence(4)hadoccurredinthepassage.However,theyfrequentlyand
mistakenlythoughttheyrememberedsentence(2)orsentence(3).Thus,undertheconditionsofSachs'sexperimentsubjectswereabletorememberthemeaningofa
sentencewithoutrememberingitslinguisticform.Areasonableexplanationofthefindingisthatthemeaningwasrepresentedinanunderlyingnonlinguisticformthat
couldbetranslatedintoavarietyoflinguisticparaphrases,whichsubjectsconfusedintherecognitiontest.Thefindingactuallyaccordswellwithourfrequentfeeling
thatwecanrememberthegistofwhatsomeonehassaidbutnottheexactwords.Theexperimentdemonstratesquantitativelythattherepresentationofexactwording
canbelostremarkablyquicklyunderquitenormallisteningconditions.Wewillreturntotheanalysisofmemoryexperimentsinchapter3,butitshouldbepointedout
herethatlinguisticrepresentationobviouslycanberemembered.Onedoesnotsingparaphrasesof"TheStarSpangledBanner,"forexample.
PropositionalFormIfweadoptatheoryofunderlyingpropositionalrepresentation,wetakeontheimposingproblemoffiguringoutindetailwhattheformal
structuresofpropositionsare.Wewillproposeonlythemostrudimentarystructureshere,becausetheexperimentalmethodsofthecognitivepsychologistarenotthe
besttoolstoapplytothedetailedanalysisoftheproblem,initially.Asastartingpoint,weassumethatpropositionsarethesimplestcompleteunitsofthought.Theyare
completeinthesensethattheycanhaveatruthvaluethatis,theycanbetrueorfalse.Anythingsimplerseemsincompleteinthissense.Forexample,Maryisnota
completeproposition,norislikes,butMarylikesJohnisbecauseitseemstoexpressacompletethoughtthatcanbeeithertrueorfalse.
Propositionstypicallycapturerelations,suchasliking,thatholdbetweenarguments,suchasJohnandMary.Likeisatwoplacerelation,orpredicate,thatrequires
twoargumentstoformaproposition.Theargumentsarenotinterchangeable:Marylikes

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JohnandJohnlikesMaryaredistinctpropositions.Wecandistinguishamongtheargumentsofapredicatebynotingtherolesthattheyplayintheproposition.Mary
isthesubjectandJohntheobjectofMarylikesJohn.Therearepredicateswithoneplace,suchasred,predicateswiththreeplaces,suchasgive,andsoon.Two
ormorepropositionsthatshareargumentscanoftenbeexpressedinasinglesentence:forexample,"Marylikestheteacherwhogaveheranapple,"whichisbuiltout
ofalikingpropositionandagivingproposition.
Propositionsandtheirpartswereplacedinitalicsabovetodistinguishthemfromlinguisticrepresentation.Theoristsusuallyalsoadoptspecialformalnotationsfor
propositionsthatallowthemtobeprocessedbyformalproceduresandthatallowaformaltheoryofmeaningtobespecified.Wewillinformallyintroduceasimple
versionofpropositionalnetworknotation,whichinvolvesthetheoreticalcommitmentsthataremostimportantincognitivepsychology.Figure2.2shows
propositionalnetworknotationsforthepropositionsjustdiscussed.
Inthisnotationeachpropositionisauniquestructuralunitbuiltaroundapropositionalnode,whichissymbolizedbyacirclewithanumberinsideit.Thevalueofthe
numberhasnomeaningotherthantodistinguishthepropositionfromotherpropositions.Thepropositionalnodeisconnectedtoitsconstituentnodesbylinks,or
pointers,whicharesymbolizedbyarrows.Eachlinkhasalabelthatspecifiestherolethatitstargetplaysintheproposition.Everypropositionalnodemusthavealink
toarelationnode,whichissymbolizedbyawordincapitalletters.Thepropositionalnodemustalsohavetherightnumberoflinkstonodesfortheargumentsofthe
relation.Argumentnodesaresymbolizedbysmallletterswhentheyrepresentparticularindividualentitiesintheworld,suchastheparticularperson,Mary.Insome
casesapreviouslyanonymousentitymustbeassignedaname,suchasafortheapplethatJohngavetoMary.Argumentnodesaresymbolizedbycapitalletterswhen
theyrepresentgeneralconceptsforobjects,orcategoriesthatobjectsbelongto.APPLEandTEACHERareexamplesinthefigure.TherelationISAisusedfor
propositions,suchasJohnisateacher,thatassertthataparticularentityfallsinacertaincategory.
Inthefourpropositionsinpart(a)offigure2.2someoftheargumentnodesoccurmorethanonce.Forexample,thenodejohnoccursinthreeofthepropositions.
Part(b)ofthefiguredisplaystheinterconnectionsamongthepropositionsmoreclearlybydisplayingeachnodeonce.Here,weseeimmediatelythatjohnisa
structurallycentralnodeinthetotalnetwork,becauseitisimmediatelyconnectedtothreeofthefourpropositions.Notethatthediagramofapropositioncanbe
rearrangedatwillaslongasthelinksstillconnectthesamenodes.Thedifferencesbetweenpart(a)andpart(b)ofthefiguredemonstratethispoint.Sinceourprimary
interestwillbeintheinterconnectionsamongpropositions,ratherthanintheirinternalstructure,thelabelsonthepointershavebeensuppressedinpart(b).Readers
interestedinpursuingquestionsabouttheuseofnetworkstorepresenttheinternaldetailsofpropositionsshouldconsultJohnsonLaird,Herrmann,andChaffin
(1984).Wegiveamoreformalanalysisofpropositionsinchapter10.
ExperimentalEvidenceforSimplePropositionalUnitsThereisgoodexperimentalevidencethatpropositionsareimportantfunctionalunitsincognitiveprocessing.
OnepreliminaryexampleisanexperimentbyKintschandGlass(1974).Theycomparedmemoryforsentencesthatexpressedasinglepropositionwithmemoryfor
sentenceswiththesamenumberofcontentwordsthatexpressedmorethanoneproposition.For

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Figure2.2
Networknotationforpropositions.(a)Notationforfour
propositionswithalllinkslabeled.(b)Thefourpropositions
combinedintoasinglenetwork.Thelinklabelsaresuppressed.

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example,sentence(5)isconstructedfromoneproposition,involvingthethreeplacerelationBUILD,whereassentence(6)isconstructedfromthreepropositions,
involvingthethreeoneplacerelationsCROWDED,SQUIRM,andUNCOMFORTABLE:
(5)Thesettlerbuiltthecabinbyhand.
(6)Thecrowdedpassengerssquirmeduncomfortably.
Subjectstendedtorecallthefirstkindofsentencebetterthanthesecond.Thisindicatesthatithadmoreunityinanunderlyingrepresentationthatdeterminedthe
subjects'memoryperformance.
PropositionalNetworksasAssociativeNetworks
Anumberoffurtherassumptionsmustbeintroducedtomakepropositionalnetworksafullfledgedtheory,ormodel,forlongtermdeclarativememory.Longterm
memoryreferstocaseswhereapieceofinformationremainsoutoftheimmediatesphereofconsciousnessforsomereasonablelengthoftime(fromminutestoyears)
andthenisretrieved,orbroughtbackintoconsciousattention,whenitisrelevanttosomeongoingthoughtprocess.Thebasicassumptionofthetheoryisthatateach
momentintimeeachnodeinanetworkisatsomelevelofactivationandthatactivationspreadsamongnodesalongthelinks.Ifthelevelofactivationreachesahigh
enoughvalueinsomeportionofthenetwork,thatportionofthenetworkisaccessibletoconsciousattention.Thelinksarethereforeassociativeconnectionsthat
determinethetendencyofoneitemofinformationtoleadtoanotherinthought.
Ourexperienceofthestreamofconsciousnessineverydaylifesupportsthisnotionofspreadingactivation.Ifwerelaxourattentiontocurrentgoals,oneideaseems
toleadtoanotherwithnoeffort,andtheconnectionsamongtheideas,althoughmeaningful,aremuchlooserthanwouldbedictatedbyarationallycontrolledand
goaldirectedprocess.Theflowofideasseemstoreflectarichnetworkofassociationsamongfactsandexperiencesstoredinlongtermmemory.VirginiaWoolf
capturedthismodeofexperienceinhernovels,andpsychoanalystsuseittotrytouncoverassociationsthatarethoughttobesuppressedbytheego'smechanismsof
defense.Inmoregoaldirectedthoughtweareabletopickandchoosefromtheactivatedmaterialtheinformationthatisrelevanttoourgoal,andweareableto
increaseandmaintaintheactivationofthismaterialbyattendingtoit.
AlthoughthetheoryofassociationofideasgoesbacktoAristotleandwasdevelopedvigorouslybynineteenthcenturyphilosophersandpsychologists,the
informationprocessingapproachhasmadepossiblethedevelopmentofversionsofthetheorythatmakenovelqualitativeandquantitativepredictions.Mostversions
ofthetheorymakeseveralassumptionsinadditiontotheassumptionthatactivationspreadsthroughanetworkalongthelinks.First,itisassumedthatactivation
spreadssimultaneously,inparallel,toallofthelinksleadingfromanode,andthatitcanspreadineitherdirectionalongthelinks.Second,itisassumedthatthe
activationatanodefadesrapidlywithtime.Third,itissometimesassumedthatthetotalactivationatanodeisdividedamongthelinksthatleadfromit.Thus,as
activationspreadsthroughthenetwork,itisweakenedbysuccessivedivisionsasitreachessuccessivenodes.Thesecondandthirdassumptionspreventasingle
thoughtfromrapidlyactivatingtheentirelongtermmemorypermanently,throwingitintoastateofpermanentconfusion.Thatis,theusefulnessofspreadingactivation
dependsonsomerelevantnodesbeinginahigherstateofactivationthantheothernodesinanetwork.Fourth,itis

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oftenassumedthatnodesandlinkscanhavedifferentactivationcapacities.Forexample,linksmightbeassumedtodifferintheproportionoftheavailableactivation
theyreceive,wherethehighercapacitylinksaretheonesthathavebeenmorefrequentlyactivatedinthepast.Quantitativepredictionsbecomepossiblewhen
concreteassumptionsaremadeabouthowrapidlyactivationspreads,howrapidlyitdecays,andsoon(Anderson1983RatcliffandMcKoon1981).
Propositionalnetworksareexamplesofrichlyinterconnectedinformationstructuresthatcanbeprocessedinparallel.Thespreadingactivationmechanismisparallel
becausetheactivationprocessaffectsmanypartsofanetworksimultaneously.Thetheoryisoneproposalforaverysimpleparallelcomputationalmechanismthatcan
efficientlymakepartsofanetworkavailableforfurtherprocessing.Itagreeswithourintuitionsfromthestreamofconsciousnessandalsowithoverwhelmingevidence
thatthenervoussystemisdesignedonthephysicallevelforhighlyparallelinformationprocessing.Theconnectionistapproachtothecognitivearchitecture,whichwill
bediscussedlaterinthischapter,aroseinpartfromadesiretoexplorethepropertiesofparallelcomputationinnetworksmoregenerally.
ExperimentalEvidenceforPropositionalNetworksThekindofevidencethathasbeenobtainedinthelaboratoryforpropositionalnetworkstructureiswell
illustratedbytheworkofMcKoonandRatcliff(1980).Theyexploitedapredictionofspreadingactivationtheorythatisnotobviousatfirstsight.Activationspreading
fromasourcepropositionraisesthelevelofactivationofotherpropositions.Thisshouldprimethemforparticipationinlaterinformationprocesses.Considerthe
networkinfigure2.2.ThinkingaboutMary,evenjustreadingtheword"Mary,"shouldspreadsomeactivationtothejohnnode,whichwillmakeiteasierforthis
nodetoreachalevelofactivationsufficientforconsciousprocessing.Forexample,theprioractivationofthemarynodemightmakeiteasiertoreadtheword"John"
ortoanswerthequestion"IsJohnateacher?"
OneachstudytestsequenceofMcKoonandRatcliff'sexperimentthesubjectsreadtwoshortparagraphswithsimplepropositionalstructures,whichwerepresented
onacomputerscreen.Theywerethengivenanimmediaterecognitionmemorytest.Thirtysixtestwordsappearedonthescreen,oneatatime.Foreachwordthe
subjectsrespondedasquicklyaspossiblebypressinga"Yes"keyiftheythoughtthewordhadappearedinoneofthestoriesora"No"keyiftheythoughtithadnot.
Onprimedtrialsthetestwordwasprecededbyatestwordfromthesamestory.Onunprimedcontroltrialsthetestwordwasprecededbyatestwordfromthe
otherstory.Therewerealso"No"trialsinwhichthetestwordhadappearedinneitherofthestories.Responsetimesonprimedtrialswerefasterthanresponsetimes
onunprimedtrials.Thenetworktheorypredictsthisfinding,becausetherewasalwayssomeassociativepathwaybetweenanytwowordsinastory.Associative
pathwaysbetweentwowordsfromdifferentstorieswouldhavetohavebeenestablishedpriortotheexperimentandwouldnotbeconsistentenoughacrosssubjects
toshowupinthedata.
McKoonandRatcliffalsoconstructedtheirstoriestoallowquitedetailedpredictionsoftherelativesizesofprimingeffectswithinstories.Hereisoneoftheir
paragraphs:
Thebusinessmangesturedtoawaiter.Thewaiterbroughtcoffee.Thecoffeestainedthenapkins.Thenapkinsprotectedthetablecloth.Thebusinessmanflourisheddocuments.
Thedocumentsexplainedacontract.Thecontractsatisfiedtheclient.

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Figure2.3
Propositionalnetworkforaparagraph.
Primetestpairswerewaiterdocuments,coffeecontract,
andnapkinsclient.(AdaptedfromMcKoonandRatcliff1980.)

Thisisaboringstorywithanexcitingpropositionalstructure,whichisdiagrammedinfigure2.3.(Notethatforsimplicitywehaveusedsomeshorthand,forexample,
waiterratherthananISApropositionlinkingtheconceptWAITERwithanamew.)Inthestorythefollowingpairsofnounsareallexactlythesamenumberof
sentencesapart:waiterdocuments,coffeecontract,andnapkinsclient.Thesecondwordofeachpairwasprimedbythefirstduringtheexperiment.Ifthesubject
rememberedthestorywordforword,theprimingeffectwouldbethesameforallpairs.Inthenetworkstructure,however,thedistancesbetweenthepairsarequite
different.Therearefourlinksandthreenodesbetweenwaiteranddocuments.Thereareeightlinksandsevennodesbetweencoffeeandcontract,andthereare
twelvelinksandelevennodesbetweennapkinsandclient.
Theprimingeffectofwaiterondocumentsshouldbequitestrong,becauseactivationissplitupamongpathwaysonlyafewtimes.Itshouldbesuccessivelyweaker
fortheothertwopairs,becauseoftheincreasingdilutionofthespreadingactivationalongthelongerpathways.Theresultswereaspredicted.Theresponsetimeto
documentswas736millisecondsunprimedand665millisecondswhenprimedwithwaiter,givinga71millisecondprimingeffect.Theprimingeffectsforcontract
andclientwere47millisecondsand30milliseconds,respectively.(Actually,theresponsetimesareaveragesoverfortyeightdifferentparagraphswiththesame
propositionalstructuretheuseofdifferentparagraphsensuresthattheresultsareduetothestructureandnottopeculiaritiesofthecontentofaparticularparagraph.)
InasecondexperimentMcKoonandRatcliffshowedthatsimilarprimingeffectscouldbeobtainedwithmorecomplexandrealisticprosepassages.
2.5SchematicRepresentation
ConceptualSchemas
Thetheorythatdeclarativeknowledgeisanetworkofpropositionsisincompleteasithasbeendevelopedsofarinthischapter.Themostseriousgapisthatalthough
arepresentationforspecificfactshasbeendeveloped,noaccounthasbeengivenofthe

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generalknowledgethatallowsthesystemtoformulateorunderstandsuchfactsinthefirstplace.Forexample,infigure2.2werepresentedthefactthatacertain
objectwasanapplebystoringanISArelationbetweenAPPLEanda.Butthispropositionisusefulonlybecausethemindalsopossessesgeneralinformationabout
applesthatis,ithasageneralconceptofapple.Peopleknowthatanappleisanediblefruitthatgrowsonatree,hasaroundishshape,isoftenbutnotnecessarily
redwhenripe,andsoon.Partofatheoryofthearchitectureofthemindmustbeanaccountofsuchgeneralknowledge.
Ourinitialhypothesisaboutthegeneralknowledgeforbasicconceptsisthatitisrepresentedinthepropositionalnetwork.Thenetworkcaneasilycontaingeneral
propositions,suchasoneassertingROUNDofAPPLE,aswellaspropositionsaboutparticularobjects,suchasourexamplelinkingAPPLEanda.Theclusterof
generalpropositionsattachedtoaconceptnodeformsaconceptualschemafortheconcept.Wewillusethetermschema(pluraliseitherschemasorschemata)for
anycognitivestructurethatspecifiesthegeneralpropertiesofatypeofobjectoreventandleavesoutanyspecificationofdetailsthatareirrelevanttothetype.A
schemaisanabstractionthatallowsparticularobjectsoreventstobeassignedtogeneralcategories.Generalknowledgeofthecategorycanthenbeappliedtothe
particularcase.
Theconceptualschemaforapplesspecifiesgeneralinformationaboutfruithood,shape,color,andsoon,butitleavesoutmanycharacteristicsofindividualapples,
suchastheprecisedetailsoftheircoloring,whethertheyfellorwerepicked,thesupermarketwheretheywerepurchased,andsoon.Theschemaabstractsaway
fromthedetailsinordertoallowcategorizationandfurtherthoughtandactionbasedonthecategorization.Someformofschematizationisessentialtointelligent
informationprocessing.Sinceeveryconcreteobjecthasaninfinitenumberofcharacteristics,ifwetriedtodealwitheachobjectinallofitsindividuality,wewouldbe
permanentlyparalyzedandbewildered.Categorizationalsoobviouslyhaspitfalls,aswell.Applespickedfromthetreearelesslikelytobebruised,andthosesoldby
certainsupermarketsaremorelikelytobefresh.Allowingone'sattentiontobecapturedandheldbytheprecisecoloringofanapplecanbethestuffofpoetry,even
thoughitprolongstheshoppingtripandprovokesstaresfrombusypassersby.Inchapter3wewillexplorefurtherthenatureoftheinformationcontainedin
conceptualschemas.
ComplexSchemas
Ourgeneralknowledgeseemstogoconsiderablybeyondconceptsfordiscreteobjectsandevents,suchasappleorgive.Someexamplesthathavebeen
investigatedincognitivepsychologyandAIare(1)schemas,orframes,forcomplexvisualscenes,suchaswhataroomlookslike(Minsky1977),(2)schemas,or
scripts,forcomplexactivities,suchasgoingtoarestaurant(SchankandAbelson1977),and(3)schemasforpeople'spersonalities,includingone'sownself(Cantor
andMischel1979Markus1980).Wewilllookatresearchonscripts,personschemas,andtheselfschema.
ScriptsCognitivescientistsusethetermscriptoractivityschematorefertoadeclarativeknowledgestructurethatcapturesgeneralinformationaboutaroutine
seriesofeventsorarecurrenttypeofsocialevent,suchaseatinginarestaurantorvisitingthedoctor.SchankandAbelson(1977)andotherscripttheoristshave
hypothesizedthatscriptscontainthefollowingsortsofinformation:anidentifyingnameortheme(suchaseatinginarestaurant),typicalroles(customer,waiter,
cook,...),entryconditions

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(customerishungryandhasmoney),asequenceofgoaldirectedscenes(enteringandgettingatable,ordering,eating,payingbillandleaving),asequence
ofactionswithineachscene(intheorderingscenecustomergetsmenu,customerreadsmenu,customerdecidesonorder,customergivesordertowaiter,...).
Pursuingourstrategyofbuildingschemasintopropositionalnetworks,itisclearthatthekindofinformationlistedabovecanbecapturedasasetofpropositions
connectedtoascriptoractivitynode.Sometheoristshavefeltthatassumptionsmustbeaddedtopropositionalnetworktheorytohandletheseeminglyhighly
organizedstructureofscripts.First,scriptsaredifficulttoencodeasatangleofpropositions.Thescriptforeatinginarestaurantcontainsasequenceofsubactivities
(entering,findingatable,andsoon)thatmustbeevokedinthecorrectorder.Andeachsubactivity(suchastheorderingscene)has,inasense,itsownsubscript.
Furthermore,introspectionsuggeststhatentirescriptsseemtobeactivatedasunitswithoutinterferencefromstraypropositionsthathappentobeassociatedwith
partsofthescript.Second,ifscriptshaveanyrealvalidityascognitivestructures,weoughttobeabletosaymoreaboutthesestructuresingeneralthanthattheyarea
clusterofinterrelatedpropositions.Thatis,thescriptsfordifferentactivitiesoughttohavethesamegeneralstructure:atheme,roles,entryconditions,asequenceof
scenes,andsoforth.
Ontheotherhand,sometheoristshavepointedoutthatifscriptsarehypothesizedtobelarge,rigidlyorganizedstructures,itishardtoexplainhowtheyarelearned
fromexperienceandhowtheycanbeflexiblyretrievedandemployedinsituationsthatdepartfromthestandard.Discussionsofthetheoreticalissuesraisedby
complexknowledgestructurescanbefoundinRumelhartandOrtony1976,Schank1982,Anderson1983,andKolodner1983.Wewillalsoreturntothese
theoreticalissuesinchapter4,sincetheresearchmethodsofAIareanexcellentmeansforexploringthepropertiesofvariousproposalsforknowledgestructure.
Withoutattemptingtoresolvetheseissueshere,wewillassumethatscriptsandothercomplexschemascanbeeffectivelyactivatedasunitsandthattheyexertstrong
influencesonthewaythatinformationinthecurrentsituationisprocessed.Wewillalsoassumethattherecanbeassociationsbetweencomplexschemasand
representationsofparticulareventsthatwerecategorizedundertheschema.Forexample,justastherecanbeassociationsbetweentheconceptualschemaforapple
andknowledgeaboutparticularapples,sotherecanbeassociationsbetweentherestaurantscriptandknowledgeaboutparticularvisitstorestaurants.
ExperimentalEvidenceforScriptsBower,Black,andTurner(1979)investigatedtheinfluenceofscriptsoninformationprocessingbyhavingsubjectsreadand
latertrytorememberbriefstoriesabouteventsthatwereinstancesofscripts.Forexample:
TheDoctor
Johnwasfeelingbadtodaysohedecidedtogoseethefamilydoctor.Hecheckedinwiththedoctor'sreceptionist,andthenlookedthroughseveralmedicalmagazinesthatwere
onthetablebyhischair.Finallythenursecameandaskedhimtotakeoffhisclothes.Thedoctorwasverynicetohim.HeeventuallyprescribedsomepillsforJohn.ThenJohn
leftthedoctor'sofficeandheadedhome.

Althoughthisstoryiseasilyunderstandable,itdoesnotexplicitlymentionanumberofthetypicalelementsofthescriptforavisittoadoctor,suchasarrivingatand
enteringtheoffice,orgettingweighedandhavingone'sbloodpressurechecked.Script

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theoristshypothesizethatwhenwehearorreadaboutascriptedevent,ourknowledgeoftheentirescriptisactivated,whichallowsustofillin,orinfer,thescenes
andactionsthatarenotexplicitlymentioned.Becauseofthisabilitythestoryabovecouldbetoldinanentirelydifferentway,perhapsbeginningasfollows:
Johnwasfeelingbadtoday.Itseemedlikeforeverbeforehefinallyarrivedatthedoctor'soffice.Helookedaroundatthevarioushealthpostersonthewall.Finally,thenurse
cameandcheckedhisbloodpressureandweight....

Bower,Black,andTurnerhypothesizedthat,whentryingtorememberstories,subjectswouldtendtoconfusematerialthattheyhadactuallyreadwithmaterialthat
theyhadfilledinonthebasisoftheirscriptknowledge.Theirpredictionwasborneoutintwoexperiments.Inarecallexperimentsubjectsreadeighteenbriefstories
liketheonejustgivenaboutdifferentpeopleindifferentscriptedsettingsandlatertriedtowritedownexactlywhattheyhadread.Subjectsshowedasignificant
tendencytorecallactionsthatwerepartofthescriptbutwerenotstatedinthestory.Forexample,inrecalling"TheDoctor,"thesubjectmightincorrectlyrecall
readingthatthenursecheckedJohn'sbloodpressureandweight.Thesubjectsshowedamuchsmallertendencytoincorrectlyrecallactionsthatwerenotpartof
relevantscripts.Asecond,recognitionmemoryexperimentconfirmedthistendency.Inthisexperimentadifferentgroupofsubjectsreadthesameeighteenstories.
Theywerethenpresentedwithaseriesofsentencesandaskedtorateona7pointscalehowsuretheywerethattheyhadreadthesentence,from1("verysureIdid
notreadit")to7("verysureIdidreadit").Someofthesentenceswerefromthestories,somewerescriptactionsthatwerenotstatedinthestories,andsomewere
plausibleactionsthatwereneitherstatedinthestoriesnortypicalscriptevents.Subjectsshowedasignificantlygreatertendencytofalselyrecognizeunstatedscript
eventsthanunstatednonscriptevents.Thesememoryexperimentssuggestthatscriptknowledgeisusedinunderstandingstoriesandthattheactivationofascriptand
itsusetofillingapsinthestoryleavememorytracesthatcanbecomeconfusedwiththememorytracesforwhatwasactuallyreadorheard.Wewillreturntothe
studyoftheinfluencesofschematizationonmemoryinchapter3.
PersonSchemasPsychologistswhostudypersonalityandsocialbehaviorhaveproposedthatschemasexistfortypesofpeople.Forexample,itisplausiblethatwe
haveschematicconceptsfortheextrovertedpersonorthematureperson.Suchschemasmightinfluenceourimpressionsofpeopleandourpredictionsofhowthey
willbehaveinvarioussituations.CantorandMischel(1979)showedthatpeopleagreeonthetypicalcharacteristicsofdifferentpersonalitytypesandthatperson
schemasinfluencetheinitialperceptionofandlatermemoryforotherpeople.Forexample,whensubjectsreadadescriptionofanextrovertthatexplicitlymentioned
featuresthatwereonlymoderatelytypicalofextroversion,thesubjectsapparentlyinferredor"filledin"themoretypicalfeaturesthatwerenotmentioned.Inalater
recognitionmemorytesttheytendedtoincorrectlyrememberthehighlytypicalfeaturesashavingbeenmentionedintheoriginaldescription.Cantor,Mischel,and
Schwartz(1982)demonstratedaninteractionbetweenschemasforsocialsituations(forinstance,aparty)andschemasforpersonalitytypes(forinstance,extrovert).
Subjects'predictionsabouthowapersonwouldbehavewereajointproductofthesituationandpersonschemas.
TheSelfSchemaOne'sknowledgeofoneselfprobablyoccupiesaspecialplaceinthestoreofknowledgeaboutpeople,andpsychologistshaveproposedthatthe
selfconceptisaparticularlyelaborateandinfluentialschema.Markus(1980),forexample,

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hasproposedthattheselfschemaexertspowerfuleffectsontheperson'sperception,memory,andthought.Informationthatisconsistentwiththeschemais
processedmoreefficientlyandbetterremembered.Incominginformationishypothesizedtobeevaluatedrelativetotheschemaandresistedifitisinconsistent.Plans
andpredictionsoffuturebehaviorarecruciallyinfluencedbytheschema.
Markushypothesizedthatsomecharacteristicswillbepartofaperson'sselfschemaandthatotherswillnot.Forexample,apersonmayconceptualizehimselfor
herselfintermsofaclusterofattributesthatweretraditionallyconsideredmasculine,suchascompetitiveandambitious,orintermsofaclusterofattributesthatwere
traditionallyconsideredfeminine,suchasgentleandsensitive(Markusetal.1982).Markustermedsuchpeoplemasculineandfeminineschematics.Shealso
hypothesizedthattherearepeoplewhoareaschematicwithrespecttotraditionalnotionsofgenderinthesensethattheydonotconceptualizethemselvesintermsof
thesetraditionalclustersofattributes.UsingapersonalitytestcalledtheBemSexRoleInventory(Bem1974),shewasabletoclassifyhersubjectsasmasculine
schematics,feminineschematics,oraschematicwithrespecttotraditionalgenderschemas.Shewasthenabletoshowthatsubjects'behavioronavarietyof
informationprocessingtaskswasinfluencedbytheirgenderschematization.Forexample,Markusetal.(1982)collectedresponsetimesinapropertyverificationtask
concerningtheself.Inthistasksubjectswerepresentedwithadjectivesandaskedtojudgeasquicklyaspossiblewhetherthoseadjectiveswereselfdescriptive.
Masculineschematicsubjectsansweredmostquicklyfortraditionallyprototypicalmasculineadjectives,andfeminineschematicsansweredmostquicklyforfeminine
adjectives,whereasaschematicsshowedthesameresponsetimesformasculine,feminine,andneutral(forinstance,''friendly'')adjectives.
Propositions,Schemas,andtheArchitectureofCognition
Nowthatwehaveexaminedsomeevidenceforpropositionsandschemasofvariouskinds,wecanreturntotheclaimthattheyarepartofthecognitivearchitecture.
Theclaimthatpropositionalrepresentationispartofthecognitivearchitectureiscentraltotheclassicalview.Noticethatitisthefacilityforpropositional
representation,notanyparticularproposition,thatishypothesizedtobebuiltintothearchitectureofcognition.Propositionsaresimple,andthereforeeasyto
implementphysically,buttheyhavetheproductivesyntacticstructurerequiredbytheclassicalview.Theyalsohaveconsiderablepowertorepresenttheworld(an
issuetakenupinmoredetailinchapter10).Theusefulnessofalongtermmemoryfullofpropositionsdependsondistalaccess.Theremustbeanefficientmechanism
forretrievingparticularpropositionsfrommemorywhentheyarerelevantorneededforongoingcognition.Spreadingactivationinanassociativenetworkhasproven
tobeafruitfulhypothesisabouttheretrievalmechanism,althoughothermechanismshavebeenproposed.Thepotentialhypothesesaboutthebasicschemeforlong
termmemoryretrievalincludeanyefficientcontentaddressingmechanism,thatis,anymechanismthattakespropositionsorfragmentsofpropositionsasinputsand
locatesotherpropositionsinmemorywithoverlappingcontent.
Theclassicalviewisalsostronglyassociatedwiththeclaimthatmechanismsfororganizingpropositionalknowledgeintoabstractschemasarebuiltintothebiologyof
cognition.Therepresentationalformatofschemasandthenatureoftheabstractionprocessthatis,theprocessbywhichconcepts,scripts,andsoon,arelearned
aremattersofcurrentdebateandresearch,someofwhichwillbedescribedinchapter3.

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Cognitionrequiressomemechanismforabstraction,orforassimilatinginformationtoknownconceptsorcategories.Theideathatconceptualknowledgeisstructured
sothatitcanberetrievedwithoutinterferenceandusedefficientlyalsomakesagreatdealofsense.Augmentingpropositionalrepresentationtodothesejobsisa
naturalelaborationoftheclassicalview.
2.6CognitiveProcesses,WorkingMemory,andAttention
Beforecontinuingourexplorationofcognitiverepresentation,wemustconsiderhowrepresentationsareprocessed.Sofar,propositionalschematicrepresentations
havebeenproposedasamediumforthestorageofinformationinhumanlongtermmemory.Associativeactivationhasbeenproposedasaschemeforretrieving
thatinformation.Intermsofthemechanicsofthearchitectureanitemofinformationcountsasretrievedifitsactivationisabovesomethreshold.(Alternativelywe
couldsaytheprobabilityofretrievalissomecontinuous,increasingfunctionofactivationgivingeverypropositioninmemorysomenonzerochanceofretrievalatany
givenmoment.)Propositionsthatareretrievedareavailableforfurtherprocessingorformotoroutput.Earlier,wealsoassociatedretrievalwithavailabilityto
consciousness.
Theretrievalmechanismaloneobviouslydoesnotsufficetoaccountforourthoughtsoractions.Itdeliversanassociativestreamofinformation.Therehavetobe
furthermechanismsthatassessretrievedinformationforrelevancetocurrentgoalsandthatcanweldpiecesofretrievedinformationintocoherentstreamsofthought
thatleadtoconclusions,decisions,orsolutionstoproblems.
GoalOrientationandFlexibilityofCognitiveProcesses
Inadditiontotheassociativeretrievalprocess,then,wemusthypothesizetheexistenceofotherprocessesthatservetotransformtheinformationthatisactiveatany
givenmoment.Theactiveinformationwilltypicallyincludenotonlyinformationfromlongtermmemorybutalsoinformationarisingfromsensorysystemsand
informationaboutcurrentgoals.Theprocessesrequiredarereasoning,planning,orproblemsolvingprocessesthatcantaketheavailableinformationasinputsand
produceconclusions,decisions,oractioncommandsasoutputs.
Supposeonehadagoaltospendsometimereadingabook,andthecurrentvisualinputyieldedtheinformationthatitwastoodarktoread.Asimplereasoning
processmightcombinethesetwopiecesofinformationandyieldasubgoaltoincreasethelevelofillumination.Thisgoalmighttriggeravisualsearchforasourceof
electriclight,producingvisualinformationthatthereisalampnearone'schair,whichinturnmightleadtoagoalofturningonthelamp,triggeringavisualsearchforthe
switch,yieldingvisualinformationthatinturntriggersthemotoractionofreachingfortheswitch.Supposethatatthatpointthelampdoesnotgoon.Thisinformation
mighttriggerasuspensionofthetoplevelreadinggoal,whichmightleadtotheretrievalofinformationthatapaperonthematerialtobereadisdueintheverynear
future,whichmightleadtoarestorationofthereadinggoal.Therestoredgoalmightleadtotheretrievalofaschemaconcerningelectricalappliancesthatincludesthe
factthattheyusuallyhavetobepluggedintoanelectricaloutlet.Thisfactmighttriggertheconstructionofanewsubgoaltocheckwhetherthelampispluggedin.This
goalmighttriggeravisualsearchforthedispositionoftheplugattheendofthecordorperhapstheproductionofarequesttoafriendintheroom,"Couldyoucheck
toseeifthislamp

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ispluggedin?"Ifitturnedoutthatthelampwaspluggedin,theschemaconcerningelectricalappliancesmightagaincomeintoplay,leadingtofurthertroubleshooting
plans.
Thissortofmundanethoughtinvolvesagreatdealofreasoningthatcoordinatesgoals,sensoryinput,andinformationretrievedfrommemory.Itrequiresustosketch
plausibleoutlinesforsomeadditionalfeaturesofthecognitivearchitecture,whichwillbeexploredfurtherlaterinthischapterandinthenext.Theexampleofthelamp
illustratestheassumptionoffigure2.1thatthesensorysystemsmustoutputactiverepresentationsthatcanserveasinputstocentralprocessesalongwiththe
representationsretrievedfromlongtermmemory.Forexample,theperceptionofalampintheimmediateenvironmentmustbefedtothereasoningprocessesinan
appropriaterepresentationalform.Similarly,activecentralrepresentationsmustbecapableoffunctioningasinputstomotorsystemssothatmovementsmaybe
effected,forexample,thearmmovementsneededtoreachaswitchortheeyemovementsneededtomakeavisualsearch.Theobviousassumptiontomakeisthat
therelevantperceptualoutputsandmotorinputsareinpropositionalschematicform.
Goalorientationisakeyfeatureofthelampexampleandanysimilarcaseofeverydaythought.Itisplausibletoassumethatgoalsarerepresentedinpropositional
schematicform.ItisaneasymattertotranslategoalssuchasIdesirethatthelampbeonintothenetworknotationoffigure2.2(thepropositionnodeoftheON
propositionservesastheobjectoftheDESIREproposition).Withintheimmediatecontextofcognitiveprocessing,goalscanhaveseveralorigins.Theycanbe
retrievedfrommemory(rememberinganintentiontoreadanassignment),generatedbycognitiveprocessesthatweredrivenbyotherearlierorhighergoals
(generatinganintentiontoturnonalamp),orinsomecasesprovidedrelativelydirectlybysensoryinput(beingaskedbyafriendtoturnonalamp).(Thequestionof
theultimateoriginofone'sgoalsisalargerquestion.)Theabilityofgoalstodirectprocessingcanbeexplainedbyourearlierassumptionsaboutthedynamicsof
activationandbyanassumptionthatcognitiveprocessestendtorequireagoalasoneoftheirinputs.Therepresentationofanimmediategoalwillbekeptactivebyits
ongoinginvolvementinprocessing.Itsactivationwillberepeatedlyrefreshedasitispickedupasaninputtocurrentprocesses.Otheractiverepresentations,arising
frommemory,sensoryinput,orpreviousprocesses,willserveaseffectiveinputstocurrentprocessingonlyiftheyproverelevanttotheimmediategoal,andtheir
activationwillfaderapidlyiftheyareirrelevant.
Cognitiveprocessingthatcandeferanimmediateresponsetosensoryinputandthatcancombinethisinputwithgoalsandretrievedmemoriesachievesgreatflexibility.
Thisflexibilitycomesinpartfromtheabilityofcognitiveprocessestoproducechainsofsubgoals.Theresultisthatasimpleaction,suchasturningalightswitch,can
betriggeredbyanunlimitedvarietyofhighergoals.Theimmediatesuperordinategoal,forexample,mightbetoturnthelighton,toturnthelightoff,toacquireasmall
pieceofplastic,toproduceaclickingsound,togenerateanexcuseforgettingupfromachair,andsoon.Higherupthehierarchyofgoals,thereareanunlimited
numberofgoalsthatcouldbeservedbyincreasingordecreasingtheilluminationinaroom.Anotheraspectofthisflexibilityisthenovelcombinationofgoalswith
sensoryinputoritemsretrievedfromlongtermmemory.Forexample,thegoaloflightinganuncooperativelampinafriend'sapartmentcanbeusefullyconjoinedwith
visualinformationthatafriendispresent(leadingtoarequesttochecktheplug)orwitha

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memoryofhavingseensomelightbulbsonaparticularkitchenshelfearlierintheday(resultinginatriptothekitchentogetafreshbulb).Thesenovelcombinations
generategreatvariabilityintheuseoftheconceptualorschematicknowledgestoredinlongtermmemory.Asmallbrownpartofcircularcrosssectionprotrudingat
rightanglesfromthebrassysurfaceofalampbasegenerallyfallsundertheconceptoflightswitch,butintheappropriatecontextitcanalsofallundertheconceptsof
plasticthingorthingthatclicks.Similarly,theinformationcontainedinagivenschemadoesnotinfluencecognitioninarigid,uniformwayinallcontexts.Thestandard
restaurantscriptdoesnotabsolutelydictateourbehaviorinrestaurants,forexample,and,asinanoldparlorgame,wecanthinkofmanyusesforabrick.Thegeneral
pointisthatsensoryinputdoesnotrigidlydeterminewhichschemasaffectongoingcognitiveprocessingandthatactiveschemasdonotalwaysaffectcognitive
processinginexactlythesameway.
BasicCognitiveProcessesandInterpretiveProcessing
Wehavenowlaidoutsomeofthepropertiesthatcognitiveprocessesappeartohave,proceedingroughlyattheknowledgelevelbuttakingadvantageofourmore
formalanalysisofpropositionalrepresentation.Thisanalysispavesthewayforamoreformalanalysisofcognitiveprocesses,whichwillunfoldintherestofthis
chapterandmuchofthenext.
Wecanbeginwiththepointthatsomeprocesseshavetobebuiltintothecognitivearchitecture.Theinformationinlongtermmemorywouldbecompletelyinert
withoutsomebuiltinprocesses,andtheassociativeretrievalprocessaloneisnotenoughtodrivegoalorientedcognition.Justasacalculatororcomputerhastohave
somebuiltinoperations,suchasaddition,somustthehumancognitivearchitecture.Toseewhatmightberequired,returntotheexampleoftherecalcitrantlamp.
Supposethecurrentactivegoalistogetthelampon.ViatheassociativeretrievalprocessthisgoalmightactivateastructureofroughlytheformTurningtheswitch
onaninactivelampusuallycausesthelamptogoon.Withabitofworkwecouldexpandourformalismforpropositionalrepresentationtoaccommodatethis
kindofstructure,butwewillsuppressourmomentarytemptationtodothisandassumethatsuchstructurescanberepresentedinmemoryandbeactivatedat
appropriatetimes.Thepointhereisthatthemereactivationofthestructureisnotenough.Therehastobeanadditionalprocessthattakesthestructureandthe
currentgoalasinputsandproducesasubgoalofgettingtheswitchturned.Thisprocessisacomponentofalargercognitiveabilitycalledmeansendsanalysis,andit
maywellbebuiltintothecognitivearchitecture.Thegeneralformoftheprocessistonotecombinationsofanend(i.e.,agoal)andarepresentationthatspecifiesa
meanstothatendandthentosetasubgoalofcarryingoutthemeans.Inchapter3thelargersignificanceofmeansendsanalysisforhumancognitionwillbetakenup.
Thepointhereistogiveaconcreteexampleofthekindofelementaryprocessthatmightbebuiltintothecognitivearchitecture.Developingawellsupportedtheoryof
fundamentalprocessesmadeavailablebythecognitivearchitectureisoneofthemostdifficultproblemsincognitivepsychology.
Aswesawinthegeneraldiscussionofuniversalmachines,onceamodeststockofprocessesisbuiltintoanintelligentsystem,itbecomespossibletoexpandthe
system'sprocessesindefinitelybyinterpretingdatafrommemoryasinstructions.Humansprettyclearlyhavethisability.Followingarememberedrecipeforchocolate
chipcookies,forexample,canbeseenasretrievingasequenceofinstructions,eachofwhichmust

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beinterpreted.Interpretingeachstep,ofcourse,involvesagreatdealmoreinterpretation,sinceoperationssuchasCombine2cupsofflour,1teaspoonofbaking
soda,and1teaspoonofsaltinabowlarenotbuiltintothecognitivearchitecture.Generally,manycognitiveschemas,suchastherestaurantscript,canbe
interpretedasrecipesforthoughtoractioninappropriatecontexts.Problemsolvingusingmeansendsanalysismayalsobethoughtofasaninterpretiveprocessin
whichtheorderinwhichvariousmeansareinvokedvariesconsiderablydependingoncurrentgoalsandsituationalconditions.
Finally,itshouldbenotedthatprocessesforstoringnewrepresentationsinlongtermmemorymustbebuiltintothearchitecture.Mostsimply,itcanbeassumedthat
anynewrepresentationconstructedbycentralprocessesorarisingfromsensoryprocesseshassomeprobabilityofbeingstoredinmemory.Aplausiblefurther
assumptionisthatthelongerthenewrepresentationremainsactiveinongoingcognitiveprocessingthegreatertheprobabilitythatitisstored.Theassociativelinksof
thenewrepresentationwillbeafunctionofitsformalcontent.Thus,apropositionaboutappleswillbestoredwithlinkstotheAPPLEnode,andsoon.Assumptions
similartotheseareatthecoreofmostclassicaltheoriesoflongtermmemorystorage,andtheyaccountforalargerangeofdata.Theassumptionscanbefleshedout
invariousways.Forexample,therelationbetweenprocessingtimeandprobabilityofstoragecanbegivenaprecisemathematicalform,oritcanbeassumedthatthe
nodesandlinksofanewrepresentationhaveindependentprobabilitiesofstorage,allowingthestorageofpartialrepresentationscontainingincompleteinformationand
associativepathways.
Thestorageofnewschemasraisesmoredifficultquestions.Althoughitispossibleforaschematobespecifieddirectly(aswhenateachertellsastudentthataregular
pentagonhasfivesidesofequallength),mostschemasarelearnedfromexamplesthatcontainirrelevantdetails.Someprocessofabstractionallowsrepresentationsof
specificinstancestocontributetotheconstruction,alteration,andstrengtheningofgeneralschemas.Thelearningofnewschemasisoneofthemostactiveareasof
researchincognitivescience.Aswepointedoutinourearlierdiscussionofschemas,ideasaboutschemalearninghaveimplicationsforschemarepresentationaswell.
Schemasmustberepresentedinawaythatmakesthemeasytolearnbyexample.
WorkingMemoryandAttention
Wehavealreadyhypothesizedthatthereisalimittotheamountofinformationinlongtermmemorythatisactiveabovethresholdatanygivenmoment.Thislimitis
hypothesizedtoarisebecauseactivationfadesrapidlyandpossiblybecauseafixedpoolofactivationisdividedamongactiveassociativepathways.Therearealso
limitsontherateatwhichthesensorysystemscandeliverrepresentationstocentralprocesses.Manyoftheselimitshavebeenextensivelystudied.Forexample,it
takesaboutatenthofasecondtorecognizeavisualobjectunderthebestofconditions,andittakesaboutaquarterofasecondtomaketheeyemovementneeded
tobringanobjecttoberecognizedtothecenterofthevisualfield,whereitsdetailcanbeprocessed.Itisgenerallyassumedthatrepresentationsarisingfrom
perception,likethosearisingfrommemory,losetheiractivityrapidlyiftheyarenotutilizedbyongoingcognitiveprocesses.Finally,itisassumedthatnewgoalsand
otherrepresentationsgeneratedbyongoingcognitiveprocessesalsoloseactivationrapidly.
Theseconstraintsonactivationlimittheamountofinformationthatisavailableforprocessingatagivenmoment.Thedifferentialavailabilityforimmediateprocessing
ofalimitedamountofinformationineffectconstitutesashorttermmemory.Thecon

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tentsofthismemoryfaderapidlyandarerecreatedfrommomenttomoment,buttheyareimmediatelyaccessible.Thepropertiesoflongtermmemoryare
complementary:averylargeamountofinformationcanbestoredrelativelypermanently,butnearlyallofitisinaquiescentstate,onlypotentiallyavailablefor
processing.Wewillusethetermworkingmemoryforthesetofactiverepresentations.
Inthinkingaboutthedesignofintelligentsystems,thedistinctionbetweenworkingandlongtermmemoryisanaturalone.Itwouldneverbethecasethatallofa
system'sknowledgeisneededforthecomputationathand,somostofitshouldbekeptinaquiescentstateofpotentialavailability.Incontrast,itmakessensetokeep
differentiallyavailablesomestockofknowledgethatislikelytoberelevanttotheongoingtask.Currentcomputers,eventhoughtheydonotneedtobeasflexibleas
anintelligentorganism,typicallyhaveseveralmemorystoresthatvaryinaccessibility,forexample,registermemory,cachememory,mainmemory,anddiskmemory.
Easyaccessmemoriescanentailcostsinphysicalmaterialsandinthefallibilityofguessesaboutwhatinformationismostlikelytobeneededinacomputation.These
costsincreaseasthesizeofthememoryincreases,soforagivenrangeofcomputationaltasks,therewillbeanoptimalsizeforthememory.
Perhapsthemoststrikingthingabouthumanworkingmemoryisitsverylimitedcapacity.Ifmorethanafewsubgoalsandpartialresultsareinvolvedinacomputation,
someofthemlosetheiractivation,becominginaccessible.Forexample,ifonetriestomultiplytwoorthreedigitnumbersmentallyusingthestandardpaperand
pencilalgorithm,thenumberofpartialresultsthatmustbemaintainedduringthecomputationusuallyoverwhelmsthecapacityofworkingmemory.Difficultproblems,
suchasdecidingonachessmoveorplanningabigparty,alsooftenoverwhelmworkingmemory,becausetheygeneratemanysubgoalsandalternativesthatmustbe
heldinmemorylongenoughtobecompared.Thelimitedcapacityofworkingmemoryhasaprofoundeffectonhumancognition.Itaffectsthewayweapproachany
reasonablycomplexcognitivetask.
Thereareseveralwaysinwhichthelimitsonworkingmemorycanbeatleastpartiallyovercome.Oneistoredesignthetasksoastoreducetheworkingmemory
load.Forexample,therearealgorithmsformentalarithmeticthatgeneratemanyfewerpartialresultsthanthestandardalgorithms.Asecondapproachistousean
externalstoragemedium,suchaswritingdownsubgoals,alternatives,andpartialresultsonpaper.Athirdapproach,calledchunking,occurswhenacomplex
representationinlongtermmemoryfunctionsasasingleiteminworkingmemory.Forexample,workingmemoryistypicallyoverwhelmedbyanoveltendigitphone
number,ifitmustberepresentedastendistinctitemsplustheirserialorder.Butifthenumberis6175001776,itcanbecodedastheBostonareacode,followedby
fivehundred,followedbytheAmericanyearofindependence.Forthepersonfamiliarwiththem,eachofthesethreeitemshasawellintegratedschematic
representationinlongtermmemoryandthereforeisactivatedasasinglestructure.Severallinesofevidencepointtotheconclusionthatworkingmemorycanhold
onlyaboutthreeorfourchunksofinformationatatime(Broadbent1975).
Giventhelimitedcapacityofworkingmemory,goalorientedcognitionisnecessarilyassociatedwithafocusofattention.Computationally,thesimplestnotionofthe
focusisthatmanyrepresentationsactiveenoughtobeavailableforprocessingactuallyreceivelittleornone.Thesenses,associativeretrievalfromlongtermmemory,
andthecognitiveprocessesthemselvesproduceasteadyflowofactiverepresentations.Someoftheactiveinformationisunrelatedtocurrentgoalsandthusfades
withoutfurther

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processing.Goals,inthebroadestsense,canbesaidtofilteractiveinformation.Goalsasconcreteaslookingataparticularregionofspaceandasabstractaswanting
tomakealotofmoneycanfunction,inconcertwithbuiltincognitiveprocessesandthecontentsoflongtermmemory,toselectactiveinformationforfurther
processing.Anaturalquestioniswhetherattentionalselectioncanoperatedirectlytopreventtheformationofrepresentationsthatdonotmeetsomecriterion.When
oneisattendingtothebassplayer,forexample,towhatdegreeistheprocessingoftheotherinstrumentsattenuated?Theexistenceofearlyfilteringisamatterof
somedispute,butourassumptionhereisthatperceptualsystemsproducehighlevelrepresentationsindependentlyofcurrentgoalsandthatthefilteringcomesafter
therepresentationshavebeenproduced.Thereareobviouslysomeexceptionstothis:eyemovementsareinlargepartundergoalorientedcontrol,forexample.
Similarly,althoughassociativememoryretrievalisheavilyinfluencedbycurrentlyactivematerial,irrelevantassociativepathwayscannotbeselectivelyturnedoffby
currentgoals.
Thecontentsofworkingmemoryandthefocusofattentionroughlycoincidewiththecontentsofconsciousness.Mostofwhathasbeensaidherereflectsour
consciousexperience.Weareawareoftheneedtofocusourattention.Wetrytoavoiddistractionwhenengagedinimportanttasksanddonotattempttodotwoor
moredifficulttaskssimultaneously.Weknowthatourworkingmemoriesarefairlyeasilyoverloadedandtrytoarrangeeverydaytaskstoreduceoravoidoverload.
Theoriesofmemoryandattention,however,muststillultimatelybebasedontheresultsfromthelaboratory,whereitispossibletomakehighlysensitivemeasuresof
whetheraparticularpieceofinformationhasaffectedcognitiveprocessing.Thereareanynumberofreasonswhywemightfailtobeabletoreportthatsomebitof
informationwaspresentinworkingmemory.Theprimaryoneisthatifwetrytorememberwhatwaspresentinworkingmemoryevenafewmomentsago,muchofits
contentswillhavelostactivationandthusnotbedirectlyretrievable.Yet,ifwetrytointrospectivelymonitorandreportthecontentsofworkingmemoryduring
cognition,ourperformanceontheprimarytaskwillbeaffectedbytheadditionalmonitoringtask.
Theseverelimitonthecapacityofhumanworkingmemoryispuzzlinginthecontextofmodernlife,wherecircumstancesthattaxthelimitariseratherfrequently.Given
thattheexpansionofworkingmemorymustbeassociatedwithphysicalcosts(incircuitcomplexity,energyexpenditure,andsoon),itmaybethatamodestworking
memorywasoptimallyadaptiveformostofthecourseofhumanevolution,whenthetasksoflivingmayhavebeenlesscomplex(thoughperhapsnolesschallengingin
otherways).Ontheotherhand,itmaybethatthecapacityofworkingmemoryismorebroadlyoptimal.Alargerworkingmemorymighthaveahighprobabilityof
containingmuchirrelevantinformationandincompatiblegoals,whichwouldrequirefancymanagementprocessestopreventdistractionandtofilterinconsistentresults
(suchasdecisionstomoveleftandrightatthesametime).Theissueiscomplicatedfurtherbythefactthatwithrepeatedencounterswithagiventypeofsituationthe
limitationsofworkingmemorycanbeovercomebychunkingandbyskillformation,whichwillbedescribedbelow.
2.7MentalImages
Wenowhavetheoutlinesofanarchitectureforcentralcognition:aformatforrepresentinginformation,asenseoftheprocessesrequiredformanipulatingthe
information,andatheoryoflongtermandworkingmemory.Wecouldaccepttheseoutlines

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andproceedtotrytosupplymoredetail.However,considerableresearchsuggeststhatoursketchomitsimportantfeaturesofbothcognitiverepresentationand
cognitiveprocesses.Considerfirstthematterofrepresentation.
Thediscussionofrepresentationsofarhasnotconsideredoneofthemoststrikingfeaturesofconsciousthought.Thinkingsometimesseemstotaketheformofseeing
thingsinthe"mind'seye,"eventhoughthethingsarenotactuallypresent.Ourtheoryhasnotmadeanydistinctionbetweenthoughtsthatareaccompaniedbythis
visualimageryandthoughtsthatarenot.Visualimageryseemstobeevokedbyparticularkindsofthinkingtasks.Forexample,ifsomeoneasksyouhowmany
penniesadimeisworth,youwillprobablynotexperienceanyvisualimageryinretrievingtheanswer"Ten."Ontheotherhand,ifsomeoneasksyoutodescribein
detailexactlywhatthetwosidesofapennylooklikewithoutpullingoneoutofyourcoinpurse,youwillprobablyfindyourselflookingatpenniesinyourmind'seye.
Agoodwaytohonestlyundertaketoanswerthisquestionistotrytodrawpicturesofthetwosidesofapenny(thisisadifficulttaskseeNickersonandAdams
1979).
TheoryofVisualImages
TheNatureofVisualImagesResearchonvisualimagerycentersonthehypothesisthatimageryisaspecialpurposecomponentofthecognitivearchitecture
containingrepresentationsandprocessesthatarededicatedtoprocessingcertainkindsofvisualinformationandthataredistinctfromtheaspectsofthearchitecture
thatsupportpropositionalrepresentations.Itisimportanttorealizethatthecompellingsubjectivedistinctionbetweenvisualandnonvisualthoughtdoesnotconstitute
verygoodevidenceforthehypothesis.Propositionalschematicrepresentationspredictqualitativelydifferentsubjectiveexperiencesarisingfromdifferent
representationalcontent.Activatingpropositionsaboutlovecangiverisetowarm,lovingfeelingsactivatingpropositionsaboutone'sdentalappointmentcanmake
onewinceandactivatingpropositionscontaininginformationaboutvisualappearancemightgiverisetofeelingsofseeing.Asalways,thecognitivepsychologistmust
movebeyondtheintuitionsthatinitiallymotivateahypothesisandattempttoconstructprecise,experimentallytestabletheories.Attemptstogetatthenatureofvisual
imagerepresentationandprocessinghaveproducedsomeoftheliveliestdebatesincognitivescience.
Theclaimthatvisualimageryisadistinctcomponentofthecognitivearchitectureplacesastrongrequirementontheresearcher.Itmustbeshownthatthevisual
representationsweexperienceasimageshaveobligatorycharacteristicsthatarenoteasilyalterableasafunctionofbeliefs.Thepropositionalschematicsystem
alreadyoutlinedisclearlycapableofrepresentingawidevarietyofinformation.Pylyshyn(1984)hasproposedthecognitivepenetrabilitycriterionasatestforwhen
arepresentationorprocessisbiologicallybuiltintothearchitecture.Roughly,thiscriterionmeansthatifimageryispartofthearchitecture,thenitshouldalways
operateinthesamewayandnotbeaffectedbychangesinone'sbeliefsorknowledgeconcerningvisionorthevisualworld.Forexample,experimentshaveproduced
evidencethatmentalimagescanbescannedinawayanalogoustothewayactualscenesarescanned.Thescanningoperationmightbecognitivelypenetrable,
however.Subjectsinexperimentsmightscantheirmentalimagesjustbecausetheyknowthattheywouldscanarealvisualscene.Underothercircumstancesitmight
turnoutthattheycanshiftattentionbetweenoranswerquestionsabouttwolocationsinanimagewithoutscanning.Inthatcaseitmightbearguedthatimagescanning
isneitherbuiltintothearchitecturenor

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anobligatorycomponentprocessinperformingcertaintasks.Instead,itmightbethatsubjectscanoptionallyemployitinordertomimictheirperceptualexperience
butdiscarditiftheythinkthatperceptualmimicryisnotcalledfor.Cognitivepenetrationisdifficulttoassessbecausesubjectsmaynotbeawareoftheknowledgethat
theyarebringingtobearonatask.Theymaystrivetoperformanimagerytaskinawaythatisnaturalandfeelslikeseeingwithoutbeingabletoarticulatehowthey
didit.Insuchcasessubjectsaresaidtobeusingtacitknowledge.Experimenterstrytouncovertheinfluenceoftacitknowledgebyalteringthesituationinawaythat
eitherinfluencessubjectstoaltertheirbeliefsorthatmakesitimpossibleforthebeliefstoinfluencetheirperformance.
Althoughintuitionisapoorsourceofevidence,itisonesourceofhypothesesforconstructingatheoryofimagery.Imagesdoseemtobeconstrainedinwaysthat
differfrombothactualperceptualexperienceandpropositionalrepresentation.Aratherabstractverbaldescriptionofanobjectcaneasilybeencodedpropositionally
andremembered.However,whentheobjectisimagined,itseemsthatanumberofpropertiesmustbeaddedtothedescription.Yetthesepropertiesfallfarshortof
allthosethatwouldbepresentinanactualvisualscene.FollowingSimon(1972),ifsomeonetellsyouthatyouwillhavetosearchinaboxoftoyblocksforathree
inchcubethathastwoadjacentbluesides,youcanrememberthatdescriptionwithnotrouble.Now,ifthepersontellsyoutoimaginethecubeinyourmind'seye,
certaininformationthatwasnotintheoriginaldescriptionwillbepresentinyourimage.Thecubewillhaveaparticularorientationrelativetoapointofview:for
example,thefront,top,andrightsidesmightbevisible,andtheback,bottom,andleftsidesmightbeinvisible.Twoparticularsideswillbeblue:perhapsthetopand
rightsides.Noneofthisinformationwasspecifiedintheoriginaldescription,andnoneofitwasrequiredtoformandrememberarepresentationofthatdescription.
Buttheinformationmustbespecifiedinordertoformamentalimageofthecube.Ontheotherhand,anactualsceneofacubewouldcontainmuchmoreinformation:
theothervisiblesidewouldhaveacolor,allsideswouldhavetexture,thecubewouldprobablyhavesomevisiblemeansofsupport,theilluminationwouldcause
shadingonthecube'ssurfacesandcastshadowsonnearbysurfaces,andsoon.Onecanoptionallybegintoaddallthisdetailtoone'simage,butitdoesnot
obligatorilyhavetobepresent,andone'simagingcapacityisquicklyoverloadediftoomanydetailsareadded.Noticealsothatimaginalrepresentationsdonotseem
tocontaininformationthatwouldnotbeavailableduringactualvisualperception.So,forexample,inanimageofacubeitseemsthatitssidesmustbeoriented
relativetoaviewpointandthattherecanbenorepresentationofthebackofthecubethatdoesnotinvolve"seeingthrough"thesidesthathideit.Itwouldbepossible
todesignadetailedspatialrepresentationthatrepresentedallthesurfacesofanobjectequally,withoutreferencetoaviewpoint,buthumanspatialimaginationdoes
notseemtohavesucharepresentationavailable.
Theintuitionthatvisualimaginationmimicsvisualperceptionsuggeststhehypothesisthatimagerymakesuseofrepresentationsandprocessesthatarespecifictothe
visualsystem.Activepropositionalschematicrepresentationsmustbeabletoevoketheconstructionandprocessingofrepresentationsinthevisualsystem.The
assumption,implicitinfigure2.1,thatsensorysystemsfeedintocentralsystemsbutthatcentralsystemsdonotfeedbackmustaltered.Ifthehypothesisiscorrect,
arrowswillhavetobeaddedtothefigurerunningfromthecentralsystemstothesensorysystems.Kosslynandhisassociates(Kosslyn1980KosslynandKoenig
1992)have

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developedadetailedtheorythatvisualimageryinvolvesthevisualsystem.Theirviewisthatvisualimageryinvolvesuniquerepresentationalformatsanddedicated
processes,whichalsooperateduringvisualperception.Theyproposethatvisualimageryistheimmediateresultofanactiverepresentationinashorttermvisual
buffer,whichmustbegeneratedfromanunderlyinglongtermrepresentationandwhichfadesrapidlyunlessitisconstantlyrefreshed.
Theclaimthatvisualimageryinvolvesthevisualsystemdoesnotautomaticallyresolvethequestionofjusthowtherepresentationsinvolvedinimageryaredifferent
frompropositionalschematicrepresentation.Afterall,twosystemsthatmakeuseofdifferentphysicalresourcescouldstillemploythesametypeofrepresentation.
Theclaimhere,however,isthatthepropositionalandimaginalrepresentationsofthesamecontent,namely,objectsinspace,differincrucialways.Thereisa
systematicdifferenceinwhatinformationisrepresentedexplicitly,andthisdifferencemakesitpossibletodefineprocessesthatoperatespecificallyonthisinformation.
Animageofacubecontainsmuchorientationspecificinformation.Theschematicconceptofacubedoesnotcontainanysuchinformation,butitmightwellcontain
theinformationthatallcubeshavesixsides,whichisnotexplicitlyrepresentedinanimage.
Itishelpfultothinkofthevisualbufferinanalogytoablockofmemoryinacomputerthatisorganizedtobereadoutdirectlyontothecomputer'smonitorscreen(a
bitmappedmemory).Eachcellinthememoryrepresentsapoint(orpixelforpictureelement)inthetwodimensionalpicturedisplayedonthemonitor.Thecell
thereforehasmanytwodimensionalgeometricproperties:aposition(whichcanberepresentedasanx,ycoordinatevalue),adjacentneighborcells,adistancefrom
everyothercell(definedbyanalyticgeometry),andsoon.Othercellsinthecomputer'smemorydonothavethesespatialproperties.Geometric,orgraphics,
procedurescanbeprogrammedtooperateonthecellsintermsoftheirgeometricproperties,todrawlinesbetweenpoints,movepointsaround,andsoon.A
spatiallyorganizedareaofmemoryplusasetofgraphicsroutinesconstituteaspecializedsubsystemincomputerswithgraphicsfacilities.Itisimportanttorealizethat
thegeometriccharacterofamemorycellisnotnecessarilydeterminedbyitsphysicallocationonamemorychip.Forexample,twocellsthatrepresentneighboring
pointsintheimagemightbeondifferentmemorychips,separatedbyseveralmillimeters.Theyareneighborcellsbecausethevaluesloadedintothemalwaysrepresent
neighboringpointsintheimage,andbecausetheroutinesthatoperateonthecellsalwaystreatthemasrepresentingneighboringspatialpoints.
Thehumanvisualbufferishypothesizedtobeasimilarspecializedsubsystem.Thebufferisashorttermmemorystructurewithintrinsictwodimensionalspatial
properties.Itisusedinbothvisualperceptionandimagery.Duringimagery,itisoperatedonbyarichsetofproceduresthatcanloadit,refreshit,andperform
varioustransformationsonit.Thebufferishypothesizedtohaveanumberofcharacteristicsthatcurrentcomputergraphicssystemsdonothave.Forexample,in
visionandimagery,thecenterofthevisualbufferhasthehighestresolution,andthereisaspatialfocusofattentionthatcanbemovedaroundwithinthebuffer,
directingprocessingtoaparticularlocation.Thecomputeranalogycanbeusedtounderstandthesignificanceoftheclaimthatthebufferandtheassociatedprocesses
formanipulatingitarepartofthecognitivearchitecture.Insomecomputersthegraphicssubsystemisnotafixedpartofthearchitectureofthecomputer.Thememory
cellswhosevaluesaredisplayedonthescreenarejustapartofthegeneralmainmemory.Theybehavegeometricallybecause

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programshavebeenwrittenforthemachinethattreatthemthatway.However,differentprogramscouldbewrittenthatoperatedonthesamememorycellsina
completelydifferentway.Forexample,thememorycellscouldbeloadedwithbaseballstatistics,andtheprogramscouldcomputelifetimebattingaverages,andso
on.Whenthegraphicssoftwareisrunning,thegraphicssubsystemcanbesaidtobepartofthevirtualarchitectureofthesystem,butitisnotpartoftheunderlying,
hardwiredarchitecture.Inacomputerwithadedicatedgraphicssystemthememoryandthegraphicsroutinescanbewiredintothehardwareinsuchawaythatthey
arenotreprogrammable.Thememorycanonlybemanipulatedbythisfixedsetofprimitivegraphicsroutines,whichareintrinsicallyspatial.Forexample,acommand
todrawalinebetweentwopointswouldbewiredintothesystemandwouldfillthememorycellsthatrepresentthepointslyingbetweenthetwotargetpoints.Such
primitivecommandswouldnotbeterriblyusefulforcalculatingbattingaverages.Thevisualsystemisadedicatedsystem.Totheextentthatvisualimaginationusesthe
resourcesofthevisualsystem,imageryislikeadedicatedgraphicsprocessor.Itsspatialcharacteristicsarebuiltinandnoteasilyreprogrammablebyexperienceor
changesintacitknowledge.
TheFunctionsofVisualImageryTheclearreasonfortheexistenceofvisualimageryistomakethecomputationalresourcesofthevisualsystemavailablefor
reasoningabouttheshapesandspatialarrangementofobjectsintheabsenceofvisualinput.Itisusefultobeabletoplanaroutebeforewalkingitortoconsider
possiblerearrangementsofthefurnitureinaroombeforebeginningtheheavylifting.Suchproblemsolvingprocessestypicallyoriginateinordinarygoaloriented
thoughtthatdrawsonpropositionalschematiclongtermmemory.Althoughlongtermmemorycontainsinformationaboutroutes,rooms,andsoon,thisinformation
doesnotincludetheexplicitspatialdetailcontainedinimages.Thebuiltincentralprocessesarealsonotdesignedtoprocessdetailedspatialinformation.Theresultis
thatwhenspatialreasoningisrequired,longtermpropositionalrepresentationsareusedtoconstructimages,whichcontaintheneededspatialinformationandwhich
canbeoperatedonbythespecializedprocessesavailableinthevisualsystem.
Thehypothesizeddistinctionbetweenthecategoricalandratherskeletalinformationthatispresentinpropositionalmemoryandtheadditionaldetailthatbecomes
availableinanimageisquiteclearinourconsciousexperience.Ifyouareaskedfortheshapeofthefacesofacube,youwillprobablyanswerthattheyaresquare
withlittleornoexperienceofimagery.However,ifyouneedtoknowhowmanyedgesacubehas,itislikelythatyouwillanswerthequestionbyformingamental
imageofacubeandcountingtheedgesbyshiftingyourattentionsystematicallytovariouslocations.Yourlongtermrepresentationofacubedidnotexplicitly
representthenumberofedges.Noticethattheimageofthecubedoesnotexplicitlyrepresentthenumberofedgeseither.Butitdoesrepresenteachindividualedge,
makingthecountpossible.Thetheoryisthatprocessesofvisualperceptionandattentionareusedontheimageofthecubejustastheywouldbeinlookingatan
actualcube.Imaginalperceptionismademoredifficultbythelackofexternalinputtothevisualbuffer.Theimagemustbecontinuallyrefreshed,anddetailsof
particularsurfacesorcornersmustbegeneratedasattentionisshifted.Itisdifficulttoavoidskippingordoublecountingsomeedges.Thetaskistaxingenoughthatit
canleadtoasubtleinterplaybetweenimageryandreasoningwithinthepropositionalsystem.Forexample,onemightsolvetheproblem

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bynoticingfromtheimagethatthecubeislikearoom.Thefloorandceilingeachhavefouredges,makingasubtotalofeight,andthewallsmeettomakefourmore
edges,foragrandtotaloftwelve.Heretheimageevokedanotherpropositionalschemathatimposesagroupingontheedgesofthecube,probablyprovidesan
explicitcodefortheedgesformedbythewalls(aroomhasfour''corners''),andallowssomesimpleadditionratherthanlaboriouslycountingalltwelveedges.This
kindofinterplayseemstobetypicalofimagerytasksthatrequireconclusionsaboutthegeometricstructureofcomplexmultipartobjects.Propositionalknowledge
aboutthestructureoftheobjectsandpropositionalreasoningfacilitiescanbeusedtominimizetheamountofdetailthathastobeimagedandthenumberofshiftsof
attentionwithintheimage.Thereisoftenatradeoffbetweentheloadsoncentralandimaginalprocesses,however.Forexample,theimaginalloadoftheedge
countingtaskcouldbereducedbyrealizingthatacubeisformedbygluingsixsquarestogetherattheiredgesinsuchawaythateachedgemateswithoneotheredge.
Sinceittakesapairofsquareedgestomakeeachcubeedge,thetwentyfouredgesonthesixsquaresmustbereducedbyhalfinformingthecube.Ifone'scube
schemacontainstheinformationthatacubehassixsquarefaces,thisstrategydoesnotrequireformingastableimageofacubeatall,butitdoesinvolvea
complicatedlineoflogicalmathematicalreasoning.
Thelimitedcapacityofvisualimaginationseemstobeajointproductofthelimitedcapacitiesofcentralprocessingandofvisualattention.Imageprocessingisusually
evokedbyongoing,goalorientedcentralprocessing.Workingmemorythereforelimitsthenumberofgoalsandschemasthataredrivingimageformationand
processing.Theprocessesthatarespecifictothevisualbufferalsohavealimitedcapacity.Theapparentclarityofordinaryvisiontendstoblindustothislimitation,
butatanymomentonlyasmallportionofthevisualfieldreceivesdetailedprocessing.Thecapacityofimageprocessingisfurtherreducedbythefactthatthevisual
bufferisnotrefreshedbyexternalinput.Theimagemustberefreshedbycentralsourcesofactivation.Itisnotclearwhetherthecentralsystemandthevisualsystem
drawonseparatepoolsofactivationcapacity.Thereissomeevidenceforacommonresourcethatmustbeallocatedamongallprocessingdemands(Cantorand
Engle1993).
ExperimentsonVisualImagery
MentalScanningThetheorysketchedaboveisplausible,butitmustbesupportedbylaboratoryevidence.Afruitfulapproachhasbeentostudywhetherresponse
timesduringimagemanipulationreflectthespecializedspatialcharacteristicsthatarehypothesizedtobecharacteristicofimagerepresentationandprocessing.When
attentionisshiftedfromoneregiontoanotherinanimage,forexample,itisassumedthattheshiftinvolvesascanacrossthespacerepresentedintheimage.If
scanningtakesplaceataconstantrate,shiftsbetweenregionsthatarefartherapartshouldtakelonger.Moreprecisely,agraphthatplotsscanningtimeagainst
distanceshouldbeastraightlinewithapositiveslopethatrepresentsthescanningrate.
Kosslyn,Ball,andReiser(1978)testedthescanningassumptionexperimentally.Theyfirsthadsubjectsmemorizeamapofafictitiousislandthatcontainedvarious
distinctlocations,suchasahut,awell,andamarsh.Oneachtrialthesubjectwasaskedtoformanimageofthemapwithattentionfixedononeofthelocations.A
wordwasthenpresentedthatnamedanotherlocationonthemap,andthesubjectscannedtothenamedlocationandpusheda"Yes"buttonwhenitwasreached.
(Theexperimentalso

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included"No"trialsinwhichthetargetlocationwasnotonthemap.)Theresultsshowedthatthescanningtimeswerealinearfunctionoftheactualdistancesonthe
map,supportingtheassumptionthatscanningtakestimeandfollowsastraightpathbetweentwolocations.
Thisexperimenthasbeencriticized(Pylyshyn1984Finke1985)becausetheresultscouldreflectthesubjects'tacitknowledgeofvisualscanningratherthanthe
operationofascanningfunctionthatisacomponentofthecognitivearchitecture.Underthetacitknowledgeaccount,subjectstakelongertoanswerquestionsabout
locationsthatarefartherapartbecausetheyknowthatrealperceptualscanningtakestime.Underotherconditions,however,theremightbenorelationbetween
responsetimesandspatialextent.AnexperimentbyMitchellandRichman(1980)demonstratedthatthemapscanningtaskdoesindeedengagesubjects'tacit
knowledgeoftherelationbetweenscanningtimeanddistance.TheirsubjectslookedatKosslyn,Ball,andReiser's(1978)mapandweretoldaboutthescanning
task.Withoutactuallydoingthetask,theyestimatedthescanningtimesforpairsoflocationsonthemap.Theirtimeestimateswerelinearlyrelatedtodistance,justas
theactualimagescanningtimeshadbeen.
Oneapproachtostrengtheningtheevidenceforabuiltinscanningoperationistotrytosetupasituationinwhichsubjectshavetoanswersomequestionabouttwo
spatiallocationsbutarenottoldorevenencouragedtomimicvisualscanning.Ifscanningisanobligatoryprimitiveoperation,responsetimesshouldstillbeaffectedby
distance.FinkeandPinker(1982)conductedanexperimentthatmetthesecriteria.Oneachtrialapatternoffourdotsappearedonascreen,andthesubjectformed
animageofthedots.Thepatternwasturnedoff,andafteratwoseconddelayanarrowappearedonthescreeninanunexpectedpositionandorientation.The
subject'staskwastodecideasquicklyaspossiblewhetherthearrowwaspointingatoneofthepreviouslyshowndots.Theresponsetimeson"Yes"trialsincreased
linearlywithincreasingdistancebetweenthearrowandthedot.Thisresultsuggeststhatsubjectswereforcedtouseascanningoperation,eventhoughtheywerenot
instructedtoscanandthedemandofthetaskwastoansweraquestionasfastaspossible.Other,similarexperimentshavenotshownthelinearrelationbetweentime
anddistance(FinkeandPinker1983Pylyshyn1981).Inthesestudiesthesubjectshadinformationaboutbothlocationsinvolvedinadirectionaljudgmentbeforethe
judgmentwasrequired.Thispatternofresultsposesachallengeforboththetacitknowledgeandthearchitecturaltheories.Thetacitknowledgetheoristmustexplain
whythesubjectsinvoketheirknowledgeofscanninginoneversionofthetaskandnotintheother.Theimagetheoristmustexplainwhyjudgmentsabouttwospatial
locationssometimesinvokethescanningoperationandsometimesdonot.Apossibleinterpretationofsuchdatawithintheimagetheoryisthatwhensubjectsaregiven
advanceinformationaboutallrelevantspatiallocations,theycanbuilddirectionalinformationintoapropositionalrepresentationandanswerquestionswithout
performingthescanningoperationonanimageheldinthevisualbuffer.
MentalRotationMentalrotationprovidesasecondexampleoftheuseofresponsetimestostudythepropertiesofmentalimagery.Thetermreferstotheabilityto
imagineobjectsrotatinginspace.Whenweneedtothinkabouthowanobjectwouldlookfromadifferentorientation,weoftenexperienceitrotatingtothat
orientationinourmentalimage.Toillustrate,decidewhichofthefivesinfigure2.4arebackward.

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Figure2.4
Whichofthesefivesarebackward?

Tocomeupwiththeanswer,youprobablymentallyrotatedeachnumber.Mostpeoplefinditdifficulttoanswerthequestionwithoutdoingmentalrotations.Mental
rotationishypothesizedtobeoneofthebuiltinoperationsthatcanbeappliedtovisualimages.ExperimentalresearchonmentalrotationwasinitiatedbyShepard
(1968)andhasbeenpursuedwithgreatingenuityanddetailbyhim,hisassociates,andotherresearchers.
Theexperienceofmentalrotationsuggeststhehypothesisthatmentalrotationisanalogoustophysicalrotationintheworldinthesensethatduringamentalrotation
therepresentationmustpassthroughintermediatestatesthatcorrespondtothepathofaphysicalrotation.Afurtherhypothesis,analogoustothescanningcase,isthat
mentalrotationoccursataconstantrate.Ifthisistrue,thenagraphinwhichdegreesofmentalrotationareplottedagainstrotationtimeshouldbeastraightlinewitha
positiveslopeequaltotherateofrotation.
Cooper(1975)studiedthementalrotationofeightirregulartwodimensionalshapes,illustratedinfigure2.5.Theeightexperimentalsubjectswerefirsttrainedto
discriminatebetweeneachstandardformanditsreflectionatafixedorientation.Afterthetrainingfourtestsessionswereconducted.Oneachtesttrialasingleform
appeared,andthesubject'staskwasstilltosaywhethertheformwasstandardorreflected.However,theformsnowappearednotonlyatthetrainingorientationbut
alsoatfiveneworientations.Intheneworientationstheformswererotatedclockwise60,120,180,240,and300degreesfromthetrainingorientation.Exampletest
stimuliaregiveninfigure2.5.Trytodecidewhethereachteststimulusisstandardorreflected.Youwillprobablyexperiencementalrotationduringyourdecisions.
Thesubjectsintheexperimentreportedthattheyexperiencedrotatingtheteststimulusintoitstrainingorientationandthencheckingtoseewhetheritmatchedtheir
mentalrepresentationofthestandardorreflectedform.
ThedatafromCooper'ssubjectsconformedtothehypothesisthattheymadetheirjudgmentsbydoingmentalrotationsandthatmentalrotationoccurredataconstant
rate.Theresultsinfigure2.6fitastraightlineremarkablywell.Theslopeofthelinerepresents2.1millisecondstocompleteeachdegreeofrotation.Thus,theaverage
subjecttook130milliseconds,alittleoveronetenthofasecond,torotateanobject60degrees,regardlessofhowfarheorshehadalreadyrotatedit.Noticethatall
oftheresponsetimesareabout75millisecondslongerthanwhatitwouldtakejusttodothementalrotationforexample,theaveragetotalresponsetimeforthe60
degreestimuliwasabout884ratherthan130milliseconds.Thereasonisthatsubjectstookabout754millisecondsoneachtrialtodosomeotherthings:forexample,
beforesubjectsdidamentalrotation,theyhadtodecidewhichoftheeightobjectsinvolvedintheexperimentwasbeingdisplayed,andafterdeterminingwhetherthe
formwasstandardorreflected,theyhadtomakearesponsebypressingoneoftwobuttons.
Inanotherexperiment,usingthesamesubjects,Cooper(1976)wasabletogetstrongevidencethatmentalrotationfollowsatrajectorythatisanalogoustoa

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Figure2.5
InCooper's(1975)experimentsubjectsfirstlearnedthestandardand
reflectedversionofeightformsatfixedorientations,asintheexamples
above.Teststimuliappearedeitheratthetrainingorientationoratone
offiveangulardeparturesfromthetrainingorientation.Examplesofrotated
teststimuliaregiveninthethirdrowofthefigure.Ineachcasethetest
stimulusisarotationofeitherthestandardorthereflectedformthat
appearsaboveit.(AdaptedfromCooper1975.)

physicalrotation.Oneachtrialthesubjectwasbrieflyshownoneofthestandardformsandthengivenasignaltobeginmentallyrotatingitinaclockwisedirection.
Duringthesubject'smentalrotationatestformappeared.Thesubject'staskwasagaintodeterminewhetherthetestformwasstandardorreflected.Usingthedata
fromthepreviousexperiment,Cooperwasabletopredicthowlongitwouldtakeforthesubjecttomentallyrotatetoacertainorientation.Onsometrialsthetest
formwaspresentedinexactlythatorientation(theexpectedtrials).Onothertrialsthetestformwaspresentedeitherpastorshortofthatorientation(theunexpected
trials).Thedatafromtheexperimentareshowninfigure2.7.Onexpectedtrialstheresponsetimewasconstant,indicatingthatCoopercorrectlypredictedwhenthe
subject'smentalimagewouldcomeintocorrespondencewiththeteststimulus.Onmanyofthesetrialstheteststimuluswasshownatanorientationthatthesubject
hadneverseenbefore,indicatingthatthementalrotationfollowedacompletetrajectoryratherthanclickingonlyamongfamiliarorientations.Theunexpectedtrials
showedalinearrelationbetweenresponsetimeandthedegreetowhichtheorientationofthetestformdepartedfromthepredictedorientationofthesubject'simage.
Subjectswereapparentlyabletoeithercontinueorreversetheirmentalrotationsinordertobringtheirimagesintocorrespondencewiththeteststimulus.
Cooper'sexperimentsprovideevidencethatmentalrotationisapreciseanalogofphysicalrotation.Thementalrotationoperationseemstotransformtheimage
contin

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Figure2.6
Meanreactiontimeasafunctionofangulardeparturefromthetrainedorientation.
Theequationisforthebestfittingstraightlinethroughthefourdatapoints.
(AdaptedfromCooper1975.)

Figure2.7
ReactiontimeresultsfromCooper1976.(AdaptedfromCooper1976.)

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uouslyandasawhole.Thedataaccordwellwiththehypothesisthattherotationoperationispartofthecognitivearchitectureandthatitoperatesonavisualbuffer.
Ontheotherhand,itisdifficulttoruleouttheinfluenceoftacitknowledgeinmentalrotationexperiments.Subjectshavealifetimeofexperiencewithseeingphysical
rotations.OnestrengthofCooper'smethodisthatsubjectsarenottoldtomentallyrotatethestimulitheirtaskissimplytojudgewhetherthetargetandtestformsare
thesameordifferent.Itcanbearguedthatsubjectshadeveryreasontofindsomequickerandeasierwaytomakethejudgmentsintheseexperimentsbutthatthe
natureoftheimagerysystemforcedthemtorelyonarotationoperationthatispartofthecognitivearchitecture.
Otherevidenceonmentalrotationappearstoreflectthelimitedcapacityofimageprocessingandtheinterplaywithcentralprocesses.Someinvestigatorshavefound
evidencethatmentalrotationisinfluencedbystructuralinformationthatisnotthoughttobeexplicitlyencodedinthevisualbuffer.Suchinformationmaybepresentin
thelongtermschematicrepresentationthatisusedtogenerateanimage,oritmaybedevelopedbypatternrecognitionprocessesthatoperateonthebuffer.
HochbergandGellman(1977)foundthatpatternsthatcontaineasilyidentifiable"landmark"featuresarerotatedatafasterrate.Pylyshyn(1979)foundthatthe
judgmentsubjectshavetomakeinfluencestherateofrotation.Inhistasktargetandtestfiguresweredisplayedsimultaneously,andthesubjecthadtojudgewhether
thetestfigurewasasubpartofthetargetfigure.Asshowninfigure2.8,insomecasesthetestpatternwasa"good"subfiguremadeupofconnectedpiecesofthe
wholethatdidnotintersectwithotherpiecesofthewhole.Inothercasesthetestpatternwasa"poor''subfigurethatwasdisconnectedorthatintersectedwithother
partsofthewhole.Therotationratewasaffectedbythegoodnessofthetestfigure.Whenthetestfigurewasagoodsubpart,mentalrotationwasmorerapid.This
resultdemonstratesthatafixedraterotationoperationwasnotappliedasingletimetoeachofthetargetfigures.Onepossibilityisthattherotationoperationapplies
nottothevisualbufferbuttomoreabstractrepresentationsthatcontainconsiderablestructuralinformation.Otherinterpretations,however,areconsistentwiththe
notionthatmentalrotationisaprimitiveoperationthatappliestothevisualbuffer.Thetargetfiguresmayexceedthecapacityofthebufferandtherotationoperation,
forcingsubjectstorotatethempiecebypiece.Thesubjectmaybreakthetargetfigureintostructurallycoherentpiecesinordertomanagethepiecemealrotation
process.Matchingapoorsubfiguremightthenrequiremoresubpartrotations,producingaresponsetimecurvewithahigherinterceptandsteeperslope.
Bymeasuringsubjects'eyemovementsbackandforthbetweendifferentpartsoftargetandtestfigures,JustandCarpenter(1976)foundevidencethatsubjectsdo
sometimesmentallyrotatefigurespartbypart,ratherthanallatonce.Theyalsofoundevidencethatintheirexperimentsubjectsrotatedobjectsin50degreesteps,
whichapparentlyconflictswithCooper's(1976)evidencefavoringmuchsmallersteps,orpossiblyacontinuoustransformation.Itispossible,however,thatwhenthe
targetandtestshapesaresimultaneouslypresent,asinJustandCarpenter'sexperiments,mentalrotationisfacilitatedbytheadditionalexternalinputtothevisual
buffer.Manyexperimentershavealsonotedthatwithpracticerotationratestendtospeedupanddifferencesamongshapestendtodecrease(ShepardandCooper
1982Pylyshyn1979).Thecomplexweboffindingsonmentalrotationprovidesamajorchallengeforanytheory.Itseemsclearthatthementalrotationoperationhas
alimitedcapacityand

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Figure.2.8
ExamplesofthetypeofstimuliusedinPylyshyn's
(1979)study.Thesubjectmentallyrotatesthefigureontheleft
untilitstopcoincideswiththearrowinthefigureontheright.
Thesubjectthenjudgeswhethertherighthandfigureisasubpart
ofthelefthandfigure.Thecorrectansweris"Yes"in(a)and(b),
and"No"in(c).Therateofmentalrotationisfasterwhenthetest
itemisagoodsubfigure,asin(a),thanwhenitisapoorsubfigure,
asin(b).(AdaptedfromPylyshyn1979.)

thatsubjectscanadjusttothelimitsbybreakingafigureintopartsorrepresentingonlyitsmostdistinctivefeatures.Itappearsthatifmentalrotationoperatesonthe
visualbuffer,subjectsusepropositionalorstructuralrepresentationstodecideonwhichaspectsofafiguretoloadintothebufferbeforerotating.Withpracticeona
setoffiguresthesubjectsmightbegintomakebetterdecisionsaboutwhichaspectsofthefigurestoimage,leadingtofewerfalsestartsandpiecemealrotationsona
typicaltrialandthusloweringtheestimatedoverallrateofrotation.
ConvergingEvidenceconcerningVisualImagery
Theliteratureonvisualimageryisperhapsthebestavailableillustrationofthedifficultyofdeterminingwhetheraparticularprocessorrepresentationisbiologicallybuilt
intothearchitectureofcognition.Theintuitivesensethatthereissomethingspecialandnaturalaboutvisualimagerythatisfundamentallydifferentfrommore
conceptualandabstractthoughthasprovedtobedifficulttobackupwithstrongexperimentalevidence.

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Inrecentyearsresearchershavecombinedcognitivestudieswithphysiologicalmethodsinasearchforconvergingevidencefavoringthetheorythatvisualimagery
involvesdistinctiverepresentationsandprocessesinthevisualsystem(KosslynandKoenig1992).Onetypeofresearchhasmadeuseoftwomethodscapableof
measuringrelativeactivityindifferentbrainregionsduringcognition,positronemissiontomography(PETscanning),andXenon133regionalcerebralbloodflow
(rCBF)scanning.Thisresearchhasshownthatimagerytasks,incontrastwithcognitivetasksthatdonotinvolveimagery,leadtoselectiveactivationofseveralbrain
areasknowntobeinvolvedinvisualperception:theoccipitalcortex,theparietalcortex,andtheinferiortemporalcortex(seechapters7and12formoreinformation).
Theinvolvementoftheoccipitalcortexisparticularlyinterestingbecauseitisthemostplausiblesiteforthevisualbuffer.Theoccipitalcortexisknowntoexplicitly
representspaceandspatiallylocatedprimitivefeatures(suchaslocalboundaries)andnottorepresenthigherordercategoricalfeatures(suchasglobalshapeor
objectidentity).Spatialinformationislaidouttopographicallyonthecortexwithadjacentareasinthevisualfieldrepresentedbyactivityinadjacentareasofthe
cortex.
Anothertechniqueinvolvesneuropsychology,thestudyofcognitivedeficitsinpeoplewhohavesufferedbraindamagefromaccidentsorillness.Thepatternofresults
inthisareaofresearchishighlycomplex,reflectingthecomplexityofthevisualsystem,thecomplexrelationsbetweencentralprocessesandvisualprocessingduring
imagery,andthetendencyforbraindamagetoaffectratherlargeareasthatrarelycorrespondwelltocomputationalfunctions(anissuetakenupfurtherinchapter7).
Forexample,thereisevidencethatdamagetotherightparietallobeimpairsmentalrotation.Thisevidenceisconsistentwithmoregeneralfindingsthattheright
hemisphereofthebrainisspecializedfortherepresentationandprocessingofspatialrelations.However,peoplewithlefthemispheredamagecanalsoshowmental
rotationdeficits.Withinthetheorywehavebeensketching,thisinitiallypuzzlingfindingcanbeexplainedbytheassumptionthatmentalrotationalsoinvolvestheuseof
abstractdescriptionsofobjectstoguidethegenerationofimagesandtorefreshandtracktheimageasitrotates.Theseprocessesareconsistentwithotherevidence
aboutthecomputationalcapacitiesofthelefthemisphere(KosslynandKoenig1992).
Wehavenowaugmentedourinitialtheoryofthecognitivearchitecture.Ourinitialdiscussionfocusedonpropositionalschematicrepresentationandcentralprocessing
constrainedbyalimitedworkingmemory.Thesensoryinputandmotoroutputsystemswereassumedtoberelativelyselfcontained,withsensorysystemsdelivering
activepropositionalrepresentationsofcurrentinputforcentralprocessing,andmotorsystemsacceptingactivepropositionalspecificationsofdesiredmotoroutput.
Withinthispictureitcouldbeassumedthatthesensoryandmotorsystemsmightpossessspecializedrepresentationsandprocesses.Theresearchonvisualimagery
ledtotheconclusionthatthevisualsystemdoesindeedpossessspecializedrepresentationsandprocessesandthatthesefacilitiescanberecruitedbycentral
processes.Thesamekindofresultappearstoholdfortheothersensorysystemsandformotorsystemsaswell.Forexample,centralcognitiveprocessescanrecruit
specializedfacilitiesoftheauditorysystemintheabsenceofacousticinputorofmotorsystemswithoutmoving.Theinvolvementofsensoryandmotorrepresentations
andprocessesinthought,evenwhenenvironmentalinputandoutputareabsent,meansthatatheoryofcentralcognitioncannotbedevelopedindependentlyof
theoriesofsensoryandmotorsystems.

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2.8AutomaticandControlledProcesses
Intuitionsaboutimagerywereonesourceofourdecisiontodevelopanaccountofthearchitectureofsensoryandmotorsystemsandtheirinterplaywithcentral
cognition.Anothersetofintuitions,inthiscaseaboutattentionandworkingmemory,leadtoafinalexpansionoftheclassicalconceptionofcognitivearchitecture.We
havealreadymentionedtheconsciousexperienceofhavingone'sworkingmemorycapacityoverloaded,whiledoingmentalarithmeticorplayingchess.Butanequally
importantrealizationisthatsomecomplexcognitiveprocessesdonotoverloadworkingmemory.Theyseemtooccurwithverylittleornoattentionaleffort.Forthe
experienceddriver,drivingacarrequireslittledeliberateattention.Onecanengageinothercomplexcognitiveactivities,suchaslisteningtoaradiotalkshowora
sportsbroadcast,whiledrivingacar.Peopleoftenreportbecominglostinthoughtwhiledrivingandsuddenlyrealizingthattheyhavedrivenformileswithoutpaying
anyattentiontowhattheyweredoing.Listeningtoaradioshowseemstorequireattentionandcontrol,anddrivingdoesnot.Bycontrast,thinkbacktothefirsttime
youwerebehindthesteeringwheelofacarandimaginetryingtoconcentrateonatalkshoworabaseballgame.Drivingrequiredagreatdealofattentionbackthen.
Thedistinctionbetweentasksthatrequiremuchandlittleattentionseemstohavelesstodowiththenatureofthetaskitselfandmoretodowiththepriorexperience
ofthepersonengaginginit.Theabilityofexpertchessplayerstoplaymanygamessimultaneously,devotingafewsecondstoeachmove,suggeststhatevenchess,an
unusuallydifficult,purelycognitivetask,canbecomenearlyasautomaticasdriving.
Letususethetermcontrolledprocessingtorefertocognitionthatmakesheavydemandsonthelimitedresourcesofworkingmemoryandattentionandtheterm
automaticprocessingforcognitionthatreflectsreduceddemandsthataresomehowtheresultofpractice.Wehavealreadyexploredthecharacteristicsofcontrolled
processinginsomedetail.Itisgoalorientedandflexible.Itdrawsonbothprimitive,builtinprocessesandtheabilitytointerpretrepresentationsinlongtermmemory.
Itisconstrainedbythelimitedcapacityofworkingmemory,althoughtosomeextenttheconstraintscanbeovercomebychunking.Wewillproceedtodevelopthe
contrastwithautomaticprocessingandthenlookathowautomaticproceduresareacquired.
AutomaticProcesses
Researchershypothesizethatautomaticprocessesmakeverysmall,orpossiblyno,demandsonworkingmemory,sotheircapacityisverylargerelativetothe
controlledprocesses.Theydonotoperatebyinterpretingdeclarativeinformation.Rather,theyarelikecompiledprogramsincomputers.Thatis,theyspecify
informationprocessesdirectly,ratherthanhavingtobeinterpretedbysomeotherprocess.Wesawabovethatdialingatendigitphonenumberplacesaheavyload
onworkingmemoryifeachdigitisasingleitem.Theloadonworkingmemoryisreducedifthenumberisbrokenupintothreechunksthatarestoredasschemasin
longtermmemory.Eveninthiscase,however,thethreechunkshavetobeinterpretedbyaprocess(possiblybuiltin)thatconvertsactiverepresentationsinto
sequencesofmotorcommands.Thereareothercasesinwhichdialingaphonenumberseemstobemoreautomatic.Anecdotessuchasthefollowingarefairly
common.Aprofessoristryingtoplaceaphonecallfromherofficewhilesimultaneouslycontributingtoanongoingconversation.Sheinadvertentlydialsherhome
insteadofthecolleaguesheintendedtoreach.Apossible

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analysisofthiserroristhatdialingone'shomenumbercanbecomeanautomaticprocedurethatcanbecarriedoutwhileattentionisdevotedtoaconcurrent
controlledprocessingtask,inthiscaseholdingaconversation.Inaddition,theloadonworkingmemoryimposedbytheconversationappearstointerferewithcontrol
bythegoalofdialingthecolleague'snumber.Intheabsenceofcontroltheautomaticprocedureistriggeredbythephonedialingstimuliinthecontext(forexample,
havingaphoneinhand).
Thisexampleillustratestwokeycharacteristicsofautomaticproceduresthatareemphasizedincurrenttheorizing.First,theybehavelikecompiledinformation
processesthatrunwithoutinterpretingdeclarativeknowledgeormakingdemandsonworkingmemory.Second,theyareautomaticallytriggeredbypatternsinthe
currentlyactivatedinformation,whichincludessensoryinput,declarativeknowledgethatiscurrentlyactive,andcurrentlyactivegoals.Theyareoftenreferredtoas
datadrivenorpatterndrivenprocesses,becausetheyareevokedbypatternsintheinformationaldatathatthemindcurrentlyconfrontsratherthanbeingselected
inarigidsequencebyahierarchicallycontrolledplanningprocess.Automaticproceduresthataretriggeredbypatternsofactiveinformationarealsooftencalled
productions.
ExperimentsonAutomaticandControlledProcessing
AsimplebutflexibleexperimentaltaskthatprovidesevidenceforthelimitedcapacityofcontrolledprocessesistheMultipleFrameAttentionandSearchTask
(MFAST),investigatedbyShiffrinandSchneider(1977SchneiderandShiffrin1977).Inoneversionofthetaskthesubjectisgivenamemorysetoffromonetofour
targetlettersandistoldtosearchforatargetletterinarapidsequenceoftwentyframes,displayedonthescreenofacomputerterminal.Thesubjectresponds"Yes"
ifanytargetletterispresentand"No"ifnotargetlettersarepresent.Eachframecontainsfromonetofourlettersandisexposedforfrom40millisecondsto800
milliseconds.Thetargetletterona''Yes"itemoccursonceinoneframeofthesequenceofframes.Inthevariedmappingconditionthememorysetchangesonevery
trial,andintheconsistentmappingconditionthememorysetisthesameoneverytrial.Theexperimentalprocedureissummarizedinfigure2.9.

Figure2.9
Anexampleofa"Yes"trialinoneversionofthe
multipleframesearchtask,inwhichthememorysetcontains
twocharactersandeachframecontainsfourcharacters.Time
movesfromlefttorightinthefigure.(a)Thememorysetis
presented.(b)Afixationdot(whichtellsthesubjectwheretofocus)
goesonfor0.5secondswhenthesubjectstartsthetrial.(c)Some
numberofdistractorframesoccurthatdonotcontainamemberof
thememoryset.(d)Thetargetframe,whichcontainsonemember
ofthememoryset,occurs.(e)Moreframesthatdonotcontaina
memberofthememorysetoccur.Thedurationofeachframeis
variedindifferentexperiments.(AdaptedfromSchneiderandShiffrin1977.)

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Thevariedmappingconditionwaspredictedtoshowcharacteristicsofcontrolledprocessing.Becausethememorysetchangesoneverytrial,thesubjectmustchange
therulerelatingthealphabettothe''Yes"and"No"responsesoneverytrial.Thus,theflexiblenatureofcontrolledprocessesisrequired.Astheexperimenter
increasesthesizeofthememoryset,increasesthenumberoflettersineachframe,andreducestheexposuretimeoneachframe,theloadonthecontrolledprocess
increases.Atsomepointitwillreachthelimitofitscapacity,andthesubjectwillbegintomakefrequenterrors.Thedataaccordedwellwiththisprediction.Subjects
werenearly100percentcorrectwithaframetimeof120milliseconds,amemorysetsizeofone,andaframesizeofone.Whentheframesizewasincreasedtofour,
however,theframetimehadtobeincreasedto400millisecondstoallownearperfectperformance.Whenthememorysetsizewasalsoincreasedtofour,
performancefellto50percentcorrecton"Yes"trialsatthe400millisecondframetime.Whentheframetimewasdoubledto800millisecondsperframe,subjectsstill
detectedthetargetletteronly70percentofthetime.Theresultswerecollectedafterovertenhoursofpractice,andtherewasnoevidencethatthesubjectswere
improvingatthatpoint.
Theconsistentmappingconditionwaspredictedtoshowthecharacteristicsofautomaticprocessingafteradequatepractice.Becausethememorysetanditsrelation
tothe"Yes"responseremainedconstantoneverytrial,theflexibilityofcontrolledprocesseswasnotnecessary.Aspredicted,aftertenhoursofpracticesubjects'
performancedidnotshowevidenceofthecapacitylimitationthatwaspresentinthedatafromthevariedmappingcondition.Subjectswereabletodetectover90
percentofthetargetswithamemorysetoffouritemsandaframesizeoffouritems,evenwhentheframetimewasreducedto120milliseconds.Performancewasstill
80percentcorrectwithaframetimeof80milliseconds.Toappreciatejusthowimpressivethislevelofperformanceis,recallthatthereweretwentyframespertrial.
Thus,subjectsweresearchingforasingletargetcharacteramidseventyninedistractorsthatappearedwithinanintervalof1.6seconds.Theevidencesupportsthe
theorythataftersufficientpracticesubjectsnolongerhadtodevoteattentiontosearchingforthetargetcharacters.
Atrulyautomaticprocessshouldshowatleasttwofurthercharacteristics.First,ifataskhasbecomelargelyautomated,attentionalresourcesshouldbefreedupto
performanothertaskconcurrently.Second,itshouldbedifficulttocontroltheoccurrenceofanautomaticprocess.ShiffrinandDumais(1981)reportedsome
informalevidencethatthefirstcharacteristicispresentintheMFASTtask.Subjectswereoftenabletocarryonconversationswhileperformingtheconsistent
mappingtask.InanelegantexperimentSchneiderandFisk(1982)wereabletotestthepredictionthatsubjectscanattendtoanothertaskwhileanautomaticprocess
isoccurring.InanMFASTtasksubjectssimultaneouslysearchedforconsistentlymappedtargetsintwocornersofafourcharacterdisplayandforvariablymapped
targetsintheothertwocorners.Whentheyweretoldtodevotetheirattentiontothevariablymappedsearch,theiraccuracyonbothsearcheswasequaltoaccuracy
incontrolconditionsinwhicheachsearchtaskwasperformedalone.Theseresultssupportedthetheorythatsubjectsareabletodetecttargetsintheconsistent
mappingtaskwithoutattentionandinparallelwiththeoccurrenceofcontrolledattentionalprocesses.
Thesecondcriticalpredictionisthatautomaticprocessesshouldoccurevenwhenpeopleconsciouslytrytopreventthemfromoccurring.ShiffrinandSchneider
(1977)wereabletotestthispredictioninyetanotherelegantapplicationoftheMFASTtask.

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Subjectswerefirsttrainedinaconsistentmappingtaskwithaframesizeoffouruntiltheirperformanceshowedevidenceofautomatictargetdetection.Theywere
thentransferredtoaspecialversionofthevariablemappingtaskwithaframesizeoffour.Theywereinstructedtoignoretwopositionsindiagonallyoppositecorners
ofthedisplayandsearchforthevariabletargetsonlyintheothertwocorners.Onhalfofthetrialsacharacterthathadbeenatargetintheconsistentmapping
conditionappearedinoneofthetwoignoredpositions.Thepredictionwasthattheautomaticresponsetothischaracterwouldtendtooccurinspiteofthesubject's
attempttoignorethatpositioninthedisplay.Theautomaticresponsewoulddistractthesubjectfromthevariablemappingtask,thusloweringaccuracy.Thereason
thattheautomaticprocessinterfereswiththecontrolledprocessinthissituationisthattheautomaticprocessredirectsattention.Inothercasesautomaticprocesses
wouldnotbepredictedtointerferewithcontrolledprocesses.
Thedatasupportedtheprediction.Whentheoldconsistentmappingtargetoccurredinthesameframeasthevariablemappingtarget,accuracyonthevariable
mappingtaskdroppedfrom85percenttojustover60percent,indicatingthattheautomaticresponsetotheoldconsistentmappingtargetinanignoredposition
distractedthesubjectfromthesearchforvariablemappingtargets.Thedataindicatethatwhatbecomesautomatizedintheconsistentmappingtaskisthedetectionof
thetargetandthediversionofattentiontoit.Theautomaticattentionalresponsedisruptstheongoingfocusofattentiononothertasks.Subjectswereunableto
consciouslyturnoffthisautomaticshiftofattention.Suchautomaticshiftsofattentionseemtooccurfrequentlyineverydaylife.Forexample,ifoneisattendingtoa
conversationataparty,one'sattentioncanbeinvoluntarilyshiftedbytheoccurrenceofone'snameinanother,ignoredconversation.
2.9TheAcquisitionofSkill
Mostcomplexcognitive,perceptual,andmotorskillsarethoughttorequireamixtureofautomaticandcontrolledprocessing.Atthehighestlevelofperformance
controlledprocessesareusedtomaintaingoalsandtoflexiblydirectskilledperformancetomeetnovelsituationsthatcouldnotpreviouslyhavebeenautomatized.The
lowerlevel,moreconsistentcomponentsoftheskillareperformedautomatically.Whenapersonisfirstbeginningtolearnaskill,controlledprocessesareresponsible
foramuchlargershareoftheperformance.Itappearsthatbeginnersperformskillslargelybyinterpretingdeclarativeknowledgeinthemannerdescribedearlier.The
beginnerislikeaninexperiencedcookworkingfromanunfamiliarrecipe.Eachlineoftherecipemustbereadandinterpretedasaninstructiontoperformsome
action.Worse,inmanycasesthereisnoexplicitrecipefortheskill,sothebeginnermustslowlydiscoverone.
TheStagesofSkillLearning
Varioustheoristshaveattemptedtodividetheprocessofskilllearningintostagesthatcharacterizetheslowtransitionfromdominancebycontrolledtodominanceby
automaticprocesses(Fitts1964LaBerge1976Anderson1983).Theirconclusionshavebeenremarkablysimilaracrossawiderangeofskills.
TheInterpretiveStageThefirststage,whichcanbecalledtheinterpretivestage,ischaracterizedbythediscoveryoftherelevantaspectsofthetaskandthe
storageof

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declarativeknowledgethatcanbeinterpretedbygeneralprocedurestoperformatthebeginner'slevel.Performanceiserrorprone,bothbecausesomeofthe
declarativeknowledgemaybeincompleteorincorrectandbecausethecontrolledinterpretiveprocesscanoverloadworkingmemoryorbespeededbeyondits
capacity.Considerthetaskoflearningtoplay"bent"or"blue"notesontheharmonica.Thefirstchallengeistodiscoverbyexperimentationjustwhatisrequiredto
playabentnote.Relevantfeaturesturnouttobeloweringthepositionofthetongue,quiteabitforlownotesandjustalittleforhighnotes,andalteringtheamountof
breath.Soonitispossibletoplaysinglebentnoteswithafairdegreeofreliability,anditistimetotrytointroducethemintophrases.Thistendstobeextremely
difficultatfirst.Agreatdealofattentionhastobedevotedtoplayingthebentnotescorrectly:thebeginningmusicianhastoanticipateacomingbentnoteand
consciouslyissueinstructionstochangethepositionofthetongueandaltertheamountofbreath.Sincethebentnotescannotbeplayedquickly,thephrasesare
playedslowlyandrhythmisdisrupted.Thisexploratory,halting,andoftenverbalizablephaseofperformancehasbeenstudiedinperceptual,motor,andcomplex
problemsolvingtasks(seeagainFitts1964LaBerge1976Anderson1983).
TheCompiledStageThesecondstageofskillacquisitioncanbecalledthecompiledstage.Duringthisstagethepartsoftheskillarechunked,orcompiled,intoa
procedurethatisspecifictotheperformanceoftheskill.Demandsonworkingmemoryareconsiderablyless,becausetheskillspecificinformationdoesnothaveto
beheldinadeclarativeformwhileitisbeinginterpretedbyamoregeneralizedprocedure.Becausedeclarativeknowledgeislessinvolved,italsobecomesmore
difficulttoverbalizetheprocessesinvolvedinperformance.Toreturntotheharmonicaexample,inthecompiledstagethereseemstobeasinglevoluntarycommand
tobendthenotethatisnolongeraccompaniedbyanawarenessofwhatisbeingdonewiththetonguepositionorbreath.
Thiscompilation,coding,orchunkingprocesshasbeenobservedinawidevarietyoftasks.LaBerge(1976),forexample,arguesthatitoccursinlearningtoperceive
individualletters.Whenadultsubjectslearnanewletterlikeform,theymustlearntoidentifyaparticularconfigurationoflinesandcurvesasaunitwithoutdevoting
attentionseparatelytoeachlineoraccessingdeclarativeknowledgeaboutthelines(whichmightbeverbalizableas,forexample,"Itlookslikeabackwardcheck
mark,butthelonglineisstraightupanddown").Theprocessalsoseemstooccurwithperceptualcategorylearning,whichtakesplacewhenweformasingle
categoryforasetofseparateitems.Aneverydaycaseistheassignmentofanycharacterfromtheset1...9tothecategoryofdigit.Whenpresentedwitha3,we
assignittothedigitcategorywithoutactivatingthesetofallninedigitsinworkingmemoryandinterpretivelysearchingthroughitforthepresenceof3.Shiffrinand
Schneider(1977,Experiment3)studiedtheacquisitionofentirelynewcategoriesofletterssuchasG,M,F,PintheirMFASTtask.Theirdataconfirmedthe
transitionfromaslowerrorproneidentificationofcategorymembershipthatinvolvedadeliberatescanofworkingmemorytoafastandaccurateidentificationwith
noscan.
Asimilarprogressionoccurswhenlearningcomplexthinkingskills,suchassolvingEuclideangeometryproblems.Anderson(1983)showsthatstudentsbegintheir
workingeometrybyapplyinghighlygeneralizedproblemsolvingproceduresthatdrawonpostulatesthatarestoredindeclarativememoryorinthetextbookitself.
With

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practice,theapplicationofaparticularpostulatecanbecompiledintoasingleproduction,sothatcertainkindsofinformationinaproblemwillinvoketheapplication
ofthepostulatewithoutrequiringthatitsfullstatementbebroughtintoworkingmemoryandcheckedforapplicability.Thiskindofproblemsolvingskillwillbe
discussedmorefullyinchapter3.
Onceaprocedurehasbeenformed,attentionisoftenstillrequiredforperformanceoftheskill.Althoughthesubjectmaynotbeabletoaccuratelyestimatethe
demandoncontrolledprocessingresourcesatthispoint,thedemandcanbemeasuredundercontrolledexperimentalconditions.Inataskthatinvolvedlearningto
identifynewletterlikecharactersLaBerge(1976)comparedanunprimedconditiontoaprimedcondition,inwhichthesubjectwascuedonwhattolookforin
advanceofeachtrial.Duringthesecondstageofacquisition,performanceintheprimedconditionwassuperiorbecausethesubjectwasabletoshiftattentiontothe
neededidentificationbeforethetrial.
TheAutomaticStageThefinalstageoflearningcanbecalledtheautomaticstage.Mostresearchershaveobservedthatperformancecontinuestoimproveafterthe
subjecthasacquiredproceduresthatarespecifictocomponentsoftheskill.Duringthisstagetheproceduresbecomemaximallyautomatic.Themainmechanismof
furtherautomatizationseemstobesimplestrengthening.Thetendencyofappropriateinputstoactivateaprocedureandthetendencyoftheproceduretorunto
completiononceactivatedbecomestrongenoughthattheadditionalactivationthatmightbeavailablebydevotingattentionalresourcestotheprocedureproducesno
furtherincreaseinperformance.Forexample,inLaBerge'sexperimentthedifferencebetweenprimedandunprimedtrialseventuallydisappearedwithpractice.The
interpretationofthisfindingwasthatshiftingattentiontotheupcomingidentificationtaskproducednobenefitbecauseattentionalresourceswerenolongerneededfor
itsoptimalperformance.SchneiderandFisk(1982)alsofoundnoimprovementinperformancewhensubjectswereinstructedtodevotetheirprimaryattentiontoan
automatizedtaskratherthantoaconcurrenttask.
FormorecomplextasksAnderson(1983)andRumelhartandNorman(1978)arguethatproceduresaretunedaswellasstrengthened.Withtuning,aprocedure
comesunderthecontroloftheoptimalrangeofinputs.Beforetuning,aproceduremaybefiredtoooftenbyanirrelevantsituation,oritmayfailtobefiredby
appropriatesituations.
Cheng(1985)hasproposedareinterpretationofthedataonautomatizationandthetheoryofskillacquisition.Shearguesthattheformationofanautomaticprocess
doesnotinvolveacompletewithdrawalofattentionandthatautomaticprocessesarenotqualitativelydifferentfromcontrolledprocesses.Hertheoryconcentrateson
thefirsttwostagesofacquisition.Theclaimisbasicallythatthebulkofimprovementinmosttasksresultsfromthediscoveryoftherelevantfeaturesofthetaskand
thecompilationofefficientprocedures.Shecallstheseprocessesrestructuring.Theresult,sheargues,isasubstantiallylowerbutnotazerodemandonattentional
resources.Ifthereisathirdstageofskillacquisition,shewouldarguethatthestrengtheningofproceduresneverinvolvesaqualitativeshifttoacompletewithdrawalof
processingresources.Rather,strengtheningwouldinvolveacontinuedshrinkageofthedemandonresources.
WhatCanandCannotBeAutomated?
Contemporaryresearchonskillacquisitionhighlightsthetremendousplasticityofcognitiveprocesses.Dramaticimprovementsinperformanceoccurasspecialized
pro

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ceduresarecompiledandautomatized.Itisnaturaltowonderwhatthelimitsofautomatizationare.Researchonthelimitsofskilldevelopmentconfrontsalogical
problem:itisalwayspossiblethatwithfurtherappropriatetrainingperformancewouldimprove.Asapracticalmatter,controlledexperimentalobservationofskill
developmentinanindividualformorethanafewmonthsisexpensiveanddifficult,thoughnotimpossible(see,forexample,ChaseandEricsson1981).Estimatesof
thetimeittakestoreachtheknownpinnacleofskillinhighlydemanding,complexactivitiessuchaschess(ChaseandSimon1973)andmusicalcomposition(Hayes
1981)suggestroughlytenyearsofdevotedpractice(Ericsson,Krampe,andTeschRmer1993).Thisobservationhasledinrecentyearstocarefulstudiesof
expertsinparticulardomains,whichwillbedescribedfurtherinchapter3.
Atthispointgeneralizationsaboutthelimitsofautomatizationandskilldevelopmentareatleastasriskyaspredictionsofthebestpossibletimeinthemarathon.
Nevertheless,somequalitativeconclusionscanbesuggested.Itseemsthatcomplexskillsaretypicallynotcompletelyautomatized.Optimalskilledperformanceseems
tobalancethespeedandhighcapacityofautomaticprocesseswiththegoaldirectednessandflexibilityofcontrolledprocesses.Asystemthatactedonlybyallowing
thecurrentlymostactiveautomaticproceduretocarrythroughtocompletionwithoutanyinfluencebygoalswouldbeincoherentlyimpulsive,withoutconsciousnessas
weknowit.Inaddition,theabilitytointerpretdeclarativeknowledge,albeitwithquitelimitedcapacity,seemstobecrucialtocopingwithproblemswehavenever
encounteredbefore.Itispreciselywhatisuniqueandmostchallengingaboutasituationthatisunlikelytoyieldtoautomatizedcomponentsofaskill,becausethepast
experiencesthatwouldbethebasisforbuildingtheprocedurearelacking.Andsincedeclarativeknowledgeisactivatedbythehighcapacityspreadingactivation
process,thelimitationisnotasgreatasitmightappeartobe.
AutomaticProcessesandtheCognitiveArchitecture
Thecapacityforautomatizationisahighlysignificantfeatureofthecognitivearchitecture.Thecognitiveprocessesunderlyingaperson'sperformanceofthesametask
changedramaticallyasafunctionofpractice.Ourorganizationofmanytutorialactivitiesaroundthemaxim"Practicemakesperfect"reflectsabasicrecognitionofthis
fact.However,bothqualitativeandquantitativedetailsoftherelationofpracticetoperformancearestillemerging,andourintuitiveunderstandingofthemseemstobe
imperfect.Improvementintheperformanceofcomplexcognitiveandsensorymotorskillscontinuestotakeplaceoveryearsandmanythousandsofhoursof
practice.Overtimetheunderlyingcognitiveorganizationofaskillundergoesqualitativechanges.Ericsson,Krampe,andTeschRmer(1993)arguethatwemay
oftenmistakenlyattributetheresultofsuperiorpracticetoinnatetalent.Thequalitativedifferencesthatappeartobethemarkofgeniusmaybejustasmuchormorea
markofaperson'sdedication.Thenotionthatinborntalentcanbeeasilyidentifiedinchildrenisalsocalledintoquestionbytheresultsonskillacquisition.Sincethe
cognitiveprocessesunderlyingperformanceatthenoviceandexpertlevelaredifferent,superiorperformanceatthenovicelevelmaynotbeagoodpredictorof
superiorperformanceattheexpertlevel.
Themasteryofacognitiveskillinvolvesthelongtermstorageofprocedures.Therearesignificantquestionsabouthowthisproceduralknowledgeisrepresentedand
whetheritisdistinctfromdeclarativeknowledge,whichisstoredinpropositionalschematic

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format.Someaspectsoftheevidencefavorastrongdistinction.Newdeclarativememoriesarerelativelyeasytostore.Theyareoftenacquiredinasingleexposure.
Thecompilationandautomatizationofacomponentofaskillseemstorequiremanyexposures.Thereseemtobemanyroutestotheactivationofadeclarative
memory,buteachaspectofaskillseemstobeunderthecontrolofprecisesensoryorcognitiveconditions.Intheearlystagesofskillacquisition,knowledgeofthe
procedureshowsstrongsignsofpropositionalstorage,suchasahighloadonworkingmemory,awarenessofwhathasbeenlearned,andanabilitynotonlyto
performtheskillbutalsotousetheknowledgeinotherways,suchastotalkaboutitoranalyzeit.Lateinlearning,theloadonworkingmemoryisreduced
dramatically,thedetailsoftheskillrecedefromawareness,andtheproceduralknowledgeisexpressibleonlyasaperformance.
Thereisneuropsychologicalsupportforthedistinctionbetweendeclarativeandproceduralknowledgeaswell(seechapter7andSquire1987).Thetwotypesof
knowledgecanbedissociatedbybraindamage.Peoplewithsevereanterogradeamnesiaareunabletolearnnewfacts,althoughtheyareabletolearnnewsensory
motorandcognitiveskills.Theirothercognitiveabilities,theirworkingmemories,andfactsthattheyacquiredpriortotheirinjuriesarealsointact.Apparently,the
amnesiadamagestissuethatisinvolvedinthetransferofactiverepresentationsinworkingmemorytolongtermpropositionalschematicmemory.Thismechanismis
apparentlynotinvolvedinskillacquisition.Examinationofthebrainsofamnesicpatientstypicallyrevealsdamagetospecificregions,themedialtemporalareaorthe
midlinediencephalicarea.Thedissociationbetweendeclarativeandproceduralstoragemechanismsproducessomestrikingbehavior.Forexample,anamnesiccan
learnanewskill(suchassolvingtheTowerofHanoipuzzle,describedinchapter5)butfailtorememberanyoftheoccasionsonwhichtheskillwaspracticed.The
distinctionbetweendeclarativeandproceduralknowledgeinhumancognitionmayrepresentanoptionaldesignchoicethatcameaboutduringtheevolutionof
cognitivesystemsandtheirphysicalsubstrates.Skillacquisitionseemstobewidelydistributedandoftenquitewelldevelopedinnonhumanorganisms.Theskill
acquisitionmechanism,althoughitworksinthesamewayregardlessofthecontentoftheskill,mayalsoberepresentedindifferentcognitiveandphysiological
systems.Forexample,muchofthelearningthatgoesonduringtheacquisitionofavisualmotorskillmayoccurinvisualandmotorsystemsratherthaninthecentral
system.Thecapacityfordeclarativeknowledgemayhaverequiredtheevolutionofaspecificphysiologicallylocalizedsysteminanarrowerrangeoforganisms.Ina
cognitivearchitecturedesignedfromscratcharoundclassicalcomputationalprinciples,suchasthatofNewell(1990),asinglelongtermmemorywithsuitably
designedstorageandretrievalprocessesmaybesufficient.
Classicaltheoriesofskillrepresentationhavecenteredaroundthenotionofproductions,whichcanbesymbolizedasIFCTHENA,orC A.Theideaisthatwhen
currentlyactivesensoryandcognitiverepresentationssatisfycertainconditionsC,thenactionsAaretriggered.Theacquisitionofaproductionhasthreepossibly
distinctaspects.First,adirectconnectionhastobeestablishedbetweentheconditionsandtheaction,sothattheconditionscanevoketheactionreliablywithoutthe
necessityofworkingmemoryintensiveandunreliableproblemsolvingprocesses.Second,theproceduralcompilationprocessisachunkingmechanismthatcan
combineproductionsinvolvingsimpleactionsintomorecomplexproductionsthatspecifysequencesorpatternsofaction.Finally,theCsideofaproductionalso
involveschunking.The

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conditionsfortheproductionhavetobeintegratedintoaperceptualcategoryorschemathatisneitheroverlyspecificnoroverlygeneral.Therearemanyquestions
abouthowproductionsareformallyrepresentedandaboutwhatisincludedinparticularconditionactionschemasastheyarebeinglearned.(Theformalaspectof
productionsystemsinthecontextofAlisconsideredfurtherinchapter4.)Thesequestionsbecomecriticallyimportantwhenthequestionoftransferofskillis
addressed.Whenthedemandsofataskchange,productionsthatwerelearnedundertheolddemandsmayfailtotransfertooreveninterferewithperformanceon
thenewtask,dependingonwhatthetwotaskshaveincommonandonhowthecommonanddistinctaspectsarerepresentedintheoriginalproductions,ifatall.
TheseissuesareexploredbySingleyandAnderson(1989).
2.10TheConnectionistApproachtoCognitiveArchitecture
Thesketchofthecognitivearchitecturedevelopedaboveissometimescalledaclassicalpictureorissaidtoexpressthesymbolicparadigmincognitivescience.In
the1980sseveralgroupsofresearchersdevelopedanalternativeconceptionofthearchitecture.Severaltermshavebeenusedsomewhatinterchangeablytodesignate
theirapproach,includingconnectionism,paralleldistributedprocessing,artificialneuralnetworks,andthesubsymbolicparadigm.Inthissectionwewill
introducetheconnectionistapproachandcompareitwiththeclassicalapproach.Thedevelopmentofwhatappearstobearadicalnewapproachtoascientificfield
inevitablyraisesfoundationalquestionsaboutthenatureofthefieldandthedefiningcommitmentsofthecontrastingresearchprograms.Wewillsketchthecontinuing
debateaboutwhattheimportantdifferencesbetweentheclassicalandconnectionistapproachesareandaboutwhetherthetwoapproachesarecompatible.
BasicFeaturesofConnectionistArchitecture
Aconnectionistnetworkconsistsofanumberofcomputationallysimpleprocessingunitsthatcommunicatewitheachotherviaconnectionsthatarecapableof
carryingonlyextremelysimplesignals.Wewillusethetermconnectionistarchitecturetoreferbothtoparticularnetworksandtogeneralcharacterizationsof
networks.Figure2.10illustratesasimpleconnectionistnetworkforcomputingtheBooleanlogicalfunctionknownasexclusiveOR,orXOR.TheXORfunctionis
illustratedinpart(a)ofthefigure.Itmapsaninputpairofbinarydigits,eachofwhichcanbe0or1,ontoanoutputbinarydigit,whichcanbe0or1.ExclusiveORis
equivalenttotheEnglishphraseeitherAorBbutnotboth.Thus,theoutputofthefunctionis1whenexactlyoneoftheinputsis1,andtheoutputis0whenneither
orbothoftheinputsis1.
First,letuslookatthestructureofthenetwork,illustratedinpart(b)ofthefigure.Therearefiveunitsinthenetwork,symbolizedbycircles.Theyareorganizedinto
threelayers:aninputlayer,ahiddenlayer,andanoutputlayer.Theconnectionsamongunitsaresymbolizedbyarrows,whichindicatethedirectionofthe
connectionbetweentwounits.Unitsinthehiddenlayerarecalledhiddenunitsbecausetheyareisolatedfromthenetwork'senvironment.Theyneitherreceiveinput
fromtheenvironmentnorsendoutputstotheenvironment.Theconnectionsinthenetworkareallbetweenadjacentlayers,makingitstrictlyhierarchical,andthe
connectionsallproceedfromtheinputlayertowardtheoutputlayer,makingitafeedforwardnetwork.Networksthatalsoincludebackwardconnectionsandthat
thereforecontainloopsare

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Figure2.10
ComputingtheXORfunctionwithaconnectionistnetwork

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calledrecurrentnetworks.Adjacentlayersofthisnetworkarefullyconnectedbecauseeachunitatalevelisconnectedtoallunitsatthenexthigherlevel.
Theprocessingrestrictionsonsingleunitsinconnectionistnetworksarerathersevere.Asingleconnectionisnotallowedtocarrycomplexsymbolicinformation,asa
singlewireconnectingtwocomputersmight.Unitsareonlyallowedtotransmitsimplenumericalvalues,whichintheexamplecanbepositive,negative,or0.Eachunit
inanetworkisanactiveprocessorthattakesthenumbersarrivingatitsinputconnectionsatagivenmomentandtransformsthemintoasingleoutputnumber,whichis
transmittedalonganyconnectionstootherunits.Thetransformationbetweentheinputsandtheoutputperformedbyasingleunitistypicallyrestrictedtorelatively
simplemathematicaloperations.Unitsarenotendowedwiththecomplexlogicalprocessingcapacitiesofelectronicmicroprocessors,forexample.TheXORfunction
isanelementaryillustrationofoneoftheconsequencesofthisrestriction.Intheexamplemodel,thehiddenunitsareinterposedbetweentheinputandoutputunits
becauseasingleoutputunitofthekindusedinthemodelcannotcomputetheXORfunctionalone.
Theinputunitsintheexamplesimplyencodetheinputdigits.Ifaninputunitisreceivinga1(or0)fromtheenvironment,itsendsanoutputvalueof1(or0)alongeach
ofitsconnectionswithotherunits.Theoperationofthehiddenandoutputunitsisabitmorecomplicated.Aunitreceivesinputvaluesfromotherunitsthatfeedit.The
inputvaluestoaunit,i,mustbecollectedintoasinglevalue,calledthenetinputtoi,orneti.Thenetinputmustthenbeconvertedintoavaluethatrepresentsthe
resultingactivationoftheunit.Theoutputoftheunitistheactivationvalue.(Insomenetworkstheactivationvalueisconvertedintoanoutputvaluebysomefurther
transformation.)Theoutputvalueissentalonganyconnectionstounitsthatarefurtherdownstream.
Thecalculationofthenetinputforthehiddenandoutputunitsintheexampleistypicalofconnectionistmodels.Eachconnectioncomingintoaunithasanumerical
weight,whichcanbethoughtofasitssensitivity.Typically,weightsareallowedtobepositive,negative,or0.Thenumbersnexttotheconnectionlinksinpart(b)of
thefigurearetheweightsontheconnections.Tocalculatenetiforaunit,theincomingvalueoneachconnectionismultipliedbytheweightontheconnection,andthe
resultingproductsareaddedup.Thenetinputtoaunitthusinvolvesaweightedsumoftheoutputvaluesoftheunitstowhichitisconnected.Inthisexample,asin
manyconnectionistmodels,thereisalsoabiasassociatedwitheachunit.Thebiasesareshownasnumbersinsidethecirclesrepresentingtheunits.Thebiasonaunit
issimplyaddedintothenetinputandcanbethoughtofasanintrinsicactivationtendencythatisindependentofinputsthatarisefromthecurrentenvironmental
stimulation.(Abiascanalsobethoughtofastheweightonaconnectionthatreceivesaconstantinputof1.)Thenetitoaunit,then,istheweightedsumoftheinputs
fromotherunitsplusthebias.Theweightedsumplusabiasschemecanobviouslybeextendedtounitsthathaveanynumberofconnectionsandweights.
SupposetheinputtotheXORnetis(1,1).Inthatcaseeachinputunitwillbesendinga1toeachhiddenunit.Thenetitothefirsthiddenunitwillthusbe
(17)+(17)+(3)=11.Thenetitothesecondhiddenunitwillbe(14)+(14)+7=1.Thesenetinputvaluesmustbetransformedintoactivation
valuesbeforetheyaresentontotheoutputunit.Whatisneededisanactivationfunctionthatspecifiesanactivationvalueforeachpossiblevalueofneti.Inthiscase
weusethesimplebinarythresholdfunctionshowninpart(c)ofthefigure.Ascanbeseen,ifneti

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islessthanorequalto0,activationis0,andifnetiisgreaterthan0,activationis1.Unitsthatcomputetheirnetinputviaaweightedsumandthatuseathreshold
functiontomapthenetinputontooneoftwoactivationvaluesarecalledlinearthresholdunits.Fortheinput(1,1),theactivationvalueofthefirsthiddenunitis1,
andtheactivationofthesecondhiddenunitis0.Sincetheoutputofaunitisequaltoitsactivationinthismodel,thesevaluescannowbepropagatedtotheoutput
unit.Thenetitotheoutputunitis(17)+(07)10=3.Sincenetiislessthan0,theactivationandhencetheoutputoftheunitis0,whichisthecorrect
responsetotheoriginalinputof(1,1).Thisseriesofcalculationscorrespondstothefourthrowofthetableinpart(d)ofthefigure,whichgivesthenetiandactivation
forthehiddenandoutputunitsinresponsetothefourpossibleinputpatterns.
ItisofsomeinteresttoexplorefurtherwhythecomputationofXORrequireshiddenunits.Togetawaywithouthiddenunits,wewouldneedtosetthetwoweightson
asingleoutputunitsothattheweightedsumsforthe(0,0)and(1,1)inputswerelessthantheweightedsumsforthe(1,0)and(0,1)inputs.Ifthiswerepossible,we
couldsetthethresholdoftheactivationfunctiontoyield0forthelowervaluesand1forthehighervalues.However,ifweassignweightssothat(0,1)and(1,0)put
theweightedsumoverthethreshold,(1,1)alsoputsitover.Theproblemisthatthesetofinputsmappedto0isnotlinearlyseparablefromthesetofinputsmapped
to1.Thegeometricsignificanceoflinearseparabilityisillustratedinfigure2.11.ThefourdesiredoutputsareplottedaspointsinatwodimensionalCartesianspace,
whichhasanaxisrepresentingeachinputvalue.Thereisnowayofdrawingalinethroughthespacesothat(1,0)and(0,1)areononesideofthelineand(0,0)and
(1,1)areontheotherside.MinskyandPapert(1969)showedthatnetworkswithasinglelayeroflinearthresholdunits(historicallyknownasperceptrons)cannot
computefunctionsthatdonotsatisfythelinearseparabilitycriterion.

Figure2.11
ThefourpossibleinputstoXOR
areplottedaspointsintwodimensional
Cartesianspace.Thesetofinputsmapped
to0isnotlinearlyseparablefromtheset
ofinputsmappedto1.Thatis,thereisno
wayofdrawingalinethroughthespace
sothat(1,0)and(0,1)areononesideof
thelineand(0,0)and(1,1)areontheotherside.

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Thefigurealsoshowsthattheseparabilitycriterionismetbyothersimplelogicfunctions.ThenetworkcomputesXORbyconvertingitintoatwostagecombination
oflogicalfunctionsthatcanbecomputedbylinearthresholdunits.Bycheckingtheactivationvaluesofthehiddenunitsinpart(d)offigure2.10,thereadercanverify
thatthefirsthiddenunitcomputesinclusiveor(''eitherAorBorboth'')andthatthesecondhiddenunitcomputesnotand("notboth").Theoutputunitthen
computestheandoftheoutputsofthetwohiddenunits.Theoutputunitthusrequiresthat"AorBorboth"and"notboth"betruesimultaneously,whichissimply
XOR.
TheideaofthinkingoftheinputtotheXORnetasapointintwodimensionalspacecanbegeneralized.Anorderedpairoftwonumbersspecifiesapointintwo
dimensionalspace,andanorderedtripleofthreenumbersspecifiesapointinthreedimensionalspace.Inthreedimensionalspacethelinearseparabilitycriterion
wouldbemetifwecouldfitatwodimensionalplanebetweentheclassesofinputpointsthatmaptodifferentoutputvalues.Ingeneral,anorderedlist,orvector,ofn
numbersspecifiesapointinndimensionalspace(andthelinearseparabilitycriterioncanbeextendedtothenotionoffittingan(n1)Dhyperplanebetweentwo
setsofpoints).Connectionistnetworkscanbethoughtofasdevicesforperformingmathematicaloperationsonvectors.Alarge,preexistingbodyofmathematics
concerningvectorscanbeuseddirectlyindescribingthebehaviorofnetworks(Jordan1986).Forexample,inadditiontothinkingoftheinputtoanetasavectorof
values,wecanthinkoftheweightsonaunitasavector.Theweightedsumforthenetinputtotheunitcanthenbethoughtofastheproductoftheweightvectorand
theinputvector.Ifwearrangetheweightvectorsonalloftheunitsinagivenlayerofanetintorowsinaweightmatrix,thentheproductofthismatrixwiththeinput
vectoryieldsthevectorofnetinputs.Thestrategyofthinkingaboutnetworksintermsofmathematicaloperationsonvectorsandmatricesandofinterpretingthese
operationsgeometricallyhasprovedveryfruitfulandisemployedextensivelyinadvancedtreatmentsofconnectionistmodels.
Thecognitivetaskthatanetworkperformsisdeterminedinpartbythearrangementoftheunitsandconnections,inpartbytherepresentationsthatareemployedat
theinputandoutputlevels,andinpartbytheweightsontheconnections.IntheXORnet,forexample,thearrangementoftheunitsandconnections,andtheuseof
binaryrepresentation,dictatethatthenetworkcomputesafunctionfromtwobinaryinputstoonebinaryoutput.However,thevaluesoftheweightsandbiases
determinewhichfunctionofthistypeiscomputed.Ifwechangedtheweightsinfigure2.10invariousways,thenetworkwouldcomputeotherfunctions.Thereader
mightponder,forexample,theproblemofsettingtheweightsandbiasessothatthenetworkcomputesNOTXOR(alsoknownasifandonlyiforIFF),which
yieldsIwheneverXORyields0andviceversa.Therearesixweightsandthreebiases,whichwecouldarrangeintoaninevaluedweightvector.Listingtheweights
fromlefttorightandbottomtotop,followedbythebiasesinthesameorder,thevectorforfigure2.10wouldbe(7,4,7,4,7,7,3,7,10).Eachsettingof
theninevaluescanbeimaginedasapointinaninedimensionalweightspace,andeachsettingisassociatedwithoneofthesixteenpossiblefunctionsfromtheset
{(0,0),(1,0),(0,1),(1,1)}totheset{0,1}.Inasense,findingasettingoftheweightsandbiasesthatcomputesaparticularfunction,suchasNOTXOR,isa
matterofmovingaroundinthisninedimensionalspaceuntilonefindsanappropriatepoint.

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Thefactthatchangingtheweightsinanetworkchangesitsperformanceraisesthepossibilitythatnetworkscouldlearntoperformtasksbyadjustingtheirown
weightsonthebasisofexperience.Learninghasindeedbeenaprominentthemeinconnectionistresearch.Thechallengesfacinganylearningprocedurearedaunting.
Inlargernetworkstheweightspacethatmustbesearchedforasuitablesetofvaluesisenormous.Ifweincreasethenumberofunitsineachlayerofathreelayer
hierarchicalnetworktoward100,forexample,thenumberofconnectionsquicklygoesintothehundredsandthenthethousands.Ifthenetworkisgoingtolearna
taskfromscratch,itneedssomesystematicprocedureforadjustingitsweightstoimproveitsperformanceinresponsetoitsexperience.Priorknowledgeofthe
functiontobecomputedcannotbeusedbecausethenetworkisassumednottohaveanysuchknowledge.Manyprocedureshavenowbeendevisedthatallow
connectionistnetworkstolearnvariouskindsoftasksundervariousenvironmentalconditions.Infact,theweightsinfigure2.10areroundedoffversionsofvaluesthat
wereactuallylearnedviaaprocedureknownasthebackpropagationalgorithmorthegeneralizeddeltarule(Rumelhart,Hinton,andWilliams1986).
Thebackpropagationalgorithmcanbeusedtoillustratesomeofthecharacteristicsofconnectionistlearningprocedures.Itappliesincaseswherethetaskofthe
networkistomapasetofinputsontoasetofoutputsandwasdevelopedspecificallytoworkfornetworkswithatleastonelayerofhiddenunits.Thenetworkis
startedwithanarbitraryconfigurationofweights,usuallychosenrandomly.Itishighlyunlikelythatthisinitialweightconfigurationcomputesthedesiredfunction.The
problemfacedbythenetworkistomovefromthisinitialpointinweightspacetoasatisfactorypointbyadjustingitsweightsusinginformationgainedfromits
experience.Clearly,asthenetworkreceivesinputsandproducesoutputs,itwillneedsomefeedbackaboutwhethertheoutputsitisproducingarecorrector
incorrect.Thebackpropagationalgorithmusesadetailedformoffeedback.Duringtraining,eachtimethenetworkreceivesaninputandproducesanoutput,the
outputiscomparedwiththecorrectoutputforthatinput.Theactualoutputvectoriscomparedwiththecorrectoutputvectorelementbyelement.Ifthereisanyerror
inthevalueproducedbyaparticularoutputunit,theweightsontheconnectionscomingintothatoutputunitarechangedslightlyindirectionsthattendtocorrectthe
error.Errorsignalsaethenpropagatedbackthroughthesuccessivelayersofhiddenunitswhereerrorcorrectingadjustmentstoweightsarealsomade.
Thenotionofaweightspacecanbeusedtounderstandbackpropagationgeometrically.Ifanetworkisbeingtrainedtocomputeaparticularfunction,eachsettingof
theweightsproducessomeamountoferroronaninputpatternorsetofpatterns.Thus,thereisafunctionfrompointsinweightspacetoerrorvalues,andtheerror
valuescanbeseenasadefiningasurfaceovertheweightspace.Theerrorsurfacehashighpoints,representinglargeamountsoferror,andvalleys,whoselowest
pointsrepresentminimumamountsoferror.Thelowestpoint(orpoints)onthesurface,theglobalminimum(orminima),representsasettingoftheweightswhere
thereistheleasterror,andthenetworkiscomingasclosetocomputingthedesiredfunctionasitcan.Iftheerrorvalueataglobalminimumis0,thenthenetwork
computesthedesiredfunctionatthissettingoftheweights.
Althoughitisnotpossibletodrawapictureofanerrorsurfacewithmanydimensions,itisusefultolookatgraphicaldepictionsofsimplecases.Infigure2.12a
measureoferrorisgraphedwithrespecttothevalueofoneweightinahypothetical

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Figure2.12
(a)Ahypotheticalerrorsurfacewithrespectto
asingleweight.Thedotrepresentsthecurrentcombination
ofweightanderror.Increasingtheweightslightlywill
reducetheerror(thepointwillmovedownonthecurve).
Amathematicalexpressionfortheslopeoferrorfunction
(thefirstderivativeofthefunction)cantelluswhichway
toadjusttheweighttoseekaminimum.Iftheslopeata
pointisnegative(asitisabove),increasetheweightifthe
slopeispositive,decreasetheweight.(b)Acontinuous
activationfunction(thelogisticfunction)thatcanbeused
insteadofthethresholdactivationfunctioninfigure2.10.

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network.Wecanimaginethiscurveasacrosssectionthroughacomplexerrorsurface,allowingustolookatwhathappenstotheerrorvaluewhenwevaryone
weightwhileholdingtheotherweightsconstant.Atagivenpointinitstrainingtheweightinquestionwillhavesomeparticularvalue,markedonthegraph.Nolearning
algorithmwillbeabletoseethewholeerrorsurfaceandthereforebeabletomovetoaminimuminasinglestep.Ifthealgorithmcantakesmallstepsdownward,
however,itwilleventuallyreachaminimum.Imagineaclimberwithnomaporcompasswhoneedstodescendamountaintoavalleyfloorandwhoiscaughtina
densefogthatallowsonlyafewfeetofvisibility.Theclimbercandescendthemountainbytakingeachstepinthelocallydownwarddirection.Whatthealgorithm
needstodo,then,istousetheerrormeasureataparticularweightsettingtodeterminethelocalslopeoftheerrorsurface.Theweightscanthenbeadjustedtoa
pointthatwillbelowerontheslope.Thestepsaretypicallykeptsmallenoughthattheyrarelyjumpoveraminimum.Complexerrorsurfacescancontainlocal
minima,whicharelowerthantheirimmediatesurroundingsbuthigherthanthelowestpointonthesurface,theglobalminimum.Therehasbeenresearchonwhenlocal
minimathatrepresentunsatisfactorysolutionstendtoexistaswellasonlearningalgorithmsthatcanfindtheirwayoutoflocalminima(e.g.,Rumelhart,McClelland,
andthePDPResearchGroup1986,chapters7and8).
Amathematicalexpressionfortheslopeoftheerrorsurfacewithrespecttoagivenweightcanbederivedusingthecalculus(Rumelhart,McClelland,andthePDP
ResearchGroup1986).Theexpressioninvolvestheslopeoftheactivationfunction.Thelinearthresholdfunctionoffigure2.10willnotdobecauseitsslopeisnotwell
definedatitsthreshold,whereitjumpsdiscontinuously.Thelinearthresholdfunctioncanbereplaced,however,byfunctionsthatarecontinuous,suchasthelogistic
activationfunction,showninfigure2.12.Thelogisticfunctionissimilartothethresholdfunctioninthatitsquashesthenetinputintoanactivationvaluebetween0and
1andmakesarapidtransitionwhenthenetinputisaround0.Duringlearning,theadjustmenttoaweightonanoutputunitdependsonlyontheamountofactivation
comingintotheweightandthedegreetowhichtheunit'soutputwasinerror.Theadjustmenttoaweightonahiddenunitdependsonthecalculationsfortheunitsthat
itisconnectedtointhenextlayer.Thus,errorsignalshavetobecomputedbeginningattheoutputlayerandthenpropagatedbackwardthroughthenetworklayerby
layer.
TheAttractionsofConnectionism
Havingdevelopedsomeofthebasicfeaturesofconnectionism,wearenowinapositiontoconsiderthereasonswhyresearchershavefounditattractive.Onehopeis
thattheconnectionistapproachwillclosethegapbetweencognitiveresearchandbrainresearch.Thus,someoftheattractionsofconnectionismcanbediscussedin
termsofincreasingtheneuralplausibilityoftheoriesincognitivescience.Atthecognitivelevelofanalysistheconnectionistapproachtosomephenomenais
consideredbysomeresearcherstobemorenaturalandpotentiallyfruitfulthanclassicalapproaches.
NeuralPlausibilityConnectionistnetworksaresometimescalledartificialneuralnetworksbecausetheyresembletheactualnetworksofneuralcells(orneurons)in
thebrain.Abstractingawayfromphysiologicaldetail,arealneuroncanbeviewedasasimpleprocessingunitthattakesaweightedsumofnumericalinputsand
producesanumericaloutputthatisasimplenonlinearfunctionofthatsum.Thedenseinter

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connectionofneuronssuggeststhatthebrain'scomputingstyleishighlyparallelandthereforepossiblysimilartothatofconnectionistnetworks.
Thisviewofthebrainisbolsteredbythefactthatthesignalingrateofneuronsisextremelyslowbythestandardsofelectronicdevices.Whereastheelectronic
componentsthatmakeupcomputerscommonlycyclemillionsoftimespersecond,neuronssendatmostafewhundreddiscreteelectrochemicalpulsespersecond
downtheiroutputfibers.Giventhatthereisacertainamountofimprecisioninthetimingoftheseimpulsesandintheresponseofreceivingneurons,itisreasonableto
hypothesizethat,atmost,thebraincanperformaboutonehundredserialstepsofcomputationinasecond.Thislimitisknownasthe100steprule(Feldmanand
Ballard1982).Manysignificantcognitiveprocessesoccurinlessthanasecond.Examplesarerecognizingfamiliarobjects,understandingspokenwordsincontext,
andmakingsimpleinferenceswhilereadingawrittenpassage.Alloftheavailableevidencesuggeststhatsuchprocessesarecomputationallycomplex,involvingat
leastthousandsofelementaryoperations.Thebraincouldnotcarrythemoutinlessthanasecondifitreliedonstrictlyserialalgorithms,executingasingleoperationat
atime.Therefore,theargumentgoes,thebrainmustutilizehighlyparallelalgorithmsthatallowmanyoperationstobeperformedsimultaneously.Anatomically,the
brainappearstobewireduptodojustthat,andresearchwithartificialneuralnetworkshasshownthatcomplexinformationprocessescanbecarriedoutinparallel.
Supportforthe100steprulecomesfromtraditionalresearchinAI,wherecomputerprogramsforvisionandlanguageunderstandingtypicallywentthroughthousands
ofstepsofcomputationtoperformsimpleactsofrecognitionandunderstanding.Suchprogramshadtoberunseriallybecauseconventionaldigitalcomputersexecute
asingleinstructionatatime.Inmanycasesevenhighspeedconventionalcomputersarenotfastenoughtoexecutetheseprogramsin"realtime,"thatis,atrates
comparabletothoseofthebrain.Byatleastoneestimateaserialcomputerwouldhavetobeabletoexecuteatleasttentrillioninstructionspersecondtomatchthe
computingpowerofthehumanbrain(Moravec1988).Currentconventionalsupercomputersareseveralordersofmagnitudebelowthisfigure.SuchresultsledAI
researchersinsomedomainstobegindesigninghighlyparallelalgorithmsandtodevelopparallelhardwareonwhichtorunthem.
Learningviaadjustableweightsonconnectionsalsohasaninitiallyhighdegreeofneuralplausibility.Itiswidelybelievedthatmuchofthelearninginthenervous
systemismediatedbychangesintheefficiencyofsynapses,thesitesofcommunicationbetweenneurons.Somecandidatemechanismsforsynapticplasticityare
actuallyunderstudy.
Afinalargumentfortheneuralplausibilityofconnectionistmodelsisthattheyrespondtosimulateddamageinwaysthataresimilartothechangesincognitionthat
occurwithactualbraindamage.Whenthebrainisdamaged,itsperformancetendstodegradegracefully.Thedecrementsinperformancetendtobeproportionalto
theamountofdamage,and,inparticular,smallinsultsrarelyleadtocatastrophiclossesoffunction.Gracefuldegradationistypicallynotafeatureofconventional
electroniccircuitsorcomputerprograms.Removingasinglecomponentfromacircuitorasinglestatementfromaprogramwilloftencausecompletemalfunction.
Resistancetodamageinneuralnetworksisanaturalconsequenceoftheirhighlyparalleldesign.Inanetworkcontainingmanyunitsineachlayer,nooneunit(orsmall
groupofunits)isacriticallinkinaserialchainofcomputation.Further,theabilityto

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computetheappropriateoutputforaparticularinputcanberedundantlydistributedacrossmanyweightsonmanyunits.Alteringordestroyingsomeoftheseweights
doesnotdestroythenetwork'sabilitytocomputetheoutput,orsomethingclosetoit,becausenooneweightmakesanabsolutelycriticalcontributiontothe
representationoftheinputoutputpair.Thiskindofdistributedrepresentationofacomputationusuallyariseswhenalearningalgorithmmakesmanysmalladjustments
tomanyweightstoimprovetheoverallperformanceofanetwork.Theresultisthateachweightmakessomesmallcontributiontothecomputationofmanyinput
outputpairs.
Neuralplausibilityargumentsarehighlyabstractandthereforedonotprovidestrongevidenceforconnectionistmodels.Mostmodelsarenotmodelsofparticular
neuralcircuitsandarenotsupportedbydetailedanatomicalorphysiologicalevidence.Themodelsignoreawealthofknownbiologicaldetail,andmanyofthem
possessfeatures,suchastheunitbyuniterrorsignalsofthebackpropagationalgorithm,thatprobablydonotoccurinrealnervoussystems.Thesemattersare
discussedfurtherinchapter7.Inspiteoftheanalogy,then,theunitsandconnectionsinmostmodelsarenotintendedtorepresentactualneuronsandsynapses.The
preciseneuralimplementationofthemodelisusuallyleftopen.Theunitsinamodel,forexample,mightmapontogroupsofneurons,singleneurons,orclustersofone
ormoresynapses.Argumentsforneuralplausibilitycanbethoughtofaspromissorynotestoberedeemedbyfutureresearch.Suchnoteshavealso,ofcourse,been
issuedinprofusionbytheclassicalschool.Thedifferenceisthattheclassicalmodelsleavethemethodofpaymentalmostcompletelyopen(e.g.,"paymentwillbe
madebythesuperiortemporallobe"),whereasconnectionistmodelssuggestanumberofrelativelymoredetailedmethodsofpayment.Byinvestigatingdirectlyhow
tobuildcognitivefunctionsoutofneuronlikeelements,connectionistsmayinspireneuroscientificresearchandhastenitsconvergencewithresearchatthecognitive
level.
CognitivePlausibilityConnectionistmodelsalsohaveanumberoffeaturesthatmakethemimmediatelyattractiveascognitivemodels,beforeanyparticular
cognitiveprocesshasbeenmodeledindetail.Oneofthechiefattractionsisthatconnectionistmodelsarespecifiedintermsofasmallsetofsimplemechanisms.
Detailedqualitativeandquantitativepredictionscanbegeneratedbywritingandrunningcomputerprogramsthatsimulatethemodels.Detailedsimulationsofclassical
theorieshavealsobeendeveloped.However,theytypicallyassumerathercomplexmechanismstobepartofthecognitivearchitecture.Forexample,aclassical
modelofmentalimagerymighttaketheoperationsofzooming,scanning,androtatingasprimitivebuildingblocks.Aconnectionistmodelwouldpresumablyshowhow
theseoperationscouldbeimplementedinnetworks.Itistemptingtoassumethattheconnectionistapproachisgettingatunderlyinggeneralprinciplesthatmight
explainavarietyofhigherlevelphenomena.Itissometimessaidthatconnectionismisexploringthemicrostructureofcognition.
Inadditiontothelevelofdetailatwhichmodelsarespecified,connectionismlendsitselftothestudyofproblemsthathavebeensomewhatneglectedwithinthe
classicalapproach.Classicaltheories,forexample,concentrateoncentralcognitiveprocessesanddonotincludedetailedaccountsoftheoperationofperceptualand
motorsystems.Becauseoftheirabilitytohandlelargearraysofinputoroutputinformationinparallel,connectionistmodelsapplynaturallytotheseareas,however.
Connectionistlearningalgorithmsalsopromisetoofferauniformaccountofchangewithexperience.The

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studyoflearninghasbecomesomewhatfragmentedwithintheclassicalapproach,withdifferentmechanismsbeingproposedfortheacquisitionofdeclarativeand
proceduralknowledge,forexample.Incomparisonwiththeclassicalapproach,connectionismpromisestoyieldanaccountoftheentirecognitivesystemintermsof
highlydetailedandgeneralprinciplesoflearningandinformationprocessing.
Intheterritorywhereclassicaltheoriesarestrongest,thepossibleadvantagesofconnectionismcanbespelledoutinmoredetail.Classicalmodelsoftenassumethe
existenceofpowerfulpatternrecognitionprocessesorcontentaddressedmemories.Forexample,thetheoriesofskillacquisitiondescribedaboveassumethataset
ofenvironmentalconditionswillmatchtheappropriateproductionsinaproductionmemory.Incomputersimulationsproductionretrievalistypicallyaccomplished
throughaserialpatternmatchingalgorithmthatsearchesmemoryforproductionswhoseconditionpartsmatchthecurrentenvironmentalcontext.Thetheoretical
assumption,however,isthatintheactualcognitivearchitecturethematchingprocessisdoneinparallelthroughsomesortofdirectcontentaddressing.Theabilityof
connectionistnetworkstomapinputvectorsontooutputvectorsinparallelopensupthepossibilityofexplainingsuchpatternrecognitionandmemoryretrieval
processesindetail.
Connectionismalsooffersanapproachtoadilemmathathasarisenintheclassicaltheoryofschematicknowledge.Aswesawearlierinthischapter,onceonehas
hypothesizedapropositionallanguageofthought,itisnaturaltoassumethatgeneralconcepts,orschemas,arerepresentedassetsofpropositions.Inthecaseof
everydayconceptsthepropositionscanbeseenasalistofrules,ornecessaryandsufficientconditions,thatmustbesatisfiedbyanyinstanceoftheconcept.The
problemisthatmostoftheconceptsthatweregularlyemploydonotseemtohavedefinitionsofthiskind.Instead,theretendtobemanyrelevantfeaturesofvarying
importance:apples,forexample,areoftenroughlyround(whenintact),areoftenlargelyred,tendtohaveasmooth,shinyskin,haveawoodystemofnarrowcross
section(whenpresent),andsoon.Suchfeaturesareneithernecessarynorsufficientformembershipinacategory,buttheydoaffecttheprobabilityofmembership.
Theyaresoftratherthanhardconstraintsontheconcept.Toimplementsoftconstraintswithinapropositionalframework,probabilitiesmustbeattachedtoeach
proposition,andalgorithmsmustbedevelopedtolearntheprobabilitiesandtoprocessthemtomakedecisionsaboutcategorymembership.Becauseoftheirabilityto
passvectorsofvaluesthroughweightedconnections,networksareobviouslywellsuitedforthiskindofcomputation.Ifavectorofinputvaluesrepresentsthe
presenceorabsence(orlikelihood)ofalargesetoffeatures,andiftheweightsrepresentprobabilities,orrelevancetovariouspossiblecategorizations,anetworkcan
simultaneouslyassesstheevidenceforallpossiblecategorizationsandselectthemostappropriatesolution.Networksaresaidtobegoodatcombiningsoftconstraints
toachievethebestfittoasituation.Ifcertainfeaturesaremissing,oriftheincomingfeaturevectorisunusual,thenetworkwillstillbeabletoweightheevidenceand
arriveatadecentsolution.Thiscapabilityisacognitivevariantofgracefuldegradation.Anexceptionalsituationmightbringasystemgovernedbyhardconstraintstoa
halt,exposingitsbrittleness.Connectionistlearningalgorithmsthatadjusttheweightsinanetworkessentiallyallowthenetworktodiscovertheconstraintsonasetof
conceptsthroughitsexperiencewithexamples.Behaviorthatappearstobegovernedbyrulescanemergewithinthisframeworkwhen

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theconstraintsoperatinginadomainareindeedhardorclosetoit.Thus,itisarguedthatthesamemechanismscanhandlebothrulegovernedandprobabilistic
domains.
Thisapproachtoconceptsrepresentsageneraldissatisfactionintheconnectionistcommunitywithidentifyingcognitionastheprocessingofstructuredsymbolic
expressions,suchaspropositions.Aproposition,suchasGIVE(JOHN,TEACHER,APPLE),isrelatedtoawealthofexperiencewithobjects,people,and
situations.ConnectionistshavearguedthatpredicatessuchasAPPLEorGIVEaresurfacemanifestationsofavastlyrichermicrostructure.Evensimpleconcepts,
suchasAPPLE,mightondifferentoccasionsinvolvevaryinglevelsofactivationofthousandsofmicrofeatures,manyofwhichcannotbeverbalized.Dependingon
theprofileofactivationoverthesefeatures,asomewhatdifferentconceptofapplemightbeconstructedineachsituation.Ourconscious,verbalnotionofastable,
welldefinedapplemightbeaconvenientfiction,orapproximation,thatstandsfortheoverlapamongallofthesesituationallyspecificconceptsofapplethatare
constructedontheflyandthatdotherealworkofapplecognition.Insuchasystem,theconceptofapplewouldbedistributedovermanyunits,whichalso
participateincomputationsinvolvingotherconcepts.Nounitswouldbededicatedtotheconceptofapple,andtoalargeextenttheconceptofapplewouldnotbe
associatedwithaparticularpatternofactivation(althoughourconsciousapprehensionoftheconceptandthewordmightrequireaparticularpatternofactivationof
somesubsetofunits).TheattractionsofsuchasubsymbolicviewoftheessenceofcognitionhavebeenwellarticulatedbySmolensky(1988).
AnExampleAmodelcalledNETtalk,developedbySejnowskiandRosenberg(1987),canservetoillustratesomeoftheattractionsofconnectionismaswellas
whatconnectionistmodelslooklikewhentheyarescaleduptomeetthedemandsofarealisticcognitivetask.ThegoalofNETtalkwastolearnthenotoriously
difficultmappingfromEnglishspellingtopronunciation.Aphonemicrepresentationwasusedforspeech.Forexample,aphonemicrepresentationforthetext"Icould
dance"inacertaindialectmightbe/aykUddns/(wherethephoneticcharacters,orphonemes,arepronouncedasshownintable6.1).Thisexampledemonstrates
someofthecomplexitiesofthemappingfromEnglishtexttospeech.Theletter'c'ispronounced/k/in'could'and/s/in'dance'.The'e'in'dance'isn'tpronouncedat
all,andsomehowthesequence'oul'in'could'comesoutas/U/.
Oneapproachtocomputingthemappingwouldbeasetofexplicitcorrespondencerules.Forexample,arulesuchas'Xave#' /e/couldspecifythepronunciation
oftheletter'a'whenitisprecededbyanything(X)andfollowedby've'andaspace(#).Therulewouldcoverthepronunciationof'a'inmostwordsendingin'ave',
suchas'gave','shave',or'enclave'.Peskyirregularwords,suchas'have',couldbehandledbywordspecificrules,suchas'#have#' //.Wecouldtreattherules
asproductionrulesandhandletheconflictsbetweenthegeneralrulesandtheexceptionruleseitherbyalwaysgivingmorespecificrulespriorityorbystoringthe
exceptionrulesinaspecialproductionmemorythatisalwayssearchedfirst.Wecouldalsotrytodeviseaproductionlearningalgorithmthatwouldlearntherules
fromexamples,suchas'#have#'/hv/,'#gave#'/gev/,andsoon.Thealgorithmwouldhavetobeabletohypothesizerulesandadjusttheirgeneralitybasedon
somerecordoftheirsuccess.
Figure2.13sketchesthealternativeapproachofNETtalk,afeedforwardnetworkwithlayersofinput,hidden,andoutputunits.Theinputlayercontained203units
dividedinto7groups,eachcontaining29units.Eachgroupcouldencodeasingle

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Figure2.13
ThearchitectureofNETtalk.Onlysomeoftheunitsand
connectionsareshown.Theinputtothenetworkisastringofseven
characters,whichcanbeletters,spaces(#),orpunctuationmarks.
Thesevencharactersareencodedbysevengroupsofinputunits.
Eachgroupcontains29units,oneforeachpossiblecharacter.The
inputlayerisfullyconnectedtothehiddenlayerof80units.The
hiddenlayerisinturnfullyconnectedtotheoutputlayerof26units.
EachoutputunitrepresentsafeatureofEnglishpronunciation(seetext).
Thegoalofthenetworkistoactivatetheoutputunitsthatcorrespondto
thecorrectpronunciationofthecentercharacteroftheinputstring.Given
the'c'inthefigure,thenetworkshouldactivatetheunitsforvoiceless,
velar,andstop,whichrepresentthecorrectphoneme,/k/.
(AdaptedfromSejnowskiandRosenberg1987.)

characterusingalocalcode.Oneunitinthegroupwasallottedtoeachletterofthealphabet,andthreeadditionalunitswereusedtoencodespaceandpunctuation.In
thefigure,thespaceunitwouldbeactiveinthefirstgroupofinputunits,the'i'unitwouldbeactiveinthesecondgroup,thespaceunitinthethirdgroup,andsoon.
Givenasevencharacterstringasaninput,thenetworkattemptedtocomputethepronunciationofthemiddleletter.Thepronunciationofanentiretextwascomputed
bymovingthetextthroughthissevenletterwindowonecharacteratatime.Iftheinputtextwere"Icoulddance,"theinputinthefigure,'#i#coul',wouldbefollowed
by'i#could'with'o'asthecentralletter.Thearchitectureofthenetworkisthusbasedontheassumptionthatlettertosoundcorrespondencescanbecomputedifleft
andrightcontextsofthreecharacterspacesareavailable.
Adistributedrepresentationwasusedforthephonemicoutput.TherepresentationwasbasedonthefactthatthesoundsofEnglish(andothernaturallanguages)can
berepresentedassetsoffeatures(seetables6.1and6.2).Forexample,thesound/k/canberepresentedbythesetoffeatures{voiceless,velar,stop},where
voicelessmeansthatthevocalcordsarenotvibrating,velarmeansarticulatedatthesoftpalate,andstopmeansthattheairstreamisinterrupted.Relatedsoundshave
similarfeaturesetsforexample,thefeaturesfor/p/are{voiceless,bilabial,stop}because/p/isidenticalto/k/exceptthatitisarticulatedwiththelips.Theoutput
layercontained26units.Therewasoneunitforeachpossiblephoneticfeature(thefeaturesetwassomewhatsmallerthanintable6.2).Therewasaunitthat
representedsilentcharacters.Therewerealsoseveralunitsthatrepresentedinformationaboutstressandsyllableboundaries,which

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wewillignorehere.Thisisadistributedrepresentationbecauseeachfeatureunitparticipatesintherepresentationofmorethanonesound.Forexample,thefeature
stopispartoftherepresentationsof/p/,/b/,/t/,/d/,/k/,and/g/.Eachphoneme,then,wasrepresentedbya26elementvectorwith1sand0sintheappropriateslots.
Forexample,thevectorfor/k/wouldhave1sintheslotsrepresentingvoiceless,velar,andstopand0selsewhere.Eachofthephonemevectorscanbethoughtof
asapointin26dimensionalspace(eachpointisavertexona26dimensionalhypercube).
Thegoalofthenetworkistoproducethevectorforthephonemethatisthecorrectpronunciationoftheletterbeingpresentedtothecenterinputunit.Inthefigure,
thecorrectpronunciationof'c'is/k/,sothenetworkshouldactivatetheunitsforvoiceless,velar,andstop.Duringtrainingthenetworkwillmissitstargetsbysome
amount.Evenafterextensivetrainingtherewillbesomeerrorbecausetheoutputofthelogisticactivationfunctionliesstrictlybetween0and1.Therefore,some
criterionhastobeadoptedtodeterminewhenthenetworkhasproducedanoutputvectorthatiscloseenoughtothetargetvectorinthe26dimensionalfeature
space.Amatchcriterionwouldrequirethattheoutputbe,say,.9orhigheronunitsforwhichthetargetvalueis1and.1orloweronunitsforwhichthetargetvalueis
0.Adistance,orbestguess,criterionwouldpickthephonemevectorthatisclosesttotheoutputvectorinthe26dimensionalspace.Iftheclosestphonemevectoris
thetarget,thentheoutputisconsideredcorrect.Thedistancecriterionisweakerthanthematchcriterionbecauseanoutputthatfailstomatchthetargetvectorcanstill
beclosertothetargetthanitistoanyotherphonemevector.Althoughthedistancecriterionmayseemtooweak,itisreasonableinthesensethatitisoftenpossible
toaddrecurrentlateralconnectionswithintheoutputlayeroranotherlayerofconnectionstopulloutputvectorstowardthenearesttarget(HintonandShallice1991).
Thehiddenlayerofthenetworkcontained80units.Theinputlayerwasfullyconnectedtothehiddenlayer,andthehiddenlayerwasfullyconnectedtotheoutput
layer.Theseconnectionsyield(20380)+(8026)=16,240+2,080=18,320weights.Theunitsalsohadadjustablebiases.Thenetworkwastrainedvia
repeatedpresentationsofcorrectinputoutputpairsconstructedfroma1,024wordtext.Theweightswereadjustedusingthebackpropagationlearningprocedure.
Afterfiftypassesthroughthetext,representingabout250,000trainingpairs,thenetworkachieved95percentcorrectperformancebythebestguesscriterion.When
thenetwasthentested,withoutfurthertraining,onanew439wordtext,itwascorrect78percentofthetime.
OurfocushereisnotonNETtalk'spreciselevelofperformanceoronitssuitabilityasamodelofhumanreadingbutratheronhowitillustratestheattractive
characteristicsofconnectionistmodels.Noassumptionshadtobemadeaboutthekindsofrulesthatareneededtomaptexttophonemes.Nospecialmechanisms
hadtobesetuptohandlethedistinctionbetweenregularaspectsofthemappingandexceptionwords.Thenetworklearnedaninternalrepresentation,encodedinthe
finalsetofweights,thatcapturedmuchofthecomplexmixtureofregularityandirregularitythatcharacterizesEnglishspelling.Therepresentationisdirectlyaddressed
bytheinput.Thatis,thereisnoneedforasearchthroughmemorytolocatetheknowledgerelevanttotheinput.Thequestionsabouthowtoconstructandrevise
texttophonemeproductionrulesinresponsetoevidencedidnothavetobedealtwithinadvance.Duringtraining,thecurrentweightsrepresentthenetwork'soverall
hypothesisaboutthemapping.Thebackpropagationalgorithmusestheerrorintheoutputvectoroneachtrainingpairtomakesmallweightadjustmentsthatimprove
thehypothesis.

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Thenetwork'srelativelyhighlevelofperformanceonanewtextdemonstratestheabilityofnetworkstogeneralizetonovelinputsandtofailgracefullyratherthan
crashwhentheenvironmentchanges.Thenetautomaticallymapsanyinputvectorontoanoutputvector,usingitsweightstoevaluatevariousaspectsoftheinputand
combinethemtosettleonasolution.Thiscapacityisanaturalconsequenceofconnectionistprinciples.Toachievesimilarcapacitiesinasystemcontainingalargeset
ofrules,wewouldhavetofigureouthowtosearchfor,evaluate,andapplypartiallymatchingrules.
NETtalkalsoperformedwellaftersimulateddamage,orlesions,toitsweights.Oneformofsimulateddamageistorandomlyaltereachweightbyanamountlying
betweendand+dforsomeconstantd.Asdincreased,NETtalk'sperformancefelloffgradually.Whendwaslessthan65percentoftheaverageweight,
performancedegradedverylittle.Evenafterseveredamagethenetworkrelearnedmorerapidlythanithadlearnedoriginally,confirmingthatthedamagedweights
retainsignificantinformationaboutthemapping.
Thenetwork'sresistancetodamagesuggeststhatitslearnedrepresentationofthetexttophonememappingiswelldistributedacrosstheweights.Thereisa
significantquestion,however,aboutjusthowthemappingisencoded.Wemightfind,forexample,thatthenetworkactuallyencodesproductionrules,ofthekind
introducedabove,insomerelativelystraightforwardway.Withover18,000weightsinthenetwork,ittakesanontrivialinvestigationtodiscoverhowthemappingis
accomplished.SejnowskiandRosenberg's(1987)studyofNETtalk'srepresentationrevealedthatitwasmoderatelydistributed.About15percentofthehiddenunits
weresignificantlyactivatedbyeachinput,andallhiddenunitsrespondedtomorethanoneinput.Whenpatternsofactivationoverthehiddenunitswerestudied,they
revealedconsiderableregularitythatreflectedtheregularitiesoftheEnglishspellingandsoundsystems.Forexample,theactivationpatternsforvowelsandfor
consonantsformedtwodistinctclusters.Generally,similarpatternsofactivationwereinvolvedwithsimilarlettertophonemecorrespondences.Forexample,
activationpatternsoverthehiddenunitswereverysimilarfor'c'/k/and'k'/k/pairs,orfor'a'/e/and'a'//pairs.Patternsofactivationforexceptionalcases
werequitedifferentfromthoseforregularcasesandtendedtoformtheirownclusters.Ineffect,NETtalklearnedtheregularitiesandthenfoundawaytorecognize
theexceptions,settingweightsinsuchawaythatthestandardresponsewasoverridden.
ConnectionismasaTheoryofCognitiveArchitecture
Havingseensomethingofhowconnectionistmodelsworkandhavingsampledsomeoftheirattractions,wearenowinapositiontoconsidertheimplicationsof
connectionismfortheclassicaltheoryofthecognitivearchitecture.Thebasicconceptsofconnectionism(units,connections,activationfunctions,weights,andsoon)
areatalowerlevelofanalysisthanclassicalcognitivetheories.Aconnectionisttheoryofthecognitivearchitecturemustmakeclaimsabouttherepresentationof
cognitivecontentandaboutinformationprocessingatthecognitivelevel.Oneapproachtodevelopingaconnectionisttheoryofthecognitivearchitectureistoadopt
manyoftheclassicaltheory'sassumptionsaboutrepresentationandprocessing.Connectionismisthentreatedasalowerlevelenterprisethatexploresthepossibilities
forimplementingclassicalmodelswithparallelalgorithmsandmachines.Analternative,moreradicalapproachistobeginwiththebasicconceptsofconnectionism
andusetheattractive

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propertiesofnetworksdiscussedaboveasaguidetobuildinganewtheoryofthecognitivearchitecture.Suchatheorywouldbeadirectcompetitorwiththeclassical
theorythatmightchallengemanyofitskeyassumptions.Variousmixturesofthetworesearchstrategiesareimaginable,aswell.
ConnectionismasImplementationofClassicalTheoryWecanbeginbyexploringtheimplementationalpositionabitfurther.Ananalogywithdigitalcomputers
showsthatthepositionispossible.Theclassicalarchitecturecanbeconsideredanalogoustoaprogramminglanguageonacomputer.Aprogramminglanguage
constitutesauniversalcomputationalarchitecturethatmakescertaincapabilitiesimmediatelyandtransparentlyavailabletotheprogrammer.Forexample,newsymbol
structuresandproceduresforoperatingonthemcanbedirectlydefined.Severallevelsofanalysisdown,however,wecandescribethecomputerasadevice
constructedbyinterconnectingaverylargenumberoflogicdevices,eachoneofwhichcomputessomerelativelysimplefunctionfromaninputvectorof0sand1sto
anoutputvectorof0sand1s.TheexampleofXORdemonstratesthatsimplelogicfunctionscanbeimplementedasconnectionistnetworks.Bysuitably
interconnectingmanyoftheselittlenetworks,therefore,wecouldconstructalargenetworkthatimplementedthearchitectureofaprogramminglanguage.
Analogously,wecouldconstructaclassicalcognitivearchitectureinthisway.
Knowingthatitispossibleinprincipletobuildtheclassicalarchitectureusingconnectionistmachineryisafarcryfromknowingexactlyhowtodoit.The
implementationalviewofconnectionismbeginswiththeassumptionthattheclassicaltheoryhasgivenusarevealingpictureofthefundamentalcapacitiesofthemindat
aparticularlevelofanalysisandseekstodiscoverhowthesecapacitiescanbeimplementedintermsofstructuresandprocessesdefinedatalowerlevelofanalysis.
Sucharesearchprogramisworthundertakingonlyifitmightleadtoanexpandedunderstandingofhumancognition.Connectionistprinciplesmightofferdeeperor
moregeneralexplanationsofsomecognitivephenomena.Theresearchmightleadtodiscoveriesabouttheneuralunderpinningsofcognition.Itmightsolvesomeofthe
openproblemswiththeclassicaltheory.Forexample,itmightshowhowsemanticnetworksorproductionretrievalcanactuallybeimplemented.Finally,itmight
generatenewempiricalfindings.Forexample,aconnectionisttheoryofproductionsystemsthatincludedanoveldistributedrepresentationofproductionsmightmake
newpredictionsaboutconstraintsonskillacquisition,errorsinskilledperformance,ortransferofskillsacrosstasks.
Someconnectionistresearchhasbeguntodemonstratehowmajorcomponentsoftheclassicaltheorycanbegivenconnectionistimplementations.Forexample,
Shastriandhiscolleagues(ShastriandAjjanagadde1992)haveshownhowsemanticnetworksandcertainaspectsofconceptualandpropositionalreasoning
associatedwiththemcanbegivenaconnectionistimplementation.TouretzkyandHinton(1988)haveshownthatsimpleproductionsystemscanalsobegivena
connectionistimplementation.Althoughtheseresearchershavenotconfinedtheirworktotheimplementationalapproach,theseparticularpiecesofresearch
demonstratedindetailthatsignificantpartsoftheclassicalarchitecturecanbebuiltfromconnectionistcomponentsandthattakingclassicaltheoryseriouslycanleadto
importantinsightsabouthowtostructureconnectionistmodels.Theirworkalsosuggestssomerevisionsofclassicalideas.

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ClassicalCritiqueoftheAttractionsofConnectionismInthecourseofurgingimplementationalconnectionismsomeproponentsoftheclassicalapproachhave
developedacritiqueoftheclaimedadvantagesofconnectionism(FodorandPylyshyn1988).Theyhavearguedfirstthatconnectionistshavemisconceivedthe
necessarypropertiesofclassicalmodelsandsecondthatmuchofthecritiqueofclassicaltheoryactuallyconcernsissuesofimplementation.
Oneillustrationofthefirstargumentisthatconnectionistshaveputoverlyrestrictiveconditionsonrulesinclassicalmodels.FodorandPylyshyn,andothers,have
arguedthatclassicalmodelsarenotrestrictedtoallornothingrulesthatfailcompletelywhentheirconditionsarenotperfectlymatched.Itispossibletoallowrulesto
firewithsomeprobabilitywhentheirconditionsarepartiallymatched,forexample,ortospecifyaprocessthatattemptstocomputeanintermediatecourseofaction
whentheconditionsformorethanonerulearepartiallymatched.Classicalrulesalsodonothavetobeimplementedasexplicitstructuredexpressions,asissometimes
impliedinconnectionistcritiques.Ifweconsideraconventionalcomputerprogramasananalogywithaclassicalmodel,weseethatsomeoftherulesinvolvedinits
executionareimplementedasexplicitexpressionsandothersarenot.Theprogram,proper,isindeedalistofexpressionsstoredinmemoryandretrievedonebyone
forexecution.Theprocessesthatinterprettheinstructionsduringexecutionareindeedsensitivetotheirsyntacticstructure.However,theinterpreter'srulesarewired
directlyintothecircuitryofthecomputer.Theyarenotstoredinamemory,andtheirinternalstructurecannotbeinspectedbyanyotherprocessinthesystem.A
classicalsystemmusthaveatleastsomeimplicitprocesses,becauseasystemthatwasalldatainneedofinterpretationwouldneverdoanything.Computersare
designedwithaminimalcomplementofimplicitrules,butthehumancognitivearchitecturecouldhaveacompletelydifferentbalancebetweenexplicitandimplicitrules.
Theclassicalapproachismoredeeplycommittedtoexplicitdatastructures,becausemostmodelsincludeprocessesthatcanbuild,store,retrieve,analyze,and
decomposesyntacticallystructuredrepresentations.
Theargumentthatmanyconnectionistclaimsconcernimplementationcanbeillustratedwiththe100stepruleandtheissueofgracefuldegradationwithphysical
damage.The100stepruleisbasedonassumptionsaboutneuralcomputationandthereforeconcernsneuralimplementation.Itdecisivelyfavorsconnectionistmodels
onlyifthereisnowaytoimplementclassicalmodelsinparallelhardware.Butinmanyclassicalmodelssignificantparallelismisassumedinbothbasicoperationsand
algorithms.Forexample,inaspeechunderstandingsystemthatusedproductionrulestobuildrepresentationsofincomingsentences,thebasicoperationof
productionretrievalcouldoperateinparallel,andmanyrulesthatdealtwithaspectsofthesound,syntactic,andsemanticstructureofthesentencecouldapplyin
parallel.Similarly,thereisnoknownbarriertoimplementingclassicalmodelsinawaythatmakesthemlessbrittleinthefaceofphysicaldamage.Theconnectionist
advantageintherealmofimplementation,then,isrelativeratherthanabsolute.Sinceconnectionisttheoriesarespecifiedatalowerlevelofanalysis,theyspecify
aspectsofimplementationthatareleftopen(andarepossiblydifficulttoresolve)inclassicalmodels.
Theconclusionoftheconservativeclassicististhatconnectionismshouldbepursuedasawayofexploringtheimplementationofclassicalmodels.Theparallel
implementationofclassicalmodelsispossible,andconnectionismoffersmanyconcreteideasaboutparallelimplementation.Ontheotherhand,theclaimedcognitive
advantagesof

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connectionismareillusory.Needlesstosay,mostconnectionistresearchersdisagreewiththislimitedinterpretationoftheirinsights.
ConnectionismasanAlternativetoClassicalTheoryInorderforconnectionismtobeviewedasanalternativetotheclassicaltheory,thebasiclowlevel
assumptionsaboutnetworkshavetobeusedtoconstructahighleveltheorythatmakesnovelclaimsaboutinformationrepresentationandprocessing.Many
researchersbelievethattheattractionsofconnectionismpointinthisdirection.
Aswehavelearned,classicaltheorymakesastandardsetofinterlockingassumptionsaboutthenatureofcognitiverepresentationsandtheprocessesthatworkon
them.Cognitiverepresentationsareassumedtobestructured.Thus,theyexhibitproductivity:thereisafinitesetofsyntacticrulesthatcangenerateanunlimitedsetof
novelexpressions.Theprocessesthatoperateonexpressionsarestructuresensitive.Structuredrepresentationsandstructuresensitiveprocessingguaranteethat
cognitionishighlysystematic,becauserepresentationsthatshareformalpropertiesareautomaticallytreateduniformlybyprocessesthataresensitivetothose
properties.Therepresentationalmappingfromexpressionstotheworldiscompositionalthatis,itisafunctionoftheinternalstructureoftheexpressions.Supposea
personreasonsfromGIVE(MARY,JOHN,BOOK7)toHAVE(JOHN,BOOK7).Theclaimisthattherehavetobesyntacticprocessesthatcanreliablygenerate
twoandthreeplacepredicationswithstandardslotsforthepredicatesandthearguments.TherehastobeaninferencerulerelatingGIVEandHAVEthatcan
accessthesecondandthirdargumentsofGIVEandgenerateaHAVEexpressionwiththesetwoargumentsplacedinthefirstandsecondargumentslots.The
representationalmappingfromtheGIVEexpressiontotheworldhingesonthedistinctionamongthethreeargumentslots.Thatis,GIVE(MARY,JOHN,BOOK7)is
trueifandonlyifMary,John,andaparticularbookarerelatedinasuchawaythatMarywasthegiverandJohntherecipientofaparticularbook.Iftheexpression
hasadifferentinternalsyntacticstructure,suchasGIVE(JOHN,MARY,BOOK7),thenadifferentrelationshiphastoholdintheworld.
Aswehaveseen,oneofthemainattractionsofconnectionismisthatnetworksarecapableofperforminginterestingcomputationswithoutexplicitlycodedsymbolic
representationsorstructuresensitiverulesforprocessing.Theirlackofsymbolicprocessingseemstobecriticaltosomeoftheirmostattractiveproperties,suchas
gracefuldegradation,lackofbrittleness,abilitytoexploitsoftconstraints,andabilitytogeneralizetodecentsolutionsinnewcontexts.Theseobservationshaveledto
thehypothesisthatcomputationoverstructuredsymbolicexpressionsisnottheessenceofcognition.
Animmediateobjectiontothishypothesisisthatatleastsomeofourthoughtdefinitelyseemstohavethecharacteristicsofsymboliccomputation.Therearetwo
somewhatdifferentwaysofansweringtheobjection.Oneisthattheappearanceofsymboliccomputationcanemergefromprocessesthatarenotsymbolic.NETtalk
givessomeoftheflavorofthisclaim.Thenetworkisabletolearnregularitiessuchas'#ciX' /s/(initial'c'followedby'i'ispronounced/s/)without,inanyobvious
way,constructingandmanipulatingproductionrulesduringlearning.Thenetobeystheproductionrules.Therulesprovideagoodhighleveldescriptionofthenet's
behavior.Buttheredoesn'tseemtobeanyscientificpayoffinclaimingthatthenetliterallyconstructedtherulesorusesthemtoproducethebehavior.Thisviewof
NETtalksuggeststhepossibilitythattheconceptsoftheclassicaltheorymightnotmaponto

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thelowerleveltheory,aswewouldexpectinanimplementationalreduction.Productionrulesmightbesaidnottoexistinroughlythesamesensethatphlogistonhas
beensaidnottoexistsinceLavoisierdevelopedthemodernchemicaltheoryofcombustion.Or,perhaps,productionrulesmightberetainedonlyasauseful
approximationofthesystem'sglobalbehavior.AnanalogyhereisthecaseofNewtonianmechanics.Newton'slawsprovideanexcellentdescriptionofthe
macroscopicbehaviorofmanyphysicalsystems,eventhoughthelawsarestrictlyfalse(iftwentiethcenturyphysicsisaccepted),andmanyNewtonianconcepts,such
asvelocityindependentmass,havenocounterpartinmodemphysics.Churchland(1986)discussestherangeofreductionisticrelationshipsthatcanexistamong
theoriescouchedatdifferentlevels.
Thenotionthatthemechanismsofcognitionarenotsymbolicisplausibleforperceptualprocessesbutlesssoforprocessesthatarelessstimulusboundandmore
extendedintime,suchasreasoningandproblemsolving.Simpleinferences,suchasinferringAfromA&B,seemtodependonbeingabletobreakA&Bintothree
parts,thepropositionsAandBandthelogicalconnective&.Thus,wecaninferwugseatflibfromwugseatflib,andblapsaremorfwithoutknowingthemeanings
ofseveraltermsintheexpressions.Itishardtoimplementthiskindofreasoninginasystemwithoutrelyingonstructuredsymbolicrepresentationsandstructure
sensitiveprocesses.ThepatternofinferenceiscompletelysystematicinthesensethatitgeneralizesoverpropositionsAandBofanylength,content,andinternal
structure(FodorandPylyshyn1988).
Thestrongestversionoftheclassicalpositionincludestheclaimthattheproductivityandsystematicityofthoughtprocessesatthecognitivelevelrequirethatthe
syntacticstructuresofcognitiverepresentationsmapontolowerlevelsinadirectmanner.Forexample,ifasystemisprocessingarepresentationofA&B,there
shouldbedistinctphysicalregionsofthesystemthatencodeA,&,andB.InacomputerAmightberepresentedbythecontentsofoneormoreparticularmemory
locations,andsoon.Thereshouldalsobesomedistinctphysicalencodingofthesyntacticrelationsamongthethreesymbols.Asimplenotionofthesyntacticrelations
hereisthatthethreesymbolsareconcatenatedintoastring,thatis,Acomesbefore&,whichcomesbeforeB.Inacomputerwithnumericallyaddressablememory
locations,concatenationcanberepresentedbyplacingadjacentitemsinadjacentmemorylocations,or,moregenerally,byaugmentingtherepresentationofeachitem
inthestringwiththeaddressofthelocationofthenextitemofthestring.Suchaddresses,knownaspointers,facilitatetheefficientstorageandprocessingof
arbitrarilycomplicatedsyntacticstructures.Pointersalsoallowthephysicalcodeforanexpressiontobehighlyandunpredictablydiscontinuous.Yetonanyparticular
occasionparticularmemorylocations(whicharebitsofphysicalstuffinparticularelectricalstates)arededicatedtoencodingtheexpression.Noonehasarguedthat
thebrainpossessesanumericallyaddressablerandomaccessmemory,butargumentsfortheclassicalpositionoftenappeartoincludethehypothesisthatthephysical
implementationofcognitiverepresentationsinthebrainisatleastasdirectasitisinvonNeumanncomputers.Thehypothesisissomewhatopenendedbecausethere
arefewdetailedproposalsforlowerlevelimplementationsofclassicalmodels.Itishardtosayinadvancejustwhatsortsofimplementationssatisfythehypothesis.
Someresearchershavearguedthateventheparadigmcaseofsystematicreasoningcanbehandledbyconnectionistmodelsthatarenotstraightforward
implementations

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ofclassicalmodels(vanGelder1990Smolensky1988).Oneproposalisthatdistributedrepresentationscanpossessarichinternalstructurewithoutbeingdivisible
intopartsthatcorrespondtothesyntacticstructureofaclassicalrepresentation.Processinginanetworkmightreflectthisinternalstructureeventhoughthestructure
isn'timplementedtransparentlyintheactivationvaluesontheunitsorintheconnectionweights.Forexample,expressionsoftheformA&Bmightberepresentedas
vectorsofactivationvalues.However,wemightnotbeabletoidentifyanyoftheunitsasrepresentingtheconstituentsA,&,andB,ortheirrelations,becausethe
representationofeachoftheseaspectsofthesyntacticstructureisdistributedacrosstheunits.Nevertheless,itmightbepossibletoentersuchvectorsintoanetwork
withappropriateweightsandreliablyproduceoutputvectorsthatrepresenttheApartsoftheexpressions.Thisprocesswouldimplementtheruleofinferencefrom
expressionsoftheformA&BtoA,yettherewouldnotbethekindofdirectimplementationofsyntacticstructurepredictedbymanyproponentsoftheclassical
approach.Evenifsuchhighlydistributedrepresentationsprovetobefeasibleforsystematicreasoning,evidencewouldthenhavetobesoughtthattheyactuallyfigure
inhumancognition.Theissuecouldbedecidedbyfindingsaboutneuralcircuitryorbyfindingsaboutthelearningorapplicationofrulesthatsupportdistributed
representations.
Thediscoverythatreasoningrestsondistributedrepresentationsthatareprocessedassyntacticallystructuredexpressionswouldhaveuncertaineffectsonthe
classicalapproach.Aclassicaltheorymightremainthebestaccountofpeople'sreasoningcompetenceaswellasofmuchoftheflowofthought.Thelowerlevel
connectionisttheorywouldexplainthenontransparentimplementationofsyntacticstructureandperhapscertainkindsofreasoningerrorsandruleacquisition
phenomena.Asuccessfulconnectionisttheorymightalsoexplainrelationshipsbetweencognitiveprocessesthatdependonstructuredrepresentationsandperceptual
processesthatrelymoreonsoftconstraintsandfindingbestfits.Smolensky(1988)arguesforaparticularversionofthetheoreticalbalance,distinguishingbetweenthe
consciousruleinterpreter,orsymbolicprocessor,andtheintuitive,orsubsymbolic,processor.Thesymbolicprocessor,althoughimplementedasaconnectionist
network,isorganizedtobehaveatthecognitivelevelasauniversalmachine.Itaccountsforourabilitytocarryoutsequentialrulegovernedcomputationsover
syntacticallystructuredrepresentations.Subsymbolicprocessingarisesfromthelowerlevel,intrinsiccharacteristicsofconnectionistnetworks,suchasmicrofeatural
softconstraintsandthebestfitprinciple.Smolenskyassociatestheoperationofthesymbolicprocessorwiththeconsciousacquisitionandapplicationofculturally
transmittedknowledge.Paradigmcasesmightbelongdivision,orselectingcollegecoursesonthebasisoftherulesforgraduation.Hearguesthatintuitivethought
doesnotarisefromunconscioussymboliccomputation,involvingunconsciousstructuresensitiverules.Thisclaimisincompatiblewiththemanyclassicalproposalsfor
unconscioussymbolicrepresentationandcomputation,particularlyinlanguage(seechapters6,9,and11fordetails).
TheFutureTheclassicalapproachremainsafertilesourceofnewcognitivetheoryandempiricallytestablehypotheses.Connectionismhasalsoproventobeaviable
foundationalapproachtocognition.Thetwoapproachesstillappeartobestrikinglycomplementarytoeachother.Theyworkprimarilyatdifferentlevelsofanalysis.
Phenomenathatseemtohavenaturalexplanationswithinoneframeworktendtochallengetheother.Atthispointtherelationbetweenthetwoapproachesremainsto

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bedecidedbyfutureresearch.Morefullscaleconnectionistmodelsofcognitivephenomena,asopposedtosmallscaledemonstrations,mustbedevelopedand
comparedindetailtocompetingclassicalmodels(Coltheartetal.1993HintonandShallice1991Marcusetal.1992VanOrden,Pennington,andStone1990).
Betterexplanationsofwhyconnectionistmodelsperformastheydoatthecognitivebehaviorallevelarealsoneeded.Connectionistlearningalgorithmscanserveasa
kindofabstractgenetictechnologythatallowsresearcherstogrowsystemsthatcomputedesiredinputoutputfunctionswithoutunderstandingveryclearlywhythe
finalsystemisorisnotsuccessful(McCloskey1991Seidenberg1993).Althoughtheoutcomesofcognitivescienceresearchcannotbepredicted,itispossibleto
predictthatafertileandexcitingperiodofinvestigationliesahead.
SuggestedReadings
CognitivePsychologyandItsImplications(Anderson1990)coverstheentirefieldofcognitivepsychologyusinggeneraltheoreticalideasaboutcognitive
architecturethataresimilartothosedevelopedinthischapter.TheArchitectureofCognition(Anderson1983)presentssimilarideasatanadvancedlevel,
developingspreadingactivationtheoryandthetheoryofproductionsystemsinconsiderableformaldetail.ComputationandCognition:TowardaFoundationfor
CognitiveScience(Pylyshyn1984)isarigorousdevelopmentofatheoryoffunctionalarchitecture.ConnectionismandtheMind:AnIntroductiontoParallel
ProcessinginNetworks(BechtelandAbrahamsen1991)introducesconnectionistmodelsandthefoundationalargumentsforconnectionism.Explorationsin
ParallelDistributedProcessing:AHandbookofModels,Programs,andExercises(McClellandandRumelhart1989)isatextandsoftwarepackage(separate
DOSandMacintosheditions)thatintroducesthecomputersimulationofconnectionistmodelsandallowsthestudenttoexploreexistingmodelsanddesignandrun
newones.SocialCognition(FiskeandTaylor1991)isanexcellentresourceforreaderswishingtofollowuponourbriefremarksaboutschemasfortheselfand
otherpeople.
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Chapter3
CognitivePsychology:FurtherExplorations
Wehavenowsketchedtheclassicaltheoryofthehumancognitivearchitecture.Wehavealsoseenthatthenewconnectionistapproachtocognitionoffersboth
challengestotheclassicaltheoryandpromisingavenuesforextendingittolowerlevelsofanalysis.Inthischapterweconsiderfurtherhowthearchitecturesupports
severalcomplexcognitivefunctions:conceptualinformationprocessing,memory,reasoning,andproblemsolving.Ourprimarystrategywillbetoaskwhattheclassical
theoryhastosayaboutthesecomplexfunctions.Atvariouspointswewillalsomentioncurrentconnectionistapproaches.
3.1ConceptsandCategories
Schemasplayedanimportantroleinoursketchoftheclassicaltheoryofthecognitivearchitecture.Wehaveendowedthemwithseveralimportantproperties.Oncea
schemaisactivatedbysomefeaturesinthecurrentexternalorcognitiveenvironment,itexertseffectsontheallocationofattentionandworkingmemoryresources,
servingasafilterthatdiscardsirrelevantinformationandfocusesprocessingonwhatisrelevant.Becauseitcanfunctionasasinglechunkinworkingmemory,itcan
facilitateprocessing.Becauseitorganizesattentionandprocessing,itcanhaveeffectsonlatermemory(thesearediscussedfurtherlaterinthischapter).Becausea
schemarepresentsgeneralizationsabouttheworld,ittriggersinferencesorpredictionsthatguidethoughtandaction.Schemasacttoclassifyobjectsandsituations,to
assignthemtocategories.Onceaclassificationismade,alltheknowledgeassociatedwiththerelevantcategorycanbebroughtintoplay.Finally,wenotedthat
schemadrivencognitioncanleadtovariouskindsoferror.Thedominanceofaparticularschemacanleadustoignorefeaturesofasituationthatareactuallyrelevant
tocurrentgoalsortomakeinappropriateorincorrectinferences.
Researchonschemasisguidedbyanumberofdeepissues.Therearemanyquestionsabouthowschemasarerepresented,howtheyareactivated,andhowtheyare
learned.Inthissectionwewillexploresomeofthesequestionsfurther,focusingmostlyonconceptsforconcreteobjects.
TheoriesofConceptsforConcreteObjects
Agreatdealofpsychologicalresearchhasbeendevotedtotheinformationcontentofsimple,concreteconcepts,suchasdogorchair.Oneattractivetheoryof
simpleconceptualschemasisthedefinitionaltheory,whichhasalonghistoryinphilosophyandthusissometimesknownastheclassicaltheoryofconcepts.This
theorystatesthattheinformationcontentofaconceptisadefinitionthatgivesthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsthatanobjectmustmeettofallunderthe
concept.Forexample,a

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reasonableschemaforgrandmotherwouldbeasmallnetworkofpropositionscontainingtheinformationthatagrandmotherisafemaleperson,withatleastone
childwhohasatleastonechild.Eachproposition,orfeature,oftheschemaisnecessaryforgrandmotherhood,andtheschemaasawholeissufficienttodetermine
grandmotherhood.Thedefinitionisgeneralbecausemanypossibleattributesofpeoplearenotmentionedinit,suchasheightorfavoriteicecreamflavor.Even
reasonablyprobableattributesofgrandmothersarenotmentioned,suchasoverfortyyearsoldorhasgrayhair.Thepowerofdefinitionalschemasisthatreasoning
fromadefinitiontoaparticularsituationiscompletelyreliable,becauseeverypropertyinthedefinitionistrueofeveryinstance.
Inspiteoftheattractionsofthedefinitionaltheory,manypsychologistshavebeenimpressedwithitspotentialproblems.Themostimmediateproblemisthatwedonot
seemtohaveaveryclearsenseofthenecessaryandsufficientconditionsformostsimpleconcepts.Manyofus,forexample,arequitewillingtoapplytheconcept
grandmothertoawomanwhoseonlychildisanadoptedsonwhohaschildren.Mattersaremuchworseforconceptssuchasdog.Justwhatmakesanobjectadog
seemstobeunknowntomostpeoplewhousetheconcept,asidefromanoccasionalprofessionalbiologistorbreeder.Further,thedefinitionaltheorygivesno
accountofouruseofcharacteristicsofobjectsthatcouldnotfigureinadefinitionbecausetheyareneithernecessarynorsufficient.Introspectionsuggeststhatouruse
ofmostordinaryconceptsfrequentlyinvolvesknowledgeofpropertiesthatareclearlynotnecessary.Withoutseemingtoregisteranymentalreservations,weblithely
assumethatgrandmothersareoverfortyandthatdogshavefourlegs(althoughadogcanlosealegwithoutceasingtobeadog).Whenwethinkverycarefully,we
realizesuchthings,butitseemslikelythatmostofthetimeweoptformoreefficientthinking.Weclassifyobjectsonthebasisoffeaturesthatareavailableinthe
currentinputbutthatarelogicallyinsufficient.Anobjectwillbeclassifiedasadog,notonthebasisofacarefulassessmentofitsmorphologyorchromosomesbuton
thebasisofitsshape,gait,orbark,althoughthesecharacteristicsmightalsobetrueofamovierobotorofsomeunfamiliarmarsupialfromanisolatedisland.
Suchintuitionshaveledcognitivescientistsawayfromthedefinitionalapproachtowardalternativesthatallowamuchbroaderrangeofcharacteristicstoplayarolein
conceptualschemas.Suchapproachesareprobabilisticinthesensethatmostofthefeaturesorcharacteristicsassociatedwithaconceptwillhavealikelihoodthatis
lessthanabsolute.Predictionsbasedonacategorizationdecisionwillbeinherentlyprobabilistic.Thecategorizationdecisionitselfalsobecomesprobabilistic.The
availablefeaturesofanobjectwillassignittoacategorywithsomeprobabilityratherthanabsolutely.Someobjectswillbedifficulttoclassifybecausetheavailable
featuresdonotsupportanycategoryverystronglyorsupportmorethanoneequally.
Undertheprobabilisticapproachtheinstancesofaconcepttendtohaveafamilyresemblancestructure(Wittgenstein1953RoschandMervis1975).Theytendto
resembleeachotherthewaymembersofafamilydo.Somemembersofaconceptualfamilywillbeverytypicalbecausetheysharemanyfeatureswithmanyother
familymembers.Somemembersofafamilymight,however,behighlyatypicalbecausetheyshareonlyafewfeatureswithotherfamilymembers.Therobin,for
example,isatypicalbirdinthatitissimilartoothercommonbirdsforexample,itsharesthecapacityforflight,alengthofaboutnineinches,atendencytoperchin
thebranchesoftrees,andtheabilitytosing.Noneofthesefeaturesisnecessaryforbirdhood,but

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thefamilyresemblancetheoryassumesthattheyplayastrongroleinourconceptofbird,nonetheless.Thepenguin,however,hasnoneofthesecommonfeatures,
althoughitdoeshavefeathersandlayeggs,whichareclosertobeingnecessaryfeatures.Thefamilyresemblancetheoryassumesthatthepenguinisanatypicalbird
withmanyuncommonfeaturesandthereforeisdifficulttoviewasabird.
Thefamilyresemblancestructureofaconceptcanbecapturedinvariousways.Onewayistosetupaprobabilisticschema.Suchaschemaisanorganized
representationofthefeaturesthatarerelevanttoaconcept,butthefeaturesareassignedprobabilitiesorweightsthatindicatehowstronglytheyareassociatedwith
theconcept.Theprobabilitiescanbeusedbycognitiveprocessestomakecategorizationdecisionsaboutparticularexemplarsortoreasonaboutthem.Forexample,
aprobabilisticschemafordogcouldbeusedtodecidewhethertocategorizeafoxasadogortopredictthelikelihoodthatafoxcanhowlorthatiteatsmeat.
Anothertypeofschemaiscalledaprototype.Eachfeatureofaprototypeisanaveragevalueofthatfeatureoveralltheexamplesoftheconceptthathavebeen
encountered.Categorizationandpredictionarebasedonsomemeasureofsimilaritytotheprototype.
SomeExperimentalResearch
RoschandMervis(1975)foundastrongfamilyresemblancestructureinsixsuperordinatecategories:fruit,vegetables,clothing,furniture,vehicles,andweapons.In
eachcategorytheexperimentalsubjectsweregiventwentyitemsthatwereinstancesofthecategoryandaskedtothinkoffeaturesofeachoftheinstances.For
example,oneoftheinstancesofthefurniturecategorywaschair,andaparticularsubjectmighthavewrittendownthefeaturesforsittingonmadebypeopleused
inthehomemadeofwood,metal,orupholsteredhasaseat,aback,andlegs(usuallyfour),andsometimesarms.Thefeaturesthatsubjectslistedwereused
tocomputeafamilyresemblancescoreforeachinstanceofasuperordinatecategory.Toillustrate,thescoreforchairwouldbethetotalnumberofcaseswherea
featurelistedforchairwasalsolistedforanotherconcept.Forexample,ifhaslegswasalsolistedforsofaandtable,andifhasabackwasalsolistedforsofa,then
thescoreforchairwouldgoupbythree.Chairgotthehighestfamilyresemblancescoreinthefurniturecategory,confirmingtheintuitionthatitisaprettytypicalitem
offurniture.Telephonegotaverylowfamilyresemblancescore,confirmingthesensethatitisanatypicalitemoffurniture.
RoschandMerviswentontoshowthatthefamilyresemblancescorespredictedpeople'sperformanceonothertasks.Oneimportantfindingwasthatthefamily
resemblancescoresconsistentlypredictpeople'simmediateintuitionsaboutthetypicalandatypicalinstancesofcategories.Whenadifferentgroupofsubjectswas
askedtodirectlyratecategoryinstancesona1to7typicalityscale,instancesthatreceivedhigh,intermediate,andlowratingswereinmostcasesthesameasthose
thatreceivedhigh,intermediate,andlowfamilyresemblancescores.Thus,inboththetypicalityratingsandthefamilyresemblancescoresforfurniture,chairranked
aboverug,whichrankedabovetelephone.
Typicality,andhencefamilyresemblance,hasalsobeenshowntoaffectthebasicmentaloperationofassigninganinstancetothecategory.Thetypicalityratingofan
instancepredictshowfastitcanbeassignedtoacategory(Rips,Shoben,andSmith1973Rosch1973).Inoneversionoftheexperimenteachtrialconsistsofthe
presentationofatargetsuperordinateconcept,suchasbird,followedbythepresentationofatestsubordinateconcept,suchasrobin.Thesubjectrespondsas
quicklyaspossible

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either"Yes"or"No,"indicatingwhetherthetestconceptisaninstanceofthetargetconcept.Inthecaseofbirdrobinthecorrectresponsewouldbe"Yes,"
whereasinthecaseofbirdrabbititwouldbe"No.''Whenthetargetconceptisbird,the''Yes"responsetorobinisconsiderablyfasterthanthe"Yes"responseto
chicken.Withinthebirdcategoryrobinhasamongthehighestscoresontypicalityandfamilyresemblance,andchickenhasamongthelowest.Birdswith
intermediatescores,suchaseagleorpigeon,haveintermediateresponsetimes.
Rosch(1978)alsousedfamilyresemblancetheorytoconstructapartialaccountofwhywedevelopthecategorieswedoatvariouslevelsofabstraction.Shefounda
highlevelofsimilaritywithincategoriesintypicaluseandvisualshape,suggestingthatcharacteristicsofthevisualsystemandofcultureconstraincategories.Shealso
proposedthatoptimallyusefulcategoriescuttheworldupatabasiclevelthatmostclearlydistinguishescategoriesfromeachother.Thebasiclevelmaximizeswithin
categoryresemblancewhileminimizingbetweencategoryresemblance.Forexample,chairisabasicleveltermbecausemostchairsshareahighnumberof
perceptualandfunctionalfeaturesthatarenotsharedbycontrastingconceptssuchastableorlamp.Superordinateconcepts,suchasfurniture,arelessuseful
becausetheylumptogethermanybasicconcepts,makingonlyaveryfewfeatureshighlypredictable,suchasfoundinthehome.Highlyspecificsubordinate
concepts,suchaskitchentable,arealsononoptimalbecausetheyarelargelyredundantwiththesomewhatmoregeneralbasicconcepts,inthiscasetable.
PropositionalNetworkModelsforConcepts
Propositionalnetworkmodelsofthekindintroducedinchapter2canbeusedforrepresentingfamilyresemblancestructures(CollinsandLoftus1975).Inthiscontext
networksareoftencalledsemanticnetworksbecausetheyrepresentgeneralknowledgeaboutthesemantics,ormeaning,ofconceptsratherthanfactsaboutspecific
objects.Adiagramofalittlepieceofanetworkfortheconceptsvegetableandgreenbeanisshowninfigure3.1.Bothconceptsareassociatedwithanumberof
features.Thenumberattachedtoeachfeaturalpropositionisitsstrength,orweight.Variousfactorsarethoughttoinfluencetheweights(SmithandMedin1981):for
instance,theprobabilitythatthefeatureistrueofaninstanceoftheconcept,thedegreetowhichthefeatureuniquelydistinguishestheconceptfromotherconcepts,
andthepastusefulnessorfrequencyofthefeatureinperceptionandreasoning.Figure3.1canbeconsideredpartofavastassociativenetworkamongconcepts.
Obviously,muchofatypicalperson'sknowledgeaboutvegetablesandgreenbeansisnotshown.Also,manyotherconceptsassociatedwiththefeaturesaremissing
fromthediagram.ManyotherconceptsareassociatedwithGREEN,forexample.
Inthesimplecategorizationtaskthecomparisonprocessbeginswiththeautomaticactivationofthetargetandtestnodesbythepresentationofthetargettestpair.
Activationspreadsinparallelalongallassociativepathsfromeachofthetwonodes.Theamountofactivationdependsontheweightsofthepaths.Someofthe
activatedpathsfromthetwonodeswillintersect,formingactivatedpathwaysthatconnectthetwonodes.Thecontrolledprocessthatdecidesontheresponse
monitorstheamountofactivationfromconnectedpathsandresponds"Yes"whensomethresholdisexceeded.Highlytypicalitems(likevegetablegreenbean)will
havemanystrongconnectedpaths,andthethresholdvaluewillbeexceededrapidly.Lesstypicalitemswillhavefewerhighstrengthconnectedpathsandmore
strengthinunconnectedpaths

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Figure3.1
Asmallpartofasemanticnetwork

andthuswilltakelongertoreachthreshold.Atypicalitemsmightevenrequirethecontrolledprocesstocheckthenatureoftheintersectionsthatareretrievedbefore
makinga"Yes"response.
Semanticnetworkmodelsofconceptsalsopredictprimingandcontexteffects.Conceptualinformationprocessingwillbefacilitatedifapriorcontexthasactivatedthe
pathwaysthatarerequiredforthetask.LoftusandCole(1974)gavesubjectsasuperordinatecategorynameandafeatureandaskedthemtoproduceaninstanceof
thecategorypossessingthefeature.Forexample,whengivenvehicleandred,thesubjectmightrespondfireengine.Insomecasesthecategorywaspresented
beforethefeature,andinothercasesthefeaturewaspresentedbeforethecategory.Subjectswereabletoproduceinstancesfasterwhenthecategorywaspresented
firstforexample,theyproducedfireenginefasterinresponsetovehiclefollowedbyredthaninresponsetoredfollowedbyvehicle.
Thespreadingactivationmodelhandlesthisresultquitenaturally.Whenactivationspreadingfromtheconceptandfeaturenodesintersectsatsomethirdnode,that
third

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nodebecomesavailableasapossibleanswer.Activationbeginsspreadingfirstfromthetermthatispresentedfirst,thusprimingthenetwork.Primingwithacategory
name,suchasvehicle,ismoreefficientbecausetherearefewerlinkstovehiclethantherearetoverywidespreadfeatures,suchasred.Thus,theactivation
emanatingfromthefeatureisdilutedamongmanymorepathsandrapidlyweakens.
ExemplarandConnectionistModels
Althoughtherehasbeenmuchdisagreementabouttheformofconceptualschemas,thenotionofschemahasbeencentraltoclassicaltheoriesofcognition.The
proponentofschemas,however,shoulderstheburdenofexplainingtherelationshipbetweentheschema,whichisarepresentationofgeneralknowledge,andspecific
exemplarsthatareencounteredinexperiencewithacategory.Theschemamustbeconstructedfromexperienceswithspecificexemplars.Propositionalschematic
modelsofmentalrepresentationclearlyhavethepowertostorebothaschemaandassociatedrepresentationsofparticularexamplars,potentiallyraisingahostof
questionsaboutwhetherallexemplarsarestoredandwhenandhowexemplarscontributetotheconstructionoftheschema.Oneradicalsolutionofschematheoryis
thatexemplarsareneverstoredbutjustcontributetotheschema.Iftheschemaisaprototype,theneachexemplarcontributesanadjustmenttothevalueofeachof
thefeaturesintheprototype,whichrepresentssomesortofaverageoveralltheexemplarsencountered.Iftheschemaisanetworkwithweights,asinfigure3.1,each
exemplarwouldadjusttheweightsaccordingtosomeprocedure.Thepureprototypetheoryisobviouslytooaustereformanytypesofconcepts.Aprototypefor
cow,forexample,wouldhavetolistasinglecolorfeature,yetitisprettyclearthatapersoncanhavegeneralknowledgethatcowscanbeblack,brown,orblackand
white.Networkmodelscanclearlyhandlethiskindofcomplexity,butthepriceishavingtocomeupwithadetailedtheoryofhowtheschematicnetworkisbuiltover
time.
Someresearchershavetriedtoescapethistheoreticalburdenbyproposingthatschemasarenotconstructedatall.Instead,representationsofallexemplarsare
storedinmemory,andnewobjectsarecategorizedbycomparingthemtoallitemsinmemoryandcomputingsomemeasureoffittoeachpossiblecategory.The
degreeoffittoacategorydeterminestheprobabilityofassigningtheobjecttothecategory.Imagineachildwhoseonlyconceptualcategoriesarecatanddog.Each
timethechildencountersaconfirmedinstanceofacatoradogafulldescriptionofthatinstance,intheformofavectoroffeatures,isstoredinmemorywiththe
appropriatelabel.Afterawhilethechildmighthavetenexemplarsofcatandtenexemplarsofdogstoredinmemory.Now,alongcomesanovelobjectthatthechild
wishestocategorize.Wemightask,Whatistheprobabilitythatthechildwillcalltheobjectadog?Exemplartheoriesusethefollowingkindofcalculation(Medinand
Schaffer1978Nosofsky1988).First,thevectoroffeaturesdescribingthenovelobjectisformed.Thesimilaritybetweenthisvectoroffeaturesandeverydogorcat
exemplarinmemoryisthencomputed.Allthedogsimilaritiesarethenaddeduptogetatotaldogsimilarityvalue.Allthecatsimilaritiesarealsoaddeduptogeta
totalcatsimilarityvalue.Theprobabilitythechildwillsay"dog"isgivenbyanequationsuchasthefollowing:

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Thisformulanicelypitsthenewobject'ssimilaritytopreviouslyseendogsagainstitssimilaritytopreviouslyseencats.Ifthesimilaritiestodogsandcatsareequal,then
theprobabilityofsaying"dog"willbe.5,justwhatwewouldexpect.Ifthesimilaritytopreviouslyseencatsis0,thentheprobabilityofsaying"dog"willbe1.0,and
soon.Thistypeofformulacanbeextendedtohandlemultiplecategoriesandvariousothercomplexities,suchasbiasesfavoringordisfavoringparticular
categorizations.Itsusehinges,however,onbeingabletorepresentobjectsasvectorsoffeaturesandonhavingapsychologicallyrealisticwayofmeasuringsimilarity.
Exemplarmodelshavebeenappliedtoperformanceinlaboratoryconceptlearningexperiments,inwhichsubjectslearntosortsomenovelsetofobjectsintotwoor
morecategories.Inthesestudiesthefeaturalcompositionoftheexemplarsisknown,soitispossibletocomputepredictedcategorizationprobabilitiesusingaformula
likethatabove.Oftentheexemplarmodelsdoabetterjobatpredictingsubjects'performancethanprototypeorschemamodels.
Animmediateconcernaboutexemplarmodelsisfindingacognitivelyrealisticmechanismforrapidlycomputingandaddinguplargenumbersofsimilarities.Itwould
benicetodothisinparallel.Sinceeachexemplarisrepresentedasavectoroffeatures,itoughttobepossibletodesignaconnectionistmodelthatcouldlearntodo
thecomputationsfromexposuretoasetoftrainingpairs.Kruschke(1992)hasdevelopedsuchamodel.ThearchitectureofKruschke'smodelforasimplifieddomain
isshowninfigure3.2.Thetwoinputunitsareabletorepresentobjectsthatvaryalongtwo

Figure3.2
ThearchitectureofKruschke'sexemplarbasedconnectionist
modelofcategorylearning.ThemodelisknownasALCOVE,for
AttentionLearningCoveringMap.(AdaptedwithpermissionfromKruschke1992.)

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dimensions,say,sizeandbrightness.Eachexemplarwouldberepresentedbyavectoroftwonumbers,representingitsperceivedsizeandperceivedbrightness.The
hiddennodesinthenetworkarecalledexemplarnodesbecauseeachnoderepresentsanexemplar.Whenthemodelisusedtosimulatealaboratoryexperiment,there
isahiddennodeforeachexemplarpresentedintheexperiment.Theconnectionsfromtheinputnodestothehiddennodesaresetupinsuchawaythatanexemplar
noderespondsmaximallywhenitsexemplarispresented.Italsorespondswhenotherexemplarsarepresented,butitsresponsedecreasesfromthemaximumasa
functionofthedistancefromtheidealexemplarinthetwodimensionalstimulusspace.Supposethepyramidinthemiddleofthediagramistheresponseprofileofthe
hiddenunitrepresentingasixinch,mediumgrayobject.Thehighestpointonthepyramidistheunit'sactivationwhenthesixinch,mediumgrayobjectispresented.
Theslopingsidesofthepyramidillustratethattheresponseoftheunittootherexemplarsdependsonhowsimilartheyaretothesixinch,mediumgrayobject.A
seveninch,darkgrayobjectmightevokeafairlystrongresponsefromtheunit,whereasaoneinch,whiteobjectmightevokealmostnoresponse.Thus,whenan
exemplarvectorisfedintothemodel,eachhiddenexemplarunitrespondswithitssimilaritytotheinput.Thenetworkthereforecomputesthesimilaritiesbetweenthe
inputandtheentiresetofpossibleexemplarsinparallel.
Thehiddennodesarefullyconnectedtothecategorynodes,witheachconnectionhavinganadjustableweight.Therearetwocategorynodesinthefigurebecauseit
isassumedthatexemplarsaretobesortedintotwocategories.Thenetinputtoanoutputnodeisaweightedsumofthehiddennodeactivations,whicharesimilarity
values.Thus,theactivationofanoutputnodeisatotalsimilarityvalue,justthekindofnumberneededintheequationabove.Theactivationscanbesubstitutedinto
theequation(oronemuchlikeit)topredicttheprobabilitythatanexmplarwillbeassignedtoagivencategory(i.e.,theactivationofthecategorynodedividedbythe
sumoftheactivationsofbothcategorynodes).Thenetworkisthusaparallelcomputerforexemplarbasedcategorization.
Theweightsinthenetworkcanalsobetrainedusingthebackpropagationalgorithm.Eachtimeanexemplarispresentedtothenetwork,thecorrectcategorizationis
comparedtotheoutputvaluesonthecategorynodes.Theerrorisusedtoadjusttheweightsbetweenthehiddenandcategorynodes.Theerrorisalsopropagated
backwardtoadjusttheattentionstrengths,whicharespecialweightsthatapplytoallconnectionsemanatingfromaninputnode.Theattentionstrengthssimulatea
standardfindinginconceptlearningexperimentsthatsubjectslearntopaymoreattentiontorelevantdimensionsoftheexemplarsandtopaylessattentiontoirrelevant
dimensions.Forexample,supposethatinataskthatvariessizeandbrightness,thecategorizationisbasedcompletelyonsize,withallobjectssmallerthansixinches
beingassignedtocategoryAandallobjectslargerthansixinchesbeingassignedtocategoryB,regardlessofbrightness.Insuchatasksubjectslearntopayattention
tosizeandtoignorebrightness.Theattentionweightsinthemodelsimulatethisaspectofconceptlearning.
OnemightobjecttoKruschke'sarchitectureoutofasensethatitrequiressomanyhiddennodes,coveringtheentireinputspace.Asthenumberofinputdimensions
grows,thenumberofhiddenexemplarnodesneededgrowsexponentially.Theproblemisnotsogreatasitfirstappears,however.Foronething,themodelperforms
wellwhenhiddennodesarerandomlyscatteredthroughouttheinputspacewithanappro

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priatedensity.Itisnotnecessarythateverypossiblevectorofinputshaveitsownhiddennode.Perhapsmoreimportant,thehiddennodesarebaseddirectlyonthe
inputdimensionsandthereforereflectperceptualrepresentationalcapacitiesthattheorganismpossessespriortolearning.Thenodesdonotrepresenteverylogically
possiblewayofcodingtheexemplars.
Thelastpointintroducesadifferencebetweentheexemplarbasednetworkandstandardfullyconnectedthreelayernetworks,suchasNETtalk(describedinchapter
2).Theexemplarnodesrespondonlytoarestrictedregionoftheinputspace,andtheresponseinthatregionisbasedonsimilarity.Singleexemplarnodes,orgroups
ofthem,thereforecannotlearnnovelrepresentationsoftheinput.Instandardbackpropagationlearning,bycontrast,thehiddennodesrespondtotheentireinput
spacewithoutanypriorconstraint.Duringlearningtheycanthereforecometorepresentinterestingstructureintheinputoutputtransformationthatisbeingacquired.
Thus,NETtalkcouldtreattheletter'c'assimilarto'k'incontextswhereitispronounced/k/(asincat),buttreatitassimilarto's'incontextswhereitis
pronounced/s/(asincity).Therearemanyconceptlearningsituationswheretheabilitytolearnnewinternalrepresentationsisimportant.Thetexttosoundmapping
inreadingmaybesuchacase.Anothercase,discussedlaterinthischapter,istheabilityofchessmastersto"see"achessboardintermsofstrategyandlikelymoves.
ConceptualComplexity
Abitofreflectionwillsuggestthatourdiscussionofconceptssofarhasbeenseriouslyoversimplified.Eventhesimplestconceptsinvolveanenormousamountof
knowledge.Yourknowledgeaboutcucumbers,forexample,mightincludetactileinformation("thosetinybumpswithtinylittlespinesgrowingoutofthem"),the
pickingsizeforseveralvarieties,whenandhowtoplant,typeofmachineryandlaborneededforfarmharvest,howtotestforbitterness,smellwhenrotting,usein
severaloftheworld'scuisines,nextdoorneighborshatethem,waxygrocerystoresurfaceanunnaturalphenomenon,andsoon.
Modelsthatrepresentobjectsorconceptsusingvectorsoffeaturesappearinthislighttobeclearlyusefulindescribingcategorizationonthebasisofperceptual
attributes.Theymaythereforebegoodmodelsoflearninginperceptualsystemsorofprocedurallearningincaseswheretheconditionsthatspecifyacertainaction
occurrepeatedlyduringtraining.Buttherealizationthatevenconceptsforsimpleobjectsinvolvecomplexknowledgeimmediatelymakesrelevantthewhole
controversyoverconnectionistknowledgerepresentationintroducedinchapter2.Ourgeneralknowledgeofsimpleconceptscanincludeexplicitrules(don'tput
rosemaryoncucumbers),arbitrarilycomplicatedpropositionalcontent(thenewfactoryinBlackCreekhasstoppedbuyingpicklersunderfourincheslong),
andfeatureswhoserelationtoperceptualinputismediatedbycomplexknowledge(unnatural).
Theproblemswithvectorsoffeaturesbegintomanifestthemselvesatafairlyelementarylevelofanalysis(Barsalou1993).Forexample,listingblackasafeatureof
anobjectfailstorepresentthefactthatblackisthecoloroftheobject.Intraditionalterminology,thefeatureblackisthevalueoftheattributecolor.Inafeaturelist
representationitisdifficulttorepresentthefactthatthevalueblackisboundtotheattributecolor.Attributevaluerelationsmatterinconceptuallearning.Suppose
subjectsinalaboratorylearnasimpleclassificationtaskinwhichtheblackobjectsfallinonecategoryandtheyellowinanother.Asubjectwhoisthengivenan

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intradimensionalshiftprobleminwhichcategoriesarealsobasedoncolor(say,greenvs.red)willtendtohaveaneasiertimethanwithanextradimensionalshiftin
whichthecategoriesarebasedonanotherdimension,suchassize(largevs.small).Featurelistsalsooftenfailtorepresentrelationsamongfeaturesthatarecriticalto
aconcept.Listingwingsasafeatureforbird,forexample,failstonotethatthewingsareattachedtooppositesidesofthebody.Theseproblemsarenotnecessarily
insoluble.Connectionistshavepointedoutthatourverballabelsforfeatures,suchasblackandwings,maybeamisleadingshorthandforamuchricher,distributed,
microfeaturalvectorrepresentation.Forexample,allcolorsmightbedistributivelycodedonacommonsetofinputnodesinawaythatwouldsupportgeneralization
amongtasksforwhichcolorwasarelevantdimension.Or,theverballabelwingsmightbeaconvenientstandinforacomplexencodingthatdoescapturetherelation
ofwingstobody.Asattractiveassuchideasare,theyarenotyetworkedoutwellenoughtobeappliedinthedomainofrealconcepts.
Thepropositionalschematictheoryofdeclarativeknowledge,althoughithasnotlentitselftoelegantquantitativetheoriesofconceptlearning,isclearlyequippedto
takeonthecomplexitiesofconceptualknowledge.Still,thewealthofknowledgeassociatedwithsimpleconceptsraisesquestionsaboutthenotionthataschemafora
conceptisarelativelysmallcollectionofprivilegedinformation.Anybitofknowledgeconnectedwithaconceptcanberelevantifthecontextisright.Whatwehave
beensinglingoutforinclusioninschemas(bothinthelastchapterandthisone)isperhapsonlydistinguishedbythefrequencywithwhichitisuseful.Puttingallofthe
knowledgeaboutaconceptintoitsschemadoesnotposearepresentationalproblem.Alloftherelevantpropositionscanbetiedtogether,andtheycanevenbe
organizedhierarchicallybyhavingpropositionnodespointtootherpropositionnodesorbyusingframeorscriptstructures.Suchlargestructuresposeaprocessing
problem,however.Itishardtoimaginesuchalargenetworkbeinguniformlyactivatedinworkingmemory.Infact,itwouldbeabadidea,becausethenthe
informationthatisneededinthecurrentcontextcouldnotbepickedoutbyitsdifferentiallevelofactivation.Whatweneedtoexplainishowtherightinformation
associatedwithaconceptisactivatedattherighttime.
Aplausibleexplanationisthatthecontextprimestherelevantaspectsofaconcept.Ifaconceptispresentedinisolation,asinthelaboratoryexperimentsmentioned
sofar,onlythestrongestpathwayswillreceivesignificantamountsofactivation,leadingtothoughtsaboutsuchmundanemattersasthegreennessofcucumbers.In
reallifesituations,however,conceptsoccurinacontextthatcancontributeadditionalactivationtoweakerbutmorerelevantassociations.Ifyouarethinkingof
servingyourneighborscucumbersinasalad,theactivationofsaladconceptsandtheconceptofyourneighborsmaystronglyactivatetheknowledgethattheyhate
cucumbers,thussavingyoufromaculinaryfauxpas.
AnexperimentbyBarsalou(1982)providedalaboratorytestofthehypothesisthatlesscentralfeaturesreceiveadditionalactivationfromrelevantcontexts.Table3.1
illustratesfouroftheitemtypesfromtheexperiment.Subjectsperformafeatureverificationtask,whichcanbeillustratedbylookingatitemtype1inthetable.On
eachtrialthesubjectfirstsawasentencewiththesubjectnoununderlined,forexample,"Theskunkwasunderalargewillow."Thesubjectthensawaphrasethat
denotedapossiblefeatureorpropertyofthesubject,forexample,"hasasmell,"andhadtorespondasquicklyaspossible,bypressingoneoftwobuttons,whether
ornotthe

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Table3.1ExamplesoffourofthetypesofitemsandtheaverageresponsetimesinmillisecondsfromBarsalou's
(1982)experiment
Itemtype

Responsetime

1.HighweightfeatureNeutralcontext
Target:Theskunkwasunderalargewillow
Test:Hasasmell

1113

2.HighweightfeatureRelevantcontext
Target:Theskunkstunkuptheneighborhood
Test:Hasasmell

1145

3.LowweightfeatureNeutralcontext
Target:Theroofhadbeenrenovatedbeforetherainyseason
Test:Canbewalkedon

1259

4.LowweightfeatureRelevantcontext
Target:Theroofcreakedundertheweightoftherepairman
Test:Canbewalkedon

1404

subjecthadtheproperty.Intheexamplethecorrectanswerisobviously"Yes."Sincethesentenceappearsbeforetheproperty,anyinformationthatoccursinthe
sentencecouldpotentiallyprimethepropertybeforeitappears,thusspeedinguptheresponsetimetoit.
Thetheoryofcontextualprimingmakesaninterestingsetofpredictionsforthefourtypesofitems.Foritemtypes1and2thefeaturethatistestedhasaveryhigh
weightandthuswillbestronglyactivatedregardlessofcontext.Addingarelevantcontextinitemtype2shouldnotspeeduptheresponsetime.Foritemtypes3and
4thefeaturetestedhasalowweightandthuswillnotbestronglyactivatedwithoutadditionalpriming.Intheneutralcontextofitemtype3activationshouldbelow,
leadingtoaslowresponsetime.Addingarelevantcontextinitemtype4shouldprimethefeature,increasingitsactivationandspeedingupitsresponsetime.Thedata
inthetableconfirmthepredictions.Contexthadasmall(negative)effectonresponsetimesforhighweightfeaturesandalargefacilitatingeffectonlowweight
features.
ThisresultandmanyothersthatalsoconfirmtheunderlyinglineofreasoninghaveledBarsalou(1993)toproposeadynamictheoryofconcepts.Sinceonlyapartof
theknowledgerelevanttoaconceptisactivatedinacontext,thereisasenseinwhichtheconceptthatisactuallyfunctioninginthatcontextiscreatedatthatmoment.
Althoughthetotalbaseoflongtermknowledgemaybethesameacrosscontexts,one'seffectiveconceptsofcucumberduringspringplantingandwhileplanningan
Augustdinnermenumaybequitedifferent.Insomerespectsthistheoryisstrikinglysimilartotheconnectionistclaimaboutthecontextualvariabilityofconcepts
(discussedinchapter2).Itshowsthattheclassicaltheoryofdeclarativeknowledgeisnotcommittedtoanotionofrigidconceptualschemasthatarecross
situationallystable.
Giventhattheclassicaltheoryisabletoincorporateaformofcontextualvariabilityinconcepts,disputesaboutconceptrepresentationmayactuallyhingemoreonthe
roleofperceptualrepresentationsversuscentralrepresentationsnottiedtoasensorymodalityandontheroleofsymbolsversussubsymbolsormicrofeatures.Many
connectionistsleantowardhighlydistributedrepresentationsthataretiedtoperceptualexperienceandthataresubsymbolicinthesensethatevenwhatarenormally
takentobeprimitivefeaturessuchasredorwingscanonlybeunderstoodintermsoftheirbasis

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inamoreprimitivelevelofmicrofeatures.Recently,Barsalou(1993)hasbeguntodevelopatheorythatchallengesboththeconnectionistandtheclassical
approaches.Herejectsvectorrepresentationsbecauseofthefailuresofartodemonstratethattheycancapturethedegreeofstructurethatisclearlyrequiredin
conceptualrepresentations.Buthealsofavorstheroleofperceptualrepresentationsovertheclassicalemphasisonpropositionalrepresentationsthatarenottiedto
sensorymodalities(sometimescalledamodalrepresentations).Therichnessandvariabilityofconceptsaretiedtoperceptualrepresentationsthatarearguedtobe
symbolic,structured,andproductive.
TheTheoreticalNatureofConcepts
Ourdiscussionofconceptsandcategorizationsofarhasemphasizedwhatmightbecalledadescriptiveandstatisticalapproach.Conceptlearninghasbeenthoughtof
mainlyasamatterofgatheringdataabouttheobservablecharacteristicsofobjects,whicharestoredintheformofexemplarsorasummaryschema.Categorization
decisionscanbeseenasevaluatinghypothesesaboutthecategorymembershipofobjectsbyweighingtheobservablefeaturesagainsttheaccumulatedknowledgeby
measuringandsummingupsimilarities.Thefactthatthelearninganddecisionmakingcanbecarriedoutveryefficientlybyconnectionistnetworksdoesn'tchangethe
focusonastatisticalcharacterizationofsurfacecharacteristics.Ourdiscussionofconceptualcomplexityadmittedawiderrangeofconceptualknowledgeintothe
picture,butthisknowledgewasagaindifferentiatedonlybyitstendencytobeactivatedbyvariouscontexts.
Conceptualknowledgecanhaveatheoreticalcharacter,however,whichcanalterandevenoverridetheinfluenceofobservablefeatures,similarity,orfrequencyof
occurrence(Medin1989).Asingleobservationofthemeltingpointofleadmightbetrustedbecauseofatheoryoftheuniformityofchemicalelements.Asingle
observationofaBonduelcucumberbeingsuperiortoaBlackCreekcucumberwouldnotsupportgeneralizationwithoutmoreobservationsandmightleadtoarash
ofalternativecausalexplanationsthatwouldrequireobservationssystematicallyrelatedtothealternatives.Whengiventheinformationthatanobjectisthreeinchesin
diameterandaskedwhetheritisaquarterorapizza,peoplejudgeitapizza,eventhoughthediameterismoresimilartothatofthequarterstheyhaveseenthanto
thatofthepizzastheyhaveseen(Rips1989).Tosomeextentthisresultmightbehandledbyastatisticalmodelthatlookedattheamountofvariabilityacross
exemplars,butitisclearthatpeoplealsohavecausalandsocialtheoriesaboutquartersandpizzasthatallowthemtopredicttherangeofpossiblediameters.They
know,forexample,thatasanitemofAmericancoinage,thequarterhasanofficiallydesignateddiameter.
Conceptacquisitioncanalsobeguidedbygoals,whichcanincludethedesiretoconstructrulesortheoriesthatgovernadomain.Atthesimplestlevel,goalsinfluence
whichconceptsweacquire.Weprobablymissmanyinterestingpatternsinourenvironmentssimplybecauseourgoalsneverledustoattendtoandprocessthe
relevantfeatures.Thegoalofmakingsenseofadomaincanalsoaffecthowweprocessexamples,becauseacurrenttheoryofthedomaincanleadustoattend
differentiallytovariousfeaturesortointerprettheminaparticularway.Theoreticalgoalsevenaffectwhichexamplesweareexposedto,becauseourideasmightlead
ustoseekoutparticularkindsofexamples.Dunbar(1993)demonstratedthesephenomenainanexperimentonscientificreasoning.Somesubjectsadoptedafind
evidencegoal,which

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ledthemtosearchforevidenceconsistentwithacurrenthypothesis,evenwhentheyhadbeenexposedtosomeinconsistentevidence.Uponexposuretothe
inconsistentevidence,othersubjectsconcludedthatthecurrenthypothesiswasruledoutandadoptedafindhypothesisgoal,whichledthemtosearchfora
hypothesisthatcouldaccountfortheanomalousfeatures.Thesetwogroupsofsubjectsinterpretedsomefeaturesoftheevidencedifferentlyinsettingtheirgoals,and
intryingtomeettheirgoals,theyattendedtoandprocesseddifferentfeaturesoftheevidence.
Itisapparentthatacompletetheoryofconceptswillhavetotakeintoaccountbothperceptualstatisticalfactorsandfactorsthatareduetothepursuitofgoalsand
theuseofrulesandtheories.Theformerhaveabottomupcharacter,inwhichconceptformationandusearedrivenbyincomingdata.Thelatterhaveatopdown
character,becausethetheoriesandrulesinfluencetheinterpretationofthedata.ResearchbyArmstrong,Gleitman,andGleitman(1983)andLandau(1982)suggests
thatthefindingsfromthetwoapproachesdoapplytothesameconceptualdomains.Theyemployedconceptsthathaveclearclassicaldefinitionsintermsofnecessary
andsufficientfeatures,suchasoddnumberorrectangle.Peoplereasoncorrectlywiththesedefinitionsinjudgingwhetheraparticularfigureisarectangleorwhether,
say,57isanoddnumber.Nevertheless,typicalityeffectswerefoundinthesedomains.Peoplerate3amoretypicaloddnumberthan57,andtheyratesquarea
moretypicalgeometricfigurethanellipse.Incategorizationtaskstheseratingspredictrelativeresponsetimes.Thus,3canbeclassifiedasanoddnumbermuchmore
quicklythan57.
Theresearchersaccountedfortheseresultsbyarguingforadistinctionbetweenfeaturesthatareatthecoreofaconceptandmoreprobabilisticfeaturesthatare
usefulinidentifyinginstancesormakinglikelyguessesaboutinstances.Ratingtasksarelikelytoactivatemanyusefulprobabilisticfeatures.Speededcategorization
tasksinvolveperceptualrepresentationsandpossiblyautomatizedproceduresformakingrapid,automaticidentifications.Thefrequencyandsimilarityinfluenced
strengthofarepresentationorprocedurewillbeinfluentialinsuchtasks.Intasksthatalloworrequiremorecarefulreasoning,however,peopleareableto
differentiateandattendtocorefeaturesofaconcept,whichmaybenecessarybydefinitionorbeinvolvedinatheoryofthedomain.Onebasicreasonforsuch
findingsisthatcorefeaturesareoftennotveryusefulinidentifyinginstances.Forexample,itisusuallyeasiertoseewhethersomeoneisoverfortyfiveyearsoldthanit
istoseewhetherthatpersonhasgrandchildren.Thus,anassessmentofaperson'sagetendstobeincorporatedintotheidentificationprocedureforgrandparenthood,
althoughitisnotpartofthedefinition.
Becausesimpleconceptsare,inasense,partofthebedrockofcognition,theywillnodoubtcontinuetobethefocusofactiveresearchinallofthecognitivescience
disciplines.
3.2.Memory
Theabilitytorememberfactsandpasteventswhentheyareneededisoneofthemoststrikingaspectsofhumancognition.Wedependonourmemoriesconstantly.
Weassumethatwecanrememberanewphonenumberforafewsecondswithoutwritingitdown,thatwecanrecallourownbirthdates,thatwecanrememberthe
threemajortheoriesoftheoriginofWorldWarIduringexaminations,andsoon.Ourdependenceonmemoryisoftennoticedonlywhenmemoryfailsus.Forgetting
thenameofanewacquaintance,forgettingtobuythemilk,orforgettingduringafinalexamcanleadone

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towonderhowmemoryworksandhowitcanbeimproved.Inthissectiontheideasaboutthearchitectureofcognitionareappliedtomemoryfunctions.Tobegin
with,theproblemareamustbedelimitedsomewhat,becausethewordmemoryisusedtorefertojustaboutanywaythatcurrentbehaviorcanbesensitiveto
previousexperience.Wewillconcentrateontheacquisitionofnewdeclarativeknowledgethatforthemostpartrecombinesknownconceptsintonew
representations.Arepresentativecasewouldbeyourmemoryforthematerialinthischapterafterstudyingit.Forthemomentwewillnottreatproceduralknowledge,
althoughitisaformofmemory.Wespeakofrememberinghowtorideabicycle,forexample.Wewillalsoignoretheuseofproceduralmemorytorememberfacts
indirectly.Forexample,ifyoudonotrememberwhichwayyoumovetheshiftleveronyourbicycleinordertodownshift,youmightbeabletorecallitbygoing
throughthemotionsofdownshifting.Inspiteofthesesimplifications,memoryfordeclarativeknowledgeisquiteacomplextopic.
AcquiringNewMemories
TheThreeStagesoftheMemorySituationMemorysituationsfitageneralschema.Cognitivepsychologistshaveagoodrepresentationofthisschemaanduseitto
analyzememoryperformance.Acompletememorysituationisextendedintimeandconsistsofthreestages.Theacquisitionperiodisthetimewhentheperson
acquirestheknowledgetoberemembered(thetargetknowledge).Theretrievalsituationisalatertimeatwhichitwouldbeadaptiveforthetargetknowledgetobe
activatedandutilizedbysomeinformationprocess.Theretentionintervalisthetimeperiodthatpassesbetweentheacquisitionperiodandtheretrievalsituation.A
theoryofmemoryperformanceinaparticulartypeofsituationpotentiallyrequiresacarefulanalysisofthecognitiveprocessesthatoccurateachofthethreestages.
ShortTermandLongTermStorageDuringtheacquisitionperiodarepresentationofthetargetinformationmustbeformed,orstored.Thestoredrepresentationis
oftencalledthememorytrace.Thememorytracemustbeactivatedandutilizedbysomeongoinginformationprocessintheretrievalsituation.Oneofthemost
introspectivelycompellingaspectsofmemoryisthedistinctionbetweenlongtermandshorttermstorage.Asimplecaseofthedistinctionisthedifferencebetween
one'smemoryforone'sownphonenumberandone'smemoryforanewphonenumberthatisrememberedonlylongenoughtodialit.Thegeneralpictureofthe
cognitivearchitecturedevelopedsofarisnicelyconsistentwiththisphenomenon.
Whenanewfact(suchasaphonenumber)ispresented,acognitiverepresentationofitisconstructed.Atthemomentofconstructionthisrepresentationisinahigh
stateofactivation,whichwillbemaintainedaslongasattentioncontinuestobedevotedtoit.Obviously,ifaretrievalsituationariseswhilethecontrolledprocessingis
stillgoingon(orwithinafewmomentsafteritceases),therewillbenoprobleminretrievingthefact,becauseitisalreadyeitherthefocusofattentionoractiveenough
tobecomeso.Shorttermmemory,then,referstotheretrievalofanewfactfromworkingmemory,whichinthiscontextissometimescalledtheshorttermstore.
Aneffectivestrategyforretainingnewinformationinworkingmemoryisrehearsal.Thinkingofanitemofinformationoverandover,orrepeatingitaloudoverand
over,ensuresthatitremainsinanactivestate.
Inmanymemorysituations,however,theretrievalsituationarisesfromminutestoyearsafterthedisappearanceoftheactivationduetotheinitialencounterwithanew

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fact.Inthesecasesretrievalwilloccuronlyifsomerepresentationofthefactsurvivesinthenetworkofdeclarativeknowledge.Insuchcasesnewpropositionsand
linksareestablishedinthepropositionalnetwork,anditisoftensaidthatinformationhasbeentransferredtolongtermstorage.Aspartofourtheoryofattention
andworkingmemory,wehavealreadyassumedthatcontrolledprocessingofnewrepresentationsis(atleastsometimes)capableofestablishingthoserepresentations
inthedeclarativenetwork.Thisfundamentalassumption,however,raisesthequestionofwhatcontrolledprocesses,orencodingstrategies,arebestforestablishing
newknowledge.
AnExampleMemoryExperimentThecontrastbetweenshortandlongtermmemoryandtheinfluenceofencodingstrategiesarewellillustratedinanexperiment
byBjorkandJongeward(Bjork1975).Theycontrastedtheeffectoftwodifferentencodingstrategies:rehearsal,introducedabove,andelaboration.Oneachofthe
twentytrialsintheexperimentthesubjectwasaskedtoquicklystudyalistofsixcommon,unrelatedfourletternouns.Thesixwordswerethenremoved,andafter20
secondsthesubjecttriedtorecallthem.Onhalfofthetrialsthesubjectwastoldtotrytorememberthewordsusingarehearsalstrategy,whichinvolvedsimply
thinkingofthewordsoverandover.Ontheotherhalfofthetrialsthesubjectwastoldtouseanelaborationstrategy.Inthiscasethesubjecttriedtoconstruct
meaningfulrelationshipsamongthewordsbymakingupsentences,stories,orimagesthatinvolvedthem.Attheendoftheexperiment,withnoadvancewarning,the
subjectwasaskedtotrytorememberthewordsfromalltwentytrials.Halfthesubjectsreceivedafreerecalltest,inwhichtheywrotedownasmanyofthewordsas
theycouldremember.Theotherhalfofthesubjectsweregivenanoldnewrecognitiontest.Insuchatestthesubjectisgivenalistofwordsthatcontainsboththe
wordsfromthestudytrials,calledthetargetoroldwords,andotherwords,calleddistractors,foils,ornewwords.Thesubjectisaskedtojudgewhethereach
wordisatargetoradistractor.
Rehearsalprovedtobethebestmemorystrategyfortheinitialrecallfollowingeachtrial.Whentheyrehearsedalist,subjectsrecalledahigherpercentageofthe
wordsandoftenrecalledtheminthesameorderinwhichtheywerepresented.Theelaborationstrategyledtolowerinitialrecallinwhichtheorderofpresentation
wasoftenscrambled.However,elaborationproducedmuchbetterresultsinthefinalperformancetests.Recallforwordsthathadbeenelaboratedwasabouttwiceas
greatasrecallforwordsthathadbeenrehearsed.Recognitionofelaboratedwordswasalsomuchbetterthanforrehearsedwords,althoughrecognitionmemoryfor
therehearsedwordswasstillreasonablygood.
Theresultsoftheexperimentdemonstratethattherehearsalstrategyisanefficientwaytomaintainasmallamountofinformationinanactivestate,allowingexcellent
shorttermmemoryperformance.Theresultsalsodemonstratethattheelaborationstrategyproducesmuchbetterlongtermrecallperformanceandsomewhatbetter
longtermrecognitionperformance.Oneofthemaingoalsoftherestofourdiscussionofmemoryistoexplainwhyelaborationproducesthispatternofresults.
TheEffectsofEncodingProcessesonMemory
LevelsofProcessingTheencodingprocessesthatoccurduringacquisitionobviouslyexertatremendouseffectonlatermemoryperformance,sincetheydetermine
thepotentialexistenceandtheformofthememorytracethatwillbeavailabletoretrievalprocesses.Amajorthemeinmodernresearchhasbeentheeffectson
memoryofthe

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Table3.2TypicalquestionsandresponsesusedbyCraikandTulving(1975)

Answer

Levelof

processing

Question

Yes

No

Structural

Isthewordincapitalletters?

TABLE

table

Phonemic

Doesthewordrhymewithweight?

crate

MARKET

Category

Isthewordatypeoffish?

SHARK

heaven

Sentence

Wouldthewordfitthesentence:

FRIEND

cloud

Hemeta____inthestreet?

levelordepthofprocessingduringacquisition.Thelevelofprocessingisaratherloosenotionthathasbeenusedtorefertothedegreetowhichapersonunderstands
anddevotescontrolledprocessestothemeaningofthetargetinformation.Thetheoryisthatdeeper,moremeaningfulacquisitionprocessinggenerallyleadstobetter
memoryperformance.CraikandTulving(1975)conductedaseriesofexperimentsthatdemonstratethisgeneralization.SubjectswereshownaseriesofEnglish
words.Beforetheysaweachwordtheyweregivenaquestiontoanswerabouttheword.Asshownintable3.2,somequestionsrequiredsuperficialprocessing,and
somerequireddeeperprocessingthatinvolvedthemeaningoftheword.Afteransweringquestionsforalistoffortyorsowords,thesubjectsweregivenrecognition
orrecalltestsforthewords.Wordsthathadbeensubjectedtodeeperprocessingwerebetterremembered.
TheRoleofIntentiontoRememberThetheorythatdepthofacquisitionprocessingexertsadecisiveinfluenceonlatermemoryhasasomewhatsurprisingcorollary:
Themereintentiontoremembershouldnotinfluencememoryperformance.Theevidencecomesfromexperimentsinwhichtwogroupsofsubjectsareinducedtouse
thesamecognitiveprocesseswhilestudyingtargetmaterial.Thesubjectsintheintentionallearninggroupareinformedthattheywillbetakingamemorytestand
thereforehaveanintentiontoremember.Thesubjectsintheincidentallearninggroupbelievethattheirencounterwiththetargetmaterialisforsomeotherpurpose
andreceiveasurprisememorytest.Thelevelsofprocessingtheorypredictsthatthememoryperformanceofthetwogroupswillnotdiffer.Thatis,aslongasthe
cognitiveprocessesengagedinbythetwogroupsarethesame,theadditionalintentiontorememberinoneofthegroupswillproducenoincrementinperformance.
ExperimentsbyHydeandJenkins(1973)andCraikandTulving(1975)confirmedthisprediction.Referringtotable3.2,itiseasytoseehowCraikandTulvingdid
theirincidentallearningexperiments.Subjectsinincidentalconditionsweretoldthattheexperimentconcernedtheperceptionofwordsandthespeedofreactionto
thequestions,andtheyweregivenasurprisememorytest.Subjectsinintentionalconditionsweretoldbeforehandthattherewouldbeafinalmemorytestandthatit
wasjustasimportantasansweringthequestions.
ElaborationAsresearchershavetriedtomaketheconceptoflevelsofprocessingmoreprecise,theyhavetendedtoreplaceitwithother,relatedconcepts(Cermak
andCraik1979).Oneoftheseconceptsiselaboration.Elaborationsareadditionstothetargetinformation.Inresponsetoasingleitemorpropositioninthetarget
informationapersonmaygenerateanynumberofrelatedpropositions,calledelaborations.The

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elaborationsmaysimplybeadditionstothetargetitem,buttheymayalsoservetorelatethetargetitemtoothertargetitemsortopreviouslyacquiredknowledge.
Elaborativeprocessesoccurconstantlyineverydaythinking.Considerastudentreadingachapterinatextbook.Appreciatingtheconsequencesofeachsentencein
thechapter,relatingthesentencestoeachother,andrelatingthechaptertopreviousknowledgeandexperienceareallelaborativeactivitiesthatinvolvethegeneration
ofmanypropositionsthatdonotoccurinthetext.
BjorkandJongeward'sexperimentillustratedthatinstructionstoelaborateontargetmaterialcanproducestrongimprovementsinmemoryperformancerelativetorote
rehearsal.CraikandTulving'sbasiclevelofprocessingexperimentcanalsobeseenasanexampleofelaboration.Thevariousquestionsintable3.2leadthesubject
toformelaborativepropositionsaboutthetargetinformationconcerningitstypeface,phonemicstructure,conceptualstructure,orpotentialroleinanevent.Craikand
Tulvingconductedafurtherexperimentinwhichtheamountofelaborationwasvariedatthesemanticlevelofprocessing.Duringacquisition,subjectsanswered
sentenceframequestionsforallwords.However,thecomplexityofthesentenceframevariedfromlow,tomedium,tohigh.Forexample,forthewordwatcha
simpleframewasHedroppedthe____,andahighcomplexityframewasTheoldmanhobbledacrosstheroomandpickedupthevaluable____fromthe
mahoganytable.Determiningthatwatchfitsthehighcomplexityframerequiresmorepropositionstobeprocessed,leadingtoamoreelaboratememorytrace.
Recallwasindeedconsiderablyhigherforwordsthatwerepresentedwithhighcomplexityframes.
Givenevidencethatelaborationhaspowerfuleffectsonmemory,thecriticalproblemistoexplaintheseeffects.Whydoeselaborationtendtoimprovememory
performance?AndersonandReder(1979)andAnderson(1983)haveshowninmoredetailhowcognitivearchitecturesofthetypewehaveconsideredcanpredict
theeffectsofelaboration.Theexamplegiveninfigure3.3willbeusedtoillustratethistypeofexplanation.Imagineasubjectparticipatinginapairedassociate
learningexperimentinwhichthetargetinformationisalistofwordpairs,suchasdogchair.Thesubjectattemptstolearnthewordpairsbyelaboratingoneachone.
Thefigureshowsthesubject'selaborationandtheresultingnetworkofpropositionsthatcouldpotentiallybestoredinlongtermmemory.Notethatwehave
introducedsomeshorthandintothediagramtocutdownonthecomplexityofthefigure.Relationpointersandrelationnodeshavebeensuppressed,andthenameof
therelationforeachpropositionhasbeenplacedinsidethepropositionnode.Inthiscasetheshorthandmakesnodifference,becauseactivationspreadingalong
relationpointersthroughrelationnodesdoesnotaffectthememoryprocess.
Thememorialadvantagesofelaborationstemfromthefactthatelaborationscontainanumberofpropositionswithoverlapping,orredundant,information.Ifanypart
oftheelaborationcanberetrievedduringthememorytest,thereisagoodchanceofproducingacorrectresponse.Figure3.3illustratesthekindofindirectretrieval
thatcanoccur.Duringanattempttorecall,onlyonepropositionbecomesactiveenoughtobeselectedbythecontrolledprocessthatisdirectingrecall:Thedogloves
themasters.Thus,onthisfirststepdoghasbeenretrieved,butchairhasnot.Devotingattentiontothisproposition,however,primestheelementsoftheproposition,
spreadingstrongeractivationtopreviouslyweakelementsofthestructure.InthiscaseprimingmastersraisestheactivationlevelofThemasterspossessthechair
enoughtomakeitavailabletotherecallprocess.Thiskindofsuccessivereprimingofanetworkbyacontrolled

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Figure3.3
Anexampleofelaborationinamemoryexperiment.Oneofthe
itemsthatthesubjectwasinstructedtorememberwasdogchair.The
subject'sverbalelaborationfortheitemwasdogchair,dogchair,the
doglovedhismastershealsolovedtositonthechairshismasterhad
abeautifulblackvelvetchaironedayheclimbedonithelefthiswhitehairs
alloverthechairhismasterswereupsetbythistheyscoldedhim.Thefigure
showsahypotheticalunderlyingpropositionalrepresentationoftheelaboration.
Propositions1and2inboldlinesareretrievedattesttimeinthatorder.Other
propositionsreceiveinsufficientactivationforretrieval.(BasedonAnderson1976.)

processiscallednoderefocusingbyAnderson(1983).Thereareobviouslymanypathsofactivationintheexamplenetworkthatcouldleadindirectlytoretrievalof
thetargetinformation.
Notethatthenetworkmustsomehowincludetheinformationthatdogandchairwereonthelist,ifthesubjectistoavoidincorrectrecallofotherpartsofthe
elaboration.TheexampleincludessimpleONLISTpropositionsthattaganitemastargetinformation.Ifsuchpropositionaltagsarenotretrievable,thesubjectmight
stillbeabletorespondcorrectlybydetectingthatthetargetitemsaremembersofmoreoftheretrievedpropositions.Thisisanexampleofareconstructionprocess,
inwhichthesubjectisabletoguessthetargetinformationintelligentlyevenwhenitisnotretrieved.Theredundancyofnetworksmakesothertypesofreconstruction
possibleaswell.Supposethatallofthepathstochairintheexamplenetworkreceivedinsufficientactivationtoallowretrieval.Iftheinformationthatthedoglovedto
sitonsomethingthatitsmastersownedwasavailable,chairwouldbeanobviousguessforthemissinginformation.
Therefocusingandreconstructionprocessesprovideageneralframeworkforexplainingtheeffectsofelaborationinspecificmemorysituations.Forexample,some
typesofelaborationstendtoenhancememoryperformancemorethanothers(SteinandBransford1979BradshawandAnderson1982).BradshawandAnderson
showedthatelaborationsofasentencetendtobemoreeffectiveiftheyconcernthecausesoreffectsofthefactsdescribedinthesentence.Forthefollowingtarget
sentence,study

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ingtheirrelevantelaborationwouldbelesseffectiveinpromotinglaterrecallthanstudyingeitherthecauseelaborationortheeffectelaboration:
Target:

MozartmadealongjourneyfromMunichtoParis.

Irrelevant:

Mozartfeltfruitswereunwholesomeforchildren.

Cause:

MozartwantedtoleaveMunichtoavoidaromanticentanglement.

Effect:

MozartwasinspiredbyParisianmusicallife.

BradshawandAndersonarguedthatthecauseandeffectelaborationsledtonetworkswithmoreinterconnectionsthandidtheirrelevantelaborations.Intheexample
thetargetandirrelevantsentencesmightenduphavingonlytheMozartnodeincommon.ThetargetandcausesentenceswillhaveboththeMozartandMunich
nodesincommon,andtheymightwellleadtotheproductionoffurtherinterconnectedelaborations.Forexample,asubjectmightencodethepropositionthatParisis
farenoughfromMunichtodeterarejectedloverfrompursuitvialateeighteenthcenturymodesoftransport.
EffectsofSchematicProcessingonMemoryThetheoryofelaborationjustsketchedpredictsthattheactivationoforganizedknowledgestructures,suchas
schemasorscripts,duringtheacquisitionoftargetmaterialshouldhaveimportanteffectsonmemory.Theavailabilityofaschemathatisrelevanttothetarget
informationshouldoftenmakeahostofhighlyinterrelatedelaborationsimmediatelyavailable.
Owens,Bower,andBlack(1979),forexample,showedthattherecallofarathergeneralstorycouldbeimprovedbyprefacingitwithaspecifictheme.Ageneral
storyaboutNancy'svisittothedoctor,forexample,containedthefollowingsentences:
Nancysteppedonthescaleandthenurserecordedherweight.Thedoctorenteredtheroomandexaminedtheresults.HesmiledatNancyandsaid,''Well,itseemsmy
expectationshavebeenconfirmed.''

ThemorespecificversionwasexactlythesameexceptthatitbeganwiththeinformationthatNancyhadbeenseeingacollegeprofessorandthoughtshemightbe
pregnant.Theassumptionisthatthisthemeinformationactivatesarichschemaabouthowunmarriedcollegestudentscopewithunexpectedpregnancy.Theschema
allowsmanymoreelaborationsthantheskeletalscriptforavisittothedoctorthatisactivatedbythegeneralversionofthestory.Infact,subjectswhostudiedstories
withthemesrecalled46percentmorethansubjectswhostudiedgeneralstories.InanotherstudyChiesi,Spilich,andVoss(1979)showedthatsubjectswhocometo
asituationwithmorecomplexschematicknowledgeareabletogenerateelaborationsthatproduceahigherlevelofrecall.Inthisstudysubjectswhowereclassified
independentlyashavingahighlevelofbaseballknowledgerecalledmorefrompassagesaboutbaseballgames.
ErrorsInducedbyElaborationandSchematicProcessingTheelaborationtheorypredictsvariouskindsoferrorsaswellasadvantages.Forfigure3.3we
explainedhowthecorrectrecallofchaircouldbereconstructedifitoritslisttagwereunretrievable.Butthesameprocessesmightleadtotheincorrectrecall,or
intrusion,ofmastersorhair,whichbothresultedfromthesubject'selaborationprocess.
Elaborationthatisguidedbyaschemacompoundstheproblem.Targetinformationthatfitswellintotheschemawillberedundantlyencoded.Manyoftheredundant

Page106

propositionsarehighlyplausibleinferences,however,thatmayprovedifficulttodiscriminateattesttimefrominformationthatwasactuallypresented.Inchapter2we
sawthatBower,Black,andTurner(1979)foundevidenceforexactlythiskindoferrorinbothrecognitionandrecalltests.Theseerrorsprovidedstrongevidencefor
theexistenceofscriptsforeverydayeventsandfortheroleofscriptsinstoryunderstanding.Intheirstudyoftheadvantagesofstorieswiththemes,Owens,Bower,
andBlack(1979)alsofoundthatsubjectstendedtorecalltheirelaborationsashavingbeenpartofthestory.Theadditionalelaborationconnectedwiththepresence
ofathemetriggeredfourtimesmoreerrorsofthistypethanthegeneralstories.Infact,forthethematicstories,aftertwentyfourhours,subjectsrecalledone
elaborationforeverytwopropositionsthatactuallyoccurredinthestory.
Inmuchofeverydaylifetheretrievalofschemabasedinferencesisprobablyadaptive,sincetheinferencesareusuallycorrect.Ontheotherhand,thereareoccasions
whenitisimportanttobeabletodiscriminatetheoriginandtimeofstorageforitemsofinformationinmemory.Legalwitnesses,forexample,areexpectedtobeable
todiscriminatewhattheyexperiencedfromwhattheyinferred.Thereissomeevidencethateyewitnesstestimonyiscontaminatedbyelaborativeandschematic
processes.Someofthemostinterestingevidencecomesfromthetranscriptsofthe"Watergate"tapes.Thetapeswereaudiorecordingsofmeetingsbetween
PresidentRichardNixonandhisadvisers,includinghiscounselJohnDean.DeantestifiedagainstNixonbeforetheSenate'sWatergateCommitteeaboutsomeofthe
tapedmeetingsbeforethetapeswererevealed.
Neisser(1981)undertooktocompareDean'stestimonyabouttwoparticularmeetingswiththetranscriptsofthosemeetings.Hefoundevidenceforaveryhigh
degreeofschematicprocessing.ItappearedthatDean'smeetingswiththepresidentallcontributedtoasinglecoherentthematicschema,orknowledgebase,about
theWatergateaffair.Deanhadagreatdealoftroublereconstructingparticularevents.Althoughmostofhistestimonywastrueingeneral,heoftenattributed
statementstopeoplethattheynevermade,thattheymadeonadifferentday,orthatsomeoneelsemade.Histestimonyalsoshowedevidenceoftheinfluenceofhis
selfschema.Errorsinhisrecalltypicallyrevisedthefactstobemoreconsistentwithhisviewofhimselfandhisownroleintheaffair.
Laboratorystudieshavealsofoundevidenceofschematicprocessingineyewitnesstestimony.InanearlystudybyLoftusandPalmer(1974)subjectsfirstvieweda
filmofanautomobileaccidentandthenansweredquestionsabouttheaccident.Onegroupofsubjectswasasked,"Abouthowfastwerethecarsgoingwhenthey
smashedintoeachother?"Forasecondgroupofsubjectstheendofthequestionwaschangedto"whentheyhiteachother?"Thefirstgroupgavemuchhigher
estimatesofspeed.Aweeklaterthesubjectswerecalledbackforfurther"testimony,"andtheywereallasked,''Didyouseeanybrokenglass?''Althoughtherewas
nobrokenglassinthefilm,32percentofthesubjectswhohadansweredthe"smashed"questionaweekearlierbutonly14percentofthesubjectswhohad
answeredthe"hit"questionreportedhavingseenbrokenglass.Alikelyexplanationisthattheinformationabouttheviolenceofthecollisionimpliedbythefirst
questionwasincorporatedintotherepresentationoftheaccident,asanelaboration.Thereportofthebrokenglasswasthengeneratedreconstructivelybyapplyinga
schemacontainingtheinformationthatautomobilesmashupstypicallybreakglass.Loftus'smethodologyandtheoreticalconclusionshavebeencriticized(by
McCloskeyandZaragoza1985,forexample).However,

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studiesemployingmodifiedmethodshavecontinuedtofindthatmisleadingposteventinformationcanimpairmemoryperformance(Lindsay1990).
StorageversusRetrievalinMemoryPerformance
Althoughtheabovediscussionsuggeststhatschemadrivenelaborationisveryimportantinhumanmemory,italonedoesnotdeterminememoryperformance.What
informationgetsretrievedatretrievaltimedependsontheretrievalcuesthatarepresentintheexternalandcognitiveenvironmentandonthedeliberateretrieval
strategiesthatapersonengagesin.Theretrievedinformationmustthenbeusedtogenerateamemorialdecisionorreport,whichisaffectedbymoreorlessdeliberate
reconstructiveprocessesandbydecisioncriteriaorgoalsthatarerelevantintheretrievalsituation.
Semanticelaborationisparticularlyusefulwhentheretrievalsituationislikelytocontaincuesthataresemanticallyrelatedtotheoriginalinformationandwhenthegoal
intheretrievalsituationistorecallknowledgethatisconceptuallyrelatedtocurrentlyactiverepresentations.Manyeverydaymemorysituationshavethischaracter.
Currentgoalsoftencanbemeteveniftracesoforiginallyexperiencedmaterialaremixedupwithinferencesandelaborationsthatoccurredduringacquisitionor
retrieval.
Thenaturaladvantageofelaborationcanbelessened,however,ifthenatureoftheretrievalsituationischanged.Forexample,amemorytestcanbemadelessdifficult
byprovidingcuesthathavethepotentialtoactivatelessaccessibleinformationinmemory.ThepreviouslymentionedexperimentsreportedbyBjork(1975)
demonstratethatonarecognitiontestmemoryforunelaborateditemscanbequitegood.ThestudybyChiesi,Spilich,andVoss(1979)providesanotherexample:
subjectswhowerelowinbaseballknowledgeandwhoshowedpoorrecallforbaseballstoriesdidverywellonarecognitiontest.Theseresultsconfirmthetheory
thatoneofthemainadvantagesofelaborationistoprovidemultiplepotentialassociativeretrievalpathwaystoeachproposition.Recognitiontestingtendstodiminish
thisadvantagebecausethetestitemusuallydirectlyactivatestherightregionofmemory.
Undersomeretrievalconditionselaborationcanbeadisadvantagerelativetootherstrategies.InBjork'sexperimenttherehearsalstrategywassuperiortoelaboration
fortheimmediaterecallcondition,probablylargelybecauserehearsalmaintainsanumberofwordsinworkingmemory,whichcanbereportedonanimmediatetest.
Eventheclassiclevelofprocessingresultsdependonthenatureofthememorytestemployed.Structuralandphonemicprocessing,illustratedintable3.2,produce
superiorperformanceifthememorytestrequiresmemoryforthephysicalappearanceofawordorforitsphonemicproperties(Morris,Bransford,andFranks1977
Stein1978).Asemanticelaborationstrategymightnotencodethesepropertiesdirectlyatall,andthepropertieswouldbedifficulttoreconstructfromthe
elaborations,sincetheelaborationsarerelatedtomeaningandthepropertiesareindependentofmeaning.
ThedependenceofmemoryperformanceoninteractionsbetweenacquisitionandretrievalconditionshasbeendiscussedbyMorris,Bransford,andFranks(1977)as
theprincipleoftransferappropriateprocessingandbyTulving(1983)astheprincipleofencodingspecificity.Ourdiscussionsofarindicatesthatclassicaltheories
ofthecognitivearchitecturehavegoodresourcesforexplainingtheseinteractions.Theseresourcescanbefurtherexploredbyconsideringsomeofthetypesof
memoryerrorsthatwerediscussedabove.

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SourceMonitoringManyoftheerrorsdiscussedabovecanbeseenasfailurestorecalltheorigin,orsource,ofinformationretrievedfromdeclarativememory.
Whenaneyewitnessattributesastatementtothewrongperson,orwhenasubjectinamemoryexperimentrecallsherowninferenceasafactthatwasstatedinatext,
asourceerrorhasoccurred.Johnson(Johnson,Hashtroudi,andLindsay1993)andothersusethetermsourcemonitoringtorefertotheprocessesinvolvedin
judgmentsaboutthesourcesofrememberedmaterial.Aswehaveseen,thetheoryofthecognitivearchitecturepredictstheoccurrenceofsourceerrors.Perhapsthe
mostgeneralexplanationofwhytheyoccuristhatlongtermdeclarativememoryanditsassociatedstorageandretrievalprocessesarenotsetuptokeeptrackof
sourceswithhighreliability.Therearenotseparatememorystoresforknowledgearisingfromdifferentsources,nordodeclarativestructuresappeartobe
automaticallyindexedbysource.
Ontheotherhand,informationthatisrelevanttosourcewilloftenbecontainedinanactiveworkingmemoryrepresentationthatisstoredinlongtermmemory.
Furthermore,elaborativeprocessingcanbedeliberatelydedicatedtocreatingrepresentationsofsourceinformation.Subjectswhodistrustasourceofinformation
(DoddandBradshaw1980)orwhoarewarnedthattheymightreceivemisinformation(Greene,Flynn,andLoftus1982)showareducedtendencytoconfuse
informationsourcesinmemory.Theexplanationoftheseeffectsintermsofelaborationtheoryisthatsubjectsgeneratemanymorepropositionsconcerningthesource
andreliabilityofinformationthantheynormallydo.Atthetimeofthememorytestthesepropositionshaveagoodchanceofbeingretrieved,bothbecausetheywere
encodedinthefirstplaceandhencepossiblystoredandbecausetheyareinterrelatedwithotherpropositions.
Giventhatparticularinformationispotentiallyavailableinmemory,sourceerrorsalsovarywithpeople'sretrievalstrategiesandwiththecriteriatheysetforreportinga
memory.InanexperimentbyHasherandGriffin(1978),whendoubtwasraisedabouttheencodingschemaatthetimeofthememorytest,subjectsmadefewer
reconstructiveintrusionsandactuallyrecalledmoreoftheoriginaltargetinformation.Subjectsintheseexperimentsapparentlyalteredboththeirretrievalstrategiesand
theirdecisionprocesses.Theydidnotusetheencodingschematofocustheirretrieval,andtheyweremorecarefulnottoreportinformationwithanuncertainsource.
InastudyoftheeyewitnesssuggestibilityeffectLindsayandJohnson(1989)alsofoundevidencethatsourceerrorscanbereducedwhenpeopleshifttheirdecision
criteriainrecognitionsituations.Subjectssawapictureandthenwereexposedtomisleadingposteventverbalinformation.Halfofthesubjectsthenreceiveda
standard"Yes""No"recognitiontestinwhichtheysawaseriesofitemsandhadtojudgewhichitemshadappearedinthepictureandwhichhadnot.Theother
subjectstookasourcemonitoringtest,whichrequiredthattheyjudgetestitemstobenew,presentinthepicture,presentintheverbalinformation,orpresentinboth
thepictureandtheverbalinformation.Subjectsinthestandardrecognitionconditiontendedtoattributeitemsfromtheposteventinformationtothepicture,whereas
subjectsinthesourcemonitoringconditiondidnotmaketheseerrors.Subjectsintherecognitionconditionwerenotconcentratingonthepossibilityofsourceerrors
andprobablytendedtotreatanysenseoffamiliaritywithatestitemasgroundsfora"Yes''(or''Old")response.Inthesourcemonitoringcondition,however,
subjectshadtotrytoretrieveinformationthatwassourcerelevantandtouseinformationfrommemorytodiscriminateamongsources.Forexample,ifanitem
appearedinthepicture,oneshouldbeabletorememberfactsaboutitsvisualappearance(shape,position,andsoon).

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MemoryAndTheCognitiveArchitecture
Theclassicaltheory,aswehavedevelopeditsofar,includesthreetypesofmemory:workingmemory,longtermdeclarativememory,andproceduralmemory.Ithas
beenarguedthatvariousrepresentationsandprocessesareimportantfortheoperationofeachtypeofmemory.Theframeworkprovidedbytheclassicaltheoryhas
beenremarkablysuccessfulinaccommodatingawiderangeofmemoryphenomena.Nevertheless,therearememoryphenomenaandideasaboutmemorythatarenot
soobviouslycompatiblewiththeclassicaltheory.
ImplicitversusExplicitMemoryThetermexplicitmemoryissometimesusedtorefertothephenomenadiscussedsofarinthissection.Inexplicitretrieval
situationstheremembererviewsthesituationasamemorysituationandengagesinsomeconscious,attentiondemanding,controlledprocessingtogenerateamemory
decisionorreport.Thereportoftenreferstoaparticularacquisitionsituation,asinthecasesofrecognizingasentencethatappearedinaparticularstoryorrecalling
whatapersonsaidonaparticularoccasion.Considerthecontrastwiththeproceduralmemorybuiltupduringskillacquisition.Herethetypicalretrievalsituationisthe
performanceoftheskill.Themeasureofproceduralacquisitioniswhethertheperformaceoftheskillimproves.Theperformersimplyperformstheskillaswellas
possible,withoutengaginginanyofthecognitiveprocessesneededtogeneratememoryreportsandwithouttryingtoreflectuponanyparticularpriorpracticesession.
Indeed,wehavearguedthatthecontentsofautomatizedproductionscannotbedeclarativelyaccessedatall.Incontrastwithexplicittestsofmemory,skilled
performancecanbereferredtoasanimplicittestofmemory.Thedistinctionbetweenexplicitandimplicitmemoryisratherinformalandislargelydefinedintermsof
thecharacteristicsofmemorysituationsratherthancharacteristicsofthememoriesthemselves.Thus,itwouldbemisleadingtosimplyidentifydeclarativememoryas
explicitmemoryandproceduralmemoryasimplicitmemory.Declarativeknowledge,forexample,isoftenaccessedandprocessedimplicitlyduringspeech,planning,
orreasoningwithoutreferencetoanyspecificprioracquisitionsituationandwithouttheoperationofthecognitiveprocessesassociatedwithexplicitmemoryreports.
Thedistinctionbetweenthetwotypesofmemoryhasbecomeimportantbecauseofthediscoverythatexplicitandimplicitmemoryforthesamematerialcanbe
dissociatedinbothnormalandamnesicsubjects.Forexample,manyamnesics,whengivenalistofwordstostudy,showlittleornomemoryforthelistonastandard
"Yes""No"recognitiontestgiven,say,twohourslater.However,theexposuretothestudylistdoesaffectperformanceonawordcompletiontest.Inoneversionof
thistest,theamnesicsubjectsaregiventhreeletterwordstems,forexample,TAB____,andaskedtocompletethemtoformthefirstwordthatcomestomind,for
example,TABLE.Subjectstendtocompletethefragmentstoformwordsthatappearedonthestudylist.Thesubjects'performancerevealsimplicitbutnotexplicit
memoryforthelist.Thiskindofimplicitmemoryphenomenoniscalledarepetitionprimingeffect.Thepriminghere,whichcanlastforhoursordays,isnotthe
sameasprimingviaimmediateactivationindeclarativememory(discussedinchapter2),whichlastsatmostforsecondsandtypicallyforwellunderasecond.
Interestingly,whenthewordcompletiontaskisgiventoamnesicswithexplicitmemoryinstructionstocompletethestemswithwordsrememberedfromthestudylist,
theprimingeffectdisappears.Inchapter2wesawthatthereisadissociationbetweendeclarativeandprocedural

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memoryinamnesia.Theamnesiccanlearnnewskillsbuthasasevere,sometimestotal,deficitintheabilitytoacquirenewdeclarativeknowledge.Primingstudies
suggestthatabroadergeneralizationmightbethatexplicitandimplicitmemoryaredissociatedinamnesia.
Adissociationbetweenexplicitandimplicitmemoryhasalsobeenestablishedinpeoplewithoutamnesia,thoughlessdramatically.Normalsubjects'performanceon
explicitandimplicittestsofmemoryisdifferentiallyaffectedbydifferentstudyconditions.Forexample,subjects'useofasemanticelaborationstrategyduringthe
studyofalistmightimproveexplicitrecallofthelistbuthavelittleeffectonpriming.Conversely,shiftingfromauditorypresentationduringstudytovisualpresentation
duringtestingmightdecreasetheprimingeffectconsiderablybuthavenoeffectonexplicitmemoryperformance.
Thisresearchhasledtoquestionsaboutwhetherimplicitmemoryrequiresthepostulationofoneormorenewcomponentsinthecognitivearchitecture(Schacter
1993).Thedissociationevidenceitself,however,providesonlyweaksupportforthisview.Onereasonisthatitispossibletoproduceexperimentaldissociations
amongtypesofexplicitortypesofimplicitmemory.Fractionatingthecognitivearchitecturewitheverydissociationisclearlyunwarranted.Further,thedissociationcan
beaccountedforbytheoriesthatfocusonthekindofstorageretrievalinteractionsthatwereintroducedabove(Roediger,Weldon,andChallis1989).
Schacter(1993,forexample)hassuggestedthattheimpassebetweenstructuralandprocessingaccountsofimplicitmemorycanberesolvedbylookingtofurther
neuropsychologicalevidence.Hearguesthatthereisindependentevidencefortheexistenceofperceptualrepresentationsystems(PRS)thataredistinctfrom
declarative,orsemantic,memoryandthatarethesiteofmanyprimingeffects,includingthewordstemcompletioneffect.Thereareneurologicalpatients,forexample,
whoseaccesstothemeaningsofwordsisseverelycompromisedbutwhohaverelativelyintactaccesstotheperceptualformofwords.Petersenandothers(Petersen
etal.1988Petersenetal.1990)haveusedthePETscanningtechniqueonnormalsubjectstomonitorthebrainregionsthatareactivatedbytheprocessingofthe
visualformofaprintedwordandtheprocessingofitsmeaning.Theyfoundevidencethattheprocessingofthevisualformofwordsisassociatedwithposteriorareas
inthebrainandthattheprocessingofmeaningisassociatedwithfrontalareas.
ThePRStheoryfitsinwellwithoursketchofthecognitivearchitecture.Thepropositionalschematiccodeofthedeclarativesystemisdesignedtodealwithsemantic
information.Itmakessensethatitisnotinvolvedinprocessingvisualinputtoidentifythevisualappearanceofaword.Theanalysisofthevisualappearanceofaword
shouldbedoneinthevisualsystem,whichwouldhavedirectassociativelinkstonodesrepresentingeitherwordsorconceptsinthedeclarativesystem.Thisis
apparentlythecase,andvisualprimingeffectsrepresentaresidueofprocessinginthevisualsystem.Onefurtherpossibilityisthatprimingshouldbelookeduponasa
proceduralknowledgephenomenon.Dependingonthestudytask,itcouldinvolveeitheratemporarysensitizationofpreexistingproceduralrepresentationsorasmall
andunstablemodificationofproceduralknowledge.Itwilltakesometimetoworkouttherelativemeritsofthisviewversustheviewthatimplicitmemoryisadistinct
phenomenon.
Aproblemwithviewingimplicitmemorystrictlyintermsofproceduralknowledgeembeddedinperceptualsystemsisthatdeclarativeknowledgemightalsobe
subjectto

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implicitmemoryeffects.Itwaspointedoutabovethatineverydayspeech,planning,andreasoning,declarativeknowledgeistypicallyaccessedandusedimplicitly.
Declarativememorymightbeprimed,therefore,byacquisitionprocessesthatactivatepropositionalschematicnetworks.Blaxton(1989)foundexactlythiseffect.In
oneacquisitionconditionsubjectsreadwordsaloudinaneutralcontext,forexample,thedisplayXXXfollowedbythewordMETROPOLIS.Thisisthekindof
conditionthatisthoughttoprimeperceptualrepresentationsystemsandthattypicallyfacilitatesimplicittaskssuchaswordcompletion.Inasecondacquisition
conditionsubjectshadtogenerateawordgivenitsfirstletterandasemanticallyrelatedcontextwordforexample,givenCITYM__,thesubjectmightgenerate
METROPOLIS.Thiskindoftaskhasbeenfoundnottoprimewordcompletion.Thesetwostudytaskswerecomparedfortheirabilitytoprimeperformanceontwo
differentimplicitmemorytests.Onetestwasawordfragmentcompletiontestforexample,giveninstructionstocompletethefragmentM_T___OL_Swiththefirst
wordthatcomestomind,thesubjectmightgenerateMETROPOLIS.Aspredicted,performanceonthistestwasprimedbytheneutralcontextstudytaskrelativeto
thesemanticgenerationstudytask.Inthesecondimplicitmemorytestthesubjectattemptedtoanswergeneralknowledgequestions,forexample,Inwhatfictional
citydidClarkKentandLoisLanelive?Inthisconditiontheprimingrelationwasreversed.Thesemanticgenerationstudytaskprimedmemoryperformancerelative
totheneutralcontextstudytask.Thisresultisconsistentwiththepredictionthatdeclarativeknowledgeshouldbeprimedbyprocessesthatactivatepropositional
schematicnetworks.
Althoughimplicitmemoryphenomenahavebecomeavaluablemethodologicalprobeforsettlingquestionsaboutthecognitivearchitecture,thepossiblefunctionsof
implicitmemory,perse,havebeenlesswidelydiscussed.Ifweviewprimingeffectsastemporaryelevationsofaccessibilityinthestandardprocessingsubsystemsof
thearchitecture,however,thenitmakessensetoviewimplicitmemoryasawayoftemporarilycachingknowledgethathasrecentlybeenusedinparticular
circumstancesonthebetthattheknowledgeislikelytobeneededinsimilarcircumstancesinthenearfuture.InvonNeumannmachinesfrequentlyusedinstructionsor
dataareoftencachedinaseparatememorystore.Thismakessensegiventhephysicalorganizationofcomputers.Inthebrain,whichhasmanyspecializedprocessing
subsystemsandrepresentations,andwhichseemstorelyonthepropagationofactivationalongconnectionsforknowledgeretrievalandprocessing,itwouldmake
moresensetoaccomplishcachingviaarelativelyshorttermmechanismforpotentiatingpathways.
EpisodicversusSemanticMemoryTheresearchonsourcemonitoringandonexplicitmemoryisfocusedinpartontherecollectionofparticularpastoccasions.
Introspectively,weoftenfeeladifferencebetweenrememberingapastoccasion,whichisaccompaniedbyadistinctconsciousawarenessofaparticularmomentor
event,andrememberingafact.Thedifferenceisnotjustthatmemoryforoccasionsinvolvesdated,locatedautobiographicalinformationandthatmerefactualmemory
doesnot,becauseitseemsintrospectivelythatanautobiographicalmemorycanhavethecharacterofmerefactualmemory.Supposethatyourememberthatyoutook
yourfirstheadfirstdiveoffaboardinaneighborhoodpoolduringthesummerbetweenthefifthandsixthgrades.Althoughthisfactconcernsyourself,itmighthave
roughlythesamesubjectivestatusasrememberingthatLincolnwasthesixteenthpresidentoftheUnitedStates.Perhapsthisisbecauseyoulearneditfromyour
motherorsisterorworkeditoutforyourself,reasoningfromotherautobiographicalinformation.Onthe

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otherhand,yourrecollectionmighthavethequalityofactuallybeingthere,ofbeingtransportedbacktotheexperience.Thetermsemanticmemoryissometimes
usedtorefertomemoryforfactsthatisunaccompaniedbytherecollectionofapastpersonaloccasion,andthetermepisodicmemoryissometimesusedtoreferto
theconsciousrecollectionofpastepisodes.Someresearchers(Tulving1983,1993)havearguedthatdistinctmemorystructuresorprocessesmustbepostulatedto
explaindifferencesbetweenepisodicandsemanticmemory.
Asalways,althoughintrospectionisafertilesourceofhypothesesaboutcognition,itdoesnotgetusveryfarinevaluatingthem.Theevidenceforthereconstructive
characterofrecallandthefallibilityofsourcemonitoringraisesimmediatequestionsaboutusingdifferencesinconsciousawarenessasevidencefordistinctepisodic
andsemanticmemorysystems.Researchershavedocumentederrorsinwhichaparticularpersonalexperienceisjudgedtobethesourceofrememberedinformation
thatactuallyoriginatedinsomeotherexperienceorinone'sownthoughtsatsomeprevioustimeorevenduringretrieval.Thelackofanabsolutelyreliablesubjective
criterionforepisodicmemoryhasbecomeimportantinrecentyearsinthecontextofpsychotherapy,wheresomecliniciansworkwithpatientsontherecoveryof
childhoodmemories.Althoughmanyofthesememoriesrefertoactualevents,othersappeartobetheresultoffalliblesourcemonitoringandreconstructionprocesses
thatareinparttriggeredbythemisleadingposteventsuggestionsthatariseduringtherapy(Loftus1993).Thisevidencedoesnotstronglydisconfirmthepossibilityof
separateepisodicandsemanticsystems.Itdoes,however,suggestthatiftherearedistinctsystems,theymustbehighlyinterconnected,andtheymustfeed
representationsintoexplicitjudgmentprocesseswithoutreliablesourcetags.
Aplausiblealternativehypothesisisthattherearenotseparatesystems.Thedeclarativememorysystemasithasbeenoutlinedsofarclearlycontainsmanyresources
thatmightbeusedtoaccountfordifferencesbetweensemanticandepisodicmemories.Wemighthypothesizethatretrievableepisodicmemorieshavethreeimportant
properties.First,theycontainrichinformationaboutone'sexperienceofthesceneandtheeventthattranspired.Second,theyarewellelaboratedintermsoftheself
schema.Third,theyarerelativelydistinctive,orunique,soasnottosufferinterferencefromtheactivationofthousandsofsimilartraces.Thesepropertieswould
explainwhywefeeltransportedbacktoincidentslikethedivingscenebutoftennottobreakfastthreedaysago.Thelackofepisodiccontentintherecallofsemantic
tracescanalsobeexplainedbythelackofthesamethreefactors.Why,forexample,doesrememberingthatAbrahamLincolnwasthesixteenthpresidentofthe
UnitedStatesnotevokethememoryofanyspecificeventinone'slife?PresumablythisfactisassociatedmoststronglywithotherfactsaboutLincolnandtheCivil
Warperiodratherthanwithfactsaboutoneselforfactsandimagesabouteventsduringwhichthisfactcameup.Further,thisfactandotherfactsaboutLincolnmay
haveoccurredinhundredsofcontexts(sittinginparticularclassrooms,readingparticularbooks,andsoon).Totheextentthatthesecontextsareactivatedatall,the
activationwillprobablybeweakandspreadacrossanumberofverysimilarpathways,makingretrievaldifficult.
Reiser,Black,andAbelson(1985)obtainedevidencethattheexperienceofaneventisorganizedintermsofthegeneralschemaorscriptfortheeverydayactivity
thatisgoingon.Asaresult,theepisodicmemoryfortheeventisassociatedwiththeknowledgeschemathatguidedperceptionandbehaviorduringtheevent.Reiser,
Black,andAbelsonshowedthatpeoplecanreadilyretrieveepisodicmemorieswhentheyarecuedwiththenameofanactivity,suchas"wenttoarestaurant."After

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readingsuchcues,subjectsaveraged2.1secondstoretrieveaspecificepisodicmemory.Theseresultsdemonstratethatsemanticknowledge,inthiscaseschemasfor
everydayactions,isrichlyinterconnectedwithepisodicmemory.Theevidenceforsuchinterconnectionsposesachallengetothetheoristwhomaintainsthatsemantic
andepisodicmemoryarefunctionallydistinct.
Anumberofresearchershavelookedtothebrainforevidencethatwouldhelpresolvequestionsabouttheepisodicsemanticdistinction.Anexperimentby
ShimamuraandSquire(1987),forexample,suggeststhattheremaybedistinctdeficitsindeclarativeandepisodicmemoryinamnesia.Intheacquisitionphaseofthe
experiment,amnesicandcontrolsubjectsstudiedobscurefacts(e.g.,"ThenameofthetownthroughwhichLadyGodivasupposedlymadeherfamousrideis
Coventry").Later,theyweregivenafactualknowledgetestthatincludedthefactspreviouslystudied(e.g.,"WhatisthenameofthetownthroughwhichLadyGodiva
supposedlymadeherfamousride?").Thisisanimplicitmemorytestthattapsdeclarativeknowledge.Theamnesicsubjectswereseverelyimpairedintheirabilityto
recallthestudiedfacts.Moreprecisely,theirfactrecallafteratwohourdelaywasequaltothatofcontrolsubjectswhoweretestedafterasevendaydelay.This
resultisevidenceagainstthenotionthatamnesiainvolvesageneralizeddeficitinexplicitmemory.Itfavorsthenotionofadeficitintheformationofnewdeclarative
knowledge,whetherthatknowledgemustbeusedimplicitlyorexplicitly.ShimamuraandSquirewenton,however,totestexplicitsourcememoryintheirsubjectsas
well.Wheneverpatientscorrectlyrecalledapreviouslystudiedfact(e.g.,Coventry),theywereaskedwhentheyhadlastheardthatfact.Amnesicsubjectsweremuch
morelikelythanthesevendaydelaycontrolsubjects(whohadequallevelsoffactrecall)tofailtorememberthatthestudysessionwasthelasttimethattheyheard
thefact.Further,patientswithseveresourceamnesiahadaboutthesameleveloffactrecallaspatientswithlittlesourceamnesia.Thatis,theseverityofapatient's
sourceamnesiacouldnotbepredictedfromtheseverityofhisorherfactrecalldeficit.Thisdissociationofadeficitindeclarativememoryandadeficitinexplicit
memorysuggeststhattheremayindeedbesomethingspecialaboutepisodicmemory.
Tulving(1993)describesasinglecaseofamnesiathathasadifferentcharacterfromthecasesaboveandmayprovideevenstrongersupportforthedistinctnessof
episodicmemory.Inadditiontoatotalsourceamnesiaforrecentevents,themaninquestion,K.C.,showsnoepisodicmemoryforhisentirelife.Hecannoteven
rememberhighlydistinctivelifeevents,suchashisbrother'saccidentaldeath,orhavinghisjawwiredshutforaweekafteratrafficaccident.Likemanyother
amnesics,however,hisintelligence,factualknowledge,andlanguageskillsareintact.AlthoughK.C.'sabilitytoacquirenewfactualknowledgeisseverelyimpaired,
Tulvingandhiscolleagueshaveestablishedexperimentallythathecanacquirenewfacts,eventhoughhehasacompletesourceamnesiaforthosefacts.Thisfindingis
illustratedbythefollowinganecdote:
Whenwedriveby...Toronto'sSkyDomeastructurebuiltafterK.C.becameamnesicheisfamiliarwithitinthesensethatheknowswhatitisandwhatitsnameis.Of
course,whenIaskhimwhetherhehaseverbeeninside,hesaysthathedoesnotknowwhenIaskhim,"Whendidyoudrivebyherelasttime,"hedoesnotknowwhenIask
himwhetherhe'severseenitbefore,hesays,"Iguessso,"andwhenIaskhimtoexplainwhyheguessesso,hesays,''OtherwiseIwouldnotknowitsname."(P68)

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Thereisevidencethatsourceamnesiaisrelatedtofrontallobedamageasopposedtothemedialtemporalanddiencephalicdamagethatistypicallyfoundincasesof
amnesia.Frontaltissuemaybeinvolvedinencodingandstoringinformationaboutthespatialtemporalcircumstancesorcontextsofeventsinone'slife.Thepossibility
thatepisodicmemoryinvolvesparticularbraintissuedoesnotsettlethematterofthedistinctivenessofepisodicmemoryatthecomputationallevelofanalysis,
however.Itmightstillbefruitfultoviewepisodicandsemanticmemoryasasingledeclarativememorysystemthatusesacommonsetofprocessesand
representations.Thefactthattheprocessingorrepresentationofspatialtemporalcontextisphysicallyinstantiatedinparticulartissuemayallowabehaviorally
dramatictypeofbrainlesion,butinitselfitestablishesverylittleaboutthecomputationaldetailsofthoseprocessesandrepresentations.Theissuesatthe
computationallevelcanonlybesettledbyspecifyingtheepisodicsemantictheorymorerigorously,sothatitmakesclear,testablepredictionsthataredistinguishable
fromanequallywelldevelopedunitarymodelofdeclarativememory(McKoon,Ratcliff,andDell1986).
Aparticulartypeofneuropsychologicaldatararelycompensatesfortheneedtodevelopatheoryfurther.Someofthereasonswhydataarisingfrombrainscansor
braindamagearenoeasier,andsometimesmoredifficult,tointerpretthanordinarybehavioraldataarediscussedfurtherinchapter7.Convergingevidencefrom
multiplebehavioralandneuroscientificdomainscanbeveryhelpfulinsortingouthypotheses,aswasseenaboveinSchacter'sdevelopmentofthePRSidea,butin
suchcasesaswellthedatamustbeinterpretedinlightofatheory.Thefurtherprogressofresearchontheepisodicsemanticdistinctionrests,then,bothonthe
developmentofnewsourcesofevidenceandonnewtheoreticalideas.
ConnectionistModelsofMemoryIfweseehumanmemoryasmainlyamatterofretrievingoractivatingknowledgethatisrelevanttocurrentinput,then
connectionistnetworkshaveanumberofattractivepropertiesasmodelsofmemory.Theirabilitytocomputecomplexinputoutputmappingscanbeseenasanability
toretrievetheknowledgethatisappropriatetoagiveninput.Networkscanforminterestinginternalrepresentationsandcanstoremixturesofspecificfactsand
generalizations.Whengivenpartialornoisyinput,networkshavetheabilitycomputeacorrectorplausibleoutput.
Inspiteoftheseattractionstheconnectionistapproachhasnotbeenwidelyappliedtomanyofthephenomenadescribedinthissection.Inlargepartthisisbecausea
theoryofhumanmemoryperformancedependsonatheoryoftheentirecognitivearchitecture.Someaccountofworkingmemoryandattentionisnecessary,aswell
asanaccountoftheproceduraldeclarativedistinction.Theeffectsofelaborationcannotbeaccountedforwithoutafairlywelldevelopedtheoryofcentralmental
representationsandcognitiveoperations.Giventhemicrostructurallevelatwhichconnectionisttheoriesaredeveloped,itisnotyetpossibletomodellargechunksof
thecognitivearchitecture.Thesuccessesofconnectionistmodelinghavesofarcomeinstudiesofsubsystemsofthearchitecture,ofthelearningofparticularmappings
thatareimportantinhumancognition(e.g.,NETtalk,describedinchapter2),andofsomeofthegeneralpropertiesofnetworks,suchastheirabilitytogeneralizeand
formcategories.
Theconnectioniststudyofmemoryhasalsobeensetbackbythediscoverythatsomeofthestandardnetworkarchitecturesandlearningalgorithmsarepoormodels
ofcertainbasicphenomenainhumanmemory.Considerastandardthreelayernetwork(containinginput,hidden,andoutputlayers)trainedwiththebackpropagation

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algorithmdescribedinchapter2.Theusualtrainingregimeforsuchnetworksinvolvesrepeatedexposurestoasetofcorrectinputoutputpairs(thetrainingset).Ifthe
descentalongtheerrorsurface(seefigure2.12)iskeptreasonablyconservative,thenetwork'sperformancegraduallyapproachesthecorrectinputoutputmapping
aslongasthetrainingsetiseitherequivalenttotheultimatetestsetorstatisticallyrepresentativeofit.Thesetrainingconditionsandtheresultingperformance
improvementmightbeplausiblemodelsforskillacquisitionorcategorylearning,buttheyarenotsoplausiblefordeclarativememory.Peopleoftenlearnnewfacts
withasingleexposure,orperhapsafewexposures.Theyareabletoretainfactsoverlongperiodsoftimewithoutconstantretrainingorrefreshing.Thetrainingregime
forhumandeclarativememorydoesnotinvolvecontinuouscyclingthrougharepresentativetrainingsetwithgradualimprovementacrosstheentireset.Ifthe
backpropagationalgorithmisappliedinatrainingregimesimilartothoseofeverydaylifeorlaboratorymemoryexperiments,itislikelytoproducepoorresults.In
suchatrainingregime,newitemsareconstantlyenteringthetrainingset,andthereareperiodsoftimewhencertainolditemsorsetsofolditemsdropoutofthe
trainingsetbutstillmustberetained.However,thealgorithmhasnowayofpreservingitsknowledgeofitemsthatarenotcurrentlyinthetrainingset.Thenetwork's
knowledgeiscontainedinitsweights,yetitadjustsallofitsweightstominimizeerroronthecurrentinputs.Wemightexpect,then,thatifsomeitemsarenotcurrently
beingtrained,theweightpatternsthatencodedthoseitemsmightmoreorlessquicklybedestroyedasweightsarereadjustedtoreduceerroronnewtrainingpairs.
Thatis,wemightexpectthatinthistypeofnetworknewlearningwouldinterferewitholdlearningmuchmoreradicallythanitactuallydoesinhumanmemory.
Severalresearchershavedonecomputersimulationstudiesofnetworksthatconfirmtheseexpectations(McCloskeyandCohen1989Ratcliff1990).Ratclifflooked
atrecognitionmemoryintheencoderarchitecture.Anencodernetworklearnstoreproducetheinputvectorafterpassingitthroughalayerofhiddenunits.Thatis,the
networklearnstocomputetheidentitymapping,inwhichthecorrectoutputvectorforagiveninputvectorisidenticaltotheinputvector.Learningisrequiredbecause
theinputunitsarefullyconnectedtoahiddenlayer,whichusuallycontainsasmallernumberofunits,andwhichdevelopsaninternalrepresentationoftheinputset.
Themeasureofrecognitionmemoryisthesimilaritybetweentheoutputvectoractuallyproducedbythenetworkandtheinputvector.Suchasimilaritymeasurecan
beconvertedintoa"Yes""No"recognitionjudgmentusingsomereasonabledecisionrule.Forexample,ifthesimilarityisgreaterthanacertainthreshold,say"Yes,"
otherwisesay''No."Usingnetworksofvarioussizesandtrainingconditionssimilartothoseinvarioustypesofmemoryexperiments,Ratcliffconfirmedtheinterference
problemforthebackpropagationalgorithm.Thenetworkstendedtoforgetitemsthathaddroppedoutofthetrainingsetandtogiveresponsesthatreflected
acquisitionoftheitemsthatcurrentlywereinthetrainingset.Unlikewhathappensinhumanlearning,increasingthenumberofexposurestoanitembeforeitdropped
outofthetrainingsetdidnotenhanceitsretention.Anumberofreasonablemodificationsofthenetworksandthealgorithmdidnotchangetheresults.
Theunsuitabilityofthestandardbackpropagationmodelanditsobviousvariantsformodelingcertainmemoryphenomenashouldnotbetakenasevidenceagainstthe
connectionistapproachgenerally.Othernetworkarchitecturesandlearningalgorithmsarebeingdevelopedandexplored.Kruschke's(1992)exemplarbasedmodel,
for

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example,doesnotsufferfromcatastrophicinterference.Thelearningofparticularitemsonlyaffectsthehiddenunitsthatrespondtothem.Whentrainingswitchesto
newitems,differenthiddenunitsareaffected,thuspreservingtheoriginallearning.Ultimately,thefailureofaparticularclassofmodelscanbetakenasasignof
successinthesensethatthemodelsarespecifiedclearlyenoughtomakedisconfirmablepredictions.Aswenotedaboveinourdiscussionoftheresearchonthe
episodicsemanticdistinction,progressinresearchrequiresthattheoriesandmodelsmakeclearpredictions.
3.3Reasoning
Aspointedoutinsection2.6,goaldirectedthoughtinvolvesmanipulatinginformationtodrawconclusionsofvariouskinds.Wedecidewhattodonext,wepredict
whatislikelytohappen,wefigureoutwhyacertaineventoccurred,andwesolveallmannerofproblems.Insomecasestheneededconclusionsaredirectlyavailable
indeclarativememoryorperceptualinput.Inothercases,however,theconclusionscanonlybegeneratedbyprocessesthattransformcurrentlyactiverepresentations
toproducenewinformation.
DeductiveReasoning
Traditionally,deductivereasoningreferstotheuseofrulestoderivelogicallyvalidconclusionsfromsetsofpremises.Totakeasimpleexample,imaginethatyouare
thinkingabouttakingapartyourwashingmachine.Youdonothavestoredinyourdeclarativeknowledgebasetheproposition"Mywashingmachinecan'tshockme,"
butyoumightarriveatthisconclusionbyretrievingthefirstthreepremises(P1P3)belowanddeducingitasavalidconclusion(C2).
P1.Ifthecordonanelectricalapplianceisunplugged,thenitcannotshockme.
P2.Mywashingmachineisanelectricalappliance.
P3.Thecordonmywashingmachineisunplugged.
________________________________________________________________C1.Ifthecordonmywashingmachineisunplugged,thenitcannot
shockme.
C2.Mywashingmachinecannotshockme.
Thefirstconclusion,C1,isgeneratedbyaninstantiation,orpropertyinheritance,operation.Thatis,awashingmachineisaninstantiationofelectricalappliance.The
conceptwashingmachineinheritsthepropertiesofitssuperordinateconceptelectricalappliance.Thisisessentiallyamatteroffittinganinstanceintoamore
generalschema,aprocessthatwehaveassumedthroughoutourdiscussionsofcognitiveprocessesandconcepts.Butasecond,extremelyimportantdeductive
processisinvolvedaswell.Thedesiredconclusion,C2,isderivedfromC1andP3byarule,orprocedure,calledmodusponens:GivenpropositionsoftheformifP
thenQandP,deriveQ.Oneoftheinputstomodusponens,then,isaconditional,orifthen,proposition,suchasC1.Aconditionalconsistsofanantecedent,or
ifpart,andaconsequent,orthenpart.Theotherinputtomodusponensisapropositionthatmatchestheantecedentofthefirstinput.Theoutputofmodusponensis
theconsequentofthefirstinput.Thus,sinceP3matchestheantecedentofC1,modusponenscanbeapplied,producingtheconsequentofC1.Weareapparently
abletomakethiskindofinferentialleapquiteeffortlessly.Thequestionis,Howdowedoit?

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DeductiveSystemsAmechanismforgeneratingdeductiveinferenceswouldbeasystemofformalrules,likemodusponens,thatcouldbeappliedsyntacticallyto
propositionsregardlessoftheircontent.Philosophersandmathematicianshavedescribedpowerfulversionsofsuchsystems(e.g.,thefirstorderpredicatecalculus,
discussedinchapter4).Therulesinsuchsystemsarecompletelyformal,andtheydealonlywiththelogicalaspectsofpropositions,suchasthelogicalconnectives
(ifthen,not,and,or,ifandonlyif)andquantifiers(every,all,some).Becauseoftheseproperties,theyareextremelygeneral.Modusponensisanexample.Itis
purelyformalbecauseitappliesanytimetheantecedentofaconditionalpremisematchesanotherpremise.Itisgeneralbecausetheantecedent,P,andthe
consequent,Q,canbeanyproposition,regardlessofcontent.Rips(1988)hasshownhowgoalorientedproductionscanbeusedtobuildapsychologicallyplausible
deductivesystem.Itwouldseemtobeagoodthingifanadequatesetofdeductiveruleswereeitherbuiltintothecognitivearchitectureoracquirednaturallyduring
experience.Indeed,modusponensandrulesinvolvingconjunction(e.g.,ifPandQisagoal,establishPandQseparately)canbearguedtobeubiquitousinhuman
cognition.
ExperimentalEvidence:TheSelectionTaskThereisevidence,however,thatpeopledonotacquireageneraldeductivesystembasedonformalsyntacticrules.
Considertheselectiontask(WasonandJohnsonLaird1972).Thesubjectispresentedwithfourcards,eachbearingasinglecharacter.
E

Thesubjectistoldthateachcardhasanumberononesideandaletterontheothersideandthatthefollowingconditionalstatementistrue:Ifacardhasavowelon
oneside,thenithasanevennumberontheotherside.Thesubjectisthenaskedtopickexactlythecardsthatmustbeturnedoverinordertofigureoutwhetherthe
conditionalstatementistrue.
Acommonresponseistopickonlythecardwiththevowel.Thisamountstoapplyingmodusponens.TheEsatisfiestheantecedentoftheconditional,sothe
consequenthadbetterbetrue,whichcanbedeterminedbyturningoverthecard.Ourhypotheticalsubjecterrs,however,innotalsopickingthecardwitha7.Tosee
this,supposethatthecardwasturnedoverandfoundtohaveanAontheotherside.Thecardwouldviolatetheconditional.Theerrorisineffectafailuretoapply
anotherruleoflogiccalledmodustollendotollens:Ifaconditionalistrue,anditsconsequentisfalse,thenitfollowsthatitsantecedentisfalse.Inourfirstexample,if
yourwashingmachineshockedyou,thenitwaspluggedin.
Thehighrateoferrorontheselectiontaskhassuggestedtomanyresearchersthatmostpeopledonotpossessafullygeneralformaldeductivesystem.Itwas
discoveredearlyon,however,thatmakingtheselectiontasklessabstractbyintroducingmoreconcretecontentintoitsometimesimprovedpeople'sperformance.In
onesuchstudyD'Andrade(1982)askedsubjectstoimaginethattheymanagedastoreinwhichthefollowingrulewasinforce:Ifapurchaseexceeds$30,thenthe
receiptmusthavethemanager'ssignatureontheback.Thesubjectsshowedconsiderableinsightintotheneedtochecktheamountsonreceiptswithnosignature.
However,practiceonthisproblemdidnotimprovetheirperformanceonabstractversionsofthetask.Apuredeductivesystemtheorycannotexplainthisfinding.
Sinceformaldeductiverulesapplytotheformsofpropositionsregardlessoftheircontent,changesincontent

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shouldnotaffecttheoperationofadeductivesystem.Themereintroductionofmoreconcretecontent,however,doesnotexplainthefindingeither,sincenotall
concreteversionsoftheproblemproducefacilitation.ManktelowandEvans(1979),forexample,failedtofindfacilitationinaversionofthetaskthatusedtherule,''If
Ieathaddock,thenIdrinkgin."
PragmaticReasoningSchemasOnepossibleapproachtotheinfluenceofcontentiscasebasedreasoning(RiesbeckandSchank1989).Inthiskindofapproach
reasoningissuccessfultotheextentthatthecontentoftheproblemevokesapastsimilarcase.Somesortofanalogyfindingprocessisrequiredtomapthecurrent
caseontotheanalogouscase.Mostsubjectsinthecheckcashingstudyhadpresumablyneverhadtoenforceacheckverificationrule,soacasebasedexplanation
wouldrequiremappingthesituationontoasimilarsituation,suchasexperiencingthistypeofruleasacustomer.Casebasedreasoningisdiscussedfurtherinchapters
4and5.
ChengandHolyoak(1985)tookasomewhatdifferentapproach,proposingatheoryofpragmaticreasoningschemas.Suchschemasdifferfromformaldeductive
rulesinseveralrespects.Theyapplytoaclassofsituationsratherthantopropositionsofagivenform.Therefore,theyaresensitivetocontextandarenotstrictly
syntactic.Situationsinvolvingpermissionwereoneclassofsituationsstudied.Situationsinvolvingobligationandcausationareotherexamples.Apragmaticreasoning
schemaconsistsofasetofdeductiverules,representedasproductionrules,thatarespecifictotherelevantclassofsituationsandthatarerelatedtogoalsinthat
situation.Inapermissionsituation,forexample,apersonmighthaveagoalofperformingacertainactionorofavoidingpunishment.Asadevelopedknowledge
structurethatcoversawholeclassofsituations,apragmaticreasoningschemaalsodiffersfromthespecificcasesusedincasebasedreasoning.Inanunfamiliar
situationtheschemacanbedirectlyevokedbyfeaturesofthesituationthatfittheschemawithouttheneedofananalogymappingprocess.
Afamiliarpermissionsituationisthecommonrulethatonlypeopleovertheageoftwentyonemaydrinkalcohol.ChengandHolyoakproposethatingenerala
permissionsituationinvolvesaprecondition,P(e.g.,overtwentyone),thatmustbesatisfiedifsomeaction,A(e.g.,drinking),istobetaken.Theschemawilltendto
beevokedinsituationswhereadesiredactionisregulatedbysomeauthority.Thehypothesizedcontentoftheschemaisfourproductionrules:
1.IfAistobetaken,thenPmustbesatisfied.
2.IfAisnottobetaken,thenPneednotbesatisfied.
3.IfPissatisfied,thenAmaybetaken.
4.IfPisnotsatisfied,thenAmustnotbetaken.

Notethattheantecedentsofthefourrulescorrespondtothefourpossibilitiesthataretestedintheselectiontask.Therefore,subjectswhohavelearnedthepermission
schemaoughttoperformcorrectlyinaselectiontaskthatclearlyinvolvespermission.Theideaisthatinrepeatedencounterswithpermissionsituationspeoplelearnto
recognizethemanddeveloprulesfordealingwitheachofthewaysthattheypresentthemselves.
Thefourrulescorrespondtomoregeneralprinciplesofdeductivereasoning.InasituationwhereAistobetaken,rule1correspondstomodusponens.Rule4
correspondstomodustollens.Rule2blocksanerrorcalleddenyingtheantecedent,in

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whichthepersonincorrectlyderivesnotQfromifPthenQandnotP.Rule3blocksarelatederrorknownasaffirmingtheconsequent,inwhichtheperson
incorrectlyderivesPfromifPthenQandQ.Therulesarenotequivalenttothegenerallogicalrules,however.First,theyareevokedbythefeaturesofpermission
situationsratherthanbythegeneralsyntacticformofpropositions.Second,theyinvolvethesocalleddeonticconceptsofpermission(may)andobligation(must),
whereasthegeneraldeductiverulesinvolveonlytheconditionalandnegation.Rule3isnotevenlogicallyvalidiftherearetwoormorepreconditionsfortheaction.
InoneoftheirexperimentsChengandHolyoakcomparedsubjects'performanceunderrulesthathadapermissionrationalewithperformanceunderthesamerules
withnorationalesgiven.Forexample,inoneofthenorationaleconditionssubjectsweretoimaginethattheywerepostalclerkscheckinglettersforcompliancewith
thefollowingrule:ifaletterissealed,thenitmustcarrya20centstamp.Theregulatorysettingandtheuseofthedeontictermmustintheruleshouldhavesome
powertoinvokethepermissionschema,soperformanceshouldbebetterthanincompletelyabstractversionsoftheproblem.Intherationaleconditionsubjectswere
toldthatthereasonfortheruleistoincreaseprofitfrompersonalmail,whichisnearlyalwayssealed,andthatsealedlettersaredefinedaspersonalandthereforemust
carrymorepostagethanunsealedletters.Theresearchersreasonedthattherationalewouldmaketheruleappearlessarbitraryandhelpevokethepermission
schema.PerformanceintherationaleconditionwasindeedmuchbetterthaninthenorationaleconditionamongMichigancollegestudents.Theresultswerevery
differentamongHongKongstudents,however.ApostalrulemuchliketheoneintheexperimenthadrecentlybeeninforceinHongKong,sothepresumptionwas
thattheHongKongsubjectsalreadyknewtherationaleforsuchrules.Theyperformedequallywellinbothconditions.However,whentheyweregivenadifferent
rule,withwhichtheywerenotfamiliar,theeffectoftherationalemanipulationwasthesameasithadbeeninMichigan.InasecondexperimentChengandHolyoak
showedthatperformanceontheabstractversionofthetaskcouldbeimprovedsubstantiallybystatingitinbarebonespermissionform.Subjectswereaskedto
imaginethattheywereauthoritiescheckingwhetherpeoplewereobeyingregulationsoftheform,"IfoneistotakeactionA,thenonemustfirstsatisfypreconditionP."
MentalModelsOnequestionaboutChengandHolyoak'sproposaliswhethertheirresultsunambiguouslysupporttheexistenceofproductionsthattaketheformof
deductiverules.JohnsonLairdandhiscolleagues(JohnsonLaird1983JohnsonLairdandByrne1991)havearguedthatpeopletypicallydonotreasonbyapplying
deductiverules,evenoftherestrictedkindproposedinthetheoryofpragmaticreasoningschemas.Rather,theyusetheproblemdescriptiontoconstructmental
modelsthatrepresentvariouspossibilitiesandthencheckthemodelstoseeifanyofthemviolatethedesiredconclusion.Asimpleconditional,ifPthenQ,is
hypothesizedtoleadmostpeopletosetuparatherimpoverishedmentalmodel,consistingofacase(P,Q),whichcontainsbothPandQ,andanotherpossiblecase
(...),containingnospecifiedcontent.Inpermissionversionsoftheselectionproblem,knowledgeofpermissionsituationsorofthemeaningsofdeontictermsis
hypothesizedtoleadthesubjecttoconstructmoremodels,suchasacompletesetofmodelsforatrueconditional,(P,Q),(notP,Q),and(notP,notQ),and
possiblyamodelforthesituationthatrenderstheconditionalfalse(P,notQ).Suchasetofmodelscanbesuccessfullycomparedtothefourcards.For

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example,acardcontainingnotQcanbeevaluatedbylookingatthemodelscontainingnotQ.Sinceonemodelissatisfactoryandtheotherisnot,thecardmustbe
turnedover.Theevaluationoftherelativemeritsofthepragmaticreasoningschemaapproachandthementalmodelsapproachisstillproceeding.Manypeople's
deductivereasoningmayblendsyntacticrulesandmodels,sincethecognitivearchitectureaswehavesketcheditpermitsboth.Amentalmodelisstillacognitive
representation.Itjusthasadifferentstructurethanaproposition,anddifferentoperationsapplytoit.Reasoningwithmentalmodelsisalsopotentiallyaspowerfulas
reasoningwithrules.Aswepointedoutinchapter1,sinceformalexpressionshavearepresentationalmappingtotheirdomains(models),meaningfulrulegoverned
operationsonthoseexpressionsmapontooperationsinthedomain(model).Mentalmodels,then,aresimplyanalternative,somewhatmoredirectrepresentationof
thedomain.Inspiteoftheirpotentialgenerality,however,peoplerathersystematicallyfailtoexploittheirfullpower.Furtherphilosophicalandmathematicalaspectsof
therelationshipbetweenformallogicalexpressionsandmodelsaretakenupinchapter10.
Asomewhatvexingquestioniswhymorecomprehensivelogicalreasoningcapacitiesareneitherpartofthecognitivearchitecturenornaturallyacquiredbymost
people.Onepossibilityisthatconcreteknowledgeismoreusefulinthepracticalreasoningsituationsthathumanbeingstypicallyface.Inthewashingmachineexample
reasoningwouldtypicallybelessamatterofprocessingtheformsofafewpropositionsthanofprocessingamodelthatincludedelectriccurrentflowingthroughwires.
Genuinelypracticalreasoningaboutthepossibilityofbeingshockedrequiresarichmodelthatincludesnotionsofinsulationandgrounding,andofalternativepossible
sourcesofpower,suchasbatteriesorcapacitors.Theresultmaybethatnaturalcircumstancesrarelyariseinwhichaperson'sgoalsandexperiencesleadtothe
acquisitionofmaximallyabstractdeductivereasoningschemasorprocedures.Thepotentialusefulnessofformallogicmaybefurtherrestrictedbytheseverelylimited
capacityofthecontrolledprocessesthatmightberequiredtoapplylogicalrulestolargesetsofpremises.Theroleofformallogicinartificialintelligence(AI)systems,
whicharenotnecessarilylimitedinthisway,willbediscussedinchapter4.TheAIresearchercanexplorethequestionofwhetherlogicwouldbemoreusefulifmore
rawcomputationalpowerwereavailableorwhetheritslimitationsaremorefundamental.
Thetheoryofdeductivereasoningviamentalmodelsillustratesthreegeneralthemesinhumanreasoningandproblemsolving.Thefirstisthestronginfluenceofspecific
knowledgestructuresonintelligentthought.Inthecaseofdeductivelogic,highlygeneralformalprinciplesthatareindependentofanyparticularcontextcouldbepart
ofeverydayinformationprocessing,buttheyseemnottobe.Thesecondthemeisthetensionbetweennormativeorprescriptiveprinciplesandtheactual
proceduresthatpeoplefollow.TherulesofdeductivelogicdevelopedbylogiciansfromAristotleonwardarenormativeinthesensethattheycanbeshowntoyield
validinferences.Yetpeopleoftenviolatethenormativestandard,asintheselectiontask.Thethirdthemeconcernsthequestionofhowpeoplemanagetogetaround
successfully,iftheydonotfollownormativelycorrectprinciples.Theanswerseemstobethathumanthoughtisheuristic.Thatis,peopleemployproceduresthatare
efficientandthatworkmostofthetime,eventhoughtheysometimesleadtoerror.

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ReasoningandConnectionism
Reasoningandproblemsolvingposelargechallengesforconnectionism.Theytendtobeseriallyextendedintime,toshowevidenceofstructuresensitiveprocessing,
andtoresistregimentationintofixedlengthinputandoutputformats.InthewashingmachineexampleconclusionC1isderivedfirstandthenisusedasapremisein
derivingC2.Modusponensisastructuresensitiverulethathastobeabletoisolatetheantecedentandconsequentofaconditionalandmatchtheantecedentagainst
anotherpremise.Theantecedent,consequent,andmatchingpremisecanhaveanypropositionalcontent,makingitimpossibletocodethemdirectlyintofixedlength
vectors.Moreover,modusponensmayhavetofinditstwoinputpremisesamongmorethantwocandidates.Noneoftheseproblemsisinsurmountable(atthevery
leastaconnectionistimplementationcouldbedevelopedfordeductiverulesormodelbasedreasoning),buttheymakeconnectionistmodelinginthisdomainmore
difficultthanitisforperceptionorcategorization.
Therearegoodarguments,however,forpursuingconnectionistapproachestosomeaspectsofinference.ShastriandAjjanagadde(1992)havefocusedonthenearly
effortlessinferenceswemakeinunderstandingordinarysituationsorstories.Inchapter2andinsections3.1and3.2wehavealreadypointedoutthattheactivationof
schematicknowledgetriggersinferences.WhenwehearthatJohnsoldabooktoMary,weinferthatMarynowownsthebook.Thisinferenceissimilartothe
washingmachineexample.
D1.Forallx,y,z:ifxsoldytoz,thenzownsy.
P1.Johnsoldbook3toMary.
_______________________________________________
C1.IfJohnsoldbook3toMary,thenMaryownsbook3.
C2.Maryownsbook3.
Thegeneralknowledgeinvolvedhere,D1,canbeconsideredpartofthecorerepresentationofsell.Again,twoprocessesarerequiredtomaketheinference.First,
someprocesshastomapD1ontotheeventinvolvingJohn,Mary,andbook3.Here,theprocessiscalledvariablebinding:thevariablesx,y,andzareboundto
John,book3,andMary,respectively,producingC1.ThesecondprocessistoinferC2.Aswedidintheexamplesabove,wecanseethisasanapplicationofmodus
ponens,inferringC2fromP1andC1.Withintheclassicaltheoryofthecognitivearchitecture,theexplanationmostreadyathandforthisinferenceinvolves
considerableuseofworkingmemory.AnactiverepresentationoftheincominginformationP1wouldlead,viaspreadingactivation,totheretrievaloftheschematic
informationD1.P1andD1togetherwouldsatisfytheinputconditionsofavariablebindingprocess,whichwouldthenproduceC1,addingittoworkingmemory.P1
andC1togetherwouldsatisfytheinputconditionsofmodusponens,whichwouldproduceC2,addingittoworkingmemory.
ShastriandAjjanagaddearguethatthesesimple,orreflexive,inferencesaremadewithremarkableefficiency.Theyaremadeinrealtime,duringthecourseof
conversation,reading,orthought,takingprobablyafewhundredmillisecondsonaverage.Theprocessjustoutlinedlookssuspiciouslyworkingmemoryintensive
fromthisperspective.Furthermore,asourlongtermknowledgebasegrows,thereisnoobviousincreaseintheamountoftimesuchinferencestake.Thiscouldpose
aproblemforourclassicalaccount,becausetheactivationofthesellconceptcouldspillquiteafewpropositionsintoworkingmemoryinmanycontexts,triggeringan
episodeofproblemsolving.

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Thereisanalternativeclassicalaccount,however,thatdoesnothavethesedefects.Alloftheprocessingcanbelookeduponastheapplicationofasingleproduction
rule.Therulewouldbetriggeredbytheoccurrenceofasellpropositioninworkingmemory.Itsactionwouldbetoaddanownpropositionwiththepropervariable
bindingstoworkingmemory(i.e.,therecipientofsellisboundtothesubjectofown,andtheobjectofsellisboundtotheobjectofown).Underthisaccount
neithertheschematicpropositionD1noritsinstantiationC1iseveraddedtoworkingmemory,andthegeneralinferencerulemodusponensisneverapplied.Theuse
ofproductionrulesthatarespecifictoparticularconceptstoreducetheloadonworkingmemoryandtheneedforgeneraldeductivemachineryisastandardideain
classicaltheories(Winograd1972,forexample,advocatedsuchaproceduralsemantics).Inconsonancewithourtreatmentofskillacquisitioninchapter2,this
production,andotherslikeit,couldarisefromthecompilationofafrequentlyoccurring,workingmemoryintensiveinference,suchastheinferencederivingC2above.
Likeotherproductions,theseconceptualinferenceproductionscouldbeaccessedandtosomeextentappliedinparallel.Perhapsthemajorlooseendinthisproposal
isthatnocomputationalmechanismisspecifiedforaccessingandapplyingtheproductionsinparallel.
Inaconnectionistcontextwecouldimaginehardwiringsuchrulesintoanetworkorsettingupanetworkthatcouldlearnthem.Themostimmediateproblemwiththis
proposalisthenecessityofvariablebinding.Eachapplicationofsuchrulesrequiresthatanyvariablesintherulebeboundtothespecificobjectsthatfigureinthe
currentinputrepresentation.Variablebindingisdifficulttoimplementinconnectionistnetworks(FodorandPylyshyn1988)andhasbecomeamajorissuein
connectionistresearch(Smolensky1990).Connectionscannotbededicatedtoparticularbindings,becausenovelbindingsoccurallthetime.Butsimply
simultaneouslyactivatingalltherelevantnodesfailstodistinguishwhatisboundtowhat.InShastriandAjjanagadde'smodelabindingrelationshipbetweentwonodes
isencodedbytheirsynchronizedrhythmicfiring.Theirnetworkisamodifiedsemanticnetwork,whichencodesbothfactualknowledgeandtheproductionrules.A
partofsuchanetworkisschematicallyillustratedinfigure3.4.Asdepicted,thenetworkuseslocalratherthandistributedcoding,witheachnodeinvolvedinthe
representationofonlyoneconcept.Ifeachnodewereimplementedasanensembleofunitsatalowerlevel,however,nodescouldbeencodeddistributivelyoverthe
lowerlevelunits.Thesinglenodesforindividuals(Mary,John,book3,etc.)arefocalnodesthatwouldbeconnectedtomanyothernodes,representinginformation
aboutthoseindividuals.Anumberofnodesarerequiredtorepresenteachpredicate,althoughonlytheargumentnodesareshown.Theconnectionsbetween
predicatesrepresentproductionrules.Activationalongasetofconnectionsappliestherulewiththepropervariablebinding.
Theassumptionsaboutactivationareratherdifferentfromthoseforothernetworkswehavelookedat.Instandardnetworks,atagivenmoment,aunithasan
activationlevel,whichcanberepresentedasanumber.InShastriandAjjanagadde'snetwork,onceaunitexceedsthreshold,itemitspulsesrhythmically.Inaddition
tothefactthataunitisfiring,thetimingofitspulseshasrepresentationalsignificance.Thebindingofanargumentnodetoanentitynodeisrepresentedbytheir
synchronous(orinphase)firing.Figure3.5illustrateshowsynchronousfiringisusedtoencodetheinitialbindingsandhowthefiringofaruleestablishesthe
appropriatenewbindings.Althoughonlyoneruleisshowninthefigure,itshouldbeclearthatrulescanfireinparallelasactivationspreadsthroughthenetwork.Since
therulesarefiringinparallel,the

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Figure3.4
AnetworkrepresentingthethreepredicateconceptsSELLTO,BUY,andOWN,aswellasthefocal
nodesfortherepresentationsoffiveentities:John,Mary,andsoon.ThearrowsfromSELLTOtoOWN
representtherulethatifxsellsytoz,thenzownsy.ThearrowsfromBUYtoOWNrepresenttherule
thatifxbuysy,thenxownsy.Thearrowsmapargumentnodesofantecedentpredicatesontothecorrect
argumentnodesofconsequentpredicates.Thelargerectanglesdemarcatethenodesinvolvedinthe
representationofeachpredicate.Thesquaresrepresentaspectsofpredicaterepresentationthatarenot
discussedhere.(AdaptedwithpermissionfromShastriandAjjanagadde1992.)

amountoftimeneededforanepisodeofreflexivereasoningisnotdeterminedbythenumberofinferencesmadebutbythelengthofthelongestchainofrules.The
mainlimitationthatisapparentfromthefigureisthenumberofseparatephasesthatcanbemaintained.Eachentityinvolvedinanepisodeofreasoningmustbe
assignedadistinctphase.Ascanbeseenfromthefigure,thenumberofphasesthatcanbekeptdistinctdependsonthetimebetweenpulsesandtheabilityofthe
systemtodiscriminatesmallphasedifferences.Thislimitationisnotsevere,however,becausereflexivereasoningrarelyinvolvesmorethanahandfulofentities.The
researchersalsoshowhowtheinferencerulescanbemadeprobabilisticandcontextsensitive.
Theuseofphaserelationshipstoaccomplishdynamicvariablebindinghasconsiderableneuralplausibility.Theneuronsinthebrainfireinrhythmictrainsofpulses(see
chapter7fordetails),andthereissomeevidencethatsynchronousneuralfiringhasrepresentationalsignificance(GrayandSinger1989).Themodelasillustratedin
figures3.4and3.5hastobefleshedoutinvariousways.Aninputmechanismmustbespecifiedthatcreatestheinitialphasesandphasecorrespondences.Sincethe
variablebindingsandinferencesaretransient,somemechanismmustbedevelopedforstoringnewfactspermanentlyinthenetwork.Amechanismisneededfor
learningtheproductions,andsomeaccountmustbegivenofhowreflexiveinferenceisrelatedtoreasoningorproblemsolvingthatisextendedintimeandworking
memoryintensive.
Overall,ShastriandAjjanagadde'sresearchisanexampleofwhatappearstobeagrowingconvergenceoftheclassicaltheoryofproductionsystemsand
connectionisttheory(Anderson1993,forexample,presentsfurtherideasaboutthisconvergence).

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Figure3.5
Illustrationofhowsynchronousfiringrepresentsbindingrelationships.(a)Thedynamicencoding
ofJohnsoldthebooktoMary.Eachhorizontallineonthegraphrepresentsthepulsetrainof
aunit.Eachbliponalinerepresentsapulse.NoticethattheJohn,Mary,andbook3unitsarefiringin
differentrhythms.Theyareoutofphase.TheJohnunitisfiringinphasewiththesubjectunit
ofsellto,representingthedynamicbindingofJohntothesubjectvariable.TheMaryunitisboundto
therecipientunitofsellto.Thesynchronousfiringofthesetwonodesishighlightedbythetwo
verticaldottedlines.Finally,thebook3unitisfiringinphasewiththeobjectunitofsellto.
(b)Dynamicbindingrelationshipsafteractivationpropagatesfromselltotoown,thus
applyingtheruleifxsellsytoz,thenzownsy.Themodelassumesthatwhenaunit
becomesactivated,itfiresinsynchronywiththenodethatisdrivingit.TheMaryunit
(Captioncontinuedonnextpage)

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NondeductiveReasoning
Aswepointedoutinthediscussionofdeduction,mostpracticalreasoningcontainssignificantnondeductiveelements.Eventhesimplestexamplesofinferencethatwe
exploredaboveweremixturesofdeductiveandnondeductivereasoning.Theapplicationofarulesuchasmodusponens,whetheritisappliedexplicitlyorassumedin
aproductionrule,ispurelydeductive.Ontheotherhand,thepremisesthattheruleisappliedtoareoftengeneratednondeductivelyonthebasisofprobabilistic
characteristicsofcategories.Thetotalinferentialepisodeisthusinductive,thatis,basedatleastimplicitlyonempiricalhypothesesabouttheworldthatcouldbefalse.
ThewashingmachineexampleinvolvedthepremiseIfthecordonanelectricalapplianceisunplugged,thenitcannotshockme.Thispremisemightbetheresult
bothofageneralizationoverexemplarsofelectricalappliancesandofatheoryormentalmodelofhowapplianceswork.Itisactuallyfalse,sincesomeelectrical
appliances,suchasTVsets,containcomponentsthatcanholdasubstantialelectricalchargeaftertheyareturnedoffandunplugged.
InductiveHeuristicsOurawarenessoftheinductivenatureofmostofourreasoningvariesconsiderably.Simple,schemabasedinferencesaretypicallynot
accompaniedbyanyfeelingofcopingwithuncertainty.Theycanbeseenassimplecasesofanavailabilityheuristic(TverskyandKahneman1973),ageneral
tendencytoreasononthebasisofinformationavailableinmemoryortheenvironment.Thisheuristiccomesoutinmoreextended,effortfulcasesofinductive
reasoningaswell.Try,forexample,toestimatewhethertherearemoreEnglishwordsthatbeginwithrormorethathaverinthethirdposition.Tomakethisestimate,
mostpeoplegeneratecasesofbothtypesofwordsandchoosethetypeforwhichtheyfindthemostcases.Theproceduresthataccessthementaldictionary,
however,makeitmucheasiertoretrievewordsintermsoftheirinitialsounds.Thus,mostpeoplegeneratemorecasesofrinitialwordsandincorrectlyestimatethat
theyaremorecommon(TverskyandKahneman1973).
Availabilityhasbeenshowntoinfluencesocialreasoningandjudgment,aswell.InastudybyTaylorandFiske(1975)subjectsobservedconversationsbetweentwo
peopleandwerethenaskedtojudgehowinfluentialeachactorhadbeenintheconversation.Someobserverscouldseethefaceofonlyoneactor.Theseobservers
thoughtthatthepersontheycouldseeclearlywasmoreinfluential,whereasobserverswhocouldseebothparticipantsequallywelljudgedthemtobeequally
influential.Theperceptualavailabilityofoneparticipant'sbehaviorapparentlyledtomoreattentiontoandencodingofthatparticipant'scontributions.Atthetimeof
judgmenteasilyavailablerecallledtoexaggeratedjudgmentsofinfluence.Inrelatedexperimentsanumberofresearchershavefoundthatnearlyanycharacteristicthat
makesapersondistinctive,orsalient,inagroupinteractionwillleadtomoreextremesocialjudgmentsabouttheperson(FiskeandTaylor1991chap.9).
Thedependenceonschematicknowledgestructuresalsoleadstoanotherheuristicinprobabilisticreasoning,knownastherepresentativenessheuristic.Trymaking
thefollowingtwoprobabilityestimations:
(Captioncontinuedfrompreviouspage)
isnowalsofiringsynchronouslywiththesubjectunitofown,andthebook3unitisalsofiringsynchronouslywiththeobjectunitofown(asillustratedbytheverticaldotted
lines).(AdaptedwithpermissionfromShastriandAjjanagadde1992.)

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1.Agroupof100peoplecontains70engineersand30lawyers.Onepersonischsenoat*randomfromthegroup.Whatistheprobabilitythatthepersonis
anengineer?
2.Now,anotherpersonischosenrandomlyfromthesamegroup,whohasbeendescribedbyafriendasfollows:
Jackisafortyfiveyearoldman.Heismarriedandhasfourchildren.Heisgenerallyconservative,careful,andambitious.Heshowsnointerestin
politicalandsocialissuesandspendsmostofhisfreetimeonhismanyhobbies,whichincludehomecarpentry,sailing,andmathematicalpuzzles.
WhatistheprobabilitythatJackisanengineer?
InastudybyKahnemanandTversky(1973)theaveragesubjectgavea.7probabilityestimateonthefirstquestionanda.9probabilityestimateonthesecond
question.Inthefirstcasesubjectswererespondingnormativelytowhatdecisiontheoristscalltheprioroddsorbaseratesinthepopulation.Inthesecondcasethey
usedtheinformationthatJackistypical,orrepresentative,oftheclassofengineerstorevisetheirestimate.
KahnemanandTverskywereabletoshow,however,thattherevisedestimateinthesecondcasedoesnotobeythenormativeprinciplesofthedecisiontheorist.A
secondgroupofsubjectsansweredthesamequestionsasthefirstgroup,withonechange.Thesecondgroupwastoldthatthepopulationof100peoplecontained30
engineersand70lawyers.Theaveragesubjectgavea.3estimateonthefirstquestionanda.9estimateonthesecondquestion.Thisresultshowsthatonthesecond
questionsubjectswerebasingtheirestimatesonlyonthetypicality,orrepresentativeness,ofthepersonalitydescription.Theestimatewasunaffectedbythedifference
inpriorodds.Statisticaldecisiontheoristshaveshown,however,thatoptimalpredictionsrequiretakingintoaccountboththeknownevidenceandthepriorodds.The
basicreasonforthisisthatthereissomeprobabilitythatapersonwhoisalawyerwouldhaveJack'spersonalitydescription.Thechancesofsamplingsuchaperson
arehigherinagrouphavingahigherproportionoflawyers.SubjectsbehavingnormativelywouldhavegivenlowerestimatesaboutJackonthesecondversionofthe
problem.
Therepresentativenessheuristicisprobablysuccessfulinmuchofeverydaylife.Assigningobjectsorsituationstocategoriesonthebasisoftypicalityseemstobe
prettysuccessfulmuchofthetime(althoughtheextenttowhichconceptlearningactuallytakesbaseratesintoaccountisstillunderstudye.g.,Kruschke1992).It
maybethatinmostsituationstheevidenceisstrongenoughtooverwhelmthepriorodds.Attimestheprioroddsofvariouspossibilitiesmaybecloseenoughnotto
matter,andatothertimestherewouldbenowaytoestimatethemanyway.Buttherearecaseswhererepresentativenessandavailabilitycombinetoproduceserious
practicalerrors.ChapmanandChapman(1967)studiedillusorycorrelationsintheuseoftheDrawaPersonTest(DAP),whichisusedinpsychiatricand
psychologicaldiagnosis.Cliniciansbelieved(andtosomeextentstillbelieve)thatwhenaskedtodrawaperson,paranoidpatientstendtoemphasizetheeyes,
dependentpatientsthemouth,andsoon.CarefulstatisticalstudiesoftheDAPhaveshownthatthesecorrelationsdonotactuallyexist.ChapmanandChapmangave
agroupofcollegestudentsasetofdata,whichconsistedofrandomlypaireddrawingsandpsychologicalsymptoms.Althoughtherewerenocorrelationsbetween
drawingcharacteristicsandsymptomsinthedata(becauseoftherandompairing),thesubjects''discovered"thesamecorrelationsthattheclinicians

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believedin.Itseemedlikelythatsubjectsdevotedmoreattentionandencodingtopairsthatwererepresentativeofstereotypesthattheyalreadyheldandthatthese
pairsweremoreavailableinlatermemoryfortheevidence.ChapmanandChapmanfoundevidencesupportingthisexplanationbyaskinganothergroupofsubjectsto
simplylistthebodypartsthatwerecalledtomindbyeachofthesymptoms.Theassociativeconnectionsrevealedbythistechniquepredictedtheillusorycorrelations
extremelywell.Hamilton(1979)hasappliedasimilaranalysistoracialstereotyping.
LearningtoApplyNormativeRulesInthepicturewehavedevelopedsofar,humanreasoningisheavilyinfluencedbytheretrievalofsituationrelevantproductions
andschemas(aswellasspecificcasesorsetsofexemplars).Thesuccessofhumanreasoningisbasedinlargepartonthemind'senormouscapacitytostore
knowledgestructuresandtoretrievethemappropriately.Therepresentativenessandavailabilityheuristicscanbeseennotsomuchasconsciouslyappliedstrategies
asthenaturaloutcomeofthetendencytogowithwhatmemoryandtheenvironmentdeliver.Limitedcapacitycontrolledprocessesfunctiontofitactive
representationstocurrentgoals.
Itisimportanttonote,however,thathumanbeingshavebeenabletoovercomethelimitationsofconcreteandheuristicreasoningtodevelophighlygeneralnormative
theories.Thequestionofhowthegreatlogiciansandstatisticianswereabletocomeupwiththeirnormativetheoriesisbeyondourpurviewatthemoment,but
questionsabouthowwellpeoplecanlearnthesetheoriesandincorporatethemintotheireverydaycognitionaremoreimmediatelyaccessible.Giventhatanormative
theoryexists,itisnothardtoseethatpeoplecanstoretherulesofthetheoryinthedeclarativeknowledgebaseanddevelopproceduresforinterpretivelyapplying
them.Iftheinformationprocessesrequiredaretoocomplex,thenonecanuseexternalaidsformemorystorageandcalculation,suchaswritingallofone's
observationsdownonasheetofpaperandcomputingacorrelationcoefficientwithanelectroniccalculator.AlthoughtheresearchbytheChapmansandothers(for
instance,TverskyandKahneman1971)demonstratesthateventrainedprofessionalscanunconsciouslyslipintonormativelyincorrectheuristicreasoning,somerecent
researchgivesmorecauseforoptimism.
Nisbettandhiscolleagues(Nisbett1993)havefoundevidencethatpeopledotendtodevelopabstractrulesforreasoningthataresimilartotherulesofnormative
theories.Theserulesareappliedinconsistently,dependingonvariouscontextualcues.Aninductiveexampleisthelawoflargenumbers,whichassertsthatalarge
randomsampledrawnfromavariablepopulationismorelikelytorevealthecharacteristicsofthepopulationthanasmallsample.Thefollowingproblemisadapted
fromtheworkofJepson,Krantz,andNisbett(1983):
Theregistrar'sofficeatalargeuniversityhasfoundthatthereareusuallyabout100studentsinArtsandScienceswhohaveaperfectacademicrecord(gradesofAinallcourses)
attheendoftheirfirsttermattheuniversity.However,onlyabout10to15studentsgraduatewithaperfectrecordthroughallfouryears.Whatdoyouthinkisthemostlikely
explanationforthefactthattherearemorestudentswithperfectrecordsafteronetermthanatgraduation?

Astatisticalanswertothisquestionwouldsomehowmakethepointthatmanystudents'performancesinasingletermwillbeunrepresentativeoftheiroverall
performancesorabilities.Forexample,thesubjectmightsimplypointoutthatitismuchmoredifficulttobeperfectforeightstraighttermsthanforone.Nonstatistical
answers

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wouldtendtoshowevidenceoftherepresentativenessheuristic,whichwouldfittheproblemintoacausaltheoryaboutstudentperformance.Anexamplenotedby
theresearcherswasaresponsethatarguedthatstudentstendtoworkharderwhentheyfirstcometocollegethantheydoneargraduation.
Thedegreetowhichpeoples'reasoningreflectstheirintuitiveconceptionofthelawoflargenumbersdependsonthedegreetowhichasituationhasstatisticalfeatures.
Thedegreetowhichsituationsinvolvefactorsthatarecommonlythoughttoinvolvechancevariationvariesconsiderably,forexample,asdoesthedegreetowhich
theyinvolveanysortofrepeatedsamplingthatcanbesystematicallysummarized.Nisbettandhiscolleaguesdeliberatelyvariedthesefactorsinsomeoftheirstudies
andfoundthatthemore''statistical"cueswerepresentinasituation,themorelikelysubjectsweretogiveanswersbasedonthelawoflargenumbers.Theacademic
performaceproblemabove,forexample,evokedanintermediateproportionofstatisticalanswers,aboutonethird.Over90percentoftheanswerstoaproblem
aboutlungcancerandsmokingdrewstatisticalanswers.Ontheotherhand,veryfewstatisticalanswersweregiventoaproblemthataskedstudentstoweightheir
ownpersonalexperienceofgoingtoasinglemeetingofauniversitycourseagainsttheresultsofanopinionpollthatsurveyedallstudentswhohadjustcompletedthe
course.
Thenaturaloccurrencebutinconsistentapplicationofabstractrulesforreasoningsuggeststhatappropriatetrainingmightincreasetheconsistencyandaccuracyofuse.
Fong,Krantz,andNisbett(1986)showedthatasingletrainingsessiononthelawoflargenumbersmarkedlyimprovedboththefrequencywithwhichsubjects
appliedthelawandthequalityoftheirreasoningwithit.Trainingsessionsthatfeaturedastandardformalpresentationofthestatisticaltheoryandtrainingsessionsthat
featuredexamplesthatwereanalyzedusingstatisticalreasoningbothwereeffective,andanevenlargereffectwasfoundwhentheformalandexamplestraining
methodswerecombined.Giventheeffectsofproblemcontentthatarecommoninstudiesofreasoning,astrikingfindingofthestudywasthatsubjectswereableto
applythelawtoawiderangeofproblemcontent,includingdomainsthatwerenotobviouslystatisticalandthatwerenotcoveredinthetraining(theacademic
performanceproblemabovewouldbeanexample).Inaningenioussecondstudytheresearchersshowedthatthesamefindingsheldforstudentsinastandard
introductorystatisticsclass.Studentswerecontactedbyphoneoutsideofclassandaskedtoparticipateinasportsopinionsurveythatincludedanumberofquestions
thatcouldbeansweredeitherstatisticallyornonstatistically.Studentscalledatthebeginningofthecoursetendedtogivenonstatisticalanswers,butstudentscalledat
theendofthecoursetendedtogivestatisticalanswers.
Theindependenteffectofexamplestrainingsuggeststhatsubjectscanlearntorecognizefeaturesinasituationthatmakestatisticalreasoningappropriate.Thelackof
contenteffectssuggeststhatsuchfeaturesmustbequiteabstract,however.Atthispointtheprecisenatureofsuchfeaturesisnotknown,althoughtheresultsonexpert
problemsolvingdiscussedinthenextsectionsuggestthatitispossibletolearntorecognizeabstractornonobviousfeaturesofsituations.
TheComplexityofReasoning
Itisapparentthatnosimpletheoryofhumanreasoningwillsufficetoexplainallthatisknown.Inferencesbasedonacategorizationcanbetheresultofunconscious
statisticalgeneralizationoverexemplars.Yetthedeliberateapplicationofnormative

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statisticalprinciplesisneededtoexplainothercases.Reasoningcanbebasedontherecallofasingleexperience,ontheevocationofapragmaticschemathat
generalizesacrossarangeofrelatedsituations,orontheapplicationofacompletelygeneralformalrule,suchasmodusponens.Theknowledgethatenablesreasoning
canbestoredprocedurallyordeclaratively,andepisodesofreasoningrangefromvirtuallyautomatictohighlyattentiondemanding.Theimplicationsforcognitive
sciencearenicelysummedupbySmith,Langston,andNisbett(1992).
Onewayoflookingatthesituationfromthepointofviewoftheclassicaltheoryofthecognitivearchitectureisthatallaspectsofthearchitectureparticipatein
reasoning(justaswefoundthemtoparticipateinmemory).Thecognitivearchitecturecouldbeviewedasahighlyintricateinferenceengine.Goaldirectedcognitionis
largelyamatterofarrivingatdecisions,predictions,conclusions,judgments,andactions,allofwhicheitherareinferencesorinvolveinferenceinsomesense.The
architectureisstructuredinsuchawaythattheneededinferencescanbedeliveredonseveraltimescalesusingawiderangeofinformation.
3.4ProblemSolving
Reasoningandproblemsolvingoverlapconsiderably,andsomeresearchershaveattemptedtocombinetheoriesofthetwoprocesses(see,forexample,Newell
1980Stillings1975).Typically,researchersspeakofproblemsolving,asopposedtoreasoning,whentheneededprinciplesaremorespecifictoadomain(suchas
chess,sewing,orphysics)andwhentheinformationprocessingneededtoreachthedesiredgoaltakesplaceoveranextendedperiodoftime.Someofthemost
interestingfindingsconcernthecontrastbetweennoviceandexpertproblemsolving.Thegeneraltheoryoftheacquisitionofcognitiveskills,sketchedinchapter2,
givesagoodaccountofthestrikingimprovementsthatoccurwhenapersonpracticessolvingproblemsinaparticulardomain.Wewillusethetwodomainsofchess
andphysicsproblemstoillustratethisresearch.
NoviceProblemSolving
IntheirstudiesofproblemsolvingNewellandSimon(1972)developedseveralconceptsthatcharacterizehumanproblemsolvinginrelativelyunfamiliardomains.The
conceptswereincorporatedintheirtheoryoftheGeneralProblemSolver(GPS).Theprocessesofsubgoalingandmeansendsanalysis,introducedinsection2.6,
arekeyconceptsofGPS.IntheGPStheoryaperson'sproblemsolvingeffortsaresaidtotakeplacewithinaproblemspace,consistingofpotentialstatesof
knowledgeandoperatorsthattransformonestateofknowledgeintoanother.
TheNoviceChessPlayerasaGeneralProblemSolverInthebasicproblemspaceforthegameofchessthestatesarethepossibleconfigurationsofthepieceson
theboard,andtheoperatorsarethelegalmoves.Onaparticularturntheproblemthataplayerfacesistoselectamovethatmaximizesthechancesofwinningthe
game.Theplayercansearchtheproblemspacebyimaginingvariousmoves,theopponent'spossiblereplies,furthermoves,andsoon.Chessistypicalofdifficult
problems,however,inthatitisimpossibletosearchtheentireproblemspacetofindthebestpossiblesolution.Infact,justtosearchallpossibilitiesforthenextthree
movesearlyinachessgame,aplayerwouldhavetoimaginewellover1,000sequencesofmoves(iftherearemorethan10

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possiblemovesoneachturn,thentherearemorethan10 =1,000possiblesequences).Theproblemsolveristhusforcedtouseheuristicmethods.
3

ThefundamentalheuristicmethodidentifiedbyNewellandSimonwasmeansendsanalysis.Theproblemsolvertriestoselectoperators,themeans,thatwillachieve
theend,orsolutiontotheproblem.Thebasicprincipleofoperatorselectionisdifferencereductionthatis,operatorsareselectedthatreducethedifferencebetween
thecurrentstateoftheproblemandthedesiredend,orgoal.Thefinalgoalisoftenreachedbyestablishingandachievingaseriesofsubgoalsthatrepresentpartial
solutions.
Anovicechessplayermighthavethesubgoalofkeepingthekingoutofimmediatedanger.Onacertainturnthismightleadtoafurthersubgoalofprotectingacertain
squarethatcouldbereachedbyoneoftheopponent'sbishops.Theproblemisthentoselectanoperator(move)thatwilldefendthatsquare.Iftwopossible
defendingmovesarediscovered,thentheymustbeevaluatedintermsofothersubgoals,suchaskeepingcontrolofthecenteroftheboardordefendingthequeen.
Thiskindofstrategyishighlyheuristicbecauseitdrasticallycutsdownonthepossiblemovesthatareactuallyexaminedandbecauseitcanfailtoexaminepossibilities
thatarecrucialtotheultimategoalofwinning(ornotlosing)thegame.
Heuristicsearchviameansendsanalysisisavastimprovementoverexhaustivesearchortrialanderror,anditisoneofthemosttypicalstrengthsofhuman
intelligence.Onceapersonisabletorepresentthestatesandoperatorsofaproblem,themethodcanbeused.Nevertheless,itisaformofunskilledcognition,slow
anderrorprone.Aswesawinchapter2,meansendsanalysismakesheavydemandsoncontrolledprocessing.Thecurrentlyrelevantsubgoalsandthepossible
statesoftheproblembeingconsideredmustbemaintainedinanactivestate.Theoperatorsarestoredindeclarativememoryandmustbeaccessedinterpretivelyby
thegeneralmeansendsprocess.Limitedworkingmemorycapacitycanbequicklyoverwhelmedbythegameofchess.Overtwentydifferentoperatorscanbe
relevantonagiventurn.Anumberofdifferentheuristics,suchasprotectingthekingandcontrollingthecenter,canbeactive,causingsubgoalstobeconstructed.
Eachsubgoalcanleadtotheconsiderationofmorethanonemove.Itisnotsurprisingthatbeginnersplayratherpoorchess.
TheBeginningPhysicsStudentasaGeneralProblemSolverAlthoughsolvingelementarywordproblemsinintroductoryphysicsisverydifferentfromplaying
chess,thebeginningphysicsstudentusesthesamegeneralproblemsolvingmethodasthenovicechessplayer.Thestatesandoperatorsaredifferent,ofcourse.The
typicalbeginningphysicsstudentoperatesinwhatLarkin(1981)hascalledanalgebraicproblemspace.Thestudenthasacquiredasetofequationsthatinterrelatea
numberoffundamentalphysicalvariables.Figure3.6illustratespartofsuchasetofequations.Thestudentusestheequationsasoperators:evaluatingthealgebraic
expressionontherightsideofanequationyieldsthevalueofthevariableontheleftside.Astateofknowledgeissimplyalistofthephysicalvariablesthatfigureinthe
currentproblem,someofwhichhavebeenassignedvaluesandsomeofwhichremaintobedetermined.
Tosolveawordproblem,thestudentformsarepresentationofthetextoftheproblem,whichconsistsofvariableswhosevaluesaregivenintheproblemand
variableswhosevaluesarethefinalgoalstate.Thestudentthenworksbackwardfromthegoalbyfindinganequation(operator)containingthegoalvariable,usually
onitsleftside.Findingthevaluesoftheothervariablesintheequation(usuallyontheright

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El.

v f=v 0+at

E2.

x=v 0t+.5at2

E3.

Vf2=v02+2ax

E4.

v a=(v 0+Vf)/2

E5.

x=v at

Where:

istheintervaloftimefromtheinitialtothefinalstateofabody

isthedistancetraveledbythebodyduringthetimeinterval

v0

istheinitialvelocityofthebody

vf

isthefinalvelocityofthebody

va

istheaveragevelocityofthebody

istheaccelerationofthebody

forabodyundergravitationalforcea=9.8m/s2

Figure3.6
Somekinematicequationsmemorizedbyabeginningphysicsstudent.(BasedonLarkin1981.)

side)isthensetasasubgoal.Thisgeneralheuristicofworkingbackwardfromthegoalcanbeappliedagaintosubgoals,ifnecessary,tofinallyreachequationsthat
canbeevaluatedintermsofthegivenvariables.Larkinandherassociates(Larkin1981Larkinetal.1980)foundthatbeginningphysicsstudentsusedthisstrategy.
Larkinwroteacomputerprogram,called"barelyABLE,"thatsolvedproblemsusingthesamestrategy.
Thefollowingproblemprovidesanillustration:
Anobjectdroppedfromaballoondescendingat4meterspersecondlandsontheground10secondslater.Whatwasthealtitudeoftheballoonatthe
momenttheobjectwasdropped?
Figure3.7illustratesaninefficientsolutiontotheproblemviaameansendssearchthroughthesmallalgebraicproblemspacedefinedbyfigure3.6.Thehypothetical
studentsetstheoverallgoalbyrealizingthattheheightoftheballoonwhentheobjectwasdroppedisthetotaldistancetraveledbytheobject,namely,x.Thestudent
thenselectstheoperatorE5,anicesimpleequationwithxontheleftside.TheselectionofE5isconfirmedwhenthestudentrealizesthatoneofthevariablesonthe
rightsideofE5,t,isgivenintheproblem.Asubgoalissettofindtheotherrightsidevariable,v a.ThisprocessisfollowedtwomoretimesuntilE1isselected,which
hasnounknownvaluesonitsrightside.E1isevaluated,andtheresultisfedbacktotheprevioussubgoalthissubgoalisinturnevaluated,anditsresultisfedbackto
thefirstsubgoal.Thesubgoalsmustberetrievedfrommemoryandevaluatedinthereverseoftheorderinwhichtheywereformed.Thus,theyarewhatiscalleda
pushdownstack,andduringevaluationtheyarepoppedoffthestackinreverseordertobeevaluated.Asinchess,keepingtrackofmultiplesubgoalsimposesa
heavyloadonworkingmemory,althoughinthiscasethestudenthasrecoursetoexternalstorageusingpencilandpaper.
Thisexampleisparticularlycompelling,becauseitisclearthatthenovicecangetsolutionswithonlyavaguesenseofhowtomapsomeofthephrasesinword
problemsontothevariables,evenwithoutunderstandingwhytheequationsareastheyare.Infact,itispossibletoseethatE5isapoorchoiceforthefirstoperator.
Our

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Figure3.7
Novicesolutiontothephysicsproblemgiveninthetext

imaginarystudentselecteditpartlyonthebasisofanauxiliaryheuristicfavoringnicesimpleequations,butneglectedanotherheuristicfavoringequationswithallknown
quantitiesontherightside.
ExpertProblemSolving
Althoughthegeneralproblemsolvingstrategydescribedsofarisintelligent,itfallsfarshortofthebestperformanceachievedbyexperts,whohaveyearsofpractice
inaparticulardomain.Researchonexpertproblemsolvingconfirmsthegeneralprinciplesofskilldevelopmentthatwereoutlinedinchapter2.
TheExpertChessPlayerThemystiquesurroundingexcellentchessplayersmightsuggestthehypothesisthattheseplayersusethesamekindofproblemsolving
strategythatnovicesdobutapplythestrategywithfantasticspeed,allowingmanymorepotentialmovestobeexamined.EarlyresearchbydeGroot(1965)failedto
uncover

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anyevidencethatexpertplayerssearchedmoremoves,searchedfartherahead,orsearchedfasterthanordinaryplayers.Theonlyobviousdifferencewasthatthe
expertschosebettermoves.
DeGrootalsoexploredasecondpopularhypothesisthatexpertchessplayershavespectacularvisualimageryabilityandnearphotographicmemories.Inone
experimentsubjectsweregivenfrom2to10secondstoviewachesspositioncontainingabout25pieces.Theythenweregivenablankboardandapileofpieces
andwereaskedtotrytoreconstructthepositionfrommemory.Theresultsshowedstrikingdifferencesamongplayersatdifferentlevels:grandmastersandmaster
levelplayerswere93percentcorrect,experts72percentcorrect,"A"levelplayers50percentcorrect,andnovices33percentcorrect.However,afurther
experimentbyChaseandSimon(1973)showedthattheseresultswerenotduetogenerallysuperiorvisualmemoryabilitiesinthemoreskilledplayers.Theearlier
experimentwasrepeatedwithonedifference:the25pieceswereplacedrandomlyontheboardratherthanbeingtakenfromanactualgameposition.Playersatall
levelswereequallypoorintheirabilitytoreconstructtherandompositions.
ChaseandSimonproposedthatthishighlychessspecificmemorywasduetoperceptuallearning.Theyhypothesizedthatchessexpertshadlearnedtorecognize
commonconfigurationsofpiecesassingleperceptualunits.Whenreconstructingaposition,theexpertwouldberecalling,say,sixorsevenoftheseconfigurations,or
chunks,eachcontainingfromthreetofivepieces.Sixorsevenitemsisknowntobewithintherangeofnormalworkingmemory.Onthishypothesisthesuperior
performanceofthechessexpertisanormalmanifestationofskilledperception,exactlycomparabletothereader'sabilitytorememberthisOurdaisiestooka
beatinginthethunderstormbetterthanthisOrasetoaetntiehnesomudiisokbaignhtudrtr.Thetwosequencescontainthesameletters,butyearsofpractice
withreadinghaveestablishedeightperceptualunitsthatareautomaticallydetectedinthefirstsequence.
ChaseandSimon(1973)performedafurtherexperimenttotestthetheoryofchunks.Theyvideotapedsubjectsperformingthereconstructiontaskandthenprecisely
timedtheintervalsbetweensuccessivepieceplacements.Theseinterresponsetimesshowedapatternthatwaspredictablefromthechunkingtheory.Longerintervals
ofgreaterthan2secondswouldbefollowedbyaburstofseveralshortintervalsoflessthan2seconds.Thisiswhatwouldbeexpectedifthesubjecttooktimeto
retrievethenextconfigurationandthenreconstructeditontheboardfromworkingmemory.Thepiecesthatwereclusteredbyinterresponsetimealsoturnedoutto
behighlyinterrelatedbystandardchesstheory.
Theagreementoftheobservedconfigurationswithstandardchessplayingtheorysuggestswhytheymighthelpinplayingthegame.Theconfigurationsare
meaningfullyrelatedtopossiblefuturemoves.Detectingaparticularconfigurationcouldautomaticallyactivatepossiblerelevantmoves.Stronginformalevidencefor
suchautomaticconfigurationactionproductionsisprovidedbythefactthatexpert(especiallymaster)levelplayersareabletonoticeexcellentmovesafteronly
secondsoflookingataposition.Insimultaneouschessdemonstrationsmasterlevelplayersareabletowinmanygamesagainstlowerlevelplayers,takingonlyafew
secondspermove.InaninterestingtheoreticalcalculationSimonandChase(1973)showedthat50,000configurationswouldbeenoughtodescribealloftheboard
positionsthatcouldariseinnormalchessplay.Thisfigureisrealistic,sinceskilledadultreaderscanacquireavocabularyof50,000writtenwords.Interestingly,
biographicalevidenceindicatesthat

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Figure3.8
Anexpert'ssolutiontotheexamplephysicsproblem.Eachproductioncorresponds
toanequationinfigure3.6forexample,P1=El.(CourtesyofH.Simon.)

ittakesaboutthesameamountoftimetoacquireanextensivechess"vocabulary"asitdoestoacquirealargereadingvocabulary:abouttenyears,involving10,000
to50,000hoursofstudy.
TheExpertPhysicistThegeneralprinciplesofskillacquisitionalsoapplytoexpertiseinphysics.Expertsdonotsearchthealgebraicproblemspace.In
understandingawordproblem,expertsabstractallthebodies,forces,andenergies,oftendrawingadiagram(orimaginingone)toclarifythesituation.Theywork
forward,ratherthanbackward,applyingprinciplestodevelopfurtherinformationaboutthesituation.Thentheysolvefortheunknownquantity.Forexample,figure
3.8showswhataphysicistsaidafterreadingtheexampleproblemabouttheballoon.Thereareanumberofnotablefeaturesinthisverbalprotocol.Theexpert
subjectrapidlydevelopsbasicinformationaboutthesituationwithoutattendingtothegoal.AlthoughcomputationsthatareequivalenttoequationsE1,E4,andE5are
performed,theyseemtobeintheformofproductions.TheproductionP1,forexample,worksinthefollowingmanner:thepresenceofv 0,a,andtinaproblem
automaticallytriggersthecomputationofv fbyacompiledprocedure.Thereisnoevidenceofretrievingequationsinadeclarativeformandinterpretivelysubstituting
valuesgivenintheproblemintotheequation.ComparethefollowingfragmentofaprotocolfromanovicesubjectwhoappliedequationE2directly:
"Nowwewantxequalsvzerotimesthetimeplusonehalfof....It'sdescendingattherateof4meterspersecond...thatequalsvzero...."(H.Simon,personalcommunication)

Hereanequationisretrievedindeclarativeform,andvaluesgivenintheproblemareinterpretivelymatchedwithandsubstitutedforvariablesintheequation.
NotethatintheexpertsolutionthethreeprinciplesrepresentedbyequationsEl,E4,andE5endupbeinginvokedinexactlythereverseoftheorderinwhichtheyare
invokedinthemeansendssearchinfigure3.7.Thesolutionisreacheddirectlyattheendofthechainwithouttheneedtoreturnresultstosubgoals.Likeour
hypotheticalnovice,theexpertmissestheeasysolutionofapplyingequationE2directly,providing

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additionalevidencethatthesearchwasnotguidedbymeansendsanalysis.However,theactualnovicejustquoted,whodiduseequationE2,stilltookoverfour
timesaslongtoreachasolutionbecauseofthetimeconsumingprocessofinterpretivelymappingtheinformationgivenintheproblemontotheequation.
Likethechessexpert,thephysicisthaslearnedtorecognizemanytypicalphysicalsituations,eachofwhichevokestheapplicationofwellcompiledphysical
principles.Eventhoughthesearchthroughtheproblemspaceisnotguidedbystrategicgoalsetting,itiseffectiveforatleasttworeasons.First,theprinciplesthatare
evokedinvariablyleadtovaluableinformationaboutthesituationthatwillnearlyalwayscontributetoanyproblemposedaboutthesituation.Second,notimeis
wastedsearchingfortheoptimallyapplicableprinciple,andnocontrolledprocessingcapacityiswastedsubstitutingintoequationsandkeepingtrackofsubgoals.
BecominganExpertThemostchallengingquestionthatfacestheproblemsolvingtheoristischaracterizingexactlyhowpeopleacquiretheirexpertiseinvarious
domains.Howdoesasystemthatstoresoperatorsinadeclarativeformandusesmeansendssearchdiscovermeaningfulconfigurationsandlinkthemtoappropriate
actions?Larkin(1981)developedalearningmechanismforthe"barelyABLE"program,whichallowedtheprogramtobootstrapitselfoutofmeansendsalgebraic
searchinto"moreABLE"expertlikebehavior.Basically,wheneveranequationwasappliedduringameansendssolution,thelearningmechanismattemptedtobuilda
correspondingproductionthatcouldbeappliedinthefuture.Forexample,theapplicationofE1infigure3.7wouldcausethelearningmechanismtoattempttoform
theproductionP1offigure3.8.Sinceproductionsareautomaticallyevokedbyconfigurationsofvariablesinthesituation,theygraduallycometodominatemeans
endssearchaslearningprogresses.Beforelearning,theABLEprogramsuccessfullysimulatedtheorderinwhichprincipleswereappliedbynovices,andafterlearning
theordershiftedtofitthatoftheexperts.
TheABLEprogram,however,doesnotfullycapturetheprocessbywhichtheexpertrealizesthataphysicalconceptappliestoinformationinasituation.Physical
conceptsarehighlyabstract,anditisstillnotcompletelyunderstoodhowthephysicistcanseethecommonfeaturesamongsituationsthatappearratherdifferenton
thesurface.Chi,Feltovich,andGlaser(1981)foundthatphysicsexpertscouldclassifyphysicsproblemsaccordingtounderlyingphysicalprinciples.Forexample,a
probleminvolvingaspringappliedtoabodywouldbeclassifiedwithaprobleminvolvingabodyslidingdownaninclinedplane,accordingtotheprincipleof
conservationofenergy.Novicesdidnotmaketheseclassifications,andcurrentcomputerprogramsarenotyetabletomakethemeither.People'sabilitytolearnto
perceivesituationsintermsoftheprinciplesofanabstracttheorymayalsobeinvolvedinthediscoverythatpeoplecanlearntoapplynormativestatisticalprinciples,
asdiscussedintheprevioussection.
SuggestedReadings
CognitivePsychologyandItsImplications(Anderson1990)andCognitiveScience:AnOverviewforCognitiveScientists(Barsalou1992)coverthetopicsof
thischaptermoreextensively.RulesoftheMind(Anderson1993)isafascinatingtreatmentofskillacquisitionfromthestandpointofAnderson'sACTtheoryof
productionsystems.Itincludesacomputerdiskcontainingprogramsthatsimulatethetheory.

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Chapter4
ArtificialIntelligence:KnowledgeRepresentation
4.1TheNatureofArtificialIntelligence
MarvinMinsky,oneofthefoundersofthefieldofartificialintelligence(AI),hassaidthatAIisthescienceofmakingmachinesdothingsthatwouldrequireintelligence
ifdonebyhumans(1968,v).Ascognitivescientistswestresstherelationshipbetweenhumanandmachineintelligence.WeareinterestedinusingAItechniquesto
enlightenusabouthowhumanbeingsdointelligenttasksandinusingknowledgeabouthumanintelligencegatheredinotherdisciplinestoinformAIresearch.For
instance,ingettingamachinetodogeometricanalogyorintegralcalculusproblems,weare,ofcourse,interestedingettingthemachinetoproducecorrectsolutions,
butwearealsointerestedinlearningmoreaboutthepowerandflexibilityofhumanproblemsolving.Wewillputmuchlessemphasisontheengineeringapproachto
AI,whichisconcernedwithprogrammingcomputerstodotasksefficientlyforthesakeofgettingthemdoneratherthanforthesakeofsheddinglightonhuman
intelligence.Also,wewillcontinuetopostponetheconsiderationoflanguageandvisionuntillaterandconcentrateonthestructuresandprocessesofintelligent
thought.
ThequestionsstudiedinAIarequitesimilartothosewehavealreadyencounteredinourstudyofcognitivepsychology.However,themethodsofAIaredifferent
fromthoseofpsychology.TheAIresearcherattemptstodevelopandtestcomputerprogramsthatexhibitcharacteristicsofhumanintelligence.Thegoalofdeveloping
aworkingcomputerprogramrequiresthattherepresentationsandprocessesofatheorybeformalizedindetail.Asaresult,aprogram'sfailurescangiveafine
grainedinsightintowherethetheoryneedstobechanged.ThecompletecontrolovertheworkingsofacognitiveprocessthatispossibleinAIcontrastswiththe
limitedcontrolavailableinexperimentalcognitivepsychology.Theinnerworkingsofahumanmindcannotbedirectlyobservedorreprogrammedatwillbythe
psychologist,whomustuseingeniousandverytimeconsumingobservationsofhumanbehaviortomakeinferencesaboutunderlyingcognitiveprocesses.Each
advanceinknowledgetakesagreatdealofworkandrestsonachainofinferencesaboutinternalprocesses.AIresearcherscansystematicallytinkerwithprograms
andrunthemwithvaryinginputsandknowledgebases,whilelookingincompletedetailattheirinternalworkings.Nevertheless,thepsychologisthastheadvantageof
workingdirectlywiththehumanmind,whereastheAIresearcherisalwaysworkingwithanartifact,whichisonlyinferentiallyrelatedtothehumanmindandisinmany
respectsapalesubstituteforit.Theirmethodsarecomplementary,andatanypointinthedevelopmentofsomeareaofcognitivescienceeithersetofmethodsmight
offerthebestroutetowardnewideas.

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UbiquitousThemesinArtificialIntelligence
Followingourtreatmentofcognitivepsychology,itshouldcomeasnosurprisethatAIresearchisdeeplyconcernedwiththeproblemofknowledgerepresentation
andtheprocessesthatintelligentlymanipulaterepresentations,forinstance,bymakinginferencesfromthem,andtheproblemsofsearchandcontrol.Further,we
haveseenthatamajorsourceofpowerandflexibilityinhumanintelligenceistheabilitytoacquireskillorexpertisewithexperience.Thus,amajorresearchissuein
thecognitivescienceapproachtoAIisthestudyoftheproblemoflearning.Inthischapterweattacktheseproblemsafresh,fromanAIperspective.Wewillseein
moredetailhowvarioustypesofsymbolicrepresentationsandprocessescanbeimplementedformally.Webeginwithabriefreviewofthekeyproblemsconcerning
thoughtprocesses,emphasizingaspectsoftheproblemsthataremostimportantinAIresearch.
KnowledgeRepresentationKnowledgerepresentationisthenamegiventotheclusterofissuesinvolvingsuchquestionsas
1.Whatistheknowledgeinvolvedintheperformanceofthetask,itstypes,structure,andorganization?
2.Howisthisknowledgetoberepresentedinthecomputer?
3.Whatsortofknowledgeismadeexplicitbytherepresentation?Whatisdeemphasized?Whatsortofknowledgeisitpossibletorepresent?
4.Howistheknowledgetobeacquiredand/orrevised?
Inaskingquestion1,weareaddressingthefundamentallyepistemologicalissueofisolatingandtakingstockoftheknowledgeinvolvedinthetaskwearetryingtoget
thecomputertoperform.Wearetryingtoestablishhowthisknowledgecanbecharacterized,perhapshowitcanbebrokenintoclasses,andwhatconnectionsexist
init.Inaskingquestion2,wearetryingtomatchupourrepresentationalneedswithknownrepresentationschemesliketheoneswediscussinsection4.2.Inasking
question3,weareaddressingtheadequacyandbiasesoftherepresentation.Andinaskingquestion4,wearetryingtodeterminehowourknowledgebasecan
evolveandbemaintained.Thisquestionisclearlyrelatedtoquestionsaboutlearning(forexample,howtoinfernewknowledge,howtosupportgeneralizationand
specialization).
Ofcourse,ouranswerstosuchquestionsdependonourpurposesandthetaskathand.Forinstance,representingmathematicalknowledgeinordertostudyhow
novicestudentssolvealgebrawordproblemsisdifferentfromrepresentingmathematicalknowledgetoprovetheoremswithcomputers.Allofthesequestionsinvolve
significantanalysisofthedomainofknowledgeitself.Wedelvefurtherintotheseissuesinsection4.2.
SearchandControlSearchisthenamegiventoissuesinvolvingtheexplorationofalternatives,asinagameplayingsituationwhereoneconsiders,''IfImovehere,
thenmyopponentmoveshereorhere,andthenImovehereorhereorhereinresponse,andthen...."Controlisthenamegiventoissuesinvolvingtheorganization
ofprocessesinasystem,inparticular,questionsofwhatprocessesshouldactwhenandwhatprocessesshouldhaveaccesstowhatinformation.
Therearemanywellunderstoodtechniquestohandlesearchwepresentafewofthebestknowninchapter5.Ofcourse,theproblemofsearchisrelatedtothatof
knowledgerepresentationbecausewhatweperceiveasalternativesdependsonwhatwerepresent.Questionstoaskwhenconsideringsearchinclude

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1.Whatarethealternatives,theircharacteristics,andorganization?
2.Whatarethedangersinpursuing"bad"pathsofpossibilitiesandtherewardsforfinding"good"ones?
3.Willthesearchinfactfindasolutionamongthepossibilities,ifoneexists?
4.Ifso,isthesolutionuniqueoroptimalor''goodenough"?
Inaskingquestion1,weareconsideringissuessuchasusingoperatorsforgeneratingthealternatives(asinthelegalmovesinaboardgame),usingevaluation
functionsforassessingthealternatives,andusingstructuresliketreesornetworksfororganizingthealternatives.Inaskingquestion2,weareconsideringwhether
certainkindsofinformationmayhelpeliminatebadsearchroutesandsuggestconcentratingongoodones,whetheritispossibletorecoverfromexploringabad
sequenceofalternatives,whethertherearepenaltiesformissingfruitfullinesofexplorationandwastingresources,andwhethertherearewaystofindsuccessful
alternativesquickly.Inaskingquestions3and4,weareaskingtheobviousquestionsaboutthepossibleexistenceofsolutionsandaboutthedesirablecharacteristics
ofuniquenessandoptimality,andbarringsuchcomputationallydesirablesolutionswhetherasolutioncanbefoundthatisgoodenoughforourpurposes.
Controlinvolvescoordinationoftheprocessesthatmakeupthecomputermodel,communicationofinformationbetweenthem,anddecisionsaboutwhatprocess
shoulddowhatwhen.Controlandtherelatedissueofprogramarchitecturethatis,thedesignofthesystemconstituteanextremelyimportanttopicforAI
systems.Eventhoughwewillhavelittletosayaboutitinthischapter,somequestionstoconsideraboutcontrolare
1.Whatkindsofprocessesarethere?
2.Howaretheprocessescoordinatedandcontrolled?
3.Whatprocesseshaveaccesstowhatinformationandhowdotheycommunicatewithoneanother?
4.Howarecomputationalresourcesallocated?
Wetouchonsuchissuesinchapter5.
LearningThelastmajorthemeinAI,learning,concernshowasystemgets"better"inthesenseofknowingmoreandbeingabletodomore.Sometimesthismeans
"merely"acquiringnewfacts.Sometimesitmeansreorganizingtheknowledgebaseorthestructureoftheprogramitself.Mostfrequentlyitmeansperformingatask
better.Learningisaveryrichandexceedinglyimportanttopicthattouchesonimportantissuesfrompsychologyandepistemology.Someofthequestionsabout
learningfromtheAIpointofvieware
1.Whatprimitivecapabilitiesandknowledgedoesthelearningsystempossess?
2.Howarenewknowledgeandcapabilitiesacquiredandmeldedintothosealreadyknowntothelearningsystem?
3.Whatistheroleoftheteacher(forinstance,ascritic)inthesystem'slearning?
4.Whatistheroleofexamplesorexperiencespresentedtothelearningsystem?
Question1addressesthebaselineofperformancethatthelearningsystemistostartwith.Itclearlycannotstartwithnothingbuthowmuchisenough,andhowmuch
istoomuch?Thisissueisoftenthefocusofattacksonlearningsystems("Thesystem

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knewitallalong"),andthereisnosimpleanalysisofit,asanyphilosopherorAIresearcherwillattest.Question2addressesissuesofacquisitionandimprovement.
Oncethebaseforthelearningsystemhasbeenestablished,howshoulditgoaboutacquiringnewcapabilitiesandimprovingitsperformance?Somelearningis
inductiveandbasedonexamples,someproceedsbycriticizingaproblemsolvingperformanceandthenrefiningit.Question2alsoaddressestheintegrationofnew
knowledgeandperformancecapabilitiesintotheexistingsystem.Questions3and4singleouttwootherimportantissues.Question3,ontheroleoftheteacherin(or
whenabsent,theselfdirectionof)thesystem,haslongbeenrecognized,asithasbeeninpsychologicalstudiesoflearning.Question4,ontheroleofexamples,has
beentoolongoverlookedbutisnowmoreconsciouslyaddressed.Examplesprovidegristforthemilloflearning,andwithoutthemalmostalllearningsystemscould
notfunction.Thesefourquestionsthereforeaddresswhatcouldbecalledthebasiclearningcycle:start,acquire,revise,improve.Thus,asagroup,theyaddresskey
aspectsinwhatcouldbecalledthebasiccomponentsofalearningsystem:performanceknowledge,learningmechanisms,criticism,selectionofnewproblems.
CaseStudiesofArtificialIntelligencePrograms
Beforedelvingintodetailsaboutrepresentation,searchandcontrol,andlearning,weexaminethreeAIprogramstogiveanideaofwhatsuchprogramscandoandto
showhowthethreethemesarerelevant.Thefirst,calledAM,isaprogramdesignedtomodeldiscoveryinmathematics.Thesecond,MYCIN,performsexpertlevel
medicaldiagnosisofbacterialdiseases.Thethird,HYPO,modelscertainaspectsoflegalreasoningwithprecedentcases.
MathematicalDiscovery:TheAMProgramAM(AutomatedMathematician)isaknowledgebasedprogramthatwasdevelopedtodiscovermathematical
concepts(Lenat1977DavisandLenat1982).AMwasinitiallyprovidedwithbotharichfundofrulesofthumbconcerninghowtodiscoverandjudgethe
importanceofconceptsandagoodsetofbasicconceptsinsettheory.Withtheseitdevelopedconceptsinelementarynumberandsettheory,forinstance,the
concept"primenumber."NoteworthyaboutAMisitsuseof(1)arichknowledgebaseencodedinframes,(2)alargebaseofdiscoveryrules,and(3)aninteresting
controlmechanism,calledanagenda,tofocusitsattentiononthingstodo.AM'staskwastodiscovernewconceptsandtherebyextenditsknowledgebaseof
concepts.
Eachconceptisrepresentedbyaclusterofinformation,aframe,whichincludesinformationstoredinslotswithnameslikeNAME,DEFINITION,EXAMPLES,
GENERALIZATIONS,SPECIALIZATIONS,andWORTH.Aframecanbeviewedasastructuredindexcardwiththeslotsasplacestoentervariousaspectsof
theentitybeingcatalogued.
AM'sinitialknowledgebasecontainedabout100framesforbasicconceptslike"set"and"setunion."Knowledgeofhowtomanipulatethisstockofconceptswas
containedinarulebasecontainingabout250heuristics.Aheuristic,fromtheGreekstemfor"discover,"isaruleofthumborasuggestionthatusuallyprovestobe
usefulbutisnotguaranteedtobesothefundamentalsofheuristicreasoningwereextensivelyexploredbythemathematicianGeorgePolyainhisbookson
mathematicalproblemsolving(see,forexample,Polya1957).Heuristicsareoftennaturallyencodedinwhatiscalledasituationactionorifthenrule:forexample,
"Ifyouareinasituation

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involvingavariablerangingoverasetofvalues,theninvestigatewhathappenswhenthevariabletakesonextremevalues."Thisheuristicofexaminingextremecases
turnedouttobecriticallyimportantinAM.
AtanygiventimetherearemanythingsAMcouldattempt,suchastryingtofindexamplesorgeneralizationsofaconcept.However,sinceitdoesnothaveenough
resources,intermsoftimeorcomputerpower,todothemall,itmaintainsa"wishlist"oragendaofthingstodothatisorderedaccordingtosuchmeasuresas
importance,recency,andwhatLenatcallsinterestingnessthatis,howinterestingaconceptis.WhenAMisreadytostartworkingonanewtask,itconsultsthis
agendaandselectsthetaskwiththehighestrating.
Creatingnewconcepts,like"primenumber,"istheprincipaltaskforAM.(Notethatitisthepersonrunningtheprogramwhoprovidesanamelike"primenumber"for
aconcept.AMitselfhasnonotionthatitisdiscoveringaconceptwithaclassicname.)Thisactivityinvolvescreatinganewframefortheconceptandfillinginitsslots
(forinstance,listingsomeexamples(2,3,5)ofprimenumbersintheEXAMPLESslot).Fillinginaslotisaccomplishedbyexecutingacollectionofrelevantheuristic
rules,suchas"Trytocreateextremeexamples."
ThebasicprocessingcycleinAMisasfollows:
1.Chooseataskfromtheagenda.
2.Gatherrelevantheuristicrulesandexecutethem,whereaheuristicruleisdeemedrelevantifexecutingitislikely(thoughnotnecessarilyguaranteed)to
bringAMclosertosatisfyingthetask.
3.Placeanynewtasksspawnedintheprocessofstep2ontheagendathisinvolvesassigningameasuretorankthenewtaskandperhapsreorderingthe
oldagenda.(Newtasksarethusnotnecessarilyplacedatthetoporthebottomoftheagendabutratheraccordingtotheirperceivedimportance.)
Thenthecyclerepeatsitself.
Heuristicshelpnotonlyinaccomplishingtasksbutalsoinorderingtheagendaandhenceindeterminingwhattodonext.Thus,heuristicsguideAM'sexploration
throughalarge"space"ofpossibilities.ThisiswhyLenatcallsAMaheuristicsearchmodelofdiscovery.
ThereareonlythreetypesoftasksonAM'sagenda:
1.Fillintheslotofaconcept
Aheuristicrelevanttofillingintheexampleslotis
TofillinexamplesofX,whereXisakindofY.CheckexamplesofYsomeofthemmightbeexamplesofXaswell.
Forinstance,tofillinexamplesforthe"primenumber"concept,AMwouldconsiderexamplesofthe"number"concept.
2.Createanewconcept
Aheuristicrelevanttothistaskis
Ifsome(butnotmost)examplesofXarealsoexamplesofY,thencreateanewconceptdefinedastheintersectionofXandY.
Forinstance,someoddnumbersarealsoprimenumbers.Theintersectionconceptwouldbe"oddprimenumber."
3.Addanewtasktotheagenda
Aheuristicrelevanttothistaskis

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IfveryfewexamplesofXarefound,thenaddthefollowingtasktotheagenda:"GeneralizetheconceptX."
Forinstance,sincethereareveryfewexamplesof"evenprimenumber"(2istheonlyone),thenthisheuristicwouldspawnthetask"Generalizethe
conceptevenprime."
Notethatsomethingthatsoundssostraightforward,like"GeneralizetheconceptX"canbequitecomplicatedandsubtle.Forinstance,inthe"evenprimenumber"
exampletwoobviousgeneralizationchoicesare"evennumber"and"primenumber''(bothofwhichareaccomplishedbydroppingacondition)amoreaggressive
generalizationwouldbe''anynumber."Aswewillseeinchapter5,generalizationisacentraltaskforlearningsystems.
AMhasroughlyfortyheuristicsthatdealwiththecreationofnewconcepts.Typicalheuristicsdealwithgeneralization,specialization,andexceptionhandling.
Droppingaconditionisonegeneralizationtechniqueanotheristochangeaconstanttoavariable.Wehavealreadyseenthegeneralizationspecializationconnections
betweenconceptslike"number,""primenumber,"and"evenprimenumber."Anexampleofanexceptionmightbethenumber2,whichistheonlyevenprimeandthus
anexceptiontothestatement"Allprimesareodd."
Figure4.1containsaneditedsegmentfromtheactualepisodeinwhichAMdiscoveredtheconcept"prime."ThissessionwasprecededbyAM'sdiscoveryof
conceptsfor"multiplication"and"division,"whichledtotheconcept"divisorsofanumber."Tofindexamplesofthelastconcept,AMinvestigatedextremecases,that
is,numberswithveryfeworverymanydivisors.Numberswithnodivisororonlyonedivisorareessentiallynonexistent,soAMdoesnotjudgethemtobeinteresting.
AMactuallydiscovered"primes"indirectly,then,byfirstinvestigatingtheveryinterestingconceptofnumberswiththreedivisors.SinceAMnoticedthatnumberswith
threedivisorsalwaysseemtobesquaresofnumberswithtwodivisors(thatis,primes),thisraisedthe"interestingness"valueoftheemergingconceptof"prime,"
whichAMthenexploredmorethoroughly.AMthenusedtheconceptof"prime"ingeneratingvariousconjectureslike"uniquefactorization"thatariseoutofthe
question,"Askwhethertherelationbetweenanumberanditsdivisorsisafunction."
OnereasonwhyAMperformedsowellwasthatthetechniquesitcouldapplytoconceptsinitsknowledgebase(likedroppingacondition)weresemantically
meaningful.Thatis,suchformaloperationsintheprogramhadmeaninginthedomainofsetandelementarynumbertheory.TherewasahappymatchbetweenAM's
internalmanipulationsandthoseofitsdomain,mathematics(LenatandBrown1983RitchieandHanna1984).
MedicalDiagnosis:TheExpertSystemMYCINMYCINisanexpertsystem,thatis,akindofAIsystemthatperformsexpertlevelreasoninginatypicallynarrow,
yetdeep,fieldofexpertise.AverythoroughexpositionandreviewoftheMYCINprojectcanbefoundinShortliffe1976andBuchananandShortliffe1984.
MYCINcandiagnosecertainkindsofbacterialinfectionsandrecommendadministrationofappropriatedrugtherapies.Suchanexpertsystemisparticularly
importantbecausebacterialinfectionsrequireimmediatetreatmentandbecauseaconsiderableamountofexpertiseisinvolvedintheirdiagnosisandtreatment.Since
decisionsoncasesofinfectionmustoftenbemadebyaphysicianwhoisnotanexpertonbacterialdiseases,consultationwithanexpertpersonorprogramcan
beveryvaluable.An

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**Task65:**
Fillinginexamplesofthefollowingconcept:"DIVISORSOF."
3Reasons:
(1)NoknownexamplesforDIVISORSOFsofar.
(2)TIMES,whichisrelatedtoDIVISORSOF,isnowveryinteresting.
(3)Focusofattention:AMrecentlydefinedDIVISORSOF.
26examplesfound,in9.2seconds,e.g.:DIVISORSOF(6)={1236}
**Task66:**
ConsideringnumberswhichhaveverysmallsetofDIVISORSOF(i.e.,
veryfewdivisors).
2Reasons:
(1)Worthwhiletolookforextremecases.
(2)Focusofattention:AMrecentlyworkedonDIVISORSOF.
Fillinginexamplesofnumberswith0divisors.
0examplesfound,in4.0seconds.
Conjecture:nonumbershave0divisors.
Fillinginexamplesofnumberswith1divisor.
1examplefound,in4.0seconds,e.g.:DIVISORSOF(1)={1}.
Conjecture:1istheonlynumberwith1divisor.
Fillinginexamplesofnumberswith2divisors.
24examplesfound,in4.0seconds,e.g.:DIVISORSOF(13)={113}
Noobviousconjecture.Thiskindofnumbermeritsmorestudy.
Creatinganewconcept:"NUMBERSWITH2DIVISORS."
Fillinginexamplesofnumberswith3divisors.
11examplesfound,in4.0seconds,e.g.:DIVISORSOF(49)={1749}
Allnumberswith3divisorsarealsoSquares.Thiskindofnumber
meritsmorestudy.
Creatinganewconcept:"NUMBERSWITH3DIVISORS."
Figure4.1
TraceofhowAMdiscoveredtheconceptofprimenumber.(FromDavisandLenat1982.)

expertconsultationprogramforbacterialinfectionsisamenabletoanAIapproachbecauseabodyofwellunderstood,circumscribedmedicalknowledgealready
existsaboutidentifyingandtreatingthem.Moreover,additionalinformationcanbeobtainedfromstandardlaboratorytests,andthereisabodyofexpertiseindeciding
whichofthesetoperform.Finally,onceadiagnosishasbeenmadeorrather,oncealistofpossiblediagnoseshasbeenrankorderedthevariousdrugtherapies
canalsobeorderedonthebasisofinformationaboutthediseaseandthepatient.
MYCINusesarulebasedapproach.Thatis,itsexpertiseisencodedintermsofifthenproductionruleslikethefollowing(BuchananandShortliffe1984,71,122):
1)Thegramstainoftheorganismisgramneg,and

2)Themorphologyoftheorganismisrod,and

3)Theaerobicityoftheorganismisanaerobic

THEN:

Thereissuggestiveevidence(.6)thattheidentityoftheorganismis

bacteroides.

IF:

Theidentityoftheorganismispseudomonas

THEN:

Irecommendtherapychosenfromamongthefollowingdrugs:

IF:

Page146

1colistin(.98)
2polymyxin(.96)
3gentamicin(.96)
4carbenicillin(.65)
5sulfisoxazole(.64)
The.6intheconclusionofthefirstruleisacertaintyfactor,whichisthemechanismwherebyMYCINhandlesdegreesofevidenceanduncertainty.Acertainty
factorof+1indicatesafactknowntobetrue,acertaintyfactorof1indicatesafactknowntobefalse,andanythinginbetweenindicatesa"maybe"ofmoreorless
certainty.MYCINwasoneoftheearliestAIprogramsthatfacedtheissueofhowtodealwithuncertaindataitusedacalculusofcertaintyfactorstodothis.The
numbersassociatedwithdrugsinthesecondruleareprobabilities,derivedfromhospitaldata,thattheorganismPseudomonaswillbesensitivetoadrug.
MYCINcontainsaboutfivehundredsuchrulesandcanhandleaboutonehundreddifferentkindsofbacterialinfections.Inbenchmarktestsitsperformance
comparedveryfavorablywiththatofmedicalschoolfacultymembersandwasbetterthanthatofmedicalstudentsandresidentsattheStanfordMedicalSchool(Yu
etal.1984).AtypicalsessionbetweenaphysicianandMYCINisshowninfigure4.2.
TheMYCINsystemperformsamultiphasedecisionmakingprocess:
1.Identifywhichorganisms,ifany,arecausingthedisease.
2.Determinewhichdrugsarepotentiallyuseful.
3.Makedrugtherapyrecommendations.
MYCINworksinabackwardchainingstyleofreasoningtoidentifyorganisms.Thatis,itworksbackwardfrompossibleconclusionsabouttheidentityofthe
organismtothefactsthatwouldjustifytheconclusions.Forinstance,therulebasemightcontainrulesofthefollowingform:
IfAthenB.
IfBthenC.
IfCthenE.coli.
Givensuchrules,MYCINwouldtrytodeterminewhethertheunknownorganismisE.colibydeterminingwhetheritsatisfiesconditionC.Ifitdidn'tknowthis,it
wouldtrytoinferitbyreasoningbacktoseewhetherconditionBissatisfied.Andsoon.Atsomepointitmightrequestadditionalinformationorclinicaldatafromthe
user.Backwardchainingfocusestheprogram'sreasoningontherulesanddatarelevanttoreachaconclusionandthusisoftencalledgoaldirectedreasoning.It
enablesMYCINtoavoidaskingtheuserunnecessaryquestions.
Onceithasestablishedthelikelyidentityoftheorganism,MYCINretrieveslistsofrelevantdrugs,considerscontraindications,andrankordersthedrugsaccordingto
theirprospectsforbeingsuccessful.Finally,onthebasisofpatientdatasuchasweight,age,andsex,itmakesactualtreatmentrecommendations.
MYCINisaparadigmaticexampleofanexpertsystem.Eventhoughthetermexpertsystemshouldrefertoanysystemperformingatexpertlevel,itfrequentlyrefers
tosystemsbuiltonaknowledgebaseofrules.Thoughtherulebasedapproachseemsstraightforwardandenticinglyeasytoimplement,a"knowledgeengineer"can
spenduntoldhoursdebriefingexperts,developingamanageablevocabularyinwhichtowritetherules,debuggingtherules,andtuningthesystem.Thefirsttask
requires

Page147

1)Patient'sname:(firstlast)
**FREDBRAUN
2)Sex:
(Questions13request
**M
backgroundpatientdata.)
3)Age:
**55
4)ArethereanyculturesforFredBraunwhichmayberelatedto
thepresentillness,andfromwhichorganismshavebeen
grownsuccessfullyinthemicrobiologylaboratory?
**y
CULTURE1
5)FromwhatsitewasthespecimenforCULTURE1taken?
**BLOD
=BLOOD
(Systemcorrectstypingerror.)
6)PleasegivethedateandtimewhenCULTURE1was
obtained.
(mo/da/yrtime)
**JUN20,1977
Thefirstorganismisolatedfromthebloodcultureof20JUN77
(CULTURE1)willbereferredtoas:
ORGANISM1
7)EnterthelaboratoryreportedidentityofORGANISM1:
**UNKNOWN
(Typicallyidentityisnotyetknown.)
8)Thestain(gramorZiehlNeelsenacidfast)ofORGANISM1:
**NEG
(Preliminarylabresultsgivesomeclues.)
9)IsORGANISM1rodorcoccus(etc.):
**ROD
10)Whatistheformoftheindividualorganism(e.g.lancet
shapedforcocci,fusiformforrods,etc.)?
**FUSIFORM
(...morequestionsfollowinordertogather
sufficientinformationtoinfertheidentity
andsignificanceoftheinfectingorganisms...)
23)Whatisthesuspectedportalofentryofthegramnegrodfrom
thebloodcultureof20JUN77(ORGANISM1)intothissterile
site?
**GI(6)
(Userindicatestheuncertaintyofhisresponse.)
24)IsFredBraunaburnpatient?
**N
25)IsFredBraunacompromisedhost(e.g.alcoholic,sicklecell
disease,immunosuppressed)?
**N
26)IsFredBraunfebrile?
**y
(...afterabout5060questions,MYCINprints
thediagnostichypotheseson
whichtherapywillbebased...)
Figure4.2
AtypicalMYCINconsultationsession.(FromBuchananandShortliffe1984.)

Page148

Mytherapyrecommendationswillbedesignedtotreatfororganismsthatareeitherverylikelyor,althoughlesslikely,
wouldhaveasignificanteffectontherapyselectioniftheywerepresent.Itisimportanttocoverforthefollowingprob
ableinfection(s)andassociatedorganism(s):
INFECTION1isBACTEREMIA
<ITEM1>E.COLI[ORGANISM1]
<ITEM2>KLEBSIELLA[ORGANISM1]
<ITEM3>ENTEROBACTER[ORGANISM1]
<ITEM4>KLEBSIELLAPNEUMONIAE[ORGANISM1]
(...questionsfollowtoevaluatepossibletherapychoices,
andfinallyMYCINprintsitstherapyrecommendations...)
[REC1]Mypreferredtherapyrecommendationisasfollows:
Inordertocoverforitems<1234>:
Give:GENTAMICIN
(Onedrugcovers4possibleidentities.)
Dose:119mg(6.0ml)q8hIVfor10days[calculatedonbasis
of1.7mg/kg]
Comments:Modifydoseinrenalfailure.
Figure4.2(cont.)

knowingenoughaboutthedomainofthesystemtobeabletotalkwithexpertsabouttechnicalmattersandanalyzetheirproblemsolvingbehavior.Thesecondoften
requiresgoingbeyondwhatisfoundintextbookstoincludeotherconcepts,typicallyofaninformalnatureornotclearlyenunciatedbytheexpert.Thethirdrequires
experimentingwiththerulesetitisrareindeedthattheinitialprogramcontainsallandonlythenecessaryrules.Andthefourthrequirestheabilitytooptimizesystem
performancebycleverorderingandstructuringoftherulebase.Thesetasksareoftengroupedundertherubric"knowledgeacquisitionbottleneck."
Nonetheless,theexpertsystemsapproachexemplifiedbyMYCINisverypowerful.Itisbestsuitedtoproblemsinvolvinganarrow,welldelineatedareaofexpertise
thatistoocomplexanddynamictobemodeledwithsimplertechniqueslikedecisiontables.
LegalReasoning:TheHYPOProgramOurthirdexampleAIsystemisacasebasedreasoningsystemcalledHYPO(Ashley1990AshleyandRissland1988
Rissland,Valcarce,andAshley1984).Casebasedreasoning(CBR)isatypeofreasoninginwhichonetriestosolveanewproblembyusingsolutionsfromsimilar
pastproblems.Forinstance,indevelopinganewplanordesign,say,forahouse,oneadaptsanalreadyexistingone:thatis,onthebasisof"specs"ordesired
featuresforasolutiontothenewproblem,oneretrievesandattemptstomodifyoldsolutionsthatarejudgedtobecloseenoughtobeamenabletobeingretailoredto
thenewsituation.TherearemanyexamplesofsuchCBRtypeproblemsolvingindesignfieldslikearchitectureandmechanicalengineering.Evencertainaspectsof
cooking,suchascomingupwithnewrecipesormenus,areexamplesofsuchdesignorientedorplanningorientedCBR.
AnothertypeofCBRisthesortofprecedentbasedreasoningusedinlegalreasoning:thatis,presentedwithanewfactsituation,onegeneratesargumentsproand
conaninterpretationortreatmentofitbasedoninterpretationsandoutcomesmadeinsimilar,pastcases.PrecedentbasedCBRistypicallyusedinareaswherethere
are

Page149

competinginterpretationsofagivensituation.Itisusedinareasasdiverseasforeignpolicy,law,andeverydayinteractionswithchildrenandstudents.Forinstance,
basedonpastprecedents,anewregulationlimitingwhatafederallyfundedartistmayexhibitorpublishmaybeinterpretedasbeinganunconstitutionalabridgmentof
anartist'sfreedomofspeech.Asanotherexample,ateachermightdecidetoacceptastudent'slatehomeworkwithoutlossofcreditbasedonhowpastsimilarlate
papercaseswerehandled.AngloAmericancommonlawisaparadigmaticexampleofsuchreasoningsinceitisbasedonthedoctrineofprecedentthatdictatesthat
similarcasesshouldbedecidedsimilarly.Ofcourse,acriticalquestionis,Whatcountsas"similar"?
InbothstylesofcasebasedreasoningwhichwecancalldesignorientedandinterpretationorientedCBRkeyissuesarerepresentationandindexingofcases,
assessingsimilaritybetweencases,andusingrelevantprecedentcasestosolvenewproblems.AllCBRsystemscontainaknowledgebaseofcases,mechanismsto
indexandretrievecases,andmethodstoassesssimilarityandrelevance.Inaddition,designorientedCBRsystemscontainmethodstoadaptcasesandinterpretation
orientedCBRsystemscontainmethodstogeneraterationalesorargumentsforpossibleinterpretations.
HYPOisaCBRsystemthatoperatesintheareaoflawconcerningtheprotectionoftradesecrets,suchasknowledgeusedtoproduceandmarketnewcomputer
hardware.HYPOanalyzesanewcase(the"currentfactsituation"or"cfs")and,onthebasisofknownprecedentcasesandwaysofanalyzingthem,formulates
skeletonsofargumentssupportinginterpretations(e.g.,itwasorwasnotanunlawfulmisappropriation)espousedbytheopposingsides,theplaintiffandthe
defendant.HYPO'soutputincludesbothacasecitationsummary,givingasummaryofrelevantcasesforeachside,anda''3ply''argument,inwhichsideIfirstmakes
itsbestpointsbycitingitsbestcases,thenside2respondsinacounterpointbyattackingside1'sanalysisandofferingitsownbestcasesandanalternativeanalysis
favorabletoitspointofview,andfinally,side1hastheopportunitytorebutside2'sanalysis.Attheheartofsuchprecedentbasedargumentationisassessmentof
casesimilarityand"onpointness,"constructionofanalogieswithfavorableprecedents,anddistinguishingawayofunfavorableones.Seefigure4.3foranexamplefact
situationand3plyargument.
HYPO,likeanyCBRsystem,usesseveralsourcesofknowledgeaboutcases.ThefirstmajorcategoryofknowledgeinHYPOisitsknowledgebaseofcases,the
CaseKnowledgeBase.HYPOusesasetofhierarchicalframestorepresentthefactualfeaturesandrelationsofitscases.Thesamerepresentationisalsousedfor
thecurrentfactsituation.Theframeshaveslotsforinformationaboutvariousfactsofcases,suchasPLAINTIFF,DEFENDANT,TRADESECRET.Eachofthese
inturnmightberepresentedinframes.Forexample,severallevelsofsubframesareusedtorepresentfactsabouttheTRADESECRET.
ThesecondmajorcategoryofknowledgeinHYPOisknowledgeoflegalfactors,whicharecalleddimensions.Dimensionsareusedtoindexcases,toassessthe
strengthofacasefromaparticularlegalpointofview,andtocomparecaseswithrespecttothisviewpoint.Dimensionsencodetheknowledgethatthepresenceof
certainfactsenablesacasetobeaddressedfromacertainpointofview.Forinstance,twotypicalwaystoapproachatradesecretscaseare(1)focusonthenumber
ofdisclosuresoftheputativesecretmadebytheplaintifftoothers,and(2)focusontherelativeexpendituresoftimeandmoneymadebytheplaintiffanddefendant.In
additiontostatingwhatinformationisnecessaryforagivendimensiontoapply,adimensionstateshowtoassessthestrengthofacasealongthatdimensionandto
comparecasesfromthis

Page150
PointForDefendantasSide1:
Where:Plaintiffdiscloseditsproductinformationtooutsiders.Defendantshouldwinaclaimfor
TradeSecretsMisappropriation.
Cite:MidlandRossCorp.v.SunbeamEquipmentCorp.316F.Supp.171(W.D.Pa.,1970).
ResponseforPlaintiffasSide2:
MidlandRossCorp.v.SunbeamEquipmentCorp.isdistinguishablebecause:InMidlandRoss,
plaintiffdiscloseditsproductinformationtomoreoutsidersthaninCrownIndustries
Counterexamples:
DataGeneralCorp.v.DigitalComputerControlsInc.357A.2d105(Del.Ch.1975),heldforplaintiff
eventhoughinDataGeneralplaintiffdiscloseditsproductinformationtomoreoutsidersthanin
MidlandRossCorp.v.SunbeamEquipmentCorp.
RebuttalforDefendantasSide1:
DataGeneralCorp.v.DigitalComputerControlsInc.isdistinguishablebecause:InCrownIndustries,
Plaintiffdiscloseditsproductinformationinnegotiationswithdefendant.NotsoinDataGeneral.In
DataGeneral,plaintiff'sdisclosurestooutsiderswererestricted.NotsoinCrownIndustries.
Note:
Plaintiff'sresponsewouldbestrengthenedif:Plaintiff'sdisclosurestooutsiderswererestricted.
Cf.DataGeneralCorp.v.DigitalComputerControlsInc.357A.2d105(Del.Ch.1975)
Figure4.3
Thebasiccomponentsofatypical3PlyArgument:aPointforSide1(inthiscase,thedefendant),a
ResponseforSide2(theplaintiff),aRebuttalforSide1,andasuggestedhypotheticaltostrengthenthe
Response.(FromAshley1990.)

pointofview.Forinstance,accordingtothefirstapproach,whichinHYPOcorrespondstothedimensioncalledvoluntarydisclosuresmade,themoredisclosures
madebythecomplainingparty(theplaintiff),theworseofftheplaintiffissincetheplaintiffisresponsibleforlettingthecatoutofthebag,sotospeak.Thesecond
approach,representedinthedimensioncalledcompetitiveadvantagegained,encodesthesecondwayoflookingatamisappropriationcase,inwhichallthings
beingequal,thegreaterthediscrepancyinexpendedresources,theworseoffthedefendantisbecauselargedisparitiesinsavingsindicatethatthedefendantsomehow
gainedanunfaircompetitiveadvantage.Eachdimensionhascertainfactualprerequisites.Forinstance,forcompetitiveadvantagegainedtobeapplicable,HYPO
mustknowfactssuchasthattheplaintiffandthedefendantmanufacturecompetingproductsandtheamountoftimeandmoneytheyexpendedinconjunctionwith
theirproducts.ThelatterfactsareparticularlyimportantsincetheyallowHYPOtocomparecasesonthisdimension.Dimensionsthusencodeprerequisitefactsto
linesofargumentoranalysis,knowledgethatcertainprerequisitesarekey,andmethodstocomparecasesalongthedimensions.TheyareattheheartofHYPO's
definitionsofcasesimilarityandrelevance.
TheoverallprocessingofHYPOgoesasfollows.HYPObeginsbyanalyzinganewproblemcase(thecfs),whichisinputdirectlyintotheframerepresentationused
forcases.Itanalyzesthecurrentfactsituationtodeterminewhichdimensionsareapplicable,ornearlyapplicable(thatis,theywouldbeapplicableifonemorekey
factwereknown).HYPOthenretrievesfromitsCaseKnowledgeBaseallcasesthatareconsideredrelevant,whereacaseisdeemedtoberelevantifitsharesat
leastoneapplicable,ornearlyapplicable,dimensionwiththecurrentfactsituation.ThisinitialsetofrelevantcasesisHYPO'sfirstcutatgatheringasetofrelevant
precedentstouseinargument.
Next,HYPOdetermineswhichcasesaremoreonpoint,ormorerelevant,thanothersbyimposinganorderingonthesetofrelevantcases.Themostrelevantcases

Page151

arecalledmostonpoint.HYPOfindsthemostonpointcasesbysortingtheinitialsetofrelevantcasesaccordingtoanorderthatconsiderstheoverlapofthesetof
dimensionssharedbetweenthecfsandarelevantcase.Mostonpointcasesarethosecasesthataremaximalaccordingtothisorderingofrelevantcases.
Tobeprecise,case1isconsideredmoreonpointthancase2ifthesetofdimensionscase1shareswiththefactsituationcontainsthesetcase2shareswiththefact
situation.Forexample,supposeforsimplicitythatthesetofapplicabledimensionsinthecurrentfactsituationisA,B,C,DthatA,B,Careapplicableincase1and
thatBandCareapplicableincase2.InthisinstancecaseIwillbemoreonpointthancase2.Notethatiftherewereacase3withapplicabledimensionsB,C,D,it
wouldbeneithermorenorlessonpointthancase1:bothsharequiteanumberoflegalaspects(i.e.,dimensions)withthecfs,butneitheronesubsumestheanalysisof
theother.Inthissituationbothcase1andcase3wouldbeconsideredmostonpointcases.Situationslikethis,inwhichneitherofapairofcasesis"more"onpoint
thantheother,arisebecausecasesoftenaddressdifferentaspectsandcomparingthemisabitlikecomparingapplesandoranges.Notealsothatcase2canbe
comparedwithbothcase1andcase3(alongthedimensionsBandC)andthatwithrespecttoboth,itislessonpoint.
Fromthesetofmostonpointcases,HYPOnextchoosesthe"best"casesforeachsidetouseinitspointsandcounterpointsinthe3plyarguments.Sincesomemost
onpointcasesmightbegoodforonesideandsomefortheopposingside,eachsideneedstofocusonthosemostonpointcasesthatarebestforitandatthesame
timebewaryofthosethatarebestfortheothersidesincethesewillsurelybeusedtomakecounterarguments.Thus,HYPO'snextstepistofurtherwinnowdownthe
setofrelevantcases.
Bestcasesforaparticularside(say,theplaintiff)aredefinedasthosecasesthatinadditiontobeingmostonpointwerewonbytheplaintiffandshareatleastone
favorabledimensionwiththecaseathand.Obviously,acasethatheldagainstyou,evenifmostonpoint,isnotonethatyouwouldliketociteinarguingyourcase.
Furthermore,itisnotwisetorelyonacasethatisstronginwaysthatyourcaseisnot,forthenyouropponentmay"distinguishaway"thiscasebysayingthatthe
reasonitwasresolvedasitwasisthatithadtheseotherstrongpointsthatyoursdoesnot.
HavingfoundthebestcasesforeachsidethelastinaseriesofstepstowinnowdownthesetofcasesinitiallyretrievedfromtheCaseKnowledgeBaseHYPOis
nowinapositiontoplayoutvariouslinesofargumentaboutthecurrentcase.Figure4.3showsa3plyargument.HYPOalsouseshypotheticalstopointouthowa
particularcasecouldbestrengthened.Forinstance,infigure4.3,HYPOsuggeststhat"plaintiff'sresponsewouldbestrengthenedif...."Thestudyofhypotheticalsis
aninterestingresearchareainitself(RisslandandAshley1986Rissland1989).
Insummary,HYPOisanexampleofaprecedentbasedCBRprogram.Itisanexampleofaprogramthatproposescomputationallywelldefineddefinitionsforkey
CBRnotionssuchas"similarity,""relevant,""mostonpoint,"and''bestcase."Withitsknowledgeofhowtocomparecases,itisabletoperformvariouskeysteps,
suchasdistinguishinganddrawinganalogies,usedinlegalreasoning.
4.2KnowledgeRepresentation
Inthissectionwepresentasurveyofthestandardtoolsofsymbolicknowledgerepresentationotherapproachesarecoveredinthesectiononconnectionismand

Page152

neuralnets.Intuitively,aknowledgerepresentationtechniqueisawayofrepresentingknowledge,thatis,awayofencodingitforusebyacomputerprogram.A
knowledgerepresentationschemeisasystemofformalconventionssometimescalleditssyntaxtogetherwithawaytointerpretwhattheconventionsmean
sometimescalleditssemantics.
Anyknowledgerepresentationschemehastwoparts:aknowledgebaseandaninterpreterthatmanipulatesit.Bothaspectsofknowledgerepresentationthe
knowledgebaseandtheinterpretiveprocessarenecessary.Neitheronealonerepresentsmuchofanythingmorethan,say,bat,ball,andplayersalonerepresentthe
gameofbaseball:oneneedstoknowwhattodowiththem(forinstance,asdescribedintherulesofthegame).
Arepresentationmakesexplicitcertainingredientsandaspectsofinformationandcangreatlyaffecthoweasyitisforaprogramtoperformdifferenttasks.For
instance,representingmathematicsforacomputertheoremproverrequiresbothaknowledgebaseoftruepropositionsandamechanismthatcombinesthemtoinfer
newtruepropositions.Arepresentationthatisgoodforcomputertheoremprovingmightnotbegoodformodelinghumanmathematicalskills.
Wewillseethatthereisnoonerightoruniversallycorrectrepresentationforknowledge.Thechoicedependsonvariousfactors,forexample,theneedsofthe
system,theresearcher'spurposesforrepresentingtheknowledge,andtherequirementoffindingtherepresentationthatbestmirrorsthestructureofthedomain
knowledgeormakesexplicitthataspectofthedomainknowledgetheresearcherwantstoemphasize.Moreover,wewillseethateachrepresentationschemehas
certainstrengthsandweaknessesandthateachcanbeaffectedbycertainwellknownproblems:thecreditassignmentproblem,grainsize,therightprimitivesproblem,
andsoforth.(Forexpositoryreasonswewillconsidertheseproblemswithrespecttoparticularknowledgerepresentationschemeskeepinmind,however,thateach
oneappliestomany,orevenall,knowledgerepresentationtechniques.)Inchoosingarepresentation,then,thecognitivescientistwillattempttomakethebestmatch
betweendesiderataandtechniqueandwillremainawareoftheassumptionssomepsychological,somecomputational,somephilosophicalthatgoalongwitheach
choice.
MuchoftheAIworkonknowledgerepresentationprovidesexamplesofAIresearchersgrapplingwithfundamentalproblemsofmeaningandtaking(evenif
implicitly)anepistemologicalstancethatissomewhat"reductionist"thatis,theytaketheviewthatknowledgecanbebrokendownuntiloneeventuallyreachesaset
ofprimitivesthatneednotbebrokendownfurther.Althoughthisviewcanbequibbledwithphilosophically,itisnotabadstancefortheAIresearcher,whomust
handlethesequestionspragmaticallybutinasprincipledamanneraspossible.
Beforewediscussparticularmethods,letuslookatalistofcriticalquestionstoaskaboutanyknowledgerepresentationscheme.
CriticalQuestionsforKnowledgeRepresentationSchemes
Everyrepresentationschemehasitsprosandconseveryschemeisgoodatcapturingcertainkindsofknowledgeandnotsogoodatcapturingotherkinds.Every
schemehasitscostsandbenefitseithertotheprogramortothepersonencodingtheknowledgefortheprogramormaintainingit.Asaneducated"consumer"of
knowledgerepresentationmethods,acognitivescientistshouldbeabletoevaluatethemethodwithrespecttotheproblemathandanddeterminewhichscheme
providesthebestmatchofstrengthstoneeds.

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Thefollowingquestionsareusefulinevaluatingknowledgerepresentationschemes:
1.Howperspicuousistherepresentation?Doesitpermitaconciseandtransparentencodingoftheknowledge?Ordoesitrequiretheknowledgetobeforced
intoitsrepresentationalconventionsinanuncomfortableway?
2.Howefficientistherepresentation?Issimpleknowledgeencodedsimply?Canknowledgethatisusedinmorethanonewayorplacebeseparatedoutor
mustitberepeated?
3.Whatisthescopeandgrainsizeoftheknowledgethatcanberepresented?Thatis,whatportionoftheworldcanberepresentedandinwhatdetail?
4.Whatisthebasicvocabularyof"representationalprimitives"?Whatprimitivesareprovidedbytherepresentation,andwhatconceptscanbeexpressedin
thoseprimitives?
5.Howeasyisittomodifytheknowledge?Isitpossibletochangejustafewpiecesofinformation,ordoeschangingjustafewpiecesrequirechangingagreat
manymore,aswell?Thatis,howmodularistherepresentation?
6.Whatkindofacquisitionispossibleornotpossible?Howisnewknowledgerelatedtooldknowledge?Howarepossibleconflictsbetweenoldandnew
handled?Willtherepresentationsupportgeneralizationorspecialization?
7.Whatkindofretrievalispossible?Isitpossibletofindknowledgeviaassociationsorhierarchicalaccess?Howarechunksofrelatedknowledgeretrieved?
8.Whatkindofreasoningispossible?Isitpossibletomakelogicaldeductions?Isitpossibletodosomesortofinduction?Isitpossibletocontinueeveninthe
faceofmissingoruncertainknowledge?
9.Whatisthedivisionoflaborbetweentheknowledgebaseandtheinterpretiveprogram?Musteverythingbeencodedaheadoftime,orcanthe
interpreterfillinthegapsorgeneratenewknowledgewhenitisneeded?Whatknowledgeisexplicit?Implicit?
10.Howcantherepresentationitselfbemodifiedorextended?Cannewprimitivesbecreatedandused?Cantherepresentationalconventionsbemodified?
Whataretheimplicationsofsuchchangesfortheinterpreter?
Thisisaverylonglistofquestions,andmanyareinterrelated.Theycanbepairedaccordingtotheissuestheyaddress:
1and2:theeaseofencoding,
3and4:expressiveadequacy,
5and6:acquisitionaladequacy,
7and8:inferentialadequacy,and
9and10:theschemeitselfanditsmaintenance.
Itisprobablytoomuchtoaskthateveryquestionbeansweredbeforechoosingandusingarepresentationscheme,butconsideringsuchalistevenifnotin
completedetailisoneofthebestwaystomakesuretheschemechosenmatchestherequirementsoftheproject.Grapplingwiththesequestionsisalsoawayto
becomefamiliarwiththeknowledgedomaintheyprovideanentrypointintotheepistemologicalanalysisthesystemdesignermustdo.
Inthenextsectionwesurveyahandfulofthebestknownrepresentationschemes.Asyouarereading,youmightwishtoconsiderhoweachrepresentationfaresin
lightoftheprecedingquestions.

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Figure4.4
Examplesofnetworks.(a)Aconcepthierarchy.Thelinksareallisalinks.(b)Asemanticnetwork
expressingsomeofthestructureofatoyhouse.(c)Anetworkshowingsomeofthelinkagesbetweena
particularpropositionandgeneralconceptualknowledgeabouthumanbeingsandflowers.

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Figure4.4(cont.)

SurveyofStandardKnowledgeRepresentationTechniques
SemanticNetsAswesawinchapters2and3,asemanticnetwork,orsimplynet,isasetofnodesandconnectinglinksthatrepresentpropositionalinformation.
Knowledgeresidesinthestructureofthenetandintheprocessesthatoperateonit.SemanticnetworkswereactuallyfirstdevelopedbyAIresearchers(Quillian
1968)workingonlanguageunderstandingandhavecontinuedtobewidelyusedanddiscussed(Brachman1983,1985).
PerhapsthesimplesttypeofnetandthemostfrequentlyusedinAIisanisaorakindof(AKO)hierarchy,wherethelinksexpresstheisaorakindof
relationbetweennodes.Forexample,partoftheruminantsubfamilyofmammalscanberepresentedbythenetworkfragmentdepictedinpart(a)offigure4.4.Such
hierarchieshavebeenusedtogreatadvantagebyprogramsthatoperateinknowledgedomainswherethehierarchicalnatureoftheknowledgeisimportant.For
instance,theAMprogramusesanisahierarchytorepresentcertaintypesofmathematicalfunctions.Insuchnetworks,oneisusuallycarefultodistinguishbetween
isainthesenseofsetinclusion,asinthestatement"primenumbersareakindofnumber"andisainthesenseofoneitembeingamemberofaparticularset,asin
thestatement"2isaprimenumber."Thesemanticsofthesetwodifferenttypesoflinksonebetweensetsorclassesofobjectsandtheotherbetweenanindividual
objectandclassarecloselyrelatedyetdifferentenoughtorequireslightlydifferenttreatment.
Anothertypeofnetcanbeusedtoshowhowanobjectcanbedecomposedintootherobjects.Typicallinksinthistypeofnetworkareisapartoforhaspart.
ThissortofnetworkwasusedbyWinston's(1970)conceptlearningprogram,describedlaterinthissection.Thenetworkinpart(b)offigure4.4containsthenetfor
ahousemadeofchildren'sblocks.Thehaspropertylinkisanothertypeoffrequentlyusedlinkitisusedtoassociateapropertywithanode.

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Ofcourse,semanticnetscanalsobeusedtorepresentaspectsofnaturallanguage,suchasofthesentenceOliviagaveWhitmanaredrose.Wecouldembedthis
bitofnetintothelargerschemeofourknowledgeabouttheworldandarriveatanetworkliketheoneshowninpart(c)offigure4.4.Notethatwehaveuseda"give"
linkinadditiontothemorestandardlinks.
Suchexamplesraisethegrainsizeandrightprimitivesproblemsconcerningtheexpressiveadequacyofarepresentation.Theyarenotuniquetosemanticnetsbut
arerelevanttoanyrepresentationscheme.Theyareeithertroublesomeorinterestingissues,dependingonone'spointofviewaseitherprogrammerorphilosopher.
Forinstance,justhowmanylinksareimportantincapturingthemeaningofsuchasimplesentenceasOliviagaveWhitmanaredrose?Mustwealso"explode"the
flowernodeintoitsconstituentpartsandeachofthesefurtherstilluntilwegetdowntotheelementsintheperiodictableofchemistry?Won'tthisleadtoahopeless
tangle?Whataboutdifferentsensesofthewordgave?OliviagaveWhitmanacold,anidea,akiss,apunchinthenose?
Thoughonecouldobviouslyrefinethenetsgiveninfigure4.4sothattheseparticularproblemsarepatchedover,similaroneswillcropupintherevisednetsaswell.
Thereareno"right"answerstotheproblemstouchedonhere:whatprimitivestouseinarepresentation,whatlevelofdetailtouse,andhowtorepresentsituations
thatchangeovertime.Suchproblemsareepistemological.Thatis,theyraisequestionsaboutthenatureofknowledge.Thepsychologisttakesanempiricalapproach,
askinghowtheproblemsaretypicallyresolvedbythehumanmind.AIworkersoftentakeapragmaticapproachandstopunearthingmorequestionsandthe
knowledgeneededtodealwiththemwhentheythinktheyhaveenoughtoallowtheprogramtoaccomplishitspurpose,whetheritbeansweringquestionsabout
storiesorsolvingalgebrawordproblems.
Theisatypeofsemanticnetisparticularlygoodfortasksinvolvingmovementofinformationbetweenindividualsandclasses.Particularlyimportantistheinheritance
ofinformationfromclasstosubclassandfromclasstoindividual,suchastheknowledgethatdromedariespossesstheattributesassociatedwithruminants,and
ruminantsthoseassociatedwithmammalshence,ifweendowthescheme'sinterpreter(theprocessthatmanipulatesthenet)withtransitivity,dromedariesalsoinherit
propertiesofmammals,suchasthattheynursetheiryoung.
Thisisveryusefulwhenweneedtoreasonaboutdromedariesbutdonotknowmuchaboutthem.However,whatweknowaboutruminantsormammalsmightbe
enoughtoanswerquestionslike"Dodromedarieschewtheircud?"or"Dodromedariesnursetheiryoung?"Ofcourse,manyquestions(forinstance,"Dodromedaries
havetwohumps?")wouldrequirespecificknowledgeofdromedaries.
Asapragmaticapproach,wecouldtrytoencodeinformationashighupinthehierarchyaspossible(forinstance,encodethefactof"havingtwoeyes"atthemammal
level)andletitbeinheriteddownward(forinstance,tothedromedarylevel).Thisofcourseplacescertainrequirementsontheinterpreterandimpliescertaincostsfor
usingknowledgeimplicitlyembeddedintherepresentation.
Theoppositeapproachwouldbetoencodetheinformationexplicitly(forinstance,toencode"havingtwoeyes"oneverynodeforwhichitistrue).Thisremoves
someoftheburdenfromtheinterpreterbutexactscostsintermsoftheneatness,efficiency,andultimateperspicuityoftherepresentation.

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Otherquestionscanbeaskedaboutinheritanceaswell.Forinstance,shoulditberestricted?Shouldtherebeaway,forexample,toblocktheinheritanceof"having
twoeyes"ontoanindividualanimalthatbecauseofamishaphasonlyone?(SeeBrachman1985foraninterestingdiscussionofsuchproblems.)Agoodruleofthumb
inthisapproachistoinheritvaluesdownwardandassumethemtobetrueunlesstoldotherwise.
Theoppositeofinheritancemaybesaidtobeinduction:movingfromthecharacteristicsofindividualstothoseofclasses.Thisseemstobeamuchharderproblem,
butonethathascentralconnectionstopsychologyandconceptlearning.Forinstance,ifalltheruminantsonehasencounteredhaveanevennumberoftoes,should
oneinferthatthisistrueofallruminants(true,barringaccidentsorgeneticmutations)ormoreradicallyofallmammals(false)?Howfarupahierarchyshouldspecific
factsbepushed,andhowfardownshouldgeneralonesbeinherited?OneapproachthatwillemergeinourdiscussionofthelearningsystemLEXistokeeppushing
upuntiloneencountersareasontostop.
AnotherwasusedbyWinstoninanearlyAIattackontheproblemofinductivelearning,whichwewillcallARCHLEARNER(Winston1970).Itusessemanticnets.
Theprogramlearnscertainconcepts,likethatofan"arch"builtofchildren'sblocks,bybeingshownexamplesandnonexamplesoftheconcept.Thenonexamples,
callednearmisses,areofaveryspecialkind:theyfailtobepositiveexamplesinexactlyonerespect(hencetheirname).Aconceptislearnedthroughsuccessive
refinementofaninitialmodeloftheconcept.Inasensetheprogramisbuildingamodelortheoryofwhat"archness"is.Thewholeprocessisdrivenbytheexemplars
(ascomparedwithknowledgeaboutbuildingsorphysics),whichisnotsodifferentfromthewayhumanslearninmanycases.Boththeconceptandthepresented
examples(i.e.,positiveexamplesandnearmisses)arerepresentedassemanticnetswitharcslikeisa,partof,andsupports.
Forinstance,supposetheprogram'scurrentrepresentationofanarchspecifiesthatanarchhasthreesubpartsatop,aleftside,andarightsideandthateachisa
kindofrectangularblock,orbrick.Thisrepresentationcapturesthekindofarchshowninpart(a)offigure4.5.Nowsupposetheteachershowstheprogramthe
structuredepictedinpart(b)offigure4.5,withthecommentthatthisisnotanarch.Sincetheonlydifferencebetweenwhattheprogramknowssofarandthisnew
nonexampleisthetouchingofthebaseblocks,theprograminfersthatthismustbeadifferencethatmakesadifferencethatis,itlearnsthatthetwosupportblocksof
atruearchmustnottouch.Thisisreflectedinthesemanticnetrepresentationbytheadditionofamustnottouchlinkbetweenthetwobaseblocks.
Byprocessingfurtherexamplesandnonexamplespresentedbyateacher,theprogramrefinesthearchconcept(thatis,thesemanticnetrepresentingthearch
concept).Forinstance,supposetheteachernextshowstheprogramanarchwhosetopisatriangularblock,suchastheoneshowninpart(c)offigure4.5,andsays
thatthistooisanexampleofanarch.Thiswillcausetheprogramtogeneralizebychanginganisalinkforthetoptopointtoamoregeneralkindofblockinits
knownhierarchyofblocktypes,whichincludessuchwedges.Thisexampleteachestheprogramthattheconceptofarchismoregeneralthanithadsupposed.If
anothernearmississhownwherethetopisnotsupportedbythetwosideblocks,asinpart(d)offigure4.5,theprogramlearnsthatthesupportrelationshipbetween
thetopandthesidesisnecessary.Thiscausesthesupportslinktobechangedtoamustsupportlink.Theresultingconceptofarchisshowninfigure4.6.

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Figure4.5
Archesandnonarches.(a)Anarch.(b)Anearmiss:support
columnscannottouch.(c)Anarch:thelintel
doesnothavetobeabrick.(d)Anearmiss:thecolumnshaveto
supportthelintel.(Adaptedfrom
Winston1970.)

Figure4.6
Thefinalconceptofarch,followingthetraining
examplesoffigure4.5.(AdaptedfromWinston1970.)

Inthisway,ARCHLEARNERevolvesamodelinsemanticnetworkformofwhatisinvolvedintheconcept"arch."Thesuccessofthisapproachdepends
heavilyonthequalityandorderoftheexamplespresentedtotheprogrambyitsteacher.
Thedecisionofhowtheprogramshouldmodifyarcsinitssemanticnets,ifatall,ismadebycomparingthecurrentrepresentationoftheconceptwitharepresentation
ofthepresentedexample.Suchacomparisonispossiblebecausebothconceptandpresentedexampleornonexamplearerepresentedinsemanticnetsusingthe
samekindsofarcsandnodes.This"singlerepresentationtrick"greatlysimplifiesthecomparison.
Further,sinceanearmisscanfailtobeanexampleinonlyoneway,theblameforthefailurecanbeassignedandtheconceptupdatedaccordingly.Iftherewere
multipledifferences,itwouldbehardtotellwhichdifferencemadeadifferencethisisaversion

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ofwhatisknownintheliteratureonlearningprogramsasthecreditassignmentproblem.Thecreditassignmentproblemwasrecognizedveryearlyinresearchon
gameplaying,asaresultoftryingtoascertainjustwhatmoveinaparticulargameledtoaplayer'sultimatewinorloss.Forinstance,whichmovewasresponsiblefor
thesuccessfulorcatastrophiccheckmate:theoriginalpushingofapawn(unlikely)orthemovesimmediatelyprecedingthecheckmate(morelikely)?Theproblemis
howtojudge.
FramesItisfrequentlyverynaturaltomanipulateseveralpiecesofinformationasiftheywereoneunit.Forinstance,incertaincontextsthewholeclusterofnetwork
nodesandarcsrepresentingtheconceptofanarchmightbemanipulatedasawhole.Furthermore,thereareoftenprototypicalclusteringsofinformation(suchas
constituentpartsandtheirproperties)thatonewouldliketobundletogethercomputationally.Whencombinedwithsomeideasondatastructuresfromcomputer
science,thesenotionsofprototypeandchunking,whichaswesawinchapter2havelongbeenrecognizedinthepsychologicalliterature,leadtotheideaofaframe
(Minsky1975).
Aframeisacollectionofslotsandslotfillersthatdescribeastereotypicalitem.Aframehasslotstocapturedifferentaspectsofwhatisbeingrepresented.Thefiller
thatgoesintoaslotcanbeanactualvalue,adefaultvalue,anattachedprocedure,orevenanotherframe(thatis,thenameoforapointertoanotherframe).Unless
otherwiseidentified,slotfillersinourexamplesareactualvalues.
Forinstance,theframetorepresentatypicalchairmightlooklikethis:
CHAIR
SPECIALIZATIONOF:FURNITURE
NUMBEROFLEGS:
DEFAULT:4
IFNEEDED:useprocedureCOUNT'EM
NUMBEROFARMS:0,1,or2
SEAT:
BACK:
DEFAULT:sameasSEAT
STYLE:
GOODFOR:sitting
Theframetorepresentatypicaldeskchairmightlooklikethis:
DESKCHAIR
SPECIALIZATIONOF:CHAIR
NUMBEROFLEGS:
NUMBEROFARMS:
DEFAULT:2
SEAT:cushioned
BACK:cushioned
STYLE:hightech
GOODFOR:sittingatadesk
NoticethattheCHAIRframehasadefaultvalueof4fortheNUMBEROFLEGSslot.Thisrepresentstheknowledgethatweusuallyexpectchairstohavefour
legsitisnotalwaysthecasethinkofathreeleggedmilkingstoolbutitisveryoftenso.Ingeneral,adefaultvalueisavaluethatweassumetobetrueunlesswe
aretoldotherwise.Forinstance,indiscussingthesemanticnetformammals,wetreatedthe

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value2asthedefaultvalueforthenumberofeyesinaspecificcasethismightbewrong,butingeneralitisaverygoodassumption.Assumingadefaultvalueisalso
appropriateforthenumberofwheels(4)onacar.ThereareexceptionsacertainkindofBritishcarhasthreewheelsbutinthepreponderanceofcaseswecan
safelyassumethedefaultvalueandproceedwithourtask.Defaultvaluesareusefulbecausetheyencodecertainexpectationsabouttheworld,asdoframes
themselves,andtheyallowprocessingtoproceedeveninthefaceofmissingdata.However,ifanincorrectassumptionisverycostly,wemightnotrelyontheuseofa
defaultvalue,like4forthenumberoflegsonachairinstead,ifwehaveit,wemightuseaprocedureattachedtotheframe,likeCOUNT'EM,togetanaccurate
value.Theuseofdefaultvaluesandattachedproceduresdistinguishesaframefromanordinarydatastructure,orindexcard.Aslotcanalsobeleftunfilled(the
BACKslot),listalternatives(theNUMBEROFARMSslot),orpointtoyetanotherframe(theSPECIALIZATIONOFslot).
Framescanstandinahierarchicalrelationtooneanother.DESKCHAIRisaspecializationof,akindof,CHAIR.TheSPECIALIZATIONslotallowsoneframeto
point''up"toanotherframegeneralizationandothertypesofpointersarealsopossible.Havingsuchpointersinframeslotsallowstheframesthemselvestobe
arrangedintonetworks.(Notethatforsimplicitywesuppressthedistinctionbetween"subsetof"and"memberof,"usingtheterm"specializationof"torefertoboth.)
Networksofframesarefrequentlyarrangedinanisahierarchy,justlikesemanticnetworks.Networksofframeshavebeenusedtorepresentknowledgeincomplex
domainslikemathematicsandlawintheAMandHYPOprograms.
Inframebasedsystemsfillinginslotvaluesisamajoractivity.Usinganinheritedvalue(thatis,thevaluefromthesameslotofanotherframe,typicallyonehigherupin
thehierarchy)isaneasywaytoobtainavalue.Forinstance,thefillerfortheNUMBEROFLEGSslotoftheDESKCHAIRframecouldbeinheritedfromthesame
slot(actuallythedefaultvalue)oftheCHAIRframe.Whenvaluesfromframeshigheruparemissing(asintheBACKslotoftheCHAIRframe)orarenotreliable
enough,attachedprocedurescanbeusedtodeterminethem.
Framesareparticularlygoodatrepresenting"chunked"knowledgesuchasaperson'sunderstandingofcomplexconcepts,likethosefrommathematics,orawhole
sectionofasemanticnet,likethatrepresentingtheconceptofanarch,althoughdesigningtherightframerepresentationjustlikedesigningtherightlinkandnode
typesforsemanticnetscanbefarfromsimple.Oncedesigned,however,framesallowforexpectationdrivenprocessing.Thatis,becausetheyrepresentthe
stereotypicalsituation,framesallowustolookfortheexpectedand,whenwenoteanexception,torecordthisdifferenceandactonit.Forinstance,ifweexamine
chairsinlightoftheCHAIRframe,whichhasadefaultvalueof4forNUMBEROFLEGS,andifwenotethataparticularchair,likeastool,hasonlythreelegs,we
can(1)distinguishitfromtherunofthemilltypeofchairand(2)treatitdifferently(forinstance,inreasoningabouthowstableitistostandon).
Framescanprovideprescriptiveknowledgethatcanhelpaprogramorpersontounderstandadomainbetterbyusingtheslotsasgeneratorsoftaskstodosuchas
questionstoanswer.Thiswastheapproachtakenindependentlybytworesearchers,LenatandRissland.Aswehaveseen,Lenat'sgoalindevelopingtheprogram
AMwastomodelthecreativediscoveryofmathematicalconcepts.Rissland'sgoalwastodescribemathematicalunderstandingofrichmathematicaldomainslike
linearalgebra.Althoughtheseresearchers'goalsweredifferent,theirrepresentationswereremark

Page161

ablysimilar.Bothusedsimilarframesintheirrepresentationsformathematicalknowledge.Lenatincludedmoreproceduralknowledgeandapowerfulinterpreterthat
knewhowtospawnnewconceptsRisslandincludedmorestructuralrefinementoftheknowledgethatemphasizedthedifferenttypesofmathematicalknowledgeand
theirconnectivity.
Inbrief,Rissland(1978)developedthreetypesofframesandthreesemanticnetsforCONCEPTS,RESULTS,andEXAMPLES.Thethreetypesofframeshad
similarslots(suchasNAME,WORTH,EPISTEMOLOGICALCLASS,INSPACEPOINTERS),andeachtypecouldbeorganizedinanetreflectingadifferent
typeoflinkage.Forinstance,thelinkageimportantamongresults(forexample,theorems)waslogicaldeduction,andthelinkageimportantamongexampleswas
generation.Thethreesemanticnetsofframes,calledspaces,wereConceptsspace,Resultsspace,andExamplesspace.Thesespaceswereconnectedthrough
interframelinkages.Atypicalframeforanexampleisshowninpart(a)offigure4.7.TheuseandrepresentationofexamplesbyRisslandwasaprecursortocase
basedreasoning.
AtypicalframeinLenat'sAMschemeisshowninpart(b)offigure4.7.UnlikeRissland'sscheme,AMhadonlyonenetworkofframes.Inthisrepresentation,
knowledgeaboutexampleswas''linkedto"theconceptexemplified.Therewerenoexplicitlinksbetweenexemplars.ThiswasquiteadequateforLenat'spurposeof
studyingthediscoveryofsetandnumbertheoryconceptsinthesettingofthenaturalnumbers.ItwouldhavebeeninadequateforRissland'spurposebecausethe
connectivitybetweenexamplesandotheritemsofknowledgeisanimportantingredientofamathematician'sunderstanding.Also,indomainswhereexampleshave
morestructurethantheydointhedomainofthenaturalnumbers,moreknowledgeaboutexamplesandtheirrelationshipswouldbeneeded(forinstance,to
accomplishthetaskofgeneratingextremecases).Thus,thesetwoschemesdemonstratehowdifferingpurposescanleadtosimilarbutdifferentrepresentationsofthe
samegeneralsubjectmatter.
ScriptsAswesawinchapter2,somestereotypicalknowledgeisepisodicorsequentialinnatureandiswellrepresentedbyscripts.Ascriptisanelaboratecausal
chainaboutastereotypicalevent.Itcanbethoughtofasakindofframewheretheslotsrepresentingredienteventsthataretypicallyorderedinaparticularsequence.
Forinstance,asanyparentwillattest,thereisatypicalscriptforattendingapreschoolchild'sbirthdayparty,whichgoessomethinglikethis:
Gotopartyhouse.
Givepresenttobirthdaychild.
Playgames.
Singsongs.
Havesnacks.
Watchbirthdaycakebeingbroughtin.
Watchbirthdaychildblowoutcandles.
Sing"HappyBirthday."
Eatcake.
Watchbirthdaychildopenpresents.
Playsomemore.
Getcranky.
Gohome.

Page162

NAME:Cantorset
CLASS:Reference,Counterexample
RATING:Veryimportant
STATEMENT:
SETTING:TheRealnumbers
CAPTION:TheCantorsetisanexampleofaperfect,nowheredenseset
thathasmeasurezero.Itshowsthatuncountabalesetscan
havemeasurezero.
DEMONSTRATION:
AUTHOR:Standard
MAINIDEA:Delete"middlethirds"
CONSTRUCTION:
0.Startwiththeunitinterval[0,1]
1.From[0,1],deletethemiddlethird(1/3,2/3)
2.Fromthetworemainingpieces,[0,1/3]&[2/3,1],deletetheirmiddle
thirds,(1/9,2/9)&(7/9,8/9)
3.Fromthefourremainingpieces,deletethemiddlethirds
N.AtNthstep,deletefromeachofthe2N1piecesitsmiddlethird.
Thesumofthelengthofthepiecesremovedis1whatremainsisthe
Cantorset

REMARKS:Cantorsetisgoodformakingthingshappenalmost
everywhere
LIFTINGS:ConstructionofgeneralCantorsets
WITHINSPACEPOINTERS:
BACK:Unitinterval
FORWARD:Cantorfunction,generalCantorsets,2dimensionalCantor
set
INTERSPACEPOINTERS:
CONCEPTS:Countable,measurezero,closed,perfect,geometricseries
RESULTS:Perfectsetsareuncountablecountablesetshavemeasure0
BIBLIOGRAPHICREFERENCES:[Namesoftextscontainingfurtherinformation]
(a)
Figure4.7
Framesformathematicalconcepts.(a)Aframethatemphasizesthestructureofmathematicalknowledge.
Theframeisfromanetworkofexampleframesandhaslinkstootherexampleframes.Italsohaslinksto
twoothernetworksforconceptframesandresultsframes.(FromRissland1978.)(b)AM'sframeforthe
concept"prime,"orientedtowardthegenerationofconjecturesandnewconcepts.Theframeispartofa
singlenetworkandistiedtootherconceptsbygeneralizationandspecializationlinks.(FromDavisand
Lenat1982.)

Page163

NAME:Primenumbers
DEFINITIONS:
ORIGIN:Numberofdivisorsof(x)=2
FORMALLOGIC:Forallz,ifzdividesx,theneitherz=1orz=x
ITERATIVE:Forx>1:Forifrom2tothesquarerootofx,idoesnot
dividex
EXAMPLES:2,3,5,7,11,13,17
BOUNDARY:2,3
BOUNDARYFAILURES:0,1
FAILURES:12
GENERALIZATIONS:Numbersnumberswithanevennumberofdi
visorsnumberswithaprimenumberofdivisors
SPECIALIZATIONS:Oddprimespairsofprimenumberswhosediffer
enceis2
CONJECTURES:Extremesofnumberofdivisorsofallintegerscanbe
uniquelyfactoredintoasetofprimedivisors
INTUITIONS:Ametaphortotheeffectthatprimesarethebuildingblocks
ofallnumbers
ANALOGIES:Maximallydivisiblenumbersareconverseextremesofnum
berofdivisorsoffactoranonsimplegroupintosimple
groups
INTEREST:Conjecturestyingprimestotimestodivisorsoftorelated
operations
WORTH:800
(b)
Figure4.7(cont.)

Scriptshavebeenusedinnaturallanguagetaskssuchastheunderstandingofshortstories(SchankandAbelson1977Lehnertetal.1983).Understandinginthis
contextmeansthataprogramcananswerquestionsaboutwhatithasread.Forinstance,considerthefollowingstory:
WhitmanwenttoOlivia'sfourthbirthdayparty.Aftersheblewoutthecandlesandeveryonesang,hegaveheranewtruck.
Nowonecouldask,"WhydidWhitmangiveOliviaatruck?"Wewouldanswer,ofcourse,"Forabirthdaypresent."Wewouldalsohavenotroublenamingatleast
onesongsungatOlivia'spartyoransweringquestionsaboutthecandles.Wewouldhavenotroubleansweringsuchquestionsbecausewecanunderstandthislittle
storyinlightofascriptthatisveryfamiliartous.Weknowthesequenceofeventsforsuchbirthdaypartiesandhavenotroublefillinginmissingdetailsorproviding
reasonsnotexplicitlymentioned.
Tounderstandthestoryandanswersuchquestionsrequiresnotonlyspecificknowledgeaboutchildren'sbirthdaypartiesbutalsocommonsenseknowledgeabout

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theworld,suchasthatthetruckinquestionisatoyandnotaToyotaforafouryearold'sparty.(Note:theanswermightbedifferentforadults.)Theneedfor
enormousamountsofsuchknowledgeisrelatedtotheproblemofcommonsenseknowledgeandreasoning:thatis,reasoningaboutthingsfromeverydaylife,which
we,"ofcourse,"allknow.Oneaspectofthisproblemisthatcommonsenseknowledgeisvasttherefore,torepresentallwemighteverneedisatremendouslydifficult
andpervasiveproblem,eveniftheindividualbitsofknowledgearenotverycomplicatedordeep.Anotheraspectoftheproblemconcernsthecommonsensephysics
ofeverydaylife(metallicobjects,likepennies,makearattlingsoundwhenshakenincertainkindsofcontainers,likepiggybankswhenaglassisknockedover,the
contentswillspillandsoon).ThisisalongstandingprobleminAI(Minsky1963)andhasbeenattackedfromtheentirespectrumofapproachestoAIrangingfrom
McCarthy'suseoflogicalformalisms(McCarthy1980)toMinsky'suseofframes(Minsky1975).ThereareseveralongoingeffortsinAItograpplewithsuch
problems.Forinstance,LenatandcoworkersareseekingtobuildanencyclopedicrepositoryofeverydaycommonsenseknowledgeintheCYCproject(Guhaand
Lenat1990).
Scriptscanpointtootherscriptsandcontainsubscripts,justasframescan.Ourbirthdaypartyscriptprobablyshouldincludeorpointtoasubscriptforbuyingthe
birthdaypresentthisinturnmightpointtoascriptaboutacquiringthemoneyneededtobuyit.Also,aspointedoutinconnectionwithsemanticnets,thisprocessof
breakingdowntheconstituentsintherepresentationhere,thesubactsinthescriptscancontinueuntilwereachafinegrainedlevelandspelloutthedetailsofsuch
actionsasthe"physicaltransfer"ofobjects.IntheirattackonthisproblemSchankandhiscoworkersdevelopedasmallsetofadozenorsorepresentational
primitivesthatwereadequateforunderstandingeverydayepisodes.Forinstance,theydistinguishedbetweentheprimitivePTRANS,representingthephysicaltransfer
ofanobjectbetweenindividuals,andtheprimitiveATRANS,representinganabstracttransferofpossessionorownership.So,forexample,ATRANSwouldbe
usedinrepresentingthesecondelementofthebirthdaypartyscript(givethepresenttobirthdaychild).Asimplehandingoverofanobjectasin"Handthepresentto
thebirthdaychild"wouldusePTRANS.
RuleBasedRepresentationsInchapters2and3weintroducedtheconceptofproductionrules.Theseifthen,orsituationaction,pairsencodetheknowledge
thatifacertainsituationobtains,thenacertainactionshouldbetaken.InAIthistypeofrepresentationhasbeenparticularlyusefulindomainsthatrequiremaking
deductionsbystringingtogetherifthenstatements.Suchrulebasedrepresentationshavebeenusedinmanyexpertsystemswhereexpertknowledgeisoftenofa
rulelikenature,oratleastcanbegainfullyrepresentedthatway.Theproductionruleapproachisparticularlyusefulintasksrequiringcategorization(Clancey1984),as
inthemedicaldiagnosisprogramMYCIN.
Otherwellknownsuccessesusingthistypeofknowledgerepresentationschemeincludeprogramstodeducethechemicalstructureofmoleculesfromtheirmass
spectrogramsandchemicalformulas(DENDRAL)(Lindsayetal.1980),toconfigurecomputerhardware(R1/XCON)(McDermott1982),tointerpretoilwell
drillingdata(DIPMETERADVISOR)(Davisetal.1981),andtoanalyzepulmonaryfunctiontests(PUFF)(HarmonandKing1985).Theiruseinrealworld
applicationshasbecomelegion.

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Aproductionsystemhasthreeparts:
1.Arulebase(thecollectionofifthenrules)
2.Acontext
3.Aninterpreter
Therulesrepresenttheknowledge.Thecontextrepresentsthecurrentstateofthesystem'sconclusions,thatis,thefactsknownsofar.Theinterpreterknowshowto
applytherulestothecontext.Thesystemworksbylookingatthecontext,seeingwhichrulesapply,selectingoneruletoapply,drawingthatrule'sconclusion,writing
itintothecontext,andrepeatingthecycle.Thiscanbesummarizedbysayingthataproductionsystemhasabasicthreepartcycle:
1.Matching
2.Conflictresolution
3.Action
Aswementionedearlier,productionsystemscanworkeitherforwardorbackward.Inaforwardchainingsystem,matchingisdonebetweendataandpreconditions
ofrulesinbackwardchaining,matchingisdonebetweengoals/subgoalsandconsequentsofrules.Thus,inthematchingphaseofaforwardchainingsystem,the
interpretermustbeabletotellwhetherthelefthandsideofaruletheantecedentorifpartissatisfiedbythefactsinthecontext.Intheconflictresolutionphase,if
thecontextsatisfiesmorethanonerule,theinterpreterselectsoneofthemtoapply.Intheactionphasetheinterpreteraddstheselectedrule'sconclusionits
consequentorthenparttothecontext.
Toseehowaforwardchainingproductionrulesystemmightwork,considerthetaskofidentifyingananimal.(Notethatthisparticularproblemcouldbesolved
simplywithadecisiontreeanddoesnotreallyrequirethepowerofaproductionsystemnevertheless,itisillustrative.)Weneedsomerules,aninterpreter,andsome
factsabouttheclassofanimalswewishtoidentify.Supposethattheknowledgebaseconsistsofthefollowingrules:
1.Iftheanimalchewsitscud,thenitisaruminant.
2.Iftheanimalisaruminantandhashumps,thenitisacamel.
3.Ifacamelhasonehump,thenitisadromedary.
4.Ifacamelhastwohumps,thenitisabactrian.
5.Ifananimalhasoneortwohumps,thenithashumps.
Andsupposethattheinterpreterworksasfollows:
1.Findallruleswhoselefthandsideobtainsandlabelthem"applicable."
2.Ifmorethanoneruleisapplicable,thendeactivate(removethe"applicable"
tagfrom)anyrulewhoseactionwouldaddaduplicatefacttothecontext.
3.Executethelowestnumberedapplicablerule.Ifnone,quit.
4.Resetapplicabilityofallrules.Returntostep1.
Conflictresolutionishandledinstep3.Step2isneededtokeepthesystemfromspinningitswheelsbydrawingthesameconclusionoverandoveragain.
Nowsupposewearetoldthattheanimalwewishtoidentifykicks,chewsitscud,andhastwohumps.Thesefactsareplacedinthecontext,whichweindicatein
squarebrackets:
[kicks,chewscud,humps=2]

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Nowwebeginouridentification.Incycle1,step1,theapplicablerulesare1and5.Neitherrulewouldaddaduplicatefacttothecontext,soneitheriseliminated
throughdeactivationinstep2.Sincewetakethelowestnumberedruleinstep3,ruleIisusedanditsconclusioniswrittenintothecontext:
[kicks,chewscud,humps=2,ruminant]
Incycle2theapplicablerulesare1and5.Sincerule1wouldleadtoaredundantadditiontothecontext,rule5isusedanditsconclusioniswrittenintothecontext:
[kicks,chewscud,humps=2,ruminant,humps]
Incycle3theapplicablerulesare1,2,and5.Bytheredundancyrule,rule2isselectedanditsconclusioniswrittenintothecontext:
[kicks,chewscud,humps=2,ruminant,humps,camel]
Incycle4theapplicablerulesare1,2,4,and5.Rule4isselectedanditsconclusioniswrittenintothecontext:
[kicks,chewscud,humps=2,ruminant,humps,camel,bactrian]
Incycle5nonewrulesaremadeapplicable.Thatis,thesystemhasinvokedeveryruleitcouldandmadeeveryconclusionitcould.Thus,thesystem'sfinal
conclusionsarethefactsnowinitscontext,inparticular,thattheunknownbeastisabactriancamel.Inthisexamplewehaveusedrulesinaforwardchaining
mannerthatis,westartedwithdataandreasoned"forward"towardconclusions.ThisisincontrasttothebackwardchainingapproachusedinMYCIN.Forward
chainingapproachesareoftencalleddatadrivenandbackwardchainingapproaches,goaldriven.Thelatterworkbestwhentheprogramhasaplausiblesetof
possibleconclusionstheformer,whentheprogramhasmuchdatabutnohunchesabouttheconclusions.Wecouldworkthecamelexampleinabackwardchaining
mannerusingthesamerulesbutmakingappropriatemodificationstotheworkingsoftheinterpreter.Forexample,wecouldattempttodeterminewhetherthe
unidentifiedanimalisaruminantbydeterminingwhetheritisacudchewer.Ofcourse,itispossibletocombinebothstylesofreasoninginamoresophisticatedsystem.
Itisinterestingthattheresearchonhumanproblemsolving,reviewedinchapter3,suggeststhattheproductionsofhumanexpertsarehighlydatadriven,leadingtoa
forwardchainingstyleofreasoning.Thismaybebecauserelevantproductionscanbeselectedbyahighlyefficientparallelactivationprocess.Inhumans,backward
chainingismoretypicalofthegeneralproblemsolvingstrategyusedbynovicesandbyexpertswhenconfrontedwithaproblemthatrequiresparticularlynoveluseof
expertknowledge.
Tousetheproductionruleapproach,theresearchermustresolveseveralproblems.Obviously,therulesmustbeexpressed,whichtypicallymeansthatsomeonemust
firstextractthecontentoftherulesfromanexpertandsettleonavocabularyforexpressingtherules.Nextcomestheproblemofspecifyinghowtheinterpreteristo
work.Thislargelyinvolvesdecidinghowtoresolveconflicts.Someobviousstrategiesare
1.Usethelowestnumberedrule(aswehavejustdone).
2.Usetherulewiththehighestcurrentpriority.
3.Usethemostspecificrule.
4.Usetherulethatreferstothefactmostrecentlyaddedtothecontext.
5.Useanarbitraryrule.

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Eachoftheseapproachescarrieswithitcertainassumptions,someofwhichmightbesignificantintermsoftheparticularsystembeingdeveloped.Forinstance,
approach1assumesthatrulesarenumberedaccordingtousefulness,importance,orsomeothermeasureofgoodnessapproach2requiressomewayofdefining,
setting,andresettingpriorities.
Perhapsmoreinterestingarethegrainsizeandrightprimitivesproblems.Forrulebasedrepresentations,theseproblemsinvolvenotonlyselectingavocabularythatis
meaningfulbutalsospecifyinghowtotellifanobjectpossessesaqualityorisaninstanceofaconcept.Rulesareultimatelybuiltupbyconjoiningcomponentscalled
predicates,orrelations,thatanswer"Yes"or"No"aboutagivenquality.(Wewilldiscusspredicatesfurtherwhenweconsiderlogicbasedrepresentations.)For
instance,inanactualencodingoftherulesforthecamelproblem,rule1wouldinvolveapredicateforCHEWSCUDintheantecedentandaRUMINANTinthe
consequent.TouseapredicatelikeRUMINANT,thesystemultimatelyneedsawayofanswering"Yes"or''No''tothequestion"Isthisanimalaruminant?"Of
course,theeasiestwayisfortheusertotellthesystemtheanswerdirectly.Anotherwayisforthesystemtoinfertheanswerbybackwardchainingorbyapplying
sometestprocedureforinstance,rule1tellsthesystemthatiftheanimalchewsitscud,thenitisaruminant.Ofcourse,theproblemwiththebackwardchaining
approachiswhattodowhentherulesrunout.Thisoccurswhenthesystemdesignerdoesn'tknowhowtobreakconceptsdownanyfurther.Forinstance,thereisno
ruleinourexampletoenablethesystemtodetermineiftheCHEWSCUDpredicateapplies.Iftheusercannotanswerthisquestion,thesystemisstuck.Another
probleminsomedomainsisthatcertainpropertiesorconceptsdonothavecrisp,blackandwhiteboundaries.Someareamatterofdegree(baldness),andsome
simplydonotadmittightdefinitions(chair).Suchconceptsariseineverydaysituationsinvolvingwhatphilosopherscall"naturalkind"categories(e.g.,chairs).Most
legalconceptsareofthistype,evensuchfamiliaronesas"income"or"contract."Inthelaw,asineverydaylife,difficultiesinreasoningwithsuchconceptsarehandled
byuseofpastcasesthataddressedtheconceptandthenreasoninganalogically.Theseproblemsaroseearlierinourdiscussionofhumanconceptsandreasoningin
sections3.1and3.3.
Severalresearchersareexperimentingwithhybridapproachesusingrulesandcasesinavarietyofdomainsandinavarietyofcomputationalarchitectures.Insuch
approaches,forinstance,casescanbeusedtoaidrulebasedreasoning.Forinstance,whenrulebasedreasoningreachesanimpasse,pastdeterminations(cases)
aboutopentexturedconceptscanbeusedtohelpresolvetheirinterpretationinanewsituation.
TworecentAIandlawsystemsthatreasoninstatutorylegaldomainsthatis,legaldomainsbasedonstatutes,whicharetherulespassedbylegislativebodies
combinereasoningwithrulesandreasoningwithcasesininterestingways.Forinstance,onesystemcalledGREBE(GeneratorofExemplarBasedExplanations)
(Branting1991)usespastexemplarsandnonexemplarstohelpdeterminewhetherthefactsinanewsituationshouldbeclassifiedasapositiveornegativeinstanceof
legalconceptsnecessaryforapplyinglegalrules(fromanareaofworkers'compensationlaw).GREBEreasonsanalogicallywiththesepastexemplarsbymapping
overtheirexplanationstothenewcase.GREBE'snotionsofanalogyandtheuseofexemplarsdrawheavilyonworkmodelinganalogyasamappingbetween
representationstructures,suchassemanticnets(Falkenhainer,Forbus,andGentner1989),aswellasontraditionalAItoolsofknowledgerepresentationandsearch.

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AnothermixedparadigmsystemcalledCABARET(RisslandandSkalak1991)bringstogetherelementsofthethreesystemsAM,MYCIN,andHYPO
introducedearlier,inanopportunisticprocessingstyletogenerateanalyses(forasubsection,thesocalledhomeofficededuction,offederalincometaxlaw).
CABARETcombinesclassicrulebasedreasoning(usingforwardandbackwardchaining)withthetypeofcasebasedreasoningusedinHYPOinacomputational
architecturebasedonanagenda,thetypeofcontrolschemeusedinAM.InCABARET,thereasoningismoreopportunisticthaninGREBEinthatdifficultiesor
observationsmadefromeithertypeofreasoningcanserendipitouslysetuptaskstoperformwiththeothertypeofreasoning.Forinstance,inadditiontotheuseof
casestoaidinreasoningwithopentexturedconceptsneededinrulebasedreasoning,CABARETcantakeobservationsresultingfromcasebasedreasoning,suchas
theexistenceofapreponderanceofcasessupportingonepointofview,tosetuptasksforrulebasedreasoning,liketheverificationoftheviewsuggestedbythe
cases.
AmixedparadigmsystemfromanonlegalapplicationisANAPRON(GoldingandRosenbloom1991),whichusescasesandrulesonthetaskofpropernoun
pronunciation.ANAPRONusescasestorepresentexceptionstogeneralrulesabouthowtopronouncenamesiftheexceptionalcasesarecompellingenough,
ANAPRONwillusethepronunciationsuggestedbythecaseratherthantheoneindicatedbytherule.InexperimentswithANAPRON,itwasshownthattheuseof
bothcasesandrulesgreatlyimprovedtheperformancebasedoncasesorrulesaloneandthattheincreaseinperformancewasmonotoniconbothaspectsthatis,
addingmorerulesormorecasesledtoimprovedperformance.Inaddition,whenANAPRONuseditscompleteruleset(approximately650rules)andcasebase
(5,000cases),itsperformancewasasgoodasthatofhumanexperts.
ItisinterestingtonotethatinadditiontoruleandcasehybridsusingsymbolicAItechniquestherearealsosymbolicsubsymbolichybridsaddressingsomeofthe
sameproblems(suchastheindexingofcases)asthesymbolichybridswehavejustmentioned.Onesuchsystemcombiningsymbolicandconnectionisttechniquesis
theSCALIRsystem(RoseandBelew1991).Itusesaconnectionistnetworkbasedonthebackpropagationalgorithmwediscussedinchapter2toretrieve
relevantcasesandtextneededforotherreasoningtasks.SCALIRalsooperatesinastatutorylegaldomain(copyrightlaw).
AnotherrecenthybridthatdrawsonbothsymbolicandstatisticalapproachesisStanfillandWaltz's(1986)MBRTALKsystem.Calleda"memorybasedreasoning"
systembyitsdevelopers,itusesalargenumberofcases(approximately4,500)andahighlyparallelapproachtoindexingthem.Itisimplementedonthe"Connection
Machine,"whichembodiesahighlydistributed,parallelarchitectureinvolvingthousandsofprocessors.
Itislikelythatinthefuturetherewillbemanymorehybridsystems:hybridsofsymbolicapproachesaswellassymbolicandconnectionistones.Insuchmixed
paradigmsystems,controllingthereasoningwillpresentinterestingproblems.Onepromisingapproachfororganizingsuchsystemsistheblackboardarchitecture,
whichwediscussinchapter5.TheCABARETsystemisactuallyanearlyexampleofthisapproachsinceanagendacanbeconsideredaspecialcaseofablackboard
architecture.
LogicBasedRepresentationsManyAIapplicationsmakeuseoftheformalreasoningtoolsofmathematicallogic.Themostwidelyusedrepresentationisfirstorder
predicate

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calculus(FOPC),whichspecifiesformalrulesforreasoningaboutpropositionsthatconcernsetsofobjects.Forexample,FOPCcanformallyexpressthekindsof
inferencesdiscussedinsection3.3,suchas

Aswenotedinsection3.3,inordertomakethisinference,adeductionsystemmusthaveboththeinferencerulemodusponensandarule(calledforallelimination
oruniversalspecialization)toconnectthegeneralpropositionaboutallrabbitswiththepropositionaboutaparticularrabbit.
FOPCwasdevelopedinthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturiesbyGottlobFregeandjointlybyBertrandRussellandAlfredNorthWhitehead.Theywere
particularlyinterestedindevelopingalogicalfoundationformathematicstheyalsorecognizedandbegantodevelopthenotionthatformallogiccouldrepresent
nonmathematicalinformationandreasoningprocesses.
TheuseofformallogicinAIprovidesaninterestingcontrastwithhumanreasoning.Inchapter3wesawthatpeopletendtoreasonwithconceptsandheuristicrules
thatefficientlyyieldusefulconclusionsmostofthetimebutmayyieldlogicallyincorrectresultsorfailtoyieldacorrectresultthatisactuallylogicallyimpliedbythedata
athand.Inaddition,peopletendtothinkofconceptsintermsofprototypicalinstancesor"familyresemblance"ratherthanintermsofstrictlogicaldefinitionsusing
necessaryandsufficientconditions.Thisstraightforwardlogicalapproachisoftencalledthe"classical"approachinitspureformitismostlydiscreditedasacognitive
model(SmithandMedin1981).
Ontheotherhand,formallogicalsystemssuchasFOPCwereexplicitlydevelopedwiththegoalsoflogicalsoundnessandcompletenessinmind.Therefore,some
researchersbelievethatifformallogicalsystemscouldbeefficientlyimplementedoncomputers,theymightoutstriphumanintelligencebybeingerrorfreeandby
comingupwithcorrectresultsthathumansmightfailtoobtain.
Logiciansworkwithassertionslike"Fidoisadog"or"AisablockandAisonmytable"or"Mytablehasfourlegs.''InFOPCsuchstatementscouldbewrittenas
follows:
DOG(Fido)
BLOCK(A)ANDON(A,MyTable)
EQUALS(4NUMBEROFLEGS(MyTable))
DOG,BLOCK,ON,andEQUALSareexamplesofpredicates.Aswesawinchapter2,whenapredicateisappliedtoitsarguments,ityieldsatruthvalue.A
predicateisafunctionthatcantakeonvaluestrueorfalse.
TheseexamplesconcernindividualobjectsFido,A,andMyTable.Torepresentstatementsaboutclassesofindividualsinouruniverseofdiscourseeitheraboutall
ofthemoraboutsomeofthemwemustintroduceintoournotationwhatarecalleduniversalandexistentialquantifiers.Forinstance,torepresentastatement
aboutalldogs("Alldogsbark"),wemustuseavariable,x,andtheuniversalquantifier(Forall...),whichallowsthevariabletorangeoverthesetofalldogs.We
couldwritethisasfollows,
Forallx Dogs,BARK(x)

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whereeisshortfor"belongsto"or"in"and"Dogs"denotesthesetofalldogs.Alternatively,wecouldusetheimplicationarrow(
allindividualsinourrealmofdiscourse(notjustdogs):

)andletthevariablexrangeover

Forallx,DOG(x) BARK(x)
Torepresentthestatement"Somedogsbark,"weusetheexistentialquantifier(Thereexists...)andphrasethestatementas"Thereexistsomedogsthatbark":
ThereexistsxEDogs,BARK(x)
or
Thereexistsx,DOG(x)ANDBARK(x)
Toencodetheassertionthat"Everybodylovessomebodysometime,"wewouldusebothquantifiersandathreeplacepredicate(apredicatefunctionofthree
variables)LOVES(x,y,t)torepresentthattheconditionofloveholdsbetweenthefirstvariableandthesecondvariableatthetimeofthethirdvariable:
(ForallxePersons)(ThereexistsyePersons)(ThereexiststETime)
LOVES(x,y,t)
InadditiontopredicatesFOPCcanalsomakeuseoffunctions.Functionscantakeonvaluesotherthantrueorfalse.ExamplesoffunctionsareCOLOR,NAME,
FATHER,NUMBEROF.Thisallowsustorepresentstatementslike"Thereareblocksoftwodifferentcolors"or"Georgeishisowngrandpa":
(ThereexistsxEBlocks)(ThereexistsyEBlocks)
(NOT(EQUALS(COLOR(x),COLOR(y))))
EQUALS(George,FATHER(FATHER(George)))
Notethatwhethersuchstatementsareactuallytrueornotisatotallydifferentconcern.
FOPCiscalled"firstorder"becauseitonlyallowsquantificationoverindividualsinthedomainofdiscourseanddoesnotallowquantificationoversuchthingsas
predicatesorsetsofindividualsasintheassertion"Allpredicatesaretwovalued."Ahigherordercalculuswouldbenecessarytoencodethelaststatement.
However,formostpurposesinAI,FOPChasalltheexpressivepowerneeded.
Ifthenstatementsareaparticularlyusefulkindofassertioninvolvingtheuseofimplication(symbolized ).Wehavealreadyseenexamplesofsuchstatementsinthe
discussionofrulebasedrepresentation.Toexpressthemintheformalismofpredicatecalculus,wewouldpayparticularattentiontothequantificationandthe
predicatesinvolved:
1.(Forallx)[CHEWSCUD(x)

RUMINANT(x)]

2.(Forallx)[(RUMINANT(x)ANDHUMPS(x)) CAMEL(x)]
3.(Forallx)[(CAMEL(x)ANDEQUALS(NUMHUMPS(x),1)) DROMEDARY(x)]
4.(Forallx)[(CAMEL(x)ANDEQUALS(NUMHUMPS(x),2))BACTRIAN(x)]
5.(Forallx)[(EQUALS(NUMHUMPS(x),2)OREQUALS(NUMHUMPS(x),1))

HUMPS(x)]

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WehavenowintroducedthevocabularyofFOPC.Itincludesnames,whichdenoteaspecificelementofthedomainofdiscourse(e.g.,Fido)variables,which
rangeoverelements(e.g.,x)predicates,whichtakeonthevaluestrueandfalse(e.g.,BARK)functions(e.g.,COLOR)theexistential(Thereexists)and
universal(Forall)quantifiers,whichapplyonlytovariablesandconnectives(e.g.,AND,OR,NOT,IMPLIES).Infact,onecanconfineoneselftoANDand
NOTorORandNOTastheconnectivestouseinFOPCsinceA Bislogicallyequivalentto[(NOTA)ORB].
Formalsyntacticrulesmustalsobespecifiedforcreatingcomplexexpressions,suchastheexamplesjustdiscussed.ExpressionsinFOPCareoftencalledwell
formedformulas(WFFs).WewillnotgivetherulesforformingWFFshere,butWFFsarebuiltupbyputtingtogetherindividualWFFsintomorecomplexWFFs
withtheuseoftheconnectives.
Perhapsthemostimportantaspectofformallogicisthattherearewellunderstoodrulesforderivingnewtruthsfromotherknowntruths.Modusponensisanexample
ofarulespecifyinghowtomakevalidinferences.Suchrulesallowthedeductionofnewassertionsfromaknowledgebaseofexistingassertionsmoreover,ifthe
assertionsintheknowledgebasearetrue,thensoarethederivedstatements.Thisisthebasisoftheoremproving,whetherbymachineorbyperson.Thus,oneofthe
mostpowerfulusesoflogicinAIistouseWFFstorepresentassertionsaboutadomainandatheoremprovertodeducenewfacts,whichwillbecertaintobetrue.
Theinferencerulemodusponensisoneexampleofaruleforderivingvalidassertionsfromotherassertions.Anotherisuniversalspecialization(US),whichstates
thatifanassertionistrueaboutallindividuals,itistrueaboutaparticularindividual:
RuleUS:GivenanindividualIandtheassertion(Forallx)P(x),inferP(I).
Bothruleswereintroducedinformallyinsection3.3.TheyapplyinthecaseofthemortalityofSocrates:
Premises:

1.(Forallx)[HUMAN(x)

MORTAL(x)]

2.HUMAN(Socrates)

ApplyUSto1:

3.HUMAN(Socrates) MORTAL(Socrates)

Applymodus

ponensto3and2:

4.MORTAL(Socrates)

Asthisexampleillustrates,logicaldeductioninvolvesconsiderabledetaildeductionsmustbemadeexplicitlyandprecisely.
Formalreasoningisapotentiallypowerfultool,andaformalproofprocedure,calledtheresolutionmethod(Robinson1965),hasbeendevelopedthatrunsefficiently
ondigitalcomputers.ResolutioninvolvesrewritingifthenstatementsintermsofequivalentstatementsusingAND,OR,andNOTandthencombiningthemina
specialway.Resolutionismostsuccessfulwhenthesetofstatementsandfactsisnottoolarge.
Twoexamplesofapplicationsoflogicandtheoremprovershavebeenquestionansweringsystemsandplanningsystems.Forinstance,ifweknowthatapigisakind
ofeventoedanimalthatisnotaruminant,
EVENTOED(pig)ANDNOTRUMINANT(pig)

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wecouldanswerquestionslike"Isittruethateveryeventoedanimalisaruminant?"bytryingtoprove
(Forallx)[EVENTOED(x)

RUMINANT(x)]

andreturning"pig"asanexplicitcounterexample.
AclassicplanningapplicationisSTRIPS(FikesandNilsson1971),whichtreatstheproblemofmovingarobotfromaninitialstatetoagoalstatebyprovinga
theoremabouttheexistenceofthegoalstate.Forinstance,iftherobotisatpointA,boxesarelocatedatpointsB,C,andD,andtheproblemistogathertheboxes
"at"someothercommonpoint,thisgoalwouldberepresentedasatheoremtoprove:
(Thereexistsx)[AT(Box1,x)ANDAT(Box2,x)ANDAT(Box3,x)]
Someofthestrengthsandweaknessesofformallogichavebeenknownsincethe1930s,whenthefirstmetamathematicaltheoremswereproved.Thesetheorems
concernedthegeneralpropertiesofformallogicalrepresentations.FOPC,forexample,canbeshowntobesoundandincertaindomainscomplete.Thesoundness
theoremdemonstratesthatanyassertionderivedbytherulesofinferencefromothertrueassertionswillalsobetrue.Thecompletenesstheoremestablishesthatthere
isaprocedurethatsystematicallyconstructsproofsforandlistsallvalidformulas.Thus,thetheoremdemonstratesthatthereactuallyisaproofforanytruestatement.
Althoughthesetheoremsapplyonlytostraightforwardsettheoreticdomains,theyareimpressiveintheirscope,andnothinglikethemexistsforformalsystemsthat
usenetworks,frames,orproductionstodoreasoning.Ontheotherhand,theundecidabilityandincompletenesstheoremsestablishprofoundlimitationsofformal
logicalsystems.Church'sundecidabilitytheoremstatesthattherecanbenoprocedurefordecidinginafinitenumberofstepswhetheraformulahasaproof.Thus,if
theprocedureofthecompletenesstheoremhasnotlistedaparticularformulaaftersomenumberofsteps,itmaybebecausetheformulaisfalseoritmaybebecause
theformulawillshowuplaterinthelist.Thepracticaleffectofundecidabilityisthatnoproofprocedurecanavoidwastingtimetryingtoprovefalsehoodsorgivingup
toosoontryingtoprovestatementsthatareactuallytrue.Gdel'sincompletenesstheoremstatesthatwhenFOPCisenrichedenoughtocontainelementaryarithmetic,
thecompletenesstheoremfails,andtherearetruestatementsaboutthedomainofdiscoursethatarenotprovablewithanyfixed,formalproofprocedure.
TheimplicationsoftheundecidabilityandincompletenessresultsforAIhavebeendiscussedformanyyears(foranintroduction,seeHofstadter1979).Most
researchersnowagreethattheresultsdonotprecludethepossibilityofartificiallyintelligentmachines.However,itcanbearguedthathumansandcomputersare
limitedbytheresultsinthesameways.Anyinformationprocessingsystem,biologicalorelectronic,thatisrestrictedtoafixedformaldeductionsystemwillbelimited
byundecidabilityandincompleteness.Totheextentthathumanbeingshavemeanstoovercometheselimitations,itisconceivablethatthesamemeanscouldbe
implementedonmachines.Suchmeansmightincludeheuristicreasoningandenrichmentoftheknowledgebasethroughinteractionwithanenvironment.
Theloftyplaneofmetamathematicshasnotbeentheonlysourceofdebateabouttheuseoflogicalrepresentations.IthasproventobedifficulttoextendFOPCfrom
mathematicaldomains,wherefactsareuniversalandeternal,torealworlddomains,wherefactschangewithtimeandsituationalcontext.Resolutiontheoremprovers

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havealsosufferedfromperformanceproblems.Theytendtogetboggeddownintheplethoraofintermediatedetailsthataregeneratedinlogicalproofs.Ithasproven
difficulttodevelopheuristicsthatidentifyplausiblelinesofprooforfocusontheassertionsthatarecrucialtoprovingatheorem.Suchdifficultieshaveledtowhat
somehavecalledthe"neatscruffy"debate:theviewthatknowledgeisneatandcleanandcanbecircumscribedandmanipulatedlogicallyversustheviewthat
knowledgeandreasoningareintrinsicallymessyandheuristicandthuslogicalmethodsareboundtofail.SomeresearcherscontinuetoworkonextendingFOPCto
handlenonmathematicalknowledge(wewillseeoneapproachinchapter10foranotherapproach,seeMcCarthy1980).Theirgoalistopreservethestrengthsthat
comefromwelldefinedconceptsandreasoningtechniquesthatcanbeshowntobelogicallysound.Otherresearchersadoptotherrepresentationsandprocessesthat
havelesswellknownpropertiesbutthateasesomeoftheproblemswithlogicalrepresentations.
Considerthelegaldomain.Atfirstglancethelawlooksneatandrulelike.Forexample,wemightthink,"Ifthere'sacontractandonepartyhasbreachedit,thenthe
othercanrecoverdamages."Butthenthequestionbecomes,"What'sacontract?"Wecouldtrytosolvethisquestioninturnwitharule:"Ifthere'sconsiderationanda
mutualbargain,thenthere'sacontract."Now,ofcourse,wemustdecidewhatconstitutesconsideration.Inthelawtherereallyisnoendtosuchbackwardchaining.
Soinfactwehavebumpedintoaparticularlyvexingformofthegrainsizeandrightprimitivesproblem:inthelegalcontextthereisnoultimatelysatisfyinggrainsizeor
setofprimitives.Furthermore,thedifficultywithlegalconceptsisthattheyareopentextured,asopposedtomathematicalconcepts,whichareclosetextured.In
calculusafunctioniseithercontinuousornot,accordingtosomeprecisedefinitioninlawtherearenowatertightdefinitions.Nomatterwhatrepresentationscheme
weuseinthelegaldomainsemanticnets,frames,productionsystems,orlogicwewillofnecessityhavetograpplewithsuchproblems.
Oneapproachistoassumethattoafirstapproximationsuchadomainisneat(forinstance,haswelldefinedconceptsorreasoningprocesses).Anotheristomodify
anexistingrepresentationschemeorreasoningmechanismtodealwiththescruffyproblems.AIworkerstakebothapproaches.Forexample,inthelegaldomain
researchersaretryingtousetraditionalrepresentationschemesaswellassupplementingthemwithnewmodesofreasoning.Gardner(1987)usesatraditionalformof
networksupplementedbytheheuristicuseofexamples.RisslandandAshley'sHYPO(Ashley1990)usestraditionalframessupplementedwithcasebasedreasoning.
RisslandandSkalak(1991)integratecasebasedreasoningwithtraditionalrulebasedtechniques.ForageneraldiscussionofrecentprogressintheareaofAIand
legalreasoning,seeRissland1990.
SuggestedReadings
ArtificialIntelligence(Winston1992),IntroductiontoArtificialIntelligence(CharniakandMcDermott1985),LogicalFoundationsofArtificialIntelligence
(GeneserethandNilsson1987),andArtificialIntelligenceandtheDesignofExpertSystems(LugerandStubblefield1989)aretextbooksinAI.Thesecondof
thesebooksincludesabriefintroductiontotheLISPprogramminglanguage.ThefourvolumesofTheHandbookofArtificialIntelligence(BarrandFeigenbaum
1981,1982CohenandFeigenbaum1982Barr,Cohen,andFeigenbaum1989)surveythefieldofAIatanintermediatelevel.Various

Page174

collectionssuchasReadingsinKnowledgeRepresentation(BrachmanandLevesque1985)andReadingsinArtificialIntelligence(WebberandNilsson1981)
reprintmanyclassicresearchpapers.OneoftheoldestcollectionsnowatrueclassicisComputersandThought(FeigenbaumandFeldman1963)anotherisThe
PsychologyofComputerVision(Winston1975).VeryinterestingandthoughtprovokingbooksbysomeofthefoundersofAIincludeTheSocietyofMind
(Minsky1986)andUnifiedTheoriesofCognition(Newell1990).
References
Ashley,K.D.(1990).Modelinglegalargument:Reasoningwithcasesandhypotheticals.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Ashley,K.D.,andE.L.Rissland(1988).Acasebasedapproachtomodellinglegalexpertise.IEEEExpert.3(3),7077.
Barr,A.,P.C.Cohen,andE.A.Feigenbaum,eds.(1989).Thehandbookofartificialintelligence.Vol.4.Reading,Mass.:AddisonWesley.
Barr,A.,andE.A.Feigenbaum,eds.(1981).Thehandbookofartificialintelligence.Vol1.LosAltos,Calif.:MorganKaufmann.
Barr,A.,andE.A.Feigenbaum,eds.(1982).Thehandbookofartificialintelligence.Vol.2.LosAltos,Calif.:MorganKaufmann.
Brachman,R.J.(1983).WhatISAisandisn't:Ananalysisoftaxonomiclinksinsemanticnetworks.IEEEComputer16(10),3036.
Brachman,R.J.(1985).Iliedaboutthetrees.AIMagazine4(3),8093.
Brachman,R.J.,andH.J.Levesque,eds.(1985).Readingsinknowledgerepresentation.LosAltos,Calif.:MorganKaufmann.
Branting,L.K.(1991).Buildingexplanationsfromrulesandstructuredcases.InternationalJournalofManMachineStudies34(6),797838.
Buchanan,B.G.,andE.H.Shortliffe(1984).Rulebasedexpertsystems:TheMYCINexperimentsoftheStanfordHeuristicProgrammingProject.Reading,
Mass.:AddisonWesley.
Charniak,E.,andD.McDermott(1985).Introductiontoartificialintelligence.ReadingMass.:AddisonWesley.
Clancey,W.J.(1984).Classificationproblemsolving.InProceedingsoftheAmericanAssociationforArtificialIntelligence.Austin,Tex.
Cohen,P.R.,andE.A.Feigenbaum,eds.(1982).Thehandbookofartificialintelligence.Vol.3.LosAltos,Calif.:MorganKaufmann.
Davis,R.,H.Austin,I.Carlbom,B.Frawley,P.Pruchnik,R.Sneiderman,andA.Gilreath(1981).Thedipmeteradvisor:Interpretationofgeologicalsignals.In
SeventhInternationalJointConferenceonArtificialIntelligence.Vancouver,B.C.,Canada.
Davis,R.,andD.B.Lenat(1982).Knowledgebasedsystemsinartificialintelligence.NewYork:McGrawHill.
Falkenhainer,B.,K.D.Forbus,andD.Gentner(1989).TheStructuremappingengine:algorithmandexamples.ArtificialIntelligence41,163.
Feigenbaum,E.A.,andJ.Feldman,eds.(1963).Computersandthought.NewYork:McGrawHill.
Fikes,R.E.,andN.J.Nilsson(1971).STRIPS:Anewapproachtotheapplicationoftheoremprovingtoproblemsolving.ArtificialIntelligence3,251288.
Gardner,A.v.d.L.(1987).Anartificialintelligenceapproachtolegalreasoning.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Genesereth,M.R.,andN.J.Nilsson(1987).Logicalfoundationsofartificialintelligence.LosAltos,Calif.:MorganKaufmann.
Golding,A.R.,andP.S.Rosenbloom(1991).Improvingrulebasedsystemsthroughcasebasedreasoning.InProceedingsoftheNinthNationalConferenceon
ArtificialIntelligence.Anaheim,Calif.
Guha,R.V.,andD.B.Lenat(1990).Cyc:Amidtermreport.AlMagazine11(3),3259.
Harmon,P.,andD.King(1985).Expertsystems.NewYork:Wiley.
Hofstadter,D.R.(1979).Gdel,Escher,Bach:Aneternalgoldenbraid.NewYork:BasicBooks.
Lehnert,W.,M.Dyer,P.Johnson,C.Yang,andS.Harley(1983).BORIS:Anexperimentinindepthunderstandingofnarratives.ArtificialIntelligence20,15
62.
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Lenat,D.B.,andJ.S.Brown(1983).WhyAMandEuriskoappeartowork.InProceedingsoftheAmericanAssociationforArtificialIntelligence.
Washington,D.C.
Lindsay,R.,B.G.Buchanan,E.A.Feigenbaum,andJ.Lederberg(1980).DENDRAL.NewYork:McGrawHill.
Luger,G.F.,andW.A.Stubblefield(1989).Artificialintelligenceandthedesignofexpertsystems.RedwoodCity,Calif:Benjamin/Cummings.
McCarthy,J.(1980).Circumscription:Aformofnonmonotonicreasoning.ArtificialIntelligence13,2739.
McDermott,J.(1982).RI:Arulebasedconfigurerofcomputersystems.ArtificialIntelligence19,3988.
Minsky,M.L.(1963).Stepstowardartificialintelligence.InFeigenbaumandFeldman1963.
Minsky,M.L.,ed.(1968).Semanticinformationprocessing.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Minsky,M.L.(1975).Aframeworkforrepresentingknowledge.InWinston1975.
Minsky,M.L.(1986).Thesocietyofmind.NewYork:SimonandSchuster.
Newell,A.(1990).Unifiedtheoriesofcognition.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.
Polya,G.(1957).Howtosolveit.NewYork:DoubledayAnchorBooks.
Quillian,M.R.(1968).Semanticmemory.InMinsky1968.
Rissland,E.L.(1978).Understandingunderstandingmathematics.CognitiveScience2,361383.
Rissland,E.L.(1989).DimensionbasedanalysisofSupremeCourthypotheticals.InProceedingsoftheSecondInternationalConferenceonAIandLaw.
Vancouver,B.C.,Canada.
Rissland,E.L.(1990).Artificialintelligenceandlaw:Steppingstonestoamodeloflegalreasoning.YaleLawJournal99(8),19571982.
Rissland,E.L.,andK.D.Ashley(1986).Hypotheticalsasaheuristicdevice.InProceedingsoftheAmericanAssociationforArtificialIntelligence.Philadelphia,
Penn.
Rissland,E.L.,andD.B.Skalak(1991).CABARET:Statutoryinterpretationinahybridarchitecture.InternationalJournalofManMachineStudies34,839
887.
Rissland,E.L.,E.M.Valcarce,andK.D.Ashley(1984).Explainingandarguingwithexamples.InProceedingsoftheAmericanAssociationforArtificial
Intelligence.Austin,Tex.
Ritchie,G.D.,andF.K.Hanna(1984).AM:AcasestudyinAImethodology.ArtificialIntelligence23,249268.
Robinson,I.A.(1965).Amachineorientedlogicbasedontheresolutionprinciple.JournaloftheACM12,2341.
Rose,D.E.,andR.K.Belew(1991).Aconnectionistandsymbolichybridforimprovinglegalresearch.InternationalJournalofManMachineStudies35,135.
Schank,R.C.,andR.P.Abelson(1977).Scripts,plans,goalsandunderstanding:Aninquiryintohumanknowledgestructures.Hillsdale,N.J.:Erlbaum.
Shortliffe,E.H.(1976).Computerbasedmedicalconsultations:MYCIN.NewYork:AmericanElsevier.
Smith,E.E.,andD.L.Medin(1981).Categoriesandconcepts.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.
Stanfill,C.,andD.Waltz(1986).Towardmemorybasedreasoning.CommunicationsoftheACM29,12131228.
Webber,B.L.,andN.J.Nilsson,eds.(1981).Readingsinartificialintelligence.LosAltos,Calif.:MorganKaufmann.
Winston,P.H.(1975).Learningstructuraldescriptionsfromexamples.InWinston1975.
Winston,P.H.,eds.(1975).Thepsychologyofcomputervision.NewYork:McGrawHill.
Winston,P.H.(1992).Artificialintelligence.3rded.Reading,Mass.:AddisonWesley.
Yu,V.L.,L.M.Fagan,S.W.Bennet,W.J.Clancey,A.C.Scott.,J.F.Hannigan,R.L.Blum,B.G.Buchanan,andS.N.Cohen(1984).Anevaluationof
MYCIN'sadvice.InBuchananandShortliffe1984.RevisedversionofAntimicrobialselectionbyacomputer:Ablindedevaluationbyinfectiousdiseaseexperts.
JournaloftheAmericanMedicalAssociation242(12),12791282(1979).

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Chapter5
ArtificialIntelligence:Search,Control,andLearning
5.1SearchandControl
Artificialintelligence(AI)programsandanalysesposewhatcanbecalledtheproblemofwhattodonext.Forproblemsthatcanbeviewedasanexplorationof
alternativesasinlookingaheadthroughgamepositionstoseewhichmovetomaketheprogramsmustselectwhichalternativetoconsidernext(inotherwords,
howtoexplorethespaceofalternatives).Thisistheissueofsearch.Inproblemswherethetaskhasbeenbrokendownintosubtasks,itmustbedecidedhowto
coordinatetheperformanceofthesubtasks:whentodowhichandhowtodecidewhentodowhich.Thisistheissueofcontrolandthecloselyrelatedissuesofhow
toorganizeandstructuretheprogram.Searchandcontrolaretwoaspectsoftheproblemofwhattodonext,andcontrolcaninfactbeviewedassearchwritlarge.
Questionsofsearchandcontrolcannotbeavoided,andhowanAIprogramdesignerchoosestoresolvethemisrelatedtootherchoices,likeknowledge
representation,thathavecertainimplicationsforcontrolstyle.
Inthissectionwebrieflydescribesomeofthefundamentaltypesofsearchtechniquesandcontrolschemes.Althoughsearchisanimportantcomponentofhuman
problemsolving,ourapproachinthissectionisnotlimitedtomodelingordescribingsearchinhumancognition.Humansearchstrategiesareverystronglyconstrained
bythephysicalimplementationofcognitioninthebrain,primarilybylimitationsonworkingmemorycapacityandonthespeedofserialoperations.InAIwecan
approachsearchasageneralissueinthedesignofintelligentsystems,exploringtheformalpropertiesofawiderangeoftechniqueswiththeknowledgethatmanyof
themcanbeimplementedefficientlyenoughoncomputerstobeuseful.
IntroductiontoSearch
Searchtechniquescanbedividedintotwomajortypes:blindsearchandheuristicsearch.Blindsearchtechniquesuseonlythestructureofthespaceofalternativesin
selectingthenextalternativetoconsiderany"legal"possibilityisasworthyofconsiderationasanother.Heuristicsearchtechniques,ontheotherhand,addmeasures
toselectthemost"promising"or"plausible"alternative(orinotherwords,toignoretheleastpromisingones).Thisapproachrequiresdevelopingmeasurestogauge
promiseandplausibility.
Theproblemofgettingfromoneplacetoanotherinastrangecitycanbeviewedasasearchproblem.Inblindsearchthetravelercouldonlymakeuseofthestructure
ofthesearchspacethelayoutofthecityandcouldasknoquestionsaboutwhichrouteisshortestorquickest.Inheuristicsearchthetravelerwouldbebetter
informedandwouldbeabletouseinformationaboutwhichstreetsareslowbecauseoftraffic

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Figure5.1
Anexampleofatree.Thegoalnodesarecircled.

congestion,whichstreetscurveandmeanderandarenottheshortestroutes,andsoon.Whenthereisarealcostinvolvedinasearchforinstance,thetravelerison
footandcarryingaheavysuitcasetheadvantagesofinformed,heuristicsearchover''dumb,"blindsearchareapparent.Heuristicdoeshavedisadvantages,
however.Theinformationusedtoinformthesearchmustbeacquired,atsomecost,anditmustbeaccurate,toavoiderrors.
ToemployAIsearchtechniques,thespaceofalternativesmustbestructuredintoagraphoratree.Semanticnetsareonetypeofgraph.Wewilldealhereonlywith
trees,sincetheyaresimpler.Inatreeasopposedtoagraphagivennodecanbereachedbyonlyonepath.
AtreeinanAIprogramisacollectionofnodesandarcsarrangedinamannerreminiscentofthestructureofatreeinnature:ithasarootnode,emanatingfrom
whicharebranches,whichinturndivideintomorebranches.Thenumberofbranchesspringingfromanodeitsbranchingfactorisameasureofthenumberof
alternatives.Thedepthornumberoflevelsisanotherimportantdescriptorforatree.Inthetreeinfigure5.1nodeAistherootnode.Ithasthreeoffspringor
successornodes:B,C,andD.Thistreeisnotatalldeep:ithasonlythreelevels(countingthelevelbelowtherootnodeas"one,"asisusuallydone).Itisalsonot
bushy,thegreatestnumberofbranchesspringingfromanodebeingthree.
Familiarexamplesoftreesareone'sfamilytree,theclassificationsystemfortheplantandanimalkingdoms,andthehierarchicalchainofcommandinanorganization
wherenooneanswerstomorethanoneboss.Familytreescanbedrawninatleasttwoways:(1)therootnoderepresentsthepersonmakingthetree,twobranches
fromthatnoderepresenttheperson'sparents,twobranchesfromeachofthosenodesrepresenttheperson'sgrandparents,andsoforth(2)therootnoderepresents
someancestor,andthebranchesfromtherootnoderepresentthatperson'soffspring.Thefirstapproachtodrawingfamilytreesleadstoauniformlystructuredbinary
tree:eachnodehasexactlytwobranchesemanatingfromit.
Suchtreescanhavealargenumberofnodes.Forinstance,thenumberofnodesinthefirsttypeoffamilytreedoubleswitheachgeneration.TreesarisinginAI
applications,suchasgameplaying,canbesolargethatonemustusecleverwaystoexplorethem.ThepointwasnicelymadebythemathematicianClaudeShannon,
whoestimatedthenumberofpossibleboardstatesinchesstobe10120,anumbersolargethat

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evenattherateofonebillioncalculationspersecond,thehistoryoftheuniversewouldnotprovideenoughtimetoexamineallthealternatives.
Inthestudyofsearchthetreeofalternativesrepresentsthreetypicalkindsofsituations:
1.States:Eachnoderepresentsa"snapshot"ofastateoftheproblem.
2.Problemsorgoals:Eachnoderepresentsanalternativeoringredientsubproblemorsubgoal.
3.Gamestate:Eachnoderepresentsthestateofthegameafteraplayer'slegalmove.
Inthefirsttypeoftree,thesearchiscalledstatespacesearchinthesecond,problemreductionandinthethird,gameplaying.
WecanusetheclassicproblemknownastheTowerofHanoitoillustratethedifferentapproaches.Asimplifiedversionoftheproblemcanbeposedasfollows:
Giventhreegraduateddiscs(large,medium,andsmall)andthreepegs(A,B,andC),wherethethreediscsarearrangedonpegAsothatthelargestisonthe
bottomandthesmallestisonthetop:MovethediscstopegCsothattheyendupinthesameorder(largestonthebottom,smallestonthetop).Onlyonedisc
maybemovedatatime,andalargerdiscmaynotbeputontopofasmallerone.
Someofthestatesforthethreediscversionoftheproblemareshowninfigure5.2.Notethatthefiguredepictsboththeseriesofstatesleadingtothespecified
solution(towerstackedonpegC)andthoseleadingtoananalogoussituation(towerstackedonpegB).Moreover,itincludesacertainamountofredundancy,since
severalstatesaredepictedmorethanonce(theinitialstate,forexample,appearsagaininlevel2)thisistoavoiddrawingagraph(whichwouldallowmorethanone
waytoarriveatagivenstate)insteadofatree.
TheTowerofHanoiproblemcanalsoberepresentedusingaproblemreductionapproach(seefigure5.3).Inthisapproachtherootnoderepresentstheoriginal
problemofmovingthe3toweronpegAtopegC.Thiscouldbebrokendownintothreesubproblems:(1)movethe2tower(thesmallandmediumdiscs)frompeg
AtopegB(2)movethebigdiscfrompegAtopegCand(3)movethe2towerfrompegBtopegC.Thissolutiontothethreediscversionoftheproblem
suggestsa(recursive)solutiontoversionsoftheproblemsusingNdiscs:(1)movetheN1toweroutofthewaytopegB(2)movethebiggestdiscfrompegAto
pegC(3)movetheN1towerontopegC.Notethatthefirstandthirdsubproblemsarealsoproblemstosolvethesecondstepisa"primitive"actionandrequires
nofurtherreduction.
Perhapsamoretypicalexampleofaproblemeasilyhandledwithaproblemreductionapproachis
Getfromyourdormtoyourparents'home.
Thisproblemcanbereducedtoseveralsubproblems:(1)getfromyourdormtothebusstation(2)getfromthebusstationtotheairport(3)getbyplanefromthat
airporttotheairportinyourhometownand(4)getfromtheairportinyourhometowntoyourparents'home.Someofthesesubproblemsmightrequirefurther
reduction:perhapsyou'llneedacabtogettothebusstation.Somecanbesolvedinmorethanoneway:togetfromyourhometownairporttoyourparents'home,
youcaneithergeta

Page180

Figure5.2
PartofthesearchspaceforthethreediscTowerofHanoi
puzzle.Onlysomeofthestatesinthesearchspaceare
illustratedhere,includingacompletesearchpathtothe
goalstate,inwhichallthreediscsareonpegC.

caborhaveyourparentspickyouup.Theideainworkingwithproblemreductiontreesistobreaktheoriginalproblemdownintosmaller,andpresumablyeasier,
subproblems,andthesesubproblemsintosubsubproblems,untilalevelisreachedthatcanbehandledby''primitive"operationsthatthesystemcanperformwithout
furtherproblemsolving.Inthetravelexampleallofthefoursubproblemsthatareimmediateoffspringoftheoriginalproblemmustbesolvedinordertosolveit,an
exampleofanANDbreakdown,butthefourthsubproblemhastwoalternativesolutions,"getacab"or"haveyourparentspickyouup,"anexampleofanOR
breakdown.ThemainpointabouttheANDORdistinctionintheproblemreductionapproachisthatifasolutionsatisfiesoneORnode,thereisnoneedtoexplore
itssiblingsandifonebranchunderanANDnodefailstobesatisfied,thereislikewisenoneedtoexplorefurther.
Atypicalgametreeproblemoccursinplayingtictactoe.Supposingthatyouropponenthasmarkedthecentersquare,findyourbest,ifpossiblewinning,move
(wherealternatelevelsinthetreerepresentalternateplayers'options).Partofthetreefortictactoeisshowninfigure5.4.
Inthischapterwewilltreatsearchonlyinthecontextwherethenodesrepresentstates.Searchinproblemreductiontreesismuchthesame,withtheadditionof
techniquestohandletheANDORdistinction.Wewillnotexplorethespecializedtechniquesrequiredbygametreesearch.

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Figure5.3
TheproblemreductionapproachtotheTowerofHanoipuzzle.Aproblemwith
anynumberofdiscscanbesolvedbysuccessivelybreakingitupintosubproblems
thatinvolvesmallernumbersofdiscs.Eachnodeinthesearchtreerepresentsa
subproblem.Thesmallestdiscisnumbered1andthelargestdisc,N.Asubtower
thatcontainstheMsmallestdiscsiscalledtheMtower,orMT.Thus,thenotation
2T:A Bmeans"Movethesubtowercontainingthetwosmallestdiscsfrompeg
AtopegB,"andthenotation2:A Bmeans"Movedisc2frompegAtopegB."
(a)Aproblemreductiontreeforthethreediscpuzzle.Thegoalofmovingthe3tower
isbrokendownintosubgoalsthatinvolvemovingthe2towerandmovingdisc
3,whichcanbedonedirectly.Thegoalsofmovingthe2towercanbebrokendown
intosubgoalsthatinvolvemovingdiscIanddisc2(notethatthe1towerisequivalent
todisc1).(b)AprobleminvolvingNdiscscanbedecomposedinthesamemanner.

Theimportantthingtorememberaboutsearchtechniqueslikeknowledgerepresentationsisthateachhasitsadvantagesanddisadvantages.Choosingthemost
appropriateonedependsonthekindoftreestobesearched.Aretheybushy?Aretheydeep?Wherearethegoalnodes?
Inanysearchproblemtheprogrammerusuallywantstouseamethodthatisguaranteedtofindasolution(ifitexists).Ifatallpossible,theprogrammeralsowantsthe
methodtofinda"good"or"optimal"solutionandtodosoefficiently.Atypicalwaytomeasureefficiencyisbycountingthenumberofnodesexaminedinthesearch
thesmallerthenumberthemoreefficientthesearch.Theentiresetofalternatives(nodes)iscalledthesearchspace,andthatpartactuallyexamined(presumably
containingfarfewernodes)iscalledthesearchtree.Searchingcanbeviewedasconstructingorunmaskingthesearchtreeasthesearchproceeds.

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Figure5.4
Asmallpartofthegametreefortictactoe.
PlayerOmovesfirst,andthepossiblemoves
generatethefirstlevelofthetree.Thepossible
responsesofplayerXgeneratethesecondlevel
ofthetree,andsoon.Onlyafewofthepossible
positionsareshown.Notethatiftwopositionscan
besuperimposedbyrotatingthepaperand/orviewing
thegameinamirror,theycanbetreatedasequivalent.
Thus,O'sninepossibleopeningmovescanbereduced
tothreecategoriesthatarestrategicallydistinct.

BlindSearchTechniques
Therearemanystandardblindsearchtechniques.Wewillbrieflydescribefourofthemostwidelyknown:breadthfirst,depthfirst,uniformcost,andhillclimbing
search.Foradetailedtreatment,seeNilsson1971.
Asearchprogramalwaysstartsfromsomeinitialorstartnodeandsearchesforagoalnodeorstate.Thoughthereisonlyonestartnode,theremaybemorethan
onegoalnode.Ingameplayingsearch,forinstance,givenaninitialposition(suchastheopeningboardconfiguration),theremaybeseveralwinning(goal)positions.
Intheexampletreeinfigure5.1therootnodeisthestartnode,andtherearetwogoalnodesGandJ(circled)atthelowestlevel.
BreadthFirstandDepthFirstSearchBreadthfirstsearchexpandsandexaminesnodesinorderoftheirproximitytothestartnode.Itexaminesallnodesata
givenlevelordepthbeforeconsideringthoseatthenext.Inotherwords,itconsiderseverynodenarcsorlevelsdownfromthestartnodebeforeconsideringany
noden+1arcsorlevelsdown,sothat(forexample)levelIiscompletelyconsideredbeforeanyattentionisgiventolevel2.
Touseaneverydayexample,abreadthfirstapproachtoalibraryresearchprojectwouldinvolvefindingasurveyarticlewithagoodreferencelistandproceedingto
considereveryworkonthatlist(beforeconsideringanyofthereferencesthoseworks

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Figure5.5
Breadthfirstsearch,ofthetreeinfigure5.1.Thenamesof
thenodesarereplacedwithnumbersthatdenotetheorder
inwhichthenodesaresearched.Thedashedbranchesof
thetreearenotexploredbecausethesearchterminates
whenagoalnodeisreached.

Figure5.6
Easyanddifficultsearches.Usingabreadthfirstsearchalgorithm,thenode
labeledBFisreachedearlyinthesearch,andthenodelabeledDFisreached
muchlater.Usingadepthfirstsearchalgorithm,theoppositeisthecase:node
DFisreachedearly,andBFmuchlater.Thus,theusefulnessofasearch
algorithmcandependonthelocationofthegoalnodesinthesearchspace.

pointto)thisgivesa"broad"lookatthesubject.Breadthfirstbehaviorallowsthesearchertoproceedcautiously.Forinstance,givensixalternativefinancial
investments,abreadthfirstapproachforcestheinvestortoconsiderallofthembeforeconsideringthealternativesopenedupbyanyone.Figure5.5illustrateshow
thetreegiveninfigure5.1wouldbesearchedusingabreadthfirstsearchtechnique.Noticethatthesearchproceedslevelbylevel.
Breadthfirstsearchiscarefulandconservative.Itisguaranteedtofindtheshortestpathtoasolutionnode.However,ifthegoalnodesareburieddeepinthetree,itis
wasteful.Inthelibraryresearchtask,forinstance,breadthfirstsearchrequiresconsideringallofthefirstlevelreferencesnomatterhowinterestingordullbefore
consideringanyofthesecondlevelreferencesnomatterhowpotentiallyrelevanttheymayseem.Examplesofgoodandnotsogoodsearchpathsforbreadthfirst
searchareshowninfigure5.6.Theoptimalkindoftreeforbreadthfirstsearchisoneinwhichthegoalnodesarelocatedintheuppermostlevelstheworstisonein
whichtheyareburiedverydeep.
Depthfirstsearchexploresallofonebranchbeforeconsideringasiblingbranch.Thatis,itexpandsnodesdescendingfromthosemostrecentlyconsidered,andonly
when

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itreachesanodewithnooffspringdoesitconsideralternatives(siblings).Sometimesdepthfirstsearchiscalledaleftmost(orrightmost)mousescanbecauseit
followstheprinciple"Exploretheleftmost(rightmost)brancheverytimethereisachoicewhenadeadendisreached,backuptothelastchoiceandtakethenext
leftmost(rightmost)branch."
Carryingoutthelibraryresearchtaskinadepthfirstmannerwouldentailpickingaworkfromthereferencelistoftheoriginalarticle,thenpickingonefromthe
referencelistofthatwork,andsoon.Intheinvestmentexample,insteadofconsideringallinitialalternatives,theinvestorwouldconsideroneofthemindepthby
followingthroughonitsimplicationsandtheimplicationsofthoseimplications.Inotherwords,adepthfirstsearcherisgoingdeepalongoneparticularlineofthought
(branchofthetree)beforeconsideringanyother.
Giventhetreeoffigure5.1,depthfirstsearchwouldconsidernodesintheordershowninfigure5.7.Depthfirstsearchproceedsbranchbybranch.Notethatit
considerstherightmostnodeoflevel1onlyuntilafterithasconsideredallthenodesdeepandshallowonthebranchestotheleft.Thus,theworstkindoftreefor
(leftmost)depthfirstsearchwouldhavegoalnodesonabranchfartotheright.Examplesofgoodandnotsogoodsearchpathsfordepthfirstsearchareshownin
figure5.6.
Depthfirstsearchisaggressivebutpotentiallydangerous.Thedangercomesfromdescendingabranch,inwhichthegoalnodesareverydeepornotpresent,and
neverreturning,oratleastnotreturningquickly.Becauseofthispossibility,searchprogramdesignersoftenuseaslightvariationcalleddepthfirstwithboundthat
keepsthesearchfromgoingdeeperthanaspecifiedlevelbeforebackingup.Itisexactlythesameaspuredepthfirstsearchexceptthatanadditionaltestfordepthis
inserted.
Itiseasytospecifyrigorouslythealgorithmsforbreadthfirstanddepthfirstsearch.Todothisrequiresdefiningcertainterms.Anodeissaidtobeopenifitisa
candidateforimmediatefurtherconsiderationbuthasnotbeenexpandedyet.Expandinganodemeansfindingallitssuccessornodes.Anodeisclosedifithasbeen
examined,expanded,andputaside.Anodeisunknownifithasnotbeendealtwithinanyway.Wewillalwaysassumethatwehaveatourdisposaltheavailable
operatorsnecessaryforexpansion.Giventhisterminology,oneprocedureforbreadthfirstsearchisasfollows:

Figure5.7
Depthfirstsearchofthetreeinfigure5.1.Thenames
ofthenodesarereplacedwithnumbersthatdenotethe
orderinwhichthenodesaresearched.Thedashed
branchesofthetreearenotexploredbecausethesearch
terminateswhenagoalnodeisreached.

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1.PutthestartnodeSontheOPENlist.IfSisagoalnode,thesearchendssuccessfully.
2.IftheOPENlistisempty(thatis,therearenomorealternativestoconsider),nosolutionexistsandthesearchendsunsuccessfully.
3.RemovethefirstnodefromtheOPENlistcallitN.PutNontheCLOSEDlist.
4.TestN.IfNisagoalnode,thesearchendssuccessfullyotherwise,continue.
5.ExpandN.IfNhasnosuccessors,gotostep2.
6.PutallsuccessorsofNattheendoftheOPENlistandcyclebacktostep2.
Thisspecificationofbreadthfirstsearchcaneasilybemodifiedtospecifydepthfirstsearch.Allthatisneededistomodifystep6sothatthesuccessorsofNare
placedatthebeginningoftheOPENlistinsteadoftheend.InbreadthfirstsearchOPENiswhatcomputerscientistscallaqueue:thefirstentryinisthefirstentry
out.IndepthfirstsearchOPENisastack:thelastentryinisthefirstentryout.
SearchwithaCostFunctionBreadthfirstanddepthfirstsearchareverysimple(anduseful)searchtechniquesthatdependonlyonthestructureofthetreebeing
searched.Inthesealgorithmsnonumericalmeasuresareusedtochoosebetweennodes.Anysuccessorisconsideredasgoodasanyothersuccessorinthesensethat
anyorderinwhichtheexpansionprocedureproducesthemisacceptable.Inmanyproblems,though,suchasthelibraryresearchandfinancialinvestmenttasks,
intuitionsuggeststhatallsuccessorsarenotequallygood,andsomemethodisneededfororderingorchoosingamongthesuccessors.Uniformcostandhillclimbing
searcharetwoofthemostcommonblindsearchtechniquesthatrelyonmeasuresforchoosingnodes.
Uniformcostsearchisusedwhenthereisacostassociatedwiththearcs.Theideaistofindthecheapestpathtoagoalnodeandalwaystoexplorethealternative
withthecheapestcostpathexaminedsofar.Whenallarcsareratedequallycostly,say,ofcost1,uniformcostsearchisexactlythesameasbreadthfirstsearch.
Figure5.8illustratestheuniformcostsearchofatreethathasacostassociatedwitheacharc.Table5.1displaystheactionsandresultsofeachstepinthesearch.
Thealgorithmissimilartothebreadthfirstanddepthfirstalgorithms,butinsteadofchoosingthefirstnodeontheOPENlistasthenextnode,thealgorithmchooses
thenodewiththelowestcost.Ifmultiplenodesaretiedforthelowestcost,agoalnodeischosenifthereisone,orelsethechoiceismaderandomly.

Figure5.8
Uniformcostsearch.Eacharcinthetreehasacost,which
isshownasanumber.Thegoalnodeiscircled.Thedashed
arrowsillustratetheorderoftheuniformcostsearch.

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Table5.1
Theuniformcostalgorithm.Forthetreeshowninfigure5.8thealgorithmopensandclosesnodesinthe
ordershown.Thechangesintheopenandclosedlistsresultingfromeachnodeexpansionarealso
shown.Thealgorithmproceedsthroughthetreebyselectingthelowestcostnodeontheopenlist.Inthe
finalstepnodeIandnodeEhavethesamecost.However,Iisselectedbecauseitisagoalnode.

Listof

Costsof

Listof

Actions

opennodes

opennodes

closednodes

OpenA

CloseA

OpenB,C,D

CloseB

OpenE,F

CloseF

CloseC

CloseD

OpenG,H,I

SelectIasgoal

Thelastblindsearchtechniqueweconsiderishillclimbingsearch,whichwasusedmostheavilyinsomeearlyAIresearch.Unlikeuniformcostsearch,which
selectsfromalltheunexploredalternativeswhosecosthasbeencalculatedsofar,hillclimbingsearchchooseswhichalternativetoexplorebyselectingthebest
alternativefromonlytheimmediatesuccessorsofthenodelastvisited.
Thesuggestivenameofthismethodcomesfromthefactthatifweimaginethespaceofalternativesasalandscapewithknollsandhillswhoseheightcorrespondsto
somemeasureofgoodness,wearetryingtofindthehighestpeak.Ateachstepoftheclimbweaskwhichnextstepgainsthemostheight.
Hillclimbingsearchrequiresmakingchoicesaboutwhichpoints(nodes)tosamplefromalandscapewithvastlymanypoints.Otherconsiderationsarehowbigan
incrementalsteptotakeandwhether,andhowoften,toadjuststepsize.Suchquestionsareeasytoappreciateifwethinkaboutthephysicaltaskofclimbinga
mountain.
Perhapsmoreimportant,continuingwiththemountainclimbingmetaphor,itiseasytoimaginesituationsthatwouldcausehillclimbingsearchtofail.Forinstance,hill
climbingsearchcoulddirecttheexplorationupasecondarypeakorafoothill,whichitwouldneverleavesuchtrappingbysecondarymaximameansthathillclimbing
searchisnotguaranteedtofindaglobaloptimum.Anotherproblemisposedbymesasandplainsthehillclimbingprocesscangetstuckexploringuninteresting
territoryandpassrightbyamaximum.Researchershavedevelopedvarioustechniques

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tocopewithfalsemaximaandothershortcomingsofhillclimbingsearchforinstance,occasionallytheprogramcantakeastepinarandomdirection.
Thealgorithmforhillclimbingsearchissomewhatsimilartothatofuniformcostsearch.Inparticular,insteadofthe"global"costfunctionusedinuniformcostsearch,
hillclimbingsearchusesa"local"gradientfunctiontomeasurethechangeinaltitudeingoingfromanodetoitssuccessors.
HeuristicSearchTechniques
Anyproblemwithmanyalternativesateachsteppresentsacombinatorialexplosionofpossibilitiestoconsider(recalltheestimateof10120forthenumberofpossible
movesinchess).Sinceitisutterlyimpossibletoexploreallofthesealternatives,thequestionbecomeshowtocontroltheexploration.Theblindsearchmethodsdo
biastheexplorationonewayoranotherbutultimatelyleadtoexploringthewholesearchspaceiftherearenogoalnodes.Attheveryleast,theytriggerexplorationof
morealternativesthanaredesirable.Theideabehindheuristicsearchistouseinformationaboutthedomain,thesearchspace,andespeciallythenatureofthegoal
nodestolimittheexplorationtoonlythemostpromisingalternatives.Thecruxoftheissueisdetermininghowtoassesspromise.
Heuristicinformationcanbeusedtodecidewhichnodetoexpandnext.Thiscanbedone,forinstance,byestimatingthe"distance"ofthecurrentnodefromadesired
goalnode,thatis,byguessingabouttheunexploredinterveningportionofthesearchspace.Doingthis,ofcourse,requireshavingawaytocalculatesuchanestimate.
Thereareseveralalgorithmsforheuristicsearch.PerhapsthebestknownoftheseandtheonlyonewewillconsiderhereistheA*algorithm,whichbuildsdirectly
ontheideaofuniformcostsearch.
Inadditiontothecostfunctionsusedinuniformcostsearch,theA*algorithmrequiressomeevaluationfunctions.Inparticular,itrequiresafunction,calledhforits
heuristicnature,tomeasurethecostthatwouldbeincurredingoingfromanodetoagoalnode.Sincethisfunctionisusuallynotknownwithcompleteaccuracy,an
approximation,calledh*,isused.FortheA*algorithmtofindanoptimalsolutionofminimalcost,h*mustunderestimatethetruehsuchanh*iscalledadmissible.
(Thatis,formally,itisnecessarythath*(x)<h(x)foreachnodex.)
TheA*algorithmchooseswhichnodetoexplorebyselectingtheoneforwhichthedistancefromthestartplustheestimateddistancetothegoalistheleast.(Recall
thatuniformsearchignoresanyestimatesofcosttoreachagoal.)
Writtenoutformally,theA*algorithmlooksverysimilartothebasicoutlineoftheblindsearchtechniques,especiallyuniformcost.Again,mostoftheactioncenterson
hownodesareselectedfromtheOPENlist.And,ofcourse,theextracostfunctionscomplicatematterssomewhat.
TowritedowntheA*algorithm,weneedmorenotation.Keepinmindthatwearesimplymanipulatingcostfunctionsboththeactualcostincurredsofarfromthe
startnodeandaheuristicestimateofthecostthatmightbeincurredinreachingagoalnode.Morespecifically,thefunctionf *calculatescostbyaddingtogetherthe
exactcost,g,ofthepathfromthestartnodeStoanodeNandtheestimateofthecost,h*,ofthepathremainingtobetraveledfromNtoagoalnode.Again,forthis
algorithmtoworkproperly,theheuristicfunctionh*mustunderestimatetheactualcosth.Torecap:

Page188

c(i,j)=costofarcfromnodeitonodej
g(N)=c(S,N),whereSisthestartnodeandNisanyothernode
h*(N)=estimateofactualcosth(N)toreachagoalnodefromN
f *(N)=g(N)+h*(N)
TheprocedurefortheA*algorithmisasfollows:
1.PutthestartnodeSontheOPENlist.Calculatef *(S)=0+h*(S).(Notethatg(S)=0.)
2.IftheOPENlistisempty,nosolutionexistsandthesearchendsunsuccessfully.
3.SelectfromtheOPENlistthenodethatminimizesthefunctionf *.Ifseveralnodesqualify,selectagoalnode,ifthereisoneotherwise,selectonerandomly.
CallitN.PutNontheCLOSEDlist.
4.IfNisagoalnode,thesearchendssuccessfullyotherwise,continue.
5.ExpandN.IfNhasnosuccessors,gotostep2.
6.ForallsuccessorsjofN,calculatef *(j):
f *(j)=[g(N)+c(N,j)]+h*(j).
Putallsuccessors(taggedwiththeirvalueoff *)ontheOPENlist.Gotostep2.
Figure5.9illustratestheA*algorithmbyapplyingittothethreediscTowerofHanoiproblem.Theinsightthatthesolutioninvolvesmovingthe2towertopegBand
movingdisc3topegCiscapturedbythefollowingmethodofcalculatingh*:
h*=4+sumofthepointsfromlistbelow
2ifthe2towerisaloneonpegB(asubgoalhasbeenreached)
2ifdisc3isonpegC(asubgoalhasbeenreached)
1ifdisc2isaloneonpegB(partofasubgoalhasbeenreached)

Figure5.9
TheA*algorithmappliedtothethreediscTowerofHanoi
problem.Thecalculationofh *isexplainedinthetext.The
costofasinglearcisassumedtobe1,makingfforanode
equaltothesumofh *andthenumberofarcsfromthestart
tothenode.Thecirclednumbersdenotetheorderinwhich
nodesareclosedbytheA*algorithm.Thealgorithmis
assumedtohaverandomlychosentoclosethesecondnode,
sincethenodehasthesameestimatedcostastheunclosed
nodetoitsleft.Thealgorithmbeginstobreakdownifthe
fifthnodeisexpandedbecauseofdefectsinh *discussedinthetext.

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1ifdisc3isaloneonpegA(disc3cannowbemoved)
+1ifdisc2isatthebottomofpegC(contrarytothesubgoals)
+1ifdisc3isonpegB(contrarytothesubgoals)
Thesearchinfigure5.9hasreachedthestatewiththe2toweronpegBanddisc3onpegC.Theh*functionbeginstofailatthispointbecauseitdoesnotreflectthe
subgoalofmovingthe2towerfrompegBtopegC.Itisaninterestingexercisetocontinuethesearchinfigure5.9,observingthebreakdownofh*.Trytofixuph*so
thatitworkscorrectly,reachingthegoalefficientlyandneveroverestimatingthenumberofmovestosolution.Couldtheresultingh*begeneralizedtoanyNtower
problem?
ProgramArchitectureandControl
Indealingwiththeissueofcontrol,wearedealingwithquestionsabouthowinformationistoflowamongtheprogram'ssubmodules,howthesesubmodulesinteract,
andhowthesubmodulesthemselvesaretobedesigned.Forinstance,inconsideringhowprocessesaretocommunicate,access,andshareinformation,wemustask,
Iseveryprocesstohaveaccesstoeverybitofinformation?Ordosomeprocesseshavemoreprioritythanothers?Oristhereaprescribedflowofinformationamong
theprocesses?Thesearequestionsofcommunicationandcoordination.Suchissuesareintimatelyboundtotheinternalarchitectureofthesystemanditssubmodules.
Inthissectionwebrieflydiscussfivecontrolschemes.Inadditiontoillustratingourdiscussionwithsystems,suchasAM,MYCIN,andHYPO,whichwehave
alreadyintroduced,webrieflydiscusstwoadditionalprograms,theclassicGPSandHEARSAYIIprograms.
Thethreephasecontrolcyclematching,conflictresolution,andactionusedinrulebased(expert)systemswasintroducedinchapter4.Itcanbeeitherbackwardor
forwardchaining.TheMYCINsystemexemplifiestheoverallcontrolstructureofabackwardchainingorgoaldirectedproductionsystem.Inbackward
chainingthesystemistryingtoestablishgoalsandsubgoalsthatis,theconsequentsorthenpartsofifthenrulesbyworkingbackwardtoestablishtheneeded
intermediateconclusionsandfactsthatis,theruleantecedentsortheifpartsofrelevantrules.Insuchasystem,thequestionofwhattodonextthatis,whichrule
antecedentstotrytoestablishisgovernedbytherulesandconflictresolutionscheme.Thesystemlooksforruleswhoseconsequentsmatchtheantecedentspresent
inthecontext,andtheruleactuallyapplieddependsonthesystem'sconflictresolutionscheme(e.g.,ruleimportance,inverserecencyofrulefiring).Thesearchcarried
outinsuchabackwardchaininggoaldirectedsystemcanoftenbedescribedintermsofabreadthfirstordepthfirstsearchofanANDORgoaltreesince
unwindingtheifsidesofrulesamountstosolvingsubgoals,structuredbythelogicalrelationspresentintherules(seefigure5.10).
ThedepthfirstapproachtobackwardchainingissufficientlyusefulacrossavarietyofAItasksthatithasbeenusedasthebasisoftheprogramminglanguage
PROLOG.BecausePROLOGprogramstatementsareessentiallystatementsinarestrictedclassofwellformedformulas(socalledHornclauses)ofpropositional
logic,itiscalledalogicprogramminglanguage.(Ofcourse,thesamelabelcouldbeappliedtomanyrulebasedsystems.)

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Figure5.10
Asimpleexampleofhowifthenrulescandefinea
goaltree.TosatisfyanANDgoal,boththesubgoals
(linkedbyacurvedtie)mustbesatisfied.Tosatisfy
anORgoal,atleastoneofthesubgoalsmustbesatisfied.

WhencertaintyfactorsareusedtoratethereliabilityofintermediateconclusionsasisthecaseinMYCINthesearchcarriedoutbythesystemiskindofheuristic
bestfirstsearchsincethemostcertainlinesofreasoningarepursuedbefore,andperhapstotheexclusionof,otherlinesofreasoning.Thecontrolschemeof
backwardchainingwithcertaintyfactorsusedinMYCINisthebasisofmanycommerciallyavailableexpertsystemsshells.ThecontrolregimeinMYCINwas
motivatedbyanalysesoftheheuristicgoaldirectedwaymedicalexpertsperformdiagnosis,whichisakindofclassificationtask.Ingeneral,thegoaldirected
approachisusefulinclassificationtaskswherethereareafewpossibleclasses,orhypotheses.
Manyproductionsystemsuseaforwardchainingordatadrivenregime.(Recallfromchapter4ourexampleclassifyingtypesofcamels.)Heretherulescanbe
viewedaslittleprocessesthat''watch''thecontextandaddtheirconclusionstothecontextwhentheyareallowedto"fire."Inforwardchaining,thesystemisineffect
repeatedlyapplyingtheinferencerulemodusponens.Inchapters2and3wesawthatthereisconsiderableevidenceforthiskindofdatadrivencontrolinskilled
humanperformance.
AMexemplifiesasecondtypeofcontrolscheme,whichisbuiltaroundanagenda,anorderedlistoftaskstodo.Everytimeanewtaskisaddedtotheagenda,itis
placedaccordingtotheordering.Typicalorderingsarebasedonpriority,recency,importance,andinterestingness.AMusesanagendaschemebasedon
interestingness,whichengendersa"mostinterestingfirst"kindofsearch.Obviously,thecontrolschemeofproductionsystemscanbeviewedasaspecializedkindof
agenda:therankingoftherulesusedbytheconflictresolutionschemespecifiesanagenda.Inthisway,theinterestingnessratingsinAMserveapurposeanalogousto
thatofcertaintyfactorsinMYCIN:theyfocusattentiononthebestmostinteresting,mostcertaintaskstodo.InAMtheactualgenerationofpossibletasksto
perform,likeproposinganewconcept(seethediscussioninchapter4),isdictatedbyproceduresattachedtovariousframesinAM'sstoreofgeneraland
mathematicalknowledge.
Thisbringsustoourthirdtypeofcontrolstructure,foundinframebasedsystemslikeAMandHYPO:proceduralattachment.Inthisschemeproceduresare
invokedwhentheframe,orslot,towhichtheyareattachedismanipulatedbythesystem.Forinstance,intheCHAIRframeexampleofchapter4,ifthesystemneeds
tohaveavaluefortheNUMBEROFLEGSslot,itcanruntheprocedureCOUNT'EM.Asanotherexample,aframerepresentingtheconceptofarighttriangle
couldhaveanattachedprocedurefortestingwhetherthelegsofthetrianglesatisfythePythagoreantheorem.

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Itcouldbeinvokedviainheritancewhenconsideringtheframeforaspecifictriangle,say,a345triangle,fartherdowntheisahierarchy.Throughprocedural
attachmenttheframeunderconsiderationpromptsnewprocessingrelatedtoit,andbytraversinglinkages,suchasisalinks,betweenframes,thesystemcanfanout
initsactivationofprocedures.
Amorecomplexkindofcontrolisprovidedbythefourthtypeofcontrolscheme:theblackboardsystem(HayesRoth1985).Inspirit,blackboardarchitecturesare
similartothetypesofcontrolwesawwithrulebasedsystems.Ablackboardisacentralrepositoryofinformationthatalltheprocesses,calledknowledgesources
(KSs),canmonitormuchasbrokersmightmonitorarealblackboardinabrokerageoffice.Basedonexpertise,eachKSisassignedtowatchforaparticularkindof
eventorinformation.Forinstance,therecouldbeacommoditiesKS(broker)thatwatchestheblackboardand"shouts"makesitsconclusionsknowntoother
KSswhenitseesatradeinacommodityaboutwhichitisknowledgeable.
Blackboardsystemscanbeconsideredageneralizationofproductionsystems,inwhichKSstaketheplaceofrules.Themajordifferenceisthatinablackboard
schemetheKSscanbequitecomplex,andtheblackboardcanbepartitionedinto"levels"orsubregionstowhichonlysomeKSspayattention.Arulesetcanalsobe
partitionedbyaddingpreconditionstorulestospecifycontext,buttheblackboardschemeseemsamuchcleanerwaytodivideuptheproblemsolvingresponsibilities
amongtheKSs.Inaddition,therecanbeKSswhoseonlytaskistocontroltheschedulingofotherKSs,forinstance,byconsideringthecostofinvokingaKS,the
benefitofusinganyconclusiontheKSmightreach,andthelikelihoodthattheKSmightbesuccessful.Such"scheduling"KSsservearoleanalogoustothatof
interestingnessratingsinAMandcertaintyfactorsinMYCIN:theyhelpfocustheprocessing(saidanotherway:theyhelpprunedownthespaceofpossibleor
pendingtasks).Althoughitishighlyflexible,thecommunicationamongKSscanbequitecomplex.Thereissomecontroversyaboutwhethertheblackboardschemeis
agoodmodelofhumancognition.ThephilosopherDanielDennettexploresthishypothesisinhisbookConsciousnessExplained(Dennett1991).
TheblackboardapproachwasfirstusedintheHEARSAYIIspeechunderstandingprogram(Ermanetal.1980).IntheHEARSAYIIsystemacontinuousstreamof
speechdataisgiventotheprogram,whichhasKSsatmanylevelsofspeechinformation,rangingfromKSsthatknowonlyhowtoprocesslowlevelsegmentsof
speechlikephonemes,tothosethatknowhowtoprocesssyllablesandwords,tothosethatknowhowtoprocesshighlevelstructureslikelinguisticallyvalidphrases.
AnoteworthyfeatureofthisarchitectureisthatdataandsmallchunksofinformationflowuptobehandledbyKSswithmoreglobalconcerns,andresultsfromthe
higherlevelKSsflowdowntoconstraintheprocessingofthelowerlevelKSs.
Forexample,thelowerlevelprocessesmightnothaveenoughinformationtochoosebetweenthehypothesesofidentifyingawordastaxes,taxis,orTexas,onthe
basisofphonemicdatathesechoiceswouldflowup.Meanwhile,atoplevelknowledgesourcemighthavehypothesesthatthephrasebeingprocessedisnonew
____"thisinformationwouldflowdown.Basedonlinguisticconstraints,andothers,thesystemwouldnarrowitshypothesestoNonewtaxesorNonewtaxis
furtherinformationwouldbeneededtoselectbetweenthesetwointerpretations.Speechunderstandingcanbequitecomplicatedforinstance,wordboundariesare
oftenhardtopindown.Considerwhatitwouldtaketohandlethesituationwheretherewere

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morehighlevelchoices,suchasnonude____,aswellasmorechoicesforthethirdwordinthephrase,suchasaccessoraxes.TheHEARSAYIIarchitecture
createsacontrolstyleinvolvingbothtopdown(orgoaldriven)processingandbottomup(ordatadriven)processing.Suchablackboardarchitecturewhere
informationisavailableforseveralorallprocessestoviewandopportunisticallyactonistheantithesisofthestandardprogrammingstyleofusingexplicitprocedure
calls.
Afifthtypeofcontrolschemeismeansendsanalysis(introducedinchapter3),inwhichthesystemusesasimple,uniformcontrolloop:atanystepofitsproblem
solving,thesystemchooseswhattodonextonthebasisoftheperceiveddifferencebetweenitscurrentstateandthegoalstate.Inotherwords,whatmattersinthis
approachisthedifferencebetween"whereyouare"and"whereyouwanttogetto."Whattodoinresponsetothemeasureddifferenceisencodedinadifference
operatortable,whichindexesrelevantprocedures,oroperators,basedondifferences.(Onceagain,relevancedoesnotguaranteesuccess.)Forinstance,solvingthe
problemofhowtogetfromyourdormtoyourparents'homemightrequirethefollowingdifferenceoperatortable:
Ifthedistanceisgreaterthan500miles,takeaplane.
Ifthedistanceisbetween10and500miles,gobycar.
Ifthedistanceisbetween2and10miles,gobybusorbybicycle.
Ifthedistanceislessthan2miles,walk.
ThiscontrolschemewasfirstintroducedinthelandmarkprogramGPS(GeneralProblemSolver)ofNewellandSimon(1972).TheGPSstyleofarchitecturecreates
aprocessingstyleofdecomposingproblemsintosubproblemsandisindeedaverygeneralapproachtoproblemsolving.Meansendsanalysisisaverysimplestyleof
controlwhencomparedtoblackboards.
Meansendsanalysisturnedouttobelesssuccessfulthanhopedbecauseofitslackofdomainspecificknowledge.Itisauniversal"weak"method,havingawide
rangeofapplicabilitybutnotthepowerofcontrolschemesthatcanmakemoreefficientuseofdomainspecificknowledge.Theseconclusionscloselyparallelthe
resultsofpsychologicalresearchonGPS.Aswesaw,humanproblemsolversuseaGPSlikecontrolschemewhentheylackexpertknowledgeofaproblemdomain.
5.2Learning
Learning,bywhichwemeananyprocesswherebyapersonoramachineincreasesitsknowledgeorimprovesitsskill,isatopicthatcombinesalloftheotherthemes
wehavebeendiscussing:representation,search,andcontrol.Awidevarietyofactivitiesinpeopleandprogramsaresubsumedunderthetopicoflearning.These
rangefromsimplerotelearningtolearningfromexamplestolearninghowtolearn.
LearningisoneofthemostdifficultissuesknowntoresearchersinAIandcognitivescience.Thisissofortworeasons.First,learningsubsumessomeofthemost
difficultproblemsfromtheotherareasofAI:representation,search,andcontrol.Onecannotdesignalearningsystemwithoutaddressingissuesintheseareas,evenif
onlyintheminimalsenseofselectingan"offtheshelf"method.
Second,itisfairlyeasytoachievesomeinitialsuccesseswithalearningsystembutexceedinglydifficulttosustainthelearning.Theimmediatelylearnedfirstresultsare
oftenadirectresultofgoodchoicesconcerningrepresentation,search,andcontrol.

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Thisphenomenoncanleadtothecriticismthattheresultswere"builtin"orimplicitlyalreadyknowntothesystem.Thoughnoonewouldseriouslyadvocateaprogram
startingwithabsolutelynoknowledge,whatcountsastoomuchorjustenoughisdebatable.Infact,thisdebateisfundamentallyunresolvableingeneralsinceone
person's(ormachine's)learnedresultcanbeanother'sbasicfact.
Learningisanimportantareaofresearchforseveralreasons.First,asistruewithmuchAIresearch,understandingamachine'sperformanceofagiventask(here,
learning)enhancesunderstandingofbothmachineandhumanperformanceofthetask.Second,providingcomputerswiththeabilitytolearngreatlyenhancestheir
capabilitiesandthustheirusefulness.Third,itisnotfeasibleforhumanstoberesponsibleforalltheimprovementincomputerprogramstheprogramsmusttakesome
responsibilityforthemselves.Thehumanresourcesaresimplynotavailabletohandtooleverysystemthisisespeciallysogiventheproliferationofexpertsystemsin
realworldapplications.
HistoricalOverview
Machinelearninghaslongbeenatopicofinterest.Inthe1940sresearchersfocusedonselforganizingsystems,stimuli,andfeedback.Theirhopewasthatsomehow
outofanunknowingsystempossessingsomegeneralcapabilitieswouldariseknowledgeinthis,however,theyweredisappointed.
Intheearly1960stherewasatransitiontousingcertainAIideasaboutmemory,search,andretrievalforlearning.Selfridge'sPANDEMONIUMprogramwasoneof
theearliesteffortsitcombinedtheoldertechniqueofadaptivecontrolwithnewerideasonlearningtotacklethepatternrecognitionproblemofidentifyingletters
(Selfridge1959).Thisprogramimproveditsperformancebytuningnumericalparameters.Itintroducedthenewideaofanindependentknowledgesource,calleda
demon,that"shouts"whenitseessomethingofinterestaboutwhichitknowssomething(forinstance,AnessorWness).Thedemonisreallyaforerunnerofthe
knowledgesourcesusedinblackboardsystems.
AprogramthatwewillcallCHECKERPLAYER,achievedchampionshiplevelcheckerplayingperformanceandrepresentsanotherearlylandmarkinresearchon
machinelearning(Samuel1959).Itcouldlearnintwoways:(1)byacquiringknowledgethroughrotememorizationaboutspecificboardpositionsandmoves("book
moves"),and(2)byimprovingtheevaluationfunctionusedtoevaluateboardpositionsinitssearchofthegametree.Betterevaluationfunctionsimprovedsystem
performancebecausethesystemcouldmoreaccuratelyevaluateboardpositions(inessenceenablingthesystemtolookdowndeeperintothegametree).
CHECKERPLAYER'sapproachtolearningemphasizedsearch,rotememorization,andadaptivetuningofevaluationfunctions(thequestforgoodevaluation
functionscanbeviewedasasearchthroughthespaceofallsuchfunctions).
Inthe1970sWinstondevelopedtheARCHLEARNER(discussedinsection4.2inconjunctionwithsemanticnets).Thisprogramwasbasednotonheavysearchor
numericaltuningbutonrepresentationanduseofdomainknowledgeitheraldedthestartofanewerainmachinelearning.Thisshiftinemphasistorepresentation
issueswasalsoapparentinthefieldofAIasawhole.ARCHLEARNERwasinstrumentalinprovidingimpetusforworkinmachinelearningtofocusonissuesof
conceptacquisitionandrepresentation,particularlyofasymbolicasopposedtoanumericalnature.

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Sincethelate1970stheemphasisinmachinelearninghasbeenonknowledgeintensivelearningandthestudyoflearningalgorithms.Thisnewerainlearningresearch
beganwiththeworkofLenatontheprogramAMandMitchellontheprogramLEX.Aswehaveseen,AMisaprogramthatperformsconceptdiscoveryin
mathematics.Amongthekeyelementsoflearning,AMemphasizesknowledgeacquisitionmorethanimprovementintaskperformance.Itnevergetsbetterat
discovering(andisnotsupposedto)infact,itsabilitytodiscoverinterestingnewconceptsflattensoutafteritsinitialrushofsuccesses.(Lenattriedtoaddressthis
probleminhisEURISKOprogram,whosetaskwastodiscoverthekindofheuristicsthatmadeAMsuccessful(Lenat1983).)LEXisaprogramthatlearnshowto
improveitsabilitytosolveproblemsinintegralcalculusbyactuallytryingtosolveproblems.Bothprogramscombinepowerfulsearchandcontrolschemeswitharich,
wellrepresentedbaseofdomainknowledge.LEXalsousesaveryexplicitlearningalgorithm,whichwewillexamineshortly.
Sincethemid1980s,therehasbeenanexplosionofinterestinmachinelearning.Thoughwecannottreatthemallindetail,severalrecentmachinelearningapproaches
deservemention.Someofthemconstituteapproachestotheproblemofconceptlearning,whichwasintroducedinsection3.1.
ID3(Quinlan1983,1986)isaninductivealgorithmforlearningdecisiontreesfromexamples.TheinputtoID3isasetofexamples,eachlabeledasapositiveor
negativeexampleofasingleconcept.Morerecentprograms,likeC4.5(Quinlan1992),canlearnthedecisiontreesforseveralconceptclassesatthesametime.In
thesesystemseachexampleisrepresentedasavectorofattributevaluepairs.Thevaluescanbesymbolic,Boolean,ornumeric.Theoutputisadecisiontree,which
representsadecisionprocedurefordetermininghowtoclassifyanexample.
Sincetheexamplesarelabeledwithrespecttoconceptclassandstatusaspositiveornegativeexample,thealgorithmiscalledasupervisedlearningalgorithm(since
thisinformationistantamounttohavingateacher,forinstance,asinthecaseofARCHLEARNER).
Inadecisiontreeeachnodespecifieseitheraclassnameoraspecifictestthatpartitionsthespaceofinstancesatthatnodeintothepossibleoutcomesofthetest.
Eachsubsetofthepartitioncorrespondstoasubclassificationproblem,whichis,inturn,solvedbyasubtree.Forinstance,adecisiontreefordecidingwhetheran
exampleisafiretruckmightcontainaBooleantest,likeIsthecolorred?,whichresultsintwobranches,oneforNOandoneforYES,tosubdecisiontreesfor
carryingouttheclassificationinthesubcasesofredandnonredinstances.Thequestionofwhichattributestotestfirstthatis,whichtoplacenearertherootofthe
decisiontreeisansweredbyconsideringaninformationtheoreticutilitymeasureofthetesttheideaistoaskthemost"useful"ordiscriminatingquestionsfirst,where
utilityofthequestionismeasuredbyhowwellthetestpartitionstheinstancesintoclasses.ID3isaveryuseful,efficient,andwellunderstoodalgorithm.Theoriginal
ID3algorithmcouldhandleonlyoneconceptclassintowhichtoclassifyinstancesanddidnothandlenumericvaluedattributesallthatwellnewerversionsofthe
algorithmdoboth.Inaddition,thedecisiontreescanbegeneratedincrementallyinthenewerID5andID5Rsystems(Utgoff1989).
COBWEB(Fisher1987)isanotherinductivelearningalgorithm.COBWEBincrementallycreatesaconcepthierarchybyperformingclusteringofinputexamples.As
inID3,theinputisanobjectdescribedbyavectorofattributevaluepairs.Each

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attributehasasymbolicnameandcantakesymbolic,Boolean,ornumericvalues.AswithID3,subsequentrefinementshandlenumericattributesbetterthanthe
originalalgorithm.Theoutputisa"classificationtree,"whichisessentiallyaconcepthierarchythatis,eachnodeinthetreedescribesaconceptdescription,which
specifiesforeachattributetheprobabilitythattheattributecantakeaspecificvalue.
UnlikeID3,COBWEBisanunsupervisedlearningalgorithm(sincethereisnoteachertosaywhatconceptsaretobelearnedorwhichexamplesaretobe
consideredpositiveornegativeexamplesofthem).COBWEBthusactuallyperformstwocloselyrelatedtasks:categorizationandclassification.COBWEBdevelops
categoriesandthenameanstoclassifyinstancesintothem.Bycomparison,ID3onlydidclassificationsinceitwasgiventhecategoriestobeginwith.
Forexample,havingdecidedthatitshouldformacategorythatwewouldcallmammal,COBWEBmightthendescribethisclassbytheprobabilitywithwhichthe
attributeslikeBodycover,Livebirth,Numberofchromosomestakevariousvalues.(Bodycoverwouldbeasymbolicattributetakingvalueslikehair,fur,no
hair,andsoonLivebirthwouldbeaBooleanattributetakingasitsvalueeithertrueorfalseandNumberofchromosomeswouldbeanumericattributetakinga
positiveinteger.)
COBWEBusesaheuristicmeasure,calledcategoryutility,todecidetheutilityofformingaconceptclass.Thismeasurewasoriginallydevelopedasameansfor
predictingsocalledbasiclevelcategoriesinhumanclassificationhierarchies(asdiscussedintheworkofRoschandothers,forexample,RoschandMervis1975).
Duringthecourseofcreatingtheconcepthierarchy,COBWEBcancreateandeliminatecategories,forinstance,bysplittingormergingsubclasses.Thedecisionof
whichclassestoincludeinthetree,andwhere,isbasedonthecategoryutilityofeachofthechoices.
OthersystemsthatinductivelybuildsimilarconceptclassificationtreesareUNIMEM(Lebowitz1987)andCYRUS(Kolodner1984).Kolodner'sCYRUSgrewout
oftheworkofSchankandhiscolleaguesondynamicmemory.CYRUScreatesamemoryofspecificinstancesandinductivegeneralizationsofsubsetsofthem(called
EMOPSfor"episodicmemoryorganizationpackets")thatareallarrangedinadecisiontree.ConsideredasacasebasedsystemCYRUS,likeHYPO,wasoneof
theoriginalsitscasesincludegeneralizedpatternsaswellasspecificinstances(HYPO,bycomparison,includesonlyspecificinstances).Indexingisdoneby
workingdownthedecisiontree,whichstructuresthecasememory(unlikeHYPO,whosecasebaseisunstructured).
Insummary,bothID3andCOBWEBareinductivelearningsystemsthatdonotrequireadeepmodelofthedomaininwhichtheyarelearning,although,ofcourse,
havinga"good"setoffeaturestorepresenttheinputthatis,todescribeinstancescanrequireartfulknowledgeengineering.(Therightprimitivesproblem,
discussedinchapter4,andthenewtermproblem,discussedlaterinthischapter,areissueshereaswell.)Bothalgorithmsrequiretheuseofaconceptualoran
informationtheoreticutilitymeasure.One(ID3)issupervised,andtheother(COBWEB)isnot.
Bycontrast,thenextapproachtomachinelearning,explanationbasedgeneralization(EBG),andtheslightlymoregeneraltechniquecalledexplanationbased
learning(EBL)useaneasilyunderstoodapproachgeneralizingaproofandnoutilitymeasures(Mitchell,Keller,KedarCabelli1986).However,EBGrequires
muchstrongerdomainknowledge.
EBGisadeductive,supervisedapproachtolearningthatusesdomainknowledgetoconstrainthesearchforaconceptdescription.AnEBGsystemlearnsby
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particularinstanceintermsofaproofandthengeneralizingthatexplanation(proof)toserveastheconceptdescription.Therehavebeenagreatmanysystemsthat
useanEBGapproach.
TheinputtoanEBGsystemisagoalconcept,adomaintheory,apositiveexampleoftheconcept,andan"operationality"criterion.Theoperationalitycriterion
specifieswhatcountsasanacceptabledescriptionofaconcept(e.g.,thattheconceptbedescribedintermsofperceptuallyobservablecharacteristics).Usingthe
domaintheory,EBGconstructsanoperationallyacceptabledescriptionoftheconceptbyreasoningaboutthepositiveexample.Specifically,usingthedomaintheory,
EBGfirstconstructsanexplanationthatis,aproofofwhytheexampleisapositiveexampleofthegoalconcept.EBGnextexaminesthisprooftodetermineaset
ofsufficientconditionsunderwhichtheexplanationholds(theattributesofthepositiveexampleactuallyusedintheproofprovideasetofsufficientconditionsfor
membershipintheconceptclass).EBGthenattemptstogeneralizethesesufficientconditionstoprovidebothageneraldescriptionoftheconceptandaproof
justifyingthegeneralizationthegeneralizationmustalsosatisfytheoperationalitycriterion.
ThemajorstrengthofEBGisthatitisalwaysclearwhyanobjecthasaparticularclassificationsincethereisaproofandtherearenomysteriousinductiveleapsor
manipulationsofutilitymeasures.Ontheotherhand,EBGplacesonerousdemandsindeedonthedomaintheory.Oneusuallyneedsthedomaintheorytobecorrect,
complete,andconsistent:adomaintheoryissaidtobecorrectifitdoesnot"explain"anynegativeexamplesoftheconcept,completeifit"explains"allpositive
examples,andconsistentifitisbothcorrectandcomplete.(IntermsofVenndiagrams,thesetcomprisingtheconceptmadeupofpositiveinstancesofthe
conceptisexactlythesetexplainedbythedomaintheory.Ifthesetofinstancesexplainedbythedomaintheoryissmallerthantheconcept's,thedomaintheoryis
notcompleteifitislarger,itisnotcorrect.)Onecouldarguethatifone'sdomaintheoryissogoodcompleteandcorrectthenmostoftheworkhasbeenalready
accomplished.Inrecentyearsresearchhasbeendoneonlooseningtheseconstraintsonthedomaintheory.
Ofcourse,theideaofcreatingageneraldescriptionbylookingattheproofofone(verygood,prototypical)exampleiscognitivelyappealingwemakesuch"greedy"
generalizationsallthetime.Inpsychology,formingageneralizationbyexaminingoneinstancegoesbythenameofmetonymy.Itiswellknownthatpeopleform
generalconclusionsbyaggressivegeneralizations(sometimesincorrect)fromaveryfewexamples.Notethata"bad"exampleorinappropriategeneralizationcan
completelycorruptthevalidityofthegeneralization.However,EBG,byrequiringtheuseofproof,tempersthegeneralizations.
EBGcanbecomparedwithhumanproblemsolvingindomainslikemathematicsorphysics.Inmathematicsoneofthebestheuristicmethodsforcreatingaproofofa
generalconjectureistoproveitinaspecialcaseandthenargueeitherthatthisproofcanbegeneralized(nopartmakesuseofanythingspecifictothespecialcase)or
thatanygeneralcasecanbereducedtothespecialcase(ina"withoutlossofgenerality"argument).Forinstance,inanalyticgeometryonemightexaminehowto
provesomestatementaboutcirclesingeneralbytryingtoproveitaboutaspecialcircle,likethecircleofradius1withcenterattheorigin,andthengeneralizethe
prooforshowhowthegeneralcasecanbereducedtothespecialone,forinstance,bytranslationorscaling(bothofwhichcanbeaccomplishedbyachangeof
variables).Eventhoughinhighschoolgeometry,forinstance,oneisalwayscautionedaboutrelyingonaspecial

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casetoproveageneralproposition,theEBGapproachprovethespecialcaseandthengeneralizetheproofisverypowerfulandperfectlycorrectwhenproperly
used.
NotethatwehavealreadyencounteredtheideaofusingthejustificationofasingleprecedentexampletohelpexplainconceptmembershipintheGREBEprogram
discussedinchapter4inconjunctionwithmixedparadigmsystems.InGREBEanexplanationofwhyaspecificprecedentcasewasconsideredapositiveornegative
exampleofalegalconceptisreusedinanewproblemcase.InGREBE,asopposedtoEBG,however,thereisnogeneralizationbutratherananalogicalmappingof
theoldjustificationstructureparticularlythesufficientconditionsontoanewexample.
Anotherlearningsystem,whichisderivedinpartfromthephenomenaofskillacquisitionandproblemsolvingdiscussedinchapters2and3,isSOAR(Newell1990).
SOAR,ageneralproblemsolvingarchitecturewithaproductionrulememory,useschunking,orknowledgecompilation,(discussedinchapter2)toacquirerules
frompastproblemsolvingexperience(Laird,Rosenbloom,andNewell1986).
TheinputtoSOARisaspecificationofaproblemasastatespacesearchproblem:aproblemspace,operators,aninitialstate,andagoalstate.Theoutputisa
sequenceofstatesconnectingtheinitialandgoalstates.ThekeyaspectofSOARasalearningsystemisthatitupdatesitsrulebasedmemorybysavingproblem
solvingchunkssothatitcansolvesimilarproblemsmorequicklyinthefuture.
SOARworksbyrepeatedlyexecutingthefollowingproblemsolvingcycleuntilagoalstate(andthusasolution)isfoundoruntilitisunabletocontinue.SOAR's
problemcycleissimilartothefundamentalmatchresolveconflictsactcycleofrulebasedsystems.First,SOARfiresalleligibleproductionrules,inparallelthisso
calledelaborationphaseaddsinformationtowhatisknownaboutobjectsandcreatespreferencesforacquiringmoreinformationaboutsomeaspectofanobject.
Next,SOARdecideswhatinformationacquisitiontaskfromthefirststepisthemostpreferred.Ifnoonetaskispreferredoverothersorthereisaconflictbetween
tasksornotasksweresuggested,thenSOARhasreachedasocalledimpasseinthissecond,decisionphasesinceinessenceitdoesnotknowwhattodonext.
SOARrespondstoanimpassebycreatingasubgoaltoresolvetheimpasseandrecursivelycallingonitsproblemsolvingmethods.Whenanimpasseisresolved,
SOARattemptstogatherinformationthatwillpreventsimilarimpassesinthefuture.Thisthird,chunkingphaseisaccomplishedby(1)collectingconditionsofachunk,
thatis,thoseportionsofworkingmemorythatexistedwhentheimpasseoccurredandwereusedinresolvingtheimpasse,andthechunk'sactions,thatis,thosesteps
resolvingtheimpasse(2)generalizingthechunkbyconvertingcertainspecificinformation,likenamedworkingmemoryelements,tovariablesand(3)optimizingthe
chunk(whichisapieceofprogramcode).Thus,SOARcachesgeneralizationsofsolutionstopastproblemssothattheycanbeusedinthefuture.
TherearesomeinterestingcomparisonstobemadebetweenEBGandSOAR.Forinstance,SOAR'schunksareanalogoustotheoperationalizedsufficient
conditions(thegeneralization)basedonthespecialexampleinEBG.Bothsupplyaninstancefromwhichsufficientconditionsforaresultmaybeharvested,
generalized,andreusedinthefuture.Ofcourse,thegeneralizationsmadeinEBGarebasedondeductivemechanismsandthoseinSOARarebasedonsubgoaling,an
approachnotusuallythoughtofasdeductive(although,strictlyspeaking,backwardchainingthrougharulesetisadeductiveapproach).

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Fromapsychologicalviewpoint,SOAR'sapproachofresolvinganimpasseinthecourseofproblemsolvingisubiquitous.Also,eventhoughEBGwasnotintended
tobeacognitivemodelandSOARwasinfact,Newell(1990)callsitanexampleofaunifiedtheoryofcognitionEBGdoeshaveacertainamountofcognitive
verisimilitudesinceitcapturesafeatureoflearningfromproblemsolving.
TherearenowanabundanceofprojectsexperimentingwiththeSOARarchitecture.Ithasbeensuccessfullyappliedinavarietyofdomains,rangingfromthe
acquisitionoftypingskilltothesolutionofsyllogisms.OnecriticismofSOARisthatthereisnonotionofhowtoevaluatetheutilityofachunkordeletemarginally
usefulones.Thus,asSOARsolvesmoreproblems,itaccumulatesmorechunksandmaybecomeslowerbecausedecidingwhichchunktoapplycantakemoretime
thansolvingtheimpasse.Thisproblemofdeterminingutilitieshasbeenaddressedinsubsequentresearch.Itcanalsobethoughtofastheproblemofindexingand
relevanceassessmentwellknowntoworkersincasebasedreasoning.NotethatSOARcannotreallycarryoutCBRstylereasoningsinceit"throwsaway"itscases
andonlykeepstheirgeneralizations.Thus,althoughSOARcancaptureacognitivelyinterestingstyleofreasoningitmissesoutonpureexampleorcasebased
reasoning.
Connectionistlearning,introducedinchapter2,hasreceivedconsiderableattentioninAI.Ofparticularnoteisthebackpropagation(BACKPROP)algorithm.As
discussedinchapter2,itisaweighttrainingalgorithmforconnectionistnetworks.Inessence,itisasupervisedinductivelearningalgorithmthatlearnsfromexamples
sinceitsinputisasetoftrainingexamples,representedasvectorsofnumericvaluesplustheexample'sclassification,anditsoutputisadecisionprocessthatis,a
(revised)configurationofthenetwork'sweightstoclassifyinstancesaspositiveornegativeexamplesofconcepts.
Astrongpointofthealgorithmisthatitdoesnotrequiremuchknowledgeengineeringtouseit.Itcanbeconsideredauniversal"weak"methodsinceitdoesnotmake
extensiveuseofdomainknowledge:itcanbeappliedtoanynetwork.Inessence,BACKPROPisanalgorithmfordealingwiththecreditassignmentproblem.
BACKPROPlooksbackoveritscomputationsanddistributescreditandblameinaparticularwaytothosenodesinthenetworkthat"deserve"it.
TheinputandoutputrepresentationsusedinanetworkarecriticaltothesuccessofBACKPROP.Thealgorithmismostlikelytodevelopausefulrepresentationin
thehiddenunitsifthenetworkstartsoutwithreasonablygoodinitialrepresentations.TherepresentationdiscoveredbyBACKPROPalsodependsonthenumberof
hiddenunits.Iftherearetoofew,thenetworkmaynothavethecapacitytocomputethedesiredfunction,anditwillarriveatinadequategeneralizations.Ifthereare
toomany,thenetworkmaystorethetrainingexamplesdirectly,asakindoflookuptable,andbeunabletogeneralizetonewexamples.Aspointedoutinsection3.2,
BACKPROPisalsosensitivetothecontentofthetrainingsetandtothemannerinwhichitispresented.Afinalproblemwiththeconnectionistapproachtolearningis
thatthenatureofthelearnedrepresentationisverydifficultforahumantodecipher.Aswesawinchapter2,forexample,asignificantamountofresearchwas
requiredtodiscoverhowthetrainedhiddenunitsinNETtalkrepresentedthemappingfromtexttophoneticrepresentation.
Todaythefieldofmachinelearningbothsymbolicandconnectionistisextremelyactive.Muchoftheworkinvestigatesdifferentalgorithmsandcontrolstructures
forlearningandreliesonalreadyunderstoodsearchandrepresentationtechniques.

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GeneralIssuesinLearning
Indiscussingalearningsystem,severalclustersofquestionsarerelevant.
1.Whatisthecomputationalarchitectureofthelearningsystem?Whichcomponentactuallydoesthelearning?Whoorwhatcomponentcritiquesthe
performancesothatthelearningcomponentcanimproveit?Whatknowledgedoesthesystempossess?
2.Whatistheroleandsourceofexamples?Howareexamples,or"traininginstances,"usedtodrivethelearningsystem?Whoprovidesthem:anexternalor
aninternalteacher?Whatpropertiesdoorshouldtheyhave?Whatkindsarethere?Howaretheyorganized?Howaretheygenerated?Howistheirorderof
presentationdetermined?
3.Whattypesoflearningisthesystemcapableof?Doesthesystemlearnby"rote"memorizationorbybeingtoldexactlywhattodo?Canitfillinmissing
detailsbyusingdeduction,induction,oranalogy?Canithandleunreliabledata?Canittakeadvice?Doesitlearnincrementallyfromoneexampleorproblem
experienceatatime,ordoesitproceedfromanentiresettakenallatonce?
4.Whatistheinfluenceoftheinitialknowledge?Whatconceptualandrepresentationalprimitivesdoesthesystemstartwith?Atwhatlevelandinwhat
detailistheknowledgerepresented?Howisthedomainknowledgestructured?Isthereadomainhierarchy?Isthereacasebaseofpastexperiences?Isthere
aninherentbiasintheknowledgerepresentationschemeandcanitbeshiftedwhenappropriate?
5.Whatlearningalgorithmsareusedandwhatactuallyislearned?Howdoesthelearningsystemgeneralizeorspecialize,doinduction,reason
analogically,orotherwisemodifyorimproveitself?Doesitlearnnewsolutions,newclassifications,newcategories,newwaystoorganizeandindexits
knowledge?Doesitlearnfromitspastmistakessothatitdoesn'tmakethesameblundertwice?
Eventhishandfulofquestionsraisesanabundanceofinterestinglearningissues.Inaddition,thereistheissuealwayspresentwithAIsystemsofhowtojudgethe
successoftheeffort:howdoweknowifasystemhassuccessfullylearned?Asusual,variousapproachesarepossible.Wewilldiscussthefivepointsinturn,
digressingbrieflybetweenpoints3and4tolookattheLEXsystem.
Issue1:TheArchitectureofLearningSystems
Alearningsystemcanbeviewedashavingseveral"conceptual"components:
1.Theknowledgebase
2.Theperformanceelement,whichperformsinthetaskdomain
3.Thecritic,whichevaluatesandcritiquestheperformanceelement
4.Thelearningelement,whichknowshowtochange,andpresumablyimprove,thesystem,particularlytheperformanceelementandtheknowledgebase
5.Thehypothesisorproblemgenerator,whichposesthenexttaskforthesystemtoworkon
6.Theenvironmentorworldfromwhichthesystemreceivesitsnewinformation,particularlyexamples
Forinstance,inahypotheticalsystemforlearningamathematicalskilllikesolvinghighschoolalgebraproblems,theknowledgebasemightcontainrelevant
mathematical

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knowledgeaboutclassificationsofequations(e.g.,linear,quadratic),generalconcepts(e.g.,solution,root,factor),methods(e.g.,plugginginintegervalues,moving
theunknowntothelefthandside,eliminatingsquareroots,usingthequadraticformula),pastproblemsandsolutions(e.g.,x 2=1hastworoots+1and1),andpast
deadendsormistakes(e.g.,''pluggingin''wholenumbersinx 2=2orx 2=1).Theperformanceelementwouldknowhowtoactuallysolveequationsthisincludes,
ofcourse,knowinghowtoaccessandapplyknowledge(say,aparticularformula)fromtheknowledgebaseoradaptanoldsolutiontosolveanewproblem.The
criticwouldreviewtheperformanceoftheperformanceelementandisolategoodandbadstepsinthesolution,wherestepsleadingtoasuccessfulsolutionmightbe
judgedgoodandstepsleadingtodeadendsbad.Thelearningelementwouldknowhowtochangethesysteminresponsetothisreview,forinstance,byadding
newconceptsorrefiningoldones(suchas"pairsofroots,""doubleroots")orbyannotatingamethodwithrespecttoitsappropriateapplications(includingwhennot
touseamethod).Theproblemgeneratoroften,ahumanteacherwouldthenposeanewproblemorselectanewexamplefromthesystem'senvironment,and
thecyclewouldrepeatitself.TheLEXsystemusesadecompositionsimilartothis.Infact,certainresearchersseeadecompositionintothesesixcomponentsasa
usefulgenericframeworktodescribealllearningsystems(Buchananetal.1978).
Fromthisdescriptionofalearningsystem,wecanseehowinformationflowsbackandforthbetweenthesystem'senvironmentanditsknowledgebase.From
presentedexamples,thesystemlearnsnewknowledgeinthereversedirection,onthebasisofitsknowledge,thesystemselectsorgeneratesnewhypothesesand
problemsfromitsenvironment.Sincetheenvironmentoftenconsistsprimarilyofexamplesorcasesandtheknowledgebaseusuallyconsistsofrulesorresults,sucha
systemfitswhatisknownasatwospacemodeloflearning(SimonandLea1974)withanExamplesspaceandaRulesorResultsspace.Ifathirdspaceisset
asideforconcepts,assuggestedbyRissland(1978)andSridharan(1985),thesystemisknownasathreespacemodel.Witheithermodeltheimportantpointisthat
muchofthelearningactivityoccursintheinteractionsbetweenthevariouskindsofknowledgefoundinthedifferentspaces.
Inthemultispacemodelthelearningcycleconsistsofthesystemmakingmappingsbetweenspaces.Forinstance,theperformanceelement,critic,andlearningelement
causethesystemtouseinformationextractedfromtheexamplestoincreaseitsknowledgeofresults(asthroughgeneralizationorspecializationofarule)theteaching
aspectofthesystem,embodiedinthehypothesisorproblemgenerator,allowsthesystemtogobacktoitsenvironmentformoreexamplesandproblems.Forthe
mostpart,learningresearchhasconcentratedonmappingsfromexamplestoconceptsandresults.However,whenAMproposednewconceptsandconjecturesto
beinvestigatedwithexamples,itwasmappinginformationinthereversedirection.LEXdeliberatelyattemptstobuildthecompletecycleintoitsarchitecture.
Eachcomponentofalearningsystemraisesmanyissues.Withregardtotheknowledgebase,wehavealreadyconsideredmanyrelevantissuesindiscussing
representation:expressivenessoftherepresentation,modifiability,extendibility,easeofinference,andsoforth.Withregardtotheperformanceelement,severalissues
arisethatoverlapwithcontrol:complexityofthetaskanditsimplementationflowandavailabilityofinformationamongthecomponentstransparencyselfawareness
andmodifiabilityofthecomponents.Withregardtotheenvironmentandthelearningelement,severalissuesarisethatareuniquetolearningsystems,suchastherole
andsourceofexamples.

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Issue2:TheRoleofExamples
Ifyouthinkofyourselfasthelearningsystem,thentheimportanceofthequalityandsourceoftheexamplesthatis,problemsorexperiencesisobvious.Thisis
evenmoretruewhenyouareworkingonyourown,forthenyouareyourownteacher.Thus,animportantquestionconcernsthesourceofexamples:dotheycome
fromanexternal"teacher,"oraretheygeneratedbythelearningsystemitself?Ineithercasethinkingupgoodexamplesrequiresexpertise.Thegoodnessofthe
examplesistiedtohowwelltheymatchtheneedsofthelearningsystem.Thus,eitherthesystemoritsteachermustknowsomethingofwhatitistryingtoteachor,at
least,havegeneralgoalsandideasaboutwhatisgoodforlearning.Threeimportantfactorsconcerningtheuseofexamplesbylearningsystemsarethequality,source,
andepistemologyoftheexamples.
TheQualityofExamplesThefundamentalquestionconcerningthequalityofexamplesis,Aretheexampleseasytointerpret?Thisquestiondealsprimarilywiththe
qualityofthesystem'slearningexperiences.Acentralissueiswhetherthereisaclosematch(orasignificantdifference)betweentherepresentationoftheexampleand
therepresentationofthesystem'sknowledge.Typically,thisboilsdowntoaskingwhetherthespacesofexamples,concepts,andresultsemploythesame
representationvocabulary(descriptivepredicates,features,andsoon).Ifso,thelearningsystemhasminimalworktodoininterpretingtheexample.Forinstance,in
ARCHLEARNERtheexampleswereverystraightforward,sincetherewasatotalmatchbetweentherepresentationoftheenvironment(thatis,positiveexamples
andnearmisses)andtherepresentationoftheknowledgebase(forinstance,theemergingconceptof"arch").Usingacommonrepresentationtoeliminatetranslation
problemshasbeendubbedthesinglerepresentationtrick.Itisemployedbecausetranslatingbetweenrepresentationschemescanbedifficult,evenforhuman
beings.
Eveniftheenvironmentandtheknowledgebaseusethesamerepresentationscheme,thedifferenceingeneralitybetweenthemcaninfluencehowstraightforwardthe
examplesare.Therecanbeasmalldifference,suchasthatbetweenvariablesandconstants,whereallthesystemneedsistopluginthevaluesormanipulatethe
variables'rangesofvalues.Ortherecanbeagreatdifference,suchasthatbetweenviewing3x+2asaninstantiationoftheformax+bandviewingitasaninstance
ofamoreabstractidealikea"lineartransformation."Thegreaterthedifference,theharderthejobofinterpretingtheexample.
Anotheraspectoftheperspicuityofexamplesiswhethertheyarecorrectlyclassifiedandfreeofextraneousdetails.Forinstance,arepositiveandnegativeexemplars
correctlyclassifiedassuch?Itisobviouslymucheasierforasystemtolearnifitdoesnothavetoworryaboutthequalityofitsexamples.Considerwhatwould
happentoARCHLEARNERifthenearmisseswereincorrectlyclassified.
TheSourceoftheExamplesThefundamentalquestionconcerningthesourceofexamplesis,Wheredoestheresponsibilityfortheintelligentselectionofexamples
lie?Doesanexternalteacherdecidewhatexamplesthesystemwillconsider?Ordoesthesystemitselfdothis?Sinceitispossibletoisolateheuristicsforpicking
examples,suchas"Usethenextmostgeneralcase"or"Examineextremecases,"guidelinesforintelligentlyselectingexamplescanbeembeddedinthesystem,withthe
resultthatthesystemisselfteachingtosomedegree.ThiswastheapproachusedinAM.
Sincelearningissometimessusceptibletotheorderinwhichexamplesarepresented,partofintelligentlyselectingexamplesisdeterminingtheirorderof

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presentation.Thisisofconcernespeciallyinsituationsinvolvingincrementallearning.Forinstance,thinkofARCHLEARNERlearningwithadifferentorderof
presentation.Ifone"falsestep"canbringthewholelearningefforttoitsknees,thenthelearningisnotveryrobust.
Inadditiontoascertainingwhichpropertiestheexamplesshouldhave,thereistheproblemofactuallyfindingorgeneratingthem.Theteacherorsomecomponentof
thesystemitselfmusthavetheexpertisetodothis.Itistruethatinsomedomains(suchaselementarymathematics)theexamplesareeasytogenerateforinstance,to
generateanotherexampleofaninteger,justadd1.Inotherdomains(suchaslawandmedicine)itisnotsoeasy.Iftheexamplesareeasilygenerated,alearning
systemcangetby(asAMdoes)withveryminimalexamplegenerationcapabilitiesandstillrelyheavilyonexamplesinlearning.Ifthisisnotthecase,thegenerationof
examplesbecomesachallengingsubprobleminitself(Rissland1981).
TheEpistemologyoftheExamplesThefundamentalquestionconcerningtheepistemologyofexamplesis,Whatkindsofexamplesarethereandhowarethey
organized?Forinstance,examplescanbecategorizedwithrespecttotheobservationthatdifferentonesservedifferentpurposesinlearningandareappropriateat
differentstages.Thefollowingtypeshavebeenidentified(Rissland1978):
1.Startupexamples,whichrequireminimalpriorknowledgeandaregoodinitialcasestotry
2.Referenceexamples,whicharestandardtextbookcases,goodatanystage
3.Counterexamples,whichlimitovergeneralizationsorfalsifyincorrectideas
4.Anomalies,whichdonotfitinwithcurrentknowledgebutrequirefurtheranalysis
5.Modelexamples,whicharetemplatelikeparadigmaticexamples
Inaddition,theExamplesspacehasstructure.ItisnomoreanunorganizedheapofknowledgethantheRulesspaceis.Theissueistodeterminewhatrelations
amongtheexamplesshouldbeusedinrepresentingthespace.Forinstance,shouldtheexamplesbeorganizedintoasemanticnet:often(asinmathematicsandlaw)
oneexampleisbuiltfromothers,inwhichcasetheExamplesspacecantakeonanetworkstructureusingarelationthatmaybecalledconstructionalderivation
(Rissland1978).Anotherapproachmightbetoorganizetheexamplestogetherwithsomepartialgeneralizationsintoadecisiontree(asinCYRUS(Kolodner1984)).
UpuntilafewyearsagofewresearchersconcentratedontheExamplesspaceaspectoflearning.However,withtheadventofinterestincasebasedsystems,thereis
nowagrowingsensethatmuchcanbelearnedbyexaminingthistopic.
Issue3:TypesofLearning
Thereareseveralwaysofdescribingthetypeoflearningasystemdoes.Forinstance,typesoflearningcanbeclassifiedaccordingtothefollowingcriteria:
1.Thetypeoflearningalgorithm
2.Theunderlyingknowledgerepresentationscheme
3.Thedomainofapplication
4.Thedegreeofmatchbetweentheexamplesandthesystem'sknowledge
5.Thepresenceorabsenceofateacher
6.Whethertheexamplesarepresentedincrementallyorallatonce

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Wehavealreadyconsideredseveralexamplesofthepossibletypesoflearningalgorithm:theconceptdevelopmentmethodusedinARCHLEARNER,theinductive
approachesusedinID3andCOBWEB,andthedeductiveapproachusedinEBG,ortheconnectionistapproachusedinBACKPROP.Wewillconsideranother,
thecandidateeliminationalgorithm,whenwediscusstheprogramLEX.
Withregardtotheknowledgerepresentationschemeanddomainofapplication,thereisobviouslyawiderangeofpossibilities,althoughbasingclassificationonthese
factorsdoesnotnecessarilyshedthatmuchlightonlearningissuesthemselves.
Howwellthepresentedexamplesmatchthesystem'sknowledgeleadstocategorizingtypesoflearninginthefollowingway:
1.Learningbyrotememorization:Thesystemdoesnothingotherthanmemorizewhatitistoldinexactlytheforminwhichtheinformationispresented(an
exampleisstoringboardpositionsinCHECKERPLAYER).
2.Learningfromexamples:Thesystem(suchasLEXorARCHLEARNER)triestogeneralizeonitsexperiencewiththeexample.
3.Learningbyanalogy:Thesystemisgivenananalogoustaskandaskedto"map"overthesolution(examplesarecasebasedsystemslikeHYPOand
GREBE).
4.Learningbybeinggivendirections:Thesystemistoldtheanswerinahighlevelwaybutmustinstantiateandfillinthedetails(veryfewsystemsreallydothis
mostareplanningsystems).
Thepresenceorabsenceofateacherleadstotwocategories:supervisedlearning,wherethesystemhasateacher,andunsupervisedlearning,wherethesystemis
onitsown.Ofthesystemswehavestudied,ARCHLEARNERishighlysupervised("highly"becausethechoiceandorderingofexamplesandnearmissesis
critical).ID3issupervised.LEX,whenitincludesitsproblemgenerator,isunsupervised.COBWEBisunsupervised.AMismostlyunsupervised("mostly"because
theusercaninfluencethesystemthroughinteractionswithitforinstance,bygivinganAMdiscoveredconceptanameandtherebyindirectlyboostingits
interestingness).
LEX:ACaseStudyinLearning
Inthissectionweexamineanexamplesystem,Mitchell'sLEX,intermsofthesixfoldconceptualbreakdownoflearningsystems.ThedomainofLEX(Learnby
Experimentation)isthecalculus.Itlearnstointegratesymbolicmathematicalexpressions(Mitchell1983Mitchell,Utgoff,andBanerji1983).LEXisrelatedtoa
muchearlierprogramcalledSAINT(SymbolicAutomaticINTegrator)(Slagle1961).SAINTusedheuristicrulestodointegrationproblems.LEX'staskistolearn
suchheuristicsinotherwords,tolearnthekindofknowledgethatwasbuiltintoSAINTtomakeitapowerfulproblemsolver.
LEXacquiresandmodifiesheuristicsbyiterativelycyclingthroughtheprocessesof(1)generatingapracticeproblem,(2)usingthecurrentstateofitsavailable
heuristicsandotherknowledgetotrytosolvethisproblem,(3)analyzingandcriticizingthestepsinattemptingtoobtainasolution,and(4)refiningtheheuristics.
TheArchitectureofLEXTheLEXprogramcontainsfourmodules:ProblemSolver,Critic,Generalizer,andProblemGenerator.LEX'sknowledgebaseconsists
primarilyoftwosortsofdomainspecificknowledge:acollectionofifthenrulesrepresenting

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integrationtechniques,andahierarchyofclassesofmathematicalfunctionsandobjects.Itsenvironmentconsistsofintegrationproblemswithintegrandsthatare
instancesofthemathematicalfunctionsandexpressionsitknowsabout.
Thefunctionsofthefourmodulesareasfollows:
1.ProblemSolver(LEX'sperformanceelement)triestosolvetheproblemathand(implementedasaproblemreductionkindofsearchforasolutionnode,
thatis,onewithnointegrandsymbol)withitsavailablestoreofoperators,includingthecurrentstatusofitsheuristics.
2.Criticanalyzesthetraceofasuccessfulsolutiontogleanpositiveandnegativeinstances.Apositiveinstanceisaproblemstateonapaththatledtoa
successfulsolutionanegativeinstanceisaproblemstateonapaththatledawayfromthesolution.
3.Generalizer(LEX'slearningelement)rewritesitsknowledgeofheuristicsonthebasisofwhattheCritictellsit:itnarrowsthemostgeneralstatementofthe
heuristiconthebasisofnegativeinstancesandgeneralizesfromthemostspecificonthebasisofpositiveinstances.
4.ProblemGeneratorposesnewproblemstosolvethatwillhelptofurtherrefineknowledgeoftheheuristics.
Theflowofcontrolamongthesemodulesisshowninfigure5.11.Thecorpusofrulesrepresentstheoperationsdoneinintegralcalculus.Theseincludeheuristic
"algorithmlike"(touseSlagle'sterm)transformationsaswellas"bookknowledge"proceduressuchascommonantiderivativesandstandardtransformations.For
example:

Figure5.11
ThearchitectureoftheLEXsystem.(RedrawnwithpermissionfromMitchell,
Utgoff,andBanerji1983.)

Page205

Thehierarchyshowninfigure5.12laysoutLEX'ssecondmajorsourceofknowledge:relationshipsbetweenmajorclassesoffunctions.
LEX'sTaskLEXimprovesitsperformanceofintegrationbydiscoveringwhatclassesinitsconcepthierarchyaruleshouldberestrictedtoforbestresults.For
instance,inthecaseofOP2,integrationbyparts(IBP),LEXistolearnhowto"bind"theuandthedv.Asstudentsofcalculussoonlearn,thereissomeartin
choosingtheuandthedv.LEXtriestoacquireandexpressthatexpertise.
Forinstance,supposeLEXistryingtolearnIBPthatis,torefineOP2tonarrowerclassesforuanddv.SupposethefirstproblemLEXtriesisthis:

AtthecompletionofonecycleIBPhasbeenrefinedandisnarrowedtoarangeofpossibilitiesfrommostspecifictomostgeneral:
Mostspecific:ApplyIBPwithu=3xanddv=sin(x)dx
Mostgeneral:OriginalformofOP2
Thatis,the"right"timetouseIBPiscertainlynotjustinthecaseofthemostspecificexamplethesystemhasworkedandprobablynotineverycase(whichiswhat
the

Figure5.12
TheconceptualhierarchyoftheLEXsystem.Thehierarchyisbased
directlyonthesyntaxofsymbolicexpressionsinmathematics.For
example,anexpressioncanbecomposedofanalgebraicoperator
(+,,*,,/,^)followedbytwoexpressions.Thehierarchyalsocaptures
majorclassesoffunctions.Forexample,sin,cos,andtanaregrouped
togetherastrigonometricfunctions,whichareinturnpartoftheclass
oftranscendentalfunctions.(RedrawnwithpermissionfromMitchell,
Utgoff,andBanerji1983.)

Page206

originalformofOP2implies).TheappropriatekindsofproblemsforIBPliesomewhereinbetween.Possibilitiesbetweenthesetwoextremesinclude

Byincrementallynarrowingthisrangeofpossibilities,LEXeventuallylearnstheconditionsthatgoverntheapplicationofIBP.
Thenarrowingoftherangeofpossibilitiesisdonebythelearningelement,theGeneralizer.ItusesanalgorithmcalledtheCandidateEliminationAlgorithm(CEA).
Basically,theideaistogeneralizefrompositiveexamplesandtospecializefromnegativeexamplesandthuseliminatecandidatesfromthespaceofhypothesized
rangesfortheheuristic.Positiveexampleshintthataheuristicmightapplytoawiderrangeofcases,andnegativeexamplessuggestthatthereisaclassofcasesto
whichtheheuristicdoesnotapply.Theclasshierarchyprovidesthewaytogeneralizeandspecializeforinstance,ifatechniqueappliestobothcos(x)andsin(x),
thenLEXsaysitappliestotheircommongeneralization,trig(theclassconsistingofalltypesoftrigonometricfunctions).Itdoesnotleaptothemostgeneral
conclusionthatitistrueforalltypesoffunctionsinstead,itmakesaconservative,leastgeneralization.Similarly,ifatechniquefailsforexpln(theclassincludingboth
exponentialandlogarithmicfunctions),LEXdoesnotassumeitfailsforeverythingsubsumedundertheexplnclassbutremainsoptimisticandsaysitmightworkfor
oneofthenextmostspecificsubclasses,exp(exponentialfunctions)orIn(logarithmicfunctions).
AnexampleofonecycleofLEXstartingwiththeproblem13xcos(x)dxresultsintheflowofinformationsummarizedinfigure5.13.WediscusstheCEAinmore
detailinthenextsection.
CritiqueofLEXLEXdoesquitewellbutstillcanmakemistakes.ThefollowingarethreecriticismsofLEX:
1.Itisnotalwaystruethatbecauseatechniqueappliestobothcosandsin,itistrueforalltrigonometricfunctionsliketan.
2.BecauseLEXdoesnothaveconceptslike"eveninteger"and"oddinteger,"itcannotlearnsomeoftheusualtricksinvolvingintegralsofpowersofsinand
cos(whichinvolveonetrickforoddpowersandanotherforevenpowers).
3.LEXfailstonoticesomethingsthatareobvioustomathematicianslikegroupingin

totakeadvantageofawellknownidentityandarriveat

Criticisms1and2areabouttheshortcomingsofLEX'sinitialvocabularyarightprimitivesproblemcomplaintanditsinherent"bias"(forinstance,givenLEX's
concepthierarchy,ittendstomakecertainkindsofgeneralization,suchasgeneralizingfromsinandcostotrig).Tothisonecouldrespondthateveryinitial
knowledgebaseislikelytobedeficientorbiasedinsomeway,andonemuststartsomewhere.Infact,researchershavebeguntoaddressthequestionofhowtoshift
suchbias(Utgoff1983,1986).Amoregeneralissueisthatlearningcanandshouldhappenonseveralfronts:

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Figure5.13
AnexampleoftheflowthroughLEX'slearningcycle.TheProblemGenerator
deliversapracticeproblemtotheProblemSolver.TheProblemSolversolves
theproblembyapplyingaseriesofoperators.TheCriticselectsanaspectof
thesolutionthatmightbeusedtobuildanewheuristic.TheGeneralizer
constructsaversionspacefortheheuristic,whichisboundedbyamostspecific
version,S,andamostgeneralversion,G.Theversionspaceisnarrowedby
cyclingthroughfurther,relatedpracticeproblems.Inthisexamplesolutionsto
furtherproblemswouldrevealwhetherScouldbegeneralizedtoexpressions
oftheform
.(RedrawnwithpermissionfromMitchell,Utgoff,
andBanerji1983.)

thesystemshouldlearnnotjusttherulelikeaspectsbuttheconceptsaswell.Forthatmatter,itwouldbedesirableforotherelementssuchastheProblemGenerator
tolearnalso(theProblemGeneratorshouldgetbetteratposingproblems).Thisdiscussionleadstothenextlevel:learninghowtolearn.ThesuccessorstoLEX,a
successortoSAINT,canbeconsideredstepsinthatdirection.
Criticism3isofatypethathasbeencalledthesuperhumanhumanfallacy:ifasystemcan'tdoallthebig(andlittle)subtle(andobvious)thingsanexpertcando,it
isn'tverygood.Sinceonecanalwayssaythis,itisn'tveryhelpful.Moreusefulisspecifyingtherangeofexpertperformancethelearningsystemshouldtrytoachieve.
Thisgoesbacktotheissueofhowtoevaluatealearningsystem,atopicwewillnotpursuehere,butcurrentlyacentralconcernofresearchersinmachinelearning,
andAI,ingeneral.
Criticism1alsopointstosomethingthatmightbeconsideredaweaknessoftheCEA.Ineffect,theCEAgeneralizesastatementtoaparentnodewheneveritistrue
fortwooffspringnodes.Amoreconservativeapproachtogeneralizationwouldrequireachangeinthealgorithm.
Inspiteofsuchcriticisms,LEXisanexceedinglyinterestingandpowerfulparadigmaticexampleofalearningsystem.Itisbasedonimportantprinciplesandis
carefullyimplemented.

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Issue4:APrioriKnowledge
Itisobviousthatwhatthesystemknowsinitiallygreatlyaffectswhatitcanrepresentandlearn.Wehavealreadydealtwithanaspectofthisindiscussing
representationalissues,particularlytherightprimitivesproblem.
Ofparticularconcernfromthelearningpointofviewisthequestionofwhatconceptsortypesofimprovementareaccessibletoasystem.Forinstance,LEXcannot
learncertainintegrationtricksbecauseitdoesnothavetheconceptsof"odd"and"even"integer.Tobeabletoacquirethenewtricks,LEXwouldhavetoreviseits
representationknowledgebyacquiringthesenewterms.Thisisanexampleofwhatlearningtheoristscallthenewtermproblem,aneverpresentprobleminlearning
research.Onewaytoattackitistofocusonshiftingthebiasofthesystem.
Utgoffhascontributedtoresearchonthisaspectoflearning.Hedefinesbiasasallthefactors"thatinfluencehypothesisselection"thatis,anyconceptsorcriteria
suchasthefollowingthatcausethesystemtoactthewayitdoes(Utgoff1986):
1.Theconceptdescriptionlanguageinwhichthehypothesesaredescribed
2.Thespaceofhypothesesthattheprogramcanconsider
3.Theproceduresthatdefinetheorderinwhichhypothesesaretobeconsidered
4.Theacceptancecriteriathatdefinewhetherasearchproceduremaystopwithagivenhypothesisorshouldcontinuesearchingforabetterchoice
Giventhatanysystemhassomebias,theinterestingquestionthenbecomes,Howcanwegivethesystemadifferentbias,inparticular,onethatmightimproveits
learningabilities?Thisisreallyanaspectoftheproblemoflearninghowtolearn.Forinstance,ifthebiasistoostrong,thesystemistoohighlyfocusedandhastoo
smallaspaceofhypothesestosearchaspacethatmaynotevencontaintherighthypothesis.Ifthebiasistooweak,thesystemispermittedtoconsideralarge
perhapsfartoolargenumberofhypotheses.Acorrectbiasisonethatallowstheconceptlearnertoselectthetargetconceptanincorrectonedoesnot.
Utgoff'sparticularinterestisinshiftingLEXlikesystemsfromanoverlystrongtoaweakerbias.Hedoesthisinathreestepprocess:(1)recommending(via
heuristics)newconceptdescriptions(forinstance,oddinteger,eveninteger)tobeaddedtotheconceptdescriptionlanguage(2)translatingtheserecommended
conceptdescriptionsintotherepresentationformalismusedbythesystemand(3)meldingintheseconceptssothatthestructureoftheprogram'shypothesisspaceis
maintained(forinstance,oddintegerandevenintegerisainteger).Therecommendationphaseisaccomplishedbycloselyexaminingthetraceoftheperformance
elementforstepswherekeyoperationslikedividingby2wereperformedandseeingifthisoperationwascommonamongsomeofthesolutionslikethose
requiringanevennumberedexponentinstepsinvolvingintegrationofpowersofsinandcos.ThissortoflearningisalsobeingexploredinEBG.
Issue5:AlgorithmsforLearning
Variousalgorithmsareavailableforthelearningelementtouse.Forinstance,inlearningnewrulesbygeneralizing,asystemcouldadoptthefollowingstrategies:
1.Changeconstantstovariables
2.Dropconditions
3.Addoptions

Page209

4.Extendtherangeofquantification
5.Climbanisahierarchy
Forinstance,ARCHLEARNERemploysthefifthtechniquewhenitmodifiestherequirementthatapart"beawedge"totherequirementthatit"beablock"(sincea
wedgeisakindofblock).
Conversely,inlearningnewrulesbyspecializing,asystemcouldadoptthesestrategies:
1.Restricttherangeofvariables
2.Addconditions
3.Dropoptions
4.Restricttherangeofquantification
5.Descendanisahierarchy
TheCEAusedinLEXhaselementsofbothspecializationandgeneralization.Itreliesonthepresenceofahierarchyspecifyingthegeneralization/specialization
possibilitiesinthedomain.
TheCEAiseasilydescribedusingtheideaofversionspaces(Mitchell1982).Versionspacesaresimplyamechanismtorepresenttherangeofpossibilitiesspanned
betweenthemostspecificandmostgeneralcasesknown.Sincetheconcepthierarchyimplicitlyspecifieshowtogeneralizeorspecialize,onlythemostspecific
instancesandthemostgeneralinstancesneedbestored.Alltheintermediatecasesareimplicitlyrepresentedandcanbegeneratedbygeneralizing(orspecializing)to
higher(orlower)classesinthehierarchy.
Themeatofthealgorithmiswhatisdonetothesetofmostspecificinstances,calledS,andthesetofmostgeneralinstances,calledG,inresponsetoapositiveor
negativeinstance,calledE:
IftheexampleEispositive,generalizeSaslittleaspossible:
1.RemovefromGanyrulesnotcoveringE,and
2.UpdateStocontainallmaximallyspecificcommongeneralizationsofEandS.
IftheexampleEisnegative,specializeGaslittleaspossible:
1.RemovefromSallrulesthatcoverE,and
2.UpdateGtocontainallmaximallygeneralcommonspecializationsofEandG.
Thekeyistotaketheleastcommongeneralizationandthegreatestcommonspecialization.(Thisisexactlyanalogoustotakingtheleastmaximumandthegreatest
minimumoftwonumbers:forinstance,16,3,and1,056aremaximumsfor2and3,but3isthesmallestmaximum2,5,and107areallminimumsfor2and3,but
2isthegreatestminimum.)
AnalysisofaLearningEpisodeinLegalHistory
ExamplesofCEAlikerefinementofrulesandconceptsaretobefoundinthelegaldomain.Afamousexampleisthedevelopmentofthedoctrineconcerningthe
liabilityofamanufacturertoathirdpartyinjuredbyadefectiveproduct.Forinstance,ifyoubuyadefectivecar,awheelfallsoff,andyouarehurt,themanufacturer
ofthecarmustcompensateyouforyourinjuryeventhoughyouboughtthecarfromanintermediatevendor(say,acardealership)andnotdirectlyfromthe
manufacturer.

Page210

Originallytherewasnorelationshipofliabilitybetweenmanufacturersandthirdpartiesbecausethelawrequiredprivityofcontract,thatis,animmediateseller
purchaserrelationshipbetweenmanufacturerandinjuredparty.Thissituation,asweknowfromdailyexperienceinaconsumerorientedsociety,haschanged.
Thechangeinthelegalrulewhichmightbestatedas''noprivity,noliability''beginswiththecaseThomasandWifev.Winchester,decidedintheNewYork
CourtofAppealsin1852.InthiscaseMr.Thomashadaprescriptionfordandelionextractforhisailingwifefilledbyhislocaldruggist.Thedruggistfilledthe
prescriptionfromajarlabeledasdandelionthejarcamefromWinchester,adrugmanufacturer.Unfortunately,thejaractuallycontainedbelladonna,asubstancethat
lookssomewhatsimilarbutcausesverydifferenteffects.Mrs.Thomasgotveryill,suffered"derangementofthemind,"andeventuallyrecovered.Mr.andMrs.
ThomassuedWinchester.
TheThomaseswon.Thecourtjustifiedmakinganexceptiontotheprivityofcontractrulebecausemislabeledpoisons,likebelladonna,wereso"imminently
dangerous"thattheydeservedanexception.Belladonnawastobeconsidered"inherently"dangerous,likealoadedguninthehandsofachildunawareofdanger.
Thus,afterthisinitialcaseanexceptiontotheprivityrulewascreatedintimetheexceptionwouldgrowtoswallowuptheruleitself.
TheThomasandWifev.WinchestercasemarkstheendofthefirststageofwhatthelegalscholarEdwardLevi(1949)viewsasathreestageprocess.Inthefirst
stageaconceptiscreated.Intheseconditisinitiallyrefinedtocoverspecificpositivecasesandexcludenegativeonesandisthenexpanded,almosttoofar.Inthe
thirditisredefined.ItisinterestingtocompareLevi'sanalysisoflegalevolutionwiththegrowthofknowledgeinotherdomainslikeastronomy(Kuhn1962)or
mathematics(Lakatos1976).
ForthenextfiftyyearsorsotheNewYorkCourtofAppealshandeddowndecisions(seetable5.2)thatallowedexceptionstotheprivityruleforitemsconsidered
"imminentlydangerous"inandofthemselves,likebelladonnaandloadedguns.Itdidnotextendtheexceptiontoincludeamoregeneralclassofitemsthatbecame
dangerouswhendefective(forinstance,itemslikecarriagesandsteamboilers).Duringthisperiodthecourtwasboth(1)definingthecategoryof"imminently
dangerous"itemsbyincludingorexcludingexamplesonacasebycasebasis(thatis,ifthecourtallowedrecoveryforthirdpersoninjuryfromanitemunderthe
rubricofthe"imminentlydangerous"exception,itwasintheclassifthecourtdidn't,itwasn't)and(2)refusingtoextendtheexception'scoveragetoamoregeneral
classofitems.Thus,bytheturnofthecentury(andtheendofLevi'sstagetwo)theexceptioncoveredarangeofcasesfromthemostspecificallytothemostgenerally
"imminentlydangerous."Thesituationissummarizedinfigure5.14.
Table5.2

Summaryof"inherentlydangerous"cases
Date

Item

Finding

Thomasv.Winchester

1852

Belladonna

Liable

Loopv.Litchfield

1870

Balancewheel

Notliable

Loseev.Clute

1873

Steamboiler

Notliable

Devlinv.Smith

1882

Painter'sscaffold

Liable

Torgesunv.Schultz

1908

Bottleofaeratedwater

Liable

Statlerv.RayMfg.Co.

1909

Coffeurn

Liable

Case

Page211

Figure5.14
Theevolutionofalegaldoctrine

However,throughitsdecisionsinthismiddleperiod(18521915)thecourtwasalsopushingtheboundariesofthe"imminentlydangerous"classtoincludesomeitems
likecoffeeurnsandhairwashthatdobecomedangerouswhendefective.Nevertheless,atthispointthecourtbelievedthe"rule"oftheexceptioncouldbesummedup
asfollows:
Onewhomanufacturesarticlesinherentlydangerous,e.g.,poisons,dynamite,gunpowder,torpedoes,bottlesofwaterunderpressure,isliableintorttothirdparties....Onthe
otherhand,onewhomanufacturesarticlesdangerousonlyifdefectivelymade,orinstalled,e.g.,tables,chairs,picturesormirrorshungonthewalls,carriages,automobiles,andso
onisnotliabletothirdpartiesforinjuriescausedbythem,exceptincasesofwillfulinjuryorfraud.CadillacMotorCarCo.v.Johnson(1915)

Page212

Thus,thecourtheldtoitspreviouslydrawnlinenottoextendtheexceptionupthehierarchy.Ontheotherhand,theclassofarticlesdeemed"imminentlydangerous"
seemedtobeexpandingmoreandmoretoincludemanyitemsthatseemedmorenaturallytobelongtothemoregeneralclassof"dangerousifdefective."
Thepressuretobreakthroughthehierarchicalbarrierandextendtheexceptionfinallybecametoomuchin1916.InthatyearthecourtdecidedthecaseMacPherson
v.Buick.InthiscaseMacPherson,athirdparty,wasallowedtorecoverforinjurycausedbyadefectiveBuick,anitemdangerousonlyifdefective.Thus,anew
specificpositivecasegavetheruleitsfinalpush.
Theopinionstated:
Wehold,then,thattheprincipleofThomasv.Winchesterisnotlimitedtopoisons,explosives,andthingsoflikenature,tothingswhichintheirnormaloperationareimplements
ofdestruction.Ifthenatureofathingissuchthatitisreasonablycertaintoplacelifeandlimbinperilwhennegligentlymade,itisthenathingofdanger.Itsnaturegiveswarning
oftheconsequencestobeexpected.Iftotheelementofdangerthereisaddedknowledgethatthethingwillbeusedbypersonsotherthanthepurchaser,andusedwithoutnew
tests,then,irrespectiveofcontract,themanufacturerofthisthingofdangerisunderadutytomakeitcarefully.Thatisasfaraswearerequiredtogoforthedecisionofthiscase.

Thus,attheconclusionofthethirdstageofevolutionofthislegaldoctrine,theprincipleoftheexceptiontotheprivityrulehasbeenextendedandnowcoversarange
fromamostspecificclassofitemslikebelladonnaandloadedgunstoamostgeneralclassofitemsconsidered"dangerousifdefective."Theswollenextensionofthe
"imminentlydangerous"concept,whichoccurredduringthesecondstage,hasstoppedandevenbeencontracted.Astheresultofthesethreestages,theexceptions
haveswalloweduptheruleofprivityofcontractsothatamanufacturercannowbeassumedtobeliable(intort)tothirdparties.
Insummary,thishistoricalexamplefromthelegaldomainhasillustratedhowtheconceptualframeworksprovidedbyAIcanbeapplied.Inparticular,itshowshow
thelawcanbeseentofunctionasasystemthatrefinesconceptsandrulesonthebasisofpositiveandnegativeexamples.Wehaveemphasizeditsrulerefinement
aspectsanddiscussedhowitcanbeviewedasanexampleofCEAlikelearning.(Youmightfinditinterestingtoreexaminetheconceptrefinementinviewofanother
learningalgorithmsuchastheoneusedbyARCHLEARNERandtonotethestrengthsandweaknessesofthisanalyticalapproach,forinstance,withrespecttothe
handlingofnearmisses.)
Forbackgroundmaterialonthisepisodeoflegalhistory,seeBermanandGreiner1980orLevi1949.AnarticlebythelegalscholarMaxRadingivesaveryCEA
likedescriptionofthislegalepisode(Radin1933).
SuggestedReadings
Artificialintelligence(Winston1984)andIntroductiontoArtificialintelligence(CharniakandMcDermott1985)aretextbooksinAI.Thesecondofthesebooks
includesabriefintroductiontotheLISPprogramminglanguage.ThefourvolumesofTheHandbookofArtificialIntelligence(BarrandFeigenbaum1981,1982
Cohen,andFeigenbaum1982Barr,CohenandFeigenbaum1989)surveythefieldofAIatanintermediatelevel.TheseriesentitledMachineLearning:An
ArtificialIntelligenceApproach(Michalski,Car

Page213

bonell,andMitchell1983,1986)presentcollectionsofpapersconcerningrecentresearchonlearningthejournalMachineLearningistheprimarysourceforarticles
onstateofthearttechniquesinmachinelearning.
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Berman,H.J.,andW.R.Greiner(1980).Thenatureandfunctionsoflaw.4thed.NewYork:FoundationPress.
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Page215

Chapter6
Linguistics:TheRepresentationofLanguage
6.1TheStudyofLinguisticKnowledge
Linguisticsisthebranchofcognitivesciencethatisconcernedwithhumanlanguage.Itsgoalistounderstandhowlinguisticknowledgeisrepresentedinthemind,how
itisacquired,howitisperceivedandused,andhowitrelatestoothercomponentsofcognition.
Alanguageisasystemthatusessomephysicalsignal(asound,agesture,amarkonpaper)toexpressmeaning.Aswehaveseen,informationprocessingsystemsare
devicesthatrepresentinformationinsymbolicform.Theyarecomputationalinthesensethatthesesymbolicrepresentationscanbemanipulatedandtransformedto
createnewrepresentations.Thereis,ofcourse,abroadersenseinwhichlanguageisnotonlyaspecialcognitivesystembutalsoahighlycomplexformofbehavior
thatimpingesonpersonality,emotionalstate,personalinteraction,culturaldevelopment,andsocialstructure.Justthesame,wewillarguethatitispossibletostudy
languageasadistinctcognitivesystem,abstractingawayfromquestionsofcommunication,aesthetics,persuasiveness,andotherappliedorfunctionalconcerns.
Moreover,wesupposethatournarrowedinvestigationoflanguagewillbeanecessarypreliminarytounderstandinghowlinguisticknowledgeinteractswiththese
otheraspectsofhumanlife.
Fornow,then,wewillrestrictourattentiontothegoalofunderstandingthenatureofgrammarsformaltheoriesoflinguisticknowledgeitself,independentofother
aspectsofcognition,socialization,orbehavior.Agrammarmustbeabletocharacterizewhatweknowaboutthephysicalsignalsononeendofthelinguisticequation,
aswellaswhatweknowaboutmeaningontheotherend.Inaddition,itmustprovideanaccountofhowthetwoareconnected.
Languagesmaybedescribedbysystemsofrulesandprinciplesthatconstitutescientifichypothesesaboutthenatureofthelinguisticknowledgepossessedbynative
speakers.Theserulesandprinciplespurporttoaccountforthepatternofthelanguagetherangeofpossiblemovesinthelanguagegamethatareconsistentwitha
setoflinguisticconventions.Itiscrucialtounderstandthatgrammarsareintendedtodescribe,nottoprescribe,linguisticsystems.Thatis,descriptivelinguistics
attemptstodetailtheunderlyingknowledgethatisreflectedwhensomeonespeaksorunderstandslanguage.Unliketheprescriptivelinguisticsassociatedwith
traditionalgrammarians,acognitivelinguistictheoryisnotconcernedwithlegislatingsocialnormsorrenderingaestheticjudgmentsaboutlanguageusage.
SomeEnglishspeakerssayhoagie,others,submarine,andstillothers,grinderforaparticularkindofsandwich.Thesedifferencesdistinguishdifferentdialectsof
English.Similarly,someEnglishspeakerspronouncetherinpoor,butforothersthisword

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soundsmoreorlessthesameaspaw.Thesealternativepronunciations,too,indicatedifferentregional(orsocial)dialects.Indeed,eventhestructureofsentencescan
varyacrossdialectgroups.Forexample,manyspeakersofParisianFrenchsayJesaispasinsteadofthestandardJenesaispas(inEnglish,"Idon'tknow").Ina
westernMassachusettsdialect,"Sodon'tI"canbeusedinterchangeablywith"Idotoo''toindicateagreement,asin"Ireallywanttogoswimming....Sodon'tI!"
Thesevariationsinvocabulary,pronunciation,structure,andmeaningcanbedescribedbyprovidingslightlydifferentaccountsofthelinguisticknowledgepossessed
byspeakersofdistinctdialectgroups.Thischaracterizationcarriesovertospeakerswhosystematicallydangleprepositions(forexample,thosewhosayIknow
whichchairyouaresittingoninsteadofIknowonwhichchairyouaresitting)orsplitinfinitives(producing,forexampleShewantedtocompletely
disassociateherselffromthem).Toadescriptivelinguist,thesearenotconsiderederrorstobecorrected,butratherfactstobedescribedaspartofatheoryof
knowledge.
WithinthisfieldofvariationisarangeofcommonlinguisticpatternsthatconstituteswhatisinformallycalledtheEnglishlanguage(betterunderstoodasaclusterof
closelyrelated,variantdialects).Furthermore,certainpatternsaresystematicallyexcluded.Considerthesentencesinexamples(1)through(4),whichrepresent
differentorderingsofcertainEnglishwords:
(1)

ThedogirritatedMary.

(2)

Maryirritatedthedog.

(3)

(4)

DogtheMaryirritated.
IrritatedtheMarydog.

Only(1)and(2)arewellformedorderingsinEnglishwewillcharacterizethemasgrammaticalsentences(3)and(4),markedwithanasterisk,areungrammatical
stringsofwords.Anyspeakerofanylanguagehasacquiredtheabilitytosystematicallydistinguishgrammaticalfromungrammaticalutterances.Inthecaseathand,
onlycertainpatternsofwordsconstituteEnglishsentences,andEnglishspeakershavetheabilitytoidentifyandusethemwhenspeakingorunderstandingthe
language.Englishspeakersalsohaveagraspofprinciplesofpronunciation,wordstructure,andmeaningthatconstitutestheirknowledgeofEnglish.
Theuseoflanguagefeelslikesecondnaturetousoncewehaveacquiredtherelevantbodyoflinguisticknowledge.Butwemustnotlosesightofthecomplexityand
varietyofthepatternsthatmustbelearned.Thespeakerofanylanguagerecognizesavastarrayofstructures:simpledeclarativeaffirmativesentenceslike(1)and(2),
questionssuchasDidthedogirritateMary?negationssuchasThedogdidnotirritateMarysentenceswithpartsemphasized,asinItwasthedogthat
irritatedMarysentenceswithpartsthataretruncated,asinIwouldliketoleaveonFriday,andMaryonSaturdayandsoforth.Moreover,speakersofdifferent
languageslearndifferentpatterns.ComparetheEnglishquestionin(5)withtheGermanequivalentin(6):

(5)

DidJohnseetheman?

(6)

SahJohanndenMann?
sawJohn

theman

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InSinhala,alanguageofSriLanka,theorderofelementsdiffersfromthebasicEnglishorder,eveninsimpledeclarativeaffirmativesentences:

(7)

Thewomaneatsrice.

(8)

Noona

bat

womanthericeeats

(Thesymbol[ ]representsthesoundthatalsooccursinEnglishattheendofawordlikesofa.)
Havingarticulatedtheperspectiveofdescriptivelinguistics,wemustconsidermorecloselythenatureofaspeaker'sknowledgeofalanguage.Initially,itisnotobvious
inwhichtermslinguisticregularitiesarebestcaptured.Perhapsastandardrepresentationintermsofadatabase(seechapter3)orasimplelistofoptionsmightseem
appropriate.Thereis,however,reasontobelievethatgrammarsarebestrepresentedintermsofgenerativerulesexplicitalgorithmsthatcharacterizethestructures
ofaparticularlanguage.
Topursuethispoint,noticethatmanyofthesentencesweuse(suchasthoseyouarenowreading)haveneverbeforebeenproducedinyourexperience.Notonlythe
content,butalsothespecificsentencestructuremaybenovel.Yetthetaskofunderstandingthesesentencesseemstopresentnountowardproblemsoflinguistic
interpretation:wecaneffortlesslyidentifysuchsentencesasgrammaticalandderivetheirmeaning.Consequently,ourlinguisticknowledgemustgobeyondfinitelistsof
wordsorsentences.Toaccountforafluentspeaker'screativeabilitytorecognizeandusenovelpatterns,weassumethatspeakersknowrulesandprinciplesthat
defineasenseofthatpatterning.Agrammarofalanguage,then,canbethoughtofasasetofsuchrulesandprinciples.
Thebodyofknowledgethatischaracterizedbyagrammarissometimesreferredtoaslinguisticcompetence.Justastherulesofchessdefinetherangeofpossible
movesandlegalpositions,butdonototherwisedirectthecourseofthegame,therulesofacompetencegrammardefinetheclassofpossiblelinguisticstructures,but
donotcompletelydetermineactuallanguagebehavior.Thereis,forinstance,noupperboundonthenumberofsentencesthataregrammaticalinanyknownnatural
language.Thegrammarofeveryhumanlanguagecontainsmechanismswithwhichafinitesetofrulescancharacterizeaninfinitelylargesetofpossibleexpressions.I
despisethedogisasentenceofEnglishsoisIdespisethedogandMelbadoesn'tlikethecatsoisIdespisethedog,Melbadoesn'tlikethecat,andSuecould
livewithouttheiguanaandsoon,withoutlimit.Thereisnoreasoninprincipletoruleoutgrammaticalsentencesofanyparticularlengthsolongastheyfitthe
patternofEnglishconjunctions.Ofcourse,atacertainpointsomesentencesmaybecometoolongorcomplexforspeakerstouseorunderstand.Evensimpler
grammaticalsentencesmaybesubjecttoerrorsinperceptionorproduction.Wehaveallhadtheexperienceofinitiallyfailingtounderstandanormalsentence,orof
producingastrangeandunintendedutterance.Thesearemattersoflinguisticperformance.Bycontrast,atheoryofcompetenceisnotintendedtoprovideanaccount
ofwhatweactuallysayatagivenplaceandtime,orofthenatureofthepsychologicalandneuralmechanismsthatimplementlinguisticknowledgeinactualbehavior.
Inchapters7and11wewillseehowlinguistscollaboratewithothercognitivescientistsinaddressingsomeoftheseotherimportantissues.

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Competencegrammarsarehighlycomplex.Articulatingthegrammarofevenasinglelanguageisanimposingandchallengingintellectualtask.Thisisbecausetherules
ofalanguagearegenerallynotconsciouslyknownbyspeakersofthatlanguage,andtheyhaveneverbeencompletelycodifiedbypreviousgrammarians.Letus
considertwocasesinpoint.AllnativespeakersofEnglishknowthatthepluralofdogisdogs,andthatthepluralofcatiscats.WhenEnglishspeakersproducethese
plurals,theyinstinctivelysoundthepluralmarker(spelleds)asa"z"soundinthefirstcaseandasan"s"soundinthesecond.Thereis,itturnsout,arulefor
constructingpluralsinEnglishthatgeneratesadifferentrepresentationforthepluralendingdependingonthephoneticpropertiesofthefinalsoundoftheword,aswe
willseeindetailbelow.
Asasecondexampleofcommonlinguisticknowledge,considerthebehaviorofthewordthat.ThatplaysseveraldistinctrolesinEnglishsentences.Foronething,
thatcanappearprenominally(beforenouns)innounphraseslikethatturkey.Itcanfunctionasapronoun,asinDon'ttouchthat.Letusfocusourattentiononits
thirdroleasacomplementizer,awordthatintroducessubordinateclauses(sentenceswithinsentences).
Inthefollowingexampleweseesomethingofthebehaviorofthisthat.Thesubordinateclausesareitalicized:
(9)

a.Irvingbelievedthatpigscanfly.

b.Thatsugarissweetisobvioustoeveryone.

c.ThepainthatIfeelisunpleasant.

d.Thedogthatbitmeismissingnow.

In(9a)thatisoptionalthesentenceisgrammaticalevenifthecomplementizerisnotpresent.Bycontrast,(9b)isaninstanceofaconstructioninwhichthe
complementizercannotbeomitted.Thepairofsentences(9c)and(9d)presentsyetanotherpuzzle.Bothexamplesinvolvethesametypeofconstruction(therelative
clause),yetthecomplementizerisrequiredin(9d)andoptionalin(9c).
Therulesandprinciplesthatgovernthedistributionofthatappeartohavelittletodowiththemeaningoftheutterancesinquestion.Infact,itisnotimmediatelyclear
whattheprivilegesofoccurrenceforthatare,althoughallcompetentspeakersofEnglish"know"itsprinciplesofdistribution.Inthecaseoftherelativeclauses,the
necessityoroptionalityofthecomplementizerseemsinsteadtodependonwhetherthe"head"oftheclause(thepainin(9c)andthedogin(9d))isfunctioningasthe
subjectortheobjectoftheverbintherelativeclause.Butthisdoesnotappeartoexplainthedistributionofthatinthefirsttwoexamples.
ThesekindsofsubtletiesinthedistributionofawordlikethataretacitlygraspedbyanyspeakerofEnglish,yettheyarefeaturesaboutwhichschooltaughtgrammar
neverspeaks,anditisexceedinglyunlikelythatparentshaveeverinstructedtheirchildrenregardingtherule.Howthendowecometohavesuchknowledge?Inwhat
formissuchknowledgerepresentedinthemind?Questionsofthisorder,posedatafinegrainedlevelofdetail,areparadigmaticexamplesofproblemsincognitive
science.
Wewillreturntodiscusssomeoftheseproblemsbelow,butfornowwewishtoemphasizethatalthoughspeakersapparentlyknowhowtodeterminethecorrect
formofEnglishpluralsandthedistributionofthat,theycannotarticulatetheprinciplesthatinformthesejudgments.Furthermore,virtuallyalltheimportantfeaturesof
linguisticknowledgehavethischaracter:linguisticcompetenceisunconsciousortacitknowledgethatspeakerspossess,butcannotarticulateandareunawareof.

Page219

Justthesame,muchofgrammarislearnedapparentlyeffortlesslybyallnormalhumanchildrensubstantiallybeforetheageoffive.Childrenacquirelanguagewith
virtuallynodirectinstruction,withlittleornosystematicpresentationofrelevantdata,andwiththeaddedloadofmanyotherdevelopmentaltasks.Indeed,thereis
considerablereasontobelieve(seechapter9)thatthedatathatareavailabletochildrenforgrammarconstructionunderdeterminethegoalchildrenarenot
providedwithenoughevidenceintheirlinguisticenvironmenttodirectlyaccountforwhattheycometoknow.
Thisstateofaffairsconstitutesaproblemofmajorproportionsforcognitivescience,atlarge.Howisitthattheyoungorganismcanacquireabodyofknowledgethat,
inimportantregards,islearnedwithoutbenefitofdirectinstruction,andinsupportofwhichthereisinsufficientinformationinitsenvironment?Manycontemporary
linguists,followingChomsky(1965,1975,1980,1986,1988),holdthatgenerallearningmechanismsorpropertiesofinformationprocessingatlargecannotaccount
fortheacquisitionandformofgrammars.Rather,theproblemofgrammaracquisitionseemsbestexplainedbypositingpowerfulspecialprinciplesthatarepresentin
thelanguagelearnerbyvirtueofitsbiologicalconstitutionultimately,propertiesofthehumangenomethatareinnateintheorganism.
Itisimportanttounderstandthatthisdoesnotamounttotheclaimthatanyparticulargrammar,orruleofgrammar,isinborn.Whatisthoughttobeinnateisasetof
propertiesthatguideandconstraintheorganismasitdevelopslinguisticknowledge,andthatdeterminetheformofparticularlinguisticrulesystems.Furthermore,the
grammarsofallnaturallanguagesarethoughttoexhibitcertaincommonaltiesthatcannotplausiblybeaccountedforintermsofotherkindsofnonlinguisticconstraints
onlearning.Thisconclusionismotivatedbythefollowingobservations:(1)alldialectsofallnaturallanguagesposethesamesortofchallengetothelearnerthe
grammarofeverylanguageissimilarlyunderdeterminedbylinguisticexperience,butstillefficientlyacquiredand(2)anychildhasthecapacitytoacquireanynatural
language(giventhepropercircumstance)regardlessofgeneticheritage.Consequently,whateverthebiologicalspecializationforlanguagelearningturnsouttobe,it
mustbecapableofplayingaroleintheacquisitionofanyhumanlanguage.
Theseconclusionsaresupportedbytheidentificationoflinguisticuniversals(propertiescommontoalllanguages)thatdonotappeartohaveanalogsinother
cognitivedomains(seebelow).Moreover,thereismountingevidence(someofwhichispresentedinchapter7)thatthehumanbrainisspeciallystructuredand
organizedtosupportlanguage.Finally,thereisasubstantialbodyofbiologicalresearchthatsuggeststhatgeneticpredispositionscanplayamajorroleinlearningand
behaviorinotherorganisms(see,forexample,Alcock1989MarlerandSherman1985).Thenaturalcommunicationsystemsofmanyspeciesexhibitcomplex
interactionsbetweengeneticstructure,development,andlearningofthegeneralsortthatareapparentinhumanlanguage.
Wenowbeginacloserinvestigationoftwoofthemajorcomponentsofthetheoryoflinguisticcompetence.Welookfirstatphonology,thestudyofsoundsystems
thenweturntosyntax,thestudyofthesentencestructuresthatprovideabridgebetweensoundandmeaning.Wedeferourexplorationofsemantics,thestudyof
meaning,untilchapter10,sincemeaningismostfruitfullyinvestigatedjointlybylinguists,philosophers,andothercognitivescientists.

Page220

6.2Phonology
TheGoalsofPhonology
Thephonologicalcomponentofagrammarcomprisestherulesthatdeterminehowlinguisticrepresentationsarepronounced.Althoughalanguagecanconsistofan
infinitelylargesetofsentences,eachlanguagehas(atagiventime)afinitelexicon,adictionaryofthelanguage'sprimitivesoundmeaningpairs(morphemes).A
morphememaybewordsized,likeelephant,orsmaller,likethepluralmorphemesthewordelephants,then,consistsoftwomorphemes.Wordsandmorphemes,
ofcourse,canbecombined(undertheconstraintsofsyntacticandotherrulesystems)toformsentences.
Averysimpleandstraightforwardaccountofphonologicalknowledge(letuscallitT1)mighthavethefollowingcharacter:
Thephonologicalcomponentofagrammarconsistsofalistofthewordsofthatlanguage,withthepronunciationofeachwordgivenasafaithfulacousticimagecoupledwith
directinstructionstothevocaltractabouthowtoproducethatimage,andinstructionstotheperceptualsystemabouthowtorecognizeit.

T1assumesnorulesthereisonlyakindofdatabase,adictionaryofdirectrepresentationofsounds.Considerawordlikecat.OnT1,therewillbeadictionaryentry
somethinglike[kt],inwhichweuseaspecialphoneticrepresentation.Wecanthinkofeachsymbolasasetofinstructionsregardingthephoneticcharacteristics,
orfeatures,ofaparticularsoundsegment.(Seetables6.1and6.2forinformationaboutphoneticsymbolsandfeaturesforEnglish.)
Now,toreturntoanearlierproblem,whatofthepluralformcats,consistingofthebasicmorphemecatandthepluralmorphemes?OnT1,wewillsimplyhavea
secondentry,[kts],containingthephoneticinformationappropriatetothisnewword.Inthesameway,thedictionarywillcontaintwoentriesforthesingularand
pluraloftheworddog:[dag]inthesingular,[dagz]intheplural.Youwillobserve,however,thatthefinalsegmentindogs,representingtheplural,isnotidenticalto
thefinalsegmentinthepluralcats:intheformerthepluralis[s],inthelatter,[z].Thatis,inthecaseofcats,wemakeafrictionsound(africative)withthefrontof
thetongue,withoutvibratingthevocalcordsinthecaseofdogs,wemakeasimilarfricativebutwiththevocalcordsvibrating.Moreover,inapairlikeglass/glasses,
thepluralendinghasyetanotherpronunciation,[ ].
Ifitweresimplythecasethatthepluralpronunciationsofwordslikecat,dog,andglasswerearbitraryandunpredictable(likethesoundshapesofthebasicwords
themselves),thissituationwouldnotbeespeciallytroublesome.Afterall,thewordthatreferstocatsmightjustaswellhavebeenblorb,hadthehistoryofEnglish
proceededdifferently.Perhaps,then,thepronunciationofthepluralforeachgivenwordisequallyarbitraryandissimplyafactthatmustbespecifiedinthelexiconfor
eachrelevantword.
Itisasimplemattertoshowthatthisisnotso.Ifitwere,weshouldexpecttofindsomewordwithasoundshapelikecatperhapsbatwithapluralending
pronouncedas[z]or[ ].Wemightalsoexpecttofindawordlikedogcog,forexamplewithapluralotherthan[z].ButeveryspeakerofEnglishknows,
unerringly,thatthisisnotso.*[btz]or*[
]simplycouldnotbethepronunciationofthepluralofanywordofEnglish.

Page221
Table6.1

Phoneticsymbols

Symbol

Description

Examples

Consonants
p

voiceless(vl.)bilabialstop

pit,spit,tip

voiced(vd.)bilabialstop

bit,rabbit,bib

vl.alveolarstop

topattack,gnat

vd.alveolarstop

dig,adopt,tad

vl.velarstop

cat,akin,tack

vd.velarstop

got,again,lag

bilabialnasal

man,amen,rum

alveolarnasal

nut,nanny,sin

velarnasal

singer,ring

vl.labiodentalfricative

fat,laugh,huff

vd.labiodentalfricative

vat,liver,shiv

vl.interdentalfricative

thick,ether,both

vd.interdentalfricative

this,either,lathe

vl.alveolarfricative

sit,as set,Liszt,this

vd.alveolarfricative

zit,lazy,fizz,is

vl.alveopalatalfricative

s hip,nation,as h

vd.alveopalatalfricative

leisure,beige

vl.alveopalatalaffricate

chip,itchy,rich

vd.alveopalatalaffricate

judge,edgy,ridge

vd.labiovelarglide

why,wick,away,row

vd.palatalglide

yes,boy,beyond

vd.lateralliquid

lip,allot,call

vd.centralliquid

rip,arrears,car

vl.glottalfricative

hat,heap,ahead

Vowels
i

highfronttenseunrounded

beet,heap,believe

highfrontlaxunrounded

bit,ship

midfronttenseunrounded

bait,hay,eight

midfrontlaxunrounded

bet,met

lowfrontlaxunrounded

bat,rat,at,attach

highbacktenserounded

boot,through,lose

highbacklaxrounded

put,look

midbacktenserounded

boat,blow,road

midbacklaxrounded

bore,bought

midbacklaxunrounded

but,begun

lowbacklaxunrounded

pot,mock,car

midcentrallaxunrounded

sofa,about,photograph

Page222
Table6.2

Featuredefinitions

Feature

Definition

Consonant

Soundmadewithaconstrictioninthevocaltract

Vowel

Syllabicsoundmadewithopenvocaltract

Voiced

Vocalcordsarevibrating

Voiceless

Vocalcordsarenotvibrating

Stop

Airstreamiscompletelyblocked

Nasal

Airstreampassesthroughnasalcavity

Fricative

Airstreamispartiallyobstructed,frictionnoise

Affricate

Stopsoundwithafricativerelease

Liquid

Consonantwithoutsignificantobstruction

Glide

Vowellikebutnonsyllabicsound

Bilabial

Articulatedatbothlips

Labiodental

Articulatedwithteethandlowerlip

Interdental

Articulatedbetweentheteeth

Alveolar

Articulatedbehindtheteethatalveolus

Alveopalatal

Articulatedbetweenalveolusandhardpalate

Velar

Articulatedatsoftpalate

Labiovelar

Articulatedatlipsandsoftpalatesimultaneously

Lateral

Articulatedwithsidesofthetongue

Central

Articulatedwithtongueincenteroforalcavity

Glottal

Articulatedattheglottis,orvoicebox

Front

Tongueisatfrontoforalcavity

Back

Tongueisisatrearoforalcavity

High

Tongueisraised

Mid

Tongueisneitherraisednorlowered

Low

Tongueislowered

Tense

Tonguerootistensed

Lax

Tonguerootisrelaxed

Round

Lipsarerounded

Unround

Lipsarespread

Infact,carefulobservationwilldemonstratethatthedistributionofthethreepluralpronunciationsisentirelypredictable:itdependsinastrictlysystematicfashionon
thephonologicalshapeofthewordthatispluralized.Ifcathadbeenblorb,itspluralwouldhavebeenpronouncedwitha[z].Haditbeenblorch,itspluralwould
havebeenblorches,with[ ].EveryspeakerofEnglishknowsthistobetrueeventhoughthewordsblorbandblorcharenotlistedintheirmentallexicons.Weare
thereforeledtotheconclusionthatEnglishspeakersknowaphonologicalrulethatdeterminesthepronunciationofpluralsandthatisindependentofanylistof
wordsinactualuse.
ThesefactssuggestthatthetheoryT1isinadequateasanaccountofourknowledgeoflinguisticsoundstructure:morphemescanhavealternatepronunciationswhose
occurrenceispredictable,andT1failstohavethiskindofpredictivepower.Asimilarstateofaffairsexistsaswordsandmorphemescombineintosentences,which
mayonoccasionbepronouncedinmorethanoneway.ConsiderthesentencethatiswrittenDoyouwantto?Thissentenceconsistsoffourwordswhosephonetic
representations,inisolation,areroughly[du],[yu],[want],and[tu].Itispossibletopronouncethissentencesimplybyconcatenatingtheserepresentations:[duyu
wanttu]isagrammaticalEnglishutterance.Nevertheless,itissomewhatunusualthekindofpronunciationthatmightbeusedonlyinanexceptionallyformal,
deliberate,andself

Page223

consciouslycarefulspeechstyle.Thereare,infact,avarietyofmorelikelypronunciationsthatwouldbeappropriateinlessformal,butotherwisegrammaticalusage.
Severalofthesearegivenin(10):

Theutterancesin(10)aregivenroughlyinorderofincreasinginformalityandcasualnessofstyle.In(10a)theunstressedvowelsofthefirsttwowordshavebeen
''reduced"totheverybriefcentralvowel[ ],a"softg."SaythesentenceDoyouwantto?toyourselfseveraltimes,outloudandrapidly,andyouwillassureyourself
thatalloftheseutterancesareindeedrealpronunciations,including(10e),wherevirtuallynopartoftheutterancecanbesimplydecomposedintotheoriginal
dictionarypronunciationsofitscomponentwords.
ItshouldbeapparentthatanaccountofEnglishmustinvolvesomeratherelaboratecomputationalrelationshipsbetweenverydisparatestructures,ifwearetomodel
theknowledgethatallofthepronunciationsin(10)arerelated.Itmightbesuggested,however,thatthevariantpronunciationsin(10)arenotsolelyamatterof
linguisticknowledge.Itmightbethecasethatincreasinginformalityandrapidityofspeechcausesthephysiologicalmechanismsofproductiontolosetheirprecisionof
control.Thus,wemightlookforanexplanationforthesefactsinthedomainofmotorcontrolratherthaninphonology.Butthereisevidencethatsuchanexplanation
isunsatisfactoryinthisandmanysimilarcases.Considertheprocessthatconverts[wanttu]to[
],sometimeswrittengonna.Considerthesentencesin(11):

Ifthepronunciationin(lb)wereamatterofmotorcontrol,wewouldhavearighttoexpectasentencelikeI'mgoingtoNewYorktobehaveidenticallyunderrapid
speechconditions.Thatis,weshouldexpecttofindcasualpronunciationslike*I'mgonnaNewYork.Butthisappearsnottobeapossiblepronunciation.The
processinquestionseemstodependonmorethanthephysiologicalstateofthevocaltractunderrapidproductionconditions.Amongotherthings,itappearsto
dependonthesyntacticstructureoftheutterance.ThereducedtoinI'mgonnaleaveispartofaninfinitiveverbintheungrammatical*I'mgonnaNewYorkthe
reducedtoisapartofspeechthatlinguistscallapreposition.Clearlytheprocessofcontractionthatproducesformslikewannaandgonnacannothaveamotoric
explanationifitdependscruciallyonsyntacticinformationofthissort.Finally,lestthereaderthinkthatthefactscansomehowbeexplainedbyanappealtoother
phoneticdifferencesbetweentheutterancesinquestion,considerthepairofsentencesI'mgoingtosplit(underthecolloquialmeaningof

Page224

"leave")andthephoneticallyidenticalI'mgoingtoSplit(where"Split"isthenameofacityintheformerYugoslavia).Thecontractedform[aym
split]canonly
meanthatyouareintendingtoleave,notthatyouintendtogototheBalkans.Sincethesesentencesdifferonlyinsyntacticstructure,weareleftwithnoalternativebut
toconcludethatthesephoneticfactsaretobeexplainedbyappealingto(ruleswithin)atheoryofgrammar.
TheNatureofPhoneticRepresentations
Beforeweproceedtodevelopamoreadequatetheoryofphonologicalknowledge,letuspausebrieflytodiscussthenatureofrepresentationsinphonology.
Aphonologicaltheorymusthaveanotationfordisplayingthephoneticshapeofutterances.Wehavealreadymadeuseofsuchasystemwhenwerepresentedthe
wordcatas[kt].Thesephoneticrepresentationsare,insomerespects,closetobeingpicturesofactualpronunciations.But,aswewillseeshortly,theyarenotin
anysense"reproductions"ofactualutterances.
Letuslookinmoredetailatarepresentationlike[kt].Notethatwealwaysusesquarebracketstoindicatethatwearedealingwithaphoneticrepresentationrather
thanawrittenforminconventionalspelling.Itisessentialtounderstandthat[kt]isnotanunanalyzablewhole.Itconsists(atleast)ofachainofdiscretesymbolsthat
eachrepresentsoneandonlyoneparticularsoundsegment.Furthermore,thesoundthatisrepresentedbyeachsymbol[k],[],[t]isitselfaclusterofmany
interrelatedphysicalevents.[k]representsasoundinwhichtheairstreamfromthelungsiscompletelyobstructedintheoralcavitybythebackofthetongueagainst
thevelum,orsoftpalate.Thisproducesavelarstopconsonant.Atthesametime,wenotethatthevocalcords(partofthelarynxintheneck)arenotvibratingsince
[k]isavoicelessstop.Bycontrast,[]representsavowelsoundthatismadewithnovocaltractobstruction,andwiththevocalcordssetinvibratingmotionitisa
voicedsound.Moreover,theairstreamisshapedbythetongue,whichislowered,fronted,andrelaxed:[]isalowfrontlaxvowel.Asfor[t],itisalsoavoiceless
stopconsonant,like[k],butinthiscasetheairstreamiscompletelyblockedbytheclosureofthetonguetipagainsttheridgedareajustbehindtheteeth,thealveolus:
[t]isavoicelessalveolarstop.(Hadwesetthevocalcordstovibrating,a[d]wouldhaveresultedavoicedalveolarstop.Thevoicedcounterpartofa[k]isa
[g],avoicedvelarstop.)Itshouldbeclearthatphoneticrepresentationslike[kt]are,inasense,shorthandaccountsofamuchricherandmorecomplexpictureof
anactualphysicalevent.
Weknowagreatdealabouttheanatomical,physiological,andacousticpropertiesoflinguisticsounds,andsuchinformationcanbeessentialtoanadequate
understandingofphonologicalphenomena.Electromyographicanalysisenablesustospecifythestatesofthedozensofmusclesthatareactivatedintheproductionof
anyspeechevent.Xraymethodsallowustovisuallyobservetheanatomicstatesofthevocaltractinmotion,andsoundspectrographyprovidesadetailedpictureof
thephysical,acousticpropertiesofspeechsignals.Withtheseandothermethodswearecapableofconstructinghighlyrefinedphoneticrecordsthatare
multidimensionalaccountsofobservable,physicalphoneticevents.Nevertheless,thereisanimportantvirtueintherelativeshorthandofthephoneticrepresentation.
Differentspeakersactuallyproducespeechsoundsthatarephysicallydistinct,andsometimesdramaticallyso.Imagineafouryearoldgirl,andafortyyearoldman
withachronichoarsevoice,pronouncingtheword[kt].Sex,age,health,emotionalstate,evenrateofspeechwillresultinvery

Page225

differentphoneticpictures.Ifwecomparedtwofortyyearoldmaleswithhoarsevoices,wewouldfindremarkablydifferentphoneticdescriptionsofwhatisarguably
thesameword,sincetheirvocaltractsarelikelytobequitedifferentinshape.Infact,evenwerewetocomparesuccessivepronunciationsofthesamewordbythe
samespeaker,wewouldlikelyfindsignificantphysicaldifferencesfromonepronunciationtothenext.
Whatisofinteresttothephonologist,asacognitivescientist,isthefactthatspeakersofthesamelanguagecanrecognizethatitisthesamewordthatisintendedin
eachcasebyeachspeaker.Factorslikeage,sex,emotionalstate,badcolds,andalcoholmayconspiretomakeactualperformancesphysicallydistinct,butthere
mustbesomelevelofphoneticdescriptionatwhichallpossibledistincttokensofthesamewordarerepresentedinessentiallythesamefashion.Putanotherway,
factorslikecoldsandagearenotrelevanttotheparticularsystemofknowledgethegrammarthatdetermineswhetheranutteranceispartofthelanguage,and
whatpartitis.Ourlinguisticcapacity(thecompetencegrammar,anditsimplementingmechanisms)managestonormalizethegreatvariabilityinspeechperformance
byestablishingrepresentationsthatcontainonlylinguisticallysignificantinformation.
PhonemicRepresentation
Wemustnowaskourselvesafundamentalquestion:Whatdoesconstitutealinguisticallysignificantpropertyofpronunciation?Inotherwords,whatkindsof
knowledgeoughttobeaccountedforinacognitivetheoryofphonology?
Somesuchaspectsofpronunciationsuggestthemselvesquitereadily.Consider,forexample,thedifferencebetweenthe[s]and[z]soundsinapairofwordslikesap
andzap.NativespeakersofEnglishknowinstantly,withoutintrospection,thatthesearedifferentwords.Thephysicaldifferencebetween[s]and[z]appearstobethe
onlyfactorthatdistinguishesthetwowords.Bothsoundsarefricativesmadebycreatingapartialobstructionbetweenthetongueandthealveolarridge.The
differencebetweenthetwoisstrictlyamatterofvocalcordvibration:[s]isvoiceless,[z]isvoiced.Thisphysicaldifferenceisneitherrandomnorcontrolledby
extralinguisticfactorslikeageordrunkenness.SpeakersofEnglishknowthatthedifferencebetweenthesesoundscanbeexploitedtorepresentadifferencebetween
wordsinthelexicon.Wewillrefertothisdistinguishingpropertyofsoundsasphonemic,andtosoundslike[s]and[z]asdistinctphonemes.
Ingeneral,themoststraightforwardwayofdeterminingwhethertwosoundsshouldberepresentedasdistinctphonemesistoapplytheminimalpairtest.Thistest
canbeconceivedinvariousways.Onewaytoapplythetestinvolvessubstitutingaphoneticallydifferentsound,say,[z],fortheinitialsegment[s]ofawordlikesap.
Ifwepronounce[sp]withaninitial[z],itsimplybecomes[zp].Thelatteris,ofcourse,aperfectlygoodpronunciationinEnglishjustas[sp]is,butitisthe
pronunciationofadifferentword.
Asecondwayofapplyingaminimalpairtestinvolvescomparingtwophoneticrepresentationsthatdifferfromoneanotherinoneandonlyonesegment.Ifthetwo
formsinquestionaredistinctwords(thatis,distinctinmeaning),thenthetwosegmentsundercomparisonaretoberepresentedasdistinctphonemes.Wecanseethis
(again)for[s]and[z]byapplyingtheminimalpairtesttothewordsloose[lus]andlose[luz].Theseformsdifferonlyintheirfinalsegmentandaredistinctinmeaning
hence,thephoneticdifferenceconstitutesasystematicphonemiccontrast.

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Thereis,furthermore,nowaytopredictthatthefinalsegmentofawordlikeloosewillbe[s],orthatthefinalsegmentofloseis[z].Theoccurrenceofoneoranother
phonemeisanarbitraryfactabouteachword.ThereisnothinginherentinthegrammarofEnglishthatmakes[z]the''correct"finalsegmentofloseexceptforthe
simplefactthatitisso.Thisisanothercrucialpropertyofphonemes.
Acentraltaskofphonologicaltheoryistocharacterizethenatureofrepresentationsinthementallexiconkeepingseparateentitiesinthelexicondistinctfromone
another.Itfollowsthatphonemicdistinctionsmustbeacrucialpartofsuchlexicalrepresentations.Thetheory,then,mustcapturethenotionofthephonemeinsome
explicitfashion.If,contrarytofact,alllinguisticallysignificantphoneticpropertiesofwordswerealsosignalsofasystematicphonemicdistinction,therewouldbea
simplesolution:phonologicaltheorycouldlargelyconsistofaclosedsetofsymbols(liketable6.1),eachrepresentingasinglephoneme.Wewould,inaddition,need
asetofrulesthatgoverntheorderandcombinationofphonemes(phonologistscallthesephonotacticrules)thattellus,forexample,that[s]and[z]maynotoccur
contiguously.Undersuchatheory,formslike[sp]and[zp]wouldconstitutelegalwords,andindeedtheyoccurintheEnglishlexicon.Thetheorywouldalso
predict,correctly,thataformlike[pz]shouldbeapossiblewordofEnglish,whereas*[paesz]isnot.
However,althoughatheoryofthissorthasmerit,ourfirstassumptionthatalllinguisticallysignificantsoundsarephonemicinnaturecannotbemaintained.Asa
caseinpoint,considerthepronunciationofanEnglishwordlikepat.Wemayforthemomentrepresentthisformphoneticallyas[pt].([p],whichwehavenotyet
discussedexplicitly,isavoicelessstoplike[t]and[k].Itsstopclosureisbilabialthatis,itismadewithbothlipssealedtogether.)
Ifyoumoistenthebackofyourhandandpronouncethewordnormally,whileholdingyourlipsclosetoyourmoistenedhand,youwillnoticethatadistinctpuffofair
accompaniesthe[p]attheonsetoftheword.Wewillrefertothispuffedpasaspirated.Nowdothesameforthewordspat.Youwillobservethatthereisno
comparableaspirationaccompanyingthe[p]inthisword.Wefindinsteadanunaspiratedvoicelessbilabialstop.Youcanobservethesameeffectsomewhatmore
dramaticallybylightingamatchandholdingitinfrontofyourlipsduringthepronunciationofeachword.Aspirated[p]willcausethematchtogoout,whereas
unaspirated[p]willnot.
ThephysicaldifferencebetweenthesetwoeventsmaynotbeapparenttoeveryreaderitisnotperceptuallysalienttomostspeakersofEnglish,andEnglishspeakers
maybequitefirmintheirconvictionthatthetwokindsofpare,insomequitepotentsense,thesame.Butthephysicaldifferenceisclear,asthetwosound
spectrogramsinfigure6.1demonstrate.
Here,then,aretwophoneticallydistinctevents.Aretheyphonemicallydistinct?Recallthatsubstituting[z]for[s]intheinitialsegmentofsapyieldedapronounceable,
yetdifferent,wordofEnglish.Supposewetrytotransposeaspiratedp(wewillrepresentthisas[ph])withunaspirated[p]inaselectionofEnglishwords.Bycontrast,
wedonotcreatenewanddifferentwordsofEnglish.Whatresultsarebizarre,deviantpronunciationsthatcannotbeEnglishwords.*[pt]withoutaspirationsounds
uncomfortablyclosetotheEnglishword[bt],bat,where[b]isavoicedbilabialstopbutnotcloseenoughtosoundlikearealEnglishword.*[spht]sounds
overstrenuouslyarticulated,noisy,andwrong.

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Figure6.1
Soundspectrogramsofutterancesofspatandspat.Timeisrepresented
onthehorizontalaxisofeachspectrogram,andfrequency(pitch)is
representedontheverticalaxis.Thedegreeofdarknessataparticular
pointindicatestheamountofenergypresentatthattimeandfrequency.
Notethattheportionofthespectrogramcorrespondingtothe/p/is
differentforpatandspatowingtothepresenceofaspirationinpat
anditsabsenceinspat.

Bothpronunciationsare,ofcourse,physicallypossible.Indeed,therearemanylanguageswhereitispossibleforinitial[p](andothersoundsaswell)tooccur
aspiratedaswellasunaspiratedthefeatureofaspirationisusedphonemicallyinsuchlanguages.AgoodexampleisAssamese,alanguageofnortheasternIndia.
Considerthecontrastingformsin(12):
a.[pat]

'leaf'

(12)

b.[phat]

'split'

c.[bat]

'road'

d.[bhat]

'boiledrice'

InAssamesethereisaphonemiccontrastnotonlybetweentheordinaryunaspiratedvoiceless[p]andthevoicelessaspirated[ph],butalsobetweentheseandthe
voicedunaspiratedandaspiratedpair[b]and[bh].Allofthesesoundscanoccurrelativelyfreelyinvariouspositionswithinwords.
Asaconsequenceoftheseobservations,weareledtotheconclusionthattheoccurrenceofaspiratedversusunaspiratedvoicelessbilabialstopsinEnglishisrule
governed.Wewillrefertothepatternofoccurrencethatthesesoundsexhibitascomplementarydistribution.Thiskindofdistribution,governedbyrule,standsin
oppositiontothecontrastivedistributionthatisexhibitedbysoundsthatarephonemicallydistinct,andwhosedistributioncannotbepredictedbyrule.Thesimple
theoryT1that

Page228

wesuggestedearlieristhusinadequate.Thereareindeedsounddistinctionsthatmustberepresentedphoneticallybutcannotbecharacterizedasdistinctphonemes.In
thefollowingsectionwewilldeveloparichertheoryofsoundstructurethataccountsbothforphonemiccontrastandforthekindofsystematicphoneticvariationthat
isexemplifiedinthecaseofaspirationinEnglish.
ATheoryofPhonemesandTheirVariants
Wehaveidentifiedtwogoalsthataphonologicaltheorymustmeet:(1)tocharacterizethesetofdistinctivecontrastingsounds(phonemes)inthelanguage,and(2)to
characterizethedistributionofsoundsthatarenotdistinctive.Simplyincreasingthevocabularyofphoneticsymbols(toincludeaspiratedstops,forinstance)doesnot
accomplishthesegoals.Aswehavenoted,therelationshipbetweenaspiratedandunaspiratedvoicelessbilabialstopsseemstoberegularandpredictable.Itis
arguablypartofthespeaker'sactiverulegovernedknowledgeofthelanguage,andnotsimplyageneraldescriptionofthedistributionofelementsinthelexicon.
SupposeanEnglishspeakerhasreasontocoinanewword,forinstance,aformrepresentedinconventionalspellingaspaff.ItisasafebetthatanyEnglishspeaker
willpronouncethishypotheticalwordwithaninitialaspiratedstop,as[phf].Butsuchawordcouldnothavebeenincludedinanylexiconofpreviouslylearnedwords
ofEnglish,oreveninacompletelexiconofallthewordsofEnglish.
Consideralsotheevidenceprovidedbyspeecherrors.Aspeakerintendstoproduceawordlikeflap[flp].Inadvertently,theproductionsystemslips,andthe
speakeremits[phlp],anticipating,asitwere,thefinal[p].Final[p]isnotnormallyaspiratedinEnglish,norisinitial[f].Butwhenspeakerscommitthiskindoferror,
theanticipatory[p]willbeaspirated.
ThesekindsofevidenceconfirmourassertionthatEnglishspeakersrepresenttheirknowledgeaboutaspirationinaformthatisindependentofthephoneticformof
actualwords.Wewillformallyrepresentthisknowledgebymeansoftheconceptofthephonologicalrule.Afirstapproximationtotheparticularrulethatgoverns
Englishaspirationisgivenbelow:
(13)

EnglishAspiration(version1)
Allinstancesofwordinitialvoicelessbilabialstopsareaspirated.

ThisrulemakesnospecialreferencetoanyparticularformintheEnglishlexicon.Inthisgeneralform,itwillholdforalllexicalitems,aswellasforpossibleformsthat
havenotyetbeenenteredintothelexicon.Moreover,ifweassumethattheruleofAspirationispartoftheactualprocessofproducingutterances(aswellasa
descriptionofphonologicalknowledge,inthecompetencesense),wecanexplainwhymistakenlyproducedutterancesalsoexhibitaspiration.
Inthecaseofaphonemiccontrast,say,between[p]and[b],speakersreporteffortlesslythatthesearedifferentsounds.Buttheyclingjustassteadfastlytothebelief
that[p]and[ph],whichareinfactrelatedbyaphonologicalrule,arethe"same"sound.Wewantourtheorytoaccountfortheseperceptionsinastraightforward,
plausiblefashion.Itseemsunlikely,forexample,thatspeakerssearchtheirlexiconforminimalpairswhenaskediftwosoundsarethesameordifferent.Norisitlikely
thatourperceptionofsamenessisestablishedonthebasisofsomemetricofphoneticsimilarity,for[p]and[ph]arenomoreorlessdifferentfromoneanotherthan
[p]isfrom[b].Bothpairsdifferbyexactlyonefeature(aspirationinthefirstcase,voicinginthe

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Figure6.2
Thestructureofphonologicalknowledge

second),yetonlythe[p]/[b]pairpresentsaphonemiccontrastthatisperceivedasdifferent.
Theseconsiderationshaveledphonologiststotheconclusionthatphonologicalknowledgecannotbecharacterizedadequatelybyatheorythatprovidesonlyphonetic
representations.Wewillclaimthatthereisasecondlevelofrepresentationatwork,alevelofmentalrepresentationthatismoredistantfromtheactualphysical
phoneticeventsthanisphoneticrepresentationitself.Werefertothisastheunderlyingphonologicalrepresentation(UPR).Theoverallpictureofthegrammarthat
isimpliedbytheseassumptionsisgiveninfigure6.2.
Byhypothesis,soundsthatareincomplementarydistributionshareasinglecommonphonemeinUPR.(Weenclosesuchentitiesinslashmarksforexample,/p/to
distinguishthemfromelementsofphoneticrepresentation.)Thelexicon,whereall(andonly)phonemicpropertiesaremarked,consistsofformsinUPRphonological
rulesthenapplytosuchformstoconvertthemintophoneticrepresentations.Thus,theruleofAspirationcannowbeunderstoodtoapplytolexicalentriesthatcontain
aphonemic/p/thatisnotmarkedforaspiration.Justincasethis/p/isintheinitialpositionofaword,itisconvertedbyruleinto[ph].Inanyotherposition/p/willbe
realizedphonetically,withnochange,as[p].Thesetwophoneticvariants,[p]and[ph],arereferredtoasallophonesofthephoneme/p/,relatedtothatphonemeby
rule.Insuchamodelourcommonsenseconvictionoftheapparentidentitybetweenphysicallydistinctsoundslike[p]and[ph]cannowbeunderstoodasareal
identitynotatthephysicallevel,notinphoneticdescription,butatadeeperlevelofmentalrepresentation.
Toillustratetheseideas,letusconsidermoreconcretelythederivations(formalmappingsbetweenlevelsofrepresentation)ofsomeactualwordssay,pat,spat,
sap,andzap.TheUPRsofthesewords,theforminwhichtheyareenteredinthelexicon,willbe/pt/,/spaet/,/saep/,and/zp/.(Howmightyoudetermine
why/s/,/z/,and//arepresumedtobedistinctunderlyingphonemesofEnglish?)Itnowremainstoapplyrelevantphonologicalrules(Prules)totheseUPRs.Thus
farwehaveseenonlyoneruleinEnglish,Aspiration.Therelevantderivationsfortheaboveformsaregivenin(14):
Underlying

(14)

representation

/pt/

/spt/

/sp/

/zp/

Prules

Aspiration

ph

notapplicable

Phonetic

representation

[p t]

[spt]

[sp]

[zp]

Page230

RulesandFeatures
Wewillnowexaminethenatureofphonologicalrulesinmoredetail.ConsideragainthephenomenonofaspirationinEnglish.InourfirstformulationoftheAspiration
rule,welimitedourattentiontothephoneme/p/.Thefactisthatothersounds,forexample,/t/,behaveidenticallyto/p/withrespecttoaspiration.Theminimalpair
testwillassureusthat/p/and/t/areindeedcontrastingphonemes:witnessthelexicalcontrastbetweenpickandtick,spillandstill.Inwordinitialpositionwefind
onlyaspirated[th]inotherpositions,plain[t].WemustthereforemodifytheAspirationrulesothatitappliesto/t/aswellas/p/:
(15)

EnglishAspiration(version2)
Wordinitial/p/and/t/areaspirated.

Phonologistsareconcernednotonlywithmakingcorrectobservations,butalsowithexplainingthem,and,asinanyscience,seekexplanationsthatleadtoclearerand
deeperunderstandings.Inthisspirit,why,onemightask,are/p/and/t/bothaspiratedunderthesameconditions?Itispossible,ofcourse,thattheyareonly
accidentallyandrandomlygroupedtogetherwithrespecttoaspiration.HadthehistoricaldevelopmentofEnglishbeendifferent,perhaps/n/and/p/ratherthan/p/
and/t/mighthavebehavedalike.
However,thefactisthatthegroupingof/p/.and/t/isaverycommonphenomenoninthegrammarsoftheworld'slanguagesthegroupingof/n/and/p/israreindeed.
Wewanttobeabletofindanonarbitrarywayofcharacterizingthisasymmetry,andwecanreadilyfindonewhenweconsiderthephoneticfeaturesthatcharacterize
thesoundsinquestion.Thephoneticsegments[p]and[t]shareanumberofarticulatorycharacteristicsbyvirtueofbothbeingvoicelessstops:theyarebothmade
withasimple,completeclosureofthevocaltract,withintheoralcavity,withnonvibratingvocalcords.Ifweassumethatthesefeaturesarenotonlydescriptionsof
physicalphoneticstates,butalsoabstractpropertiesofthephonemesthatunderlietheminmentalrepresentation,wecanrecasttheruleofAspirationinaformthat
capturestheunityof/p/and/t/inaprincipledmanner:
(16)

EnglishAspiration(version3)
Voicelessstopsoundsareaspiratedinwordinitialposition.

ComparingthefirsttwoversionsoftheAspirationrulewiththethird,wenoteacrucialdifference.Thefirsttwoareformulatedintermsofparticularphonemes,treated
asunanalyzablewholes.Butthemostrecentversionoftheruleisformulatedintermsofparticularproperties,orphonologicalfeatures,ofgroupsofphonemes.There
isnothingaboutthefirsttwoversionsoftherulethatwouldprecludeanyotherarbitrarysegmentfrombeinginvolvedintheprocess.Thus,wemightexpectthe
secondversionoftheruletoeventuallycometoapplyto/p/,/t/,and/n/.Aswenoted,suchgroupingsdonot(commonly)arise.ButthethirdversionofAspiration
makesaspecificandtestableclaim:anyvoicelessstopinEnglishwillbeaspiratedintheappropriateenvironment.Thusfarwehavediscussedonlytwosuchstops,/p/
and/t/.Butifthereareothervoicelessstopphonemesinthelanguage,thenewAspirationrulepredictsthattheywillbehaveidenticallywith/p/and/t/.Infact,thereis
another:/k/,thevelarvoicelessstop.Itsphonemicstatuscanbedeterminedsimplyenoughbytheminimalpairtest:comparepill,till,andkill.Theaspirationof/k/in
initialposition,aspredicted,isevidentinformslikekill(butappropriatelymissinginskill).

Page231

Phonologicaltheoryhasfargreaterexplanatoryandpredictivevalue,then,ifweregardphonemesnotasatomicwholes,butassetsofcomponentphonological
features.Thefeaturesservetwopurposes:first,theyprovideadescription,atthelevelofphoneticrepresentation,thatisappropriatelyclosetothephysiologicaland
acousticnatureofspeecheventssecond,theyallowaproperclassificationofphonemesatthelevelofunderlyingphonologicalrepresentation.Cognitive
representationsinthephonologicaldomainarethushighlyabstractincertainways,butcloselylinkedtothephysicalnatureoftheorganismandtheworldinother
respects.Furthermore,thereisgoodreasontobelievethatphonologicalfeaturesarenotidiosyncraticallydefinedforeachparticularlanguage.Insteadwebelievethat
auniformsetoffeaturesismadeavailablewithinuniversalgrammar,asafixedpropertyofthearchitectureofthelanguageacquisitionsystem.Wewillseesome
evidenceforthisviewshortly.
MorphophonemicAlternation:TheCaseofEnglishPlurals
EarlierinthischapterwesawthatthepluralendinginEnglishcantakethreephoneticallydistinctforms:[s],[z],and[ ].Anumberofinterestingproblemsremainto
beconsideredinthisregard.
First,inthetheorywehavedevelopedabove,eachofthesepluralformswouldseemtorequiredistinctphonemicrepresentations.Wemightexpecttheunderlying
formof[s]tobe/s/,andof[z]tobe/z/.But[ ]posessomethingofaproblem./z/iscertainlyaphoneme,butitisnotatallapparentthatthereisa/ /phoneme.The
minimalpairtestwillfailtofindasinglecasewheretwowordsdifferuniquelyinthatonecontainsa/ /contrastingwithsomeothervowel(atleastinmonosyllabic
wordswherethevowelisstressed).Whatthencantheunderlyingphonologicalrepresentationof[ ]be?
Thesecondproblemisthatevenifwecouldaccountfortheunderlyingnatureof[ ],wewouldbeleftwiththreedistinctunderlyingrepresentationsforwhatis
transparentlythesamemorphemeofEnglish,themeaningbearingelementthatrepresentsplurality.SurelythetheoryofphonologicalknowledgeofEnglishoughttobe
abletocapturethisfundamentalidentityof[s],[z],and[ ]inaunitaryfashion.Butthetheoryofphonemeswehavedevelopedseemstoforcethreeseparatelexical
representationsonuswhenweoughttohaveonlyone.
Letusstepbackforamomentandrecallthatthedistributionofthethreeformsis,infact,predictable.Inthecurrenttheorythiskindofpredictabilityisrepresentedin
theformofP(honological)rules.WhatwouldsuchrulesbelikeinthecaseoftheEnglishplural?Considertheactualdistributiontable6.3outlinesthecircumstances
inwhichwefindeachtypeofending.Onexaminingthefirstcolumn,wediscoverthatthefinalsegmentofeachnounstemthebasic,nonpluralformisvoiceless.
Similarly,allofthenounsthattakethe[z]endinghavevoicedfinalsegments.Thethirdcolumnrendersthingsalittlelessclear.Someofthewordsendinavoiceless
segment(forexample,the[ ]ofjudge).However,carefulobservationleadstoarevealingdiscovery:allofthewordsinthethirdcolumnendinconsonantsthatare
acousticallynoisy,andeachhastwodistinctnoisesources.The[s]and[z]endings,forinstance,involvefrictionnoisebetweenthetongueandroofofthemouth,and
alsonoiseproducedbytheairstreamasitpassestheteeth.Wecancapturethisacousticsimilaritybycharacterizingthefinalsegmentsinthestemsofthethirdcolumn
bythephonologicalfeaturestrident.

Page232
Table6.3
DistributionofthethreeversionsoftheEnglishpluralmorpheme
[s]

[z]

[ ]

ship/ships

hub/hubs

glass/glasses

gnat/gnats

dud/duds

gaze/gazes

tick/ticks

bag/bags

lash/lashes

laugh/laughs

cur/curs

garage/garages

depth/depths

shill/shills

latch/latches

ram/rams

rouge/rouges

shin/shins

judge/judges

hoe/hoes

shiv/shivs

lathe/lathes

Thereappear,then,tobethreegeneralizationsatworkhere:(1)ifanounendsinastridentsound,ittakesthe[ ]ending(2)ifitendsina(nonstrident)voiced
sound,ittakesthe[z]endingand(3)ifitendsina(nonstrident)voicelesssound,ittakesthese[s]ending.Wemighttakethesestatementstoberulesthatgovernthe
assignmentofthreelexicalpluralmorphemes.Butsuchananalysismissesthethrustoftheproblemsposedearlier,namely,that[ ]hasnodirectphonemiccounterpart,
andthatthethreephoneticformsinquestionrepresentthesingleconceptofthepluralinEnglish,inspiteoftheapparentphonemicdifferencesamongthem.Weought
thentoconsiderrevisingourtheoryinordertocapturetheunityofthepluralphenomenon.
Infact,thisisasimplemattertoaccomplish.Letusclaimthatthereisindeedonlyasinglelexicalrepresentationofthepluralmorphemeassuming,byhypothesis,thatit
is/z/.TheprocessofformingapluralinEnglishconsistsofaffixingtheplural/z/toanounsteminunderlyingphonologicalrepresentation.Considerthenounsgnat,
bag,andglass.Thesehavethelexicalphonemicforms/nt/,/bg/,and/gls/,respectively.Afteraffixingtheplural/z/,wehavethecompositeunderlying
representationsin(17):
(17)

/nt+z/

/bg+z/

/gls+z/

Inordertoaccountforthe[z]thatoccursinformswithfinalvoicelesssegments,likebags,weneeddonothingatall,and/bg+z/willsurfacephoneticallyas[bgz]
withnoadditionalsteps.Inordertoaccountforthe[s]thatoccursinformslikegnats,wepositaruleoftheformin(18):
(18)

Devoicing

Whenamorpheme/z/isprecededbyafinalunvoicedsegment,

devoicethe/z/thatis,convertitto[s].

TheDevoicingrulewillnotapplyto/bg+z/becausethefinal/g/ofthestemisvoiced.Buttherulewillapplytoaformlike/nt+z/,becausethefinal/t/ofthestem
isvoicelesshence,the/z/pluralaffixisconvertedbyDevoicingto[s],yielding[nts].
Itremainstoaccountforthepluralofwordslikeglass.Recallthattheunderlyingrepresentationofthepluralis/gls+z/.[ ]musteventuallyappearbetweenthe/s/
ofthestemandthepluralaffix.Sincethisvowelisnotpresentinunderlying

Page233

representationunderthisaccount(andhasnospecialphonemiccounterpartinanycase),wemustpostulatearuletoaccomplishitsinsertionintotherepresentation:
(19)

[ ]Insertion

Whena/z/morphemeisaffixedtoastemwithafinalstrident

segment,insert[ ]betweenthestemfinalsegmentandtheaffix.

Theruleof[ ]Insertionwillapplyappropriatelyto/gls+z/.Observethattherulesinquestionmustapplyinaparticularorder.IfDevoicingweretoapply
first,/gls+z/wouldsurfaceincorrectlyas*[gls s],since/z/,precededbyavoiceless/s/,wouldtriggerDevoicing.Theorderingrelation[ ]Insertion/Devoicing,in
additiontotherulesthemselves,mustthereforebeapartofthephonologicalgrammarofEnglish.
Thegeneralityofthisanalysisbecomesclearwhenweobservethattheinsertion/devoicingphenomenonisnotsimplyadescriptionofnounpluralformationinEnglish.
Infact,wefindthesamedistributionof[s],[z],and[ ]whenweexaminethethirdpersonsingularendingofEnglishverbswalks[waks],nags[ngs],hitches[
].ThepossessiveendingbehavesinthesamefashionMark's[marks],Bob's[babz],George's[
].Ineachcasewehypothesizethattheunderlying
representationis/z/phonologicallyidenticaltotheplural,butdifferinginmeaningandsyntacticfunctionandtherulesof[ ]InsertionandDevoicingapply.
Anexaminationofthisbroaderdomainalsoprovidesdirectevidencethattheunderlyingformisindeed/z/,andnot/s/or/ /orsomethingelse.Noticethatadecision
totreattheunderlyingformofthepluralas/s/,asitsconventionalspellingmightsuggest,wouldchangethelogicofthederivationconsiderably.Inparticular,werewe
tomakethisassumption,theDevoicingrulewehavepositedwouldneedtobereplacedbyacorrespondingVoicingruleonethatchangedthepluralmarker/s/into
[z]intheenvironmentofawordfinalvoicedconsonant.However,byconsideringthephenomenonof''iscontraction"inEnglish,wherewefindvariationbetween
phraseslikeBobis(here),andBob's(here),wefindindependentevidencethatEnglishcontainsaDevoicingrule,inturnmotivatingouroriginalassumptiontreating
thepluralmarkerasunderlying/z/.TheunderlyingrepresentationofBobis(here)is/babIz/andmustsurfaceas[babz].Thecontractionprocessconsistsofdeleting
the/I/ofisandaffixingittotheprecedingnoun.Oncethiscontractionisaccomplished,anenvironmentariseswhere[ ]InsertionandDevoicingcanapplyonthe
assumptionthatthoserulesoperateover/z/,inthiscase,thesecondsegmentofis([iz]).Indeed,wefindjustthesameoutputsthatwesawinthecaseoftheplural,the
thirdperson,andthepossessive:Markisheresurfaces,aftercontraction,as[markshir]Georgeishere,as[
hir]andBob'shere,unchangedbyrule,as[babz
hir].ThehypothesisthattheunderlyingformoftheEnglishpluralis/z/turnsouttohaveexactlytherightpredictivevaluewhenitcomestounderstandingthe
completelyunrelatedphenomenonofcontraction.Thus,wehavesupportingevidenceforourapparentlyarbitrarydecisiontoassume(inspiteoforthographic
appearance,whererelevantformsarealwayswritten"s")thatthepluralisunderlyingly/z/.
HierarchicalRepresentations
Ontheviewthathasbeendevelopedthusfar,phonologicalrepresentationsarelinearsegmentalandtwodimensional:thatis,arepresentationcontainsarowof
phonemes,eachofwhichconsistsofacolumnoffeatures.Thefamiliarromanalphabetroughlyrepresentsalinearstringofphonemes.Eachwrittensymbolor
combinationofsymbols

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corresponds(ideally)toonephoneme.Notallwritingsystemsarelikethis,however:manyofthemusesymbolsthatdonotcorrespondtosinglephonemes,butto
groupingsofphonemesthataregenerallycalledsyllables.Wehaveseenampleevidencethatphonemesthemselvesarenotmerelyartifactsofourwritingsystems,but
fundamentalelementsofphonologicalrepresentation.Wewillnowconsidersomeevidencethatthesameistrueofthesyllable.
Consider,again,thecaseofaspiration.YouwillrecallthatwehaveclaimedthatvoicelessstopsareaspiratedinwordinitialpositioninEnglishforexample,[phIt].
Butthisisnotthewholestory.Inawordlikeappear,themedial/p/isalsoaspirated,asisthe/t/inattackandthe/k/inakin.However,theruleweadducedearlier
doesnotaccountforthesefacts,sincetherelevantvoicelessstopsarenotwordinitial.
Wecanneverthelessprovideaperspicuousgeneralaccountofaspiration,ifweassumethatphonologicalrepresentationsareorganizednotonlyintosegmentalchains,
butalsointohigherordersyllablestructures.Thesyllableisanotionthatisintuitivelyeasytograsp:itisagroupingofsegmentsthatseemtoustocoheretogether.
Thus,evenifpakaisnotawordofEnglish,virtuallyanyspeakerwillbeabletobreakitdownintosyllablessyllabifyitaspaka.Indeed,itisafairlysafe
predictionthatspeakersofeverylanguagewillmakethesamesyllablebreak.Eveninmorecomplexcases,whennativespeakersmaybelesssureofwherethe
syllablebreaksare,theyarequiteuniformlyabletosayhowmanysyllablesthereareinaword.
Researchershavelongsoughtameasurabledefinitionofthesyllable,hopingtofindthattheintuitivenotioncorrespondedtoaphysicaleventlikeabreathingpulse,ora
unitofmusculareffort.Sucheffortshavefailed.Thesyllableappearsinsteadtobebestinterpretedasaunitofcognitiveorganization.Itishelpful(and,asitturnsout,
theoreticallysignificantseebelow)toregardaphonologicalrepresentationasconsistinginpartofasequence,orskeleton,ofCandVelements.Syllablescanthen
basicallybedefinedintermsoftheorganizationofCandVelementsintheskeleton.
Everysyllablemustnormallycontainavowel(V)nucleus,thecoreofsyllabicorganization(withtheoccasionalexceptionbeingcaseslikeEnglishbuttoninwhicha
sonorousconsonantinthiscase,/n/servesasthepeakofthesyllable).Indeed,itappearsthattheabilityofspeakerstocountsyllables,evenwhentheycannotsay
howtheyarebrokenup,isafunctionofcountingthevowelnuclei.Vowelsarethemostperceptuallysalientelementsofthesyllablelargelyaccountingforitsoverall
duration,andcarryingthesyllable'spitchortonality.
Itisquitepossibletoidentifysomeelementarygeneralprinciplesofsyllabification.OnesuchprincipleappearstobethatsuccessivesequencesofCandVare
organizedwiththeCelementasthebeginning,oronset,ofthesyllable.Astringlikepatakawillalwaysbesyllabifiedaspataka,notas*pataka.Theprinciple
thatguaranteesthisistheMaximalOnsetPrinciple.Theprinciplesaysthatallthingsbeingequal(butseebelow)consonantsareorganizedintotheonsetofa
followingsyllableratherthantheendofaprecedingone.So,toconsideranactualexample,awordlikeattract,[
].Languagesdo,however,differinthe
complexitytheyallowinonsets.WhereassomelanguagespermitonlysimpleCVsyllables,otherspermitmorecomplexsyllableonsets.InEnglish,forexample,the
onsetmaycontainasmanyasthreeconsonants:forinstance,thewordspree,whoseskeletoncontainsthesingleCCCVsyllable/spri/.
Thesyllabicnucleusitselfmaybecomplex,asinthecaseofEnglishdiphthongslike/oi/inboy,wheretwononidenticalsegmentsareeachassociatedwithadistinct

Page235

Figure6.5
Hierarchicalsyllablestructureforthe
onesyllablewordpat

Vslot(figure6.3).IncaseswherevowelsequencesareidenticalinlanguagessuchasSinhala,wheretheword
'meat'ithasbeenconvincinglyarguedthata
skeletalnucleusoftheformVVisassociatedwithasinglephoneme.Thelengthofthevowelisaconsequenceofhavingtwoelementsintheskeleton,ratherthantwo
distinctvowelphonemesegmentsinalinearstring(figure6.4).Englishalsopermitscomplexsyllableoffsets,orcodas,whichfollowthevocalicnucleus:forexample,
brisk,whoseskeletonisthesingleCCVCCmonosyllable/brIsk/.
Thereisgoodreasontothinkthatthenucleusandcodaarethemselvesgroupedtogetherinahierarchicalfashion,intoarhymeconstituent.Thetermisdueinpartto
thefactthatitisthisconstituentthat"rhymes"inconventionalpoetrysit,pit,bitwhereastheonsetdoesnotparticipateinthiskindofnormalrhymescheme.The
rhymealsoplaysacrucialroleinthedeterminationofstresspatternsinmanylanguages(includingEnglish).Rhymesthatarecomplex,whichcontainanucleusplusa
coda,ora"branching"nucleusadiphthongorlongvoweltendtobethemostprominent,orstressed,syllableinwords.
Theoverallhierarchicalpictureofthesyllablethatemergesisillustratedinfigure6.5fortheonesyllablewordpat.Therhymeconstituentisobligatory:everysyllablein
everylanguagemustcontainatleastaVnucleus.Consonantalonsetsandcodas

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Figure6.6
Syllabificationforpit

areoptionalinsomelanguages:Englishallowsboth,either,orneither:beat[bit],bee[bi],eat[it],oh[o].
WenotedabovethattherearesomeapparentcounterexamplestotheMaximalOnsetPrinciple.AnEnglishwordlikeconstrainhastheskeletalstructure
CVCCCCVC.TheMaximalOnsetPrinciplemightappeartomandatethatthiswordbesyllabifiedasCVCCCCVC*constrain.Ofcourse,noEnglishspeaker
wouldreportsuchasyllabification.Indeed,wewanttoruleoutthepossibilityofamonosyllabicEnglishwordbeginningwithasequencelike*/nstr/eventhoughsuch
initialsequencesarepossibleinotherlanguages.(Russian,forexample,hasonsetslike/mst/inthenameMstislav.)Therefore,wemustspecify,foreachlanguage,the
setofconsonantsequencesthatcanserveasonsets.TheMaximalOnsetPrincipleisoverriddenwhensuchlanguagespecificconstraintswouldbeviolated.
Althoughthereisagreatdealmoretosayabouttheorganizationofsyllablestructurethatisbeyondthescopeofthisdiscussion(morediscussionregardingthe
evidenceforsyllableswillbefoundinchapters9andII),forpresentpurposesitsufficestoassumetwothingsaboutphonologicalrepresentation.First,phonological
representationsarehierarchicalinthesensediscussedabove,andsecond,theMaximalOnsetPrinciple(atleastinpart)definestherelationshipbetweensyllabified
segments.WecannowreturntotheproblemofcharacterizingtheEnglishAspirationrule.Wehaveseenthatvoicelessstopsareaspiratedinwordinitialposition,and
alsoinwordslikeappear.Ourinitialformulationoftheruledoesnotaccountfortheselattercases.Butanobviousgeneralizationemergeswhenwethinkintermsof
syllablestructure.
Allwordinitialsegmentsare,bydefinition,intheonsetofthefirstsyllable.Thus,pitissyllabifiedasinfigure6.6.UndertheMaximalOnsetPrinciple,awordlike
appearwillhavethesyllabicstructureillustratedinfigure6.7.Ifwemaketheplausibleassumptionthatsyllablestructuresarepartoftheunderlyingrepresentationof
words,thentheirpropertiesshouldbe''visible"tophonologicalrulesthatoperateoverthem.ItbecomesasimplemattertoreformulatetheAspirationruleinaway
thatgeneralizestothenecessarycases:
(20)

EnglishAspiration(syllabicversion)
Aspirateallsyllableinitialvoicelessstops.

(Thereare,however,somemedialvoicelessstopsthatdonotaspirate.Forexample,themedial/p/inhappyisnotaspirated.Acarefulexaminationoftherangeof
caseswill

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Figure6.7
Syllabificationforappear

showthataspirationoccursonlywhenavoicelessstopisintheonsetofastressedsyllable.Kahn(1976)hasarguedthattheonsetsofunstressedsyllablesinEnglish
areactuallyambisyllabic.Thatis,theyalsoserveascodasoftheprecedingsyllable.Selkirk(1980)arguesthatconsonantsintheonsetofunstressedsyllablesare
resyllabifiedbyaspecialruleofEnglish,whichchangesbasicsyllablestructure(asdefinedbytheMaximalOnsetPrinciple)reassigningtheconsonanttothecodaof
theprecedingsyllable.Hence,suchconsonantswouldnotbesubjecttotheAspirationrule(20).)
Englishaspirationisageneralizationthatcannotbecapturedinapurelylinearrepresentationalframeworkwithoutgreatdescriptivecomplication.(Asanexercise,the
readermaywishtotrytoformulatetheAspirationruletocoverthefullrangeofcaseswithoutmakinguseofnotionslikethesyllable.)Indeed,thelastdecadeanda
halfofresearchhasledtotheconclusionthatmanyotherphonologicalphenomenaarealsobestunderstoodinanonlinear"threedimensional"framework.Inanearly
developmentofthisview,Goldsmith(1976)showedthattonelanguages,whosewordsmaybedistinguishedsolelybydifferencesinpitch,arebestdescribedinan
autosegmentalframework,oneinwhichthefeaturesofpitcharerepresentedasdiscreteelementsonaseparatetierofrepresentation(likesyllables),ratherthanas
inherentfeaturesofsegmentswithinalinearstring.Anexampleofananalysisthatisilluminatedbythisperspectivecanbefoundbyexaminingsomedatafromthe
AfricanlanguageEtung.Inthislanguageonesyllablewords(forexample,(21a))canbeassociatedwithhighpitch(H),lowpitch(L),risingpitch(R),orfallingpitch
(F).Butinwordsofmorethanonesyllable(21bc)),onlysimplehighandlowpitcharenormallyexhibited:
(21)

a.

kpa'first'

kpe'even'

na'itis'

no'how'

b.

HH

LL

HL

LH

nse'father'

egu'evening'

oda'platform'

ekat'leg'

c.

HHH

LLL

HLL

LHH

ekue'forest'

eyuri'dress'

akpuga'money'

bisone'spoon'

Iftonesaretobecharacterizedbyphonologicalfeaturesthatinhereinindividualsegments(say,vowels),wemustpositfoursuchfeatures:high,low,rising,andfalling.
Butapuzzlepresentsitself:whycantheputativetonefeaturesrisingandfallingonlyoccuronvowelsinwordsofonesyllable?

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Figure6.8
Tworepresentationsof"
tonemelodies"inEtung

Figure6.9
Tonesexhaustivelylinkedtovowels
inEtung.

Figure6.10
Representationsofcontour
tones

Anautosegmentalanalysiscanprovideaninsightfulaccountofthesefacts.TonelanguagessuchasEtunghavelexicalrepresentationsthatconsistof(atleast)a
phonemetierandanindependenttonaltier.Thetone"autosegments"HandLrepresentinghighandlowpitchcanoccuronthetonaltier.But,aswithphonemes,
onlycertainsequencesoftonesarepermitted.SupposethatforEtung,onlyH,L,LH,andHL"tonemelodies"areallowed.InatwosyllablewordwithanHLorLH
melody,eachtonewillbeassociatedwithonevowelaccordingtoawellformednessconstraintrequiringthateverytonemustbeassociatedwithavowel,andevery
vowelwithatone.Therepresentationsinfigure6.8obtain.Whenthenumberofsyllablenucleiexceedsthenumberoftonesonthetonetier,thewellformedness
conditionrequiresthatthetone(s)exhaustivelylinktoallvowels(orsyllablenucleiinEtung,nasalsmayserveassyllablenucleialongwithvowels,atleastinword
initialposition)(seefigure6.9).
IntheonesyllablecasesthepictureissimplewhenasingleHorLmelodyoccursthewordexhibitshighorlowtonebystraightforwardassociation.Butwhenan
LHorHLmelodyoccurs,thestoryismoreinteresting.Thewellformednessconditionrequiresthatalltonesbelinkedtovowels.Inonesyllablewordsbothtones
mustbelinkedtothesinglevowel.Thisgivesrisetocontourtones,representedinfigure6.10.
Thephoneticinterpretationoftheserepresentationsisquitestraightforwardalowhighsequenceisheardasariseahighlow,asafall.Therearenorisesorfallsin
themultisyllabicwordsabovesimplybecausesuchformshaveenoughvowelstolinkwitheachtonalautosegmentwithoutformingacontour.Thisisaformallysimpler
accountofthisphenomenonthanispossibleinalinearsegmentalmodelnoseparaterisingorfallingfeatureswithskeweddistributionsareneededtodescribe
thesecontouredtones.
Thedecisiontotreattoneasanautosegment(intonelanguages)alsoreceivessupportfromotherquarters.Forexample,Goldsmith(1976)hasdemonstratedthat

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Figure6.11
Metricalstructure
forpersist

Figure6.12
Metricalstructure
forperfect

tonalautosegmentscanbeinsertedordeletedindependentlyofthesegmentsorsyllableswithwhichtheywillbeassociatedphonetically,aspartofmorphophonemic
processes.And,indeed,thesegmentalmaterialtowhichatoneislinkedcanbealteredorevendeletedwithoutaffectingitsassociatedtone.Furthermore,lexical
representationsintonelanguagescanhave"floating"tonalautosegmentsmorphemesthatarenotassociatedwithanyparticularphonemeatall,buthaveapurely
intonationalaffect.Thisindependenceoftonesandsegmentalphonemes(seeGoldsmith1990fordetails)providescompellingsupportforthenotionthatphonological
representationmustbericherthantheconventionalpictureofalinearstringofsegments.
LibermanandPrince(1976),Selkirk(1984),Prince(1983),Hayes(1980,1982),andothershavealsodevelopedrelatedframeworkstoaccountformetrical
structurepatternsofstress,rhythm,andintonation.Ontheseviews,theperceptualsalienceofcertainpartsofwordsandphrasescanbecapturedbyrepresenting
theindividualsyllablestructuresofamultisyllabicwordinahierarchicalrepresentationthatisindependentofthelinearstringofphonemes.
Insuchametricaltheory,astressedsyllableisrepresentedasstrong(S)relativetoaweak(W)syllablewithwhichitispaired.Onthisview,stressisinherentlynota
phoneticpropertyofasyllablethatcanberepresentedbyafeatureitisamatterofrelativeprominencethatisalwaysdefinedwithrespecttosomeotherelement
inanonlinearrepresentation.Atwosyllablewordlikepersist[prsIst],withstressonthesecondsyllable,isassumedtohavethemetricalstructuregiveninfigure6.11.
Bycontrast,anadjectivelikeperfect[prfIkt]hasthemetricalstructureinfigure6.12.Notethattheverbtoperfecthasthesamestresspatternastopersist,whichis
alsoaverb.Ingeneral,Englishverbstendtohavefinalstress,evenwhentheirassociatednounshavestressonthefirstsyllable.
Metrical"trees"likethoseabovecanalsobeusedtorepresentstressinstructuresmorecomplexthansinglewords.Thus,nounphrasesgenerallyexhibittheoverall
metricalpatternWS,thatis,withmainstressonthefirstsyllableoftherightmostelement.Thisisthestresspatterntypicalofphrasalstructures(figure6.13).Themain
prominence(inisolation)ofthefirstsyllableofprettyisreducedbecausethesecondelement,flower,hasanoverallgreaterprominenceinthephrase.Asaresult,the
firstsyllableoffloweristhemostprominent(moststressed)elementinthewholephrase.Compoundnounslikeblackboard,consistingoftheadjectiveblackandthe
nounboard,andhavingaspeciallexicalmeaning(asurfacetowriteonwithchalk),followadistinctmetricalpattern,withstressontheleftmostelement(figure6.14).

Page240

Figure6.13
Stresspatternforthephraseprettyflower

Figure6.14
Metricalstructure
forthecompound
blackboard

Figure6.15
Gridrepresentationsfor
perfectandpersist

Theinteractionofwordstress,phrasalstress,andcompoundstressgivesrisetohighlyintricatepatternsofprominenceandintonation.Thesephenomenaarequite
complexandprovidedataforaveryrichresearchprogram.Somelinguists,notablyPrince(1983)andSelkirk(1984),havedevelopedasomewhatdistinctapproach
inwhichstressisrepresentedwithagridofassociatedbeats,orrhythmicalelements,ratherthanhierarchicaltreestructures(figure6.15).Althoughthisgridallowsus
toexpresssomewhatdifferentrelationshipsthanthemetricaltreeweconsideredabove,likethetreestructures,thegridcanbeviewedasadistinctautosegmentaltier.
Liketones,theelementsofthistiercanactindependentlyofinformationatotherlevelsofrepresentation.
Inongoingresearch,linguistscomparetheseandotherrepresentationalsystemsinanattempttodiscoverthenatureofthecognitivesystemthatmediatesthemetrical
propertiesoflanguage.Ingeneral,allofthesenonlinearapproacheshavetendedtoshiftsomeoftheburdenofphonologicaldescriptionfromtheprocesslikerulesand
ruleorderingswediscussedabove,topropertiesofricherhierarchicalrepresentationsthemselves.Moreover,manyofthesepropertiessuchastheorganizationof
syllablesintoonsetandrhymeconstituents,orthepossiblelocationsofstressareheldtobeconsequencesofhumancognitivearchitecture(thespeciesgeneral
linguisticcapacity,oruniversalgrammar)ratherthanpeculiaritiesthatmustbestatedinthegrammarsofparticularlanguages.

Page241

6.3Syntax
SomePreliminaries
Languagesarecognitivesystemsthatenablehumanbeingstoexpressaninfiniterangeofmeaningsinaphysical,(typically)acousticform.However,having
investigatedatheoryofphonologicalrepresentation,wearestillfarfromanunderstandingofhowlinguisticsoundsarepairedwithsemanticinterpretations.Indeed,
oneofthecentralmysteriesofnaturallanguagecanbecouchedinthisway:howisitthatthemovementofairmolecules,andattendantchangesinpressure,can
ultimatelybetreatedbyhumanbeingsasmeaningful?
Obviously,meaningsmustbecorrelatedwithmorphemesandwords,buttheremustalsobeaprocedureforassigningmeaningtophrases,sentences,andlarger
discourses.Currentlinguistictheorymaintainsthatthereisahighlyarticulatedsubcomponentofgrammarsthesyntaxthatmediatesthepairingofsoundand
meaning.Asinthecaseofphonologicaltheory(or,indeed,anycurrentlydevelopingtheory),thereareanumberofalternativeapproachestothestudyofsyntax.
However,topermitustoexaminesyntaxinsomedepth,wewillconcentrateonthetheoryofgenerativegrammarcurrentlybeingdevelopedbyChomskyandothers
knownasGovernmentandBinding(GB).(Forreferencestoandsummariesofotherapproaches,seeSells1985andWasow1989.)
Thereareseveralmotivationsforpositingalevelofsyntacticrepresentation.ConsiderasentencelikeHerbandRaewenttothebeachinwhichthereappearstobe
anintuitiveboundarybetweenthesubjectofthesentence,HerbandRae,andthepredicate,wenttothebeach.Thesyntacticstructureofthesentencecanbe
informallysketchedasfollows:
(22)

[[HerbandRae][wenttothebeach]]

Sometimeswehaveclearintuitions(introspectivebeliefsandjudgments)aboutthiskindofstructuralcategorization.Askinganativespeakerto"divideasentenceinto
itstwomainparts"willfairlyreliablygivethestructurein(22).Thereisalsoconsiderableexperimentalevidencewithinpsycholinguisticstosupporttheviewthatthe
mentalrepresentationsofsentencesinvolvehigherorderstructureofthissort.Fodor,Bever,andGarrett(1975)provideagoodoverviewoftheseresults.Levelt
(1970),forinstance,showedthatwhensubjectsareaskedtojudgethe"relativerelatedness"ofadjacentwordsinasentence,responsesshowingahighdegreeof
relatednessclusteraroundsyntacticboundarieslikethoseindicatedin(22).Inexperimentsusingmorecomplexsentences,FodorandBever(1965)insertedbrief
clicksintosentencesandaskedsubjectstolocatethenoise.Subjects'performancewasbestwhentheclickcoincidedwithasyntacticboundary.
Incertaincases,however,ourintuitionsaboutsyntacticstructurearenotalwaysclearandmaybesubjecttodisagreementamongspeakers.Moreover,weoughtnot
investigatethepropertiesofalanguagesimplybyaskingspeakerstotellusaboutitsstructures.Althoughpeopleoftenbelievethattheyhaveinsightintosuchmatters,
itdoesnotmakeforgoodsciencetorelyonthelayperson'shunchesaboutlanguageanymorethanitwouldtoemploysuchanapproachinthestudyofanorganlike
thebrain,orthemechanismsofvisualperception.
Consequently,casesinwhichexperimentalevidenceisunavailable,orinwhichwemaynotyetknowwheretolookforexperimentalconfirmation,willrequireother

Page242

waysofestablishingthestructurethatweassociatewithsentences.Fortunately,thereareteststhatcanbeappliedthatprovidelinguisticevidenceforassigned
structure.Amongthesetoolsareconstituencytests.Inthisregard,considerthefollowingambiguoussentence,acaseinwhichasinglestringofwordscanbe
assignedmorethanonesemanticinterpretation.
(23)

Thepeopletalkedoverthenoise.

Thissentencemightbeinterpretedtomeanthatthepeoplespokesoastoovercomeaninterferingsound.Inthiscaseaplausiblesyntacticanalysisofthesentence
mightbeasin(24):
(24)

[Thepeople][talked[[over][thenoise]]]

Here,theverbistalked,andtherestofthepredicateconsistsofaprepositionalphraseoverthenoise(whichinturnconsistsoftheprepositionoveranditsobject
thenoise).
Alternatively,thesentencemightbeinterpretedtomeanthatthepeoplediscussedthenoise.Underthisinterpretation,areasonableconstituentanalysismightlooklike
this:
(25)

[Thepeople[[talkedover][thenoise]]]

Thisanalysisof(23)treatstheverbascomplex,consistingofthesimpleverbtalkedandtheparticleover.Butifthisgroupingiscorrectandthestringtalkedover
formsaconstituent(astructuralunit),weshouldbeabletosubstituteanotherverbforitforinstance,discussedandstillhaveasentencethatpreservesthesame
relationshipsbetweenstructureandmeaning.Inthecaseof(24),however,wecannotmakesuchasubstitution.Instead,wecansubstituteaphraselikeinspiteofthe
interruptionsforoverthenoise,consistentwiththeclaimthatthelatterconstitutesastructuralunitin(24)(thoughnotin(25)).Werefertothisasthesubstitution
test.Inthecaseathandthistestrevealsthatasinglesentencecancorrespondtotwoquitedifferentpropositions,eachofwhichhasadistinctsyntactic(andlogical)
structure,hence,adifferentcognitiverepresentation.
Additionalconfirmationfortheconclusionthat(23)canbeassociatedwithtwodifferentsyntacticrepresentationscomesfromconsideringthefollowingexample:
(26)

Thepeopletalkedthenoiseover.

Noticethatunlike(23),(26)canonlymeanthatthepeoplediscussedthenoise,andnotthattheyovercameit.Butwhydoesthesecondmeaningdisappear?Our
explanationisthatwhen(23)isstructuredasin(25),itcanbetransformedintoanalternativerepresentationinwhichtheparticleoverappearsattheendofthe
predicate.Othercomplexverbssuchascallupandeggonalsoallowdisplacementoftheparticle:
(27)

a.Thecommittee[calledup]thecandidate.

thecandidateup.

b.Thefans[eggedon]theiropponents.

opponentson.

Thecommitteecalled

Thefanseggedtheir

Prepositionalphrases,however,donotallowarepositioningoftheprepositionattheendofthephrase:

Page243

(28)

a.Themanstoodquietly[behindthetree].

quietlythetreebehind.

b.Theduckworriedaboutthefootball.

footballabout.

*Themanstood
*Theduckworriedthe

So,when(23)hasthemeaningandthestructureof(25),overcountsasaparticleandcanbedislocatedtotheendofthepredicate.Thisexplainswhy(26)cancarry
themeaningof(23)thatissupportedby(25).Incontrast,when(23)hasthemeaningandthestructureof(24),overcountsasapreposition.Sinceprepositions
cannotdislocate(see(28)),overcannotdislocateinthisanalysis.Thus,onitsrepresentationin(25),(23)canbeturnedinto(26),butnotonitsrepresentationin(24).
Thisprovidesastrongargumentfortakingmeaningtobeassignedonthebasisofsyntacticstructure,andnotdirectlytowordsandsentencesthemselves.Byapplying
constituencytestssuchasthesubstitutiontestandbyexaminingdistributionalpatternsinalanguage,linguistscandeterminethenatureofthesyntacticstructure.
Wearguedearlierthattheinherentcreativityoflanguage,andtheabilityofthehumaninformationprocessingsystemtoacquireandprocessit,cannotbeexplainedif
weviewthelanguageabilitysimplyasamentallistofsentences.Suchalistofsentenceswouldneedtobeinfinitelylong,afactatoddswiththeassumptionthatallof
ourcognitivecapabilitiesmustberepresentablewithinfinitesizedsystems(ourbrains).Ourmostrecentconsiderationsaddasecondreasontoresistaconceptionof
thelanguagefacultyasalistofsentencestheinterpretationofsentencesrequirestheassignmentofaparticularsyntacticstructure.Wehavesuggestedthatamore
promisingconceptionoflinguisticknowledgeisthatspeakersknowthepatternsoftheirlanguage,andthatthosepatternscanberepresentedasasetofrulesand
principlesthatdefinetheinfinitelylargeclassofpermissiblesentences.
TheGoalsofaGrammar
WhatwouldanappropriatesetofsuchrulesandprincipleslooklikeforalanguagelikeEnglish?Toapproachthisquestion,considerfirstthesimplercaseofan
abstractformallanguagethatconsistsexclusivelyofsentencelikestringscontaininganynumberofinstancesofthesymbol''B"followedbyasingleoccurrenceofthe
symbol"A."Agrammarforthislanguagecontainstheinitialsymbol"A,"andarulethatdictatesthatthesymbol"A''candominate(consistof)thestringofsymbols"B
A":
(29)

BA

Theapplicationofsucharuleyieldsthestring"BA"thesymbol"A"dominatesthetwosymbols"BA,"astherulespecifies(figure6.16).Notice,however,thatthis
rulecanapplyrecursivelyitmayreapplytoitsownoutput.Ifwereapplytheruleonce,theloweroccurrenceof"A"willdominatethestring"BA."Ifwereapplyit
twice,wegettheresultshowninfigure6.17.Thereis,infact,nolimittothenumberoftimestherulemaybeappliedinaderivation.

Figure6.16
Treerepresentation
ofaderivation
employingtherule
ABA

Page244

Figure6.17
Anexampleofa
recursivederivation

Supposeweconsidereachoccurrenceofasymbolthatdoesnotdominateanyothersymbolaterminalelement.Thesequenceofterminalelementsconstitutesawell
formedstring,orsentenceofthelanguage.Inthecaseoffigure6.17,thesentencewehavegeneratedis"BBBA."Sincethereisnoupwardboundonthenumberof
timesthatthisrulecanberecursivelyapplied,thereisaninfinitenumberofsentencesinthisformallanguage.Accountsincurrentlinguistictheoryholdthatthesyntaxof
naturallanguagescanbecharacterizedbyagrammarthatemploysrecursioninthissensetoprovidefortheessentialcreativityoflinguisticsystems.
Notethatallthesentencesgeneratedbyoursimplegrammarwillbeoftheform"BnA"somenumbernof"B"sfollowedbyexactlyone''A."Anyotherstringis
ungrammaticalitisnotapartofthelanguage,andthegrammarwillnotbeabletogenerate(assignastructureto)it.Thesyntacticianundertakestodeterminejust
whichfinitesetofrulesisadequatetothetaskofdefiningthesyntacticpatternsofaparticularlanguage.Theprimarygoalofsyntactictheoryfromtheperspectiveof
thecognitivescientististomodelthesystemofknowledgethatdetermineswhichutterancesconstitutethelanguage,andtocontributetoanexplanationofhowthat
knowledgeisacquiredandused.
Aswehavepointedout,thecriterionofgrammaticalityisnottobefoundingrammarbooks,butinthejudgmentsofspeakers.Wetestclaimsaboutsyntacticstructure
andtheadequacyofaparticularhypothesisagainstdataintheformofintuitionsofnativespeakers.AllspeakersofEnglishwill,withouthesitation,reportthatthestring
*girlthethehippopotamuswithoutaisnotasentenceofEnglish.Neitheris*girlthekissedboythe,eventhoughwecanmakemoresenseofthisstring.
Furthermore,wecanproduceandunderstandasentencelikeMelvinateabulldozerthathebelievedwastryingtoturnhimintoawatermelonanddetermine
thatitisgrammatical,inspiteofthefactthatitexpressesabizarreclaim.Indeed,Chomsky(1957)observedthatasentencelikeColorlessgreenideassleep
furiouslyisgrammatical(thatis,fitsthepatternofEnglish)eventhoughitisnonsensical.
Syntacticiansdonotordinarilyrelyontheproductionofspeakers'actualutterancesingatheringtheirdata.Foronething,speakersmaynotnecessarilyproducethe
typesofsentencesthatwewishtoinvestigateeventhoughtheyarewithintheirgrammaticalcompetence.Foranother,actualutterancesmayinvolveerrorsin
performance:shiftsofattention,limitsonmemory,drunkenness,andsoforth,canproduceoutputsthatarenotactuallyconsistentwiththegrammar(andwhose
inconsistencyhasadifferentkindofexplanation).

Page245

Figure6.18
PhrasemarkerforthesentenceThedogwashumble

Asaresult,wemustprovidealaboratorylikeenvironmentinwhichweartificiallyinducethekindoflinguisticbehaviorthatwewanttoexamine.Syntacticianstypically
proceedbyaskingquestionsofnativespeakers"Is'...'agrammaticalsentence?"isnormallyallthatisneededonceasubjecthasaroughandreadyunderstanding
ofwhatismeantbygrammaticality.Byandlargewecandevelopasubstantialandhighlyconsistentbodyofdatainthisfashion.Wetypicallyneednotresorttomore
formalexperimentalprocedures,althoughinunclearcaseswemaywellwanttodoso.Inpart,thisconsistencyisachievedbyinvestigatingconstructionsthatare
sharedbymanyspeakersofagivendialectorlanguage.
TheTheoryofGrammar:PhraseStructure
Wehavealreadyseenevidencethatthesyntacticpropertiesofsentencescannotbedescribedsolelyintermsoflinearsequencesofwords.Butlinearorderisan
importantpartofacharacterizationofgrammaticalityformany(thoughnotall)languages.InEnglishnewbooksisawellformedphrase,whereas*booksnewisnot.
Bycontrast,inSinhalapotalutliterally'booksnew'isgrammatical,but*alutpotisnot.Syntactictheorymustthereforecharacterizealevelofrepresentationthat
allowsustocapturethenotionofsyntacticconstituency,permitsacharacterizationofthelinearorderofelementswithinandbetweenunits,andadmitsof(atleast
some)variationamongdialectsandlanguages.Oneformthatsuchrepresentationscantakeisthephrasestructuretree,orphrasemarker.
Phrasemarkersareupsidedowntreelikestructuresinwhichthenodesarelabeledbysyntacticcategory.ForasentencelikeThedogwashumble,thephrase
markerwillhaveroughlytheformshowninfigure6.18.Someofthesymbolsappearinginthephrasemarkersthatwewilldiscussarelistedintable6.4.
Althoughyouarenodoubtfamiliarwithtermslikenoun,itmaynotbesoclearwhataNounPhrase(NP)is.Althoughthesubjectorobjectofasentencesometimes
isasinglenoun(forexample,apropernounlikeSeymour),othersentencescontainsubjectsorobjectsconsistingofasequenceofwords.Forexample,infigure6.18
wefindthesubjectNPthedog.ThesentencewouldhavebeenequallygrammaticalwithasubjectascomplexastheonlyotherbookthatIhaveeverreadthatI
canrememberthetitleof,oreveryotherarmadillointhetown.Furthermore,thesesamesequencesofwordscanalsoappearinobjectposition,forexample,
aftertheverblikedinthestringIliked...Wecancategorizeallsequencesofwords(phrases)thatcanappearinsubject(orobject)positionbyassigningthemtothe
categoryNP,notingthatphrasesthatoccupythisslotcontainatleastonenoun.

Page246
Table6.4

Symbolsusedinphrasemarkers
Symbol

Name

Examples

Sentence

Agirlwalkedthedog.

NP

NounPhrase

thedog,agirl

DET

Determiner

the,a,some

Noun

dog,girl

TENSE

TenseMarker

PAST,PRESENT

VP

VerbPhrase

walkthedog

Verb

walk,kiss

AP

AdjectivePhrase

verysmart,tallandthin

Adjective

interesting

NextwewilladdresstheTENSEnode.Wehavemadeanunintuitiveassumptioninfigure6.18:thetensemarkerappearsinthetreeinfrontoftheverbratherthan
followingit(aswemightexpectbyobservingthatordinarypasttenseverbslikewalkedexhibitapasttensemarker,ed,suffixedaftertheverbstem).Therearesome
importantreasonsforthisdecision,whichwewillsurveylaterinthediscussion.WeshouldalsonotethatEnglishphrasemarkerscontainonlytwopossibletenses,
PASTandPRESENT.Otherlanguageshavemorecomplextensesystems,butEnglishisrestrictedtopastandpresenttenseformsoftheverb.Referencetofuture
timeisaccomplishedbymeansofa"helping"orauxiliaryverb,forexample,will,whichprecedestheverbstem.
Inouranalysis,theverb'stenseisdeterminedbyselectingeitherPASTorPRESENTasthenodeunderTENSE.Noticethattheverbitselfisinsertedinthephrase
markerinitsbasicunaffixedform.Byconvention,theTENSEnodespecifiesthetenseoftheverbimmediatelytoitsright,andthetenseoftheverbisdeterminedby
thevalueofthetensemarkerchoseninthetree.ThetreeforthesentenceThedogishumblediffersfromfigure6.18onlyinthatthenodeunderTENSEis
PRESENTratherthanPAST.
TheexplanationoftheneedfortheVerbPhrase(VP)andAdjectivePhrase(AP)categoriesisparalleltotheexplanationforthecategoryNP.Ineachcasewefind
thatalthoughsomesentencesexhibitsimpleadjectivesandverbs,otherscontaincomplexphrases.Forexample,insteadofthesimpleadjectivehumbleinfigure6.18,
wemighthavehadthecomplexAPmorehumblethanthelowliestsnail,orvery,veryhumble.Similarly,died,chasedthecat,andgavehisownerahardtime
areallVPsthatmighthavesubstitutedforwashumbleintheexamplephrasemarker.
Twofinal,briefcomments.TheDeterminer(DET)categorycomprisesaclassofwordsincludingsome,every,anda,inadditiontothe.Theseintroduceandspecify
commonnouns.TheSnode,atthetopofthetree,canbethoughtofintwoways:asthesymbolforSentence,andalsoastheStartsymbolthatbeginseachphrase
marker.
NoteveryarrangementofnodesintoaphrasemarkercorrespondstoanEnglishsentence.Forexample,inEnglishthesubjectNPtypicallyprecedestheVP
predicate.Therefore,reversingthefirstNPandtheVPinfigure6.18resultsintheungrammaticalstring*washumblethedog.AcompetentspeakerofEnglishmust
knowasetofrulesandprinciplesthatdistinguishpossiblefromimpossiblephrasemarkers.Althoughsomeoftheserestrictionswillbeparticulartoagivenlanguage,
othersmayfollowfromgeneralpropertiesoflanguage.However,itisnotalwaysclearattheoutsetwhetheranygivensyntacticpropertyistobeattributedtoa
languagespecificruleor

Page247

agenerallinguisticprinciple.Consequently,wewillbeginbyassumingthateveryfeatureofthelanguageunderinvestigationmustbespelledoutbyarule,andlater
suggestwaysinwhichsomeoftheserulesmightbereplacedbygeneralprinciples.
Therulesthatdescribeconstituencyrelationsandlinearorderarecalledphrasestructurerules.Herearetherulesweneedtoconstructthephrasemarkerinfigure
6.18:
(30)

NPTENSEVP

NP

TENSE

DETN

VP

VAP

AP

{PRES,PAST}

Therulesshownin(30)tellusthatasentence(S)consistsofanNP,aTENSEnode,andaVP,inthatorder.ThisruleencodesthebasicorderofEnglishsubjects
andpredicates.ThesecondrulespecifiesthatanNPdominatesadeterminerfollowedbyanoun.TheTENSEruleprovidesthetwotensealternativesinEnglish.
Exclusivechoicesarelistedwithinbraces,setoffbycommas.ThenextruledictatesthataVPincludesaVerbfollowedbyanAdjectivePhrase,andthefinalrule
indicatesthatanAdjectivePhrasedominatesanAdjective.Althougheachoftheserulesrequiresconsiderableamendmentstobecompleteandaccurate,thissmall
grammarissufficienttogeneratethephrasemarkerinfigure6.19,whichisthesameasthatinfigure6.18,withoutitslexicalitems.
Inordertoassociatethebottomnodesofthetreewithactuallexicalmaterial(words),wemustapplytheprocessoflexicalinsertion.Toaccomplishthis,werequire
alistofvocabularywordscalledthelexicon,whichspecifiesasyntacticcategoryforeachentryaswellasinformationaboutitsphonologicalformandsemantic
interpretation.Inthecaseofverbs,asubcategorizationframeisalsospecifiedtoindicatewhichsyntacticcategoriesmaycooccurwitheachparticularverb(its
complementstructure).Notice,forinstance,thatbecanappearwithanNPaswellasanAP:
(31)

Dogsare[NParesponsibility]NP

(32)

Dogsare[APquitebothersome]AP

VerbslikeperspireandelapsedifferfrombeinthattheycannotcooccurwithNPsatall:
(33)

Acarpenterperspired.

(34)

(35)

ThetimeremaininginRover'slifeelapsed.

(36)

Acarpenterperspiredsweat.
ThetimeremaininginRover'slifeelapsedtwohours.

Figure6.19
Phrasemarkerforthesentenceinfigure6.18beforelexicalinsertion

Page248

Bysubstitutingexpelledforperspired,andexceededforelapsed,wereversethepatternofgrammaticalityjudgmentsin(33)through(36).Eachverb,then,mustbe
associatedwitharangeofappropriatecomplements.Samplepartiallexicalentriesforsomeofthevocabularyunderconsiderationmightlooklikethis:
(37)

be,/bi/,V,____{NP,AP}

perspire,/prspair/,V,____0

elapse,/ilps/,V,_____0

expel,/ ksp l/,V,_____NP

exceed,/ ksid/,V,_____NP

time,/taim/,N

the,/ /,DET

Onthebasisofsuchlexicalinformation,wecanselecttheappropriatewordsandinsertthemintotrees.
Transformations
Inadditiontothephrasestructureandlexicalcomponentsofthegrammar,collectivelyknownasthebase,thereisasecondtypeofsyntacticrulethathasplayedan
importantroleinlinguistictheory,thetransformation.Unlikephrasestructurerules,thisclassofrulesdoesnotcharacterizephrasestructuretrees.Rather,
transformationsrearrangephrasemarkersincertainways.TherulediscussedabovethatoptionallymovesaparticletotheendofaVP(particlemovement)isan
exampleofatransformationalrule.
Anothertypeofphenomenonthathasyieldedtotransformationalanalysisissocalledwhquestionformation.Whquestionsaresentencesthatask"Who?Where?
Why?What?"andsoforth,incontrasttoyes/noquestions,whichmerelyrequireanaffirmativeornegativeanswer.ExamplesofEnglishwhquestionsaregivenin
(38)and(39):
(38)

Whospilledit?

(39)

Whatistheproblem?

Whquestionwordsinotherlanguagesmaynot,ofcourse,beginwiththeletterswh(eveninEnglish,howquestionsareofthewhquestiontype),butsuchquestions
typicallyinvolveaquerycorrelatedwithsomemajorconstituentofthesentence,suchasthesubjectorobjectNP.InEnglishthequestionwordtakestheplaceof
somesuchconstituentandusuallyappearsatthebeginningofthesentence.
In(38),becausewearequestioningthesubject,itisnotpossibletodetectanyshiftinposition.Butin(39),wherewearequestioninganounphraseattheendofthe
VP,thequestionwordappearsinsentenceinitialposition.Linguistshaveanalyzedthesetypesofquestionsbyassumingthatthequestionwordisinitiallygeneratedin
anormalargumentposition(assubjectorobject),butisconsequentlymovedtosentenceinitialpositionbyatransformation.Thestructurefor(39)thatisgenerated
bythephrasestructurerulesisshowninfigure6.20.
Noticethatweareassumingthatwhatisanoun,andthatitisgeneratedbythephrasestructurerulesforNPs.ThetransformationofWhMovementthenappliesto
rearrangethephrasemarkerinfigure6.20,movingwhattothefrontoftheS.Anothertransformation,Inversion,willalsoapplytoreversetheorderoftheverband
subject.Figure6.21showsaninformalrepresentationofthesetwomovements.

Page249

Figure6.20
Phrasemarkergeneratedbyphrasestructurerulesforthesentence
(39),Whatistheproblem?

Figure6.21
Informalrepresentationoftransformationsapplyingtothephrase
markerinfigure6.20inthederivationof(39),Whatistheproblem?

Perhapsitisnotclearwhywecouldnotsimplygeneratethewordwhatinsentenceinitialpositionintheinitialphrasemarkerratherthanappealingtoatransformation
tomoveittothefrontofthesentence.Thereasonisthatthereisadependencybetweenthefrontedquestionwordanditsinitialargumentpositionthatwouldnotbe
accountedforbythismoredirectanalysis.Thedependencymaybestatedasfollows:wheneverthereisaquestionwordatthefrontofasentence,thereisalsoa
correspondinggapamissingconstituentinsidethesentence.Thus,in(38)thereisamissingsubjectin(39),amissingobject.Sentencesinwhichthesepositions
arefilled,andaquestionwordoccursaswell,areungrammatical:
(40)

(41)

WhoJohnspilledit?
Whatistheproblemthebook?

Intheframeworkwearedeveloping,ifweweretodirectlygeneratequestionwordsininitialposition,wewouldnotbeabletocorrelatesentenceinitialwhwords
withthecorrespondinggapsinargumentposition.Wecan,however,explainthefactsinthetransformationalaccount.Onthisanalysis,theonlywaytoproducea
questionwordatthebeginningofasentenceisforthatquestionwordtohavebeenmovedtherefromitsnormalposition,whereitwasinitiallyplacedbythephrase
structurerules.Thus,itisanautomaticconsequenceofthetransformationalmovementthatagapisleftbehind.

Page250

Thetransformationalaccountalsopredictsthatquestionformationshouldbepossibleinsubordinateclauses.(42)and(43)presentsomerelevantexamples:
(42)

IknowwhoBillinsulted.

(43)

JohnknowsMaryknewwhatNancyconsidered.

Inthecaseof(42),beforeWhMovement,thequestionwordwhowasinobjectpositioninthesubordinateclause.Itismovedtothefrontofthesubordinateclause
toform(42),as(44)informallyindicates:

In(43),whatstartedoutasthesubjectofthelowestsubordinateclause:

Furthermore,thewhatcanmovetwoclausesup,asin(46):

Finally,itispossibleinbothofthesecasestomovethequestionedwordallthewaytothefrontofthemainclause.Furtherrulesapply,inthiscase,toinsertaformof
theauxiliaryverbdo,but(47)and(48)givesthebasicideaofhowthisworks:

ThefullrangeoftheseconstructionscanbeaccountedforifweassumethattheWhMovementtransformationmovesaquestionwordtothefrontofanS.Thistype
offormulationallowstheruletomovethewhwordtoeitheroftwopositionsinconstructionslikethoseabove,whichcontainmorethanasingleSnode.
Questionformation,then,involvesamovementtransformation:thederivationinvolvesmovingaconstituenttoanewpositioninthephrasemarker.Wewillnow
brieflydiscussanothertypeoftransformation:adeletionrule.
(49)

Moeaddedsalt,andCurlydidtoo.

(50)

Maxpreferredthemackerel,andBillthebrill.

(51)

Hermanownedsomedogs,andMaryownedsometoo.

Ineachofthesesentencesthereisaphrasethatis"understood"butnotovertlypresent.In(49),forinstance,whatCurlyisunderstoodtohavedoneistohaveadded
salt.Similarly,Billisunderstoodtohavepreferredthebrill,andwhatMaryownedwasdogs.Thesesentencesarederivedbydeletiontransformationsfromthe
structuresthatunderliethefollowingsentences:

(52)

Moeaddedsalt,andCurlyaddedsalttoo.

(53)

Maxpreferredthemackerel,andBillpreferredthebrill.

(54)

Hermanownedsomedogs,andMaryownedsomedogstoo.

Page251

Therulethatconvertsthetreecorrespondingto(52)intotheonecorrespondingto(49)deletesaVP,inthiscaseaddedsalt.Thereisaninterestingspecialcondition
thatmustbemetinorderforthisruletoapply:theremustbeacopyofaVPthatisthepotentialdeletiontargetelsewhereinthesentence,orthelargerdiscourse.For
example,itwouldnotbepossibletoapplytheVPDeletionruletothestructureunderlying(55)inordertoderive(49):
(55)

Moeaddedsalt,andCurlyaddedpeppertoo.

Anotherwayofputtingthepointisthatthistypeofdeletiontransformationcanonlyremovematerialthatisredundant,andthereforerecoverablefromthesentence
thatresultsaftertheruleapplies.Inthecaseof(49)and(52),thisrecoverabilityconditionismet.
Theexamplesin(50)and(53)involvearulethatdeletesverbs,sometimesknownasGapping.Inthecaseof(51)and(54)aruleofIdenticalNounDeletionisat
work.Forbothoftheserules,theconditionsonrecoverabilityofdeletionobtain.Noticethattheprincipleofrecoverabilityofdeletionhasaverypowerfulpractical
motivationitmustbepossibleforahearertodetermineexactlywhatconstituentmeaningismissinginordertointerpretellipticalsentences.Sincethepreservationof
meaningiswhatisinvolved,thismaywellbeacasewheregeneralpropertiesofhumaninformationprocessingareatwork,interactingwiththeformandfunctioningof
linguisticrules.
ACaseStudy
WewillnowexaminemorecloselyaspecialprobleminthesyntacticanalysisofEnglish,casemarking,andconsideritsrelevanceforuniversalgrammar.Case
markingisadeviceforvaryingtheformofaword,typicallytoprovideanindicationoftherolethatitplaysinasentence.Forexample,in(56)thethirdperson
pronounappearsinadifferentformdependingonwhetheritisthesubjectortheobjectofaccused(heisinthenominativecase,him,intheaccusativecase):
(56)

AfterJohnsawIrvleavethevictim'sroom,heaccusedhimofthemurder.

Ingeneral,Englishappearstohaverelativelylittlecasemarking,especiallyincomparisontoalanguagelikeFinnish,whichhasmorethanadozendistinctcasetypes.
Furthermore,Englishspeakersdrawsystematiccasedistinctionsonlyinthepronounsystem(andtoindicatepossessionwiththegenitivemarker,'s).Bycontrast,
Japanese,whichprovidescasemarkingsforsubjectandobjectgaando,respectivelyattachesthemquitegenerallytosubjectsandobjects:
(57)

Jonga

hono

John(subj)book(obj)
read

'Johnreadthebook.'

yonda.

However,althoughitmayappearthatEnglishemploysverylittlecasemarking,wewillshowthatcaserelationsactuallyplayahighlysignificantroleinEnglishsyntax,a
rolethatmayinpartbedeterminedbypropertiesofuniversalgrammar.
Webeginthisanalysisbyadvancinganabstracthypothesis:allnounsinEnglishbearcase,butitisonlyinthepronounsystemthatcaseismarkedbyanovert
phonologicalform.Issuchaclaimplausible?ArethereothercircumstancesinEnglishgrammarwhereasignificantmorphemeorsyntacticcategorymaynothavea

Page252

Figure6.22
Phrasemarkerenrichedwithindices

phoneticrealization?AlthoughmostEnglishnounsarepluralizedbyaddingthesuffix/z/,thereareexceptionssuchasdeer,whicharesuperficiallyinvariantinthe
singularandplural.Thatis,Thedeergrazedpeacefullyisambiguouslyabouteitheronedeerormorethanonedeer.Noticethatitwillnotdotosuggestthatdeeris
neithersingularnorpluralthatitdoesnotbearpluralitybecauseinthecaseslike(58)inwhichtheverbinflectsfornumber,deermustbepluralsincewereisthe
thirdpersonpluralformoftheverb,whichcanonlyappearwithpluralsubjects:
(58)

Thedeerweregrazingpeaceably.

ThelogicofthesituationwithregardtoEnglishcaseissimilar.Weknowthatpronounsmustbeassignedcasebecausetheydisplayitphoneticallywemustlookfor
additionalevidenceifwewishtoclaimthatotherforms(nounsingeneral)alsoareassignedcaseevidencefromwhichwecandeducethepresenceofcaseeven
whereitisnotovertlymarked.
WebeginbyformalizingtheclaimthatallnounsinEnglisharecaseassignedbyadoptingtheCaseFilter(fromChomsky1986):
(59)

CaseFilter
EveryNPmustbearacase.

Accordingto(59),therecanbenogrammaticalphrasemarkersinwhichNPsdonothaveacase.Typically,thenouninsubjectpositionofanygrammaticalsentence
willreceivenominativecasemarking,andtheobject,accusativecasemarking.
Wefurtherhypothesizethatcasemarkingisassigned.Forexample,wewilltreatthetransitiveverbasassigningaccusativecasetoitsobject.Onthisview,theverb
"deposits"acasepropertyontheobjectNP,byanalogytothewayelectronsaretransferredfromelectrondonorstoelectronrecipientsinchemicalmodels.Wecan
indicatethisformallybyannotatingaverbthathasassignedacaseandtheNPtowhichithasassigneditwiththesameindex,asinfigure6.22.Inthiscaseseeandits
objectarecoindexedwiththeindexi.SinceanNPthatiscoindexedtoaverbhasbeenassignedtheaccusativecasebythatverb,thethirdpersonobjectpronoun
appearsintheaccusativecase(him).Iftheobjectofseehadbeenotherthanapronoun,caseassignment(andcoindexing)wouldproceedinthesamemanner.For
example,ifBillhadbeenthedirectobject,thephrasemarkerinfigure6.23wouldresult.Thatis,wecangeneralizecaseassignmentsothatverbscaseassigntheir
objectsregardlessofwhethertheassignedcaseshowsitselfintheformofanovertmorphologicalmarking.

Page253

Figure6.23
IndexedphrasemarkerforJohnsawBill

Figure6.24
IllegalindexedphrasemarkerforJohnsawBill

Inamomentwewillturntoevidenceinfavorofthisassumption,butfirstweexaminethecaseassignmentmechanismwehaveintroducedabitmoreclosely.
Howdoescaseassignmentsucceedinlinkingatransitiveverbtoitsobjectandtransferringcase?Supposewestartoffwiththesimplestassumption,namely,thata
verbcancasemarkanyNP.Ifthiswereso,wewouldexpectthephrasemarkerinfigure6.24,inwhichseecasemarksthesubjectJohn,asanalternativetotheone
infigure6.23.Sincecaseisnotovertlydisplayedonpropernouns,itmightnotseemproblematicalthatthesubjectinfigure6.24,John,iscoindexedwithsee.
However,insituationswheresubjectpositionisfilledbyapronoun,itisclearthataccusativecasecannotbeassignedtosubjectposition:
(60)

HersawBill.

(61)

ShesawBill.

WemustthereforeruleoutthepossibilityoftransitiveverbsfreelycaseassigninganyNP.Wecaneliminatethisoptionbyspecifyingadomaininwhichcase
assignmentmusttakeplace.Wewillsaythatcaseassigners(inthiscase,verbs)canassigncaseonlytoNPsthatareintheirgoverningdomain.Thisdomainis
definedasfollows:

Page254

Figure6.25
Graphicrepresentation
ofthenotion''governing
domain''

(62)

Anodea isinthegoverningdomainofanodeb ifthefirstbranching

nodethatdominatesb alsodominatesa (whereabranchingnodeisone

thatdominatesatleasttwoothernodes).

Thesimplestcircumstancethatsatisfiesthisdefinitionisillustratedinfigure6.25.Inthiscase governsb (andviceversa)becausethefirstbranchingnodethat

dominates ,namely,X,alsodominatesb .Belowwewillseeotherphrasestructureconfigurationsthatfitthedefinitionofgovernment.Fornow,though,letus
formalizetheprincipleofcaseassignmentasfollows:
(63)

CaseAssignmentunderGovernment

AcaseassignercanassigncaseonlytoanNPwithinthegoverning

domainofthecaseassigner.

Wemustnowaccountforhowcaseisassignedtosubjectposition.RecallthattheCaseFilterrequireseveryNPtobeassignedcase.Furthermore,thefactsof
English(asevidencedbytheformofsubjectpronouns)demandthatitbenominativecasethatisassigned.First,wemustidentifyacaseassignerthatcanassigncase
tosubjectNPs.OurhypothesisisthatitistheTENSEnodethatplaysthisrole,assigningnominativecasetoNPsinsubjectposition.NoticethatTENSEisan
appropriatechoiceinthatitgovernsthesubjectNP,providingsomemotivationforourearlierdecisiontoplaceTENSEbeforeratherthanaftertheverb.
NowconsiderthephrasemarkerofthesentenceHesawhim,incorporatingthetwochainsofindicesthatarerequiredbytheassumptionthatthenodesVand
TENSEeachseparatelycoindexNPswithintheirgoverningdomains(seefigure6.26).HereTENSEhascaseassignedthesubjectNP,andVhascaseassignedthe
objectNP.SinceTENSEassignsnominativecase,thesubjectreceivesthatcasesinceVassignsaccusativecase,theobjectissomarked.
WehavelimitedourcommentssofartothedetailsofsimplesentencesinformalizingtheaccountofEnglishcaseassignmentwewanttodefend.Thesentencesare
simpleintwosenses.Foronething,theydonotinvolveanyfloridconstructions.Butinamoretechnicalsensetheyaresimplebecauseeachcontainsasingleclause,a
constituentwiththebasicpropertiesofasentence.English,aswellasothernaturallanguages,alsoallowsconstructionsthatcaninvolveoneormoresubordinate
clausesinadditiontothemainclause.Someexamplesofsuchconstructionsaregivenin(64)through(68),withthesubordinateclausesitalicized:

(64)

Thepositionyouaredefendingispreposterous.

(65)

Aftersizingupthesituation,Johndied.

Page255

Figure6.26
IndexedphrasemarkerforthesentenceHesawhim

Figure6.27
Phrasemarkerforthesentence(66),IbelieveBrendaisaspy

(66)

IbelieveBrendaisaspy.

(67)

Thatbeansaremagicalbecameobvious.

(68)

IsuspectthatyoufearedthatIknewVernasneezed.

Althoughthesyntaxoftheseconstructionsiscomplex(andfascinating),wewillrestrictourattentiontopointsthatbearontheanalysisofabstractcase,case
assignment,andgovernment.Severaloftheseconsiderationsprovideinterestingargumentsinsupportofthisanalysisofcase.Observethat(69),whichisalmost
synonymouswith(66),differssomewhatinitssyntacticstructure:
(69)

IbelieveBrendatobeaspy.

Firstofall,theverbtobeappearsinatenseless(orinfinitival)formin(69),whereasthesameverboccursin(66)initspresenttenseform,is.Thephrasemarkers
for(66)and

Page256

Figure6.28
Phrasemarkerforthesentence(69),IbelieveBrendatobeaspy

(69)areroughlyasgiveninfigures6.27and6.28caseindexingissuppressedforclarity.Anotherimportantdetailtonoticeisthatinfigure6.28thereisnoTENSE
markeroftheusualsortinthelowerS,justtheinfinitivemarkerto.Thisaccountsforthefactthatbeappearsinitsuntenseduninflectedform.Givenourprevious
assumptionsaboutcaseassignment,wecannowaccountforaveryinterestingfurtherdifferencebetweenthestructuresinfigures6.27and6.28thatisnotimmediately
apparent.InthefollowingsetofdatawehavesubstitutedpronounsforBrendawhereitoccursintheearlierexamples:
(70)

Ibelievesheisaspy.

(71)

(72)

(73)

Ibelievehertobeaspy.

Ibelieveherisaspy.
Ibelieveshetobeaspy.

Thesedatashowthatthesubjectpositionofthetensedsubordinateclauseisassignednominativecasejustlikethesubjectpositioninsimplesentencesweseethis
in(70).Butthesubjectpositionoftenselesssubordinateclausesisassignedaccusativecase,as,forexample,in(73).Wecanexplainthesephenomenainthe
followingway.WehaveclaimedthatitisTENSEthatisresponsibleforassigningnominativecasetosubjectNPs.Thecoindexingoperationsforthephrasemarkerin
figure6.27andforsentence(70)willproceeduneventfully,andnominativecasewillbeassignedtoeachsubjectposition(inboththemainandsubordinateclauses)
accusativecasewillbeassignedtotheobjectNPinthelowersubordinateclauseinfigure6.29(assumingthatbelievedoesnotassigncaseintotensedsubordinate
clauses).
Consider,bycontrast,thephrasemarkerinfigure6.30,whichunderliesthesentence(73).SincethereisnoTENSEnodeinthesubordinateclausetoassign
nominativecasetothesubjectofthatclause,thetheorypredictsthatnominativecasewillnotappear

Page257

Figure6.29
Phrasemarkerforthesentence(70),Ibelievesheisaspy,aftercoindexing

Figure6.30
Phrasemarkerforthesentence(73),Ibelievehertobeaspy,aftercoindexing

Page258

inthisposition.This,ofcourse,leavesuswiththequestionofwhatdoesassigncasetoherin(62).Onestandardassumptionisthatbelievecanberecruitedtoassign
casetothesubjectpositionoftenselesssubordinateclauses,perhapsbecause(unlikeinthecaseof(61))itistheclosestpotentialcaseassignerthatgovernsthe
embeddedsubjectposition.Sincebelieveisaverb,weexpectaccusativecasetobeassigned,asdesired.
Giventheconstellationofassumptionsthatwehavedeveloped,wecanaccountforwhatappears,atfirstblush,tobeaverycuriouscorrelationbetweentenseand
case.Moreevidenceforthisconnectionistobefoundincontrastslikethefollowing:

Concentratingonthecaseformofthesubjectofthesubordinateclause,wenotethatthecontrastbetween(74)and(76)isexpected:subjectsoftenselessclausesare
accusative,andsubjectsoftensedclausesarenominative.Theinterestingcaseis(75).Herethesubordinateclause(if,indeed,itisaclause)apparentlycontains
neitheratensemarkernortheinfinitivalto.Thecaseformofthethirdpersonpronounisaccusative(compare:*Iconsiderheaspy),patterningwith(74)ratherthan
(76),inthisregard.
Again,thisistheexpectedresult,givenourframeworkofassumptions.Sincetheembeddedmaterialin(75)doesnotincludeTENSE,thereisnocaseassigner
availablecapableofassigningnominativecase.Rather,thehigherverbmustcaseassignthepronoun,resultinginaccusativecasemarking.
Thispatterncanalsobeobservedinsentencescontainingcomplementstotheverbsee:
(77)

Johnsawherleave.

Hereagain,thecomplementtotheverb,herleave,isuntensed(compare*HerleavewithSheleft).Consequently,caseassignmentofhercannotcomefromwithin
thesubordinateclauseandmustbeassignedbythehigherverb,saw.Notice,incidentally,thatthisaccountofcaseassignmentdirectlyexplainswhystringslike
*Him/Heabelieverand*Her/SheleavecannotappearasmainclausesinstandardEnglish:inbothoftheseexamplestherewouldbenoavailablecaseassigner.This
guaranteesthatthesestringscanonlyappearascomplementstoverbsthatarecapableofassigningcasetosubordinatestructures(forexample,(75)and(77)).
OnefinalpieceofevidenceinfavorofourtheoryofabstractcaseassignmentspeaksmoredirectlytotheclaimthatallNPsarecaseassigned(eveniftheydonot
revealanyovertcasemarking).Wehaveclaimedthatverbsassignaccusativecasetotheirdirectobjects.Wemightbemorespecificbyrestrictingthisprincipleto
transitiveverbsverbsthattakeadirectobject.Intransitiveverbs(thosethatdonotappearwithdirectobjects)obviouslycannotassignaccusativecase.Suppose,
then,thatwestipulatethatintransitiveverbsdonotassigncase,asabasicpropertyofallintransitiveverbs.Wecanextendthisgeneralizationtoincludepassiveverbs.
Thatis,justas

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simpleintransitiveverbscannotcooccurwithlexicalobjects(forexample, Johnperspiredsweat),neithercanpassiveverbphrases(forexample, Johnwas

arrestedthepolice).Putanotherway,passiveverbphrasesareintransitive,suggestingthatthey,too,failtoassigncase.
*

Againstthisbackground,letusreconsiderthefollowingcontrasts:

Thepatternin(78)isusual.In(78a)thetensemarkerinthelowerclausewillassignnominativecasetothelowersubject,explainingwhyBrendaorshecanappearin
theembeddedsubjectposition.Herisungrammaticalsinceitwouldrequireaccusativecaseassignment.Incontrast,in(78b),intheabsenceofatensemarkerinthe
lowerclause,believedassignsaccusativecasetotheembeddedsubject,accountingforthegrammaticalityofBrendaandher,butnotshe.(79a)alsofollowsthe
expectedgeneralizations.Thecaseofthesubjectofthesubordinateclausemustbenominative,asassignedbythetensemarkerinthelowerclause.Thus,justasin
(78a),eitherBrendaorshe,butnother,issuitableasthesubjectinthesubordinateclause.Noticethatineachofthesethreecases,eitherthenominativeform(she)
ortheaccusativeform(her)ispossible,andsoisthenoncasemarkednameBrenda.Onouranalysis,thechoiceofpronounshiftswiththechoiceofcaseassigner
(eitherTENSE,fornominative,orthemainclauseverb,foraccusative).Thepropernamecanreceiveeithernominativeoraccusativecaseandthereforeisgenerally
compatible.However,thisgeneralizationappearsnottoobtainin(79b).
Thepuzzleis,Whyarenoneofthepossibilitiesfortheembeddedsubjectgrammaticalin(79b)?Letusconsidereachoptioninturn.First,sincethesubordinateclause
isinfinitival,thereisnotensemarkeravailabletoassignnominativecasetoembeddedsubjectposition,explainingtheimpossibilityofsheinsubjectposition.Infact,
casecannotbeassignedfromwithinthesubordinateclause,sincetherearenogoverningcaseassignersintheclause.Inthisregard,thesubordinateclausepatterns
with(78b).Ofcourse,insuchacircumstance,itfelltothehigherverbbelievedtoassign(accusative)casetothelowersubject.In(79b),however,themainclause
containsthepassiveverbphrasewasbelieved,which,becauseitisintransitive,isincapableofassigningaccusativecasetothelowersubject.Thisexplainswhythe
thirdcandidate,her(theaccusativeform),isungrammaticalin(79b).

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Wehaveruledoutthenominativeformofthepronounin(79b)becausethereisnonominativecaseassignment,andtheaccusativeformbecausethereisno
accusativecaseassignment.Butwhycan'tBrenda,theovertlynoncasemarkedpropername,appearastheembeddedsubjectof(79b)?Theexplanationdepends
onthecrucialdifferencebetweencasemarkingandcaseassignmenttowhichwearecommitted.EventhoughBrendaisnotovertlymarkedforcase,itmust,onour
account,beassignedeithernominativeoraccusativecase.Butin(79b)thereisnocaseassigneravailabletoassigncasetothesubjectofthesubordinateclause.
Consequently,ifBrendaweretoappearinthisposition,itwouldgowithoutbeingassignedcase,violatingtheCaseFilterandrenderingthesentenceungrammatical.
AlthoughwehavebarelyscratchedthesurfaceofevenonetinycornerofEnglishsyntax,wearealreadyabletoglimpsethedeductiverichnessandexplanatorydepth
thatonehopesforinthescientificinvestigationofalanguage.Moreover,thestudyofaspectsofgrammarsuchascasetheoryhascometooccupyaprominent
positionincurrentsyntacticresearchbecauseithasturnedoutthattheyfigureimportantlyinourunderstandingofthegrammarsofmanydisparatelanguages.Themost
ambitiousclaimwemightpursueisthattheabstractprinciplesthatweuncoverareuniversalthattheyapplytoeverynaturallanguage.Weturnnexttothis,perhaps
themostimportantareaofongoingresearchinlinguistictheory.
6.4Universals
Accordingtomuchofcurrentlinguistictheory,certainlinguisticproperties(forexample,theCaseFilterandtheMaximalOnsetPrincipleseebelow)areprinciples
thatarereflectedbyeverynaturallanguage.Consequently,althoughcertainpropertiesholdforeachindividuallanguage,theyarenotbestunderstoodashavingbeen
coincidentallywrittenintothegrammarofeachlanguage.Instead,linguists,followingthepioneeringworkofChomsky(1965)andRoss(1967),havelocatedsuch
principlesinuniversalgrammar(UG).UGisnotagrammarintheusual,generativesenseoftheterm.Rather,UGcomprisesthefeaturesthatareinstantiatedinthe
grammarsofallnaturallanguages.PrinciplesofUGareperfectlygeneral,andtherulesystemsofindividuallanguageswillonlyneedtostatetheidiosyncratic
propertiesofthelanguagestheygenerate.
TheprinciplesofUGhavealsobeenclaimedbothtoplayacentralroleintheacquisitionoflanguagebychildrenandtoconstitutespeciesspecific,domainspecific,
innatepropertiesofmind.TheroleoftheprinciplesofUGinlanguageacquisitionisdiscussedinsomedepthinchapter9.Fornow,itwillsufficetoemphasizethat
theseprinciplesaretakentolimittherangeofhypothesesthatchildrenwillnormallyconsiderduringthecourseofacquisition.Letusexaminehowthiswayof
conceptualizingtheprocessoflanguageacquisitionproceeds.
Whenachildisfacedwiththetaskofdecipheringthepatternrevealedbysomesubsetofsentencesofalanguage,therewillbeanumberofsystemsofrulesthatare
consistentwiththeavailabledata(forinstance,thesentencesthechildisexposedto),althoughultimatelydivergentinthelanguagestheygenerate.Thechild'slearning
problemcanbeseenasthatoffiguringoutwhichofthesepossibilitiestoreject.TheprinciplesofUGarethoughttoaidinthistaskbydelimitingtheliveoptionsonly
thosegrammarsthatareconsistentwithUGwillbeavailabletothechildascandidatesforcapturingthepatternofthelanguage.Withoutthisrestrictiononhypothesis

Page261

formation,thechild'staskseemsdaunting,and,somelinguistshavecontended,impossible.ResearchanddebateconcerningtheroleofUGinlanguagelearningareat
thecenteroftheongoingworkinlinguisticsandcognitivescience.
TheclaimthattheprinciplesofUGarespeciesspecificturnsonthepropositionthatonlyhumanshavelanguageability.Ofcourse,differentspeciescertainlyhave
effectivecommunicationsystems,andsomemayevenpossesssystemsthatarelanguagelikeinsignificantregards.Yetmostcognitivescientistshavecometothe
conclusionthatwhateversuchabilitiesamountto,theyappeartobedistinctfromthehumancapacity(see,forexample,Premack1986).Inturn,linguistshave
reasonedthatalthoughtheprinciplesofUGmaywellbe(partof)whatenableshumanstolearnlanguage,theabsenceofthesepropertiesandthelearningadvantages
theyaffordmayexplainwhyotherorganismscannotacquirehumanlanguages.
TheprinciplesofUGhavealsobeenassertedtobedomainspecifictogoverntheshapesofgrammarsandtherebydirectthecourseoflanguageacquisition,butto
havenodirectimpactonothercognitivecapacitiesorinotherlearningdomains.Thispositiontypicallyformsapartofthemodularitythesisthatascribesdifferent
cognitiveabilitiestoseparatefacultiesofmind(seeFodor1983PiatelliPalmerini1980Garfield1987).Onthisview,sincelanguageisadistinctcognitivecapacity,
theprinciplesofitstheoriesshouldnotbeexpectedtocharacterizeothercapacities.ThisentailsthattheprinciplesofUG,inparticular,arespecifictolanguage,and
alsothatthewaychildrenlearnlanguagemaybeimportantlyunrelatedtothewaytheylearnanythingelse.
Finally,theprinciplesofUGhavebeenclaimedtobeinnate(seeChomsky1965,1980).Assuch,theyaretakentobeapartoftheorganism'sbiologicalendowment,
ultimatelytobeidentifiedintermsofhumangenetics.Theargument,roughlyput,isthatsuchprinciplesarenotsimplyinduciblefromtheprimarydataavailableto
childrenyetlearnerscannotformadequatehypothesesabouttheirownlanguageswithoutsuchprinciples.Theymust,perforce,beinnate.IfnotionsliketheCase
Filterareindeedapartofthebiologicalsystemthatguidestheformationofgrammars,itshouldnotbesurprisingtofindthatabstractcaseplaysacrucialand
widespreadroleinEnglisheventhoughthereislittleovertevidenceforcasemarking.Weshouldalsofindevidencethatthesekindsofprinciplesareatworkevenin
languagesthatexhibitnoovertmanifestationofcasewhatsoever.Suchresultswouldbeimpressiveindeed,andmuchofcurrentlinguisticresearchisdirectedtoward
uncoveringthiskindofevidence.Althoughtherearealternativeaccountsoftherelationshipbetweengrammarsandcognition(seeGazdaretal.1985),andseveral
rivalaccountsofthedetailsofsyntactictheory(seeSells1985Wasow1989),muchcurrentlinguisticresearchisdirectedatworkingoutthedetailsofcasetheory
andothersubtheoriesofgenerativemodelsoflinguisticknowledge.
Thetaskofelucidatingthepropertiesofuniversalgrammarwouldberelativelystraightforwardifalllanguagesuniformlyembodiedafixedandunvaryingsetof
principles.Butmattersarenotsosimple.Thedetailsofcaseassignmentvaryfromlanguagetolanguage.Syllablestructurecanvarysignificantly,andthereisnosingle
stresssystemthatfollowsinexorablyfromprinciplesofmetricalstructure.FactssuchasthesethreatentovitiatetheimportantclaimsthathavebeenmadeaboutUG.
Indeed,ifpartoftheempiricalappealofUGwasthatitsclaimsaretestableagainstthedataofanynaturallanguage,thefailuretoaccountforthedataofevenone
languageisdeeplyproblematic.

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Inanattempttosolvetheseproblems,generativelinguistsremaincommittedtotheviewthatthegrammarsofparticularlanguagesreflectasetofcoreproperties
capturedbytheprinciplesofUG,butholdthatthesebasicsaresubjecttoa(limited)degreeofvariationaswellparametersthatmarktherangeofpossiblehuman
languages.Beforeweturntosomeexamplesoftheprinciplesandparametersviewofthings,ananalogymaybeuseful.
Considerthegreatvarietythatseemstoexistinhandwovenrugs.Onenteringarugstore,wemaybestruckbythegreatwealthofdifferentdesigns:colors,patterns,
andsizesallvaryaccordingtothecountryoforigin,themaker,andsoforth.Yetwhenweexaminetherugsmoreclosely,itispossibletodiscernsomeinteresting,
thoughmuchlessobvious,similarities.Tworugsthatappearwhenviewedfromtheusualdistancetobeconstructedfromutterlydifferentweavingpatternsturnout,
whenviewedatcloserange,tobebuiltupfromidenticalknotswhichhappentobeorienteddifferentlyandmadefromwoolofdifferentthicknesses.Asthesetwo
simpleparametersvary,highlysimilarrugs(atacertainlevelofexamination)takeonstrikinglydistinctsuperficialappearances.Theuniversallinguisticpropertiesthat
wehaveconsideredmaywellhavethischaracteradmittingofsmallvariationsonrelativelyabstractparametersthat,fromafar,createtheappearanceofgreat
diversity.
APhonologicalExample
Accordingtothetheorywehavebeendescribing,manyoftheidentifyingdetailsoftheworld'slanguagescanbeviewedassmallvariationsonuniversalthemes.
Consider,again,thematterofsyllablestructure.Attheheartofthesyllabificationprocessisasetoffundamentalandinvariantprinciples.Manyphonologists
maintainthatuniversalgrammarrequiresalllanguages(asaconsequenceoftheMaximalOnsetPrinciple,amongothers)tohaveatleastsomesyllablesoftheform
[CV...],withanonset.Nolanguageisknowntoviolatethisprinciple.Nevertheless,itissubjecttoparameterization:somelanguages,likeKlamath,aNative
AmericanlanguageofOregon,requireeverysyllabletobeofthisform.Others,likeEnglish,permitsomeonsetlesssyllables.Similarly,alllanguagesexhibitsyllables
withvowelsattheirnucleus.Buttheappearanceoftwovowelsorofconsonantsinnuclearpositionisparameterized:somelanguagesexhibitlongvowels,diphthongs,
orsonorantsasnuclearconsonants.Othersforbidthemandadmitonlysinglevowelsinthenucleus.Finally,the"codaparameter"regulatestheappearanceof
consonantsinsyllablefinalposition.Nofixedprincipledetermineswhetheralanguagemusthavesyllablesbeginningandendingwithconsonents(closedsyllables):
theyare"optional,"subjecttowhatwemaydescribeasasimple"yes/no''parameter.Setto"yes,"theparameterpermitssyllableslike[...VC]Englishisan
example.Setto"no,"theparameterprohibitsthem,HawaiianandItalianbeingcasesinpoint.Butifalanguagechoosesthe''yes"option,acoreprincipleofuniversal
grammarstillrequiresthatitmustalsoallowopensyllableswithoutafinalconsonant.Thus,therangeofsyllablestructuresthatisavailabletolanguagesisquite
broadbutstillsetwithinratherstringentlimits.
SomeSyntacticPrinciplesandParameters
Theapplicationofthetheoryofprinciplesandparameterstoproblemsinsyntacticanalysishasbeenoneofthemostimportantprogramsofresearchincontemporary
linguistictheory.FollowingChomsky(1986),linguistshavedecomposedsyntactictheoryintoanumberofsubtheories,eachoneofwhichcontainsparameterized
prin

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ciplesthatdefineitscoreproperties.Thesesubtheoriesincludecasetheory,bindingtheory,boundingtheory,thetatheory,andXbartheory.Wehavealready
consideredproblemsincasetheory,whichisresponsibleforestablishingtheprinciplesofcaseassignment.ThecentralprincipleincasetheoryistheCaseFilterthe
(universal)principlethatrequiresthatNPsmustbeassignedcase.Infact,theprinciplemaybemoregeneral,forinsomelanguages(forexample,Russianand
German)ithasbeenproposedthatcertainadjectivalphrasesaremarkedforcase.Thus,theprinciplemaytaketheform"allXPsmustreceivecase,"withthevalueof
Xbeingsetsomewhatdifferentlyfordifferentlanguages.Ifthisiscorrect,wewouldexpectlanguagesalltoinvolvecase,buttoassignitandmarkitinsomewhat
differentways.
Bindingtheoryconcernsitselfwiththeanaphoricpropertiesofpronouns,reflexives,andlexicalNPs.Theseprinciplescapturethestructuralcircumstancesunder
whichcertainexpressions(forexample,pronouns)candependonanantecedentfortheirinterpretation.Forexample,Johnandhecanbenaturallyconstruedtobe
thesamepersonin(80),butnotin(81):
(80)

Johnthinks[thatScruffylikeshim]

(81)

Scruffythinks[thatJohnlikeshim]

Onepartofbindingtheoryconstrainstheinterpretationofpersonalpronounslikehim,asfollows:
(82)

Bindingtheory
ApronounmustbefreeinitslocalX.

Pronounsthatarefreeareinterpretedindependentlyofpotentialantecedents.ForEnglish,Xworksoutroughlytoclause.WhatthisamountstoisthatEnglish
personalpronounscannotdependfortheirinterpretationonantecedentsthatarelocallycontainedinthesameclauseastheyare.Thus,himcanrefertothesame
personasJohnin(80)becauseJohnisthesubjectofthehigherclause,whereashimistheobjectofthelowerclause.In(81)bothJohnandhimarecontainedinthe
sameclause,andsohimmustbeinterpretedasbeingfreefromJohnthatis,himandJohncannotrefertothesameperson.
Otherlanguagesalsolimittheinterpretationsofpronouns,butinwaysthatmaybesomewhatdifferentfromthepatterninEnglish.Inparticular,languagescandifferin
thesettingfortheparameterXinbindingtheory,producingcontrastingdistributions.InIcelandic,forexample,thepersonalpronounhann'him'appears,atfirst,to
followtheEnglishpatterninsubordinateclauses:
(83)

Jnsegir [Mariaelskarhann]
JnsaysthatMarialoveshim

Theinterpretationof(83)isparalleltothatoftheEnglishtranslationJonandhanncanrefertothesameperson.Intenselesssubordinateclauses,however,the
patternsdiverge:
(84)

Jn

mr [rakahann]

Jnorderedmetoshavehim

WhereasintheEnglishtranslationhimcanrefertoJn,hanncannotrefertoJnintheIcelandicsentence.ThisisbecauseinIcelandicthevalueoftheparameterXin
thebindingtheoryclausethatappliestopronounsissetdifferentlyfromthevaluefor

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English.ThevalueforIcelandicis"tensedclause,"meaningthatpotentialantecedentsmustnotbemembersofthesmallesttensedclausecontainingacorresponding
personalpronoun.In(83)hannisinaseparatetensedclausefromJn.In(84),however,althoughthesetwotermsareinseparateclauses,thesmallesttensedclause
containingJnalsocontainshann.
OnceagainwehaveprofitablycomparedandcontrastedtwodifferentlinguisticsystemswithintheprinciplesandparametersframeworkofUG.Similarinquirieshave
alsobeenundertakenintotheothersubdomainsoflinguistics.Boundingtheory,forexample,concernsitselfwithhowdistantamovedelementcanbefromits
correspondinggap.Insomelanguagesamovedelementmustappearwithinthesameclauseasdoesthegap,whereasotherlanguagespermitgreaterdistance
betweenthetwo.Subjacencyisthehypothesizeduniversalprinciplethatestablishestheserestrictionsonmovement:
(85)

Subjacency
AmovedelementmaynotcrossX.

whereX,asinthepreviousexample,isaparameterthatcanbesetinasmallnumberofways(forexample,aclauseboundaryortwoclauseboundaries),specificto
eachlanguage.SeeifyoucanfigureoutwhatthevalueforXisinthecaseofEnglish.
Thetatheoryisthepartoflinguistictheorythatexplorestheassignmentofthematicrolestoarguments.Thematicrolesdeterminetheactionstructureofthesentence
bydistinguishingwhoisdoingwhat,towhom.Forexample,ifweunderstandJohnastheagentin(86),thenheistakentobetheinitiatoroftheaction:
(86)

Johnrolleddownthehill.

Itispossible,however,toconstrueJohnasreceivinganaction(asapatient),aswell,althoughthisinterpretationiseasiertoassignin(87):
(87)

Therockrolleddownthehill.

Thetatheoryisinterestedintheprinciplesthatmediatetheassignmentoftheseroles,andliketheothersubdomainsofthegrammar,itcontainsprinciplesthatare
thoughttobeuniversal.ThecentralprincipleofthetatheoryistheThetaCriterion,whichrequiresthateveryargumentpositionmustbeassignedexactlyonethematic
role.Inthecaseof(86),forexample,thisprincipleentailsthatifJohnmaybeaeithertheagentorapatient,thenhecannotbetakentobebothsimultaneously,or
neitheratall.Thiscriterionandtherelatedtheoryarecurrentlyobjectsofconsiderableattentionbylinguistswhoareexploringtheapplicationoftheseprinciples(along
withanyparameterization)acrossthelanguagesoftheworld.
Finally,thesubdomainofuniversalgrammarthatcharacterizesthephrasestructureofeachnaturallanguagecanalsobelookedatfromtheperspectiveofitsprinciples
andparameters.Earlierwenotedthatalthoughitispossibletowriteoutaphrasestructuregrammarforeachlanguagethatgeneratestheinitialphrasemarkersofthat
language,therearecrosslinguisticgeneralizationsinthisaspectofgrammarthatsuggestanalternativeapproach.Indeed,sometimeagolinguistsnoticedthatthereare
regularitiesinwordorderandconstituentstructurebothwithinandacrosslanguagesthatdeservetobecapturedbytheprinciplesofUG.Xbartheory,whichisthe
universalprincipleattheheartofthiscomponentofthegrammar,isanattempttodistilluniversalprinciplesofphrasestructureandconstituency.Totheextentthat

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Xbartheorysucceeds,thephrasestructurerulesforeachlanguagecanbesimplifiedandwillonlyneedtorecordthefeaturesofphrasemarkersthatareidiosyncratic
inaparticularlanguage.ProposedprinciplesincludetheclaimthatinalllanguagesaphraseoftheformXPmustcontainanoccurrenceofX,whichiscalledthehead
ofthephrase.Thatis,NPsmustcontainnounsasheads,VPsmustcontainverbsasheads,andsoon.
Theorderingofsubconstituentswithinaconstituentisonelocusofvariationacrosslanguages.Insomelanguagesadjectivesfollowthenoun(forexample,Hebrew),in
sometheyprecedeit(forexample,English),andinsomebothalternativesarepossible(forexample,French).Nevertheless,therearecertainsubregularitiesthat
generallyobtain.Forexample,languageslikeJapanese,whichisverbfinal,alsotendtobepostpositional(objectsofprepositionsfollowprepositions),containrelative
clausesthatprecedethenountheymodify,andhaveadjectivesthatprecedethenoun.ThesearelanguagesinwhichtheHeadParametertheparameterthat
establishesinwhichperiphery(leftorright)ofaconstituentphaseitsheadwillbelocatedissettothevalue"headsright."InHebrew,incontrast,wheretheverbis
VPinitial,thereareprepositionalphrases,relativeclausesfollowthenounstheymodify,andadjectivesfollowthenoun,thesettingis"headsleft."Althoughlanguages
sometimestoleratesomeexceptionstotheseorderinggeneralizations(forexample,EnglishtrytosettheHeadParameterandnoteanyexceptions!),theHead
Parametergenerallymakesaccuratepredictionsaboutconnectedaspectsofwordorderacrosslanguages.Inthisregard,itisanimportantcomponentofthetheoryof
UniversalGrammar.
ChallengestotheTheory
Chomsky'ssystemofUGhasbeenextremelyinfluentialinguidingthedevelopmentofresearchprojectsinmanyareasofcognitivescience.Yet,likeanyimportant
idea,thepositionwehavesketchedhasbeenseriouslycriticized,frequentlyamended,andinsomecasesjettisonedinfavorofalternativeframeworks.Wecloseour
discussionofUGbybrieflynotingsomeoftheinterestingareasofcontinuingresearchonUG,withspecialattentiontothemoregeneralpsychologicalandbiological
claimsthathavebeenmadeforUG.
Thehypothesizedinnateuniversalgrammarisoftencompared(byChomskyandothers)toabodilyorganalbeita"mentalorgan"thatisorganizedinbrainand
otherneuraltissue.Althoughthedetailsofthebiologicalbasisofthelinguisticcapacityarebynomeanswellunderstood(seechapter7),itisoftenclaimedthatUG
representsamodular,highlyspecializedcapacityanditissometimessuggestedthatithasaspecializedgeneticbasis.Thatis,thenotionoflinguisticinnatenesshas
beentakentomeanthattheremusthavebeenhighlyspecificnaturalselectioninthecourseofhumanevolutionforthedetailsofUG.Thisviewissometimesfurther
popularizedtosuggestthattherearespecificgenesforlanguage.Butthereislittleevidencetosupportthisnotion.Infact,feworgansystemsorbehaviorsarethe
productsofsinglegenes.Thereiscertainlylittlebasisincontemporarymolecularbiologytosupportthenotionthatspecificinformationalstates,liketheCaseFilteror
abstractprinciplesofsyllabification,couldbesomehowdirectlyencodedinhumanchromosomes.Thechallenge,then,istoreconcileChomsky'sclaimsaboutthe
biologicalbasisoflanguagewithwhatisknownaboutgeneticmechanismsandevolutionaryprinciples.
Thereisalsoroomfordoubtabouttheclaimsofspeciesspecificitythathavebeenmadeforthelanguageorgan.Ithasbeendiscovered,forexample,thatmammals
otherthanhumansexhibitcategoricalperception(KuhlandMiller1975),thetendencyto

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perceivewhatareinfactdistinctpointsalongacontinuumasfallingintodiscreteclumpsofdata.Humanshavebeenclaimedtorelyinnatelyoncategoricalperception
todistinguishvoicedfromvoicelesssounds.Thatis,despiteconsiderableactualacousticvariation,wehearsoundsonlyasvoicedorvoiceless,withnoapparent
middlecategoriesofperception.Althoughitisclearhowcategoricalperceptionisusefulinspeechperception,KuhlandMiller'sevidencethatnonhumansexhibitthis
phenomenonissurprising.AlthoughcategoricalperceptionmaynottechnicallyqualifyasoneoftheprinciplesofUG(inthatitismoreaperceptualpropertythana
narrowlylinguisticone),findingssuchasthesefuelthehopesofthosewhomaintainthattheremustbesubstantialoverlapbetweenthecognitivepropertiesofhumans
andnonhumans.
Finally,therearealsohesitationsconcerningtheclaimthatthepropertiesofuniversalgrammararestrictlymodularthatis,thattheypertainonlytolinguistic
representationandacquisitionandthelike,anddonotfollowfrommoregeneralarchitecturalorothercharacteristicsofcognition.Itisdifficult,ofcourse,toattribute
broader(oranalogous)functionstohighlyabstractpropertiesliketheCaseFilter,andtheimplausibilityofthisattributionhasbeentakenbysomeresearcherstobe
strongevidenceformodularity.Butmuchmorewillneedtobeknownaboutcognitionbeforewecandeterminewithanyconfidencewhethersomeoftheinnate
mechanismsthatsubservelanguageturnouttohaveabroaderorganismicsignificance.
Again,motivationtopursuethisinquirycomesfromthephenomenonofcategoricalperception,whichhasalsobeendemonstratedincertainnonlinguisticdomains,for
example,betweencertainmusicalsoundsrelatedonanacousticcontinuum,suchasthepluckingandbowingofaviolinstring(CuttingandRosner1974).These
resultssuggestthatsomecapacitiesthatsupportlanguagelearningmaynotbespecifically"linguistic,"butareinsteadpartofmoregeneralcognitivecapacities.Canthis
reductionbeaccomplishedfortheprinciplesofUG?Certainlytheuniversalswehavesketched,forinstance,theCaseFilter,donotobviouslyadmitofthiskindof
account,thoughfurtherresearchmayindeedshowthattheydofollowfrommoregeneralaspectsofcognitivearchitecture.Indeed,researcherslikeLieberman
(1985)havearguedthatalllinguisticuniversalsareultimatelyafunctionofgeneralbiologicalmechanisms,aviewshared,incertainrespects,withPiagetian
psychologists.ButmanygenerativelinguistsremainskepticalthattheeliminationofUGinfavorofgeneralbiologicalandcognitivepropertiesispossible,andany
strongconclusionsseempremature.
SummaryandReprise
Adultlearnersofnewlanguagesstruggle(muchlikelinguists)toacquiresomeunderstandingoftheirlanguage.Thestrugglewillgoonforsometime,andittypically
endsinanimperfect(ifhardwon)mastery.Veryyoungchildrenlearningtheirfirstlanguage(orlanguages)facethesamegeneraltask,complicatedbythelimited
experientialresourcesofinfancyandanapparentlackofanylinguisticcontextinwhichtoembednewknowledge.Despitetheselimitations,childrenenjoyaneaseof
languagelearningthatadultsenvy.
Thechild'scourseoflearningisnotinstantaneous,orfreefromerrorsandmissteps.Buttheredoesappeartobeahighlysystematicpatterntotherangeoffalsesteps
thatchildrentake.Moreover,thereappeartobetypesoferrorsthatchildrenlearninganylanguagesimplydonotmake.Forinstance,childrenlearningquestions
typicallygo

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throughseveralstagesofdevelopment,someofwhichinvolveutterancetypesthatdifferininterestingwaysfromtheadultsystem.Butcertaindifferencesdonot
emerge.Forinstance,childrenneverseemtomisjudgetheappropriatepositionofquestionwordsonthebasisofevidencelikeIknowwhatJohnatetheydonot
hypothesizearuletotheeffectthatquestionwordsinEnglisharetobeplacedinthemiddleofsentences.Inthesamevein,childrenneverseemtohypothesize,onthe
basisoffrequentexposuretowordswithclosedsyllables,thatallEnglishwordsinvolvesuchsyllables(bycontrast,manychildrenforaconsiderabletimeproduce
onlyopensyllables).Thereisnoapriorireasonwhychildrendonotentertainthesealternativehypotheses,yettheyfailtodosoeveninthefaceofdatathatare
consistentwiththem.Itisintriguingtoconcludethattheydonotdosobecausetheycannot,thatUGenforcesageneralconstraintontheformofrulesthatprecludes
themfromdeducingconstructslike"themiddleofasentence."Suchconstraintsvastlysimplifythelearningtaskbyrestrictingtherangeofpossiblehypotheses.By
settingsuchlimitsonthekindsofknowledgerepresentationthattheorganismcanlearnwhetherbyhighlyspecificneuralconstraints,orasaconsequenceofmore
generalconstraintsondevelopmentevolutionhasfacilitatedtheacquisitionoftheextraordinarilypowerful,flexible,andcreativesystemswecalllanguage.
SuggestedReadings
AbroaderintroductiontolinguistictheoryandthestudyoflanguageingeneralcanbefoundinAnIntroductiontoHumanLanguage(Gee1993).SeveralofNoam
Chomsky'sworksalsoprovideanaccessibleperspectiveontheoreticalissuesandontheintellectualcontextofrecentworkseeinparticularRulesand
Representations(1980)andLanguageandProblemsofKnowledge:TheManaguaLectures(1988).TheLanguageLottery(Lightfoot1982)andHowtoSet
Parameters(Lightfoot1991)provideaperspectiveonthebiologicalnatureoflanguage,languageacquisition,languagechange,anduniversalgrammar.Generative
Phonology:DescriptionandTheory(KenstowiczandKisseberth1979)andAutosegmentalandMetricalPhonology(Goldsmith1990)provideanintroductionto
generativephonology.TheProblemBookinPhonology(HalleandClements1982)providesaseriesofphonologicalproblemsdrawnfromthelanguagesofthe
world.ACourseinPhonetics(Ladefoged1982)containsbackgroundinformationonarticulatoryandacousticphonetics.Forworkincontemporarysyntactic
theory,seeIntroductiontoGovernmentandBinding(Haegeman1991)andIntroductiontotheTheoryofGrammar(VanRiemsdijkandWilliams1986).
Finally,foracomparisonofvariouscompetingcontemporaryapproachestosyntactictheory,seeLecturesonContemporarySyntacticTheories(Sells1985)and
"GrammaticalTheory"(Wasow1989).
References
Alcock,J.(1989).Animalbehavior:Anevolutionaryapproach.Sunderland,Mass.:SinauerAssociates.
Chomsky,N.(1957).Syntacticstructures.TheHague:Mouton.
Chomsky,N.(1965).Aspectsofthetheoryofsyntax.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Chomsky,N.(1975).Reflectionsonlanguage.NewYork:Pantheon.
Chomsky,N.(1980).Rulesandrepresentations.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.
Chomsky,N.(1986).Knowledgeoflanguage:Itsnature,origin,anduse.NewYork:Praeger.
Chomsky,N.(1988).Languageandproblemsofknowledge:TheManagualectures.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.

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Cutting,J.E.,andB.S.Rosner(1974).Categoriesandboundariesinspeechandmusic.PerceptionandPsychophysics16,564570.
Fodor,J.A.(1983).Modularityofmind.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Fodor,I.A.,andT.G.Bever(1965).Thepsycholinguisticrealityoflinguisticsegments.JournalofVerbalLearningandVerbalBehavior4,414420.
Fodor,J.A.,T.G.Bever,andM.F.Garrett(1975).Thepsychologyoflanguage.NewYork:McGrawHill.
Garfield,J.(1987).Modularityinknowledgerepresentationandnaturallanguageunderstanding.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Gazdar,G.,E.Klein,G.Pullum,andI.Sag(1985).Generalizedphrasestructuregrammar.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.
Gee,J.P.(1993).Anintroductiontohumanlanguage.EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:PrenticeHall.
Goldsmith,J.(1976).Anoverviewofautosegmentalphonology.LinguisticAnalysis2,2368.
Goldsmith,J.(1990).Autosegmentalandmetricalphonology.Oxford,U.K.,andCambridge,Mass.:Blackwell.
Halle,M.,andG.N.Clements(1982).Problembookinphonology:Aworkbookforintroductorycoursesinlinguisticsandmodernphonology.Cambridge,
Mass.:MITPress.
Hayes,B.(1980).Ametricaltheoryofstressrules.Doctoraldissertation,MIT,Cambridge,Mass.
Hayes,B.(1982).ExtrametricalityandEnglishstress.LinguisticInquiry13,227276.
Kahn,D.(1976).SyllablebasedgeneralizationsinEnglishphonology.Doctoraldissertation,MIT,Cambrige,Mass.
Kenstowicz,M.,andC.Kisseberth(1979).Generativephonology:Descriptionandtheory.NewYork:AcademicPress.
Kuhl,P.,andJ.Miller(1975).Speechperceptionbythechinchilla:Voicedvoicelessdistinctioninalveolarplosiveconsonants.Science190,6972.
Ladefoged,P.(1982).Acourseinphonetics.2nded.NewYork:HarcourtBraceJovanovich.
Levelt,W.J.M.(1970).Ascalingapproachtothestudyofsyntacticrelations.InF.B.Floresd'ArcaisandW.J.M.Levelt,eds.,Advancesinpsycholinguistics.
NewYork:AmericanElsevier.
Liberman,M.,andA.Prince(1976).Onstressandlinguisticrhythm.LinguisticInquiry8,249336.
Lieberman,P.(1985).Thebiologyandevolutionoflanguage.CambridgeMass.:HarvardUniversityPress.
Lightfoot,D.(1982).Thelanguagelottery.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Lightfoot,D.(1991).Howtosetparameters.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Marler,P.,andV.Sherman.(1985).Innatedifferencesinsingingbehaviourofsparrowsrearedinisolationfromadultconspecificsong.AnimalBehaviour33,57
71.
PiatelliPalmarini,M.(1980).Languageandlearning.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.
Premack,D.(1986).Gavagai!Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Prince,A.(1983).Relatingtothegrid.LinguisticInquiry14,19100.
Riemsdijk,H.van,andE.Williams(1986).Introductiontothetheoryofgrammar.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Ross,J.R.(1967).Constraintsonvariablesinsyntax.Doctoraldissertation,MIT,Cambridge,Mass.
Selkirk,E.(1980).TheroleofprosodiccategoriesinEnglishwordstress.LinguisticInquiry11,563605.
Selkirk,E.(1984).Phonologyandsyntax:Therelationbetweensoundandstructure.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Sells,P.(1985).Lecturesoncontemporarysyntactictheories.PaloAlto,Calif.:CenterfortheStudyofLanguageandInformation.
Wasow,T.(1989).Grammaticaltheory.InM.I.Posner,ed.,Foundationsofcognitivescience.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.

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Chapter7
Neuroscience:BrainandCognition
7.1IntroductiontotheStudyoftheNervousSystem
Inthepreviouschapterswehavetakenacomputationalapproachtocognition,analyzinginformationprocessesascomputationsoverabstractlydefined
representations.Althoughhumanandanimalcognitionisphysicallyrealizedinthenervoussystem,thecomputationallevelofanalysishasallowedustostudycognition
withoutpayingmuchattentiontoitsphysicalimplementation.Inthischapterweintroduceneuroscience,thefieldthatencompassesthelevelsofanalysisthatare
requiredforthestudyofphysicalprocessesandstructuresinthenervoussystem.Thereareseveralreasonstoextendourstudyofcognitiontoincludeitsbiological
underpinnings.
First,thequestionofhownervoussystemsachievethekindsofcomplexinformationprocessingthatwehavebeenstudyingisintrinsicallyfascinating.Questionsabout
howtocompletethechainofscientificunderstandingfrommindtobrain,fromthoughttoneurontomoleculeandperhapsontosubatomicparticle,areamongthe
mostinterestinginscience.
Second,researchonthenervoussystemcanhelptestsomeofthetheoriesthathavebeendevelopedincognitivepsychologyandlinguistics.Wesawinchapter2,for
example,howthediscoverythatvisualareasofthebrainaredifferentiallyactiveduringimageryisanimportantpieceofevidencefortheexistenceofaspatially
organizedbufferforvisualimagery.
Third,aswesawinourstudyofconnectionism,thepotentialimportanceofneurosciencetocognitivesciencegoesbeyondthelikelihoodthatneuroscienceisasource
ofevidenceforautonomouslydevelopedcomputationaltheories.Theinformationprocessesthatasystemiscapableofcarryingoutefficientlyarestronglyconstrained
byitscomputationalarchitecture.Thecapabilitiesofanarchitecturearisedirectlyoutofitsphysicalstructure.Thus,knowledgeaboutfundamentalprinciplesof
structureandprocessinthenervoussystemshouldbeabletocontributetotheinitialconstructionofatheoryofcognitivearchitecture.Ideally,atheoryofthe
architecturewouldbethejointproductoffindingsatthecomputationalandbiologicallevelsofanalysis.Connectionistresearchershavereachedforthisidealbytrying
tobuildprinciplesofneuralcomputationintotheirconceptionsofcognitivearchitecture.Thereisconsiderablecontroversyaboutwhethertheprinciplesthathavebeen
suggestedaretherightonesandevenwhetherthewholeenterpriseispremature,givenourprimitiveunderstandingofneuralcomputation,butthevisioncannotbe
faulted.Inordertoconveyasenseofwhatisknowninneuroscienceandhowitrelatestoanalysisatthecognitivelevel,thischaptercoversquiteabitofterritory.
Someofwhatispresentedfallsintotheareathathascometobecalledcognitiveneuroscience,theactiveintersectionbetweenthetwofields.Othermaterialis
currentlyratherremotefromthecentral

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concernsofcognitivescience,butcouldbecomemoreimportantasresearchadvances.Thecognitivescientistshouldbeconversantwithneuroscience,readyto
establishnewconnectionswhentheybecomepossible.
Afourthreasonforlinkingthestudyofcognitivescienceandneuroscienceisthattheunderstandingoftherelationshipbetweenthephysicalstructureofthenervous
systemanditsinformationprocessingcapacitieshasmanypotentialpracticalapplications.Increasedunderstandingofthebiologicalsubstratesofcognitionwill
contributetothedevelopmentofbetterphysicalandbehavioraltreatmentsfordamagetothenervoussystemcausedbyaccidentordisease.Moregenerally,such
knowledgewillaidinthedesignoflearningenvironmentsthataretunedtothephysicallydeterminedstrengthsofhumaninformationprocessingandwillsuggestnew
waysinwhichcomputersystemscanbeusedtocompensateforitsweaknesses.Researchershavealsobeguntoenvisionnewtypesofcomputerswithhighlyparallel
hardwarethatexploitssomeofthedesignprinciplesofthenervoussystem(HechtNielsen1990).
7.2OrganizationoftheCentralNervousSystem
Introduction:LevelsofDescription
Thenervoussystemhasbeenstudiedatmanydifferentlevels.Neurobiologygivesaverydifferentpictureofwhatthebrainisdoingthanpsycholinguisticsor
neuropsychology.AsSejnowskiandChurchland(1989)havepointedout,thesedivisionsofstudyaresomewhatarbitraryandservetheconvenienceofscientistsand
thetechniquesthatareusedintheirresearch.Theydescribesevendifferentlevels(seefigure7.1),organizedalongaspatialscale.Atthetopofthescaleareneural
systemsorganizedaroundgeneralfunctionalcharacteristics,suchasthespeecharticulationsystem.Atthebottomofthescaleareneurotransmitters,thechemicalsthat
carrysignalsbetweenneurons,thecellsinthebrainthatprocessinformation.Atpresentour

Figure7.1
Scaleofsizeand
unitoffunctionin
thenervoussystem

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knowledgeofneuralprocessesatthemolecularorsynapticlevelismuchmoredetailedthanattheneuralnetworkandmaplevels.Futureresearchislikelyto
restructurethesedescriptivelevelsaswelearnmoreaboutthebrain'sownstatesofinternalrepresentation.
BasicNeuroanatomy
Thehumannervoussystemisdividedintocentralandperipheralsystems.Thecentralnervoussystemismadeupofthebrainandspinalcordandcanbethoughtof
asthecontrolcenterforinterpretingsensoryinputanddirectingourthoughtsandactions.Theperipheralnervoussystemfunctionstocarryinformationfromthe
bodyandtheoutsideworldtothecentralsystemandback.Forunderstandingcognitivefunctions,wearemostinterestedinareviewofthecentralnervoussystem
(CNS).
Neuroanatomyreferstothegeneralstructuralorganizationofthebrainandspinalcord,includingitsmajorphysicalandfunctionaldivisions.Neuroanatomyisdifficult
tolearnbecausenewbrainstructuresdevelopedontopofolderonesduringthecourseofevolution,producingahighlycomplicatedorganwithmanyregionstightly
packedtogetherandextremelycomplexinterconnectedpathwaysamongthem.Figure7.2illustratesthemajorregionsoftheCNSandsomeofitsprincipalstructures.
Thelowestfunctionaldivisionisthespinalcord,whichconnectsthebraintothebody'sorgansandmuscles.Themiddledivisionisthebrainstem,whichismadeup
ofthediencephalon(betweenbrain),themidbrainormesencephalon,andthehindbrainorrhombencephalon.Thehighestdivisionistheforebrain,whichincludesthe
cerebralcortex,basalganglia,olfactorybulbs,andlimbicsystem.Therearecomplementaryleftandrightstructuresateverydivisioninthebrain,withtheexceptionof
thepinealbody.

Figure7.2
Amidsagittaldiagramoftheprincipalstructuresofthebrain.
(FromKandel1991a.)

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Thediencephalonconsistsofthreethalamic(innerchamber)structuresandthepituitarygland.Theepithalamusismadeupofthepinealbodyandothercellgroups,or
nuclei,calledthehabenula.Thehypothalamusiscomposedofovertwentysmallnuclei.Theyareinvolvedinnearlyallaspectsofbehavior,includingregulatory
functionsofsleep,appetite,reproductivecycles,andbodytemperature.Thesefunctionsareaffectedthroughthereleaseofchemicalscalledhormonesintotheblood
streamthatarethentransportedtoothertissuesinthebodyandbrain.Thethalamus,madeupofaclusterofsmallernuclei,islocateddorsally(ontop)andanterior
(infrontof)totherestofthemidbrain.Thethalamusfunctionsaspartofthesensoryrelaysystemthatreceivesinputfromallsensoryorgansexceptthenoseand
relaysthesesignalstothecortex.Forexample,thelateralgeniculatenucleus(LGN)receivesinputfromtheeyes,andthemedialgeniculatenucleus(MGN)
receivesauditoryprojections.
Themidbrainisorganizedintotwosectionsthatarephysicallydividedbythecerebralaqueduct.Thisnarrowcavityispartoftheventriclesysteminthebrain,whichis
filledwithcerebrospinalfluid,cushioningthebrainfromshockandpossiblyplayingaroleinfilteringmetabolicwastes.Thearealyingabovetheaqueductiscalledthe
tectumandprimarilyconsistsofthesuperiorandinferiorcolliculi,nucleithatreceiveprojectionsfromvisualandauditoryorgans,respectively.Belowtheaqueductis
thetegmentum,madeupofsensoryandmotorfiberspassingbetweentheforebrainandtheperipheralnervoussystem,andanumberofmotornuclei,suchasthe
substantianigra(whichwhendamagedproducesthesymptomsofParkinson'sdisease).
Thehindbrainismadeupofthepons,medullaoblongata,andcerebellum.Intheponsareavarietyofsensoryandmotornucleithatgovernvestibular(balanceand
posturalorientation)andmotorfunctions.Themedullaoblongataconsistsprimarilyoffibertractsthatpassinformationbetweenthespinalcordandthecortex.In
addition,itcontainsacomplexmixtureoffibers,calledthereticularformation,thattravelupanddownthebrainstemfromthediencephalonthroughthehindbrain.
Overlyingthebrainstemisthecerebellum.Itscellularorganizationisremarkablyuniformthroughout,ascompared,forexample,tothecortex,whichhasregionally
organizedcharacteristics.Thecerebellumhasconnectionstostructuresthroughouttherestofthebrain.Althoughitwasoncethoughttobespecializedprimarilyfor
sensorymotorcoordination,recentresearchsuggestsrolesinlearning(McCormickandThompson1984)andpossiblyotherhighercognitivefunctions(Courchesne
etal.1988).
Theforebrainisdividedintofourregions:thecerebralcortex,thelimbicsystem,olfactorybulbs,andbasalganglia.Sometimesthethalamusisplacedwiththeforebrain
group.Thelimbic(border)systemismadeupofseveralstructures.Themajornucleiincludethehippocampus(seahorse),amygdala,septum(partition),mammillary
bodies,fornix,andcingulate(girdle)gyrus,whichtogethersurroundandsheathethebrainstem.Thesestructuresformconnectionswithpartsofthehypothalamus,
thalamus,andcortexthroughthecingulategyrus.Becauseoftheirinterconnectionswiththeolfactorybulbstheywereoncecalledtherhinencephalonandthoughtto
analyzeolfactoryinformation.Morerecentlythehippocampushasreceivedintensestudyforitsroleintheformationofmemory(Squire1987)andinspatial
orientation(O'KeefeandNadel1978).
Thebasalgangliaareformedfromseverallargenucleithatsurroundthethalamusandlieinthemedial(middle)regionbelowthecortex.Thesestructures,includingthe
putamen(shell),theglobuspallidus,andthecaudate,haveextensiveconnectionswith

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Figure7.3
Themainpartsofthecentralnervoussystemandcerebralcortex.(FromKandel1991a.)

thecortexandthalamusaswellasportionsofthemidbrain,suchastherednucleusandsubstantianigra.Theyplayasignificantroleintheinitiationandcontrolof
movement.
CerebralCortexApproximately1.53mmthick,thecerebralcortexconsistsoffourtosixlayersofcellsthatarespreadoutoveralargesurfaceareaof100,000
200,000mm2(Chemiak1990).Asthecortexincreasedinsizeduringthecourseofevolution,foldsandwrinklesappeared,presumablytoallowmorecorticaltissue
tofitintotheskullwithoutexpandingthesizeofthecranium.Thisfoldingprocessproducedcharacteristicridges(calledgyriorlobules)andclefts(calledfissuresor
sulciifshallow).
Theseridgesandcleftsarenotidenticalinanytwoindividuals,buttheyarerelativelyuniformandcanbedividedintofourmajorregions(seefigure7.3).Theoccipital
lobesarelocatedintheposterior(back)partofthecortex.Theyserveastheprimarysensorysystemforvision.Thetemporallobe,locatedlateral(totheside)and
ventral(below)totheprominentlateralorSylvianfissure,servesatleastthreefunctions:primaryandsecondaryprocessingofauditoryinformation,longtermstorage
ofsensoryinformation(suchastheidentityofvisualobjects)(MishkinandAppenzeller1987),andprocessingofemotionalqualitiesassociatedwithsensation.The
parietallobeisstrategicallylocatedposteriortothecentralsulcusandanteriortotheoccipitallobe.Itsmultipleconnectionswithoccipital,frontal,andtemporal
lobessuggestafunctionalroleinthecrossmodalintegrationofsensoryinformation.Recentresearchalsohassuggestedafunctionalroleinlocatingvisualobjectsand
directingvisualattention

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(Andersen,Siegel,andEssick1987).Thepostcentralgyrusoftheparietallobecontainsthesomatosensorycortex,whichistheprimarysensoryareaforafferent
(incoming)signalsfromthesurfaceofthebody,suchastouchandpain.
Thefrontallobeiscomposedofthecorticaltissuethatisanteriortothecentralsulcus.Thefrontallobehasacomplexarrayofconnectionswithothercorticalregions
andwithsubcorticalstructures.Untilthe1930sthefrontallobesweremostoftendescribedastheseatofhumanintelligence,includingfunctionssuchasforesight,self
awareness,andethicaljudgments.Todaytheoriesoffrontallobefunctionaremorecomplicatedandincludecomponentsofmotorcontrol(bothfinemotorcontroland
complexlimbmovementsthatinvolvetactileorvisualguidance),speechproduction(associatedwithBroca'sarea),andhighermentalfunctions,suchasplanningor
structuringactivitiesaroundagoal.Theprecentralgyrusofthefrontallobecontainstheprimarymotorcortex,whichsendsefferent(outgoing)signalstothespinal
motorsystems,producingmusclemovement.
ComparativeNeuroanatomy
Theanatomyofthehumanbrainissimilartothatoftheratormonkey.Althoughearlyneuroanatomistshopedtofindtypesofneuralcellsthatwereuniquetohumans,
thishasprovednottobethecase.However,thehumanbrainisdifferentinotherways.Whenthesizeofthehumanbrainiscomparedwiththebrainsizeofother
animals,takingbodyweightintoaccount,humanshavethelargestbrainsofallmammalssixtimesaslargeasacat'sbrainandalmostthreetimesaslargeasa
chimpanzee's(dolphinsrankaclosesecondtohumans)(Stephen,Bauchot,andAndy1970).Humansfareevenbetterwhentherelativesizeofthecortexisusedfor
comparison.
Comparedwithotherprimates,humansarebornwithabrainthatissmallrelativetoitsadultsize.Macaquemonkeysarebornwithbrainsthatare60percentoftheir
adultweight.Theproportionsforchimpanzeesandhumansare46percentand25percent,respectively.Theserelationshipsappeartobeduetotherateofbrain
growththatoccursafterbirth.Duringfetaldevelopmentthebraingrowsatthesamerateinmacaque,chimpanzee,andhuman.Atbirththeratesofbraingrowthslow
downmarkedlyformacaqueandchimpanzee,buthumanbrainscontinuetogrowattherapidfetalrateforabouttwomoreyears.Apparently,theincreaseinthesize
ofthehumanbrainwasachievedevolutionarilybyprolongingdevelopmentafterbirth.
Thesignificanceofthefactsaboutbrainsizeisinsomedispute.Differencesinsizecouldbetheresultofmorecells,morecellprocesses(suchasthesizeofdendritic
branchesorthenumberofaxonalconnectionsbetweenneurons),orincreasedcelldensity.Usingonemethodtoestimatethedensityofcorticalcells,Changeux
(1985)reportedthatcelldensityandtherelativefrequencyofdifferenttypesofcellsforagivencorticalregionarefairlyconstantacrossanumberofspeciesfrom
mousetohuman.Hesuggestedthatthehumanadvantageisinthesheernumberofcells,estimatinghumanstohavefromthreetofourtimesthenumberofcorticalcells
asotherprimates.Usingothermethods,Passingham(1982)calculatedthatwithlargerbrainvolume,humancorticalcellsarespacedfartherapartthanthecellsinthe
brainsofotherprimates.Hesuggestedthatincertaincorticalareasthehumanbrainhasmoreconnectionspercellratherthanmorecells.Theincreasedvolumeisnot
foundinprimarysensoryregionsofthecortex,suchastheoccipitallobeorpartsofthetemporallobe,suggestingthatthemainevolutionarypressureonbrain
development

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inhumanswastoenlargecorticalareasinvolvedinthecrossmodalintegrationofinformation,suchastheparietalandfrontalcortex.
Thefunctionalorganizationofthehumanbrainalsomaybedifferentfromthatofthebrainsofothermammals.Forexample,Passingham(1982)hassuggestedthat
becausecertainbehavioralfunctionsappeartobelocalizedinonecorticalhemisphere,suchaslanguageinthelefthemisphere,humansmayhaveabrainthatcan
processinformationmoreefficiently.Wewillreturntothistopiclaterinthechapter.
CellularSystems
NeuronsThecellsofthebrainaregenerallydividedintotwocategories:thenervecellsorneuronsandotherscalledglialcells.Neuronsareintensivelystudied
becauseoftheiruniquecomputationalproperties.Althoughtheirbiologicalprocessesaremuchlikethoseofothercells,neuronshavethespecialabilitytoreceiveand
transmitinformationtootherneurons,muscles,andglands,sometimesovergreatdistances.Mostneuronssendsignalstomanyotherneuronsandalsoreceivesignals
frommanyotherneurons.
Glialcells,whicharemuchmorenumerousthanneurons,arenotwellunderstood,buttheyareknowntoserveseveralfunctions.Theyareinvolvedintheremovalof
unnecessaryorexcesssubstances.Glialcellsoftenabsorbexcessneurotransmitterchemicalsatsynapses(aprocessdescribedbelow)andhavebeenobservedto
multiplyandremovecellulardebrisatsitesofbraindamage.Invertebrates(animalswithspinalcords)glialcellsprovidetwospecialfunctions.Theyestablishthe
bloodbrainbarriertofilterthebloodsupplytothebrainandalsoformmyelinontheaxonsofsomeneurons(bothfunctionsaredescribedbelowinmoredetail).
Thebrainisthemostmetabolicallyactiveorganinthebody,accountingfor15to20percentofthebody'soxygenutilizationbutonly2percentoftotalbodyweight.
Neuronsarealwaysactiveandrequireaconstantsupplyofenergyintheformofbloodglucosetoremainalive.Asaneuron'slevelofactivityincreases,itsneedfor
energyrisesaswellandglucoseistakenupmorerapidly.Specialimagingtechniques,suchaspositronemissiontomography(PET),havebeendevelopedto
providepicturesofthebrainbylabelingglucosewitharadioactiveisotope.Thelabeledglucoseisintravenouslyinjectedanddifferentiallyabsorbedbythoseregionsof
thebrainthataremetabolicallymostactiveduringthetimeperiodwhentheisotopeisstillactive.Oncetheisotopehasbeenabsorbedintothecells,itremainsthere,
andthesubject'sbraincanbeimagedwithoutharmfuleffects.PETscansareoneofthefewproceduresavailablethatcanprovidefunctionalbrainimagesinhumans.
Thistechniqueisparticularlyusefulforlocalizingbehavioralfunctionstospecificbrainlocations.Itrequiresfindingataskthatinvolvesareasofthebraindifferentially
andkeepingasubjectatthetaskfortwominuteswithoutdistractionorinterruptionwhiletheimageisbeingrecorded.
Ifthesupplyofoxygenatedbloodtothebrainisinterrupted,throughaheartattackorstroke,forexample,thelossofoxygendisruptscellmetabolismandneurons
begintodiewithinminutes.Becausethegeneticmaterialinthesomaofadultneuronscannotinitiatetheprocessforcellduplication(unlikeglialcells),neuronscannot
reproducetoreplacelostcells.Thus,anybraindamageinadultsispermanent.Neuronsarevulnerableinotherwaysaswell.Theirfunctioningcanbedisruptedby
toxicsubstancesfromtheenvironmentorevenbynaturallyoccurringchemicalsinthebloodstreamsuchas

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aminoacids.Forprotection,abloodbrainbarrierhasevolvedthatactstoselectivelyfilterthebrain'sbloodsupply.Glialcells,whichhavefattymembranes,tightly
sheathemostofthebloodvesselsinthebrain.Smallmolecules,suchasoxygen,caneasilypassthroughthismembranetissue,butlargerones,suchasglucose,require
specialtransportmechanismstogetacrossthebarrier.Foradrugtodirectlyaffectbrainfunction,itsmolecularstructuremustbesmallenoughtofitthroughtheglial
membraneorbesolubleinthefattytissueandsotransportableacrossthemembrane.Inafewlocationsinthebrainthebloodvesselsarenotwrappedinglialtissue,
whichallowsthesebrainregionstomonitorthecompositionofthebloodforsubstancessuchashormones.
Althoughneuronsvaryconsiderablyinshapeandsize(seefigure7.4),theygenerallyhavethreemajorparts:thecellbodyorsoma,thedendrites(Greekfortree),
andtheaxon.Thesoma,whosediameterisusuallysmallerthan50micrometers(onemillionthofameter),containsthecell'snucleusandmanyothersmallstructures
(calledorganelles)thatcarryoutprocessesnecessaryforthecell'shealth.Radiatingoutfromthecellbodyarethedendritesandtheaxon.Eachtypeofneuronhas
manydendriticfibers,whichformacharacteristicshapethatdistinguishesitfromothertypes.Forexample,thedendritesofthePurkinjecellsinthecerebellumhavea
complexcoral

Figure7.4
Examplesofdifferenttypesofneurons.(FromKandel1991b.)

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shape,whereasthepyramidalcellsinthecortexhavedendritesthatbranchlessfrequentlyandextendfarther(figure7.4).Thedendritictreeofasingleneuronreceives
inputfromasmanyasseveralthousandotherneuronsthroughsynapticcontacts(whicharedescribedbelow).Inputisalsoreceivedonthesoma.Insometypesof
neuronsthecontactpointsalongthedendritesbulgeup,producinglittleknobscalledspines,whichchangeinshapeandsizewithexperience,servingtoexpandthe
surfaceareaofcontact.
Eachneuronhasonlyoneaxon,whichhasbeenestimatedtomakeupto4,000contactswiththedendritesandsomasofasmanyas1,000otherneurons(Cherniak
1990Shepherd1990b).Theaxonisconnectedtothecellbodyoralargedendriteatajunctioncalledtheaxonhillock.Axonsareconstructedlikefinecylindrical
tubesthattaperasthetubeextendsfromthesoma.Attheendoftheaxon,manysmallcollateralbranchesextendtomakecontactwithotherneurons.Asthese
branchesend,thetissueexpandsintoasmallbulbknownastheaxonterminal.Someaxonsarequiteshortandextendlessthanamillimeter,whereasothersaxons,
suchasthosethatcarryinformationtoorfromthespinalcord,canbeseveralfeetlong.
Neuronsareelectricallycharged,somewhatlikeabattery,carryinganegativechargeinsiderelativetotheoutsideoftheircellmembrane.Inarestingstatethevoltage
differenceorpotentialbetweentheinsideandoutsideofaneuronisabout70millivolts.Thischargeisduetoanunequaldistributionofchargedparticles,calledions,
betweentheinsideandoutsideofthecell.Positivelychargedions,suchassodium(Na+ ),arefoundinhigherconcentrationsoutsidethecell,whereasnegatively
chargedions,suchascellproteins(P2),aremoreconcentratedinsidethecell.Otherions,suchaspotassium(K+ ),calcium(Ca2+),andchloride(Cl),arealso
unequallydistributed.Thisdistributionismaintainedbythecellmembrane,whichcontainstinychannels,specializedfortransportingeachtypeofion.Initsrestingstate
themembraneissemipermeabletoK+ ,allowingtheseionstomoverelativelyeasilybetweentheinsideandoutsideofthecellthroughthepotassiumchannel.However,
atrestthemembraneisimpermeabletoNa+ .Cellproteinsaretoolargetopassthroughtheionchannelsandremaininthesoma.Thecombineddistributionofthese
ionsproducesanegativelychargedcell.
Thecell'schargewouldeventuallyrundown,werenotitforamechanisminthemembrane,calledthesodiumpotassiumpump,whichpumpspotassiumbackinto
thecellandsodiumout.Thecell'snegativepotentialismaintainedprimarilybykeepingNa+ ionsoutsideofthecell,aspotassiumchannelsallowK+toleakbackinto
thecell.Ionchannelsalsoareactivatedbychangesinthepotentialofthecell.
LocalandActionPotentialsWithinneuronsinformationisconductedintwodifferentways.Longdistancetransmissionoccursviaactionpotentials,whichtravel
alongthesurfaceoftheaxonfromthesomatotheaxonterminals.Toassimilateincominginformationinthedendritesandsoma,neuronsuselocalpotentials.
Sometimeslocalpotentialsalsofunctiontotransmitinformationoververyshortdistances(lessthanamicrometer)betweentwoadjacentneurons.Actionpotentials
producealarge,allornonesignalthatisbrief(110milliseconds)andtravelsunattenuatedandatarapidrate(ashighas100meterspersecond).Localpotentials
aresmallandgraded,andpropagatepassively,rapidlydegradingaselectricalresistanceisencountered.
Changesinlocalpotentialsofdendritesandthesomaareproducedbysynapticcontactwithotherneurons(aprocessdescribedbelow).Thesesynapseseither

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electricallyexciteorinhibitthereceivingneuron.Thechargeofthesomacanbedepolarized(say,from70millivoltsto60millivolts)ifthesumofthelocalpotentials
synapticallygeneratedbyotherneuronsislargeenough.Themoreexcitatorysynapsesthatoccuratthesametime,thelargerthelocalpotential.
Actionpotentialsbeginattheaxonhillock.Thehillockisverysensitivetochangesinthemembranepotentialofthecell.Whenthepotentialinthehillockisdepolarized
toacriticalthreshold,theionchannels,whicharesensitivetovoltagechanges,openbriefly(abouthalfamillisecond)toallowNa+ torushintothecell.Becausethe
concentrationofNa+ outsidethecellismuchhigherthaninside,Na+ isdriveninsidethecellbyprocessesthattendtoequalizetheconcentrations(diffusion,duetothe
concentrationgradient,andelectrostaticpressure,duetothechargegradient).Thisinfluxofpositiveionsrapidlydepolarizesthecellfurther,achievingapositive50
millivoltcharge,atwhichpointthesodiumchannelsclose(seefigure7.5).
MeanwhilethepotassiumchannelsarealsoopenedtoallowK+ toflowoutofthecellthroughthediffusionprocess.Becausepotassiumchannelsopenmoreslowly
andtheconcentrationgradientforsodiumismoreoutofbalance,theNa+ influxdominates

Figure7.5
Schematicdiagramofchangesthatoccurinaneuron'smembranepotential
duringanactionpotential.Refertothetextforanexplanation.
(FromThompson1994.)

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theinitialchangesinthecell'smembranepotential.However,afterthesodiumchannelsclose,thepotassiumchannelsremainopen.Thecellisthennegatively
repolarizedasK+ continuestoleavethecellandasNa+ isactivelytransportedoutofthecellbythesodiumpotassiumpump.Whenthecellbeginstoreachitsresting
potential,thepotassiumchannelsclose.However,thisprocesstakesafewmilliseconds,duringwhichthemembraneisactuallyhyperpolarized(at,say,75millivolts)
untilthesodiumpotassiumpumpandtheleakingofNa+ totheoutsideofthecellcanreturnthemembranepotentialtoitsrestinglevel.
Whenthehillockbeginstodepolarize,theadjacentregionofaxonmembranebecomesdepolarizedaswellbytheinfluxofNa+ .Thesepositiveionsmaketheinsideof
thecelllessnegativelycharged.Thisreductioninmembranepotentialissufficienttotriggeradjacentsodiumchannels,causingthemtoopenandthusmovingtheaction
potentialfartherdowntheaxonmembrane.Whenthesodiumchannelsareopen,thisregionofthemembranecannotbeelectricallystimulatedtoproduceanother
actionpotentialuntilthechannelscloseandthemembranebeginstorepolarize.Thisportionoftheactionpotentialiscalledtherefractoryperiod.Becauseofthe
refractoryperiod,theactionpotentialispropagatedinonlyonedirection,awayfromthesoma,advancingalongthatpartoftheaxonmembranewhichiselectricallyat
rest.Eachstepinthisprocessisillustratedinfigure7.5.
Tospeeduptherateatwhichactionpotentialsareconducted,someaxonsaresheathedwithSchwanncells,atypeofglialcell.Schwanncellsproduceafatty
substancecalledmyelinthatwrapsaroundtheaxoninmultiplelayers.Myelinisanelectricalinsulatorthatisolatestheaxonmembranefromtheextracellularfluidand
thusfromchangesinelectricalpotentialcausedbythemovementofionsacrossthemembrane.Ifthemyelinsheathwerecontinuousalongtheaxon,theaction
potentialcouldnotpropagate.However,everymillimeterorsotherearesmallgapsinthemyelin,callednodesofRanvier.Theelectricalcurrentassociatedwiththe
influxofNa+ atonenodeisdirectlyandveryrapidlyconductedtothenextnode,causingadepolarizationatthatnode.Inthiswaytheactionpotentialjumpsfromone
nodetothenext.Inunmyelinatedaxons,wheretheactionpotentialmustbepropagatedcontinuouslyalongthemembrane,conductionspeedisrarelymorethanafew
meterspersecond,butmyelinationcanincreasethespeedtoupto100meterspersecond.
Humaninfantsarebornwithminimalmyelination,mainlyinprimarysensoryandmotorareas,butmyelinationcontinuesthroughoutchildhood,pasttheageoffifteen.
Themyelinationprocesshasaprofoundeffectonthedevelopmentofcognitiveandmotorfunctions.Forexample,infantsbegintowalkataboutthetimethatthe
peripheralmotorneuronsthatcontrollegmusclescompletemyelination.Someresearchershavespeculatedthatmyelinationinassociativeandfrontalcortexmayplay
animportantfunctionalroleinthedevelopmentoflanguageandotherhighercognitivefunctions(Huttenlocher1979).Multiplesclerosis(MS)isadegenerativedisease
inwhichpatchesofmyelinandsometimesaxonsinthemotorandsensorytractsaredestroyed.
Inadditiontoconductingactionpotentials,axonsprovideaconduitforthetransportationofchemicalsubstancesbetweenthesomaandtheaxonterminal.Certain
chemicals,calledneurotransmitters,usedinthesynaptictransmissionattheaxonterminal(describedbelow)aremanufacturedinthesomaandthengothrough
anterograde(forward)transporttotheaxonterminal,wheretheyarestoredinsynapticvesicles.Thesechemicalsalsoundergoretrograde(backward)transportfrom
theterminaltothesomasotheycanbereused.Aslow(onemillimeterperday)anterogradetransport

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systemcarriesmaterialimportantforcellgrowthandregeneration.Afaster(1020millimetersperday)systemcarriesthetransmittermaterial.Someneurotransmitters
(suchasacetylcholine,whichisinvolvedinsynaptictransmissionintheperipheralnervoussystemtoactivemuscletissue)aremanufacturedattheaxonterminal.
Thefiringrateofaneuroncanrangefromafewactionpotentialspersecondtoseveralhundreddependingupontheamountofexcitatoryorinhibitoryinput.Changes
inthefiringraterepresentabasiccomputationalpropertyofthenervoussystem.Whenaneuronchangesitsfiringrateinresponsetoaparticularstimulus
characteristic,theneuronisprobablyinvolvedinthecomputationalanalysisofthatattribute.
SynapsesSynapsesarethebasicbuildingblocksforneuralcomputation.Asynapseisasiteatwhichelectricalorchemicaltransmissionoccursbetweenneurons.The
changesthatoccurinthefiringratesofneuronsarecontrolledbythesynapticactivity.Mostsynaptictransmissioninthemammalianbrainischemical.Thesending(or
presynaptic)cellreleasesaneurotransmitter,whichbindstothemembranesurfaceofthereceiving(orpostsynaptic)cell,causingachangeinitslocalpotential.Some
transmissionsareexcitatoryanddepolarizethepostsynapticcell,drivingittowarditsfiringthresholdandthusmakingitmorelikelythatanactionpotentialwillbe
generated.Othertransmissionsareinhibitoryandhyperpolarizeacell,drivingthemembranepotentialbelowitsrestinglevel,reducingthelikelihoodthatanaction
potentialwillbeproduced.
Theprocessofchemicaltransmissionbetweenneuronsiscalledexocytosis(outofthecell).Exocytosistakeslessthanamillisecond.Aneurotransmitteriscontained
intinyvesiclesinthepresynapticterminal.Eachvesiclecontainsabout10,000moleculesofthetransmitterchemical.Whenanactionpotentialreachestheaxon
terminal,thechangeinvoltagetriggerstheopeningofcalciumion(Ca2+)channels.Theseionsdiffuseintothecell,furtherdepolarizingtheterminalandcausingthe
vesiclesofneurotransmittertofusewiththeterminalmembraneandopentotheoutsideofthecell,releasingthetransmitterchemicalintoaverysmallspaceroughly20
nanometerswide(calledthesynapticcleft)betweenthepreandpostsynapticmembranes.Thevesiclesarethoughttobereformedoutoftheterminalmembrane.
TheFastSynapticSystemOncereleasedintothesynapticcleft,theneurotransmitterdiffusesacrossthespaceandattachestomolecularreceptorsonthe
postsynapticmembrane(seefigure7.6).Thesereceptorsarelargeproteinmoleculesembeddedinthecellmembranewithonesurfaceareastickingout.Thissurface
hasaregionwithapreciseshapethatmatchestheconfigurationofthetransmittermoleculesothatthetransmittercanattachitselftothisregionlikeakeyfittingalock.
Insomereceptorstheattachmentofthetransmitteraltersthereceptor'smolecularstructuresothatachannelisopenedtotheoutsideofthecell,allowingcertaintypes
ofionstodiffuseintooroutofthepostsynapticcell.Whereastheionchannelsinvolvedinthetransmissionoftheactionpotentialareelectricallygatedthatis,they
openorclosetochangesinthevoltageofthecellthesepostsynapticreceptorsarechemicallygated,sothationchannelsopenandcloseinthepresenceofcertain
neurotransmitterchemicals.
Whetherthepostsynapticcellisexcitedorinhibiteddependsupontheflowofions.Excitationcauseswhatiscalledanexcitatorypostsynapticpotential(EPSP).An
EPSPisadepolarizationofthecellmembrane,drivingthemembranepotentialinapositivedirectiontowarditsfiringthreshold(seetheareamarked3infigure7.5).
Aninhibitory

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Figure7.6
(a)showsanelectronmicroscopephotographofasynapse.(b)isaschematicdiagramofthisprocess,
showingasynapticvesiclefusingwiththepresynapticmembranetoreleaseneurotransmitterintothe
synapticcleft.(FromSteven1979.)

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synaptictransmissionproducesaninhibitorypostsynapticpotential(IPSP)andhastheoppositeeffectofhyperpolarizingthecell,drivingitspotentialbelowits
normalrestinglevel.Acetylcholine,aneurotransmitterthatoccursinsynapsesbetweenmotorneuronsandmusclecellsintheperipheralnervoussystem,isexcitatory
becauseNa+ channelsopenatthereceptorsiteandallowpositivelychargedionstoflowintothecellanddepolarizeit.Ontheotherhand,gammaaminobutyricacid
(GABA)isaninhibitoryneurotransmitterbecauseitsreceptorsopenClionchannels,allowingionstoflowintothecellandcausinghyperpolarizationviatheirnegative
charge.Ingeneral,theactionoftheneurotransmitterdependsuponthereceptormolecules.Thesameneurotransmittercanbeexcitatoryatsomesynapsesand
inhibitoryatothersforexample,acetylcholineinhibitsheartmusclefibers.
Neurotransmitterchemicalsarerapidlyinactivatedsothatthetimingofthesignalispreciselycontrolledotherwise,postsynapticneuronswouldcontinuetorespond
untilthebrainwentoutofcontrol(somethinglikeanepilepticseizure).Inactivationoccursinseveraldifferentways.Theneurotransmitterchemicalcansimplydiffuse
fromthesynapticjunctionintointercellularspace,enzymesinthesynapticcleftcanbindtotheneurotransmitterandinactivateit,orthetransmitterchemicalscanbe
recycledbackintothepresynapticterminalandreused,aprocesscalledpinocytosis.
SecondMessengerSystemsOtherneurotransmitters,suchasdopamineandnorepinephrine,operatebydifferentandmoreelaboratemechanismsthanchemically
gatedionchannels.Theseneurotransmittersaffecttheconcentrationsofcertainchemicalsubstancesinthepostsynapticcells,whichinturncauseachainofchemical
eventsthateventuallyactontheionchannelsdirectly.Thistypeofpostsynapticeffectistermedasecondmessengersystem.
Secondmessengersystemsareextremelycomplicatedandinvolveasequenceofmanychemicalevents,eachofwhichhasmultipleeffectsonotherchemical
processesinthepostsynapticcell(seefigure7.7).Forexample,manyneurotransmittersusecyclicadenosinemonophosphate(cAMP)asasecondarychemical
messenger.TheprecursortocAMPisadenosinetriphosphate(ATP),whichisasourceofenergythatisformedbythemetabolismofbloodglucose.Whenthe
transmitterbindstothepostsynapticreceptor,itactivatesanenzyme,adenylatecyclase,whichcatalyzestheconversionofATPintocAMP.Inturn,cAMPcanacton
otherbiochemicalmachinery,suchasproteinkinase(anenzymethataltersthepermeabilityofionchannels),thesodiumpotassiumpump,thegeneticactivityofthecell
nucleus,andsoon.Thus,informationfromtheneurotransmitter,orthefirstmessenger,ismultipliedandamplifiedasthemessageispassedfromonechemicalreaction
toanother.Thenetresultisthataweaksignalfromthetransmitterreceptorcanproducelargeandlonglastingeffectsonthepostsynapticpotential.Thissystemis
relativelyslow.Whereasthechemicallygatedtransmissiontakeslessthanamillisecond,secondmessengersystemsrequireseveralmilliseconds,andsomechemical
responsescantakeuptoseveralminutestobecompleted.
Someneurotransmittersfunctioninboththefastsynapticandthesecondmessengersystems.Forexample,intheperipheralnervoussystemacetylcholinereceptors
usethefastsynapticsystemmediatedbysodiumionchannelshowever,inthebrainandspinalcordacetylcholine'seffectsareproducedthroughasecondmessenger
system.Dopaminealsousesatleastthreedifferenttypesofreceptors.Thefirstdopaminereceptor(D1)activatesasecondmessengersystem,whereasD2activates
chemicallygatedionchannels.

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Figure7.7
Modeoflongtermpotentiation.Refertothetextforanexplanation.
(FromKandelandHawkins1993.)

SynapticModulatoryMechanismsSynapticeffectsaremodulatedbymanydifferentmechanisms,whichcontrolthesizeandthedurationoftheEPSPorIPSP.At
leasttwodifferentmechanismsareknown.First,Kandelandhiscolleagues(Hawkinsetal.1983)reportedthatthestrengthofasynapticconnectioncouldbe
modulatedbytheactivityofathirdneuron,whichwasactiveatthesametimeasthepresynapticneuron.Thismodulatoryeffectwasfirstfoundinthestudyofthe
classicallyconditionedgillwithdrawalreflexinaseasnail(aplysia),butithasnotyetbeenseeninthemammaliannervoussystem.Intheaplysiathemodulatoryneuron
stimulatesthepresynapticneuronthroughaserotoninreceptor,whichleadstoactivityinthepresynapticneuronthatincreasestheinfluxofCa2+.Thisincreasedlevelof
calciumions,inturn,resultsinmoreneurotransmitterbeingreleased,producingalargerEPSPorIPSP.

Page284

Second,Hebb(1949)proposedthatcoincidentalactivityinpreandpostsynapticneuronsstrengthensthesynapticconnectionbetweenthem.InaclassicHebbian
synapsechangesareproducedinboththepreandpostsynapticcells,makingtheconnectionbetweenthemmoreefficient,whereasinthemodulatorysynapse
increasesinsynapticstrengthareprimarilytheresultofchangesthatoccurinthepresynapticneuron.Themammalianhippocampushasbeenthesiteofmuchrecent
researchonHebbiansynapses(LynchandBaudry1984).Whenahippocampalpathwayisrapidlystimulatedforashortperiod,producingactionpotentials,synaptic
strengthscanincreasefordaysorevenweeks(BlissandLomo1973).Thischangehasbeencalledlongtermpotentiation(LTP).TheassociativetypeofLTP
requirestheconjunctionoftwoinputsandseemstoinvolveagenuinelyHebbiansynapse(WigstromandGustafsson1985).Thereleaseoftheneurotransmitter
glutamate(themostcommoninthehippocampus)initiatesthepostsynapticchanges.Glutamatedepolarizesthepostsynapticcellbybindingtoatypeofreceptorcalled
nonNMDA(NmethylDaspartate).Thisdepolarization,inconjunctionwiththepresenceofappropriateneurotransmitters,opensachannelinanothertypeof
receptorcalledNMDA,whichisusuallyblocked,allowingCa2+toenterthepostsynapticcell.Thecalciumionstriggerachainofsecondmessengereventsthatinduce
LTP.ThelongtermmaintenanceofLTP,however,appearstorequirepresynapticchangesthatincreasethereleaseofneurotransmitter,perhapsinachemical
feedbackmessagesentbythepostsynapticcell.Severalresearchersnowthinkthatnitricoxidemaybethatmessenger(KandelandHawkins1993).
NeurochemicalSystems
Thebraincontainsmanydifferentchemicalsubstancesthatinfluencesynapticcommunicationbetweenneuronsatleastfortybymostrecentaccounts.Whythereare
somanydifferentneurochemicalsisthesubjectofmuchspeculationandintensestudy.Onesuggestionisthatavarietyofchemicalshavebeenadaptedtoservea
multitudeoffunctionsduringevolutionarydevelopment,eachoneacquiredatadifferenttimeandplace(Iversen1979).
Neurochemicalshavebeenmostrecentlycategorizedasneurotransmittersorneuromodulators.Neurotransmittersarereleasedinsynapsestoconductinformation
locallybetweentwoneurons,whereasneuromodulatorsarereleasedinthecerebralspinalfluidorthebloodstreamandthusaffectalargepopulationofneurons.
Severaldifferentcriteriahavebeenusedfordefininganeurotransmitter:(1)thechemicalissynthesizedinthepresynapticneuron(2)itisreleasedfromthesynaptic
terminal(3)itproducesanEPSPorIPSPand(4)itisremovedfromthesynapticcleftordeactivated(FeldmanandQuenzer1984).Atpresentonlynine
neurochemicalshavereceivedwidespreadacceptanceasneurotransmitters(Pinel1990).Neurotransmitterswereoncethoughttohavespecificanatomicalpathways
oftheirowninthebrain.Neuronswereidentifiedbytheneurotransmittertheyreleased,andimagingtechniqueswereemployedtoproduceneuroanatomicalmapsof
thedifferentneurotransmittersystems.However,newevidencedemonstratesthatsomeneuronssecretemorethanoneneurotransmitterorhavereceptorsthat
respondtodifferenttypesofneuromodulatorsandneurotransmitters(Snyder1986).Furthermore,assigningfunctionalspecificitytotheneurochemicalpathways
remainselusive.Inadditiontotheiroverlappinganatomicallocations,neurotransmittersdifferintheirmodesofaction.Someneurotransmittersmodulatetheeffectsof
anothertransmitteronapostsynapticcell.Somehavetheir

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effectsthroughpostsynapticchemicalreceptors,andothersacttomodulatevoltagesensitivechannelsinpresynapticterminals.Stillothersmodifysecondmessenger
systemsinpostsynapticcells.Wearejustbeginningtounderstandthefullrangeofneurotransmitterfunction.
Neuromodulatorsactmoreglobally,yetappeartohavebehavioraleffectsthatarehighlyspecific.Theycanbefoundinthecentralnervoussystemaswellasinother
areasofthebody,suchasthegastrointestinaltract(e.g.,substanceP,enkephalins,somatostatin).Verysmallamountsofsomeneuromodulatorshavebeenshownto
produceprofoundbehavioraleffects.Forexample,aninjectionofananogram(onebillionthofagram)ofthepeptideangiotensinIIcanproduceintenseand
prolongeddrinkingbehaviorinanimalsthatwerenotthirsty.Someneuroscientistshaveinterpretedthesedatatosuggestthatneuromodulatorsarespecializedfor
triggeringbrainactivityassociatedwithparticularbehavioralfunctions,suchasregulatingemotionalstatesorthebalanceofbodyfluids.
Neurochemicalsthatexistnaturallyinthebodyarecalledendogenousandaredistinguishedfromexogenoussubstances,suchasdrugs,whichcanproduceprofound
psychologicalandneurophysiologicaleffects.Somedrugsaresopotentthatneuroscientistsbegansearchingforendogenoussubstanceswiththehypothesisthatif
drugsaresostrong,theremustbeendogenoussubstancesinthebrainthathavesimilarneurophysiologicalproperties.HughesandKosterlitz(Hughesetal.1975)
discoveredtwoendogenousneurochemicalsthatactedlikemorphine,anarcoticdrugthatishighlyaddictiveandapowerfulanalgesicforpain.Theycalledthese
substancesenkephalins.Snyderandhiscolleagues(Snyder1980)injectedradioactivelylabeledmorphineintoalaboratoryanimalandthenstudiedwheretheisotope
wouldbefoundintheanimal'scentralnervoussystem,photographingslicesofthebrainusingfilmthatwassensitivetothepresenceoftheisotope.Theydiscovered
thatcertainregionsofthebrainandspinalcordcontaincellswithchemicalreceptorsthathaveaspecificaffinityforopiates(sonamedfortheopiumpoppyfrom
whichmorphineisderived).HughesandKosterlitzshowedthatenkephalinsboundtotheopiatereceptorsjustlikemorphine.
PsychoactiveandNeurolepticDrugsManyotherpsychoactivedrugsmayproducetheireffectsbymimicking,enhancing,ordisruptingtheeffectsofendogenous
neurochemicals.Forexample,severalhallucinogenshavemolecularstructuresthatresemblethoseofneurotransmitters.LSDisstructurallysimilartoserotonin,and
mescalineresemblesnorepinephrineanddopamine.CaffeineinhibitstheenzymethatdegradescAMPinthesecondmessengersystemofpostsynapticcells.Cocaine
blocksthereuptakeofnorepinephrine,withtheresultthatmoreneurotransmitterremainsinthesynapticclefttostimulatereceptors.Thisinformationdoesnotexplain
whycaffeineactsasamildpsychologicalstimulant,whyLSDdistortssensoryperceptions,orwhycocaineproducesaeuphoriceffect.However,understandingthe
behavioraleffectsofthesedrugsmustcertainlyincludeaclearpictureoftheirneuropharmacologicalproperties.
Neurolepticdrugs,socalledfortheirclinicaleffectonbrainfunction,havereceivedintensivescrutinyinanefforttobetterunderstandthebiologicalbasisforthe
mentaldisorderstheytreat.Manyofthesedrugswereprescribedovertheyearsbecausetheywereclinicallyeffective,butnooneknewwhytheyworked.
Neuroscientistshavebeenstudyinghowtheyaffectbrainfunctioninthehopeoffindingevidenceaboutthebiologicalbasesofmentaldisorders.

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Thebestexampleofthisapproachhasbeenthestudyofschizophrenia,amentaldisorderwidelytreatedwithaclassofdrugscalledphenothiazines.Researchnow
indicatesthatphenothiazinesblockthereceptorsitesfortheneurotransmitterdopamine,specifically,thethirdtypeofdopaminereceptor(D3),thusformingthebasis
forthedopaminergichypothesisforschizophrenia:ifphenothiazinesimproveschizophrenicsymptomsandalsoblockdopaminereceptors,perhapsthesymptomsarea
productoftoomuchdopaminergicactivityinthecentralnervoussystem(Snyder1976).Ofcourse,thestoryisnotnecessarilysimple.Oneormoreofanumberof
presynapticandpostsynapticprocessescouldbeinvolvedinschizophrenia.Becauseofthecomplicatednatureofthesynapticprocess,itisdifficulttopindown
exactlywhattheproblemis.Additionally,psychologicalfactors,suchasstress,mightalterneurochemicalfunctions,furthercomplicatingthepicture.Still,resultsfrom
thislineofresearcharepromising.Otherdisorders,includingdepression,mania,obsessivecompulsivedisorders,Alzheimer'sdisease,andParkinson'sdisease,have
alsobeenthesubjectofextensiveneurochemicalstudy.Thepotentialtoalleviatemanyofthedebilitatingeffectsofbraindiseasebyneurochemicalmeansstillholds
greatpromiseforthefuture.
NeuralDevelopment
Howthebraingrowsfromasinglecelltoacomplexstructureofbillionsofneuronslargelyremainsamystery.Duringgestationthebraingrowsatanaveragerateof
severalhundredthousandneuronsperminute.Animalresearchhasrevealedmuchaboutthesequenceofdevelopmentalevents,butmostofthefinerdetailsabout
whatcontrolsanddirectstheeventsremaintobediscovered.Byroughlythreeweeksafterconception,thedorsalsurfaceofthedevelopingembryocontainsasmall
patchofcellsthatwilleventuallyformtheentirehumannervoussystem.Overthenextweekthisplateofapproximately125,000cellsformsagroovethatfoldsover
onitselfandthenfusestobecomeatube.Thistubeeventuallybecomesthespinalcanalandventricles.Oncetheneuraltubeisformed,cellsrapidlyproliferate,and
afterfortydaysofgestationthetubehasdevelopedthreebulgesthateventuallybecometheforebrain,midbrain,andhindbrain(seefigure7.8).
Cellsundergoafixedsequenceofeventsduringdevelopment:proliferation,migration,andaggregation.Thetimingoftheseprocessesiscriticalandvariesfor
differentspeciesandfordifferentpartsofthenervoussystem.First,cellsdividealongtheinnerwalloftheneuraltubeinaregioncalledtheventricularzone.Each
neuronpassesthroughanumberofdivisions(mitosis),eventuallylosingthecapacityforfurtherdivision.Neuronsstopdividingwhentheybeginmigration.Proliferation
continuesinsomepartsofthenervoussystemuntilagestationalageofabouttwentyeightweeksforhumans.
Oncemitosisisover,cellsbeginamigrationawayfromtheventricularzonetowardtheoutsidewalloftheneuraltube,formingprogressivelythickerlayersofcells.
Generally,largerneuronswithlongaxonalprojectionsbeginmigrationbeforesmallerneurons.Migratingcellsmovealongglialcells,whichsetuplongfibersthatact
likescaffoldsextendingfromtheventricularzonetotheoutsidewalloftheneuraltube.Neuronsfollowtheseglialprocessesataslowrate,ontheaverageofatenthof
amillimeterperday.Cellsthateventuallyoccupythesamecorticallocationalwaysbeginmigrationtogether.
Whenneuronsreachtheirdefinitive''addresses,''theyaggregatewithotherneuronstoformcorticallayersornuclei.Cellsofthesamekindtendtogrouptogetherand

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Figure7.8
Humanbraindevelopmentfrom25daysgestationuntilbirth.Figuresareenlarged
forages25to100days(approximatesizedisplayedbelow).(FromCowan1979.)

alignthemselvesinapreferredorientationforexample,inthecortexpyramidalneuronsareorientedwiththeirdendritesspreadouttowardthesurfaceofthebrain
andtheiraxonsprojectingbelow.Thisaggregationprocessisnowthoughttobemediatedbycertainmoleculesonthesurfaceoftheneuron(Rutishauseretal.1988).
Cellmigrationerrorsarenotunusual.Throughstainingandmicroscopicstudy,aggregatesofneuronscanbefoundinthewrongcorticallayer,anabnormalitycalledan
ectopia.Anothermigrationerrorcalleddysplasiaoccurswhenapocketofneuraltissueismissingcells(seefigure7.9).Inoneanimalstudyabout3percentofthe
neuronsoutofthepopulationexaminedmigratedtothewronglocation(Cowan1979).
Severalhumandevelopmentaldisordersareassociatedwithcellmigrationerrors.Probablythemostcarefullystudiedexampleisdevelopmentaldyslexia,afairly

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Figure7.9
Anexampleofanectopia(arrow)andadysplasia(arrowhead).Barinlower
rightcornerequals500p.(FromGalaburdaetal.1985.)

frequentcondition(25percentofthepopulation)inwhichchildrenwithnormalintelligenceandeducationalopportunityhavedifficultylearningtoread.Theresearch
ofGalaburda,Rosen,andSherman(1989)hasdocumentedseveralcaseswherelargenumbersofectopiasanddysplasiashavebeenfoundinthebrainsofdyslexic
patients,whichwerestudiedafterthepatients'deaths.Ithasnotyetbeendeterminedwhethercellmigrationerrorsarepresentinallcasesofdyslexiaorwhethersuch
errorsactuallycausereadingproblems.
Thisexamplesuggeststhepossibilitythatsomedevelopmentaldisordersmaybetheproductofdisruptiveeventsthatoccurredduringcriticalphasesofneural
development.Becausedifferentpartsofthebrainareatdifferentstagesofdevelopmentduringgestation,thetimingofadisruptioniscriticalandcontrolswherethe
abnormalitywillappearinthebrainandtheseverityoftheabnormality.Whatcouldcausesuchdisruptionsisthesubjectofconsiderablespeculationenvironmental
factors,suchasviruses,andgeneticdefectshavebothbeensuggested.
Oncemigrationandaggregationarecompleted,cellsundergoaprocessofdifferentiationinwhichaxonsgrow,synapticconnectionsareformed,andcircuitsare
pruneddowntofunctionalpathways.Theearlystagesofthedifferentiationprocessareundergeneticcontrol.Studiesofneuraldevelopmentinsimplerinvertebrate
nervoussystemshaveshownthatforeachmemberofaspecies,growingneuronsfollowspecificpathsandformpreciseconnectionswithotherneurons(Bastianietal.
1985).Threedifferenthypotheseshavebeenproposedtoexplainhowthistakesplace:(1)thatchemicalsignalsaretransmittedbetweenthepreandpostsynaptic
cellstoguidethegrowingaxon(Sperry1963)(2)thatthechemicalorphysicalsignalislaiddowninapathwayfortheaxontofollow(Singer,Nordlander,andEgar
1979)(3)thattherelative

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positionofthecellbodiesinanaggregateofgrowingneuronsinfluencesthedirectionofaxongrowthsothatthesynapticterminalsoftheaxonsendupinthesame
relativepositionastheircellbodies(Easteretal.1985).
Followingthegrowthofaxons,thenumberofsynapsesandthedensityofsynapticcontactsaresignificantlyreduced.Synapticreductioniscommonlyassumedtobe
causedbycompetitionbetweenneuronsforfunctionalconnections,althoughthemechanismsunderlyingthesechangesareunknown.Onehypothesissuggeststhat
somecellsdiebecausetheyfailtoreceiveanecessarynutrientprovidedbyasuccessfulsynapticcontact(Cowan1979).Studiesfromdifferentspecieshave
suggestedthatfrom15to85percentoftheinitialneuronalpopulationmaydieduringtheperiodofsynapticconsolidation.However,humansmaynotloseneuronsto
thesamedegreeasotherspecies.Recentstudiesofhumanbrainshaveshownadecreaseinsynapticcontactswithouttheaccompanyingcelldeath(Huttenlocher
1990).
Celldifferentiationcontinuesforalongtimeinhumans.Studiesoftheprimaryvisualcortexhavesuggestedthatthedensityofsynapticconnectionsrapidlyincreases
fromaboutthesecondmonthofpostnatallife,reachingadultvaluesaroundtheageoffivemonths,andthenoverproducingforthenextthreetofivemonths.
Connectionsarethengraduallyeliminatedoverthenextnineyears,reachingadultvaluesbytheageoften(LeubaandGarey1987).Otherpartsofthecortexmay
showadifferenttimecourseforexample,neuronaldensityinthefrontallobedoesnotreachadultvaluesuntilaroundsevenyearsofage,andsynapticconsolidation
maycontinuethroughlateadolescence(Huttenlocher1990).
DevelopmentalPlasticityDevelopmentinavertebratenervoussystemismarkedbyprogressivephasesofovergrowthandsubsequentregressivephasesinwhich
excessneuronsandneuralconnectionsareeliminated.Prenatalprogressiveeventsincludecellproliferation,migration,andaggregationamongsimilarcelltypes,as
describedabove.Postnatally,cellprocessescontinuetoproliferate,producinganabundanceofsynapticcontacts.Children'ssynapticconcentrationsremainnearly
doubleadultvaluesinsomecorticalregionsuntilpuberty(Huttenlocher1990).Regressiveeventsbeginprenatallywiththedeathofexcessneurons,whichcontinues
untilabouttheageoftwo.Thepruningofexcesssynapsesandaxoncollateralsbeginspostnatallyandcontinuesthroughoutchildhoodandadolescence(Changeuxand
Konishi1987Cowanetal.1984Purves1988Rakic1979).
DevelopmentalchangesincerebralfunctioningcanbestudiedmoredirectlywithPETimagingtechniquesthatmeasuretherateofcerebralglucosemetabolism.The
developmentalcourseofthePETdataisconsistentwithneurobiologicalandmicroscopicevidence.Corticalmetabolicvaluesofnewbornbabiesare30percentlower
thanthoseofadults,thenincreasetoexceedadultvaluesbytheageoftwotothreeyears,presumablyreflectingtheincreasedmetabolicactivitynecessarytosupport
themanyadditionalsynapticcontacts.ThesePETvaluesremainhighuntiltheageofaboutten,thengraduallydeclineuntiltheyreachadultlevelsaroundtheageof
sixteentoeighteen(ChuganiandPhelps1990).
Regressiveeventsarethoughttobetheresultofcompetitiveinteractionsbetweenneuronsortheirprocessesforsomerequiredresource(e.g.,anutritionalfactorthat
isnecessaryforthehealthofthecell,orelectricalstimulation)thatisinlimitedsupply(Purves1988).Whenaneuronoritsprocessesaredeprivedofthisresource,the
sizeoftheaxonalanddendriticarborsisreduced,processesarewithdrawnfromtheregion

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ofcompetition,orthecelldegenerates(ChangeuxandDanchin1976Rakic1986).Throughaprocessofcompetitiveelimination,selectiveratherthanrandom
connectionsarelost,producingfunctionallysegregatedcorticalareas.Forexample,Rakic(1986)hasshownthatoculardominancecolumnsintheLGN,whichare
groupsofcellsthatselectivelyrespondtooneeyeortheother,areprimarilyformedbythepruningofaxoncollateralsfromtheinappropriateeye.
Earlyindevelopmenttherearecriticaltimeperiodsfortheestablishmentofcertainbehavioralfunctions.Theneuralsubstratesofthesebehavioralfunctionsdevelop
onlyifthenervoussystemreceivescertainenvironmentalinputsduringthecriticalperiod.Environmentaldeprivationcanproduceprofoundandpermanent
impairments,andenvironmentalvariationcanproducevariationinneuraldevelopment.Criticalperiodshavebeendemonstratedforawidevarietyofbehaviors,andin
somecasestheassociateddevelopmentsinthenervoussystemhavebeenidentified.Inthevisualsystemclosingoneeyeduringthefirstfewmonthsofliferesultsin
moreneuronsinlayerIVoftheprimaryvisualcortexbeingdevotedtosensoryinputfromtheopeneye.ThenumberoflayerIVneuronsthatstillcanrespondtoinput
fromtheclosedeyeiscorrespondinglyreducedby80percent,thusproducingpermanentvisualdamageinthateye(HubelandWiesel1977).
Experimentswithwhitecrownedsparrowsandothersongbirdshavedemonstratedthatthesebirdshaveaninnatecapacitytodevelopabasicsongpatternspecificto
theirspecies,butonlyduringthefirstfewmonthsoflife(Konishi1985Nottebohm1970).Althoughtheneuralcorrelateshavenotbeenidentified,ananalogous
developmentoccursinhumanspeech.Attheageofeightmonthsinfantsareabletohearthedifferencebetweentwospeechsoundsfromaforeignlanguagethatthey
haveneverheardbeforeandthattheircaretakerscannotdistinguishhowever,bytwelvemonthsofagetheylosethisabilityandcandiscriminateonlyspeechcontrasts
fromtheirnativelanguage(Werkeretal.1981).
Criticalperiodsforbehavioraldevelopmentcorrespondtoperiodsduringwhichneuraldifferentiationisoccurringinthosepartsofcortexinvolvedinthebehavior.The
increaseinsynapticdensityappearstoprovideadegreeofplasticityorflexibilityfortheformationofbehavioralfunctions.So,forexample,becausesynapticdensity
continuestoremainhighinthevisualsystemuptotheageoffouryears,thevisualconditionknownasstrabismus(inwhichthevisualaxisofoneeyetendstodeviate
fromthecorrectlineofsight)canbetreatedduringthisperiodbyoccludingthesightofthegoodeyeandforcingtheuseofthesquintingeye(Assaf1982).
Presumablyafunctionalplasticityassociatedwiththeuseofthefrontalcortexwouldpersistlonger,sincesynapticreductiondoesnotbegininthisregionuntilaboutthe
ageofseven.
Theplasticitygainedfromsynapticoverproductionalsoappearstoprovidethebrainsomereservecapacitytorecoverfromdamage.Manystudieshaveshownageto
beaveryimportantfactorinsuccessfulrecovery.Inyoungchildren,forexample,languageimpairmentsproducedbybraininjuryarebrief,andnormalfunctioningis
usuallyrestoredwhentheinjuryoccursbeforetheageoffive,althoughtheseverityandlocationoftheinjurycanimpederecovery(Aram,Ekelman,andGillespie
1990KolbandWhishaw1990).
Sincethedamagedtissuecannotregenerateitself,linguisticfunctionmusthavebeenassimilatedintootherpartsofcortex.Themoststrikingevidenceforthis
conclusioncomesfromcasestudiesofhemidecorticatepatients,whohadonecorticalhemisphereremovedafewweeksafterbirthbecauseofararediseasethatleft
onlyonehemisphere

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normalandhealthy.Sincelanguagefunctionsarelocalizedtothelefthemisphereinmostpeople,followupstudieswereremarkableinthatmanylinguisticfunctions
werenormalinthepatientswhohadtheirlefthemisphereremoved(DennisandWhitaker1976).Asimilarrecoverywouldnotoccurfromahemispherectomyin
adulthood.Althoughtherighthemispherewasnotabletoprocesssomelinguistictaskswell(forexample,distinguishingthedifferencebetween"theman'slostwallet"
and"thelostman'swallet"),patientsperformednormallyonmostofthetasksgiven,includingalloftheacademictests.
7.3NeuralRepresentation
Thestudyofthebiologicalpropertiesofthesynapseandneuronisanimportantenterprise,butitcannotbyitselftellushowthenervoussystemrepresentsand
transformsmeaningfulinformation.Tounderstandhowrepresentationsandcomputationsareencodedneurally,wemuststudythepropertiesofinterconnected
networksofneuronsaswell.Forthecognitivescientist,thestudyofneuralrepresentationandcomputationisthemostexciting,andchallenging,frontierof
neuroscience.
StructuralPrinciples
Highercognitiveabilities,suchasmemoryconsolidationorvisualperception,areoftenassociatedwithlargeanatomicalregionssuchasthehippocampusoroccipital
lobe.Theseregionscanbebrokendownintosmallerandsmallerstructuralcomponents,rangingfromsomewhatsmalleranatomicallyidentifiablecorticalregionsto
neuralcircuitstoparticulartypesofneuronsorsynapses.Afullunderstandingofhowthebrainachievessomecognitiveabilityrequiresunderstandingthe
computationalfunctionscontributedbyeachlevelofstructure.Forexample,thehippocampuscanbedividedstructurallyintothedentategyrus,CA3,andCAI
regions,anddifferentaspectsofmemoryfunctioncanbeascribedtothesesubstructures.Rolls(1990)hashypothesizedthatCA3servesasanautoassociationsystem
toretrievethememoryofspecificautobiographicalepisodes.EnoughisknownabouttheneuroanatomyofCA3andtheresponsepropertiesofthedifferenttypesof
neuronscontainedinitthatRollswasabletodevelopanetworkmodelthatexhibitssomeoftherequiredcomputationalpropertiesandisfaithfultocertainaspectsof
theneuronaldata.Ourunderstandingoftheneuralimplementationofvariousfunctionsistypicallyincompleteandstillunfolding.Nevertheless,severalorganizational
principlesinthenervoussystemhavebeenwelldemonstrated.Wewilltouchonafewhereforamorecompletediscussion,consultsomeofthereadingslistedatthe
endofthechapter.
ExperimentalTechniquesChartingthestructuralandfunctionalcomponentsofthebrainhasnotbeeneasy.Researchhasreliedheavilyonthreeprocedures.Thefirst
techniqueinvolvesdestroyingselectedneuronsandthenstudyingwhatotherpartsofthebrainshowdegenerationasaresultofthedamage.Bytracingthepathof
degeneration,neuroanatomistshopetodiscoverfunctionalpathwaysbetweenbrainregions.Theproblemwithlesionprocedureshasbeentheinabilitytolocalize
damagetospecificcells.Fibersfromothercellsthatmayjustbepassingthroughthetargetregionalsomaybedestroyed,resultingintheirdegenerationaswell.The
recentdiscoveryofacidsthatselectivelydestroyneuronswithsomasinaspecificregionandnotfibersofpassagehasrevivedinterestinthisprocedure.

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Thesecondtechnique,whichwasmentionedearlierinthischapter,involvestheintroductionofdyesthataretakenupbytheneuraltissuetohighlightparticularcellsor
selectedpartsofthem.Inthelasttwentyyearsnewstainingprocedureshaveadvancedrapidly.Oneprocedure,calledautoradiographictracing,usesthe
anterogradetransportsysteminneuronstodeterminewhereacell'saxonterminates.Aminoacidsarelabeledwithtritiumandinjectedintothetargetedbrainsite.
Theseacidsaretakenupbyneurons,convertedtoproteins,andtransporteddowntheiraxonstothesynapticterminal.Sometimesthelabeledchemicalsare
transportedtothepostsynapticcells.Thistransportationtakesafewdays,afterwhichtheanimaliskilled,andthebraintissueisslicedandpreparedinawaythat
highlightsthetritiumstainedcellsinaphotograph.Anotherprocedureusesretrogradetracingtomapfromsynapticconnectionsbackuptothecellsfromwhichthe
axonsoriginate.Themostcommontechniqueuseshorseradishperoxidase(HRP),anenzymefoundinhorseradishandotherplants,whichistakenupbythesynaptic
terminalsandtransportedbackuptheaxontothecellbody.Doublelabeling,usingbothtechniques,providesamuchmoreprecisedescriptionofneuralpathways
thanhasbeenpossiblewitholderstainingorlesionprocedures.Newtechniquesforlabelingneurotransmittersalsohavebeeninventedtoidentifypreciselythe
neurochemicalpathwaysofthebrain.Mostrecently,opticaldyes,sensitivetoelectricalchangesorfluctuationsinionconcentrations,havebeendevelopedthatare
takenupbysynapticallyactivecells,providingthepotentialtoidentifyfunctionalneuralpathwaysoperatingunderrelativelynormalconditions(Grinvaldetal.1986).
Athirdtechniqueinvolvesrecordingtheelectricalactivityofsinglecells.Extracellularrecordingsaremadewithmicroelectrodes,verysharpneedlesthatcanbe
insertedintothebraintomonitorthechangesinelectricalpotentialofasingleneuron.Intracellularrecordingsaremadebymicropipettes,verytinyglasstubesthatcan
beinsertedintothecellbodyofaneuron.Althoughintracellularrecordingscanonlybemadeforafewminutes,microelectrodescanrecordforlongperiods.Using
thesetechniques,neuroscientistshavebeenabletomeasuretheresponsesofindividualneuronstoexternalsensorystimuli.Individualneuronshavebeenshownto
increase(ordecrease)theirfiringratesinresponsetospecificfeaturesofsensoryinput,suchastheangleoforientationofavisuallinedisplay,itsdirectionof
movement,oritscolor(Hubel1988).However,manyneuronsthatareseveralsynapsesbeyondprimarysensoryinputdonotrespondtoanysimplestimulus
characteristicbutmaybepartofanassemblyofcellsthatperformsaparticularcomputationalfunctionnecessaryforperception,movement,orthought.Manysuch
neuronsreceiveinputsfrommultiplesources,suggestingacoordinationorintegrationrole.Functionsstudiedatthesehigherlevelsincludetherecognitionofcomplex
stimuli,suchasfaces(Perrett,Mistlin,andChitty1987)orthecoordinationofmotormovementsforreachingandlocomotion(GeorgopoulosandGrillner1989).For
afurtherdiscussionoftheseissues,seethesectionbelowoncomputationalmaps.
FunctionalPathwaysManydifferentpathwayshavebeendiscoveredintheCNSthatcarrysensoryandmotorinformation.Oneofthefirstdiscoverieswasmadein
1822byFranoisMagendie.Hereportedthatthedorsalrootofthespinalcordcarriedsensoryinformationfromtheperipheraltothecentralnervoussystem,butthat
theventralroottransportedmotoroutputtothemuscles.ThisdiscoveryestablishedtheprinciplethatdifferentpartsoftheCNScouldbespecializedfordifferent
functionsandthatfunctionalpathwayscouldexisttocarryspecificinformation.

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Weknowmostaboutthesensoryinputandmotoroutputsystems.Ourbodieshavefiveexteroceptivesensorysystems,whichperceivestimulifromoutsidethebody:
vision,touch,hearing,olfaction(smell),andtaste.Allfivesensorysystemsappeartobeorganizedinasimilarfashion.Intheclassicalmodel,sensorysystemsare
hypothesizedtobeorganizedhierarchically,witheachmajorreceptororganpassingsensoryinformationalongapathwaytothethalamus,whichthenrelaystheinput
tothecortex.Eachsensorysystemhasaspecialpartofthethalamusdevotedtoprocessingitsinput.Forexample,visualinformationfromtheretinaoftheeyeis
carriedtotheLGNofthethalamus.Thecortexalsohasprimarysensoryregions,devotedtosensoryinput(seefigure7.3).Informationispassedfromtheprimary
cortextosecondarysensoryregionsandthentotheassociationcortex,whereinformationfromdifferentsensorymodalitiesisintegrated.Inthesimplestmodelasingle
streamofinformationfollowsasequentialprogression,movingfromreceptorstohigherbrainregions,graduallybeingtransformedfromrawsensorydatainto
perceptualrepresentations.Eachlevelofthesystemanalyzestheinformationavailableatthatstageandthenpassesitsanalysisontothenextlevel(seefigure7.10).
Ahierarchicalmodelofthiskindwasonceproposedforthevisualsystem(HubelandWiesel1977).Themodelaccountsforconsiderableneurophysiologicaldata.
First,therearelightsensitivereceptorcellsintheretinathatsignaltheintensityofthelightataparticularpointintheincomingimage.Theretina'soutputneurons
(calledganglioncells),however,respondtointensitychangesinsmallregionsoftheimage.Thisshiftfromsignalingintensityatapointtosignalinglocalcontrastcanbe
seenasthe

Figure7.10
Twodifferentmodelsofsensoryprocessing.(AdaptedfromPinel1990.)

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firststepinaprocessofobjectrecognition.Theregionsoflocalcontrastintheimagecanbeseenasearlyinformationabouttheedgesorcontoursofobjects.The
contrastsignalsarerelayedthroughtheLGN,andthenextstepinthehierarchyisaccomplishedbycellsintheprimaryvisualcortex(calledsimplecells)thatdetect
contrastboundariesatspecificangularorientationsinsmallregionsoftheimage.Theseedgeandlinedetectorscanbeseenasorganizingthelocal,unoriented
contrastinformationcomingfromtheretinaintosmall,orientedsegmentsoftheboundariesofobjectsintheimage.Furtherstepsintheprocesswouldbeassociated
withothercellsinthevisualcortexthatrespondtothepresenceofanorientedboundaryoveralargerregionoftheimage(complexcells)orthatrespondtocorners
orterminatedlines(hypercomplexcells).Eventuallytheconstructionprocesswashypothesizedtoreachcellsinthemedialtemporalregionthatarespecializedto
respondtocomplexshapes,suchasahandorface(DesimoneandGross1979)orperhapsevenspecificallytothefaceofone'sgrandmother(Barlow1972).
Althoughtheearlyevidenceontheresponsepropertiesofneuronsinthevisualsystemwasconsistentwiththisclassicalmodelofasinglehierarchicalvisualpathway,
recentevidencehassuggestedthatthesystemisorganizedintoanumberofparallelpathways(seefigure7.10).Informationaboutshape,color,motion,andbinocular
disparityappearstobeprocessedindistinctparallelchannels(Hubel1988).Theparallelismisalreadypresentintheganglioncells.Intheprimateretinatherearetwo
typesofganglioncells,whichcanbedistinguishedbythesizesoftheircellbodies,theshapesoftheirdendritictrees,andtheirresponseproperties.Althoughthesmall
cells(Pcells)andlargecells(Mcells)areintermixedintheretina,theiraxonsprojecttodistinctlayersoftheLGN.ThePcellsprojecttotheparvocellularlayers
andtheMcellstothemagnocellularlayersoftheLGN.Theseparationbetweenthetwopathwaysismaintained,andtheyarefurthersubdivided,asvisualanalysis
developsinthevisualareasofthecortex(LivingstoneandHubel1987).Computationinthevisualsystemisstillthoughttobehierarchicalinthesensethatlaterstages
ofthesystemdelivermorereliableandmeaningfulinformationaboutthevisualworldincomparisonwithearlierstages,whoseoutputscodelocalpropertiesofthe
visualimagethatareoftennotreliablycorrelatedwithpropertiesofthevisualworld(seechapter12).Forexample,earlystagesofthecolorpathwaycannotrepresent
thesurfacecolorofanobjectindependentlyofthecolorofilluminatinglight,whereaslaterstagesofthepathwaycan.
Notmuchisknownabouthowincreasinglymeaningfulinformationisdevelopedintheparallelchannelsoftheprimatevisualsystemorabouthowtheinformationis
integratedtoproducevisuallyguidedbehaviorandobjectrecognition.However,detailedstudiesoftheneuralsubstratesoftwoperceptuallydrivenbehaviors,the
soundlocalizationresponseofthebarnowlandthejammingavoidanceresponseoftheelectricfish(Konishi1991),haveshownthatitispossibletoanalyzeasensory
pathwayindetail.Inbothcasesthesensoryanalysisiscarriedoutintwoseparateparallelchannels,whicheventuallyconvergeontheneuronsthatcodeforthecritical
property.
Theanalysisofthebarnowlbeginswiththeobservationthatwhentheowlhearsasound,itturnsitsheadinthedirectionofthesoundsource.Thisheadorientationis
accurateinboththehorizontal(azimuth)andvertical(elevation)directions.Thus,ifthesourceofasoundis30degreestotheleftand15degreesabovetheaxisofthe
currentheadorientation,theowlwillturnitsheadupwardandtothelefttheappropriate

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amounts.Byplayingexperimentallycontrolledsoundsthroughearphones,researcherswereabletoshowthatthehorizontalandverticalcomponentsoftheorientation
responsearecontrolledbytwodifferentaspectsofthesound.Horizontallocalizationisbasedoninterauraltimedifferences.Becausetheowl'searsareseparated
horizontallyinspace,asoundintheenvironmentisdeliveredtothetwoearsinslightlydifferentways.Considera100hertz(cyclespersecond)soundthatoriginates
totheleftoftheowl.Thesoundwillreachtheleftearslightlybeforeitreachestherightear.Anotherdifferencearisesfromthefactthatthesoundoscillatessinusoidally
withtime.Thesinewavefora100hertztonereachesitspeakenergyvalue100timespersecond.Eachenergypeakwillreachtheleftearslightlybeforeitreaches
therightear.Thesinewavesatthetwoearsaresaidtobeoutofphasewitheachother.Complexsoundsaremixturesofmanyfrequency(orpitch)components.The
experimentsshowedthattheowlusesthephasedifferencesatallaudiblefrequenciesratherthantheinitialdifferenceinonsettimeforhorizontallocalization.
Becausetheowl'srightearisangledslightlyupwardandtheleftearisangleddownward,differencesinthepropertiesofasoundasitarrivesatthetwoearscanalso
beusedtodeterminethesound'selevation.Thebehavioralexperimentsshowedthatintensity(oramplitude)differencesbetweenthetwoearswereusedinthiscase.
Asoundthatisabovetheowlisslightlylouderintherightearthanintheleftandviceversa.Asaresultofthebehavioralstudiesresearchersknewthattheauditory
systemmustextractacombinationofinterauraltimeandamplitudedifferencesfromtheincomingsound.Thiscombinationspecifiesthehorizontalandverticalvaluesof
thesoundandhenceitsdirectioninspace.Acodeforthecombinationmustbepassedontothevisualandmotorsystems,sincetheowlturnsitsheadtowardsounds
initsenvironmentandtriestovisuallylocatethesourceofthesound.
Konishiandhiscolleagues(Konishi1991)wereabletolocatespacespecificneuronsintheexteriornucleusoftheinferiorcolliculus,amidbrainstructurethatispart
oftheauditorysystem.Singlecellrecordingsshowedthateachspacespecificneuronfiredwhenasoundoccurredinaparticularspatialdirection.Using
experimentallycontrolledsoundsdeliveredthroughearphones,theresearcherswereabletoshowthattheneuronswereinfactselectiveforcombinationsofinteraural
timeandamplitudedifferences.Thespacespecificneuronsappeartobetheoutputneuronsforthesoundlocalizationcomputation.Theydirectlyencodethe
informationthattriggerssoundlocalizationbehavior.Anatomically,theyareatthetopoftheowl'sauditorypathway,andtheiraxonsprojecttotheoptictectum,a
midbrainstructureinvolvedinvisioncontainingneuronsthatrespondtobothauditoryandvisualinputs.Electricalstimulationoftheseauditoryvisualneuronscauses
quickheadmovementsofthekindthatarealsoinducedbysound.
Theneuralcircuitryleadinguptothespacespecificneuronsissketchedinfigure7.11.Theinitialtransductionofsoundisaccomplishedbyreceptorcellsinthe
cochlea,astructureintheinnerear.Receptorcellsfireinresponsetoparticularfrequencies.Theirrateoffiringiscorrelatedwiththeintensityoftheincomingsound,
andtheytendtofireinphasewiththeincomingsound.Thus,frequency,amplitude,andphaseinformationareallavailableatthereceptorlevel.Furtheramplitudeand
phaseprocessing,however,occursintwoseparate,parallelpathways.Theoutputofeachcochleaprojectstobothamagnocellularnucleusandanangularnucleus.
Magnocellularnucleusneuronstendtofireinphasewithaparticularfrequencycomponentofthesoundinthesourceear.Theirresponsesarephaselockedwiththe
incomingstimulus.

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Figure7.11
Ananatomicalandfunctionalmappingoftheauditorysystemofthebarnowl.
(FromKonishi1991.)

Theseneuronsarenotsensitivetovariationsinamplitude,however.Incontrast,angularnucleusneuronsfiremorerapidlyinresponsetohigheramplitudesbutarenot
sensitivetophase.
Atthenextstageinthephaseprocessingpathway,thephaselockedsignalsfromthetwoearsarecombinedinthelaminarnuclei.Laminarneuronsrespondto
particularinterauralphasedifferencesatparticularfrequencies.Atfurtherstationsshowninfigure7.11thephasesignalsaretransformedintoanunambiguouscode
forinterauraltimedifferencesbyremovingfrequencydependenceandsomeambiguitiesinthephasesignals.Interauraldifferencesinamplitudearefirstencodedata
nucleusintheposteriorlaterallemniscalnucleiandarerenderedunambiguousbytheprocessingatfurtherstages.Thetwopathwaysconvergeintheinferiorcolliculus
withneuronalselectivityforspecificspatialdirectionsfinallyemergingintheexteriornucleusoftheinferiorcolliculus.
Soundlocalizationinthebarnowlprovidesarelativelysimple,concreteillustrationofthesimultaneousparallelandhierarchicalorganizationofsensorypathways.
Althoughthispathwayextendsfromasensoryorgantovariousnucleiinthebrainstem

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ratherthanfromthalamustocortex,thearchitecturesdepictedinfigures7.10and7.11aresimilar.Thehierarchicalnatureofthesoundlocalizationpathwayisvery
clear.Computationally,therepresentationsathigherlevelsinthepathwayrepresentbehaviorallyrelevantinformationmoreexplicitlyandunambiguouslythanthe
representationsatlowerlevels.Neuronsatthetopofthehierarchyencodethebehaviorallyrelevantpropertyofspatialdirection.Neuronssomewhatlowerinthe
hierarchyencodetwoindependentdimensionsofspatialdirection.Neuronsthatarestilllowerinthehierarchyencodestimuluspropertiesthatareusefulinputstothe
computationofthetwodimensions,andsoon.Anatomically,itispossibletotracetheforwardfeedingconnectionsamongcellpopulationsthatareresponsibleforthe
levelsofrepresentation.Insomecasesthedetailedcircuitryoftheconnectionshelpsexplainhowahigherlevelrepresentationiscomputedfromalowerlevelone.
Forexample,theaxonalprojectionsfromthemagnocellularnucleitothelaminarnucleiappeartobeorganizedasdelaylines,whichallowphaselockedsignalsthat
originateatdifferenttimesatthetwoearstoarrivesimultaneouslyatlaminarneurons.
Soundlocalizationinthebarnowlalsoillustratesotherprinciplesofneuralcoding.Oneprincipleisthatofplacecoding.Nervoussystemsoftendedicatespecific
neuronstotherepresentationofagiventypeofinformation.Thelocationofaneuronataparticularplaceintheneuralcircuitryanditsinterconnectionwithother
neuronsdetermineitscomputationalrole.Asimpleexampleisprovidedbythefactthatcellsintheoccipitalcortexaredevotedtovision,whereascellsinthe
postcentralgyrusaredevotedtosensationsfromthebodysurface.Atafinergrainneuronsinaparticularregionofthevisualcortexcorrespondtoaparticularregion
oftheretina,andneuronsinaparticularregionofthesomatosensorycortexcorrespondtoaparticularregionofthebodysurface.Inthebarnowlweseemoresubtle
examplesofthisprinciple.Groupsofneuronsarededicatedtotherepresentationofmoreabstractproperties,suchasmonauralphase,monauralamplitude,interaural
timedifferences,interauralamplitudedifferences,anddirectioninauditoryspace.Thesignificanceofplacecodingisbroughtoutfurtherinthesectionsbelowon
corticalcolumnsandmaps.
Inadditiontoitsplaceinaneuralnetwork,aneuron'scomputationalrolehingesondetailsofitsmomenttomomentbehavior.Intheangularnucleusofthebarnowl,
forexample,theamplitudeofasoundataparticularfrequencyisencodedbytherateatwhichfrequencyselectiveneuronsfire.Inthemagnocellularnucleus,
however,phaseisencodedbytimingactionpotentialstocorrespondtothephaseofthestimulus.Toseethattherateandtimingofimpulsesrepresenttwodistinct
codingstrategies,recallthattwoneuronscouldbefiringatthesameratebutstillbeoutofphasewitheachother.Rateandphaseoffiringarewellestablishedbases
forneuralcodes.Othertimevaryingpropertiesofneuronalactivation,suchastheprobabilityoffiringduringabriefinterval,maybeaddedtothisshortlist.However,
apointmadeaboutconnectionistmodelsinchapter2canbereiteratedinasomewhatdifferentformhere.Itisnotthoughtthatthetimingofatrainofneuralimpulses
canencodearbitrarilycomplexinformationinthemannerofatextbeingtransmittedoveratelegraphlineviaMorsecode.
Thestudyofsoundlocalizationinthebarnowlisinstructiveasanexampleofaresearchprogramincomputationalneurosciencethathasadvancedtothepointwhere
evidencefromacognitivelevelanalysisofabehaviorhasconvergedwithevidencefromneurophysiologyandneuroanatomytofavoraratherdetailedmodel.Thisis
thekindofconvergencethatwecanlookforwardtointhestudyofthecognitive

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capacitiesofhumansandotherprimates,butforthemostpartitisagoalratherthanareality.Injudgingthecurrentstateofcognitiveneuroscience,itisagoodmodel
tokeepinmind.However,thespecificsoftheexampleshouldnotbeovergeneralized.Thesingleneuronencodingandtheparallelhierarchicalorganizationofthe
computationmayormaynotcharacterizeothercapacitiesinotherorganisms.
ColumnarOrganizationTheprimarycortexofallfivesensorysystemscontainsverticalcolumnsofcellsthattendtorespondtothesamekindsofsensoryinput.
Eachcolumnreceivesinputfromthesamegeneralareaintheperipheralsensoryorgan,thusencodingthelocationofsensoryinput.Inthevisualsystemthismeansthat
adjacentcolumnsofcellsintheoccipitallobecorrespondtooverlappingpartsofthevisualfield.Microcolumnsalsohavebeendiscoveredinsidethelargerplace
columns(Hubel1988).Thesesubstructuresorganizeinformationintoleftandrighteyeinputaswellascolumnsthatshowapreferenceforcontrastboundariesof
particularorientations(seefigure12.10).
TopographicMapsBecausespatialrelationshipsbetweencorticalcolumnscorrespondtothespatialorganizationfoundbetweenadjacentneuronsinthesensory
organs,primarysensorycorticalareasprovidedetailedrepresentationsofsensoryinputpatterns,whicharecalledtopographicmaps.Suchmapshavebeenfoundin
thevisual,somatosensory,andauditorycortices,butgustatoryandolfactorymapshavenotyetbeendiscovered(however,seeSkardaandFreeman1987fora
discussionofolfactoryrepresentation).Eachmapdisplayssystematicvariationforaparticularstimulusattribute.Inthevisualandsomatosensorysystems,the
mappingscorrespondtothetwodimensionaltopographyoftheretina(retinotopic)andbodysurface(somatotopic),respectively.Theprimaryauditorycortexis
mappedtonotopically,withtheanteriorportionrespondingtohighfrequencytonesandposteriorregionsrespondingtoprogressivelylowerfrequencies.
Thesecorticalmapsmaintainacorrespondencewithperipheralsensoryneurons,sothathigherconcentrationsofsensorycellsinoneregionwillproduceacentralmap
withmorespacedevotedtothatregion.Consequently,corticalmapsofthehandsandface,whichhavemanymoresensoryneuronsthanthefeet,canappearquite
distortedinrelationtothesizeofthebodypart(seefigure7.12).
Multiplecorticalmapsappeartoexistforeachsensorymodalityintheirrespectivecorticalregions.Manyretinotopicmaps,forexample,havebeendiscoveredonthe
cortexofnonhumanprimatesthemacaquemonkeyhasroughlytwentydifferentvisualmaps,whichareinterconnectedbyovereightypathways.Thesemaps
representdifferentstimulusattributes,suchastheorientationofcontrastbordersorthedirectionofmovementofvisualobjects(Swindale,Cynader,andMatsubara
1990).Mapsalsomayperformdifferentcomputationsonthesameattribute,orfacilitatethespeedwithwhichcertaincomputationsareperformed(Dudai1989).As
researcherslearntotunetheirexperimentstotheproperattributes,manymoremapsprobablywillbediscovered.
Substantialexperimentalevidencesuggeststhatcorticalmapscanchangewithexperienceandevenvarybetweenindividuals(Merzenich1987Pons,Garraghty,and
Mishkin1988).Merzenichandhiscolleagueshavedemonstratedthesechangesinamoststrikingway.Throughtheuseofmultiplemicroelectrodestheyrecorded
fromdifferentregionsinthesomatosensorycortexofanowlmonkeywhilestimulatingthesurfaceofthemonkey'shandanddigits.Inthiswaytheywereabletomap
the

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Figure7.12
Illustrationoftheprimarysomatosensoryregionscorrespondingtodifferentpartsofthebody
(FromKandelandSchwartz1985.)

monkey'shandanddigitsontothesomatosensorycortex(seefigure7.13).Themonkeythenreceivedanhourandahalfofdailytraininginwhichitrotatedadiskwith
itssecond,third,andoccasionallyfourthdigitsinordertoreceiveafoodreward.Aftertwentyweeksoftraining,theresearchersremappedthecortexanddiscovered
thatthecorticalrepresentationoftheuseddigitshadmarkedlyexpanded.Theseresultssuggestaplasticityorabilityofthecortextoadapttoexperiencethat
previouslyhadnotbeenthoughtpossible.
Corticalmapsalsovaryamongindividuals.ThirtyfiveyearsagoWoolsey(1960)proposedatheorythattheauditorycortexwastonotopicallyorganized,withhigh
frequencytonesmoreanteriorthanlowfrequencytones.EarlyattemptstotestWoolsey'stheorysuggestedhewaswrong.Whenresearchersrecordedfromneurons
inaspecificregionofauditorycortex,theyfoundthatcellsindifferentanimalsrespondedtoawiderangeoffrequenciesratherthantothesamefrequency,as
Woolseyhadsuggested.Whenexperimentalproceduresimproved,allowingmorecellstoberecordedfromoneanimal,researchersdiscoveredthatdifferentcells
fromthesameregionrespondedtosimilarfrequenciesinanindividualanimal,thussupportingthetonotopictheory(Merzenich,Knight,andRoth1974).Theyalso
foundthatthepartoftheauditorycortexthatrespondedtoagivenfrequencyvariedfromoneanimaltoanother.
Thelessonfromthisresearchisclear.Topographicalmappingisanimportantorganizingprinciplethatisconsistentlyfollowedinallsensorymodalitiesstudiedsofar.
However,thespatialorganizationofcorticalmapschangeswithexperience,andindividualdifferencesarelikelytobeconsiderable.

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Figure7.13
Atopographicalmapofthesomatosensorycortexofanadultowlmonkey'shand.
Thehandsurfaceofanormalmonkeyiscodedinthebottomfigure.Eachdigitis
numbered(thumb=1)d=distal,m=middle,p=proximalpartsofthedigitsP1
P4=thepalmarpadsatthebaseofthedigits.Thesurfaceofthehandisrepresented
inacorticalmapinthesomatosensorycortex,illustratedinthemiddlefigures.Onthe
leftisthecorticalmapbeforetraining.Eachcorticalareahasneuronsthatrespondto
touchinthecorrespondingregionofthehand.Thegrayareasarethedorsalsurface
ofeachdigit.Therightfigureshowsthesamecorticalregionofthesameanimalafter
training.Overtwentyweeks,monkeysweretrainedforoneandonehalfhourseach
daytousethedistalpartsofdigits2and3.Noticetheincreasedsizeofthecortical
areasthatrespondedtotactilestimulationindigits2and3.(AdaptedfromJenkins
andMerzenich1987.)

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ComputationalMapsThecortexalsocontainscomputationalmapsthatdonotcorrespondtothetopographyofsensoryneurons.Thesemapsrepresentmore
abstractinformationthatfiguresincognitionorbehavior.Wesawabove,forexample,thatthebarnowl'sinferiorcolliculus(asubcorticalstructure)containsneurons
thatcodeforparticularspatialdirections.Theneuronsarearrangedinanorderlymap,inwhichneighboringneuronsrespondtoneighboringdirectionsandinwhich
changesinazimuthandelevationaredefinedalongroughlyperpendicularaxes(Konishi1986).Forecholocationthemustachedbatemitsacomplexspectrumof
soundsandthenlistenstotheechoesthatreturnfromtargets(biosonar).Suga'sresearch(1990)hasrevealedacentralauditorysystemthatnotonlyencodesthe
frequency,amplitude,andtimedelayoftheechoesbutalsocontainscomputationalmapsfortargetvelocityandrange.
Mapscanalsoencodecombinationsoftwoormoretypesofinformation.Topographicalinformationcancombinewithcomputedinformation,withinoracross
sensorymodalities(Dudai1989).Inthebarnowlwesawthattheaxonsofthespacespecificneuronsintheinferiorcolliculusprojecttotheoptictectum,which
containsavisualauditorymapofspacethatrespondstobothauditoryandvisualinputandthattriggersheadmovements.Swindaleandhiscolleagues(1990)provide
aninterestingdescriptionofhowvisualorientationanddirectionmapsinteracttomaintaincontinuityandcompletenessinourcorticalrepresentationsofvisualscenes.
DistributedversusSinglecellRepresentations
Wesawinchapter2thatanissueofsingleunitversusdistributedcodingarisesinconnectionistmodeling.Connectionistmodels,ofcourse,aretypicallynotspecified
inanydetailattheneurallevelofanalysis.Forexample,inanetworkwithsingleunitcoding,eachunitmightbeimplementedattheneurallevelbymanyneuronsina
distributedmanner.Nevertheless,wecanimaginetakingsingleunitcodingallthewaydowntotheneurallevel,usingsingleneuronstoencodefeatures,concepts,
propositions,orschemas.Inthiscasethestandardapocryphalexampleofthegrandmotherunitwouldbeasingleneuronthatfiredifandonlyifyouwerethinkingof
yourgrandmotherthesocalledgrandmothercell.Justasinaconnectionistnet,suchacellwouldhavetobeconnectedtomanyothercells,involvedinprocessing
visualinput,kinshipconcepts,andsoonnevertheless,activityinthiscellwouldbeanecessaryandsufficientconditionforgrandmothercognition.
Itissometimesthoughtthatsinglecellcodingisunreliableandthereforewouldbeselectedagainstduringevolution.Imaginelosingyourconceptofyourgrandmother
whenthesinglecellthatencodesherdiesrandomlyasyoustrugglethroughthelastmileofamarathon.Evolutioncouldguardagainstthispossibility,however,by
providingmultiplecopiesofeachcodingunit.Thus,theremightbetencopiesofyourgrandmothercellandaminisculeprobabilitythatmorethanoneortwoofthem
woulddieoffinalifetime,barringamajorbraininjuryordisease.Insuchabrain,therewouldbesingleunitcodingthatisresistanttodamage.
Atheoryofsinglecellrepresentationisinitiallyattractiveconceptuallybecauseitiseasytounderstandhowitemsofinformationarerepresentedandeasyto
understandthefunctionalroleoftheindividualneuronincognition.Thetheoryisalsoinitiallyattractivemethodologically.Sinceweknowhowtorecordtheactivityof
singleneurons,wecanimmediatelystartlookinginexperimentalanimalsforneuronswhose

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activityisuniquelycorrelatedwith,say,therecognitionofsomeparticularobject.Thisstrategyisnotsoeasilyimplemented,however.Forexample,toshowthatacell
isagrandmothercell,wewouldatleasthavetoshowthatitfiresvigorouslytograndmotherandnottoanythingelse.But,confrontedwithaneuronthatisfairlywell
removedfromthesensorymotorperiphery,wemighthavetotestthousandsofobjectstofindonethatitprefers,andifwehituponapreferredobject,wemight
havetotestthousandsmoretoshowthatthecelldoesnotfiretoeachofthose.Further,ifwefoundthatthecellrespondedtosomedegreetootherobjects(though
notasstronglyastograndmother),wesimplywouldnotbeabletoconcludethatthecelldoesnotplayaroleintherepresentationofnongrandmothers.So,thereisno
simpleempiricalmethodtotestforsinglecellrepresentations.Wecannoteasilyconfirmordisconfirmtheexistenceofsuchrepresentationsbyjustwanderingthrough
thecortexandtestingtheresponsepropertiesofindividualneurons.Weneedamorecompletetheoryofneuralrepresentationthatmakestestablepredictionsabout
theanatomyofandthecourseofprocessinginentireneuralpathwaysornetworks.
Distributedneuralencodingissomewhathardertoimagine,but,aswesawinchapter2,theinitialconceptualhurdlesareclearedbyconnectionistmodelsthat
successfullyemploydistributedcodesinnetworksofneuronlikeunits.Torepeat,thereisnoassumptioninthesemodelsthatindividualunitscorrespondtosinglecells
attheneurallevelofanalysis,butthemodelsdemonstratethatdistributedcodingisaviablepossibilityinthebrain.Cognitionoftheproverbialgrandmothermightnow
berepresentedbyadistinctivepatternofactivityoverapopulationofneurons,allofwhicharealsoinvolvedinencodingotherconcepts.Followingtheleadof
connectionistnetworksinwhichknowledgeofeachpieceofinformationisencodedinthepatternofweightsacrossalloftheunitsinthenet,wecanimaginean
extremecaseinwhichknowledgeofgrandmother(andallotherconcepts)isencodedinsynapticpatternsacrossallofthetrillionorsocellsinthecerebralcortex.
Currently,thispossibilityisnotbeingactivelypursuedbyresearchers,because,aswehaveseen,thereisabundantevidencethatthebrainishighlyorganized
structurally.Itisunlikely,forexample,thatthevisualrecognitionofyourgrandmotherinvolvespatternsofactivationacrosstheentireprimarymotorcortex.Itismore
likelythatdistributedcodesarerestrictedtofunctionalregionsofthebrain,suchasthecorticalmapsjustdiscussed.
Likesinglecellrepresentations,distributedcodescannotbefoundthroughsimplefishingexpeditionsinthebrain.Evenwiththebesttechniquesforsimultaneously
recordingfrommorethanoneneuron,forexample,itmightbedifficulttorecordfromenoughoftheneuronsinvolvedinadistributedcodetofigureouthowthecode
works.Ifaparticulardistributedrepresentationdependsononlyafractionofthecellsinsomecorticalregion,itmightalsobedifficulttofindmanyofthosecells.
Worse,thefactthatacertainprofileofactivityoccursinanumberofcellsundersomeconditionsandnotinothersdoesnotbyitselfdemonstratethatdistributed
codingisinvolved.Afterall,inanetworkwithsingleunitcodingallofthecellswillhavesomelevelofactivityallofthetime,andtheprofileofactivityinsomegroupof
cellsmightwellbesimilarundersimilarcircumstances.Forexample,activityinthecellthatencodesgrandmothercognitionmightwellbeaccompaniedbystrong
activityinthecellsthatencodegrayhaircognitionandtwinklingeyecognition,weakactivityinthecellthatencodesbeardcognition,andmiddlingactivityinthecell
thatencodesaparticularnoseshapethatsortofmatchesgrandmother's.Asinthecaseofsingleunitcoding,

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whatisrequiredisadetailedtheoryanddataaboutanatomicalstructureandpatternsofactivityatmorethanonelevelinapathway.
Bothlocalanddistributedcodingareknowntooccurinnervoussystems.Inthebarnowl,forexample,individualspacespecificneuronsatthetopoftheauditory
pathwaycodeforparticulardirections.Atlowerlevelsinthehierarchy,however,thecodingofspatialdirectionisdistributedbetweentheamplitudeandphase
pathways.Attheinnereartheinformationaboutthedirectionoftheauditorystimulusisdistributedacrossvirtuallyallofthereceptorsinthetwoears.Generally,
distributedcodingisanecessitytowardtheperipheryofsensorysystemsforatleasttworeasons.First,cognitivelyorbehaviorallysignificantinformationinthe
stimulushastobeextractedfromamultiplicityofoftenambiguouscuesintheinput.Forexample,singleunitsforsounddirectioncouldnotexistinorneartheinnerear
ofthebarnowlbecauseinformationfromthetwoearshastobecomparedtoestablishdirection.Or,justasobviously,therecouldnotbegrandmotherdetectorson
theretina,becausewhengrandmotherisinviewtheinformationaboutherisdistributedacrossafairlylargeareaoftheretinalimageandthereforeacrossmany
receptorcells.Torecognizegrandmother,theoutputsofthesecellsmustbecombined,andtherelevantinformationcomingfromthem(e.g.,haircolor)mustbe
separatedfromtheirrelevant(e.g.,levelofillumination).Second,itisoftenphysicallyimpossibletousesingleunitstoencodeinformationthatismeaningfulandlocally
availableattheperiphery.Thewavelengthofthelightataparticularspotontheretinalimageisacaseinpoint.Hundredsorthousandsofunits,eachselectivefora
particularwavelength,couldnotbepackedintoeachpointontheretina.Instead,sensitivitytovariationsinwavelengthisaccomplishedbyjustthreetypesof
receptors.
Theretinalconesareanexampleofcoarsecodinginthenervoussystem.Eachtypeofconerespondsacrossabroadregionofthevisiblespectrum.Themedium
wavelength(''green'')cones,forexample,haveapeaksensitivityaround530nanometers,buttheirsensitivityfallsoffrathergraduallyaroundthispeak.Becauseof
theirbroadtuning,thegreenconesdonotrepresentanyparticularwavelength.Further,theiroutputisajointfunctionoftheirsensitivityandtheintensityofthe
incominglight.Theirresponsetoanintenselightat,say,500nanometerscanbestrongerthantheirresponsetoadimlightat530nanometers.Theresultofthistrade
offbetweenwavelengthandintensityisthatasingletypeofreceptorcannotencodewavelength(andthereforecolor)informationatall.However,thecombinationof
theresponsesofthethreebroadlytunedconetypes(eachwithadifferentpeaksensitivity)doesencodewavelengthinformation.Thiscombinationconstitutesa
distributedcode,whichcanberepresentedasavectorofthreenumbersorapointinathreedimensionalspace.Eventhoughnoneoftheconetypeshastheabilityto
encodewavelengthinformationbyitself,thecombinationgivesustheabilitytoperceivemanythousandsofcolors.Generally,theprofileofresponsesfroma
populationofcoarselytunedunitscanspecifyavaluewithgreatprecision.
Theabilityofneuralsystemstodevelopcodesthataremoreprecisethantheresolvingpoweroftheindividualinputneuronsisknownashyperacuity.Inadditionto
colorvision,thevisualsystemexhibitsanumberofotherhyperacuities.Forexample,peoplecanmakespatialdiscriminationsinvolvingdistancesthataresmallerthan
thedistancebetweenadjacentreceptorcellsontheretina.Batscandiscriminatedistancesassmallas1.0to1.5centimetersusingthetimedelaysbetweenthereturn
oftheir

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echoes(Suga1990).Thediscriminationrequiresasensitivitytotimedifferencesintherangeof0.06to0.09milliseconds,butthesensitivityofindividualauditory
neuronsisonly0.13milliseconds.Afertilehypothesisisthatdistributedcoarsecodesareageneralstrategyforachievinghyperacuities(BaldiandHeiligenberg1988).
TheresearchofGeorgopoulosandhiscolleagues(1986)illustratesoneapproachtopursuingthishypothesis.Theyrecordedtheactivityofcellsinthemotorcortex
aftertrainingmonkeystoreachfordifferentspatiallocations.Mostofthecellsshowedaresponsepreferenceforaparticulardirectionofmovement,buttheywere
broadlytunedtoarangeofdirections.Theresponsecurvesofdifferentcellsalsooverlappedconsiderably.Itwasimpossibletopredicttheactualdirectionof
movementfromtheactivityofanysingleneuron.However,theaverageresponseoftheentirecellpopulationpredictedtheexactdirectionofarmmovement.Similar
resultshavebeenobtainedforothermotor(Schor,Miller,andTomko1984)andvisual(Steinmetzetal.1987)behavior.
Inthecaseofarmmovement(aswellassomeothermotorbehaviors)theresponseofacellpopulationrepresentsitsoverallaverageresponse.Itispossiblethatata
higherlevelofrepresentationtheaverageisrepresentedbyfinelytuneddirectionspecificneurons.Inothercases,takingtheaverageresponseoverthepopulation
woulddestroytheinformationitencodes.Forexample,averagingtheresponsesofthethreeretinalconetypeswouldproduceasinglebroadlytunedresponsecurve
similartothatofeachoftheindividualcones,withnocapacitytoencodewavelengthinformation.Inthesecasesanyhigherordergrandmotherunitswouldhaveto
capturepropertiesoftheprofileofresponsesoverthepopulation.Alternatively,vectorsofactivationcanbemappeddirectlyontoothervectorswithnointervening
localcode.
Thehypothesisthatdistributedcodingisemployedverywidelybythenervoussystemcurrentlyguidesagreatdealofworkincomputationalneuroscience
(ChurchlandandSejnowski1992).Thehypothesisissupportedbytheknowncasesofdistributedcodingandbythefindingthatneuronsinsensoryandmotor
corticalareastendtobebroadlytuned.Itisalsosupportedbythenecessitythatevenwherelocalcodingholdsatthetopofaprocessinghierarchy,theremustbe
distributedcodingatlowerlevels.Wherethereisagrandmothercell,theremustbedistributedinformationaboutgrandmotherbelowthelevelofthatcell.The
hypothesisisalsofueledbythetheoreticalargumentsfordistributedcodingthathaveemergedfromconnectionistresearch(Hinton,McClelland,andRumelhart1986,
andchapter2).Withdistributedcoding,similarobjectsorconceptshavesimilarcodes,sharingmanyelementsorhavingsimilarvaluesonmanyfeatures.Thesystem
canrespondtoanovelinputvectorbyexploitingitscorrelationswithfamiliarvectors.Itcanmapincompleteornoisyinputstodecentoutputs.Thehighdimensional
spacescreatedbydistributedrepresentationscontainplentyofroomforencodingvastnumbersofobjectsorconceptsandtheirvariants,producedbydifferentpoints
ofviewordifferentinterpretations.Adjustableweightsallowdistributedsystemstolearncomplexmappingsfromexperience.Suchsystemscontinuetorespond
reasonablyevenwhentheirconnectionsandweightshavesustainedsignificantdamage.Theseproperties,whichseemtobepropertiesofnervoussystems,area
naturalconsequenceofdistributedcoding,anditisoftenarguedthatitisnotclearhowtoachievetheminsystemsthatrelyextensivelyonlocalcoding.Thestrongest
formofthetheoreticalargumentisthatdistributedcodesshouldbemaintainedthroughoutasystem,mappingvectorsontovectors,withoutpassingthroughstagesof
localcoding.Muchoftheevidenceisconsistentwiththisview,butitis

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consistentaswellwithaviewthatgivesastrongroletolocalcodingathigherlevelsofrepresentation,whichalsohasitstheoreticalproponents(Trehub1991).The
generaldebateaboutstrategiesofneuralcodingandcomputationcanonlybesettledbydetailedmodelsandempiricalevidence.
InnateorLearnedRepresentations
Philosophersandscientistshaveproposedconflictingviewsonexactlyhowrepresentationsareformedinadevelopingnervoussystem.Ingeneraltermstheempiricist
positionarguesthatneuralrepresentationsareareflectionofenvironmentalstimulation.Neuralcircuitsareprogrammedasifthebrainwereablankslatetobewritten
onbyexperience.Theopposingnativistpositionhypothesizesthatrepresentationsareinnateandbiologically"hardwired."Neuralcircuitsarealreadyinplaceto
subservespecializedfunctions,andthe"right"kindofsensoryinputtriggerstheactivationofsuchprewiredcircuits.
Neurodevelopmentalandgeneticconsiderationssuggestthatbothpositionshavemerit.Themajorneuralpathwaysandstructuresareverysimilarinallmammals,
suggestingahighdegreeofgenetichardwiringtoguidethedesign.Membersofthesamespeciesproducenearlyidenticalneuralcircuitsduringtheearlystagesof
neuraldevelopment.However,Changeux(1985)haspointedoutthatgenesarenotlikelytoberesponsibleforthediversityandspecificityofallsynapticconnections.
Studiesoftheeyeinasimpleorganismsuchasthewaterflearevealthatthenumberofsensoryneuronsandthenumberofganglioncellswithwhichtheymakecontact
arethesameforinsectsthatareclonedandthusgeneticallyidenticalbutthenumberofsynapsesbetweenthesecellsandtheshapeoftheiraxonalbranchesvaryfrom
oneclonetoanother(Macagno,Lopresti,andLevinthal1973).Whenweconsiderthemorecomplicatednervoussystemofmammals,thevariabilityisonlylikelyto
increase.
Considerableresearchhasdocumentedenvironmentalinfluencesonbraindevelopment.Animalexperimentshaveshownthatenrichedenvironmentsincreasethesize
ofthecortex,thedensityofglialcells,andthedensityandnumberofsynapticconnections(Diamond1984).Researchwiththevisualsystemalsohasshownthat
sensorydeprivationearlyinlifecanleadtosevereabnormalitiesinvisualcorticalcellsandproduceblindness,butdeprivationlaterinlifedoesnotproduceilleffects
(Kratz,Spear,andSmith1976).
Acknowledgingtheinfluencesofbothgenesandtheenvironment,severalneuroscientistshavesuggestedthetheorythatlearningproceedsfroma"selective,
Darwinisticmechanism"(Changeux1985Dudai1989Edelman1987).ThekeyideaisthatthebrainspontaneouslyproduceswhatChangeuxhascalled
prerepresentations,whichcorrespondtothetransientbutdiscreteelectrochemicalactivityofanassemblyofneurons.Theseautonomouspatternsofactivityare
endogenousthatis,theyexistapartfromanysensoryinput.Inputsfromsensoryreceptorsandthecorticalmapstheyprojecttocreateaprimarypercept.Percepts
interactwithprerepresentationsofthebraintoproduceresonantstatesinwhichtheprerepresentationisstabilizedandamemoryormentalimageisformed.For
resonancetooccur,acertaindegreeof"matchup"hastoexistbetweentheperceptandtheprerepresentationtoomuchdissonancewillinterferewithlearning.
Resonanceisproducedwhenneuronsfireinphasewithoneanother,creatingatemporallycoupledvolleyofactivity(VonderMalsburgandWillshaw1981).This
resonantpatternreinforcesitselfthroughastrengtheningofsynapticconnectionsbetweenneuronsintheassembly,thus"storing"thememory.

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Mentalrepresentationsarenotthedirectproductofsensoryinput,noraretheyhardwiredintofunctionalcircuitsbythegenome.Rather,stableneuralstatesare
selectedfromamongavarietyofspontaneouslygeneratedneuralactivationpatternsthroughaninteractionwithsensoryinput.Theideaisthatprerepresentationsare
geneticallyinherited,butonlythoseendogenousactivationpatternsthatprovetobefunctionallyusefulthroughexperiencearestabilizedtoformthementalstructuresof
themind.Thisstabilizationprocessoccursduringthecriticalperiodofneuraldevelopmentwhensomeneuralconnectionsarestabilizedintofunctioningcircuitsand
othersynapticcontactsregress.Presumablyneuralarchitecturecanbeinfluencedbyevolutioninthesamewayasotherphysicaltraits.Thoseprerepresentationsthat
providetherightkindofrawmaterialtoformmentalrepresentationsgivetheanimalaselectiveadvantage.
Althoughtheseideasarelikelytoremainspeculativeforsometime,theyneverthelesshavedirectedconsiderableinteresttothelevelofcellassemblies.Inthestudyof
complexrepresentations,mostneuroscientistsnowrecognizetheneedtomonitortheactivityoflargeassembliesofneurons,notjustrecordtheactivityofsinglecells.
Techniquestoprovidesuchfunctionalmappingdonotyetexist,althoughseveralnewexperimentalprocedures,suchasopticaldyes(Grinvaldetal.1986)ormapping
brainactivityusingmultipleelectrodes(AbelesandGerstein1988),holdpromise.
7.4Neuropsychology
TheoreticalandMethodologicalConsiderations
Thestudyoftheneuralsubstratesofhighercognitivefunctions,suchasmemory,language,orconsciousness,isoftenreferredtoasneuropsychology.Traditionally,
neuropsychologistshavestudiedhowcognitivefunctionsarephysicallyimplementedbystudyingpeopleoranimalswithdamagedbrains.Performancebyaperson
withdamagetoaknownareainthebraincanbecomparedwithperformancebypeoplewithintactbrainsordamagetootherareas.Thedifferencesinperformance
canbeusedtogenerateortesttheoriesabouttherolesplayedbyvariousareasofthebrainincognitivefunctioning.Inrecentyearsthislineofresearchhasbeen
vigorouslypursuedaspartoftheframeworkofcognitivescienceforseveralreasons.First,neurologicalpatientssometimesexhibitstrikinglyselectivecognitivedeficits,
whichsuggestthatsomeofthedetailedrepresentationsandprocessesthathavebeenhypothesizedatthecognitivelevelofanalysisareimplementedinlocalizedareas
ofthebrain.Second,recentmethodologicaladvancesincognitivepsychologyhavemadepossiblemuchmoredetailedassessmentsofthecognitiveimpairmentsof
neurologicalpatients.Third,contemporarycognitivescientifictheorieshavegeneratedahostofnewneuropsychologicaltheories.Thefloweringofneuropsychological
researchwithincognitivesciencehasalsobeenacceleratedbythedevelopmentofnewmethodsforobservingtheworkingbrain.Localizedpatternsofactivityduring
cognitioncannowbeobservedintheintactordamagedbrainusingmethodssuchasmagneticresonanceimaging(MRI),positronemissiontomography(PET),orthe
recordingofeventrelatedpotentials(ERP).Althoughtheirspatialandtemporalresolutionislimited,thesemethodsallowresearcherstoobservedirectlysomeofwhat
mustbeinferredinthetraditionalmethodofcorrelatingcognitiveperformancewiththelocationsofbrainlesions.

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Traditionalandmuchofcontemporaryneuropsychologyisatopdownenterprise,inwhichtheoriesfromthecognitivelevelofanalysisarebroughttobearon
neuropsychologicaldata.Advancesinourknowledgeofneuralcircuitryandthegrowthofconnectionistandneuralnetworkmodelsarebeginningtobringbottomup
considerationstothefield,however.Neuropsychologyresearchersmustnowpayattentiontorelevantdataaboutneuralcircuits,andtheymustconsidernetwork
modelsinadditiontomoreclassicalcognitivemodels,whichareoftencouchedatahigherlevelofanalysisandemployhighlystructuredrepresentationsandrules.
Currently,thereislivelydebatewithinneuropsychologyovertherelativeweighttobegiventotraditionalcognitivemodelsandtheirsupportingdataversusnetwork
modelsandneurobiologicaldata.Manytraditionalcognitivemodels,ofcourse,werenotdesignedwithanygeneraltheoryofneuralcomputationinmind,andthegross
anatomicaldataaboutbrainlesionstraditionallyassociatedwithneuropsychologysaylittleabouttheorganizationofneuralcircuits.Theoristswhoareorientedtoward
thereductionofcognitivemodelstoneuralmodels(Churchland1986Sejnowski1986)tendtoarguethatallneuropsychologicaltheoriesshouldbebasedatleastin
partonwellsupportedcharacteristicsofneuralcomputationand,wherepossible,microstructuralneuroscientificdata.
Thedetailedstudyofacquireddyslexia(thelossofreadingskillsthroughbraindamage)representsoneofthemoresuccessfulexamplesofthetopdownapproach
toneuropsychologicalresearch(Coltheart,Patterson,andMarshall1987Patterson,Marshall,andColtheart1985).Researchershavesystematicallyanalyzedthe
patternsofreadingerrorsproducedbydyslexicpatientstogaininsightintohowthereadingsystemisstructured.Theoverallstructureofatheoreticalmodelresulting
fromthislineofresearchcantypicallyberepresentedasaflowchart,suchastheoneinfigure7.14.Eachboxinthechartrepresentsacomputationalmodule,or
component,thattakesoneormorerepresentationsasinputandmapsthatinputontoanoutputrepresentation.Thelabelinaboxdescribestheoutputrepresentation
thatiscomputedbythatmodule.Thearrowsinthechartrepresenttheflowofinformationamongthemodules.Figure7.14representsamodel,proposedbyMarshall
andhiscolleagues(MarshallandNewcombe1981),whichcontainstwoparallelinformationprocessingroutesforthereadingofindividualwords.Onerouteisbased
onsightvocabularyandisknownasthelexicalordirectroute.Theotherroute,calledthephonologicalroute,reliesonregularitiesinthecorrespondencebetween
spellingandsoundandonthemorphologicalandphonologicalstructureofspokenlanguage.Thisroutecan"soundout"awordintheabsenceofadirectprocessing
route.
Inthecurrentmodelwordrecognitionbeginswithananalysisofvisualfeaturestoprovideinformationforidentifyinglettersorwholewords.Inthephonologicalroute
lettersaregroupedorparsedtogetherintosyllabicunits,whicharethencovertedtotheproperphonemes.Thisconversionprocessisbasedonrulesorregularities
acquiredfromspellingexperience(Venezky1970).Thephonologicaloutputsoftheconversionprocessarethenpassedtoafurtherprocessthatblendsthemback
togethertoproducethewholeword.Theearlystagesofdevelopmentofthephonologicalrouteareevidentwhenyoungreaderssoundoutwords.Inthelexicalroute
wordsalsoareparsedintheearlystagestoidentifythebaserootofaword(e.g.,antiabortionbecomesanti/abort/ion).Thenlexicalmemoryisaccessedtorecall
themeaningandproperpronunciationofthebaseandanyprefixesandsuffixes.Thewordpartsarethenresynthesizedforproperpronunciation.Thetworoutesare
hypothesizedtooperatein

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Figure7.14
Symbolicmodelofreading

parallelsothatwhicheversubsystemcompletesthewordidentificationprocessfirstwillcontrolhowthewordispronounced.
Thismodelhashadconsiderablesuccessinaccountingforthevariablereadingperformanceofacquireddyslexicpatients.Forexample,patientswithacondition
calledphonologicaldyslexiahavedifficultypronouncingunfamiliarwords,evensimplenonwordssuchastroat,butotherwisemayhavenotroublereading.Inthis
casethephonologicalrouteisthoughttohavebeendamaged,leavingintactthelexicalrouteanditsaccesstoapreviouslylearnedreadingvocabulary.Theopposite
problemisthoughttoexistforaconditioncalledsurfacedyslexia.Inthiscasethepatientcannotaccesslexicalinformationandsomustsoundouteverywordby
readingthroughthephonologicalroute.Becausethephonologicalroutefollowsspellingrulesinderivingapronunciation,surfacedyslexicsfrequentlymispronounce
wordswithuniquepronunciations,suchas"yacht,"orwordsthathavesomeirregularity,suchascomeorhave(therulesaysthateattheendofthewordshould
makethevowellong).Surfacedyslexicsalsohavetroubleunderstandingwhattheyreadbecauseaccesstolexicalmemoryisimpaired.

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Figure7.15
TheWernickeGeschwindmodelofreadingasrepresentedindifferentcorticalregions

Modelsofthiskindhavebeenmappedontothebrain(seefigure7.15)bycorrelatingthelocationofbraindamageandpatternsofreadingimpairmentwiththe
processingcomponentsofthemodels(BensonandGeschwind1982).Visualinputisprocessedalongtwoparallelpathwaysfromoccipitaltoparietal,temporal,and
thenfrontalregions.Inthephonologicalroutevisualinformationisconvertedtoanauditorycodeasthewordformpassesthroughlanguageregionsintheleft
hemisphere.Thisconversionhasbeendeterminedtotakeplaceinaregionoftheparietallobecalledtheangulargyrus,sincepatientswhosufferdamagetothisregion
losetheabilitytosoundoutwords.Thelexicalrouteispresumedtocircumventtheangulargyrusandtoaccesssemanticinformationdirectlyfromthetemporallobe,
basedonthevisualwordform.MotorprogramsforcontrollingspeechoutputarehypothesizedtobelocatedinapartofthefrontalcortexknownasBroca'sarea
(seethediscussionoflanguagebelow).
Regardlessoftheresearchstrategythatisfollowed,neuropsychologyisanextraordinarilydifficultenterprise.Theneuropsychologistfacesthreesortsof
methodologicalproblems.
Thefirstproblemissharedwithallcognitivescientists.Likeanycognitivescientist,theneuropsychologisttypicallyhasacomputationaltheoryofthecognitiveprocess
understudy.Whetherthistheoryisatraditionalsymbolictheoryoramoremicrostructuralconnectionisttheory,itcanbewrong.Theproposedrepresentations,
components,orcomputationalprocessesmightbeincorrect.
Thesecondproblemissharedwithallcognitivescientistswhoareinterestedinthebrain.Inadditiontoacomputationaltheoryofsomecognitiveprocess,the
neuropsychologistmusthaveatheoryofhowthecomputationalmodelisrealizedinthebrain.Thecomputationaltheorydoesnotdictatethephysicalrealization
theory.

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Giventhecurrentstateofourknowledge,thereisalmostalwaysmorethanonepossibilityformappingthecomputationaltheoryontothebrain.Asimplemappingthat
associatespartsofthecomputationalmodelwithdiscretepartsofthebrainwouldbeincorrect,forexample,ifonecomputationalcomponentwereimplementedin
severalanatomicallydistinctareasofthebrainratherthaninonebrain"center."
Thecognitiveneuroscientististhusjugglingtwotheories,eachofwhichcanfailinvariousways,makingitdifficulttointerpretdataandtoassigncreditorblamewhen
thedatasuggestarevisionofthetheories.Manyresearchershopethatthisdoubledifficultyofcognitiveneurosciencewillbeconvertedintoanadvantageas
knowledgeadvances.Computationalandneuralmodels,supportedbybehavioralandneurobiologicaldata,shouldultimatelybecomemutuallyconstraining.Research
atonelevelofanalysisshouldstronglysuggestorruleoutpossibilitiesatotherlevels.Argumentsoverthemeritsofcognitivelyversusneurallyinspiredmodelsaside,
theprospectofconvergingevidencefromdifferentlevelsofanalysissuggeststhatalllevelsshouldbepursuedsimultaneouslyandascooperativelyaspossibleinwhat
Churchland(1986)callsacoevolutionaryresearchstrategy.Forsomehighercognitiveprocessesthecurrentproblemisthatnotenoughreliableknowledgeisavailable
atlowerlevelsofanalysistostronglyconstrainthehigherlevels,hamperingthedynamicofcoevolutionaryresearch.
Thethirdproblemforneuropsychologyisspecifictoworkingwithsubjectswhohavesufferedbraininjuryorhaveotherkindsofneurologicalabnormalities.The
attempttounderstandtheworkingsofanextraordinarilycomplexsystembyobservingitsbehaviorwhenpartsofithavebeencapriciouslydamagedisobviously
fraughtwithdifficulties.Tobeginwith,theneuropsychologistfacestheadditionalburdenofdevelopingatheoryofhowthecomputationalmodelofnormalcognition
performswhenitis"lesioned"andofmappingthesecognitivelesionsontophysicallesions.Thegeneralempiricalstrategyinneuropsychologyhasbeentoshowthat
damagetoaspecificbrainareaselectivelyimpairssomeaspectofperformanceandsparesotheraspects(whichinturnmaybeimpairedbydamagetoanotherbrain
area).Whenbraininjuriesdissociatevariousaspectsofnormalcognitiveperformancefromeachother,itbecomespossibletomaptheinjuredbrainareasontothe
componentsofcognitivemodelsthatareresponsiblefortheaspectsofperformancethatareimpairedorspared.Evenincaseswherethedissociationiscomplete,
however,themappingsproposedarenotlogicallynecessary(Shallice1988).Forexample,ChurchlandandSejnowski(1992)arguethat"lesioned"connectionist
networkscanexhibitdissociatedperformanceeventhoughtheydonotconsistofdiscretemodulesthatareinterconnectedbypathwaysthatcarrydifferent
representations.Onewaythiscanhappenisthat,astheweightsonhiddenunitsareadjustedduringlearning,unitscancometospecializeononeoranotheraspectof
thestructureofadomain(e.g.,vowelsvs.consonants).Ifunitswithsimilarspecializationsarephysicallyclustered,theycouldbeselectivelylesioned,causinga
selectiveperformanceimpairment.
Theproblemswithinterpretingneuropsychologicaldataarefurthercomplicatedbyotherfactors.Naturallyoccurringbraindamage(typicallycausedbystroke,trauma
tothehead,orinfection)doesnotrespectcomputationalcategories,anditisusuallyquitediffuse,involvingseveralmajorareas.Localizedlesionsarerare.When
patientswithsimilarcognitiveperformancearegroupedtogetherforpurposesofstudy,thegroupsareneverhomogeneous.Thesubjectsusuallyhaveavarietyof
lesionsofdifferentsizesandinsomewhatdifferentlocations.Eveninafairlyhomogeneousgroup,theremight

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stillbeconsiderableindividualdifferencesintheorganizationofcorticalmaps(seetheearlierdiscussionoftopographicalmaps).Imagingtechniquesusedtoidentify
braininjuryalsohavelimitations.Computerizedtomography(CT),themostfrequentlyusedbrainscan,cannotimagealesionsmallerthan1to2centimetersanddoes
apoorjobinidentifyingsubcorticaldamage.Anotherfactortoconsideristhecauseofthedamage.Groupingpatientswithdifferenttypesofinjuryisproblematic.
Headtraumaalmostalwaysproducesdiffusedamagetumorscanproduceelectricalabnormalitiesandbrainfunctioncanbeaffectedbyrelatedmedicalconditions,
suchascynoticheartdisease,whichcanslowdownmetabolicactivitybydepletingoxygensupply.Manypatientswithbraindamagealsotakepsychotropicdrugs,
suchastheseizurepreventiveTegretol,yettheeffectsofthesedrugsoncognitivefunctionsarenotwellunderstood.Finally,thepatient'sageatthetimeoftheinjury
andhis/hertimeforrecovery(theintervalbetweenwhentheinjuryoccurredandwhentestingtookplace)canbeimportantfactorsinperformance.Takentogether,
theseconcernsconstituteaformidablechallengetotheneuropsychologist.Nostudyofagroupofbraindamagedpatientsevercontrolsforallthefactorsbecausetoo
manypatientswouldbeeliminatedfromthegroup.
Oneapproachtothisproblemhasbeentoavoidstudiesthatinvolvegroupsofpatientsandinsteadtomakedetailedcasestudiesofindividualswithbraindamage.
Casehistorystudieshaveattemptedeithertoprovideacomprehensiveassessmentofanindividual'scognitivefunctions(theapproachpioneeredintheformerSoviet
UnionbyLuria)ortoanalyzeindetailaspecificcognitivefunction(theBritishapproachrecentlychampionedinthiscountrybyCaramazza).Therearestrongopinions
onbothsidesabouttherelativemeritsofgrouporcasestudiesinneuropsychology(CaramazzaandMcCloskey1988).
Asresearchprogresses,thechallengesofneuropsychologyshouldbemetbyacombinationofimprovedtechniques,suchastheuseofhighresolutionbrainscansand
theexpandingdatabaseofcarefullystudiedsubjects,andconvergentdatafromothersources.Oneareawherethevalueofconvergingevidencecanbeseeniscolor
visionandcognition.Certainaspectsofcolorvisionperformance,suchascolormatching,discrimination,andnaming,havebeenverywellcharacterizedinlaboratory
studies.Theunderlyingneurophysiologyuptotheprimaryvisualcortexisalsowellunderstood,anditfitstogetherverywellwiththeperceptualdata.Althoughthe
basiccharacteroftheperceptualdatahasbeenknownforoveronehundredyears,thefitwiththephysiologicalresultscamewithafertileperiodofcoevolutionthat
beganwiththedevelopmentofmodemneurophysiologicalmethods,suchasthetechniquesforrecordingtheresponsesofsingleneurons.Giventhatwehaveagood
handleonsomeofthephenomenaofcolorperceptionandcognitionandthatweknowagooddealabouthowcolorisinitiallyrepresentedinthecortex,wehavea
goodchanceofbeingabletoputneuropsychologicalobservationsaboutcolortogoodtheoreticaluse.Davidoff(1991),forexample,integratesawiderangeof
neurophysiologicalandperceptualcognitivedatawithfindingsconcerningvariousimpairmentsinvolvingcolor,suchastheselective,totallossofcolorvisioncausedby
corticalinjury(acquiredachromatopsia)ortheselectivelossoftheabilitytonamecolorswhenotheraspectsofcolorperceptionandcognitionareintact(color
anomia).Asconvergingsourcesofevidenceaccumulateinotherareasofresearch,neuropsychologicaldatawillmakeaclearercontributiontotheoverallscientific
pictureinthoseareasaswell.

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Memory
Memoryisagoodillustrationofthestudyofacognitivefacultyforwhichneitherthecognitivenortheneurobiologicaltheoryanddataareasdetailedorsecureasthey
areforcolorvision.ThecontemporaryneuropsychologicalstudyofhumanmemorybeganwiththestudyofHM,apatientwhounderwentaradicalsurgicalprocedure
tocontrolhisconstantepilepticseizures.Medicationshadprovedineffective,andsothepartsofHM'sbrainthatwereproducingtheseizureactivitywereremoved
(ScovilleandMilner1957).Toeveryone'ssurprise,whenHMrecoveredfromsurgery,hewasprofoundlyamnesicandcouldnotremembereventsthatoccurred
afterthesurgery.HMhadnotroublerecallingeventsfromhischildhoodorutilizinginformationthathehadlearnedpriortothesurgery.Hisshorttermmemoryskills
werenormal.Therefore,thesurgeryaffectedhisabilitytostoreorretrievenewlongtermmemories.HMhasadisordercalledanterogradeamnesia,theinabilityto
recalleventsthatoccuraftertheonsetoftheamnesia.(Retrogradeamnesiareferstothelossofmemoryforeventsthatoccurredpriortotheamnesia.)ForHMthe
amnesiaissoprofoundthathecannotrememberwhathewasdoingevenafewminutesago.Heisforeverstuckinthepresent,orashehimselfdescribedit,"Every
dayisaloneinitself,whateverenjoymentI'vehad,andwhateversorrowI'vehad....It'slikewakingfromadream.Ijustdon'tremember"(Milner,Corkin,and
Teuber1968,216).
ThecaseofHMredirectedattentiontothestudyofstorageandretrievalprocessesaswellasdifferentaspectsoflongtermmemory.Aswediscussedinchapter3,
HMandotheramnesicpatientslikehimhavedifficultywithsemanticandepisodicmemory.Semanticmemoryreferstomemoryforfacts,suchasthemeaningofa
wordorthebirthdateofagrandson,andepisodicmemoryreferstorecallofspecificautobiographicalevents,suchasaboattriplastFourthofJulyoryesterday's
breakfast(Squire1987).Inoursketchofthecognitivearchitectureweclassifiedbothofthesekindsofmemoryasdeclarative,thekindofmemorythatcanbelearned
injustonetrialorexperience,andcanbevoluntarilyandconsciouslyaccessed,usuallythroughmorethanonesensorymodality.Wecontrasteddeclarativememory
withproceduralmemories,whicharebuiltupoverrepeatedexposures,aremanifestedbychangesinperformanceratherthanbyconsciousrecollection,andare
modalityspecific.Figure7.16presentsaclassificationschemefortypesofmemory.
Aswepointedoutinchapter3,studiessuggestthattheproceduralmemorysystemisintactforamnesicpatients.Milner(1965)wasthefirsttodemonstratethatHM
could

Figure7.16
Modelofmemorysystems.(FromSquire1987.)

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learnnewskillsbydemonstratinghisimprovedperformanceonamirrortracingtaskafterdailypracticeeventhougheachtimehepracticed,hehadnorecollection
thathehaddonethetaskbefore.Sincethisfirststudy,improvedlearninghasbeendemonstratedformanyotherbehavioraldomains,includingmazelearning,hand
eyetracking,mirrorreading,theTowerofHanoiproblem,andjigsawpuzzles(Squire1987).Onestudyalsoreportedthatamnesicpatientscouldbephysiologically
conditionedusingaparadigminwhichtheylearnedtoblinktheireyeswhentheyheardatone(WeiskrantzandWarrington1979).
HMandotheramnesicpatientsalsoshowrepetitionprimingeffectsontaskssuchasthewordstemcompletiontestdescribedinchapter3.Inthistaskthesubjectis
firstexposedtoalistofwords,suchasMOTELorABSENCE.Laterthesubjectseesalistofwordfragments,suchasMOT__,ABS__,orCHE__,andisasked
tosaythefirstwordthatcomestomindthatstartswiththesameletters.Atleasttendifferentwordscouldbeconstructedfromeachfragment,andsobychance
subjectscouldguesstheprimedwordatmost10percentofthetime.Bothamnesicsandcontrolsperformwellabovetheguessingrateandshowsimilarpriming
effectsbyrespondingwithwordsfromthepriminglistabout60to70percentofthetime,eveniftheyarediscouragedfrommemorizingthefirstlist(Graf,Squire,and
Mandler1984).Whenthetaskisconvertedintoastandarddeclarativememorytaskbyinstructingsubjectstousethewordfragmentsascuestotherecently
presentedwords,amnesicsubjectsareunabletomakeuseofthecues.Suchprimingistemporaryanddisappearsifadelay,rangingfromseveralhourstodays,is
imposedbeforeshowingthewordfragments.Schacter'shypothesisthatprimingaffectsperceptualrepresentationsystemsthatarenotpartofthedeclarativememory
systemwasdiscussedinchapter3.
Themarkeddifferenceinamnesicperformancebetweendeclarativeandproceduralmemorytasksprovidesstrongsupportforconsideringthesetwotypesof
knowledgetobeorganizedintodifferentneurobiologicalsystems.Squire(1987)hasdescribedproceduralmemoryasthementalhistoryofaccumulatedexperiences
''tiedtoandexpressiblethroughactivationoftheparticularprocessingstructuresengagedbylearningtasks.Itisacquiredandretainedbyvirtueoftheplasticity
inherentinthesestructures''(p.162).Suchlearningishypothesizedtobecontainedinthespecificneuralcircuitsthatareusedtocompletetheproceduraltask.
Throughrepeateduse,structural(e.g.,dendriticspines)andneurochemical(e.g.,calciumionchannels)changesoccurintheneuronsthatfacilitatethesynaptic
connections,producingafunctionalneuralcircuitcapableofcomputingthedesiredbehavioralresponse.Thislearningmechanismishypothesizedtobepresentin
neuralcircuitsthroughouttheCNS.Thetheorythatprocedurallearninginvolveslocalchangesintheefficiencyofneuralcircuitsmayexplainwhyproceduralmemory
tendstobehighlyspecific.Forexample,proceduralmemoriestypicallydonottransferwellacrosssensorymodalities.Asimplecaseistheprimingparadigmjust
described.Theprimingeffectisreducedwhentheinitialpresentationoftheprimewordsisauditoryratherthanvisual.Declarativememories,however,areorganized,
stored,andrecalledtogetherfrommanydifferentsensorymodalitiesforexample,memoriesofaFourthofJulyfromchildhoodmightbetriggeredbythesmellof
cottoncandyorbythesoundofafamiliarsongfromthattime.Toconsolidatethememoryofasingleeventappearstorequireacentralstructurethatfunctionsto
associateinformationfromdifferentsensorymodalities.Hippocampalandamygdaloidstructuresarethoughttoservethisfunction.Thisconsolidationprocess

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mustbecontainedinneuroanatomicalstructuresthatarephysicallyseparatefromthosewherethelongtermmemoriesarestored,sinceHMcouldrecalldeclarative
informationthatwasacquiredbeforethesurgery.
NeuralModelofaMemorySystemSeveraldifferentbrainstructureshavebeenimplicatedinmemoryfunctioning.HM'shippocampusfrombothhemisphereswas
surgicallyremoved,alongwithbothamygdalaeandpartsofbothtemporallobes.Consequently,intenseinteresthasfocusedonthehippocampusandamygdalaasthe
siteforlongtermdeclarativememoryconsolidation(Amaral1987).However,othercorticalregionsalsohavebeenimplicatedinamnesia.Longtermalcoholism
accompaniedbythiaminedeficienciescanproduceaneurologicalsyndromecalledKorsakoff'sdisease.Korsakoff'spatientssufferfromdamagetothethalamus
(dorsomedialandanteriornuclei)andoccasionallytothemammillarybodiesofthehypothalamus,althoughresearchersnowbelievethethalamicdamageismostlikely
tocausethememoryloss(ZolaMorganandSquire1985).
Mishkinandhiscolleagueshaveproposedamodelinwhichthemedialtemporal(hippocampusandamygdala)anddiencephalic(mammillarybodiesandthalamus)
regionsfunctiontogetherasamemorysystem(MishkinandAppenzeller1987).Mishkin'smodelincorporatesinformationnotonlyaboutthesestructuresbutalso
aboutbrainregionsthatareconnectedtothem,suchastheprefrontalcortex,basalforebrain,andtemporalandparietalstructures(seefigure7.17).Inhismodeleach
regionservesdifferentrolesinthememoryprocess.Sensoryinformationmovesfromtheprimarysensorycorticalregionstotheassociativecortex,wherelongterm
memoriesarestabilizedbyconcurrentfeedbackactivityfromthehippocampusandamygdala.Thisfeedbackcircuithastwoloops:anindirectroutethatpassesfrom
diencephalicstructuresthroughtheprefrontalcortexandthenthebasalforebrainandanotherroutethatconnectsmoredirectlythroughthebasalforebrain.The
prefrontalcortexhasbeenhypothesizedtoorganizeandassociatebehavioralresponsesbasedonthecurrentsensoryinput.Thehippocampusandamygdalaare
thoughttofunctionasaworkingmemorysystem,tohelpconsolidatenewperceptionsfromshorttolongtermmemoryandalsotoassistinmemoryrecallby
associatingthemanyfeaturesofanepisodicmemoryacrossdifferentsensorymodalities.Damagetoanypartofthesystemwilldisruptfunctioning,butnottothesame
degree.Theseideasaboutthefunctionalroleofeachregionstillremaintentative,butmoresystematicstudyinvolvingabroadersampleofstandardizedbehavioral
tasksmayhelptosortthesequestionsout.
Language
Wehavealreadybeenexploringtheideathatdifferentpartsofthebrainarespecializedforparticularcognitivefunctions.In1861twoFrenchphysicians,Auburtin
(18251893)andBroca(18241880),describedapatientwhohadsufferedspeechloss,adisorderalsocalledanaphasia,astheresultofdamagetopartofthe
frontallobe(seefigure7.18).Brocaeventuallyexaminedatotaloftwentythreeindividualswhohadlanguagedisordersandconcludedthatineachcasethefrontal
lobeofthelefthemispherehadbeendamaged.Further,henoticedthatonlyspeechproductionwasimpairedcomprehensionremainedintact.Todaythisregionis
calledBroca'sarea,andpatientswhosufferspeechlossfromdamagetoithaveBroca'saphasia.

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Figure7.17
Theflowchartandanatomicallocationsofamodelforvisualmemoryfunctions

Broca'saphasiapatientsarecharacterizedbyslowandeffortfulspeechinwhicheachwordcanrequireseveralsecondstoproduceandspeechsoundsareslurredor
rearranged.Forexample,Gardner(1974)reportsthisconversationwithaBroca'saphasiapatient:
IaskedMr.Fordabouthisworkbeforeheenteredthehospital.
"I'masig...no...man...uh,well,...again."
"Letmehelpyou,"Iinterjected."Youwereasignal..."
"Asignnalman...right,''Fordcompletedmyphrasetriumphantly.
..."Isee.Couldyoutellme,Mr.Ford,whatyou'vebeendoinginthehospital?''
"Yes,sure.Mego,er,uh,P.T.nineo'cot,speech...twotimes...read...wr...ripe,er,rike,er,write...practice...gettingbetter."
"Andhaveyoubeengoinghomeonweekends?"
"Why,yes...Thursday,er,er,er,no,er,Friday...Barbara...wife...and,oh,car...drive...purnpike...youknow...restand...tee
vee."(Gardner1974,6061)

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Figure7.18
Figuresshowingthesiteofbraindamage(darkareas)fordifferentindividuals.
TopgroupsufferedfromWernicke'saphasia,middlegroupfromBroca'saphasia,
andbottomgroupfromGlobalaphasia.(FromKolbandWhishaw1990.)

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AbouttenyearsafterBroca'sreport,Wernickedescribedasecondlanguagecenterlocatedinthetemporallobe.WhereaspatientswithBroca'saphasiatalkina
slow,deliberatemanner,usingsimplegrammaticalstructures,thosewithWernicke'saphasiahavepoorspeechcomprehension,andalthoughspeechisfluent,they
oftenconfusethesoundsofwordsandmixupsyllablestocreateneologisms(newwords)orscramblephrasestogethertoproducewordsalad.Again,another
examplefromGardner'sbook:
"Whatbringsyoutothehospital?",Iaskedthe72yearoldretiredbutcherfourweeksafterhisadmissiontothehospital.
"Boy,I'msweating,I'mnervous,youknow,onceinawhileIgetcaughtup,Ican'tmentionthetarripoi,amonthago,quitealittle,I'vedonealotwell,Iimposea
lot,while,onetheotherhand,youknowwhatImean,Ihavetorunaround,lookitover,trebbinandallthatsortofstuff."(Gardner1974,68)
Inaddition,thewritingskillsofWernicke'saphasicsareusuallyimpaired.
SinceWernicke'stime,neurologistsandneuropsychologistshavecontinuedafunctionalistapproachtothestudyofneurolinguistics.Themethodinvolvesacareful
examinationofthelinguisticskillsofbraindamagedpatientstocorrelatetheirspeechimpairmentswiththesiteoftheirbraintrauma.GoodglassandKaplan(1972)
haveproducedaclassificationsystemthatiscommonlyusedtoanalyzelinguisticfunctions.Thissystemincludestwotypesofcomprehensiondisorders,visualand
auditory,andeighttypesofexpressivedisorders,whichcoverareassuchasarticulation,grammar,fluency,andwriting.Mostaphasicpatientshaveimpairmentin
manyofthesecategories,involvingbothexpressiveandreceptivefunctions.Althoughmanyneuropsychologistswhostudyaphasiahopeandexpectthatsomeday
eachofthesefunctionswillbelocalizedtodiscreteanatomicallocations,sofarthisgoalhasnotbeenreached.Onereasonmaybetheextentofmostpatients'brain
damage.Aphasiaiscommonlycausedbystrokes.Themiddlecerebralartery,abloodvesselinthebrainthatnourishestheselanguageregions,isparticularly
susceptibletoarteriosclerosis,adiseaseinwhichbloodvesselsthickenandareweakenedwithage.Whenabloodvesselisoccludedorbursts,largeportionsofbrain
tissuedie,typicallyproducingalesionthatisnotlocalizedtoaspecificfunctionalarea.
OtherexplanationsforthedifficultyinlocalizingsuchfunctionsmaybeeitherthatthebraindoesnotorganizelinguisticprocessesbyGoodglassandKaplan's
categories(Marshall1986)orthatsuchfunctionsaremorebroadlydistributedandnotlocalized.Inpracticeonlyabout60percentofaphasicpatientsexhibitpatterns
oflinguisticimpairmentthatfitintothecurrentclassificationschemes.
Linguisticaphasiologyresearchhasadoptedaninformationprocessingapproachtoprovideamuchmoredetaileddescriptionoflinguisticfunction(Caplan1987).
Usingtheoreticalconceptsderivedfromlinguisticsandcognitivepsychology,aphasiologistshavestudiedtheimpairedlinguisticperformanceofaphasicpatientstomap
theirdeficitsintosubcomponentsofalanguageprocessingsystem.Manyinterestingrefinementsoflinguistictheoryhaveresultedfromthiswork.Forexample,several
studieshaveexaminedtherolesyntacticstructuresplayinsentencecomprehension.Considerthesethreesentences:

(1)

Thegirlischasingthebigdog.

(2)

Thedogthegirlischasingisbig.

(3)

Thedogthegirlischasingisbarking.

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Althoughsentences(1)and(2)conveythesamemeaning,theorderofthenounsisreversedinsentence(2),requiringthereadertousesyntacticinformationtoassign
theproperthematicrolestothedogandthegirltodeterminewhoisdoingthechasing.Syntacticinformationalsoisusefulinsentence(3),althoughlexicalpragmatic
informationcanbeusedtodeterminethematicrolessincegirlsdonotbark.WhensentenceslikethesearegiventoBroca'saphasiapatients,theyhaveaverydifficult
timecomprehendingsentence(2)butnot(1)or(3),suggestingthepresenceofseveraldifferentsystemsinvolvedinlanguagecomprehension(CaramazzaandZurif
1976).However,Broca'saphasicsarenotcompletelyimpairedintheirgrammaticaljudgments.Linebarger,Schwartz,andSaffran(1983)reportedthatBroca's
aphasicswhowereseverelyimpairedintheirsyntacticcomprehensionwerestillabletomakereasonablygoodjudgmentsaboutwhethersentenceswere
grammaticallycorrect.Thisfindingsuggeststhatgrammaticalsystemsmustbebrokendownfurtherintoparsingoperationsthatdetermineconstituencyandaseparate
stageinwhichthesentencestructurecreatedbytheparserisinterpreted.
Theissueoflocalizinglinguisticfunctionstoparticularbrainregionsisproblematic.Althoughconsiderableevidencesuggeststheprincipleofgrosslocalizationofmajor
linguisticfunctions,moreelementarystagesoflinguisticprocessingappeartobedistributedandtovarybetweenindividuals.Someofthemostproblematicevidence
comesfromstudiesconductedbyOjemannandhiscolleagues(Ojemann1983),whoattemptedtomapspeechzonesduringneurosurgery.Ojemannusedaweak
electricalcurrenttostimulateselectedsurfaceareasofthecortexwhilepatientswereengagedinverbaltasks.Duringtheprocedurepatientsremainedawakeandalert
becausetherearenopainsensorsonthesurfaceofthebrain.Iftheirperformancewasdisrupted,thenthesiteoftheelectrodeindicatedaspeechzone.Theirresults
supportedthegeneralconceptofBroca'sandWernicke'slanguagezoneshowever,stimulationinbothregionshadquitesimilareffects,disruptingbothexpressiveand
receptivefunctions.Inaddition,theboundariesvariedconsiderablyfromoneindividualtoanother,andmanyotherregionsoutsideofthesezonesalsoaffected
linguisticfunctions.Furthermore,manydifferenttasks,suchasphonemeperception(distinguishingbafromda)orcopyingorofacialmovements(suchasstickingthe
tongueout),couldbedisruptedfromthesamesite.
Otherbrainstructuresbesidesthecortexhaveoftenbeenoverlookedwhendiscussinglanguagefunctions.In1866HughlingsJackson(1932)wasthefirsttosuggest
thatsubcorticalstructuresareimportanttonormallanguagefunction.Recentstudieshavedemonstratedlanguagedisordersinpatientswiththalamiclesions(Ojemann
1975)andinParkinson'spatientswhohavebasalgangliadamage(Lieberman,Friedman,andFeldman1990).Togetherthesedatasuggestthatthelanguagesystemis
extremelycomplex,involvingmanycorticalandsubcorticalstructures.
LeftBrain/RightBrainCerebralDominance
Acuriousfeatureofthebrain'sorganizationisthatthesymmetricalhalvesofthebrainrespondtosensoryinputfromtheoppositeorcontralateralsideofthebody.The
somatosensorysystemisalmostcompletelycrossedsothattherighthalfofthebraincontrolstheleftsideofthebodyandviceversa.Thevisualsystemisslightlymore
complicated(seefigure7.19),withthenasal(nearthenose)portionsofthevisualfieldcrossingwhiletheperipheralvisualfieldsremainipsilateral(samesided).Thus,
iftheeyesarefocusedstraightahead,theleftvisualfieldismappedontotherightvisual

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Figure7.19
Centralvisualpathways.Lightfromtheleftvisual
fieldprojectstothelefteye'snasalandrighteye's
temporalpartsoftheretina.Theseregionssend
opticfiberstotherightcorticalhemisphere.
Similarly,lightfromtherightvisualfieldprojects
totheleftcorticalhemisphere.

cortexandviceversa.Theauditorysystemalsoiscontralaterallyorganized,althoughipsilateralprojectionsexistaswell.
Anotherunusualfeatureisthatonecerebralhemisphereisusuallydominantforparticularbehavioralfunctions.Forexample,thevastmajorityofpeopleshowa
righthandedpreference,suggestinglefthemispherecerebraldominanceformanualmotorfunctions.Manyothercognitivefunctions,suchaslanguage,arealso
lateralizedtothelefthemisphere,althoughsome,suchasvisualspatialabilities,showarighthemispherepreference(Bryden1982).Whyhighercognitivefunctions,
suchaslanguage,shouldlateralizetoadominanthemispherehasbeenthesubjectofintensespeculationandrecentbiologicalinvestigation(GeschwindandGalaburda
1984).Onehypothesissuggeststhatthetwohemispheresarenotasphysicallysymmetricalasoncethoughtandthatimportantanatomicalandcellulardifferencesmay
beattheheartofcertainfunctionaldifferences.Forexample,GeschwindandLevitsky(1968)haveshownthataregionknownastheplanumtemporale,locatedin
thetemporallobeneartheprimaryauditorycorex(seefigure7.20),islargerinthelefthemisphereforabout80percentofthebrainsexamined,suggestingapossible
roleinthelefthemisphere'sdominanceforlinguisticfunctions.

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SplitBrainStudiesSincethe1940scommissurotomyhasbeenusedasalastresorttreatmentforsomepatientswithintractableseizures.Thisisarareneurosurgical
procedureinwhichthefibersofthecorpuscallosumthatconnectthetwocerebralhemispheresofthebrainarecut.Thesurgeryisthoughttopreventthespreadingof
epilepticdischargefromonehemispheretotheother,thushelpingtocontrolseizureactivity.Twogroupsofpatientswhohavehadcommissurotomieshavebeen
carefullystudied,revealingimportantdifferencesinthewaythetwohemispheresfunction.TheCaliforniagroupconsistsofabouttwodozenpatientswhounderwent
completecommissurotomiesinthe1960s.TheywereextensivelyexaminedbySperryandhiscolleagues(Gazzaniga1970Sperry1968).Duringthe1970sasecond
groupofpatientsunderwentpartialcommissurotomiesatDartmouthMedicalSchoolandwerestudiedbyGazzanigaandhiscolleagues(GazzanigaandLeDoux
1978).
Studyprocedurestookadvantageofthefactthatsensorysystemsarecontralaterallyorganizedforthetwohemispheres.Ifvisualinformationwasonlybriefly
displayedtotheleftvisualfield(soastoavoideyemovementsthatwouldshiftthefieldofvision),orifobjectswerehandledonlybythelefthand,thesensory
informationwouldbeconductedonlytotherighthemisphere.Withthecorpuscallosumsevered,informationfromonehemispherecouldnotbetransferredcortically
totheotherhemisphere,providingtheopportunitytodirectlyexaminethecognitiveprocessingcapabilitiesofeachhemisphere.
Ingeneral,splitbrainstudiesconfirmedthatthecontrolofspeechislocalizedtothelefthemisphere(LH)formostpeople.FormostsubjectstheLHwasableto
respondverballytoquestionsorothervisualdisplays,whereastherighthemisphere(RH)wasunabletodoso.Gazzaniga(1983)reportedthatonlythreeoutof
twentyeightpatientsfromtheDartmouthgroupshowedanyevidenceofRHlinguisticfunction,andinallthreecasesevidencesuggestedtheRHmayhaveassumeda
roleinlanguagebecauseofLHdamageearlyinlife.AccordingtoGazzaniga,onlytwopatientsintheCaliforniagroupshowedevidenceofRHlanguagefunction,
althoughZaideldisagreedandclaimedthatasmanyassixpatientshadRHlanguage(Zaidel1983).Partofthedisagreementmaybeduetodifferencesinhow
linguisticresponsesaredefined.NoneofthepatientsfromtheCaliforniagroupwereabletowriteorspeakwiththeRH.However,severalwereabletocomplete
somelinguisticcomprehensiontaskswiththeRH,suchasmatchingsimple,concretenounsspokenoutloudwithpicturesselectedbythelefthandorfollowingoral
commandstomakeafistorraisetheleftarm.Zaidelalsodevisedacontactlensthatwouldblockonepartofthevisualfieldsothatpatientscouldvisuallyexamine
objectsforalongerperiodoftimeandstillensurethattheinformationwasselectivelyprocessedonlybyonehemisphere.Usingthislens,Zaidelextensivelystudied
twopatientsandreportedasurprisingdegreeoflinguisticcomprehensionintheRH,roughlyequivalenttoatenyearoldlevel,althoughcomprehensionofcomplex
sentences,suchas"Beforetouchingtheredcircle,pickupthegreensquare,"wasstillcompromised.MorerecentlyGordon(1980)reportedthatiftheLHwas
occupieddoingatask,theRHcouldrespondtoaverbalcommand,suggestingthattheLHmaydominateandinhibittheRHfromfunctioninglinguistically(Smith
1966).
ThesplitbrainstudiesalsosupportedthenotionoftheRHasspecializedforvisualspatialfunctions,althoughthisconclusionisbasedononlyasmallselectionofRH
responses.Formostofthesplitbrainpatients,theRHrarelyrespondedatall(Churchland1986).Whentherewereresponses,theRHwassuperiortotheLHon
suchtasks

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asdrawingfigures,analyzingpartwholerelationshipsforgeometricshapes,andmanipulatingspatialrelationships.
Remarkably,noneofthesehemisphericdisconnectioneffectsareseeninpatientswhowerebornwithoutacallosum.Inveryrarecasesthecallosumfailstoform
duringfetaldevelopment,aconditionknownascallosalagenesis.Thefewstudiesconductedwiththesepatientshaveshownbothhemispheresabletoprocessverbal
andspatialtasks(Ettlingeretal.1972SaulandSperry1968).AlthoughmostsplitbrainpatientscannotrespondverballytopicturesshowntotheRH,eventhough
theirlefthandcanselectthecorrectobjects,callosalagenesispatientshavenosuchdifficulty.Thenervoussystemsofthecallosalagenesispatientsmayhave
compensatedduringdevelopmentforthelackofacorpuscallosum,recruitingsubcorticalconnectionstocommunicatebetweenhemispheres.
HandPreferenceAbout90percentofpeopleprefertousetheirrighthandwhentheywrite,eat,orneedtouseonehandtoperformotherskilledactivities.Because
somepeoplearecomfortableusingmorethanonehandfordifferentunimanualtasks,researchersnowtreathandpreferenceasacontinuousvariable,withsome
peoplestronglylateralizedtoonesideandothersmorenearlyambidextrous.Tomeasureanindividual'shandpreference,questionnaireshavebeenconstructedto
samplehanduseonavarietyoftasks.Suchtestsproducescoresthatrepresentanaverageperformance,calledalateralityquotient.WhenOldfield(1971)surveyed
1,000undergraduatesattheUniversityofEdinburgh,hefoundthatstudentswhopreferredtousetheirrighthanddidsoquiteconsistently,whereasthosewho
preferredthelefthandtendedtobemoreambidextrous.Thisfindingsuggestedthatrighthandednessisthenorm,andthosewhoarenotrighthandedvarytodiffering
degreesfromthatnormalcondition.
Severalneurobiologicalexplanationsofhandednesshavebeenproposed,butnonehasreceivedwidespreadacceptance.Recentstudieshavedemonstratedseveral
anatomicalasymmetriesassociatedwithhandpreference(KolbandWhishaw1990).Onmeasuresofcerebralbloodflow,andrelativesizesofleftrightcortical
regions,suchasthewidthoffrontaloroccipitallobes,upto60percentoftherighthandersgenerallyshowstronglateralization,whereaslefthandersshowthe
oppositeasymmetryornodifferences.Thefunctionalsignificanceofthesefacts,however,ishardtoexplain.Behavioralstudiesofleftandrighthanderssuggestthat
lefthandershavemorebilateralrepresentationoffunction(SpringerandDeutsch1989).Forexample,aprocedureknownastheWadatestisoftenusedwithpatients
whoareabouttoundergoneurosurgerytodeterminewhichhalfofthecortexcontrolsspeechproduction.IntheWadaprocedureonehemisphereistemporarily
anesthetizedbyaninjectionofsodiumamobarbitalintothecarotidarterythatprovidesthebloodsupplytothathemisphere.Studiesofhundredsofpatientshave
shownthat96percentofrighthandershavespeechlateralizedtothelefthemisphereand4percenttotheright.However,only70percentoflefthandershavespeech
lateralizedtothelefthemisphereoftheothers,15percenthavespeechlateralizedtotherightand15percenthavebilateralspeechrepresentation(Rasmussenand
Milner1977).Onemightthenconcludethatthestructuralasymmetriesarebehindthesefunctionaldifferences,butacarefulexaminationofindividualssuggeststhatis
notcase.Atpresentnoonehasproducedaconvincingexplanationtoaccountforthesignificanceofthestructuraldifferences.
AnewhypothesiswasproposedbyGeschwindandGalaburda(1987),suggestingahormonaltheorytoaccountfortheassociationamonglefthandedness,immune

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disorders,andlearningdisabilities.Inonestudy,500stronglylateralizedlefthanderswerecomparedto900stronglylateralizedrighthandersbyquestionnaire.
Comparedtorighthanders,resultsshowedthatlefthandershadabouttwoandahalftimestheincidenceofmigraineheadaches,thyroidconditions,andimmune
disordersparticularlyinvolvingthegastrointestinaltract,suchasceliacdisease,Crohn'sdisease,orulcerativecolitis.Lefthandersalsohadtentimestherateof
developmentaldisorders,includingdyslexia,stuttering,languagedisorders,hyperactivity,autism,andTourette'ssyndrome.Asecondstudywithanother1,400
subjectsreplicatedtheseresults.Noticingthatthesedisordersoccurmorefrequentlyinmenandthatthemalehormone,testosterone,isknowntoaffectthedeveloping
nervoussysteminnonhumanspecies,GeschwindandGalaburdaproposedthatexposuretohigherconcentrationsoftestosteroneslowsthegrowthoftheleft
hemisphereandaffectstheimmunesystemduringfetaldevelopment,producingimmunemalfunctionsanddisruptingcorticalorganizationtoaffecthandednessand
cognitivedevelopment.
Forexample,microscopicstudiesofthebrainsofasmallsampleofdyslexicshaveshownacorticalsymmetrybetweentheleftandrightregionsoftheplanum
temporale(seefigure7.20),anareathoughttobeinvolvedinlanguageprocessing,whereasinnormalreadersthisregionislargerinthelefthemisphere76to84
percentofthetime(Galaburda,Rosen,andSherman1989).Indyslexicstheplanumalsohashighconcentrationsofectopiasanddysplasias,abnormalitiesproduced
bytheneuralmigrationerrorsdescribedabove.GeschwindandGalaburda'shormonehypothesissuggeststhatthedyslexiclefthemisphereissmallerandcontains
structuralabnormalitiesbecauseofexposuretohighconcentrationsoftestosteroneduringfetaldevelopment.
Asinglemechanismthatcouldaccountforsomanydifferentneuralconditionsisappealinghowever,tworecentpiecesofevidencehaveweakenedthishypothesis.
First,studiesofneuraldevelopmentinanimalshaveshownthatcorticalasymmetry

Figure7.20
Differencesintheanatomyofthetwohemispherescanbefoundinthe
temporallobe.Asseenintheleftfigure,theSylvianfissurerisesmore
steeplyintherighthemisphere.Thisdifferenceisrelatedtothesizeof
theplanumtemporale,whichislocatedalongthesurfaceoftheSylvian
fissure(exposedintherightfigure).Theplanumislargerintheleft
hemisphere.(FromKolbandWhishaw,1990.)

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developsasaresultofsynapticreductionandcelldeathinthesmallerhemisphere(Sherman,Rosen,andGalaburda1989),suggestingthatthehypothesisthat
testosteroneinhibitslefthemispheredevelopmenttoproduceabnormallysymmetricalhemispheresisprobablywrong.Apparentlythenormalhemisphericasymmetryis
producedbyneuralreductionintherighthemisphereratherthangreatercellproliferationintheleft,andsosymmetryistheresultofmorecellsandsynaptic
connectionsremainingintactintherighthemisphere.Itremainstobeseenwhethertheseresultsalsoholdtrueforhumans,sinceneuralcelldeathduringhuman
developmentmaynotbeasextensiveasanimalstudieswouldsuggest(Huttenlocher1990).Second,thehigherincidenceofsomedevelopmentaldisordersinmales
hasrecentlybeenquestioned.Forexample,severalresearchers(DeFries1990FinucciandChilds1981)havesuggestedthatboysareoverrepresentedinthe
dyslexicpopulationbecauseofsamplingbias.Ifgenderdifferencesinsomeofthesedisordersturnouttobeculturallydefinedandnotbiologicallybased,thenthe
testosteronehypothesiswouldhavetobemodifiedorabandoned.
7.5ComputationalNeuroscience
Computationalneuroscienceisanewtermusedforthestudyofthebiologicalimplementationofinformationprocesses.Thisresearchapproachisanattemptto
relatepsychologicalmodelsofbehaviortoneurobiologicalfunctions.Constructingcomputermodels,whichcanmathematicallydefineandsimulatethecomputational
componentsofneuralsystems,isanimportantpartofthisapproachandanecessaryadjuncttoneurobiologicalexperimentation.Sejnowski,Koch,andChurchland
(1988)citethreereasons.First,acomputermodelcancapturecomplexinteractionsamongneuralcomponents,makingtheanalysisofcomplex,nonlinearbrain
functionsmoreaccessible.Second,modelsimulationscanprovidenovelexplanationsforcomplexbehaviors.Simulationsoftensuggestnewexperimentsthatcould
thentestthemodel'spredictions.Third,computermodelscanprovideavehicleforconductingsimulatedexperimentsthatcannotbeperformedinvivo.
Atarecentsymposiumoncomputationalneuroscience(Schwartz1990),manyquestionswereraisedabouttheenterprise:Canresearchonsimpleinvertebrate
nervoussystemsbegeneralizedtomorecomplexmammalianbrains?Cantheneuralbasisofcognitionbestbeunderstoodbyastudyofthelogicalfunctionsofthe
brain,ormustcomputationalmodelsalsobedesignedwiththeneural"hardware"inmind?Whatspatialandtemporalscalesshouldbeusedincomputational
modelsshouldmodelingworkfocusatthesynapticneuronallevel,orshouldcellassembliesandcorticalmappingschemesbestudied?Allpointsofvieware
representedintheneuroscientificcommunity,anditisprematuretopredictwhicheffortswillbemostsuccessful.However,somegeneralguidingprincipleshave
emerged.First,knownneurobiologicalprinciplesarethestandardagainstwhichmodelsimulationsmustmeasuretheirsuccess.Otherwise,neuroscientistsare
engineeringdesignsoftheirown,ascomputerscientistswoulddesignanintelligentmachine,notdiscoveringhowthebrainfunctionscomputationalneuroscienceisthe
studyof"natural"intelligence,notartificialintelligence.Second,modelscanberealisticandincorporateasmuchbiologicaldetailaspossibleorcanbesimplified,
providingaconceptualframeworkforstudyofalgorithmicsolutions.Bothapproacheshavemerit.

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ConnectionistModels
Atpresentclassicalsymbolicmodelscannotbereducedtoneurobiologicalterms.Wesawinchapters2and3thatmanyconnectionistmodelsalsohavebeen
developedtoaccountforcognitivephenomenawithoutanydetailedassumptionsabouttheunderlyingneuralarchitecture.Smolensky(1988)andothershaveargued
thatconnectionistmodelsconcernasubsymbolic,ormicrostructural,levelofanalysisthatislowerthanthatofclassicalsymbolicmodelsbutstillaboveandinmany
respectsautonomousfromthephysiologicallevelofanalysis.Nevertheless,connectionistshavedeliberatelyattemptedtoincorporatewhatissometimescalledbrain
styleprocessingintotheirmodels.Connectionistmodelsaresometimescalledartificialneuralnetworks,suggestingthattheprocessingunitsareanalogousto
neuronsorcellassembliesinthebrain.Connectionistmodelshaveinfactbeenrapidlyassimilatedintotheneurosciencecommunity(GluckandRumelhart1990
Grossberg1988HansonandOlson1990Nadeletal.1989Schwartz1990).
Someneuroscientists(Crick,1989Shepherd,1990a)havearguedthatcurrentconnectionistdesignsmakemanyunrealisticassumptions,andtheyhaveencouraged
networkmodelerstodevelopsystemsthatincorporatemorefeaturesofrealneuralarchitecture.Ontheonehand,someconnectionistmodelshavecharacteristicsfor
whichthereisnoneuroscientificevidence.Thebackpropagationlearningalgorithm,forexample,requiresthateachforwardpaththroughanetworkbepairedwitha
backwardpathalongwhicherrorsignalscanbesent.Inthemodelitiseasytoimaginesendingtheerrorsignalsbackalongtheverylinesthatcarryactivationforward
throughthenet,butnervefibersarenotbidirectional,andthereiscurrentlynoevidenceforthepreciselymatchedforwardandbackwardpathsthatthemodelrequires
(Crick1989ZipserandRumelhart1990).Ontheotherhand,thereisampleevidenceforthecomputationalrelevanceofmanyfeaturesofrealneuralnetworksthat
areoftennotincorporatedintomodelnetworks.Forexample,realneuronsgeneratestreamsofactionpotentials,whichhavebothafrequencyandaphase,whereas
theunitsinmanynetworkmodelsgeneratesimplenumericalvalues,whichlackphaseinformation.Realneuralnetworkscontainmultipleneurotransmittersandmany
distinctmorphologicaltypesofneurons.Mostartificialnetworksdonotincorporatethesedistinctions.Thenetinputtoaunitinatypicalconnectionistmodelisa
weightedsumofitsinputs.Inrealneuralnetworksthereisevidenceformicrocircuitswithindendritictreesthatcomputecomplex,nonlinearfunctionsratherthan
simplesummations.Thisfindingsupportsanapproachthattakesthesynapse,ratherthantheneuron,tobethebasicunitofneuralcomputation(Shepherd1990a).
Currently,networkmodelsvarywidelyinneuralrealism.Theconnectionistmodelsdiscussedinthisbookfallattheabstractendofthespectrum.
Inspiteofattemptstomakethemmoreneurobiologicallyrealistic,modelsalwaysfailtoincorporatesomerelevantdetailsofactualneuralnetworksandrestonsome
assumptionsthatarenotfullysupportedbyevidence.Limitationsonneuralrealismarepartlyamatteroftheneedforbetterempiricalinformationandpartlyamatter
ofthedifficultiesofsimulatingmodelsoncomputers.Amoreimportantfactor,however,isthebeliefthatinsomecasesasimplemodelwillyieldgreaterscientific
insightthanamorecomplexonebecauseitshowsclearlyhowsomefeaturesofthebraincontributetoaparticularfunction.Inthequesttounderstandthebrainatthe
physiologicallevelofanalysis,thekeyissueconcerninganyparticulartypeofmodeliswhetheritsucceedsingivingusinsightsintoneuralcomputation.

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Abstractconnectionistmodelsareinfactyieldinginsightsintobrainfunction.Zipser(1990),forexample,trainedaconnectionistnetworktocomputethecorrect
spatialdirectionofanobjectusingthepatternofactivationontheretinaandthepositionoftheeyesasinputs.Visualsystemsmustcomputethisfunctionbecausean
objectataparticularpositioninspacecastsanimageontodifferentpartsoftheretinadependingonthedirectionofgaze.Thetruedirectionoftheobjectmustbe
recoveredbycombininginformationaboutretinalpositionwithinformationabouteyeposition.Thebackpropagationalgorithmwasusedtotrainanetworkconsisting
ofinputunitsthatencodedretinalandeyeposition,alayerofhiddenunits,andoutputunitsthatencodedtruespatialdirection.Theinputrepresentationswere
designedonthebasisofevidenceabouttheactualinputstothevisualcortex.Followingtraining,theresponsecharacteristicsofthehiddenunitsinthemodelclosely
resembledtheelectrophysiologicalbehaviorofparietalneuronsrecordedinmacaquemonkeys.Theseneuronsweresuspectedofbeinginvolvedincomputingvisual
location(ZipserandAndersen1988).Thisresultdemonstratedthatthepositioncomputationcanbeacquiredthroughexperience,anditshowedhowneuronswith
particularresponsepropertiesmightariseduringlearning.Issuesconcerningthebiologicalplausibilityofbackpropagationarelessimportantthantheymightinitially
appearinthisresearchbecauseanylearningalgorithmthatminimizeserrorinweightspace(seechapter2)willyieldthesameresult.Althoughthemodelisextremely
simpleandunrealisticinsomerespects,itsverysimplicitymakesforastrongerscientificresult.Zipserwasabletodetermineexactlywhichcharacteristicsofthemodel
producedhiddenunitswiththedesiredresponsecharacteristics.Severalotherresearchershavereportedsuccessesusingsimilarapproaches(AnastasioandRobinson
1989LehkyandSejnowski1988).
Apotentiallypowerfulfeatureofthisresearchistheuseoflearningalgorithmstodevelophypothesesaboutinternalneuralrepresentations.Experimentaltechniquesfor
recordingandinterpretingthepatternsofactivationamonglargesetsofneuronsareonlyjustbeginningtobedevelopedandarestillalongwayfromproviding
detailedinformationaboutrepresentationalstates.Itisdifficult,therefore,toconstructarepresentationaltheorydirectlyfromneurobiologicaldata.Ifdataisavailable
oninputandoutputrepresentations,however,amodelwithhiddenunitscanbesimulated,andtherepresentationsdevelopedbythehiddenunitscanbestudiedto
develophypothesesaboutwhattolookforinthebrain.
Thevisionofcooperativeinteractionamonglevelsofresearchmaybecomingclosertorealization.Empiricalresultsinneurobiologycanguidetheconstructionof
networkmodels,andtheresultsofmodelsimulationscanbeusedtoguidefurtherresearchonthebrain.
SuggestedReadings
TheBrain(Thompson1994)providesaveryreadableintroductiontoneuroscience.Therearemanygoodsourcesofinformationaboutbasicneuroanatomyand
neurophysiology:FundamentalNeuroanatomy(NautaandFeirtag1986)andSynapticOrganizationoftheBrain(Shepherd1990b)areamongthebest.InThe
ComputationalBrainChurchlandandSejnowski(1992)provideaconnectionistapproachtocomputationalneurosciencethatincludesdetaileddiscussionsofmany
neuroscientificdetails.TheManWhoMistookHisWifeforaHatandOtherClinicalTales(Sacks1985)isadelightfulintroductiontoclinicalneuropsychology.
FundamentalsofHumanNeuropsychology

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(KolbandWhishaw1990)isanexcellentreferencesource.Forareadableintroductiontoconnectionistmodeling,seeConnectionismandtheMind(Bechteland
Abrahamsen1991)foramoreadvancedreview,seeParallelDistributedProcessing,Vols.1and2(RumelhartandMcClelland1986McClellandandRumelhart
1986).
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Chapter8
Philosophy:FoundationsofCognitiveScience
8.1PhilosophyinCognitiveScience
Allsciencesusedtobebranchesofphilosophy.Ascienceisbornwhenitbreaksofffromphilosophyandbeginstobepursuedbyspecialists.Physics,biology,and
chemistryareallsciencesthatwereborninthiswayaratherlongtimeago,butallbeganasbranchesofphilosophy.Cognitivescience,andthedisciplinesit
comprisespsychology,linguistics,neuroscience,andcomputerscience(omitting,forthemoment,philosophyitself)areyoungsciences,eachhavingemergedfrom
philosophywithinthelasthundredyearsorso.Psychologywasbornasanindependentscienceinthelastfewdecadesofthenineteenthcentury.Neurosciencehadits
beginningsaroundthesametime,thoughitsrealdevelopmentintoapromisingtheoreticalenterpriseismuchmorerecent.Linguisticsasweknowittodaybeganto
emergeinthe1920sandisstillverymuchintheprocessofbecomingindependent,withcertainofitsproblems,particularlythosehavingtodowithlogicand
semantics,stillfallingasmuchinthedomainofphilosophyasinitsown.Computersciencehasexistedonlysinceabout1950(thoughitsrootsareprimarilyin
mathematics).
HistoricalBackground
Cognitivescience,thefusionofthesedisciplines,isyoungerstill,onlyseveraldecadesold.Soit,evenmorethanitscomponentdisciplines,isthoroughlyentwinedwith
itsphilosophicalroots.Theserootsaretobefoundintheseventeenthcentury,whenphilosophersbegantofindnewwaysofaddressingproblemsaboutthenatureof
thoughtandthemind.Debatesbeganabouttherelationbetweenmindandbody,therelationbetweenlanguageandthought,therelationbetweenthoughtsor
perceptionsandtheobjectsthoughtaboutorperceived,whetherideasareinnateoracquired,andthenatureoftheembodimentofmind.Amidthisintellectual
ferment,twofiguresstandoutasgrandfathersofthecognitiveapproach:RenDescartesandThomasHobbes.
Descartesarguedthatallofourknowledgeoftheexternalworldismediatedbyrepresentationsmentalobjectsthatsomehowstandforthingsoutside.Thought,he
contended,alwaysinvolvesthemanipulation,throughinferenceorothermentalprocesses,oftheserepresentations.Thisisnotasobviousasitmightseematfirst.
Afterall,itcouldbe(andmanyhavearguedthatitisthecase)thatourknowledgeoftheworldconsistsmerelyofourbeingabletodocertainthingsandthatitinno
wayinvolvesmanipulatinginternalsymbols(whethertheyaremadeofimmaterialsoulstuffasDescartesthought,orofgraymatter,orofsilicon).Onenaturalwayto
thinkabouttheserepresentationsisthatadoptedbymanyofDescartes'scontemporariesasmentalimagesofwhattheyrepresent.Another,moreplausible,and
ultimatelymore

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influentialwayisassentences(orasremarksofsomekind)inaninternallanguageofthought,orperhapsinthenativelanguageofthespeaker.Whatmakesthe
contentionthatthoughtisrepresentationalsointerestingaretheimplicationsDescartessawinthisposition,implicationsthathavehelpedtoshapenotonlyall
subsequentphilosophicalthoughtaboutthemindbutcurrentcognitivescienceaswell.
ThefirstimplicationDescartesnoticedwasthattheserepresentationshavenonecessaryconnectiontothethingstheyrepresent.Ofcourse,fortunatelyforus(and,
Descartesthought,onlythroughthegoodgracesofthedeity),theytendtobearsomeconsistentrelationtothethingstheyrepresentandhencearefairlywellableto
servetheirfunctionofguidingouractivityintherealworld.But,Descartessuggested,eveniftherewerenoexternalworldatall,wecouldhavethesame
representationsthatwedonow(justas,thoughthereareinfactnounicorns,therearepicturesofunicorns,andjustas,thoughwehavepicturesandreportedsightings
ofyetis,wedon'tknowwhethertheseyetirepresentationscorrespondtoactualyetis).Ofcourse,wewouldbemistakeninthinkingthattheyrepresentedreality,but
theywouldbethesamementalstates.Theywouldfeelthesame,wouldinteractwitheachotherinthesameway,andwouldguidebehaviorinthesameway.(Of
course,whoistosaythatwearenotinthatstaterightnow?)Becauseoftheskepticalworrythatthispositionsometimesraises,letusfornowcallDescartes'sinsight
representationalskepticism.
ThesecondinterestingimplicationofDescartes'sviewisthatonecanstudythemindwithoutpayinganyattentionatalltotherealityitpurportstorepresentandthink
about.Afterall,onthisview,sincewhatwearestudyingisjustthenatureandinterrelationsofsymbolsandprocessesgoingoninsideamind,andsincethosesymbols
andprocesseswouldbewhattheyareevenifnothingbutthatmindexisted,whybotherpayingattentiontoanythingbutthosesymbolsandprocessesthemselves?The
suggestionisnotthatnothingotherthanthemindinfactexistsaviewcalledsolipsismbutratherthatifwestudythemindasifsolipsismweretrue,wecansay
everythingscientificallyinterestingthatwewouldeverwanttosayaboutit.Forthisreason,theviewiscalledmethodologicalsolipsism.(Formorediscussionof
methodologicalsolipsism,seePutnam1975borFodor1981,chap.3.)
ThethirdinterestinginferencethatDescartesdrewfromhisrepresentationaltheoryofmindisthatmindandbodyaretwocompletelydifferentkindsofthing.This
view,forwhichDescartesisperhapsbestknown,isusuallycalledCartesiandualism.Mostoftendualismisinterpretedasthebeliefinaghostlysoulstuffpermeating
ourbodiesinsomemysterious(nonspatial)wayandrunningthemforus.ThisisprobablyroughlyhowDescartesthoughtofit.ButwecanthinkofCartesiandualism
inaslightlymoresophisticatedlight:mentalthings,likebeliefs,images,andthoughts,arewhattheyarebecauseofwhattheyrepresent.This,afterall,isthecentral
insightoftherepresentationaltheoryofthemind.Now,theyrepresentwhattheyrepresentbecauseofhowtheybehaveinthemind(afterall,wejustsawthatitcan't
bebecauseofanyrelationtheybeartotheexternalworld).Thepointisthatverydifferentkindsofthings(brainstates,statesofcomputers,inkmarksonpaper,
sounds)couldallrepresentthesamething.Forinstance,considerthesituationdepictedinfigure8.1.
ThefigureshowsJohn,John'sname(John),theimageofJohninBill'shead,Bill'sthoughtaboutJohn,thesoundsBillmakeswhenhecallsJohn,Bill'spictureofJohn
(inwhateverstyleBillisworkinginthesedays),andamagneticrecordof'John'inacomputer.ExceptforJohn,eachofthesethingsisarepresentationofJohn.But
theserepresentationshavenothingwhateverincommonphysically.Whatmakesthem

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Figure8.1
JohnandsomerepresentationsofJohn

aboutJohnmustthereforebe,amodemdayCartesiancanreason,somethingnonphysical.Hence,whatmakesarepresentationtherepresentationthatitis,thislineof
reasoningcontinues,issomenonphysicalfactaboutit.Mentalobjects,consideredasmental,arethereforenonphysicalkindsofthings.Thisisnottosaythat
representationsarenotalsophysicalthings.Afterall,theimageinBill'shead,thepainting,thenametag,thesounds,andthecomputerrecordareallphysical,butthe
kindofthingtheyallarearepresentationofJohnisanonphysicalkindofthing.
Thesethreecentraltenetsoftherepresentationaltheoryofmindrepresentationalskepticism,methodologicalsolipsism,andCartesiandualismhavebeenextremely
influentialinthehistoryofthoughtaboutthemind.Allthreetenetsarerepresentedtosomedegreeincontemporarycognitivescience.TheyareDescartes'slegacy.
HobbesintroducedonetwistonDescartes'sviewthatisinterestingforourpurposes.(DonotbemisledHobbesandDescarteshadverydifferentviewsofthemind
anddifferedfromoneanotherradicallyonmanypoints,butthisparticularoneofHobbes'sinsightscanusefullybegraftedontotheCartesiantheorywehavejust
outlinedtoyieldanintriguingpicture.)Hobbessuggestedthat''allreasoningisbutreckoning.''Bythishemeantthatthoughtcanbeunderstoodasakindofcalculation,
perhapsoftenunconscious,usingformaloperationsonsymbolsstoredinthemind.WithHobbes'sdictuminmind,wecanseethecompletionofDescartes'smodelof
mindasaprototypeforcontemporarycognitivescience.Notonlyareourmentalstatesandprocessestobeconceivedofasformingasortofautonomous
representationalsysteminfact,theyarealltobethoughtofasinsomesensemathematical(oratleastlinguisticbutatanyrate,insomesenseformal)objects,at
leastatsomelevelofdescription,andtheoperationsourmindsperformonthemwhenwethinkaretobeconceivedofascomputations.Again,notethatthis
elaborationisneitherobviousnorinanysensenecessarilytrue.Itcouldwellbe(asmanycurrentconnectionistsmaintain)thatalthoughwerepresenttheworld,our
representationsarenotinanyappropriatesensedistinctformalobjectsthemselves.Thesefruitsofseventeenthcenturyphilosophycontaintheseedsofcontemporary
cognitivescience.

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OverthenextthreehundredyearstheCartesianapproachtothephilosophyofmindwentinandoutoffashionandwasrefinedandblendedwithotherapproaches.
Attheendofthenineteenthcenturyphilosophygavebirthtopsychology.Thatfirstpsychology,sometimescalledintrospectionism,wasveryCartesianinits
orientation,butitsoongavewaytobehaviorism,adecidedlyantiCartesianschoolofpsychology.Then,intheearly1950s,aremarkabledevelopmentoccurred.
Behaviorismbegantogivewaytocognitivepsychology,abrandofpsychologythattakesseriouslythecomputationalversionoftherepresentationaltheoryofmind.
(Thoughthereasonsforthisdevelopmentinpsychologyaremanyandcomplex,onecansaywithsomejusticeaswewillseeshortlythatthereasonsforthedemise
ofbehaviorismandtheriseofcognitivepsychologyhadtodowiththedifficultiesbehavioristshadinextendingtheirrathersimplemodelsofhabitformationand
learningtotheoriesofcomplexbehavior,reasoning,memory,problemsolving,languageacquisition,andthelikeexactlythethingsDescartesandHobbesfound
mostinteresting.Thepatternsoffailuresuggestedthattheoriesofaverydifferentkinddescribinginternalrepresentationalstructuresindetail(orperhapsbrain
processes)wouldbenecessarytoaccountforthisrangeofphenomena.)AtthesametimephilosophybegantoswingbackintheCartesianHobbesiandirection,
linguistics(inChomsky'sveryCartesianform)begantoemergeasanexcitingscience,andcomputerscienceemergedasafullfledgeddiscipline.Motivatedbythat
sameCartesianHobbesianvisionofthemindasacalculatingdeviceoperatingonrepresentations,computerscientistsbeganthequestforartificialintelligence.
Cognitivesciencewasconceived.
TheRoleofPhilosophy
Clearly,philosophyhasplayedanimportantroleinthehistoryofcognitivescienceandinthehistoryoftheideasitembodies.Thephilosopheralsohasaplaceinthe
ongoingpracticeofcognitivescience.Philosophyisafoundationaldiscipline.Notonlydoesitdothespadeworkthatmakestheconstructionofotherdisciplines
possibleitalsopaysconstantattentiontothefoundationsofthosedisciplinesastheyarepracticed.Philosophersassistscientistsindefiningtheirenterpriseandin
clarifyingwhattheyarestudying,whattheirmethodsoughttobe,andwhatrelationsholdbetweentheentitiesstudiedbythevariousdisciplines.Thisfunctionis
particularlyimportantinanew,interdisciplinaryenterpriselikecognitivescience,inwhichtheentitiesbeingstudiedabstractmentalandcomputationalprocesses
areoftendifficulttopindownandinwhichpractitionersofdifferentdisciplinesareworkingonrelatedproblemsinratherdifferentways.Thephilosopherhelpsthese
collaboratorstoformulatetheirproblemsandmodelsandtothinkmoreclearlyaboutthenatureandstructureoftheobjectsandprocessesunderdiscussion.
Philosophershaveworriedaboutthesequestionsaboutthemindandlanguageforafewmillennia,and,ifnothingelse,theyknowwhereitiseasytogetmuddled.We
candistinguishthreeareasofphilosophicalcontribution:definingtheenterpriseandgettingasynopticviewofit(philosophyofscience)concerningitselfwiththe
natureoftheabstractstructuresbeingstudiedbycognitivescience,andtheirrelationtomoreconcretethings(metaphysics)andthinkingabouttheinterrelations
betweenrepresentations,andhowthemindorganizesandusesthemtogenerateknowledge(epistemology).
Inthefollowingsectionsofthischapterwewillapplyallofthesephilosophicalcontributions:wewillattempttogainasynopticviewoftheenterpriseofcognitive
science,considerontologicalquestionsthatitraises,discussknowledge(howitis

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representedinthemindandhow,ifatall,itcouldberepresentedinamachine),andexplorethecurrentstateofthefield.
8.2TheEnterpriseofCognitiveScience
Behaviorism
Thefirstfiftyyearsofthiscenturysawthestudyoftheminddominatedbyaschoolofpsychologicalthoughtknownasbehaviorism,ledbyI.P.Pavlov,John
Watson,EdwardChaceTolman,ClarkHull,andB.F.Skinner.Behaviorismaroseasareactionagainstintrospectionism.Theintrospectionistsstudiedthecontents
andstructureofconsciousnessbyhavingcarefullytrainedsubjectsintrospect,thatis,"lookinside"theirmindsandreportwhattheyobserved,undercarefully
controlledconditionsandwhileperformingparticularcognitivetasks.Introspectionistpsychologyfailedlargelybecauseofthefallibilityofintrospection,whichwas,
afterall,itsprincipalinstrument.Butthefeaturesofintrospectionistpsychologymostdirectlyresponsibleforitscollapsewerethetremendousdisagreementsover
fundamentaldatabetweendifferentlaboratoriesandthelackofanyunified,testabletheorytoexplainthesedata.
Thebehavioristsarguedthattheproblemlayinthesubjectivityoftheintrospectionistmethod.Theycontrastedthismethod,whosedatacouldbedirectlyobserved
onlybythesubjectandcouldnotbeindependentlyverified,withthemethodsofthephysicalandbiologicalsciences,wheredataarealwayspublicandtherefore
independentlyobservable,orobjective.Somebehavioristcriticswentsofarastosuggestthattheveryphenomenatheintrospectionistsclaimedtobestudyingthe
mind,consciousness,attention,andcognitiveprocesses,amongotherscouldnotevenbeshowntoexistandwerethereforenotproperobjectsofscientificinquiryat
all.Thebehavioristsproposedtoreplaceintrospectionismwithanobjectivescienceofbehaviormodeledonthemoresuccessfulphysicalsciences.
Behaviorismwasnotconfinedtopsychology.PhilosopherssuchasGilbertRyle,LudwigWittgenstein,RudolphCamap,OttoNeurath,andMoritzSchlickarguedthat
iftheyweretobeatallusefultoascienceofpsychology,suchmentalistictermsasthought,belief,mind,andconsciousnesshadtoberedefinedintermsof,or
replacedwith,moreobjectivetermsthatreferredonlytopubliclyobservablemovementsoftheorganismortoeventsinitsenvironment.
Thebehavioristsattemptedtodiscoverscientificlaws,thatis,universalgeneralizationsthatwoulddescribe,predict,andexplaintherelationsbetweenthestimuli
organismsencounteredintheirenvironmentandtheresponses,ormovements,theyproducedinthepresenceofthosestimuli.Theprincipalareainvestigatedbythe
behavioristswaslearning.Lawsweresought,forinstance,thatwouldpredicttherateatwhichratswouldpressbarswhentheyreceivedfoodrewardsonavariable
ratherthanafixedschedule.
Asanapproachtoexplainingsimplesortsofbehavior,particularlyofcognitivelysimpleanimalsincarefullyrestrictedsituations,behaviorismwasrathersuccessful.But
whenthebehavioristsattemptedtounderstandmorecomplexbehavior,theyencountereddifficulties.Itbecameapparentthattheresimplyarenogoodwaysto
describeverycomplexbehaviorsuchasspeechthatallowtheformulationofexplanatorylaws.Forexample,trytodevelopageneralizationthatenablesyoutopredict
underwhatcircumstancessomeonewilluseanadverb,justasaphysicistcanpredicttheorbitofa

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planet.Moreover,muchbehavior(again,linguisticbehaviorprovidesanexcellentexample)doesnotseemtobeunderthedirect,lawlikecontroleitherofstimuliinthe
environmentorofpastreinforcementorpunishmenthistories.Rather,itseemstobegeneratedbycomplexcognitivestructures,includingthoseresponsibleforthe
thoughtbeingexpressedandsuchstructuresasthegrammarsstudiedbylinguists.
Behaviorismclaimedthatallmentalistictermscanberedefinedintermsofobservable,physicallydescribablebehavior.Butconsideranymentalistictermsay,
"thinkingthatthequeenofEnglandistherichestwomanintheworld."Abehavioraldefinitionofthattermmightrunlikethis:"'ThinkingthatthequeenofEnglandisthe
richestwomanintheworld'=df(abbreviationfor"isbydefinition")beingdisposedtosaythingslike'ThequeenofEnglandistherichestwomanintheworld'
beingdisposedtoanswerthequestion'Whoistherichestwomanintheworld?'with'ThequeenofEngland,ofcourse'andsoon.''(Definitionslikethis,with
manyvariations,havebeensuggestedbydefendersofvariousversionsofbehaviorism.)
Butsuchdefinitionscannotwork,forseveralreasons.First,theandsoonattheendofthedefinitionisnotjustanabbreviationforalotofdispositionsthatwearejust
toolazytospecify.Thenumberofdispositionsnecessarytofilloutsuchadefinitionisboundless,andevenifendlessdefinitionsmakesense,theyarecertainlyoflittle
usetoascientificdiscipline.
Second,manythingsthatdonothavetherequisitebeliefsnonethelesshavethenameddispositionsforexample,thetaperecorderwiththetapeloopthatendlessly
plays"ThequeenofEnglandistherichestwomanintheworld."
Third,thereisthecaseofthingsthatdohavethebeliefinquestionbutlackanyofthesupposedlydefiningbehavioraldispositions.Supposeyouarebeingtorturedby
theRenganesesecretpolice,whowanttoknowwhotherichestwomanintheworldissothattheycankidnapher,holdherforransom,andsolvetheirnationaldebt
problems.Youknowtheanswer.Butdoyouhavethedispositiontoanswertheirquestionscorrectly?Certainlynot!(Andassumingyoudidcrackundertorture,fora
diehardbehaviorist,youranswercouldbeofnousetoyourcaptors.Althoughtheirinterpretermightcometosaythingslike"ThequeenofEnglandistherichest
womanintheworld,"theRenganesesecretpolicespeakonlyRenganese.Sotheywouldonlycometosaythingslike"HoyapataEnglaterrinyoolchenmikya"
whichisadifferentthingtosayandhencebespeaksadifferentbelief,onthestandardbehavioristaccount.)
Fourth,abehavioristmighttrytorescuetheaccountbysayingthatthedispositionsaredispositionstosaythingsonlywhenaspeakerwantstoevidencethebelief,or
whenthespeakerbelievesthatnoharmwillresult,orsomesuchthing,andthatnotonlyEnglishwordscount,butsodoanytranslationsofthem,thatis,anywords
thatmeanthesamething.Butbothoftheseattempts,thoughperhapstheonlyhopeforsavingthetheory,leaddownthegardenpathtocircularity.Thegoalof
behaviorismwastodefinementalistictermsusingonlybehavioralterms,butthisstrategyforrescuingfaileddefinitionsreliesuponusingmentalistictermsthemselvesto
defineothermentalisticterms.Thus,behaviorismappearstosuccumbnotonlytoempiricaldifficulties,buttoconceptualconfusionaswell.
Thefailureofbehaviorismprovidedonemotivationforadoptingthecognitiveapproach.Behaviorism'sdifficultiesmadeitclearthatinordertoreallyunderstand
complexcognitivecapacities,itisnecessarytolookinsidetheorganismtopayattentionnotonlytothestimuliimpingingupontheorganismanditsresponsestothem
(thoughthesearecertainlyimportant)butalsototheinternalprocessesthat

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mediatebetweenperceptionandaction.Butwhatwaslackinguntilrecently,whencomputersciencedeveloped,wasasuitablemodelfortheinternalprocessingthat
couldsupportsuchbehavior.
TheComputerandCognitiveScience
Thenecessarymodelforinternalprocessingwassuppliedbythedigitalcomputer.Computerscienceshowedcognitivescientiststhatitwaspossibletoexplainthe
intelligentbehaviorofacomplexsystemwithoutpresupposingtheintelligenceofitscomponentsbyemployingtheideaofaninformationprocessingsystemandthe
computationalmodelofexplanation.Thismodelalsodemonstratedthepossibilityofanalyzingmeaningintermsoffunctionallyinterpretedstatesofphysicalsystems
(whatNewellandSimon(1976)havecalledtheideaofaphysicalsymbolsystemintroducedinchapter2).Finally,allofthissuggestedamodeloftherelation
betweenmindandbodythatisrespectablyphysicalistic,inthatitdoesnotpositadualismofsubstance,butthatavoidsthepitfallsofbehaviorismanddoesnot
involvereducingthementaltothephysical.Letusfirstseehowthedigitalcomputergivesrisetoeachoftheseideas,andthenturntotheirrealizationintheenterprise
ofcognitivescience.
Formanyyears,especiallyintheheydayofbehaviorism,itwasthoughtthattherewereonlytwowaystoexplainintelligentbehavior:physicalisticallyormentalistically.
Mentalisticexplanationsoperatedbyreferencetothe"internalworkingsofthemind"or,asRyle(1949)calledit,the"ghostinthemachine."Suchexplanationswere
lookeduponwithdisfavorbecauseitwasargued(byRyle,amongothers)thatanymentalisticexplanationcouldonly"explain"intelligencebyappealingtostructuresor
processesthatwerethemselvesintelligent.
Asanexample,considerahypotheticaldebatebetweenyourself,asacognitivescientist,andaphilosopherofRyle'sschool.Youwanttoexplainyourabilitytocome
upwithexamplesinadiscussionofphilosophyofmindbyappealingtointernalprocesses."Well,"thephilosophermightsay,"comeupwithsomeplausiblecandidate
processes(notnecessarilyallofthedetails)."Youmightreply,"Thereisaprocessthatselectsimportantfeaturesofthetopicunderdiscussion,anda'librarianprocess'
thatchecksmymemorystoreofphilosophicalexamplesforexamplesthathavesomeofthosefeatures,anda'patternmatcher'thatfindstheclosestonetowhatI
need,andan'augmenter'thatfixesupthedetailsjustright."
Withonlythismuchinhand,thephilosophercanargue,"Theseinternalprocessesareallwellandgood,buteachmustbeappliedintelligently.Ifthe'featureselector'is
todoanygood,itmustselecttherightfeaturesifthe'librarian'istodoitsjobwellitmustselectthebestexamplesandsoforth.Andallofthesetasksrequire
intelligence.Therefore,yourexplanationofyourabilityrequiresustoexplaintheintelligenceofyoursubsystems,andwearebackwherewestarted,onlywithmore
problems.Somuchforghostsinmachines."
Theadventofdigitalcomputershasprovidedamodelofexplanationthatsuggestsareplytothisargument(whichwemaycallRyle'sregress).Imaginehowwe
explaintheabilityofacomputertodothethingsitdoes.Wepositsubprocessestoexplaintheactionsofprocesses,subsubprocessestoexplaintheactionsof
subprocesses,andsoon,untilwereachthelevelofelementaryinformationprocesses.Althoughtheactionofthewholeprogrammayappeartorequirebrilliance
(especiallyifitreliablygeneratesgoodphilosophicalexamples),theprocessesintowhichitdecomposesatthefirstlevel(the"main"subroutines)requireonlymoderate
brightness.Aswegodown

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throughthelevelsofdecompositionintheexplanation,thesparkofintelligencerequiredfortheprocessesateachlevelgraduallydims,untilwereachthemachine
languageinstructions,whichareeasytoimplementmechanically.Theghostisexorcizedbygraduallyreducingittosimpleformaloperationsasweelaboratethe
explanation.
Fromtheideaofaninformationprocessingsystemitisbutashortsteptotheideaofaphysicalsymbolsystem.Wewillmakebothoftheseconceptsmuchmore
preciselater,butfornownotethatwhatacomputerdoesisprocesssymbols.Symbolsalwayshaveadualnature.Ontheonehand,theyarephysicalthings(likethe
inkonthispage,ortheelectricalimpulsesandmagneticrecordsinthecomputer)ontheotherhand,theystandforthingsotherthanthemselves.Thecomputer
processesthesesymbolsaccordingtorules,andthemeaningsofthesymbolsaretiedupwiththeserules.Butthecomputerdoesnotneedto"know"themeaningsof
thesymbols.Itperformsitsoperationsonsymbolsbymeansofproceduresthatdependonlyupontheirphysicalcharacteristics.Thetrick,ofcourse,istogetthe
physicalandmeaningful(orsemantic)characteristicsofthesymbols,therules,andthemachineemployingthemtomatchupintherightway.Thisistheessenceofan
informationprocessingsystem:thatitencodesinformationabouttheworld,operatesonthatinformationinsomewaythatcanbecharacterizedasmeaningful,andis
structuredasasetoffunctionallyorganized,interactingparts.Thedigitalcomputerisaperfectexampleoftheseideas,andithasprovideddramaticevidencethat
intelligentperformancecanbetheproductofaphysicalsymbolsystem.
Thefinaliteminourcatalogueofideasgiventocognitivesciencebythedigitalcomputerisanaccountoftherelationbetweenmindandbodythatisneither
objectionablydualistic(asinanaiveCartesiantheoryofmind)norobjectionablyreductionistic(asinanaivebehavioristtheoryofmind).Theidea,knownas
functionalism,isthatmentalstates,suchasbeliefs,andmentalprocesses,suchasconsideringordeciding,arenothingbutphysicalstatesdescribedfunctionally.The
samephysicalstateindifferentlyorganizedsystemsmightyielddifferentmentalstatesthesamementalstatemightberealizedverydifferentlyindifferentphysical
systems.
Thisisthecasewithcomputers.Whenasmallpersonalcomputerandthelargestsupercomputerperformthesamecomputation,theyhavelittleincommonfroma
physicalstandpoint,thoughfunctionallytheymaybeidentical.Similarly,acomputerperformingaparticularcomputationusingaparticularmachinelanguagesubroutine
mayinoneprogrambedecidingonachessmove(ifthatsubroutineinthatcontextisa"positionevaluator"),anditmayinanotherprogrambedecidingwhethertobuy
porkbellies(ifinthatcontextitisan"expectedgainestimator").Thelowlevelcomputationalstates(andso,perhaps,thephysicalstates)arethesame,butthehigh
levelfunctionalinterpretationstheyreceiveareradicallydifferent.
Thisfactaboutcomputerscertainlysuggestsanintriguingquestion:Mightthesamebetruewithhumanminds?Ourpsychologicalstatesmightnotbereducibletoour
physicalstates,sincedifferentphysicalstatesmightbecorrelatedwiththesamepsychologicalstate,andviceversa.Butthisdoesnotentailadualismofsubstance.
Eachparticular(ortoken)psychologicalstateissomeparticularphysicalstate(aviewknownastokenidentitytheory),butnotypeofpsychologicalstateisatype
ofphysicalstate,andviceversa.Thismeansthatthereneedbenomysteryaboutwhatkindofthinganyparticularpsychologicalstateorprocessisitissome
particularphysicalstateorprocessbutweneednotbecommittedtotheviewthatwheneverthatphysicalstateorprocessoccursinaperson,thesame
psychologicalstateorprocessisoccurringinthatperson,orviceversa.

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Thesearethewaysinwhichthedigitalcomputerfacilitatedthetransitionfrombehaviorismtocognitivescience.Letusnowturntothequestionsthecognitivescientist
asksofthephilosopherofscience.Whatiscognitivescience'scharacteristicmethodofasking,attacking,andansweringquestions?Howexactlydoesitconceiveof
themind?Webeginwiththeideaofaninformationprocessingsystem.
InformationProcessingSystems
Whatisaninformationprocessingsystem?Thisquestiongoesrighttotheheartofthestructureofcognitivescience,sincemorethananythingelse,theviewofthe
mindasaninformationprocessingsystemiswhatcharacterizesandunifiesthefield.Wediscussedthegeneralconceptofaninformationprocessingsysteminchapters
1and2,andwewillintroduceotherbasicdistinctionshereinordertosetthestagefortherestofourdiscussion.
Thefirstdistinctionisbetweendigitalandanalogrepresentations.Althoughthedigitalcomputeristhedominanttechnologyinpresentdaycomputing,thereisanother
typeofelectroniccomputer,whichisbasedonanalogcomputation.Amundaneexamplewillillustratethecharacteristicsoftheseanalogcomputers.Mostpeoplebuy
thingsusingdigitalmonetarysystemsthatarerestrictedtofixeddenominations:dollarsandcents,poundsandshillings,andsoon.Butinsomeplacespeopleuse
analogmoneysystemsinwhichgoodsareexchangedforquantitiesofsomematerial,say,goldorsilver.Goldhasacertainadvantageoverdollarsandcents:thevalue
ofapieceofgoldisdirectlyproportionaltoitsweight,anintrinsicphysicalcharacteristic.Indigitalmoneysystems,suchastheU.S.system,nosuchsimple
relationshipholdsbetweenthevaluesofcoinsandbillsandanyoftheirphysicalproperties.Thatis,thereisnofunctionrelatingvaluetoweight,size,oranyotherbasic
physicalcharacteristic.Instead,foreachtypeofbillandcointhereisaratherarbitraryrelationbetweensomeclusterofphysicalcharacteristicsandaparticularfixed
value.Apennyisidentifiedbyasetofphysicalcharacteristics,butthereisnolawofphysicsthatwillallowustopredictthecharacteristicsofthenickelanddimefrom
thecharacteristicsofthepenny.Further,thiskindofarbitrarymappingrequiresthatsomecoinrepresentthesmallestvalueinthesystem.
Aniceconsequenceofthedirectphysicalrelationusedforgoldisthatitcanbeusedtorepresentcontinuousmonetaryvalues,becauseweightvariescontinuously.
Weight,andthereforegold,alsohasnominimumvalue(weareignoringquestionsthatariseattheatomicscale).Supposeyouhavesomeparticularlyworthless
object,say,anoutdatedtextbook,goodfornothingbutholdinguptablelegs.Supposeyouwanttosellittoaneighborwitharicketytablefor.7cents.Atransaction
indollarsandcentsisimpossible,butgoldmeetsyourrequirements.Ifgoldisworth$200anounce,then.0000035ouncesofgoldisexactlywhatyourneighbor
owesyouforthebook.Theanalogsystemappearstobemorenatural,precise,andflexible.
Thereisaproblem,however.Inanycomputationalsystemwenotonlyneedrepresentationswealsoneedtobeabletoprocessthem.Theapparentprecisionofthe
analogsystemdependsontheaccuracyofthedeviceusedtomeasuretherelevantphysicalquantity.Inordertomeasurethegoldneededtopurchaseyourbook,
yourneighbor'sscalewouldhavetobeaccuratetothetenmillionthofanounce.Thisproblemisnotrestrictedtoattemptstoweightinyamounts.Itariseswhenever
weneedprecisionthatexceedsthecapacityofthescale.Ifthescaleisaccuratetothehundrethofanounce,thenitsrangeoferrorat$200perounceis$2.Under
these

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conditionsdollarsandcentsaremoreaccurate(aslongastheeyesightofthepersonhandlingthemoneyisgoodenoughtodistinguishthecoins).
Analogsystemshaveadvantages.Theyhaveacertainsimplicityanddirectnessbecausemeaningfulvaluesaredirectlyrepresentedasphysicalquantities.
Straightforwardphysicalprocessesthatoperateonthephysicalqualitiescanthereforehaveanimmediateinterpretation.Continuousvaluescanberepresented.Also,
certaincomputationalproblemsthataresolvablebyanalogcomputationleadtounmanageablecombinatorialexplosionswhenapproacheddigitally.Anexampledue
toDreyfus(1979)illustratesthispoint.Supposeyouhaveamapofacomplicatedrailwaysystemlinkingallofthetownsinaregion,andyouwanttofigureoutthe
shortestroutebetweentwotowns.Youcouldwriteadigitalcomputerprogramtosolvetheproblem,butanyprogramyouwrotecouldbeshowntoconsumerapidly
increasingandfinallyimpracticalamountsoftimeasthenumberofcitiesservedbythesystemincreased.Instead,youcouldmakea"stringnetmap"ofthesystem,by
tyingpiecesofstringoflengthsproportionaltotheraillinkstogetherinsuchawaythatthepatternoflinksandtownsmatchesthepatternofstringpiecesandknots.
Thenyoucouldjustgraspthetwoknotsmatchingthetwotownsandpull.Thetautstringpathwouldrepresenttheshortestrailroute.
Analogsystemsalsohavedisadvantages.Theyalwayshaveamarginoferrordeterminedbytheaccuracyoftheirmeasuringdevices.Ifvaluesmustbeheldovertime,
orpassedalongfromprocesstoprocess,theerrorscanaccumulaterapidlyandrendertheoutputuseless.Becausemeaningfulvaluesandtransformationsaredirectly
representedbysimplecontinuousphysicalcharacteristicsandprocesses,analogsystemsalsotendtobeinflexiblespecialpurposedevices.Astringnetmapisnotthe
rightdevicetoscheduletrainsandkeeptrackofpassengerreservations,forexample.Thus,itisnotclearhowacomplexandflexiblesymbolsystemcouldbe
implementedonastrictlyanalogcomputer.
Theadvantageofthedigitalsystemisthatthereisnomarginoferror.Thequantitiesitrepresentsarealwaysprecise.Evenawornpennyandatorndollarbill
representonedollarandonecentexactly.Indigitalcomputerssymbolsarealsoassignedtophysicalvaluesinsuchawaythatperturbationsofphysicalqualitiesrarely
causeerror.Digitalcomputation,however,oftenseemsawkwardandunnaturalbecauseoftheindirectrelationshipbetweencomplexsymbolicstructuresandphysical
operations.
Severalfactorsdeterminewhatkindofsystemofrepresentationisappropriateforanyparticulartask.Oneimportantvariableisthekindofequipmentavailable.Ifyou
havegoodmintsandpoorscales,chooseadigitalmonetarysystemgivengoodscalesbutpoormints,ananalogsystemmightworkbetter.Anotherimportantvariable
isthenatureofthetasktobeaccomplished.
Aninformationprocessingsystemmayrepresentandencodeinformationineitheradigitalorananalogform.Ifitistooperatedigitally,usingsuchperfectlyprecise,
errorfree(andhenceinformationpreserving)operationsasarithmetic,linguistic,andlogicaloperations,theinformationmustbeencodeddigitally.Ifthesystemisto
operateanalogically,exploitingthespeedandfinegrainednatureofsuchanalogprocessesasrotation,expansion,orcontinuousamplification,therepresentationsit
employsmustbeanalogical.
Justwhich,ifany,humaninformationprocessesaredigital,andwhich,ifany,areanalog,isafascinatingphilosophicalandpsychologicalquestion.Thecontroversythat
mostoftenraisesthisquestionconcernstherealityofmentalimagery.Thedisputeis

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generallycouchedintheseterms:Areallmentalrepresentationslinguisticinform,oraresomepictorial,operatedonbyprocessesthatcanbecharacterizedwithterms
suchas"mentalrotation"or"scanningwiththe'mind'seye'"?Linguisticrepresentations,ofcourse,aredigital.Theunitsofrepresentationarethesetofphonemes,or
thelexiconofthelanguage,dependingonthelevelofanalysisonechooses.Theoperationsonthemaretheoperationsoflogic,arithmetic,andsyntax.Mentalimages,
however,areanalog.Theunitsofrepresentationare"pictures"in"mentalspace,"andtheirdimensionsvarycontinuously.Theoperationsonthemarealsodescribed
spatially,andarecontinuous.Whetherhumansusebothtypesofrepresentationinthinkingoronlyone(andifso,which)isanopenquestionincognitivescience.In
chapter2wediscussedthetheorythatanintrinsicallygeometricimagerepresentationandassociatedprocessesarebuiltintohumanbiology(inadditiontothe
referencescitedthere,agoodphilosophicalsourceisBlock1980c).Accordingtosuchtheories,continuousquantitiessuchasspace,size,andangleofviewarebuilt
intoimagerepresentationandaretransformedbybuiltinoperationsforscanning,zooming,rotating,andsoon.Althoughanalogimagerytheorieshavebeenhotly
disputed,sometheoristsbelievethattheypointthewaytothediscoveryofanumberofspecialpurposeanalogsubsystemsinthehumanmind.
Researchonconnectionistnetworksprovidesanewcontextforthecontrastbetweenanaloganddigitalcomputation.Aswesawinchapter2,theconnection
weights,netinputs,andactivationvaluesinnetworkstypicallyvarycontinuously.Vectorsofactivationvaluesorweightscanoftenbeinterpretedaspointsin
multidimensionalspaces.Valuesarecomputednumericallyusingcontinuoustransformations,suchasthelogisticfunction.Suchfeaturessuggestthatconnectionist
networkscanbethoughtofasanalogcomputers.Ontheotherhand,theinputsandoutputsofconnectionistnetworksoftenarenotnumericalanalogsofphysical
quantities.TheXORnetworkdescribedinchapter2,forexample,learnstocomputeadigitalfunction,althoughitemploysananalogstyleofcomputation.Thus,the
senseinwhichconnectionismrepresentsanalternativetodigitalcomputationisanopenquestion.Laterwewillreturntotheissuesposedbycompetingcognitive
architectures.
Whetheraninformationprocessingsystemisdigitaloranalog,itisintentional."Intentionality"anditscognatesarephilosophers'termsforaboutness.Thethought
thatthefullmoonisbeautifulisintentional,becauseitisabout,orcontains,thefullmoon.Thewordsinthisbookarealsointentional:theyhavecontenttheyareabout
cognitivescience.Insofarastheinformationcontainedinandprocessedbyaninformationprocessingsystemisaboutanythingthatis,insofarasitfunctions
representationallythestatesandprocessesofthatsystemareintentional.
Justwhatittakesforasystemorastateofasystemtobeintentional,andjustwhatitistorepresentonethingratherthananother,aredifficultmatters.Asnotedin
chapter1,itseemsatleastnecessaryfortheretobeanisomorphism(samenessofstructure)betweentherepresentationalcomponentsofthesystemandthecontents
ofthoserepresentationsandprocesses.Ideally,therewouldbesomestructurepreservingmappingbetweenthecomponentsofthesystemthatdotherepresenting
andthethingsintheworld(oroutofit)thattheyrepresent.Thus,ifallpointersaresportingdogs,andallsportingdogsarecarnivorous,thenforaperson(ora
computerdatabase)torepresentthissetofrelations,astructuresuchasfigure8.2shouldbepresent.Theinformationrepresentedinsemanticnetsiscarriedbythe
structureofthenodesandlinks.Thereasonthatthisnetcanrepresenttheinformationitdoesisthattherelations

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Figure8.2
Doghierarchy

Figure8.3
Dinosaurhierarchy

betweenthenodesinthenetareisomorphictotherelationsbetweenthecorrespondingentitiesandclassesofentitiesintheworld.
Butthisrelationofisomorphismisnotsufficienttomakethenetaboutdogsandrelatedmatters.Considerthenetshowninfigure8.3.Thisnetisisomorphictotheone
representedinfigure8.2.Buteventhoughtheyareeachaboutsomething,theyarenotaboutthesamethings.Whatwouldcapturethisdifference?Oneansweristhat
thewaysinwhichthesenetshookupwithperceptionandactionwoulddiffer.Forinstance,the"dognet"wouldbeactivewhenthrowingsticksforGrete,andthe
"dinosaurnet"wouldbeactivewhenstrollingthroughthedinosaurexhibitofamuseum.Thepointisthatintentionalityrequiresnotonlyisomorphismbutalsosome
kindofappropriatecausalrelation(sometimescalledinputoutputrelations)totheworld.Notonlymusttherepresentationalstructuresinthemindormachinebe
isomorphictowhattheyrepresent,butsince,asourtwoexamplesshow,anymentalstructurewillbeisomorphictoahostofdifferentthings(andviceversa),a
representationalstructure,inordertorepresentsomestateofaffairs,musttypicallybetriggeredbythatstateofaffairs,orsomethinglikeit,andmusttypicallytrigger
behaviorappropriatetothatstateofaffairs,orsomethinglikeit.
Thesetwofeaturesofaninformationprocessingsystemmaynotbesufficientforittobeintentional.Manyphilosophersarguethatmoreisnecessaryaswell(Searle

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1980).Buttheyseemclearlynecessary,andtheyseematleasttobecentralfeaturesoftherepresentationalpowerofhumanandartificialinformationprocessing
systems.Reflectiononthenonsufficiencyofisomorphismforrepresentationraisesthepossibility,however,thatisomorphismmightnotevenbenecessaryfor
intentionality.Somecognitivescientistsreflectonthecapacityofconnectionistnetworkstoemploydistributedrepresentations.Theynotethatthereissometimesno
obviousfeatureoftheserepresentationsthatisisomorphictowhatisrepresented,andtheywouldarguethatintentionalityrequiresonlyreliablecausalrelationsof
particularkindsbetweenrepresentationalstatesandperception,action,andotherrepresentationalstates,andthatnofurtherisomorphismrequirementmustbe
attached.
Onefinalcharacteristicofinformationprocessingsystemsremainstobediscussed:theirmodularityonfunctionaldimensions.Thisisapointaboutwhatkindsof
partsthesesystemsdecomposeinto.Comparethreeobjects:ananvil,anautomobileengine,andastoryunderstandingcomputer.Inordertounderstandthe
''behavior"oftheanvilundervariousstressesorweatherconditions,wecansimplydecomposeitintoasetofadjacentregionsandinvestigatetheirbehavior.But
supposethatwetriedtoexplainhowanautomobileengineworksbydividingitexhaustivelyintoasetofadjacentoneinchcubesandthenexplaining(1)thebehavior
ofeachcubeand(2)theirinteractions.Imaginewhatsomeofthesepieceswouldcontain.Onemightincludepartofapiston,partofanintakevalve,someempty
space,andabitofthewallofacylinder.Anothermightincludeapieceofcarburetor,apieceofairfilter,andpartofawingnut.Manycubeswouldbelargelyempty.
Therewouldbenowaytoexplaintheoperationoftheenginetakingthissetofcubesasitsfundamentalparts.
Itwouldbemuchbettertodecomposetheengineintoits"natural"modules:thefuelsystem,theelectricalsystem,theignitionsystem,theexhaustsystem,andsoforth,
toexplainthebehaviorofeachofthesesystems(perhapsbydecomposingthemintotheirnaturalcomponents),andthentocharacterizetheinteractionsamongthese
systems.Theinterestingthingaboutthisstrategy(theonlyonecapableofprovidinganexplanation)isthatthecomponentsintowhichitdividestheenginewillin
generalberelatednotspatiallybutfunctionally.Theysubservethesameorrelatedfunctions,andthesefunctionsarehierarchicallyarranged:thefuelsystemdelivers
fueltothecylindersthecarburetor(acomponentofthefuelsystem)mixesthegasolineandairtheneedlevalveassemblycontrolstheamountofgasolineadmittedto
thecarburetorandsoforth.Thiskindofexplanationofhowsomethingworksiscalledasystematicexplanation(Haugeland1978).
Thiskindoffunctionalorganizationischaracteristicofinformationprocessingsystemsaswell.Theonlydifferenceisthatininformationprocessingsystems,unlike
automobileengines,thepartsofthesystem,theirfunctions,andthewaysinwhichtheyareinterconnectedarecharacterizedintentionally,thatis,byreferencetotheir
representationalproperties.Forinstance,achessplayingcomputerwoulddecomposenotintoadjacentoneinchcubes,butintosuchthingsasapositiondecoder,a
movegenerator,alookaheaddevice,atreepruningroutine,positionevaluationroutines,andsoforth.Eachofthesecomponentsischaracterizedfunctionally,rather
thanphysically.Indeedandthisisanimportantfeatureofinformationprocessingsystemsthereisasenseinwhichitdoesnotmatterwhatphysicalstuffthe
componentsaremadeofaslongastheygeneratetherightoutputforeachinput.Moreover,eachfunction,andhenceeachdevice,ischaracterizedintentionally.This,
then,istheessenceofaninformationprocessingsystem:asystemofrepresentationsandrepresentation

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manipulatorsthatdecomposesfunctionally,andwhosefunctionsandcomponentsarecharacterizedintentionally.Cognitivescienceistheattempttounderstandthe
mindasjustsuchasystem.
Laterinthischapterwewillturntosomeofthespecificphilosophicalproblemsthatarisefromthinkingofthemindasaninformationprocessingsystem(henceforth
IPS).Muchofthephilosophyofcognitivescienceistakenupwiththoseproblems.ButfirstweconsiderthegeneralstructuralfeaturesofIPSsmorecarefullytosee
whatitmeanstothinkaboutthinkingfromanIPSpointofview.
TheStructureofCognitiveScience
OnceweadoptanIPSviewofthemind,wethinkofcognitiveprocesses(deciding,planningmovement,retrievingamemory),cognitivestates(believingthatcognitive
scienceisfun,desiringacolddrink),constructingavisualperceptinresponsetolightimpingingonourretinas,orsolvingadifficultpuzzlelikeRubik'scubeas
manifestationsofacomplexsetofcomputationaloperationsonneurallyencodedsymbols,carriedoutbyacomplexIPS,ofwhoseoperationswearelargelyunaware.
Thosesymbolsrepresentnotonlythethingsaboutwhichweareconsciouslythinkingbutalsoahostofitemsusedinternallytothesystem,ofwhoseveryexistencewe
areunaware,suchastexturegradientsorstackheights.
Onthismodel,ourcognitivestatesourbeliefs,desires,moods,hopes,andfearsarestatesofthisIPS.Exactlywhatthismeansisamatterofsomedispute(see
section8.3).Buttheroughideaisthatjustasacomputer'smovingitspawntoking'sfouris,whencarefullyexamined,justaninformationalcharacterizationofa
particularphysicalstateofthatcomputer(voltagehighonsuchandsuchaline,andsoforth),yourmovingapawntoking'sfourisjustawayofinformationally
characterizingyourphysicalstate,includingperhapsthemovementofyourarm,aswellasthecurrentpatternofneuralfirings.Cognitivepsychologyattemptsto
elucidatethenatureoftheinformationprocessesthatmediatebetweenourneuralwetwareontheonehand,andourbeliefsandotherconsciousstatesontheother.
Thisapproachinvitesspeculationconcerningthemediuminwhichalloftheseinformationprocessesarerepresentedandcarriedout.Thephysicalsymbolsystem
hypothesis,developedinchapters1and2,identifiesinformationprocessingwithsymbolmanipulation,whichinvolvesstructuredrepresentationsandstructure
sensitiveoperations.Fodor(1975,1987)hasextendedthisviewtoarguethatthereisaninternallanguageofthought,innatelyspecified,bymeansofwhichallhumans
representtheworldtothemselves.Otherresearchers,inspiredbyconnectionistmodeling,arguethathumaninformationprocessingmightnotinvolve,properly
speaking,computationsoversymbolsatall,despitethefactthatitcanmimicsuchprocessing(Churchland1989Smolensky1988).Givenitscentralitytothought
aboutthenatureofmentalrepresentationandmentalprocesses,thisdebateovertheinternalmediumofthoughtwhetherthereisone,andifsowhatitishas
becomeincreasinglysalientinthefoundationsofcognitivescience.
UnderstandingtheIPSmodelofthemindmakesitclearjustwhyAIplayssuchacentralroleincognitivescience.Afterall,intheabsenceofsuchamodel,itwould
bestrangetolumpneuroscience,psychology,linguistics,andthephilosophyofmind,allseeminglyabouthumans,withAI,abranchofcomputerscience,seemingly
aboutmachines.ButifthemindisunderstoodasanIPS,asanabstractlycharacterizedformalstructureformanipulatingrepresentations,thenitwouldseemthatit(or
portionsofit)

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caninprinciplebeimplementedonadigitalcomputer.Consequently,bystudyingparticularprogramsrunningonmachines,AIcanbeseenasadomainfor
experimentingwithcognitivemodelsofthemindinordertodivinethestructureofhumanprograms.ThisenterprisewouldbeincoherentintheabsenceoftheIPS
modelofthemindbutisperfectlynaturalwithinthatmodel.
GiventheIPSviewpoint,thecognitivesciencedisciplinethatmightnotseemtofit(ifoneadoptsaclassical,asopposedtoaconnectionist,modelofthought)is
neuroscience.Althoughattimeswehavesaidthatinasenseitdoesn'tmatterwhathardware(orwetware)aprogramrunson,fromtheIPSviewpointthereisasense
inwhichitcanmakeagooddealofdifference.Achessplayingprogramonasupercomputermightalsorunonapersonalcomputeroronasetoffilingcards
manipulatedbythousandsofclerks.Itmightgenerateidenticaloutputforidenticalinputanddecomposeidenticallyineachoftheseimplementations.Butitwillrunat
verydifferentspeedsonthesedevices,takingmonthstogenerateeachmovewhenimplementedbyclerksandcards,minutesonapersonalcomputer,and
millisecondsonasupercomputer.Itmightbestillfasteronadedicatedchessmachine,acomputerdesignedsolelytoplaychess.Understandingjusthow,indetail,the
programisimplementedbythesevarioussystems,andwhataccountsfortheirperformancecharacteristics,wouldbeaninterestingtask.Thisisonemotivationfor
cognitiveneurosciencetofindouthowour"software"isimplementedonourwetware,andhowthisimplementationaffectsourcognitiveperformance.Furthermore,
thedesignofamachinedeterminesthatcertainprogramswillbemoreefficientthanothersonthatmachine.Asanexample,consideramachinewithafastadderanda
slowmultiplier(andsupposethatthesefunctionswererepresenteddirectlyonbitsofhardware).Thenitmightturnoutthatforcertainproblems,itwouldbefasterto
computeaproductbymeansofaseriesofadditionoperationsthanbyasinglemultiplicationoperation.Givendataabouthowfastanunknownprogramranonsucha
machine,andaknowledgeofitshardware,wemightbeabletogetsomeimportantcluesaboutthestructureoftheprogram.Similarly,ifneuroscientistscantellus
interestingthingsaboutthestrengthsandlimitationsofournervoussystems,fromaninformationprocessingstandpoint,this,togetherwithperformancedata,might
yieldvaluablecluesaboutthearchitectureoftheprogramswe"run."Finally,ofcourse,ifneurosciencecanprovidearadicallydifferentmodelofacomputingdevice
(forexample,aconnectionistmodel),wemightbeledtorethinktheverymodelofcomputationthatundergirdsthecomputationalmodelofmind.Somecognitive
scientists(forinstance,P.M.Churchland1984,1989P.S.Churchland1986)urgejustsuchaneurosciencebasedapproachtothestudyofmind.Rememberingthat
therearecurrentlymanyviableapproachesbothtocognitivescienceandtothephilosophyofmind,somecomputationalandsomenot,itisnowtimetoinvestigatethe
philosophicalproblemsraisedbyconceivingofthemindasaninformationprocessingdeviceofsomesort,andbyconceivingofaresearchprograminthisway.
8.3OntologicalIssues
Ontology
Theontologyofmindisthestudyofthenatureofpsychologicalstatesandprocessesandtheirrelationtophysicalstatesandprocesses.Wewillconsiderfourcentral
ontologicalproblemsraisedbycognitivescience.Thesearebynomeanstheonly

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interestingontologicalproblemsposedbythefield,buttheyareamongthemostfarreachingandintriguing.First,wewillconsiderwhathasbecomecognitive
science'sversionofthemindbodyproblem:theproblemofspecifyingthekindofrelationthatholdsbetweenpsychologicalandphysicaleventsinrepresentational
informationprocessingsystemssuchashumanbeingsandartificiallyintelligentcomputers.Second,wewillconsiderhowtointerpretinformationprocessingtheories
ofhumanintelligence.ArepsychologicalprocessesreallycarriedoutbythebraininsomekindofbiologicalanalogofLISPcode,oraretheprogramswrittenby
psychologistsandcomputerscientistsengagedincognitivesimulationmerelyusefulcalculationaldevicesforpredictingourbehavior?Third,wewillaskspecific
questionsaboutthenatureofcertainkindsofcontentfulpsychologicalstatessuchasbeliefs,desires,hopes,andfears.Fourth,wewillaskwhatkindofaccount
cognitivescienceshouldofferusofthefeltqualityofourinnerexperience.
Functionalism
ItisusefultobeginadiscussionoftherelationofpsychologicaltocomputationaltophysicalstateswithadiscussionofTuringmachines.ATuringmachineisasimple
kindofcomputingmachine.Itisusuallydescribedascomprisingatape(ofanylength),dividedintodiscretecells,uponeachofwhichasinglecharacteriswritten
(usuallya0ora1)aread/writemechanismcapableofreadingthecharacteronagivencellofthetape,writinganewcharacter,andmovingonecellineither
directionafinitelistofinternal''states"themachinecanbeinandamachinetableprescribingforeachpossiblemachinestate,andeachcharacterthatthe
machinemightscanwhileinthatstate,whatcharacteritshouldwriteonthetape,whichdirectionitshouldmoveafterwritingthatcharacter,andwhatstateitshould
shiftinto.ThesecomponentsoftheTuringmachinearedepictedschematicallyinfigure8.4.InthisfigurethemodelTuringmachineisinstate2,scanninga1,andso
willprint(thatis,inthiscase,leavealone)a1,moveleftonecell,andgointo(thatis,remainin)state2.

Figure8.4
DiagrammaticrepresentationofaTuringmachine

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Despiteitssimplicity,intermsofthetasksitcanaccomplish,theTuringmachineisthemostpowerfulcomputationaldevicepossible.Itisalmostcertainlytruethatany
computationalprocessthatcanbeperformedcanbeperformedbyaTuringmachine,anditiscertainlytruethatanycomputationthatcanbeperformedbyadigital
computercanbeperformedbyaTuringmachine.Infact,becauseoftheexistenceofasocalleduniversalTuringmachine,amachinethattakesacodedversionof
otherTuringmachinesasinputs,andthenemulatestheirbehavior,itisfurthertruethatthisonemachine,theuniversalmachine,itselfpossessesallofthecomputational
powerthatanycomputingmachinecanpossess.
HowareTuringmachinesrelevanttoanaccountoftherelationbetweenthemind'sinformationprocessingstatesandthebrain'sbiologicalstates?TheTuringmachine
hasgivencognitivescienceapersuasivemodelofwhatthisrelationmightbeandofwhatthenatureofmentalstatesmightbe.Thegenerictermforthetheories
inspiredbthismodel,whichareembodiedtosomeextentorotherbycognitivescience,isfunctionalism.Inthefollowingthreesectionswewilldistinguishseveral
differentvarietiesoffunctionalismandaskwhich,ifany,constituteplausibletheoriesofthenatureofmind.Thevarietiesoffunctionalismwewillconsideraremachine
functionalism,psychofunctionalism,andwhatwewillcallgenericfunctionalism.
MachineFunctionalismThesimplestTuringmachinemodeloftherelationofpsychologicaltobiologicalstatesisthatadoptedbymachinefunctionalism.The
machinefunctionalistnotesthattheTuringmachineisbothaphysicalsystemandanabstractcomputingdevice.Wheneveritisinaparticularphysicalstate,itisalsoin
aparticularmachinestate,anditisperformingsomeparticularcalculation(say,addingtwonumbersoremulatingsomeotherTuringmachine).Andthereisnogreat
mystery,no"mindbodyproblem,"abouthowthephysicalmachinemanagestobeatthesametimeacomputingmachinethatis,abouthowitsmachineor
computationalstatesarerelatedtoitsphysicalstates.Ifsomeoneweretoaskhowthismerelyphysicalmachinecouldpossiblybeperformingthe"mentaloperation"of
adding,wewouldsimplypointoutthateachmachinestateofthesystemjustisaphysicalstateofthesystemunderacomputationaldescription.
Machinefunctionalismassertsthatthesamemightbetrueofhumanbeings.Afterall,aTuringmachinecanrepresentanyinformationprocessingsystemhumans
instantiate.They,likeus,arefinite(thoughunbounded)physicalsystems.Hence,ifwearephysicallyinstantiatedinformationprocessingsystems,ascognitivescience
wouldhaveit,thenwearefunctionallyequivalenttosomeTuringmachine.SinceforaTuringmachinetobeinaparticularmachinestate(itsanalogofapsychological
state)isforittobeinaparticularfunctionallyinterpretedphysicalstate,itisoverwhelminglyplausibletoassertthatforus,tobeinaparticularpsychologicalstateisto
beinaparticularfunctionallyinterpretedphysicalstate(presumablyabiologicalstateofthecentralnervoussystem).Afterall,thislineofreasoningcontinues,aTuring
machinecanberealizedinanykindofphysicalmedium,includingbothmetalandneuralmatter.Itwouldseemthatinthecaseofhumans,then,neuralstatesaretobe
thoughtoffirstasmachinestatesandthenaspsychologicalstates.Onthisview,thetaskofcognitivescienceistouncoverthemachinetablethatcharacterizesthe
machinesthathumanbeingsinstantiate.(Fortheclassicexpositionofthisview,seePutnam1960.)
Machinefunctionalismcapturestheideathatwhatisessentialtothepsychologicalnatureofamentalprocessorstateisnotitsparticularphysicalrealization(though
this

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maybeimportantforvarioustheoreticalandpracticalreasons)butitscomputationalroleintheinformationprocessingsystem.Hence,itprovidesanaccountofhow
people,intelligentMartians,andsuitablyprogrammeddigitalcomputerscouldhavethesamepsychologicalstatesandprocesses,simplybyvirtueofinstantiating,albeit
invastlydifferentphysicalmedia,thesameTuringmachinetable.
PsychofunctionalismEventhisliberalviewofthelinkbetweenthephysicalandthepsychologicalnatureofinformationprocessingstatesmaybetoorestrictive,
however.OneessentialcomponentofaTuringmachineisitsfixedfinitelistofmachinestates.ButeventhoughthenumberofmachinestatesforanyTuringmachineis
finite,thenumberofpossiblecomputationsthatamachinecanperformis,ingeneral,infinite.Considerthefollowingexample.SupposethatwehaveaTuringmachine
capableonlyofperformingaddition.CallitA.EventhoughAmayhaveaverysimplemachinetable,involvingonlyafewstates,ifwechoosetocharacterizeA,not
byreferencetoitsmachinestates,butbyreferencetowhatwemightcallinsteaditscomputationalstates,wewillseethatAisinfactcapableofbeinginaninfinite
numberofstates.ForAmightbeadding2and3,oritmightbeadding666,666and994.Itmightbe"carrying2,"oritmightbe"writingtheanswer."Althougheach
ofthesecomputationalstatesisequivalenttosomesequenceofmachinestatesandtapesequences,noneisidentifiablewithanysinglestate,andbyvirtueofthe
unboundednessofthesetofpossiblesequencesofmachinestates,thereareinfinitelymanypossiblecomputationalstatesofA.
TheviewthathumanpsychologicalstatesaretohumansasaTuringmachine'scomputationalstatesaretotheTuringmachineisknownaspsychofunctionalism.Two
generaltypesofreasonsmotivatepsychofunctionalismasopposedtomachinefunctionalism.Thefirstconcernstheapparentunboundednessoftheclassofhuman
psychologicalstateswewouldlikeourtheoriestocopewiththesecondconcernsthecriteriawewouldadduceforascribingpsychologicalstatestohumansor
machines.Letusconsidertheseinturn.
SupposethathumanbeingsareTuringmachines.Thenhumanbeingshavefinitelymanypossiblemachinestates.Howmanybeliefscouldyou,asonehumanbeing,
possiblyhave?Notatonetime,ofcourse,orevenactuallyinonelifetimebuthowlargeisthelistofpossiblebeliefsthatyouarecapableofholding,byvirtueofyour
psychologicalmakeup?Couldyou,forinstance,believethat2isthesuccessorof1,that3isthesuccessorof2,andsoon,forallnaturalnumbers?Ifyouthinkthat
foranybeliefofthisform,youcouldformthatbeliefandholdit,thenyouthinkthatyoucouldholdinfinitelymanypossiblebeliefs.Andwehaven'tevengottenpastthe
mostelementaryarithmetic!Norhavewetouchedondesires,hopes,fears,andthemultitudeofsubconsciousprocessesnecessarytoacompletepsychology.
Considerationssuchasthesemotivatetheviewthatthenumberofpossiblepsychologicalstatesthatacompletecognitivesciencemustaccountforvastlyoutstripsthe
numberofmachinestatespossibleforanyTuringmachine(thoughanyTuringmachineofevensmallcomplexityiscapableofinfinitelymanycomputationalstates).Of
course,thisdoesnotimplythatthebrainmightbecapableofassuminginfinitelymanyphysicalstates.Quitethecontrary.Thepointisthatjustasamuchricher
descriptionofafiniteTuringmachineresultsfromtalkingaboutitscomputationalstatesthanfromtalkingaboutitsmachinestates(inthesensethattherearemany
moreoftheformerthanthelatter),soamuchricher(andhencepossiblypsychologicallymorefertile)descriptionofhumanbrains

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wouldresultfromtalkingabouttheircomputationalstatesthanfromtalkingabouttheirmachinestates.
Evenifbysomechancethereareonlyfinitelymanypsychologicalstatesinwhichhumansarecapableofbeing,therewouldbereasonstopreferthepsychofunctional
accountofpsychologicalstates.SupposewehavetwoTuringmachines,T1andT2.Bothareaddingmachines,andbotharemadeofthesamematerial.Butsuppose
thattheirmachinetablesandsetsofmachinestatesaredifferent.WhereasT1addsbysuccessivelyincrementingthefirstaddendby1thenumberoftimesspecifiedby
thesecondaddend,T2addsbyincrementingthesecondaddendby1thenumberoftimesspecifiedbythefirstaddend.Moreover,theyaccomplishtheirtasksusinga
differentsetofmachinestates.Now,itseemsfairtosaythatwhenthesetwomachinesareaddingapairofnumbers,theyare,inanimportantsense,doingthesame
thing.Ifwecountthemas"believing"anythingaboutthesumstheycompute,thenthey"agree"inalloftheir"beliefs,"eventhoughtheysharenomachinestates.Hence,
itseemsthatthecomputationallevelofdescriptionis,forsomepurposes,atleast,ausefuloneforthedescriptionofTuringmachines.Isthistrueforpeople?
Herethecaseseems,ifanything,clearer.Forevenifitseemsfarfetchedtoattributebeliefstomachines,oroddtothinkthatthecomputationallevelwouldbea
particularlyinterestinglevelofdescriptionforthem,itiscertainlytruethatamongthepsychologicallyinterestingfactsaboutpeoplearethethingswebelieve,fear,
doubt,andsoon.Andevenifweare,underneathoursurfacepsychology,Turingmachines,manydifferentTuringmachinescouldrealizethesesurfacestates.Further,
itseemsthatourcriteriaforattributingthesestatestoourselvesandeachotherhavenothingwhatevertodowithourviewsaboutthemachinetablesunderlyingour
cognitiveprocesses,butinsteadhavesomethingtodowiththerelationsthatthesestateshavetoothersuchstates,totheinputswereceivefromourenvironments,and
tothebehaviorweproduceinresponsetothem.Forinstance,ifyouaredisposedtosay,"Goatsarewonderful,"toarguevigorouslywiththosewhodoubtthevirtues
ofgoats,toactinanadmiringandfriendlywaytowardgoats,toinferfromthefactthatgoatsarenearbythatsomethingwonderfulisnearby,andsoon,thenothers
willfeelprettycomfortableinascribingtoyouthebeliefthatgoatsarewonderful.Andthisbelief,thoughitmaybesupportedbysomesetofyourmachinestates,tape
states,andsoforth,neednotbeidentifiedwithanyparticularmachinestate.Moreover,itcertainlyneednotbethecasethatthereissomemachinestatethatissuch
thatanyonewhosharesyourbeliefisinthatstate.Psychofunctionalistsarguethatpsychologicalstatesbeararelationtothoseholdingthemthatisanalogoustothe
relationthatcomputationalstatesbeartotheirTuringmachines,andthishasseemedamuchmoreliberal,andindeedmoreplausible,waytoapplytheTuringmachine
metaphortothetaskofunderstandingthenatureofmentalstates.
GenericFunctionalismAsliberalaspsychofunctionalismappearsinitsaccountofthepsychophysicalrelation,itispossibletodevelopanaccountthatisstillless
restrictive,yetstillrecognizablyfunctionalist.Inordertounderstandthisgenericfunctionalism,itisnecessarytostepbackfromtheTuringmachinemetaphorandto
considerwhatitisthatmakesanaccountfunctionalistinthefirstplace.Bothmachinefunctionalismandpsychofunctionalismdevelopthegeneralideaoffunctionalism
usingtheTuringmachineastheleadingidea.Butthatisreallynotanessentialfeatureofthefunctionalistapproach.Thekerneloftheapproachisreallyintheinsight
thatpsychological

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termssuchasbelief,desire,pain,memory,andperceptionneednotbeunderstoodassomekindofshorthandeitherforneurophysiologicaldescriptionsorfor
behavioraldescriptions.
Theclaimthatthesepsychologicaltermsstandforneurophysiologicaldescriptions(aviewcalledcentralstateidentitytheory,orCSIT)impliesthatwhensomeone
saysthatJohnrememberseatingvanillaicecreamandthatBilldoes,too,thenthatpersonisclaimingthatbyvirtueofsharingaparticularmemory,JohnandBillshare
aparticularbrainstate.Itwould,ofcourse,beanunfortunateconsequenceofthisviewthatonlybeingswhoareneurophysiologicallylikehumanbeingscanhave
psychologicalstates,therebyrulingoutinasingleaprioristrokethepossibilityofintelligent(orevensentient)Martiansorcomputers.Insomecasesitrulesoutthe
possibilityoftwopeoplesharinganystatesaswell.Suppose,forexample,thatJohnlostthelefthalfofhisbraininanautoaccidentatanearlyage,andBilllostthe
righthalfofhisinthesameaccidentfortunately,however,bothwereyoungenoughthattheyhavecompletelyrecoveredwithnolossoffunction,sothatdespitetheir
apparentlysimilarattitudetowardvanillaicecream,theyinfactsharenopsychologicalproperties.
Thinkingthatourpsychologicalvocabularyisasetofshorthandsforbehavioraldescriptionsis,ofcourse,behaviorism.Onthisview,toascribetobothMaryandSue
thedesireforapetunicornwouldbetoassertthattheyshareasetofbehavioraldispositions,includingthetendencytochaseandattempttocaptureanypassing
unicorns,tosaythingslike"IwishIhadapetunicorn,"tosearchthe"PetStore"sectionoftheYellowPagestirelesslyforastorecarryingunicorns,andsoforth.
Suppose,though,thatMaryissopainfullyunassertivethatsheneveropenlyexpresseswhatshewants,andmoreoverthatshehasneverheardoftheYellowPages
andsupposethatSueisabrashandcosmopolitanindividualwhomakesallherwishesknown.Onthebehavioristaccount,MaryandSuecouldnotpossiblysharethis
desire(orprobablyanyother,forthatmatter).Clearly,thebehavioralaccountisinadequate.
TheScyllaofCSIThasthismuchinitsfavor:itletsMaryandSueshareadesire,despitetheirpersonalitydifferences,andgivesafairlystraightforwardanswertoany
questionaboutthenatureofthepsychophysicalrelation.Unfortunately,itdeliversthewrongansweronJohnandBill,anditrulesoutintelligentMartiansand
computersaltogether.TheCharybdisofbehaviorismhasthisinitsfavor:itletsBillandJohnshareanattitude,despitetheirdifferentneurophysiologicalmakeup,by
virtueofbeingdisposedtosayanddothesamerelevantthings.ButitfailswhereMaryandSueareconcerned(andelsewhere,aswehaveseen).
Functionalismnavigatesthenarrowstraitbygivingeachsideitsdue.Thefunctionalistagreeswiththebehavioristthattheconnectionsbetweenpsychologicalstatesand
theorganism'sinputandoutputarecentraltothatstate'snature,andthatpsychologicalstatesareindependentofparticularphysicalrealizationsinparticularorganisms
ormachines.Butthefunctionalistalsoagreeswiththeidentitytheoristthatitisimportanttolookattheinsideoftheorganism,andtheinterrelationsofinternalstates,in
assigningpsychologicalpredicatestophysicalcorrelates.Thefunctionalistdiffersfrombothinsuggestingthattherightwaytounderstandthemindbodyrelationisvia
whatiscalledthetokenidentitytheory,thatis,thatparticular(ortoken)psychologicaleventsaretobeidentifiedwithtokenphysicalevents.Boththebehavioristand
theidentitytheoristsubscribetothestrongertypeidentitytheory,whichholdsthateachkind(ortype)ofpsychologicaleventistobeidentifiedwithatypeof

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physical(fortheidentitytheorist)orbehavioral(forthebehaviorist)event.Anditisthegreaterflexibilityofthetokenidentitypositionthatprovidesthecompassthat
guidesthepassage.
Wehavedigressedatthislengthbecauseitisimportanttogetapictureofthegeneralpositionstakedoutbyfunctionalisminordertoseethatalthoughthemodelsof
machinefunctionalismandpsychofunctionalisminspiredbyTuringmachinesmightbestrongversionsofthisview,theyarenottheonlypossibleversions.Generic
functionalistscandenythatparticularpsychologicalstatesaretobeidentifiedwithparticularcomputationalormachinestatesofsomeTuringmachineusedtomodel
themind,whileallowingthattokenpsychologicalstatesaretobeidentifiedwithtokenphysicalstatesunderoneoranotherschemeforidentification,withoutbeing
committedtotheparticularscheme.Genericfunctionalistswillagreewiththeirbrandnamecousinsthatwhateverthisschemeis,itmustpayattentiontothefunctional
rolethatthepsychologicalstateinquestionplaysinthesystembeingstudiedthatis,toitsrelationstoinputs,outputs,andotherinternalstates.Inshort,generic
functionalistsacceptallofthegeneraltenetsoffunctionalismwhilewithholdingcommitmenttoanyparticularversionofthemappingfromthepsychologicaltothe
physical.Thishastheadvantageof"lookingbeforeleaping"intheabsenceofconcreteevidenceforthestrongerclaimsofthebrandnameversionsandtherefore
appealstothoseofaconservativetemperamentbutithasthedisadvantageofnotsuggestingaparticularresearchprogramorlineofinvestigationfordeterminingjust
howtomappsychologicalstatesontophysicalstatesandthereforeisunappealingtothosewhowantaboldconjecturetotest.
Whethergenericfunctionalismiscompatiblewithradicalconnectionismisamatterofsomedebate.Inanetworkwithhiddenunitsanddistributedrepresentations,a
psychologicalstate,say,believingthatthequeenofEnglandistherichestwomanintheworld,wouldbestoredsomehowinthenetwork'ssetofconnectionweights.
Differentlearninghistoriesthatincludedtheacquisitionofthisbeliefwouldproducedifferentweights.Infact,itisquitepossiblethattwolearninghistorieswould
producedifferentvaluesforeverysingleweightinthenetwork.Nevertheless,itisconceivablethatsomefunctionalpropertyoftheweightvectormightbediscovered
thatisanecessaryandsufficientconditionforthepossessionofthebelief.Forexample,thepropertymightconcernthepropensityofthenetworktoproducecertain
patternofactivationoveritshiddenunitswhenthebeliefisrelevanttothecurrentsituation.Itispossible,then,thatonecouldbeagenericfunctionalistanda
connectionistatthesametime(thoughneitherofthestrongerversionsoffunctionalismwehaveconsideredwouldbeavailabletoaconnectionist).Ontheotherhand,
eitherwemightfailtodiscoveranysuchproperty,orwemightfindthatallthepropertiesthatseemtobecorrelatedwiththebeliefaretoodistributedandtemporally
unstabletoqualifyasthebeliefitself.Genericfunctionalismwouldseemtorequiredabelieftobeastable,internal,computationallydiscreteproperty,capableof
playingacausalroleincognition(Ramsey,Stich,andGaron1991).Finally,apropertyoftheweightsthatwewishtoidentifywiththebeliefmightsustainthat
interpretationonlyinthecontextofappropriateinputoutputrelationsandbyitselfdeservenospecialinterpretationatall(toanticipatetheconsiderationsinfavorof
naturalismtobediscussedbelow).Suchresultsmightleadtotheconclusionthatfunctionalismofanytypeandconnectionismareincompatibleandrepresentgenuine
alternativetoeachother.Anotheralternative,introducedinchapter2,istoarguethatanyplausibleconnectionistmodelofcognition

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willturnouttobeanimplementationofaclassicalmodel(FodorandPylyshyn1988).Thisdebatemaybewithusforsometime.
InterpretingtheTheoriesWehave,then,asketchofthewaysinwhichonecanthinkoftherelationbetweenthemindandbodyifoneadoptsthecomputational
viewofmindembodiedbycognitivescience.Buttherearedifferentwaystoadoptscientifictheories.Ontheonehand,onecouldadoptacognitivetheoryasliterally
trueandassertthattheprocessesandstructuresitpositsareactually"inthehead"(arealisticinterpretation).Ontheotherhand,onecouldjustsupposethatthe
theoriesmaketruepredictionsaboutsuchthingsasbehavior,reactiontimes,errorpatterns,andsoforth,butnotassertthatthestructurestheypositactuallyreflect
psychologicalreality(aninstrumentalistinterpretation).Beforeweexplorethesepositionsinanydetail,letusdigresssomewhat.Supposethatwe,ascognitive
scientists,areconfrontedwithachessplayingcomputer,playingtolerablygoodchess.Ourtaskistoofferatheoryexplaininghowthemachineworks,atheorythat
willenableusnotonlytounderstanditsplaybutalsotopredictaswellaspossiblewhatitsnextmovewillbeinparticularsituations.
Briefly,consideringdistinctionsdrawnearlier,therearethreegeneralstrategieswecouldadopt(describedinmoredetailinDennett1971).Wecoulddescribe
transistorbytransistor,wirebywire,andpixelbypixel,howthecurrentflowsthroughthemachine,howitisaffectedbythedepressingofkeys,andhowitresultsin
thechangeinluminosityofvariousregionsofthevideodisplay(thehardwarestrategy).OrwecouldabandonthatelectroHerculeantaskinfavorofdescribingline
byline,subroutinebysubroutine,theprogramthemachinerunsinordertoplaychess,explaininghowitencodesboardpositions,howitrepresentsthevaluesof
variousparameters,whatmathematicaloperationsareperformedontheseparameters,andsoforth(theprogramstrategy).Or,dismayedbythatprospectaswell
(quiteadauntingoneevenforaprofessionalprogrammer),wemightofferatheorysomethinglikethis:"Themachineevaluatesthecurrentposition,lookingforthreats
topieces,possibleforks,anddiscoveredchecks.Ittakescareofthosefirst.Thenitlooksaheadabouttwomoves,evaluatingeachpossiblepositionaccordingtothe
balanceofmaterialandthreatstopieces.Itespeciallyworriesaboutlosingitsmajorpieces.Andonemorething:Itknowslotsofopenings,butonlyaboutfivemoves
ofeach"(thementalisticstrategy).
Whataretherelativeadvantagesanddisadvantagesofthesestrategies?First,if(andthat'sabig"if")thehardwarestrategycouldbemadetowork,itwouldgivean
accuracyofpredictivepowerunmatchedbyeitheroftheotherstrategies.Thehardwarestrategycouldevenpredict(somethingtheotherstrategiescouldnotevendo
inprinciple)whensmokewouldcomeoutofthebackofthemachine.Theproblem,ofcourse,isthatsuchanexplanationisimpossibleinpracticemoreover,although
ittellshowthismachinereallyworksinonesense,itfailsutterlytotellhowthemachineplayschess.Toseethis,letusconsideranothermachine,runningexactlythe
sameprogram,butmadeoutofwoodengearsinsteadofsiliconchips.Anyexplanationofhowonemachineplayschessshouldbeanexplanationofhowtheother
playsaswell,sincetheyrunexactlythesameprogram.Butthehardwareexplanationofoursiliconbasedcomputerwillbeirrelevanttoandcertainlyfalseofits
woodencousinhence,whateveritdoesexplain,itdoesnotexplainourmachine'schessplayingabilityperse.

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Theprogramstrategyavoidsthisproblemsinceitwouldassignthesameexplanationtothetwophysicallydissimilarbutcomputationallyequivalentcomputers.
Moreover,theexplanationwouldbeeasiertocomeupwith.Thesearethisstrategy'sprincipaladvantages.Ontheotherhand,ithasafewdisadvantagesofitsown.
First,thoughitisinfinitelyeasiertocomeupwithaprogramexplanationoftheabilitiesofsuchasystemthanitistocomeupwiththecorrespondinghardware
explanation,itisstillverydifficult,andtheexplanationmightbesocomplicatedthatitwouldprovidenorealinsightintotheabilityatall.Second,thereismuchthatthe
programexplanationwillbeunabletohandle,suchasmachinemalfunctionsthatareperfectlyamenabletoahardwareexplanationbutaresimplyoutsidethescopeof
theprogramstrategy.Third,theprogramapproachencountersaproblemanalogoustotheproblemofrigiditythatthehardwareapproachencounters,thoughit
emergesataslightlyhigherlevel.Considertwomachines,alikeinhardware,thatrunprogramsthatimplementthesamegeneralchessplayingstrategiesbutarewritten
indifferentprogramminglanguages,usingdifferenttypesofunderlyingsubroutines,datastructures,andcontrol.Ideally,theexplanationofhowtheyplaychessshould
bethesameforboth.Butthatwouldrequirea''higher,"moreabstractlevelofdescriptionthantheprogramstrategy.
Thatmoreabstractlevel,ofcourse,iswhatwehavecalledthementalisticstrategy.Here,insteadoftalkingabouttransistorsorcogs,subroutinesoraddresses,we
talkaboutplans,goals,desires,beliefs,knowledge,andsoforth.Thedisadvantagesofthisstrategycomparedwiththefirsttwoareplain:itspredictionswillbefarless
exact,anditsexplanationsinparticularcasesthatmuchmoresuspect.Itwillbecompletelyunabletohandlebothhardwaremalfunctionandsoftware"bugs."Butits
advantagesareimpressiveaswell.Areasonableamountofcloseobservationwillyieldreasonablygoodtheoriesatthislevel,andthetheorieswillberelativelyeasyto
testandtoimplementforprediction.Mostofall,explanationsatthismentalisticlevelwillgeneralizetoallmachinesusingthesamekindsofstrategies.
Letusfocusontheprogramandmentalisticexplanatorystrategies,sincethesearetheexplanatorystrategiesmostcharacteristicofcognitivescience.Acognitive
scientistinterestedinhowpeopleplaychesswouldbeprimarilyinterestedinunderstandingwhatkindsofstrategiestheyemploy,or,ifthescientistwasoperatingata
morefundamentallevel,whatkindof"program"theyarerunning.Now,therelevantquestionisthis:Wheninterpretingatheoryexpressedatoneoftheselevels,do
weinterpretclaimsthatparticularprogramsarebeingexecuted,orthatparticulargoalsandintentionsarebeingactedon,aspossiblyliterallytrue,andtheprocesses
theypositasinsomesensereal(arealisticinterpretation)?Ordoweinterpretthesetheoriesonlyasusefulpredictiveinstruments,withnoclaimtorealtruth,butonly
tousefulnessinpredictionandexplanation,perhapspendingthedevelopmentofanexplanationoftherelevantphenomenaintermsofprocesseswithabetterclaimto
reality,perhapsahardwaretheory(aninstrumentalisticinterpretation)?
Bothpositionscanbedefended.Ontheonehand,theadvantagesofthementalisticstrategyargueinfavorofarealisticinterpretationofcognitivetheories.These
theoriescaptureimportantfunctionalcommonalitiesbetweenhumanbeings,perhapsbetweenhumanbeingsandintelligentcomputers.Iftherearefeaturesthathumans
sharewithotherphysicallydistinctinformationprocessingsystemsthatexplainimportantaspectsofthefunctioningofboth,thisarguesthatsuchfeaturesoughttobe
treatedasrealpropertiesofpersonsquaintelligentorganisms.Accordingtothislineof

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reasoning,theoriesthatexplainourbehaviorbyvirtueoftheseprocessesoughttohaveeveryclaimtotruth.
Ontheotherhand,theinstrumentalistwouldcounter,onecouldtreatalloftheargumentsinfavorofadoptingthementalisticstrategy,orindeedtheprogramstrategy,
assupportingtheusefulnessoftheseperspectivesforpredictingthebehaviorofcomplexsystemsbutstillassertthattheysaynothingwhateveraboutthetruthof
programormentalistictheoriesorabouttherealityoftheprocessestheexplanationsposit.Indeed,theinstrumentalistmightcontinue,thefactthat,asweascendthe
hierarchyofabstractionfromthehardwaretothementalisticapproach,weloseconsiderableaccuracyandscopeofpredictivepowerisstrongevidencethatwhatwe
aredoingistradingtruthforconvenience,acceptingagoodinstrumentforhumanpurposesinsteadofaclumsy,thoughliterallyaccurate,one.Therefore,the
instrumentalistconcludes,whenwedevelopprogramandmentalistictheoriesofthemind,orofartificiallyintelligentsystems,whatwearedoingisdeveloping
increasinglysophisticatedinstrumentswhoseaccuracycanonlybevouchsafedbyrealisticallyinterpretedtheoriesatthehardwarelevel.
Thoughsomehaveadoptedthisinstrumentalisticattitude,mostcognitivescientistsandphilosophersofcognitivescienceacceptsomeversionofarealistic
interpretationofthetheoriesofcognitivescience.Theygrantthatneuralmatterandsiliconarerealandthattheyarethesubstrataofthehigherlevelphenomenathat
cognitivescienceisinterestedinexplaininganddescribinginitscognitivetheories.But,theyargue,allofthisdoesnotimpugntherealityofthehigherlevelphenomena
supportedbyhardorwetware.Thosephenomena,too,arereal,fortheycanbesharedbyobjectsofradicallydifferenthardwareconstitutionandarethereforein
someveryimportantsenseindependentofhardwarephenomena.Cognitivescientists'theoriesstudythesestructuresandaretruebyvirtueofmakingtrueclaimsabout
theseabstractstructuresandprocesses.
Eventhoughtheinstrumentalistrealistdisputeisverymuchopenincognitivescience(Dennett1978,1982Stich1983),inwhatfollowswewillassumearealistic
interpretationofcognitivetheoriesandhencethatwhateverpsychologicalorcomputationalinformationprocessesorstatescognitivesciencerequiresactuallyexist,if
cognitivescienceistobeviable.
Wehavedoneagooddealofontologicalspadework:wehavedevelopedtheoutlinesofthefunctionalistviewofthemindthatunderliesthecognitivescience
approach,andwehaveseenwhatitwouldbetopursuecognitivesciencewitharealisticinterpretationofitstheories.Wearenowinapositiontoexamineparticular
kindsofpsychologicalphenomenatoaskjusthowcognitivescienceshouldunderstandthemandhowtheyfitintoafunctionalistphilosophyofmind,andwhat
constraintsacoherentphilosophicalaccountofthesephenomenamightplaceontheshapeofcognitivetheory.
Wewilltaketwobroadclassesofpsychologicalstatesasexamplesfortheremainderofthisontologicalinvestigation.First,wewillexaminethepsychologicalstates
thatphilosopherscallpropositionalattitudes.Thesearestatessuchasbelief,desire,hope,andfearthatseemtohaveastheircontentspropositions,orassertions
abouttheworld.When,forinstance,youbelievethatsnowiswhite,theclausethatsnowiswhiteisapropositionandappearstobethecontentofyourbelief.
Beliefisbutoneattitudeyoumighttaketowardthatproposition.Youmightalsodoubt,fear,orhopeit.Propositionalattitudesareinterestingtocognitivescience
becausetheyarerelational.Theyseemto

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involveacertainrelationoftheindividualtotheworld,oratleasttoapropositionabouttheworld.Second,wewillexaminequalia,orthefeltcharacterof
psychologicalstates,suchaswhatchocolatetasteslikeorwhatredlookslike.Thesestatesareinterestingtocognitivesciencefortheoppositereason:theyseem
tobenonrelational.Examiningtheontologicalproblemsposedbythesetwoclassesofphenomenashouldgiveusagoodfeelfortherangeofontologicalissues
raisedbyarealistic,functionalistictheoryofmindandhencefortheinformationprocessingapproachtothestudyofmindgenerally.Webeginwiththepropositional
attitudes.
PropositionalAttitudes
Cognitivescienceisconcernedwithpropositionalattitudesbecausecognitivescienceseesitstaskasexplainingthecognitiveprocessesandstatesofpeopleandother
intelligentinformationprocessingsystems.Humanbeings(andperhapssomeotherintelligentinformationprocessingsystems)atleastappeartohavepropositional
attitudes.Cognitivesciencehenceowesus,ifnotanexplanationofthesestates,thenatleastanexplanationofwhyweappeartohavethem.Andevenifthe
propositionalattitudesofwhichweareimmediatelyaware,suchasbelief,desire,andtherest,wereexplainedaway,insteadofmerelyexplained,theproblemthey
posewouldremain.Partandparceloftheideaofaninformationprocessingsystemistheideathatthestatesofsuchasystem,physicalthoughtheymaybe,are
interpretableashavingcontent,eveniftheyareonlyrepresentingsomethingasmundaneasarithmeticoperations.Onthisaccount,then,evenacalculatormightbe
representingthefactthat3+4=7,andwewouldstillhavetoexplainjustwhatitisaboutthemachinethatconstitutesitsstates'havingthecontentthattheydo.
Nevertheless,itisnotatallclearjustwhat,ifanything,cognitivescienceoughttobeexpectedtotellusaboutpropositionalattitudes.Foronething,itisnotyetclear
whetherpropositionalattitudesarethekindsofthingsthatwillappearinarecognizableforminacompletepsychology(inthewaythatgolddoesbothin
commonsensetalkandinchemistry)orwhethertheyaremerelycreaturesofthecommonsenseworldthathavenoplaceinmaturescience(astheclassofprecious
metalspersehasnoplaceinchemistry).Norisitclearwhattheboundariesofthedomainofcognitivesciencewillbe.Forallweknownow,acognitivetheorymay
eventuallybedevelopedthatisadequatetoexplainawiderangeofphenomena,butbeliefmayfallnaturallyintothedomainofanoncognitiveportionofpsychology.
Sopositionsontheplaceofpropositionalattitudesincognitivesciencevarywidely:someholdthatcognitivesciencemustprovideacompleteinformationprocessing
accountofwhatbeliefisandofhowitisrelatedtosuchthingsasmemoryandbehaviorsomethatcertainaspectsofbeliefwillbeamenabletocognitiveexplanation
butthatothersmightrequireamoresociologicaltreatmentsomethatbeliefitselfisacommonsensenotionthatwillhavetobereplacedwithamorerefinedconcept
forthepurposesofscienceandsomethatbeliefisatbottomanincoherentnotionthathasnoplaceinanaccuratedescription,cognitiveorotherwise,ofthe
psychologicalworld.Inthediscussionthatfollowswewillconsiderarangeofpossibleapproachestoprovidingcognitiveexplanationsofthenatureandroleofthe
propositionalattitudes,recognizingthattheseapproachesdonotexhaustthepossibilitiesandthatitisnotobvioustowhatextentbeliefisapropersubjectofcognitive
theory.Suchphilosophicaltheorizingaboutthepropositionalattitudesmay,however,contributesignificantlytocharacterizingthelimitsandnatureoftheenterpriseof
cognitivesciencebydelimitingthenatureandrangeofphenomena

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towhichitissuitedandbysketchingtheformthatatheorywouldhavetotakeinordertoaccommodateatleastthesestatesandprocesses.
Propositionalattitudes(henceforthsimply''beliefs")areproblematicforanumberofreasons.Forourpurposes,thecentralproblemisthattheylooklikethekindsof
thingsthatshouldbeidentifiedandgroupedaccordingtotheircontent,butrealscientificandcommonsensedifficultiesstandinthewayofdoingthat.
Anexamplewillbegintospelloutthesedifficulties.SupposethatKilroyistheworld'sleadingcognitivescientist,arenownedgoatherd,andSam'snextdoorneighbor.
BettyknowsnothingofKilroy'sgloriouscaprinesuccessesbuthaslongadmiredhisworkincognitivescience.Sam,ontheotherhand,thoughblissfullyignorantof
Kilroy'scareerincognitivescience,isinaweofhischampiongoats.Now,supposethatasSamandBettyareenjoyingabeeratthelocaldive,instrollsKilroy.Betty
comestobelievethattheworld'sgreatestcognitivescientisthasenteredthebar.Sam,ontheotherhand,comestobelievethattheworld'sgreatestgoatherd
hasenteredthebar.Theyare,ofcourse,bothright,andwhatmakeseachrightisthateachcorrectlybelievesthatKilroyhasenteredthebar.Theverysamefact
makesbothoftheirbeliefstrue.BothoftheirbeliefsareaboutKilroy.Infact,amindreadingbartenderwouldtruthfullyreportthatbothbelievethatKilroyhas
enteredthebar.Andthere'stheproblem.Ontheonehand,ifthecontentoftheirbeliefiswhatmatters,theydoseemtobelievethesamething.Ontheotherhand,if
thefunctionalrolethatbeliefplaysintheirinternalinformationprocessingsystemiswhatmatters,theydonotbelievethesamething,sincealthoughBetty'sbeliefis
connectedwithotherbeliefsaboutcognitivescience,Sam'sisconnectedwithotherbeliefsaboutgoats.Hence,theyhavedifferentrelationstootherbeliefs,inputs,
outputs,andsoforth,withtheresultthatonanyfunctionalistaccounttheyaredifferentbeliefs.Therefore,ifcognitivescienceistorealizethedreamofafunctionalist
accountofthemindasaninformationprocessingsystem,andifitistoaccountforbeliefsinthisschemetotreatbeliefs,notasclassifiedbytheircontent,butas
classifiedbytheirfunctionalroleintheinternaleconomyoftheinformationprocessingsystemthequestionthenis,Howcancognitivesciencedothis,whileatthe
sametimedoingjusticetotheobviousfactthatbeliefsarebeliefsjustbecausetheyareaboutthings?
Theapproachtobeliefthatattemptstoidentifybeliefswithparticularinternalinformationprocessingstatesiscalledindividualism.Twogeneraltypesofindividualism
canbedistinguishedinrecentworkontheproblemofbelief:methodologicalsolipsism(Fodor1980Putnam1975aStich1983)andnaturalisticindividualism.
MethodologicalSolipsismSolipsismasametaphysicalthesisisthepositionthatnothingexistsoutsideofthemindofthesolipsist.Itishenceaverylonelydoctrine,
andnotonefrequentlydefendedanymore.Understoodmethodologically,ratherthanmetaphysically,however,solipsismismoreplausibleandhasmoreadherents
(mostofwhomrecognizeeachother'sexistence).Theideaisthis:wecanstudymentalstatesandprocesseswithoutpayinganyattentionatalltotheexternalworld
theyostensiblyrepresent,andindeedwithoutevenassumingthatitexists.Ratherthanexplicitlydenyingtheexistenceofanexternalworld,whichwouldbeboth
absurdandbesidethepoint,wecan,themethodologicalsolipsistasserts,ignoretheexternalworldforthepurposesofcognitivescience,inparticular,forthepurposes
ofcharacterizingandattributingbeliefstosubjects.Thewaytodothis,themethodologicalsolipsistcontinues,istorestrictourcognitivesciencetodiscussingformal
(thatis,computationally

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characterized)operationsonformal(thatis,characterizedonlybyreferencetotheirshape)tokens,orstatesoftheorganismorcomputer,andexplicitlyrefusingto
discussanypossibleinterpretationormeaningthosestatesorprocessesmighthaveforthesysteminitsenvironment.
Methodologicalsolipsismismotivatedbytheobservationsthataninformationprocessingsystemhasnoaccesstotheworldexceptthroughitsbeliefsandthatits
processingcertainlycannotbesensitivetotheinterpretationsassignedtoitsinternalstates.Ifitisoperatingonasymbolsay,theEnglishwordyoutheprocessor
willdowhateveritdoestoitregardlessofwhohappenstobeinfrontofitinfact,regardlessofwhetheranybodyhappenstobeinfrontofit.Informationprocessing
systemsprocessinformationbymanipulatingwhataretothemmeaninglesssymbols,accordingtophysicallydeterminedrules.Whatmakeswhattheydoinformation
processingisthatwecanlaterinterpretthosesymbols,states,andprocessesasmeaningful,inlightofwhatweknowabouttheorganism'sinteractionwithits
environment.
Indevelopingtheviewmotivatedbytheseintuitions,webeginbycharacterizingthestatesandprocessesofourinformationprocessingsystempurelyformally,asaset
ofuninterpretedformalsymbolsmanipulatedbythesystemaccordingtoasetofuninterpretedformalrules,likeacomplexgameorahighlysystematic,butpossibly
meaningless,computerprogramwritteninaveryabstractcomputerlanguage.Thisformsthecoreofourcognitivetheoryoftheinformationprocessingsystemin
question.Eachstateofthatsystem,eachbelief,doubt,perception,intention,andmemory,willeventuallybeidentifiedwithoneoftheseasyetuninterpretedstates.
Thenweinterpret.Wetrytoassignmeaningstothesmallestsymbolsandprocessesofthesysteminsuchawaythattheentiresystem,underthistranslationscheme,
turnsouttobefunctioningsensibly,havingmostlytruebeliefs,makingmostlygoodinferences,andinteractingplausiblywithitsenvironment.Whenwesucceedinthis
interpretivetask,wearedone.
Thefeatureofthisapproachthatdeservesemphasisisthis:whenBettybelievesthattheworld'sgreatestcognitivescientisthasjustenteredthebar,whatishappening
asfarascognitivescienceisconcernedisthatBettyhasprocessed(inthewaythatisinterpretedasbeliefinagoodcognitivetheoryofBetty'sprocessor)aformal
stringofmentalsymbols(ultimatelyneurallyrepresented)thatareinterpreted(inthelightofthetotalbehaviorofBetty'sinformationprocessingsystem)asa
representationofthefactthattheworld'sgreatestcognitivescientisthasjustenteredthebar.ThesamecanbesaidforSamwhenhebelievesthattheworld's
greatestgoatherdhasjustenteredthebar.NeitherofthemhasarepresentationthatisinanyessentialwayconnectedwithKilroy.Theirrespectiveinternal
cognitivestateswouldpresumablybesharedbytwoquitedifferentpeople,whouponseeingBillClintonenterthebar,andhavingbizarrebeliefsabouthim,believe
thattheworld'sgreatestcognitivescientist,andtheworld'sgreatestgoatherd,haveenteredthebar.Onthisaccount,therepresentationshaveonlytodowiththe
conceptsinvolved,andtheymeanwhattheydoregardlessofwhattheyrefertointheworld,ifanything.SoKilroyhimselfplaysnopartinthecognitivestoryabout
Sam'sandBetty'sbeliefs.Hedoes,however,happentoexplainthetruthofbothoftheirbeliefs,byvirtueofhishappeningtosatisfybothdescriptionsthatarethebest
interpretationsofthedescriptivetermsinSam'sandBetty'srespectivebeliefsymbols.Thus,methodologicalsolipsismisabletoexplainhowcognitivesciencecould
accountfortherepresentationalcharacterofcognitivestateswhilereferringonlytointernalinformationprocessesincharacterizingthenatureofthosestates.

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AfurtherargumentformethodologicalsolipsismisduetoStich(1983),whocallsittheargumentfromtheautonomyprinciple.Theautonomyprinciplestatesthatthe
propermatterforcognitiveexplanationincludesonlythosestatesandprocessesthatarerealizedentirelywithinthephysicalboundsoftheorganism.Forexample,
someone'sbeingtothewestoftheWorldTradeCenter(ignoringthefactthatthisisnotevenplausiblyacognitiveproperty)wouldberuledoutbytheautonomy
principleasthekindofpropertywithwhichcognitivescienceshouldconcernitself.Stichuseswhathecallsthereplacementargumenttodefendtheautonomy
principle:
Supposethatsomeoneweretosucceedinbuildinganexactphysicalreplicaofmealivinghumanbodywhosecurrentinternalphysicalstatesatagivenmomentwereidentical
tomineatthatmoment.AndsupposefurtherthatwhilefastasleepIamkidnappedandreplacedbythereplica.Itwouldappearthatifthecrimewereproperlyconcealed,noone
(apartfromthekidnappersandmyself)wouldbethewiser.Forthereplica,beinganexactphysicalcopy,wouldbehavejustasIwouldinallcircumstances.Eventhereplica
himselfwouldnotsuspectthathewasanimposter.Butnow,theargumentcontinues,sincepsychologyisthesciencewhichaspirestoexplainbehavior,anystatesorprocesses
orpropertieswhicharenotsharedbyStichandhisidenticallybehavingreplicamustsurelybeirrelevanttopsychology.(Stich1983,165166)

Thisargumentneedssomerefinementtohandlecertainproperties,suchasthosedeterminedbysocialrelations,buttheseneednotconcernusnow.Thepointofthe
exampleshouldbeclear.Stich'sreplica'spsychologymustbethesameashis,andsoitmustbethattheonlyphysicalpropertiesthatmakeadifferencetoStich's
psychologyarepropertiesofhisbody.Ifthatistrue,thenthereisnoneedforacognitivetheorytopayattentiontoanythingoutsideStich'sbody,andthatiswhat
methodologicalsolipsismcomestothatforthepurposesofcognitivescience,anorganism'sinformationprocessingstatescanbecharacterizedwithoutreferenceto
theirmeaningortheirconnectionwiththeexternalworld.
Thisviewofmentalstatesasessentiallyuninterpretedinformationprocessingstatesthatcanbeidentifiedandexplainedbycognitivesciencewithoutreferencetotheir
content,butthatderivecontentasaresultofourinterpretingtheminlightofthewaytheyandtheorganismormachinetowhomtheybelongareembeddedinthe
world,hasgainedmuchfavorwithincognitivescience,particularlyamonglinguists,computerscientists,andphilosophers.Butsome(forexample,Pylyshyn1980
Bach1982McGinn1982,1990)areuneasyandsuggestthatmoreattentionneedstobepaidtothemeaningofinternalstatesthanmethodologicalsolipsismpermits.
Theyagreewiththemethodologicalsolipsistthatbeliefsareinternalinformationprocessingstatesoftheindividualbutdenythattheycanbeidentifiedandexplained
withoutlookingbeyondtheindividual.Themethodologytheyproposeishenceakindofnaturalism,byvirtueofpayingattentiontotheorganism'ssituationinand
relationtonature,butisindividualistic,inthatitcontinuestoviewthestatesthemselvesaslocatedfirmlywithintheboundsoftheindividual.Wewillnowexamine
considerationsthatleadsometoadoptnaturalisticindividualism.
NaturalisticIndividualismPylyshyn(1980)hasnotedthatcertainkindsofexplanationmightbedifficult,ifnotimpossible,toprovideinamethodologicallysolipsistic
cognitivescience.Suppose,forinstance,thatweaskthesolipsisttoexplainMary'sbehavior:

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Itsimplywillnotdoasanexplanationof,say,whyMarycamerunningoutofacertainsmokefilledbuilding,tosaythattherewasacertainsequenceofexpressionscomputedin
hermindaccordingtocertainexpressiontransformingrules.Howevertruethatmightbe,itfailsonanumberofcountstoprovideanexplanationofMary'sbehavior.Itdoesnot
showhoworwhythisbehaviorisrelatedtoverysimilarbehaviorshewouldexhibitasaresultofreceivingaphonecallinwhichsheheardtheutterance"thisbuildingisonfire!",
orasaconsequenceofhearingthefirealarm,orsmellingsmoke,orinfactfollowinganyeventinterpretableasgenerallyentailingthatthebuildingwasonfire.Theonlywayto...
capturetheimportantunderlyinggeneralisation...isto...[interpret]theexpressionsinthetheoryasgoalsandbeliefs....
Ofcoursethecomputational[methodologicallysolipsistic]modelonlycontainsuninterpretedformalsymbols....Thequestioniswhetherthecognitivetheorywhichthatmodel
instantiatescanrefrainfromgivingthemanintentional[meaningful]interpretation.Intheaboveexample,leavingthemasuninterpretedformalsymbolssimplybegsthequestion
ofwhytheseparticularexpressionsshouldariseunderwhatwouldsurelyseem(intheabsenceofinterpretation)likeaverystrangecollectionofdiversecircumstances,aswellas
thequestionofwhythesesymbolsshouldleadtobuildingevacuationasopposedtosomethingelse....Whatiscommontoallofthesesituationsisthatacommoninterpretation
oftheeventsoccurs....Butwhatinthetheorycorrespondstothiscommoninterpretation?Surelyonecannotanswerbypointingtosomeformalsymbols.Therightanswerhas
tobesomethingliketheclaimthatthesymbolsrepresentthebeliefthatthebuildingisonfire....(Pylyshyn1980,161emphasisadded)

ThepointofPylyshyn'sargumentisfairlystraightforward.Agoodcognitiveexplanationofbehaviorthatismotivatedbybeliefsoughttoexplainhowthosebeliefsare
relatedtothebehaviorandtothecircumstancesthatgiverisetothem.Ifthebeliefsarecharacterizedbythetheoryasuninterpretedsymbols,andifbelievingis
characterizedasanuninterpretedprocessinthebeliever,thenthetheorycannotexplaintheirconnectioneithertobehaviorortostimulationorforthatmatter,to
otherbeliefs.Inanyrealexplanation,thisobjectiongoes,thecontentofthebeliefplaysarole.ThesymbolsinMary'sheadcauseherbehaviorbecausetheyrepresent
thefactthatthereisfire,andanysymbolsthatdidnotrepresentthatfactwouldbythemselvesnotexplainherbehavior.Theconclusionthatanaturalisticindividualist
drawsisthatinacognitivetheoryinternalinformationprocessingstatesmustbeidentifiedbytheircontent,andinorderforthistohappen,onemustofcourseexamine
theirconnectionsnotonlytoothercognitivestatesandprocessesbutalsototheorganism'senvironment.
Thisargumentchargesmethodologicalsolipsismwithbeingauselessresearchstrategy.Anotherlineofargumentinfavorofnaturalisticindividualismdeniesthevery
coherenceofthesolipsisticstrategy.Methodologicalsolipsisminsiststhatinformationprocessingstatesandprocessesaretobetakenbycognitivetheoryas
uninterpretedformalstatesandprocessesandthattheyaretobeidentifiedwithoutpayingattentiontoanyrelationsbetweentheorganismandtheenvironment.Now
(thenaturalistpointsout)weallagree,ascognitivescientists,thatinformationprocessingstatesarenottobeidentifiedphysically,forthenwecouldnotgeneralize
aboutinformationprocessingsystemsrealizedinphysicallydifferentsubstrata,suchashumanbeingsandartificiallyintelligentbutperhapsfunctionallyequivalent
computers.

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Thechallengeisthenposedtothemethodologicalsolipsist:givensomethingyouhavereasontobelieveisaninformationprocessingsystemandwhosebehavioryou
wishtoexplainasacognitivescientist,yourtaskistodecidewhichofitsphysicalstatesandprocessesaregoingtocountasfunctionalorcomputationalstatesand
processes.Andofcourseyoucannot,forthereasonswehavejustdiscussed,simplystareattheneuronsandfigureitout.Well,thenaturalistcontinues,Icanthinkof
onlyonewaytodoit:watchtheorganisminteractwiththeenvironment,seehowtheneuralstuffactswhenconfrontedwithparticulartypesofstimulationwhenthe
organismperformscertainkindsofactions,andsolvescertainkindsofproblemsandinterpretthestatesaccordingly.Andthat,itwillbeagreed,isaverynaturalistic
strategy.(ButseeFodor1987foradetermined,thoughcontroversial,argumentforthecompatibilityofsuchanaturalisticresearchprogramwithasolipsistic
psychology,andGarfield1991forareply.)
Thepointisthatsimplytomaketheinitialmovefromthephysicallevelofdescriptiontothefunctionalorcomputationallevel,aswemustinordertodocognitive
scienceatall,istointerpretthesystem,andtheonlywaytogetthedatathatjustifyaparticularinterpretationistopayattentiontonaturalisticphenomena.Onthis
account,then,methodologicalsolipsistsarewrongintwoways:first,theyarewronginthinkingthatthereissuchathingasanuninterpretedformaldescriptionofa
physicalsystem,andsecond,theyarewronginthinkingthatsolipsisticdataalonecouldjustifyevenaminimalinterpretationofthestatesofaphysicalsystemas
informationprocessingstates.
Wehaveseenpowerfulargumentsforbothversionsofindividualisticinterpretationsofthepropositionalattitudes.Whichposition,ifeither,isinfactcorrectisstilla
hotlydebatedissueconcerningthefoundationsofcognitivescience.Butbeforeleavingthesubjectofthepropositionalattitudesaltogether,wewilltakeabrieflookat
nonindividualisticaccountsofbelief.SuchaccountsareofferedbyBurge(1979,1982),McGinn(1990),andGarfield(1988,1990,1991),andconsideredbyStich
(1983).
NonindividualisticConceptionsNonindividualiststakenaturalismonestepfurther.Theyagreethatinordertospecifythenatureofanybelief,itisnecessarytotalk
aboutitscontent,andthatitisimpossibletotalkaboutthecontentofanybeliefwithoutpayingattentiontotheworldoutside,includingsuchthingsasthecausesofthe
belief,thethingsthebeliefisabout,andthemeaningsofthewordsthespeakerusesinformulatingthebelief.Nonindividualistsdrawafurthermoralfromthisneedto
payattentiontonaturalisticdata.Theyinferthatbeliefitselfmaybeanaturalisticphenomenon,thatis,thatitmaybeessentiallyarelationbetweenanorganismor
machineandtheworld,ratherthanastateoftheindividualorganismormachineitself.
Ananalogywillhelptoclarifyandmotivatethispoint.Individualiststreatbeliefsassomethinglikeinternalsentences.Themethodologicalsolipsistdiffersfromthe
naturalisticindividualistonlyinthattheformerthinksthatwecantellwhatsentencesareinsomeone'sheadjustbylookinginside,whereasthelatterthinksthatwe
needtolookaroundattheworldaswell.Butsupposethatbelievingthatrosesareredisnotsomuchlikewriting"Rosesarered"inthe"beliefregister"ofaperson's
brainasitislikebeingrelatedtowhat"Rosesarered"means.Theinscription"Rosesarered"byitselfisnotasentenceaboutflowers.Youcanseethisbyimagininga
swirlofgasesinafaroffnebula,orbillionsofhydrogenatomsscatteredacrosslightyearsofintergalacticspace,thathappentohavethesameshapeasanEnglish
inscriptionof''Roses

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arered."Thesethingsmakenoassertionsaboutflowers.Whatmakesaninscriptionasentenceexpressingathoughtabouttheworldisinsteaditsrelationtoa
languageandtoacommunityofusersofthatlanguage.Asentence'sbeingastatementishencearelationalfactaboutthatsentence,muchasHarry'sbeingabrother
(whereHarryisapersonwhohasabrother)isarelationalfactaboutHarry.ItisnotafactaboutHarryperse,inisolationfromhisenvironmentrather,itisafact
aboutonerelationbetweenHarryandhisenvironment,inparticularbetweenHarryandhisfamily.
Note,forinstance,thatnobodycouldtellbyjustexaminingHarrynotevenhisdoctorperformingthemostthoroughphysicalthatheisabrother.Nor,saysthe
antiindividualist,couldanyonetellevenbymeansofthemostthoroughneuralexaminationwhatsomeonebelieves.Thisisjusttosaythatbelievingthatrosesare
redisarelationalfactinthesamewaythataninscription'smeaningis.Toholdthatbeliefinvolvesarelationamongabeliever,thecorrespondingbehavior,roses,
redness,andalanguage.Onthisaccount,beliefismorelikebrotherhoodthanlikeheight.Itisnotacharacteristicoftheindividual,butoneoftherelationsthat
individualbearstotheworld.
Thosecognitivescientistswhoadoptthisviewofbelieftakeoneoftwoattitudestowardtheplaceofbeliefincognitivescience.Eithertheydecidethatbeliefisnotthe
rightkindofthingforcognitivesciencetostudyandthatitshouldconcernitselfonlywithindividualisticphenomena,ortheydecidethatcognitivesciencemustbe
broadenedtoencompassnotonlythenatureoftheinternalinformationprocessingoforganismsandmachinesbutalsotheirinformationtheoreticrelationstotheir
environments.Bothoftheseapproachesinvolvecertainattractionsbotharefraughtwithdifficulty.Ontheonehand,banishingbeliefismotivated,ifbeliefturnsoutto
berelational,forthereasonssuggestedbytheautonomyprinciple.Butbanishingbeliefseemstoinvolvebanishingacentralpsychologicalphenomenonfromthe
domainofpsychology,anditisnotclearwhatwouldbeleftforcognitivesciencetostudy.Broadeningthepurviewofcognitivesciencetoencompassrelationalfacts
aboutinformationprocessingsystemsseemsattractiveinthatitoffersthegreatestpromiseofexplainingawiderangeofcognitivephenomena.Ontheotherhand,
thereismuchtobesaidforfocusingonthealreadydifficult,butsomewhatcircumscribed,domainofindividualinformationprocessingsystemsinisolation.Itshould
alsobenotedthatsuchanaturalisticviewofbeliefprovidesaverynaturalwayofaccommodatingconnectionistmodelsofcognitionthatdefyfunctionalistorotherwise
symbolicinterpretationwitharealisticviewofthepropositionalattitudes.Thismaywellbedespitethefactthatnodistributedconnectioniststateofyourbrainbyitself
canbeidentifiedasthebelief,say,thatthequeenofEnglandistherichestwomanintheworld.Butevenifindividualismisfalse,thatwouldnotimpugntherealityof
yourbeliefthatsheis.Forthatbeliefmaywellcompriseacomplexsetofrelationsyoubearbyvirtueofthatdistributedstatetoexternalthings,suchassentencesof
EnglishandElizabethII,amongothers.
Onefinalremarkabouttheplaceofpropositionalattitudesincognitivesciencebeforeweturntoqualia.Wehavenowseengoodargumentsnotonlyforidentifying
propositionalattitudesbothsolipsisticallyandnaturalisticallybutalsoforconstruingthemindividualisticallyandnonindividualistically.Indeed,itappearsthattheirvery
natureasstatesthatconnecttheorganismtotheworldgivesthemaJanuslikecharacter.Ontheonehand,inordertofigureininternalinformationprocessing,they
seemtobenecessarilyindividualisticallyconstruedontheotherhand,inordertohave

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content,theyseemtobenecessarilyrelational.Withoutcontenttheyseemtolackexplanatorypower,andwithoutautonomousinternalexistencetheyseem
psychologicallyandcomputationallyinert.Therefore,somehavesuggested,perhapstherightconclusionfromtheseconflictingconsiderationsisthattheconceptsof
belief,andofpropositionalattitudesgenerally,areincoherentinotherwords,thatdespitethefolkloreabouthumanbeingsasbelievers,doubters,hopers,and
fearers,weinfactareneverinanyofthosestates,simplybecausethereisnosuchthingasapropositionalattitude.Onthisview,tosaythatyoubelievethatrosesare
redisasfalseasitistosaythatyouareSantaClausorthatyouliveinaroundsquarehouse.Herethecentraltaskofcognitivescienceistoconstructthenotionofan
informationprocessingsysteminawaythatinvolvesnostatessuchasbeliefatall.ThisviewisdevelopedinvariouswaysbyStich(1983),Ramsey,Stich,andGaron
(1991),P.M.Churchland(1984),andP.S.Churchland(1986).Justhowsuchaviewwouldlook,andjusthowitwouldaccountforourpersistentbeliefinbelief,is
notatallclear.Norisitclearthatanalogousproblemsaboutcontentwillnotberaisedforthestructuresthatsupplantbeliefinsuchatheory.Theplaceof
propositionalattitudesinthecomputationaltheoryofmindisfarfromsettled,butitisclearthatgiventhecentralrolethatthenotionofacontentfulstateplaysin
cognitivescience,itwillbeimportanttoresolvetheseproblems.
Qualia
Thedifficultiesraisedbythepropositionalattitudesderivefromtheirrelationalcharacter.Itisintriguingthattheotherclassofstatesthoughttoraisespecialproblems
forcognitivescience,thequalia,arethoughttoraisespecialproblemspreciselybecausetheyarenotrelationalincharacter.
Thewordquale(pluralqualia)isthephilosopher'stermforthe"felt"or"experienced"characterofmentalstates.Forinstance,althoughtastingchocolateisnotaset
ofqualia,whatchocolatetasteslike(moreprecisely,whatitfeelsliketotastechocolate)isasetofqualia.Inorderforchocolatetastingtotakeplace,theremust
actuallybesomechocolateinrathercloseproximitytothetastebudsofthetaster.Wecouldevenimagineamechanicalchocolatetastertastingchocolatewhile
experiencingnothing(havingnoqualia),perhapsonlyexaminingthechocolatefortheFDA.Ontheotherhand,wecouldimagineexperiencingwhatitisliketotaste
chocolate(havingchocolatequalia)intheabsenceofanychocolate,bymeansofhypnosisordrugs.Sothequaliathatnormallyaccompanyaparticularfunctionally
characterizedstateareatleastconceptuallyseparablefromthestateitself.Whethertheyarealsoinfactseparablethatis,whetherthesestatescaninfactoccur
withouttheircorrespondingqualia,andwhetherqualiaassociatedwithastatecaninfactappearwithoutthecorrespondingstateisanotherquestion,oneperhaps
bothphilosophicalandempirical.
Somepsychologicalstateshavenointrinsicqualitativecharacter.Believingthattheearthrevolvesaroundthesunordoubtingthatthemoonismadeofgreencheese
hasnoparticularqualitativecharacter,thougheachmayhaveaparticularfunctionalcharacter.Ingeneral,propositionalattitudesseemtohavenotypicalqualitative
character,butperceptualstates,andperhapsemotionsandmoods,appeartobetypicallyqualitative.Ofcourse,manyquestionssuggestthemselvesatthispoint.Are
moodsandemotionsqualitativebecausetheyinvolvesomekindofperceptualstates,ordotheyhavequaliaalltheirown?Doallperceptualstateshaveassociated
qualia,oraretheresomekindsthatdonot?Butwewillnotaskthesequestions.Rather,wewillaskhowqualitative

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statesdifferfrompropositionalattitudes,whatpossibleproblemstheyposeforcognitivescience,andwhethercognitivescienceneedstoworryaboutthematall.
Thecentraldifferencebetweenqualitativestatesandpropositionalattitudesisthatattitudesalwaysseemtoinvolvearelationbetweentheirsubject(thebeliever,
hoper,doubter,andsoon)andtheobjectoftheattitude(thepropositionbelieved,doubted,hopedtobetrue,andsoon).Therelationisnoteasytocharacterize,but
itseemsnonethelessclearthatwhensomeonebelievessomething,thatpersonisrelatedbythebeliefrelationtosomething.Thequalitativecharacterofaperceptual
state,ontheotherhand,seemstobeamonadicpropertyofthatstate,thatis,asimplefactaboutthatstateofmind,notinvolvingitsrelationtoanythingelse.
Examplesofothermonadicpropertiesarebeingred,weighingonehundredpounds,andbeingadog.Thesearepropertiesthatthingshavethatdonotinvolvetheir
relationstootherthings,asopposedtopropertieslikebeingtotheleftof,beingheavierthan,orbeingthefavoriteanimalof,whichessentiallyinvolverelations
tootherthings.Somearguethatthepropositionalattitudesaremonadicpropertiesofpersons(Quine1960Sellars1968)andothersarguethattheyarenot(Fodor
1978Stich1983),butdiscussionofthisviewwouldtakeusfarfrombothcognitivescienceandourconcernwithqualia.
WhyQualiaAreProblematicInordertoseethepossibleproblemsthatqualiaraiseforcognitivescience,wemustfocusonthefunctionalisttheoryofmindthatwe
haveseentounderliecognitivescience.Whatmakesfunctionalismaplausibletheoryofmindisthatitoffersagoodwaytoidentifythepsychologicalstatesofanatural
orartificialsystemwithitsphysicalstates:namely,intermsoftherelationsthattheybeartoeachother,andtotheinputandoutputofthesystem.Andtheserelations
areallthatmatter.Onthefunctionalistview,theintrinsicpropertiesofthestate,suchaswhatkindofmaterialthestateisrealizedin,orhowlongitlasts,orhowmuch
noisethesystemmakesgettingintoit,areirrelevanttoitspsychologicaldescrptian.Allthatisimportantherearetherelationsthatthephysicalstatetobedescribed
psychologicallybearstootherpsychologicallydescribablephysicalstatesofthesystem.
Thosewhohavesuggestedthatqualiaposespecialproblemsemphasizethisessentialrolethattherelational(asopposedtotheintrinsic)propertiesofstatesplayin
functionalism.Theycontrasttheplausibilityofconstruingpropositionalattitudesinthiswaywithwhattheysuggestistheimplausibilityofconstruingtheapparently
nonrelationalqualiainthisway(Block1978,1980aBlockandFodor1972).Afewoftheexamplesoftenusedtomakethispointwillhelp:
Imagineabodyexternallyquitelikeahumanbody,sayyours,butinternallyquitedifferent.Theneuronsfromthesensoryorgansareconnectedtoabankoflightsinahollow
cavityinthehead.Asetofbuttonsconnectstothemotoroutputneurons.Insidethecavityresidesagroupoflittlemen.Eachhasaverysimpletask:toimplementa"square"ofa
reasonablyadequatemachinetablethatdescribesyou.Ononewallisabulletinboardonwhichispostedastatecard,i.e.,acardthatbearsasymboldesignatingoneofthestates
specifiedinthemachinetable.Hereiswhatthelittlemendo:Supposethepostedcardhasa'G'onit.ThisalertsthelittlemenwhoimplementGsquares"Gmen"theycall
themselves.SupposethelightrepresentinginputI17goeson.OneoftheGmenhasthefollowingashissoletask:Whenthecardreads'G'andtheI17lightgoeson,hepresses
outputbuttonO191andchangesthestatecardto'M'.ThisGmaniscalledupontoexercisehistaskonlyrarely.Inspiteofthe

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lowlevelofintelligencerequiredofeachlittleman,thesystemasawholemanagestosimulateyoubecausethefunctionalorganizationtheyhavebeentrainedtorealizeisyours.
ATuringmachinecanberepresentedasafinitesetofquadruples(orquintuples,iftheoutputisdividedintotwoparts)currentstate,currentinputnextstate,nextoutput.Each
littlemanhasthetaskcorrespondingtoasinglequadruple.Throughtheeffortsofthelittlemen,thesystemrealizesthesame(reasonablyadequate)machinetableasyoudoand
isthusfunctionallyequivalenttoyou.
Ishalldescribeaversionofthehomunculiheadedsimulation,whichismoreclearlynomologicallypossible.Howmanyhomunculiarerequired?Perhapsabillionareenoughafter
all,thereareonlyaboutabillionneuronsinthebrain.
SupposeweconvertthegovernmentofChinatofunctionalism,andweconvinceitsofficialsthatitwouldenormouslyenhancetheirinternationalprestigetorealizeahumanmind
foranhour.WeprovideeachofthebillionpeopleinChina(IchoseChinabecauseithasabillioninhabitants)withaspeciallydesignedtwowayradiothatconnectstheminthe
appropriatewaytootherpersonsandtotheartificialbodymentionedinthepreviousexample.Wereplacethelittlemenwitharadiotransmitterandreceiverconnectedtothe
inputandoutputneurons.Insteadofabulletinboard,wearrangetohavelettersdisplayedonaseriesofsatellitesplacedsothattheycanbeseenfromanywhereinChina.Surely
suchasystemisnotphysicallyimpossible.Itcouldbefunctionallyequivalenttoyouforashorttime,sayanhour.(Block1978,278279)

Now,itisargued,thoughitmightbeplausiblethatsuchahomunculiheadedbody,whetheritshomunculiareinternal,asinthefirstcase,orexternal,asinthesecond,
sharesallofyourpropositionalattitudes,including,naturally,thebeliefthatitisnotahomunculihead,itwouldbeimplausibletothinkthatsuchacreaturewould
shareyourqualia.Suppose,forinstance,thatyouarecompletingthelasthundredmetersofamarathon,andthePeoples'RepublicofChina(anditsroboticinput
outputdevice)isintheprocessoffunctionallysimulatingyou.It,likeyou,believesthatitisfinishingtherace.Itsrobot,likeyou,issprinting,orstaggering,towardthe
finishline.Itscognitiveprocesses,likeyours,are,byhypothesis,slightlyaddled.Grantingafunctionalistaccountofbelief,allofthisseemsperfectlyplausible(giveor
takeabitofsciencefiction).ButcouldthePeoples'RepublicofChina(oritsinanimate,remotecontrolledrobot)feelthesamepain(orelation)thatyoufeelattheend
ofagruelingrace?Itmightbelievethatitisinintensepain,butwhatwoulditbeforonebillionpeopleandarobot,nooneofwhomisindividuallyinpain(inany
relevantsense),tocollectivelyfeelpain,asaresultoftheinputstoarobottowhichtheyareonlyconnectedviawalkietalkiesandsatellites?
Itisthebizarrenessofthissuggestionthatleadsmanytosuggestthatqualiaposeaspecialproblemforcognitivescience.Theproblemappearstobethat(1)qualiaare
psychologicalphenomenaandareessentialtomanypsychologicalstates(likebeinginpain,forinstance,orseeingred)hencethattheyarewithinthedomainthat
cognitivescienceoughttocoverbutthat(2)unlikethepropositionalattitudes,whichareamenabletotherelationalaccountofferedbyfunctionalism,thequaliaof
psychologicalstatesaremonadic,intrinsicfeaturesofthosestates,andnotfunctionalattributes.Thisisdemonstrated,theargumentcontinues,bythefactthattherecan
befunctionallyidenticalsystems,oneofwhomhasqualia(you)andoneofwhomdoesnot(Peoples'

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RepublicofChina+robot).Thisisoftencalledtheabsentqualiaproblem.Hence,theargumentconcludes,qualiaarenotfunctionallycharacterizable.Hence,states
withanessentialfunctionalcharacterarenotfunctionalstates.Hence,notallhumanpsychologicalstatesarefunctionalstates.Hence,functionalismisnotanadequate
accountofthemental.Hence,insofarascognitivescienceiscommittedtofunctionalism(andwehaveseenthatitmayberatherdeeplycommittedtoit),cognitive
scienceisintrouble.
Therearetwogeneralstrategiesthatafunctionalistcognitivescientistcouldadoptinreplyingtothisqualiacenteredcharge:denythatcognitivescienceoughtto
concernitselfwithqualia,ormeettheargumentheadonandshowthatthepurportedcounterexamples(thehomunculiheads)arenotrealcounterexamples,either
becausetheyareimpossibleorbecausetheyinfacthavequalia.Wewillconsidereachoftheserepliesinturn.
BanishingQualiaThetaskofcognitivescience,whenappliedtohumanpsychology,istoexplainandcharacterizehumanpsychologicalphenomenaascognitive.In
particular,thoughallpsychologicalstateshavesomenoncognitiveproperties(suchasbeingrealizedonadigitalcomputerorinahumanbrain),thesenoncognitive
propertiesarenotthebusinessofcognitivescience.Furthermore,byvirtueofbeingfunctionalist,cognitivesciencehasanaccountofwhatitisforapropertytobe
cognitive:itisforthatpropertytobeafunctional,informationprocessingstateofthesysteminquestion.Iffunctionalistscouldarguepersuasivelythatqualianotonly
arenotfunctionalstates(justwhattheabsentqualiaobjectorurgesagainstthem)butalsoarenotreallypartofthedomainofcognitivepsychologyatall,theywould
haveastrongreplytothequaliaobjectionineffect,thatclaim(2)isrightqualiaarenotfunctionallycharacterizableorexplicablebutclaim(1)thattheyare
withinthepurviewofcognitivescienceiswrong,andhencefunctionalistsshouldnomorebeworriedabouttheirinabilitytoexplainthemthantheyareworried
abouttheirinabilitytoexplainthecommoncold.
Theargumentbeginsbynotingthatmanypsychologicalstatesarequalitative.Butthatnomoreguaranteesthattheyarenecessarilyqualitative,whenconsideredjustas
psychologicalstates,thanthefactthatsomepsychologicalstatesareneurologicalguaranteesthattheyarenecessarilyneurologicalwhenconsideredjustas
psychologicalstates.Hence,somepropertiesofanypsychologicalstateinparticular,physicalpropertiesthoughtheyserveasunderpinningsforpsychologically
importantpropertiesofthatstate,arethemselvesirrelevanttothepsychologicalidentityofthestate.Furthermore,theveryexamplesthatboththefunctionalistandthe
absentqualiaobjectoroffersuggestthatfunctionallyidenticalstatesmightdifferqualitatively,injustthewaythatwehaveseenthattheycandifferphysically.Now,
functionalismindependentlyprovidesagoodtheoryofthenatureofpsychologicalstates.Giventhisfactaboutthepossiblephysicaldissimilaritybetweencognitively
identicalstates,theseexamplesshouldsuggestonlythatqualitativecharacteristoapsychologicalstatejustasphysicalcharacteristoitacharacterthatmany,or
perhapsevenall,stateshave,butonethatisaccidentaltotheircognitivenatureandhencenotwithinthepurviewofcognitivepsychology.Onthisaccount,theright
waytothinkaboutpsychologicalstatesisasfunctionalstates,whichtypicallyhavequalitativecharacterbutwhosequalitativecharacterisnotessentialtotheir
psychologicalnature.Explainingandcharacterizingthisqualitativecharacterisnobusinessofcognitivescienceonthisaccount,exceptinsofarasweareconcernedto
explaintheparticularphysical

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realizationthatapsychologicalstatemighthave.Suchanaccountmightvaryfromsystemtosystem.Ofcourse,onewouldhavetoaddthatexplainingthebeliefthat
oneishavingqualiaofagiventypewouldfallwithinthepurviewofcognitivescienceonthisaccount,sincebeliefsarefunctionalstatesaccordingtothetheorywehave
beenexploring.Butonthisview,beliefsaboutone'sownqualianomoreentailtheneedforanexplanationofthequaliathanbeliefsaboutelephantscallforatheoryof
elephants.Totheextentthatoneiscomfortableexilingqualiafromthedomainofpsychology,thisisanattractiveposition(ChurchlandandChurchland1981).
QualiaFunctionalizedIfonewantedtokeepqualiawithinthedomainofcognitivescienceandthereforewantedtodefendafunctionalistaccountofqualia,onemight
arguesomethinglikethis:Theveryexamplesthatdefendersofqualiaemployagainstcognitivescienceareincoherent.Theseexamplessupposethattherearepossibly
twokindsofstates,bothofwhicharetypicallycausedbythesamesortsofthings,andwhichtypicallycausethesamesortsofbeliefsthatoneisinastateofa
particularqualitativecharacter.Forexample,wearetoimaginethatonfinishingtheracedescribedearlier,youareinstateQ1,whichiscausedbyrunningamarathon
andwhichcausesonetobelievethatoneisinpain,buttheChinesehomunculiheadedrobotisinstateQ2,whichisalsocausedbyrunningamarathonandwhichalso
causesonetobelievethatoneisinpain.However,stateQ1producesatruebeliefthatoneishavingpainqualia,whereasstateQ2producesafalsebeliefofthesame
kind.Now,whatcouldaccountforthisdifference?
Thereseemtobetwopossiblewaystoanswerthisquestion.Onecouldsimplysaythatthereisnodifferencethatanystatethathassuchandsuchcausalproperties
byvirtueofsuchandsuchfunctionalrelationsisqualitativehence,thehomunculiheadsandtheircousinsthecomputers,intuitionstothecontrary,havequalia.Orone
couldinsistthatthereissomenonfunctionalfactaboutgenuinelyqualitativestatessuchasQ1,notsharedbysuchersatzstatesasQ2,thataccountsfortheirbeing
genuinelyqualitative.
Thereisconsiderablereasontoarguethatthehomunculiheadsdo,appearancesandintuitionstothecontrary,havequalia.Afterall,whatmorecouldyousayabouta
pain,orasensationofred,otherthanthatitistheverythingthatistypicallycausedby(...)andgivesrisetoallthe(verycomplex)setofbeliefs,desires,andsoon
that(...)anddispositionstodo(...).Obviously,''..."willbecomeverycomplicatedandwillbenoeasymattertospellout,butthatisthetaskofcognitivescience
andiswhatmakesithardandinteresting.Andimaginetryingtoconvincesomeone(something)thathasjustbeeninjured(broken),andissincerelytellingyouthatitis
inpain,andisactingasthoughitisinpain,thatitismistakeninthinkingthatitisinpain,because,thoughithasalloftherightbeliefs,desires,andbehavior,andforall
oftherightreasons,itlacksqualia.
Ontheotherhand,ifdefendersofqualiamaintainthatthereissomethingnonfunctionalaboutqualitativestatesthatdistinguishesthemfromtheirersatzcounterparts,
theyhavethedifficulttaskoftellinguswhatthatis.Onereasonthatitisdifficultisthis.Thedistinguishingqualitymustbesomethingthatmakesadifferenceinpeople's
cognitivelivesthatmakesrealqualitativestatesdifferentfromersatzqualitativestates(Davis1982)orelsethereisnodifferencebetweenthetwo,andthe
argumentisover.Presumably,thisdifferencemustinvolvetheabilityofgenuinequalitativestatestoproducesomeeffectsonourbeliefs,desires,andsoon,thatersatz
states

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cannototherwise,whatwouldthedifferencecometo?Butifthatistrue,thefunctionalistcanreply,thensinceourbeliefsarefunctional,wecandefinegenuine
qualitativestatesfunctionallyintermsofthebeliefstheycause,andersatzstatesfunctionallyintermsofthedifferentbeliefstheycause.Hence,onthisview,ifthereisa
differencebetweenrealandersatzqualitativestates,itisafunctionaldifference,andsoqualiaarefunctional.Therefore,theapparentexamplesofnonfunctional
differencesbetweenrealandersatzqualia(theinternalandexternalhomunculiheads)arenotrealexamples,sinceitisimpossibleforasystemtobefunctionally
equivalenttobutqualitativelydifferentfromus(Shoemaker1981,1982).
Thisreplyexertsconsiderablepullunlessoneadoptstheview(explicitlydeniedbythedefenderoffunctionalisminthelastparagraph)thatthereisadifference(hardto
capturethoughitmaybe)betweenrealandersatzqualitativestatesthatdoesnotshowupintheinteractionsofthesestateswithfunctionallycharacterizedstatesbutis
insteadanirreducible,introspectible,andmonadicpropertyofthesestatesthemselves.Thedefenderofqualiacanarguethatjustasmanythings(thesightofan
elephant,drugs,fever)canproduceinusthebeliefthatweareseeinganelephant,somanythings(pain,dreams,ersatzpain)canproduceinusthebeliefthatwearein
pain.Butitwouldnotfollowfromthefactthatersatzandrealpainborethesamerelationstoallfunctionalstatesthattheyare,orfeel,thesame,justasitwouldnot
followfromthefactthatsomedrugandthesightofanelephantbothtypicallycauseonetobelievethatoneisseeinganelephantthatthedrugandtheelephantarethe
samething.And,thedefenderofqualiawouldconclude,asmentalstates,qualiaarewithinthedomainofcognitivescience,fortofeelpainisnot,likebeingina
particularneuralstate,merelyanaccidentalfeatureofapsychologicalstate,itisthatpsychologicalstateitselfhence,ifcognitivescienceistosayanythingaboutthe
mind,itmustsaysomethingaboutqualia,andiffunctionalismisincapableofcapturingqualia,somethingmustchangeincognitivescience.
Thisdebateisobviouslycomplicated,anditremainsoneoftheinterestingareasforphilosophicalresearchintheontologyofcognitivescience.Itis,ofcourse,possible
(Searle1980)thattheproblemsaboutpropositionalattitudesthatwehaveraisedandtheverydifferentlookingproblemsaboutqualiaarereallytwosidesofthesame
underlyingproblemabouttheabilityoffunctionalismandthecomputationalparadigmtoaccountformeaningfulstatesgenerally.Thosesympatheticwiththisoutlook
havesuggestedthattheproblemistobelocatedintheview,essentialtothecognitiveparadigm,thatphysicalrealizationisinessentialtopsychologicalpropertiesthat
thementalcanbeabstractedfromitsphysicalsubstrate.Thosewhotakeamorebiologicalviewofthementalrejectthisassumptiontheyarguethatthepsychological
isessentiallybiologicalandhencethattheproblemswehaveseenaboutpropositionalattitudesandqualiaaresimplyproblemsthatarisewhenonemistakenlytreats
intelligenceandmentalityasabstract,informationprocessingconcepts.Thisisadisputethatgoestotheheartoftheontologicalfoundationsofcognitivescience.We
haveonlytouchedthesurface.
8.4EpistemologicalIssues
Wenowturntotheepistemologicalissuesrelevanttocognitivescience.Epistemologyisthebranchofphilosophyconcernedwiththenature,structure,andoriginsof
knowledge.Traditionally,themajorissuesinepistemologywithwhichphilosophershave

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concernedthemselveshavebeentheanalysisoftheconceptofknowledgeandthenatureofthejustificationofbelief.Butcognitivesciencehasforcedareconception
ofwhatepistemologicalissuesdemandattention,andcurrentlyissuesaboutthestructureandorganizationoftherepresentationofknowledgearecomingtocenter
stage.Wewillfirstdiscussthenatureofwhathascometobecalledtheknowledgerepresentationproblemtheproblemofjusthowtorepresentlargebodiesof
knowledgeinsuchawaythattheycanbemobilizedtoguidebehaviorandtounderstandandproducelanguage.Wewillthenexamineafewofthespecialproblems
abouthowtounderstandtheconceptofknowledgeinthecontextofcognitivescience.
TheKnowledgeRepresentationProblem
Artificialintelligence(AI)issocentraltocognitivesciencebecauseitbothembodiesthecomputationalmodelofcognitionandservesasatestoftheenterprise.Ifwe
couldbuildintelligentinformationprocessingsystemsondigitalfoundations,thatwouldshowthatdigitalinformationprocessingsystemscanbeintelligentandwould
provideapowerfulreasonforbelievingthathumanscanbedescribedinthatwayshoulditproveimpossibletobuildsuchsystems,orshouldseriousprincipled
difficultiesarise,thatwouldconstitutepowerfulevidencethatcognitivescienceisheadedinthewrongdirection.AmongthemostpowerfultestsofanAIsystemisits
abilitytounderstandnaturallanguage.
Understandingnaturallanguagerequiresavastarrayofknowledge,anditisimportantthattheknowledgebearrangedinsuchawaythatatamoment'snoticethe
systemcandrawuponjusttherightbittohelpitunderstandthetextitisreadingorhearing.Haugeland(1979)drivesthispointhomewithafewaptexamples:
(1)

Ileftmyraincoatinthebathtubbecauseitwasstillwet.(p.621)

(2)

WhenDaddycamehome,theboysstoppedtheircowboygame.Theyput
awaytheirgunsandranoutbacktothecar.(p.625)

(3)

Whenthepolicedroveup,theboyscalledofftheirrobberyattempt.They
putawaytheirgunsandranoutbacktothecar.(p.625)

Strictlyspeaking,theitalicizedtextsareallambiguous.Theitin(1)couldrefertothebathtub,butthatisnotthemostlikelyinterpretation.Thesecondsentencesin(2)
and(3)areidentical.Buttheymeanverydifferentthings,andnospeakerofEnglishwouldpauseforamomentovertheambiguity.Foranyonewiththerightkindof
commonsenseandlinguisticability,thesetextsareunambiguousincontext.Thequestionis,Howdowe(andhowshouldanAIsystem)representtheknowledgethat
enablesustounderstandnaturallanguageincaseslikethisinsuchawaythatwecanmobilizeitjustwhenweneedtoinordertoeffortlesslydisambiguatetextslike
these?
Thisisnotrivialproblem.Supposethatthewayweunderstand(1)isbyretrievingthefactthatputtingaraincoatinabathtubmakessenseiftheraincoatiswet,
butnotifthebathtubis.Thiswouldbeaprettystrangepieceofknowledgetohavefloatingaroundinourheads.Thinkofhowmanyotherslikeitwewouldneedto
haveifthiswerereallyhowweworked:thatgrizzlybearsdon'tlikechampagne,thatthereisnomajorleaguebaseballonUranus,andsoonadinfinitum.
Probably,then,thisisnottherightaccount.
WehaveexploredsomeofthestrategiesthatthefieldofAIusesinordertotrytosolvethisknowledgerepresentationproblem.Framesandscriptsareone
approach.But

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evenframes,withalltheirflexibilityandpower,arenotclearlyadequatetotaskslikethoseposedbythiscollectionofmundanetexts.AsHaugeland(1979)pointsout,
althoughbothabathtubandaraincoatframewouldcontaintheinformationthattherespectiveobjectscouldgetwet,neitherwouldplausiblycontainjustthepieceof
informationweneed.Itwouldalsoappearthatproductionorotherrulebasedsystemswouldhavegreatdifficultywithsuchtexts.Thesesystemsareevenlessflexible
thanframesystemsandmorepronetobeingleddown"gardenpaths"ofmisinterpretation.Thiskindofproblemmaybebestviewedasakintoapatternmatching
problem.Forinstance,someresearchersclaimthatrecognizingletters,words,orfamiliarobjectsissomethingthatismoreeasilyaccomplishedbyconnectionist
systemsthanbyclassicalsystems.Solvingtheseproblemsmaynotrequireagreatmany(orevenany)explicitlystoredstatementsorrules,butinsteadawelltuned
networkthatreliablymapsstimuluspatternsintoactions.Itmaybethatbyvirtueofawelltunedcognitiveneuralconnectionistnetwork,humanbeingsreliablyand
withnoexplicitrelianceonpropositionalknowledgeorinferencerulessimplymapthe"raincoat"situationontotheactionofputtingtheraincoatintothebathtub,and
thatisallthereistoit.Maybemuchofourknowledgeislikethat.This,ofcourse,wouldrepresentadramaticreconceptualizationofwhatandhowweknow.
Theproblemofhowweinfactrepresentthemyriadbitsofinformationweobviouslyrepresentabouttheworldinawaythatallowsustofindjustwhatwewantwhen
wewantitisstillunsolved.Itisacentralproblemofcognitivescience.
Procedural,Declarative,andTacitKnowledge
Indiscussingknowledgerepresentation,wehavebeentalkingaboutknowledgealmostexclusivelyasthoughitis"knowledgethat..."or(tousethephilosopher's
term)declarativeknowledge,thatis,knowledgeofthetruthofdeclarativesentences(forexample,"Puttingaraincoatinabathtubmakessenseiftheraincoatiswet,
butnotifthebathtubis").Butitisfarfromclearthatallofourknowledgeisofthisform.
Traditionalepistemologydistinguishesbetweenknowinghowandknowingthat.Thoughthisdistinctionisnotthesameastheonepsychologistsdrawbetween
proceduralanddeclarativeknowledge,thetwoarecloselyrelated.Muchofourknowledgethatisprobablyencodeddeclaratively,sincemuchofitismobilizedin
controlledprocesses.Similarly,thekindsofautomated,productionstyleskillswehavearetypicallydemonstratedinsituationswhere"knowhow"isthemostapt
characterizationoftheknowledgeinquestion.Anexampleofapieceofproceduralknowledgethatisalsoknowhowisknowinghowtorideabicycle.Wemight
alsoknowdeclarativelythatabicyclehastwowheelsandthatwemustbalanceinordertorideit.Butitisaverydifferentthingtoknowthatwehavetobalanceitand
toknowhowtoaccomplishthatfeat,asanychildwithtrainingwheelswilltestify.Notonlycanwehavesomeknowledgethatwithouthavingthecorresponding
knowledgehowwecanalsoknowhowtodosomethingwithoutknowingthatwedoitinthewaythatwedo.However,thesedistinctionsdonotcoincideexactly.
Wemay,forinstance,knowhowtosolveatrickypuzzlebyvirtueofrepresentingdeclarativelyasetofrulesforitssolution,anditmaybecorrecttosaythatababy
knowsthatcryingwillleadtofeeding,evenifallthatisrepresentedisaproductionrulemediatingahighlyautomatedprocedurethatfireswhenthebaby'sstomachis
empty.Inwhatfollowswewilloversimplifysomewhatandrefertoknowledgethatasdeclarativeknowledgeandknowledgehowasproceduralknowledge,
examiningonlythecaseswherethedistinctioncollapses.

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Giventhatsomeknowledgeappearstobedeclarativeandsomeappearstobeprocedural,wecanbegintoasksomeinterestingquestions.Istheresomeknowledge
thatisnecessarilyproceduralornecessarilydeclarative?Issomeknowledgemoreefficientlyrepresentedprocedurallyordeclaratively?Islinguisticknowledgemore
accuratelycharacterizedprocedurallyordeclaratively?Doesitmakeanyrealdifferencehowwechoosetorepresentaparticularitemorkindofknowledge?Couldall
knowledgeberepresentedonewayortheother?Isknowingwhatthewordhammermeansmorelikeknowingthatithassixlettersorlikeknowinghowtousea
hammer?Doesthedistinctionbetweenclassicalandconnectionistmodelsofthearchitectureofcognitivesystemscorrespondtoorcrosscuttheprocedural/declarative
orthehow/thatdistinction?
InanotherversionoftheargumentwehavecalledRyle'sregress,Ryle(1949)arguedthatproceduralknowledgeismorefundamentalthandeclarativeknowledge
thatis,thatalldeclarativeknowledgepresupposessomeproceduralknowledge,butnotviceversa.Inparticular,manytasksrequiringintelligence,suchasreading,
problemsolving,speakingone'snativelanguage,andcarryingonaconversation,areguidedbyproceduralratherthandeclarativeknowledge.Rylewasconcernedto
argueagainstwhathecalled''theintellectualistlegend"accordingtowhichinordertodoanythingintelligentlywastodoitguidedbysomeinternallyrepresented
declarativeknowledgeaboutthetask.Rylearguedthatthisviewwascommittedtoaninfiniteregressofsuchdatastructures.Foriftodoanythingintelligentlyistodo
itinawayguidedbysomedeclarativeknowledge,thentousetherelevantdeclarativerepresentationsforaparticularintelligenttaskintelligentlywouldrequireusing
declarativeknowledgeaboutwhichinformationtouse,howtouseit,andsoforth,andtousethatknowledgeintelligentlywouldrequireafurtherdatastructure,andso
onadinfinitum.Touseanyinformationwithoutconsultingtherelevantmetainformationwouldbetouseitunintelligentlyhence,theentireoperationwouldbeguided
unintelligentlyandthereforewouldbeunintelligent.Hence,Ryleargued,anyviewofintelligentactionthatrequiresthatactiontobeguidedbydeclarativeknowledgein
ordertobeintelligentmustbemisguided.
Ofcourse,thepointofthisargumentisnotthatthereisnodeclarativeknowledge,oreventhatintelligentbehaviorisnotoftenguidedbydeclarativeknowledge.
Plainly,thereisanditis.Rather,thepointisthatitcannotbedeclarative"allthewaydown."Atsomepoint(perhapsoften,appearancestothecontrary,atthevery
top)theregressofdeclarativerepresentationsmustbottomoutwithatleasttheknowledgeofhowtousetherelevantdeclarativerepresentations.Sincethis
knowledgecannotbedeclarative,onpainoftheregress,alldeclarativeknowledgepresupposesatleasttheknowledgeofhowtoaccessandusethatknowledge,
whereasproceduralknowledgepresupposesnodeclarativeknowledge.Hence,theargumentconcludes,proceduralknowledgeisthemostfundamentalkindof
knowledge.
Notsurprisingly,giventheroleofdeclarativerepresentationsincontemporaryapproachestocognitivescience,notallcognitivescientistsarepersuadedbythis
argument.Fodor(1981)expressesonereplyinthisway:
SomeonemayknowhowtoXandnotknowhowtoanswersuchquestionsas"HowdoesoneX?"Buttheintellectualist[cognitive]accountofXingsaysthat,wheneveryouX,
thelittlemaninyourhead[controlroutineoftheprogramyourun]hasaccesstoandemploysamanualonXingandsurely,whateveris

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hisisyours.Soagain,howareintellectualisttheoriestobesquaredwiththedistinctionbetweenknowinghowandknowingthat?
Theproblemcanbeputinthefollowingway.IntellectualistswanttoarguethatcasesofXinginvolveemployingrulestheexplicationofwhichistantamounttoaspecificationof
howtodoX.However,theywanttodenythatanyonewhoemployssuchrulesipsofactoknowstheanswertothequestion"HowdoesoneX?"
What,thenarewetosayistheepistemicrelation[wayofrepresenting]anagentnecessarilybearstorulesheregularlyemploysintheintegrationofbehavior?Thereisaclassical
intellectualistsuggestion:ifanagentregularlyemploysrulesintheintegrationofbehavior,theniftheagentisunabletoreporttheserules,thenitisnecessarilytruethatthe
agenthastacitknowledgeofthem.(Fodor1981,7374reprintofFodor1968)

Theregress,thislineofargumentsuggests,isgeneratedonlyifweworryinthewrongwayabouthowthebehaviorisexecuted.Ifweinsist,withRyle,thatforthe
behaviortobeexecutedintelligentlyisonething,requiringguidancebydeclarativelyrepresentedrules,andforittobemerelyexecutedisanother,requiringnosuch
guidancebyrepresentations,thenwewillfallpreytotheregress.Butsupposeinsteadthattoexecutethebehaviorrequiresthatthesystemrepresentsomethinglikean
internalmanual(Fodor'stermforastructureofdeclarativelyrepresentedinformation).Supposefurtherthattherelevantdeclarativerepresentationistacit(hence
unconsciousorunavailabletointrospection)andthatthesystemiswiredsoastoaccessthatinformationinordertoexecutethebehavior.Wecanthentreatthe
intelligenceofbehaviorasadescriptionofthequalityoftheinformationusedbythesystem,oroftheproceduresthatmakeuseofit,andnoregressarises.
Thisreplytotheregressinvolvestwokeyinsights.Thefirstistheinsightthattherecanbedeclarativeknowledgethatisnotconscious,thattheorganismisunableto
articulatethatis,tacitknowledge.Toattempttoarguethattheknowledgethatguidesaparticularperformanceisproceduralsimplyonthegroundsthattheperson
ormachineperformingtheprocedurecannotexplainhowitdoesitistoignorethepossibilitythatmuchofourknowledge,whetherproceduralordeclarative,is
inaccessibletoourintrospection.
ThesecondkeyinsightbehindthiscognitivereplytoRyle'sregressisthatinorderforbehaviortobeguidedbyaninternaldeclarativerepresentation,itdoesnot
followthatthesystemneedsafurtherdeclarativerepresentationtoguideitsaccesstothefirstrepresentationalstructure.Atsomepoint,thisreplypointsout,the
operationGettheinformationnecessaryfordialingthetelephonecanbe"wiredinto"thesystem,andanexecutivewhoseonlyjobistoaccesstheright
informationattherighttimesdoesnothavetodomuchmorethanrecognizethosetimes.Hence,evenforbehaviortobeguidedintelligently(thatis,byagood
representationalstructure),allthatisneededisthataratherdumbexecutiveroutinerecognizethatitistimetoactivatethatparticularstructure.Thentheknowledge
containedinthatstructurecanbeusedbydumbprocessestoguideintelligentbehavior.Andthatisthewaythatlargecomputeroperatingsystemswork.
Thislineofargumentiscertainlyplausible,anditmayultimatelybethecorrectreplytotheregressargument.However,itisimportanttonotethatseveralkeyissues
aresweptundertheruginadoptingthisreply,issuesthatarecentraltothe

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epistemologyofcognitivescience.First,ifthebulkoftheknowledgethatguidesintelligentbehavioristoberepresentedexplicitly,albeittacitly,ininternal"manuals"or
someotherkindofdeclarativedatastructure,witharelativelydumbexecutiveactingaslibrarianforthesystem,itisnecessarytospecifywhatthecontentofthese
manualswilllooklike.Itiswellandgoodtofocusonthingslikedialingtelephones,tyingshoes,stackingblocks,andothersuchsimple,selfcontainedoperations.But
istheretobeamanualforconductingaconversationabouttheweather,fordoingliterarycriticism,orforselectingamovie?Whatgetsputinwhatmanual?This,of
course,isaproblemthatgoesbeyondmerelydeclarativedatastructuresandcanberaisedaswellforhighlyproceduralknowledgerepresentationsystems,suchas
productionsystems.Itistheproblemofwhatknowledgetoputwhere,ofhowtoorganizeitforquickaccess,andofhowtodesignanexecutiveadequateforthe
accesstask.
Second,eveniftherewereawaytopartitiontheknowledgewerepresentintoatidylibraryofmanualsforguidingbehavior,itisbynomeansclearthatthe"dumb
executivelibrarian"thatwouldhavethejobofselectingtherightmanualattherighttimewouldhavesuchaneasyjobthatitcouldbeverydumb.Ittakesacertain
amountofjudgmenttoknowwhetheritisappropriatetotaketheRunforYourLifemanualofftheshelfratherthan,say,theFundamentalsofSelfDefensemanual.
MaybebotharepartoftheHowtoCopewithDangermanual.Oncethebooksgetthatfat,however,thelibrarylosesmuchofitspoint,forvastamountsof
proceduralknowledgewillbeneededeventohelpfindtherightchapter.
Considerationssuchasthesesuggestthatitisprobablynecessarywhenthinkingaboutknowledgerepresentationtothinkaboutemployingahealthymixofprocedural
anddeclarativestrategiesforrepresentingnecessaryknowledge(notonlytheknowledgenecessaryfortextunderstandingbutalsotheknowledgenecessaryfor
guidingaction)andthatsimplysolvingtheproblemofhowtorepresentknowledgeaboutsomesmallportionoftheworld(ora"microworld")mayleaveuntouched
thelargerandmorefundamentalproblemofhowtorepresentandorganizethelargeamountsofinformationnecessarytogetaroundinaworldthatresiststidy
compartmentalization.Itisalsoimportant,theseconsiderationssuggest,torememberthatto"know"something,whetheritbeknowledgehoworknowledgethat,is
notnecessarilytoknowconsciouslyitisonlytosomehowrepresenttherelevantinformationinawaythatmakesitaccessibleforinformationprocessing.
LinguisticKnowledge
Asanexampleoftheusefulnessoftheconceptoftacitknowledgeincognitivetheorizing,letusconsidertherepresentationofspecificallylinguisticknowledge.Two
epistemologicallyinterestingclaimsareoftenmadeaboutlinguistic,especiallysyntactic,knowledge:(1)thatalthoughwehavenoconsciousaccesstothem,and
althoughwefrequentlyviolatethem,weknow(theasyetscientificallyunknown)rulesofthesyntaxofournativelanguageand(2)thatourknowledgeofcertain
universalprinciplesandparametersofsyntaxisinnate.
Theseclaimsinitiallysoundpuzzlingsince,althoughthenotionoftacitknowledgemakessense,wemightthinkthattheonlygroundsforassertingthatasetofrulesis
representedtacitlyinasystemisthatthesystemalwaysobeysthem.Afterall,wearebyhypothesisdeniedtheevidenceofthesystem'srecitingtherulestous.Butwe
donotalwaysobeytherulesofourgrammar.Giventhatanyknowledgewehaveoftheserulesmustbetacit,andthattheonlygroundsforattributingtacitknowledge
of

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asetofrulestoasystemisthatitobeysthem,andthatwedonotalwaysobeytherulesofourgrammar,whycanwenonethelesslegitimatelysaythatwetacitlyknow
thoserules?
Theanswertothispuzzleinvolvesdistinguishing,asinchapter6,betweenourlinguisticcompetenceandourlinguisticperformance.Ourlinguisticperformanceis
whatweactuallydo.Itdependsonmanyfactorsthathavenothingtodowithourlinguisticknowledgeorwithcognitivescience:whatweknow,howtiredweare,
howmuchwe'vehadtodrink,whatmusicwe'vebeenlisteningto,andsoon.Ourlinguisticcompetencedescribeswhatweareabletodo,underidealconditions,
simplybyvirtueofourknowledgeofourlanguage.AmodelofEnglishcompetenceisamodeloftheidealizedspeakerofEnglish.Thebusinessoflinguistictheoryisto
explainidealbehavior,linguisticcompetence,andnotthecountlessdeviationsfromcompetenceoccasionedbytheslingsandarrowsofoutrageousfortune.(Thetask
ofexplainingsuchdeviationsislefttootherbranchesofcognitivescience,suchascognitivepsychology,psycholinguistics,and,inextremecases,neuroscience.)Now,
ifthetaskistoexplainourlinguisticcompetence,andifthebestexplanationofourlinguisticcompetenceinvolvessuggestingthatwefollowahighlyarticulatedsetof
rules,thenitseemsthatweareforcedtotheconclusionthatwesomehowrepresentthoserulesinawaythatenablesustoguideourbehavior.Andthat,giventhefact
thatwearecompletelyunabletosaywhatthoserulesare,suggeststhatwetacitlyknowthem.Now,ofcourse,thisisnottosaywhethertheserulesarerepresented
declarativelyorprocedurally,classicallyorconnectionistically(andwhether,ifthelatter,inawaythatactuallyletsusisolatetherepresentationofparticularrulesatall),
oratwhatlevelofanalysistheirrepresentationistobefound.Thatisnoconcernoflinguistics,orevenofepistemology,butratherofempiricalpsycholinguistics.What
turnsouttobethemostefficientforminwhichtorepresentlinguisticknowledgewilldependagreatdealonotherasyetundiscoveredfactsaboutthestructureofthe
humaninformationprocessingsystem.Butitdoesseemclearthatthefactsthatwedonotaccuratelyfollowourgrammarandthatwecannotarticulateitinnoway
impugntheassertionthatwetacitlyknowit.
Thiscompletesourbriefsurveyofsomeofthemajorepistemologicalissuesthatconfrontaphilosopherofcognitivescience.Thereisclearlymuchscopeforworkto
bedone,butitshouldalsobeclearthatphilosophyhasasubstantialcontributiontomake,bothtotheprocessofcomingtoasynopticunderstandingofthenatureand
commitmentsofcognitivescienceandtotheassessment,reformulation,andrevisionofcognitivetheoryandresearch.
8.5TheStateofCognitiveScience
Wehavesurveyedthestructureandontologyofcognitivescienceandsomeoftheepistemologicalproblemsitposes.Wehavedevelopedtheideaofaninformation
processingsystemandexploredthevalueofthatideaasaframeworkforunderstandingthemind.Itisanextremelyfruitfulidea.Thisisobviousfromthepaceand
resultsofresearchincognitivescience.Itisalsoremarkableevidenceinfavorofthisapproachtothestudyofthemindthatithassparkedsuchathoroughandexciting
convergenceofideasandresearchamongpsychology,philosophy,neuroscience,computerscience,andlinguistics.Theviewofthemindthatemergesisboth
scientificallyandphilosophicallycompelling.

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Wehavealsoseenthatincognitivesciencephilosophyisnotamere"commentator"ontheactivitiesoftheotherdisciplines.Philosophyfunctionsasateamplayer,
helpingtodefineproblems,criticizemodels,andsuggestlinesofinquiry.
Butwehavealsoencounteredsomeoutstandingphilosophicalproblemsconfrontingcognitivescience.Thereisthematterofwhatbrandoffunctionalismlooksbestas
anaccountofthemindbodyrelation.Eachversionhascertainadvantages,buteachisbesetwithdeepphilosophicaldifficultiesaswell.Thereistheproblemof
whethertoadoptarealisticinterpretationofcognitivetheory,andofwhattheconsequenceswouldbe.Asoundaccountisneededofthenaturebothofthe
propositionalattitudesandofqualia.Disquietaboutthenatureofthesecomplementaryclassesofpsychologicalstatesleadstodeeperworriesabouttheconnection
betweenmindanditsphysicalsubstratethatpenetratetotheveryfoundationsofthecognitiveapproach.Thesearenotmereconceptualplaythings.Theyare
ontologicalproblemsthatmustbesolubleifthecognitiveapproachiscoherent.Thissituation,ofcourse,isnotuniquetocognitivescience.Allsciencespose
philosophicalproblems,andtheexistenceofdifficultiesdoesnotnecessarilyindicatethatthosedifficultiesareinsuperable.
Theepistemologicalissuesconfrontingcognitivesciencealsoraiseamyriadofoutstandingissues:theknowledgerepresentationproblem,whichisbothformidableand
centraltotheenterprisetheproceduraldeclarativeissueandthemanyproblemsofdetailitraisesandfortunatelyotherproblemsthatphilosophyhasalreadyhelped
tosolveaswellastopose.Again,however,noticingdifficultiesisnottantamounttonoticingcertainfailure,andnothingwehavesaidabouteitherontologicalor
epistemologicalissuescouldbeinterpretedatthisstageasevidenceoftheimminentdemiseofcognitivescience,onlyofmuchwork,andmuchphilosophicalworkat
that,tobedone.
Evenifwehadverygoodreasontobelievethatoneormoreoftheproblemsraisedinthischapterwasindeedinsoluble,andthatbecauseofitsintractabilitythe
informationprocessingapproachtounderstandingintelligenceandhumanbehaviorwasultimatelydoomed,thiswouldnotbeareasontogiveuponcognitivescience.
Afterall,Newtonianphysicsultimatelyturnedouttobefalse,buthaditnotbeenpursued,relativisticphysicscouldneverhavebeenborn.Similaranalogiescanbe
foundinallofthesciences.Itisafactofscientificprogressthattheadventofeachnew,moreclosetotruetheoryorapproachismadepossibleonlythroughthe
workofearlierscientistspursuinganultimatelyfalseorultimatelyunworkableapproach.Thepointofscience,includingcognitivescience,isalwaystopursuethebest
researchprogramgoing,andtopushitasfarasitwillgo.Itwilleitherturnouttobecorrect,or,ifnot,itwillalmostcertainlyleadtothediscoveryofabetter
approach.
SuggestedReadings
Brainstorms(Dennett1978)offersanumberofessaysontopicsinthephilosophicalfoundationsofcognitivescience,focusingprimarilyonquestionsconcerning
intentionalityandtheinterpretationofintentionalpsychologicaltheoriesbutdiscussinganumberofotherrelatedtopicsaswell.Formorediscussionoftherelationof
mindtobrainandoftheroleofneuroscienceincognitivescience,seeMatterandConsciousness(P.M.Churchland1984)orANeurocomputationalPerspective:
TheNatureofMindandtheStructureofScience(P.M.Churchland1989).Foramoredetailedviewoftherelevantneuroscienceinaphilosophicalcontext,see
Neurophilosophy(P.S.Churchland1986)foramorepopulartreatment,seeMinds,Brains,andScience(Searle1984).

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FurtherdiscussionsofphilosophicalproblemsraisedbyAIcanbefoundin"SemanticEngines"(theintroductiontoHaugeland1981)andArtificialIntelligence
(Haugeland1985),inGdel,Escher,Bach:AnEternalGoldenBraid,awideranging,morepopular,andoftenhighlyentertainingandintriguingtreatment
(Hofstadter1979),andintwoparticularlyskepticaltreatmentsofAI,WhatComputersCan'tDo:ACritiqueofArtificialReason(Dreyfus1979)andMinds,
Brains,andScience(Searle1984).GooddiscussionsofthenatureofpsychologicalexplanationandthestructureofcognitivetheoryaretobefoundinTheNature
ofPsychologicalExplanation(Cummins1983)andTheScienceoftheMind(Flanagan1984),andanespeciallycarefultreatmentoftheroleofcomputational
modelsinpsychologicaltheoryinComputationandCognition(Pylyshyn1984).Forinterestingchallengestotherealityofsuchcommonsensepsychologicalstates
aspropositionalattitudes,see(fromtheperspectiveofneuroscience)MatterandConsciousness(P.M.Churchland1984)andNeurophilosophy(P.S.Churchland
1986)and(fromamorecomputationalperspective)FromFolkPsychologytoCognitiveScience:TheCaseagainstBelief(Stich1983).Representations:
PhilosophicalEssaysontheFoundationsofCognitiveScience(Fodor1981)andTheModularityofMind(Fodor1983)offerarticulateexpositionsand
defensesofthefunctionalist,computationalmodelofmind,asdoesComputationandCognition(Pylyshyn1984).BeliefinPsychology:AStudyintheOntologyof
Mind(Garfield1988)offersacriticalsurveyofanumberofproposalsregardingtheattitudesandadefenseofanaturalisticaccountofmind.MentalContents
(McGinn1990)providesadetailedexaminationofthescopeandlimitsofsuchanaturalism.Fortreatmentsofepistemologicalissuesincognitivescience,see
CognitionandEpistemology(Goldman1986)andLanguage,Thought,andOtherBiologicalCategories(Millikan1985).SimpleMinds:Mental
RepresentationfromtheGroundUp(Lloyd1989)offersacompellingintegratedvisionoftheembodimentofmindinsimpleorganismsandmachines,aswellasin
humans,andasensitiveexplorationofthetensionbetweenclassicalandconnectionistmodels.
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Flanagan,O.J.(1984).Thescienceofthemind.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
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Chapter9
LanguageAcquisition
Allnormalhumanchildrenacquireatleastonenaturallanguageintheprocessoftheirdevelopment.Thesuccessfulcompletionofthistaskseemslargelyindependent
ofrace,religion,culture,generalintelligence,orlocation.Infact,manywouldcontendthatthenaturalabilitytoacquirealanguageisthechiefdefiningcriterionforwhat
itmeanstobehuman.Furthermore,itiseasytoseewhytheprocessoflanguageacquisitionshoulddrawsuchconsiderableattentionfromcognitivescientists.The
informationprocessingsystemthatdevelopsinthechildtosubservethelanguagefunctioncanprofitablybeinvestigatedfromeachpointofviewrepresentedinthe
field.Forexample,linguistsexploretherepresentationoftheknowledgethatthechildcomestorepresent,psychologistsandresearchersinartificialintelligence(AI)
studytheprocessesinvolvedintheacquisitionanddeploymentoflinguisticknowledge,andphilosophersinvestigatetheimplicationsofrivallearningtheories,for
instance,withregardtotheepistemologicalstatusoflinguisticknowledge.Finally,althoughwewillnotexploresuchworkhere,neuroscientistsprovideinsightintothe
natureoflanguageacquisitionbyexploringtheemergingneurologicalandbrainmechanismsthatunderlielanguagedevelopment.Forthesereasons,amongothers,the
studyoflanguageacquisitionisattheconfluenceofthesovereigndisciplinesincognitivescience.
Itmayatfirstseemsurprisingthataprocessasomnipresentaslanguageacquisitionshouldbethefocusofsomuchacademicattention.Indeed,priortostudyingthis
field,manycasuallyassumethatthereislittledifficultyinaccountingforhowchildrenlearnlanguagechildrenaresimplytrainedtospeakbyparentsandothersin
theirlinguisticcommunity.Afterall,sincelanguageisrulegoverned,itisnotunreasonabletoassumethatparentssimplyinculcatetheappropriaterulesystemsintheir
children.Onthisview,childrenratherpassivelylearnlanguagebecausetheyaretaught.
Veryquickly,however,ourconfidenceinthissortofanalysisisshaken.Althoughlinguisticknowledgeisrepresentableintheformofrulesystems,thegrammarsthat
linguistswriteaboutarehypothesesaboutunconsciousrules.Weemphasizethehypotheticalnatureofthesegrammarstomakethepointthatgrammars,viewedfrom
aresearchperspective,arescientificconstructs.Therefore,itispresumptuoustoassumethatparentscanfullyarticulatetotheirchildrenlinguisticrulesystemsthat,in
part,resistourbesteffortsatscientificinquiry.Furthermore,parentsdonotgenerallyhaveaccesstotherelevantrulesoftheirlanguage(recall,forinstance,the
analysisofphrasestructureorpluralizationinchapter6).Thatisbecauseourlinguisticknowledgeisunconscious.Althoughwemay,fromtimetotime,havecauseto
reflectonourlanguageuse,wesimplydonothavereliableaccesstothesystematicbodyofknowledgethatunderliesourlinguisticability.Therefore,sinceparents
cannotteachwhattheydonot(knowthey)know,languageacquisitionmustproceedsomewhatdifferentlythanwemighthavethought.

Page380

Thepositionthatvirtuallyalltheoristshaveacceptedisthatparentsgenerallyteachchildrenlanguageonlyinaveryindirectmanner.Ofcourse,parentscontribute
richlytothechild'slinguisticenvironment.Theyillustratethelanguage,ineffect,modelingtheendstatethatthechildisdestinedtoattain.Still,itisuptothechildto
developtheabilitytouselanguageafterthefashionofthelinguisticcommunity.Theinformationprocessingtheorywearedevelopingviewsthesituationroughlyas
follows.Thechildisinitiallyfacedwithaseaoflinguisticdata.Fromthesedatathechildmustabstractthepatternofthelanguagebeinglearned.Ifweconcentrateon
thepartsoflanguageexaminedinchapter6andagreethatthebestrepresentationofthepatternsofalanguageisagenerativegrammarofthatlanguage,thenwecan
recastourpositionbyidentifyingthechild'staskasthatofdeducingthegrammarfromtheavailablelinguisticdata.
Thechild'ssituationisincertainregardsquitesimilartothatinwhichlinguistsfindthemselves.Workingfromdatathatincludeutterancesdrawnfromalanguage,
linguistsattempttowritegrammarsthatdefinethewellformedsyntactic,semantic,andphonologicalstructuresofthatlanguage.Childrenarealsofacedwith
specimensofalanguage,andtheirtask,too,istodiscovertheoperativerulesystems.Forthisreason,thechildhasbeenmetaphoricallydescribedasa"little
linguist"(Valian,Winzemer,andErrlich1981)toemphasizethefactthatlanguagelearnersmustprocessthelinguisticinformationthatsurroundsthemandtest
hypothesesaboutthenatureoftheirlanguageagainstthesedata.
Thisactivemodeloflanguageacquisitionstandsinmarkeddistinctiontothepassivemodel.Itisactiveinthesensethatthelinguisticknowledgethatthechildmust
learnisnotsimplypresentedintheformofagrammarthatcanbeinternalizeddirectlyinstead,linguisticdataarepresented,andthegrammarmustbeactively(butnot
consciously)deduced.Aswehaveseen,theprocessofdeducingagrammarfromlinguisticdataisanimposingintellectualtaskwhenundertakenbyadultscientists.In
fact,ifwecomparetheprogressmadeinlinguistictheoryinthelastthirtyfiveyearstothatmadebyanyrandomlyselectedlanguagelearningchild,wediscoverthatin
learninganativelanguage,thereisasenseinwhichthechildaccomplishesbypubertywhatlinguistshavenotyetmanagedtodoinseveraldecades:extrapolatea
completegrammarfromlinguisticdata.
Thiscircumstanceraisesamultitudeofquestionsaboutthelanguagelearningabilitiesofnormalchildren.Wemustwonderwhatcapacitieschildrenhavebyvirtueof
whichtheylearnlanguagewithsuchfacility.Ourexplanationforhowchildrenlearnlanguagewillcomefromstudyinglanguage,observingandexperimentingwith
children,anddesigningtheoriesoflanguageacquisitionthatexplainthegrowthoflinguisticknowledge.Afterlookingatathumbnailsketchofthecourseoflanguage
development,wewillturntorecentworkincognitivesciencethattriestoexplainthenatureoflanguageacquisition.Wewillconcludewithadiscussionofsomeofthe
philosophicalimplicationsofthiswork.
9.1MilestonesinAcquisition
Babbling
Mostofourknowledgeabouttheearlieststagesoflanguagedevelopmentcomesfromobservationanddiarystudiesandsomeimportantexperimentalresearch.Itis

Page381

usefultodivideearlyacquisitionintotwostages:prelinguisticandlinguistic.Intheprelinguisticstagesthechild'slanguagecapacitymatureswithoutanyclearly
identifiablelinguisticproduction.Still,ataveryearlyageinfact,beforebirthchildrenbegintodevelopinwaysthatbringthemclosertolanguage.Thechild'sfirst
vocalizationisusuallythebirthcry,butwellbeforethis,eveninutero,thereisconsiderablegrowthofstructureandfunctionthatwillcometosubservelanguage(for
example,intheauditorysystemandthecentralnervoussystem).Thereisevensomeevidencethatunbornfetusesarecapableofrememberingmessagesheardbefore
birth(seeReich1986).Verysoonafterbirth,childrencandiscriminatesoundsonthebasisofchangeinvoicing,placeofarticulation,stress,andintonation.
Puttingasidethebiologicalchangesfacilitatinglanguagedevelopmentthattakeplaceintheveryearlymonthsofthechild'slife(Carmichael1964)andtheearliestcries
andvocalizations,itisthebabblingofyoungchildrenatapproximatelysixmonthsofagethatsignalstheonsetoflinguisticproduction.Emergingafterthecooingand
gurglingsoundsthatprecedeit,thebabblingperiodfeaturesmanysoundsoccurringinthelanguagesoftheworld,althoughnotalwaysinthelanguagethechildis
destinedtolearn.Thisstageseemsprelinguisticbyvirtueofthefactthatthesoundsproducedduringthebabblingphaseappearnottobeintendedbythechildto
conveylinguisticmeaning.Butsincebabblingismarkedbyavarietyofsoundsthatareincludedinthechild'stargetlanguage,someresearchers(forinstance,Allport
1924)contendthatbabblingsignalsthebeginningofthechild'scommunicativelinguisticability.Theypointout,forexample,thatthesoundsofthebabblingstage
providetherepertoireoutofwhichchildrenidentifythephonemesoftheirlanguage.However,McNeill(1970),citingworkbyBever(1961),pointsoutthattheorder
inwhichsoundsemergeduringbabblingisgenerallyoppositetothatinwhichsoundsemergeinthechild'sfirstwords.Forexample,backconsonantsandfrontvowels
(e.g.,[k],[g],and[i])appearearlyinthebabblingstagebutquitelateinsubsequentphonologicaldevelopment.ThelinguistOttoJespersenhasnoted,''The
explanationliesprobablyinthedifferencebetweendoingathinginplayorwithoutaplanwhenitisimmaterialwhichmovement(sound)ismadeanddoingthe
samethingoffixedintentionwhenthissoundandthissoundonlyisrequired"(Jespersen1925).
Unlikethecooingsoundsthatprecedeit,thesoundsofthebabblingperiodaretypicallyorganizedintosyllables.InitiallythesehaveC(onsonant)V(owel)structure,
withCVCsequencesemerginglater(Goodluck1991).Althoughthepitchcontoursoftheseearlyutterancesoftenappeartoimitatethoseofthetargetlanguage,there
islittlereasontothinkthatthesesignalsexploitlinguisticmeaninginanysystematicway.Finally,althoughthereisevidencetosuggestthatchildrenbroughtupin
differentlinguisticcommunitiesbabblesomewhatdistinctively,thedifferencesareslightindeed.Apartfromminorvariationsinintonation,thenatureofchildren's
babblingappearstobelargelyindependentoftheirlinguisticenvironment(seeReich1986).
TheFirstWords
Thefirstindisputablylinguisticstageoflanguageacquisitionseemstobetheonewordstage.Atthisstage,whichtypicallyoccurswithinafewmonthsofthechild's
firstbirthday,childrenproducetheirfirstwords.Furthermore,mostofthechild'sutterancesaregenerallylimitedtonomorethanasingleword.Table9.1givesa
sampleoftypicalonewordutterances.Thesefirstwordsarepronouncedquiteabitdifferentlybychildrenthanbyadults.Forexample,Menyuk(1969)reportsthat
thechildresponsible

Page382
Table9.1
Onewordutterances(Menyuk1969)
Noun

Verb

Adjective

Preposition

light

go

nice

up

bottle

look

good

down

car

sit

pretty

on

fortheearlyutterancesintable9.1pronouncedbottleas[batu],caras[ta],andlightas[ai].Severalfactorsappeartocontributetotheunusualpronunciations.
Somesounds,suchas[ ](the"th"soundinthe),appeartobeoutsideyoungchildren'saudiblerangepriortocertainmaturationofthenervesheaths(SalusandSalus
1975).Soundsthataredifficultforchildrentodetectareobviouslydifficultforthemtolearn.Furthermore,somesoundsappeartobearticulatorilydifficultfor
children.Forexample,itisquitecommontofindchildrenwhoarequitelinguisticallyadvancedforwhomthe[r]soundseemsallbutimpossibletopronounce.
Sometimessoundsthatpresentlittledifficultyingeneralcanbecomedifficulttoproduceintheenvironmentofcertainothersoundsorincertainwordpositions.For
example,childrenattheonewordstagefrequentlyomitfinalconsonantsounds,thepronunciation[ailforlightbeingacaseinpoint.Final[1]soundsthatconstitutea
syllablealsoprovideanarticulatorychallenge,aswitnessedinthepronunciationofbottleas[batu].Noticethatthisexampleinvolvesmispronouncingthefinal[1]
soundasa[u]ratherthanomittingitcompletely.Thepronunciationof[k]as[t]incar([ta])isanotherexampleofasubstitutionphenomenon.
Otherveryinterestingclassesofearlyphonologicalerrorsdonotseemtobeattributableeithertoauditoryortoarticulatorycomplexity.Thesimplesttypeinvolves
soundssuchas[],which,curiously,developsaftermanyothervowelsareinplace.Thisissurprisinginlightofthefactthatoverthreequartersofyoungchildren's
cryingconsistsofthevowel[](seeReich1986),and,asDale(1972)pointsout,[]occursquitefrequentlyinEnglishinwordssuchasbad,cat,andhand.
Furthermore,thesearewordsthatchildrenarelikelytoencounter,suggestingthatthefrequencyofasoundinthechild'slinguisticenvironmentmaynotbeagood
predictorofhowreadilythatsoundwillbeacquired.
ThefactthatchildreninitiallyproducesyllableswithCVandlaterCVCstructurealsoisatoddswiththecorrelationwemightexpecttofindbetweentheformofthe
primarylinguisticdata(thetotalityoflinguisticinputavailabletothechild)andtheformofthechild'sverbaloutput.Earlyintheonewordstage,childrenwhoare
exposedtoarangeofsyllabletypesinEnglishdeleteorsubstitutesoundsintheirownspeechtoconformtoCV(andlaterCVC)skeletons(Goodluck1991).Later,
whentheycanarticulateconsonantclustersastheonsetsofsyllables,theystilltendtosimplifyCCCVsequences(suchasstraw([ ]))(Smith1973).AsGoodluck
(1991)pointsout,thisisasituationinwhichEnglishspeakingchildrenemployaconsonantclustersequencethatdoesnotappearinthelanguagetowhichtheyare
exposed([sr])whileeschewingacluster([st])thatappearsregularly(inCCV...structureslikestore,stop,andsoon).Byinvestigatingtheprinciplesofinformation
processingthatareatworkinthecourseoflanguageacquisition,researchershopetoexplainthesediscrepanciesbetweenwhatthechildhearsandwhatthechild
says.

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AccordingtoonetheoryofphonologicaldevelopmentduetoJakobson(1968),"Itisthefrequencyinthelanguagesoftheworld,andnothowfrequentthephoneme
isintheparticularlanguagethechildhears,thatisimportant"(Dale1972,212).Indeed,toreturntoourearlierexamples,the[]soundisquiterareacrosstheworld's
languages,and[sr]and[tr]clustersaremorefrequentthan[str]or[st]clusters,justasthisaccountwouldpredict.
Itisquiteinterestingtoaskwhatfeatureoflearningorcognitioncouldaccountforthiscorrelationbetweenlinguisticuniversalsandtheorderofphonological
development.Clearly,childrenarenotawareofuniversallinguisticgeneralizations,andeveniftheywere,itisnotclearwhythiswouldfacilitatetheacquisitionofthe
morewidelydistributedfeaturesoflanguage.Theexplanationthatwewilladvancebelowisthatuniversally(orwidely)distributedlinguisticphenomenaarereadily
learnablebecauseofthenatureofthehumanlanguagelearningsystem.Thatis,thechild'smindisnaturallydisposedtoassociatecertainkindsoflinguisticpatterns
withandidentifycertainkindsoffeaturesinagivenrangeofprimarylinguisticdata,and,therefore,thesepatternsandfeaturesaremostwidelydistributedcross
linguistically.Wewillreturntothispointinalatersection.
Anothersortofphonologicalmistakethatyoungchildrenarepronetomakethatisprobablynotbestexplainedarticulatorilyorauditorilyinvolvescertainsystematic
soundsubstitutionssuchasthefollowingreportedbydeVilliersanddeVilliers(1978)(seealsoSmith1973andStampe1972).Onechildtheydiscusspronounced
thewordpuzzleas[p gl]andpuddleas[p zl].Theexplanationforwhythechildfailedtopronouncethe[z]inpuzzlecannotbetheunavailabilityofthesoundina
phoneticrepertoire,sincethemispronunciationofthe[d]inpuddleshowsthatthe[z]soundisavailable.Rather,thebestexplanationseemstorequiretheassumption
thatchildrenarelearningcomplexrepresentationsandrelationsbetweensoundsthatlinguistsrepresentasphonologicalrules,andthattheycanentertainfalse
hypothesesaboutthenatureoftheserulesandrepresentations,leadingtomistakenpronunciations.Childrenseemtobelearningasoundsystem,notmerelyan
inventoryofsounds.
Childrenattheonewordstagenotonlypronouncewordsdifferentlythandotheadultsintheirlinguisticcommunitybutalsomeandifferentthingsbythewordsthey
use.Forexample,itisusualforchildrentoinnovativelycoinsomeoftheirfirstwords.Althoughsomeoftheseidiosyncraticformsarebasedonimperfectimitation,
othersarenovel,andbothtypesmust,ineffect,belearnedbythechild'sparentstodeterminethechild'smeaning.Whenmoreconventionalformsdoemerge,many
researchershavenotedthatchildrenseemtoexpresscomplexandsometimesunusualmeaningsbyquitelaconicutterances.Itisasiftheyareproducingoneword
sentencesthatareintendedtorepresentcompletethoughts.Thisuseoflanguage,calledholophrasticspeech,indicatesthatchildren'sconceptualdevelopmenttends
tooutstriptheirlinguisticdevelopmentattheseearlystagesofacquisition.Wemustdrawthisconclusioncautiously,however,sincejudgmentsaboutwhatchildren
meanatbeginningdevelopmentalstagescanbedifficulttomakewithconfidence.
Inaccessingtheseandotherpropertiesofthechild'ssemanticsystem,wemustconsiderthequestionsaboutthenatureofmeaningdiscussedinchapter10.In
particular,itisimportanttoclarifyjustwhatsortofknowledgethechildmustmasterduringtheprocessoflanguageacquisition.Frege'sdistinctionbetweensenseand
referenceisrelevantwecanexplorehowchildrenformandorganizemeaningsandhowtheylearntorefer.

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Infact,initially,pairingsofwordswithreferentsmaynotinvolvereferenceatall.Children'searlyusesofwordsmayinsteadinvolvealoosertypeofassociation.Atthis
stage,althoughchildrencansometimessuccessfullymatchwordswithanappropriateobject,theymaybeabletodosoonlyinthecontextofaritualorgame.For
example,althoughchildrenmaybeabletonameanobjectinapicturebook,theymayfailtocorrectlylabelanactualoccurrenceofthesameobject.Aschildren
developfullyreferentialusesofwords,theybecomeabletonameobjectsintheabsenceofpromptingorastereotypicalcontext,toreasonaboutobjectsthatare
referredtobutabsent,andlatertoretrieverequestedobjectsbythemselvesfromaremotelocation.
Theconceptsthatchildrenassigntowordsalsopassthroughinterestingstagesofdevelopment.Clark(1973)andAnglin(1977)haveshownthatchildren'sfirst
meaningsdepartsystematicallyintworatheroppositewaysfromthoseoftheadultspeechcommunity.Incertaincaseschildrenusewordstorefertoan
inappropriatelywiderangeofobjects.Forexample,carmightbeusedtorefertolargeobjectsthatmoveortoanyobjectprovidingtransportation.Intheopposite
casechildrenusewordsinanoverlyrestrictivemanner,referringtoasometimesdrasticallylimitedsubsetoftherangeofpermissiblereferents.Achildusingdogonly
asthenameofthefamilydogwouldbeacaseinpoint.
Theseoverextensionsandunderextensionsarequitefrequentintheearlyspeechofchildrenbuteventuallydecreasetothepointwherethechild'slexiconis
qualitativelysimilartotheadult's.Clark'saccountofsemanticacquisitioncruciallyinvolvestheassumptionthatchildrenlearnwordmeaningsbybundlingtogether
semanticfeaturesthatcollectivelyconstitutetheconceptexpressedbyaterm.Ineffect,thishypothesisaboutlexicaldevelopmentseesthechildamassingadatabase
whoseprimitives,semanticfeatures,areassociatedasagroupwithasinglenode,inturnassociatedwithalexicalitem.Ifachildmistakenlyassociatestoomanyortoo
fewfeatureswithagiventerm,theresultingconceptwillbeoverlyrestrictiveoroverlygeneral,respectively,leadingtooverandunderextensioninreference.
Althoughthedetailsofthisexplanationarecontroversial(Carey1978),theideathatchildrenconstructconceptsoutofsomekindofconceptualprimitivesislessso.
Asinthecaseofphonologicalacquisition,then,thereisevidencethatchildrenacquireabstractrepresentationsontheirwaytolearningtheirlanguage,evenatthevery
earlieststagesofacquisition.
Thusfarinourinvestigationoftheonewordstagewehaveconcentratedonwhatchildrenunderstandaboutthemeaningandpronunciationoftheirfirstwords.Before
leavingthisstage,however,weshouldbrieflyconsiderwhatisknownabouthowchildrenfirstidentifywordsasthebasiccurrencyoflanguage.Thecentralquestionto
askinthisregardishowchildrendeterminewhatthewordsoftheirlanguageare.Inparticular,howarechildrenabletoindividuatethewordsinthespeechstreamto
whichtheyareexposed?
Sincetypicallytherearenopausesbetweensoundsinawordorbetweenwordsinaphraseinnormalarticulation,childrenmustgenerallyrelyonsomecueotherthan
interveningperiodsofsilencetoidentifythepartsofthespeechstream.Thisrequiresparsingacontinuousspeechsignalintoconstituents(forexample,phonemes,
morphemes,words,andphrases)thatarenotobviouslyphysicallydemarcated.
Indeed,incertaincaseschildrenmakemistakesinthistask,forexample,takingIpledgeallegiancetobeIpledgealegions.Thesesortsoferrorssometimespersist
andcanevenbecomepartofthelanguage.Forexample,thecurrentformanapronderives

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historicallyfromanapron(compareanapkin,whichdidnotundergothischange).Generally,however,childrenaresuccessfulinidentifyingthecorrectunitsof
analysis.Intheabsenceofphysicalgapsbetweenphonemesandwords,then,howdochildrenidentifythesebasicelementsoflanguage?
Inthecaseofphonemesevidence(duetoEimasetal.1971)suggeststhatchildrenarebiologicallyspecializedtoidentifyphonemicsoundsinspeech.Veryyoung
children(ontheorderoftwomonthsofage)showsensitivitytovoicingandotherphoneticfeaturesthatdistinguishphonemes,suggestingthat"languagelearnershave
relevantinformationinadvanceabouttheinventoryofpossiblephoneticelements"(Gleitmanetal.1988,154emphasisadded).Inotherwords,phonemedetection
seemstobeaninnatecapacityofthelanguagelearner.
Evidenceforthispositioncomesfromstudiesoftheabilityofveryyoungchildrentodetectfeatureslikevoicingandaspiration,whicharecapableofdistinguishing
phonemesinmanylanguages.Forexample,inEnglishandmanyotherlanguagesvocalcordvibrationoccurringinatimeframefromconsonantalreleasetoabout20
30millisecondsafterreleaseisassociatedwiththeconsonant,whichisconsequentlyperceivedasvoiced(forexample,as[b]ratherthan[p]).Thereare,however,
somelanguages(forinstance,ThaiandSpanish)thatemploydifferenttimeenvelopesforvoicing.So,justasEnglishcontainssomerelativelyunusuallinguistic
properties(suchasthevowel[]andtheinitialconsonantcluster[str]),therearelanguageswithunusualvoiceonsetdelays.
Furthermore,theremaybealearningtheoreticconsequenceofthespecialvoiceonsettimeinSpanish.StudiesofSpanishspeakingchildrensuggestthatuptotheage
ofaboutsixmonths,theycontinuetousetheregulardiscriminationboundariesforvoicingeventhoughtheirtargetlanguageemploysdifferentvalues(Lasky,Syrdal
Lasky,andKlein1975).AsReich(1986)suggests,SpanishlearningchildrenmaybesomewhatdelayedintheirabilitytodiscriminatepartsoftheSpanishphonemic
inventory.Thisprovidesindirectevidencethatthereisaninnatephonemedetectioncapacitythatisatleasttemporarilyfrustratedwhenthelanguagetobelearned
exhibitsidiosyncratictimingenvelopesorotherunusualfeatures(seeGoodluck1991forfurtherdiscussion).
Althoughthereissomesupportfortheclaimthatphonemedetectionnormallyexploitsabiologicalcapacity,inthecaseofidentifyingthewordsofalanguagewemust
pursueadifferentexplanation.Foralthoughitmaybepossibleforachildtobeinnatelypredisposedtoidentifytherangeofphonemesavailableinthelanguagesofthe
world,itisimplausibletobelievethatdiscoveryproceduressufficientforthetensofthousandsofvocabularyitemsineachlanguage(past,present,andfuture!)could
bepartofhumangeneticendowment.How,then,doesthechildefficientlyindividuatewordsintheflowoflanguage?
Gleitmanetal.(1988)arguethatwordidentificationisinitiallybootstrappedbythechild'sattentiontothefeatureoflinguisticstress.Thatis,thepartsofthespeech
streamthatbearstressaresalientforthechild.Thismayexplainwhystressedsyllablesarethefirsttobepronounced(forexample,raffforgiraffe)why,when
wordshavebothstressedandunstressedforms(forexample,not/n't),theformerarelearnedfirst(Bellugi1967)andwhywordsthatgenerallylackstress(for
instance,functionwordsinEnglish)areomittedfromearlyspeech(butseebelowforanotherexplanation).Onthisview,childrenattheonewordstageidentify
stressed

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syllablesastheirfirst"words,"incorporatingunstressedmaterialatalaterstageofdevelopment.
Thus,eventhoughourfirstassumptionsaboutlanguageacquisitionviewedchildrenassimplyacquiringsoundsandmeanings,ourcursoryinvestigationofthechild's
firstwordsindicatesthatthestrategieschildrenusetoextractlinguisticpatternsarequitesophisticated.Furthermore,eventhelinguisticknowledgeacquiredbythe
averageoneyearoldtakestheformofarichsystemofrulesandrepresentationsthatmustbededucedfromthechild'sexperiencewithalinguisticcommunity.Early
linguisticdevelopmentismarkedbyconsiderableprogress,aswellasbymistakesandmismatchesbetweenthechild'sandtheadult'sgrammar.Indeed,itisoften
preciselythechild'slinguisticerrorsthatprovidethedeepestinsightsintothenatureoftheacquisitionprocessandthecognitivemechanismsofthechild'semerging
informationprocessingsystem.
TheEmergenceofSyntax
Attheonewordstageofdevelopmentwerestrictedourdiscussiontothesemantic,phonetic,andphonologicalaspectsoflanguagedevelopment.Asfarasthechild's
earlylinguisticproductionisconcerned,thereislittleevidenceatthisstageofmasteryofthesyntacticrulesystem.Mostlexicalitemsareuninflected,theredonot
appeartobedistinctlexicalcategories,andanswerstowhquestionsarenotreliablycategoricallycorrect(Radford1990).Asthechild'sutterancesexpandinlength
totwowords,itbeginstobepossibletoexaminesyntacticdevelopment,atleastinarudimentaryfashion.Examplesoftwowordutterancesmightincludemommy
sock,allgonesticky,morecookie,andfixshoe.Justasintheonewordstage,thepronunciationsandintendedmeaningsofthespokenwordsmaydeviatefromthe
adultmodel.Fornow,however,letusrestrictourattentiontosyntacticstructure.
Apopularearlyhypothesisconcerningthepatternofthesetwowordutterances(Braine1963)contendedthatchildrenorganizedvocabularywordsintotwolexical
classescalledpivotandopen.Itwasclaimedthatchildren'stwowordutteranceswerecomposedofeithertwoopenclasswordsoroneopenclasswordandone
pivotclassword,ineitherorder.Onewordutteranceswouldbeselectedsolelyfromtheopenclass,withtheresultthatpivotpivotsequencesandpivotsingletons
weresupposednottooccur.Theassignmentofwordstooneclassortheotherwouldneedtobediscoveredforeachindividualchildbylookingcarefullyat
productiondata.If,forexample,achildproducedballononeoccasionandhitonanother,eachwordwouldbeassignedtotheopenclassforthechildinquestion,
sinceonlypivotwordswerearguedtoappearaloneinonewordutterances.Thistheorywouldthereforepredictthatballhitandhitballshouldbepossible
utterancesforthischild.Conversely,anywordusedbythechildthatfailedtoappearaloneinasinglewordutterancewouldbeassignedtothepivotclass,andthe
theorywouldpredictthatnotwosuchwordswouldbestrungtogetherinatwowordutterance.
Asresearcherslookedmorecloselyattheutterancesproducedbychildrenatthetwowordstage,anumberofcounterexamplestothepivotopenhypothesis
emerged.Nevertheless,evenatthisearlystageofdevelopmentthechildseemstobefollowingagrammar.ThespeechoftwentyeightmontholdAdam,achild
studiedbyRogerBrownandhiscolleagues(BrownandFraser1963),wasdescribedbyMcNeill(1970)bythefollowingthreephrasestructurerules:

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Sampleutterancesgeneratedbythisgrammarincludedoggieeat,thatflower,Adamwrite,andputon.AsMcNeillpointedout,itisunsurprisingthatthechild'sfirst
grammarshouldbesosimple.Nevertheless,despitethetinynumberofrules,theconceptsofoptionalityandorderalreadyseemtobeinplace,indicatingthatcertain
ofthekeyprinciplesofthedevelopinglinguisticsystemhaveemergedatthisearlystageofdevelopment.
Ascombinationsofwordsemerge,thechildbeginstosystematicallyestablishrelationshipsbetweenthem.Theearliestsuchrelationsappeartoincludethoseof
modifiermodifiedandagentaction.Inthefirstcase,takingmorecookieasanexample,thechildmustcometograspthatmorespecifiesanamountofcookieand
mustnotbeinterpretedasthesubjectofcookie,perhapsmeaningthatmorestandsforsomethingthatisa(kindof)cookie.Theexampledoggieeatmaywellinvolve
aninterpretationinwhichthedogisthesubjectofeatandcarriesouttheassociatedaction.Thepointisthattheorderandjuxtapositionoftermsdonotpredictthe
natureofthesemanticrelationshipbetweenthosetermsinanysimplemanner,eveninalanguagelikeEnglishthatisquitesensitivetowordorderinsentence
construction.Thesesemanticrelations(sometimescalledthematicrelations)developovertime,apparentlybeginningatthetwowordstage.Someresearchers,such
asBloom(1970)andBowerman(1973),haveproposedthatthematicrelationsconstitutethefirstimportantstructuralrelationsthatthechildusestoconstruct
multiwordutterances,suggestingthatthechild'sfirstgrammarmaybebestdescribedinthematicterms.Suchasystemmightanalyzesentencesintermsofcategories
likeagentandactioninsteadofthesyntacticcategoriesNounPhraseandVerbPhrase.
Againstthis,however,Radford(1990)arguesthattheincreasinguseofinflectionsandthegrowingabilitytoreplytowhquestionswithanswersintheproper
syntacticcategorysuggestthatchildrenhavebeguntounderstandpartsofspeechandtoemployanessentiallysyntacticorganizationofthegrammar,oftenbeforetheir
secondbirthday.Radfordalsoprovidesevidencethatchildrenatthisstageorganizesentencesintermsofhierarchicalstructure,as,forexample,inthecaseofrule
(2),whichanalyzesaDETNsequenceasasingleconstituent.
Anothersuggestion,madebyBerwickandWeinberg(1983),isthatchildren'searlygrammarsarebasedontheassumptionthateachsyntacticstructureiscorrelated
withexactlyonethematicstructure.Thus,attheseearlystagesofdevelopmenteveryNPVPsequencewouldbeinterpretedbyanagentactionrelationship,and
similarlyforothersyntacticsequences.However,thereissomeevidencethatbythelaterportionofthetwowordstagechildrenarecapableofassociatingasingle
syntacticstructurewithmorethanonethematicstructure,andofassociatingasinglethematicstructurewithmorethanonesyntacticstructure(Radford1990).This
suggeststhatbythisstagechildrenhavedevelopedabstractsyntacticrepresentationsthattheyassociatewiththematicrepresentations.Inotherwords,childrenatthe
latetwowordstage

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seemtohavealreadydevelopedanautonomouslevelofsyntacticrepresentationthatmediatesbetweensoundandmeaning,justasitdoesinadultgrammars.
Thereare,ofcourse,anumberofwaysinwhichthelinguisticsystemsofchildrenatthisstageofdevelopmentdifferfromtheadultsystem.Inadditiontowaging
continuedstruggleswithpronunciationandmeaning,childrendeviateinquiteinterestingwaysfromthesyntacticpatternoftheadultspeechcommunity.Obviously,
theyproducemuchbriefersentencesmoreover,mostoftheirutterancesareinnovativeinthattheyarenotimitationsofadultspeech.Someoftheexamplesoftwo
wordutteranceswehavediscussedsuchasallgonestickyclearlysuggestthatcreativespeechisalreadypresent.Whyitshouldbethatchildrenpassthroughthis
stageofdevelopmentremainspoorlyunderstood.Itmayturnoutthatextragrammaticalfactorssuchaslimitationsofmemoryorattentionspanaccountforrestricted
production.Whatisclear,however,isthatchildrendoindeedgothroughaprocedureofgrammarconstructionthatisinevidenceattheearlieststagesofmultiword
utterances.
BeyondtheTwoWordStage
Althoughtheoneandtwowordstagesoflanguagedevelopmentdonothaveprecisebeginningsandendings,theyareplateausreliablyfoundinchildren'spatternsof
languageacquisition.Afterthetwowordstage,however,theredonotseemtobeeasilyidentifiablestagescorrespondinginanysimplewaytothenumberofwords
perutterance.Moreover,soonaftertheirsecondbirthday,childrenlearninginflectedlanguagessuchasEnglishbegintotacklethesystemofprefixesandsuffixesthat
inpartcomposethemorphologyoftheirlanguage,andthisprecipitatestheneedforamorefinegrainedmeasureoflinguisticdevelopment.Thecalculationofthe
meanlengthofutterance(MLU)intermsofthenumberofmorphemesperutteranceallowsustotakethedevelopmentofinflectionalsystemsintoconsideration.
Asthechild'sMLUshootsupward,thecomplexityofthegrammarthatgenerateseachsuccessivebodyofnewdataitselfbecomesmorecomplicatedbothinthe
numberandinthetypeofrulesinvolved.AlthoughAdam'sgrammarattwentyeightmonthscomprisedonlythreephrasestructurerules,atthirtysixmonthsthesame
child'sverbaloutputwasanalyzedbyagrammarthatBrown,Cazden,andBellugi(1970)judgedtoincludeoveradozenphrasestructurerulesaswellasseveral
transformationalrules,includingatransformationforformingquestions.Theutterancesproducedbytwoandthreeyearoldsare,again,oftenillformedbyadult
standards.ThefollowingexamplesofthespeechoftwotothreeyearoldswithMLUinthevicinityoffivemorphemesperutterancearetypical(theutterancesare
takenfromvarioussources):
(4)

Countabuttons.

Itfellinsandbox.

Themonster'scoming.

Mommytryit.

Whatthat?

Nosithere.

Wherethosedogsgoed?

Puttruckwindow.

Incontrasttotheholophrasticspeechofchildrenatearlierdevelopmentalstages,thespeechofchildrenatthislevelofdevelopmenthasbeendescribedas
telegraphicspeech.Thefinalexamplein(4)clearlyillustrateswhatismeantbythislabelinthatthe

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childhasomittedthesmallfunctionwords,inthiscasethedeterminerandthepreposition,muchassomeonewithaneyetowardeconomywouldphraseatelegram.
Radford(1990)suggeststhattelegraphicspeechgenerallyarisesbecauseofthebasicorganizationofchildren'searlygrammars,whichfailstoprovidesyntactic
representationforfunctionalcategories.
Thesyntacticformofearlyquestionsisalsoquiteintriguing.Bothoftheinterrogativesin(4)revealsomedifficultywiththeprocessofauxiliaryinversion,whichplaces
averbalelement(inthesecases,isanddid)totheleftofsubjectpositioninwhquestions.InthecaseofWhatthat?theverbisisomittedfromthesentence,atypical
featureofchildren'sspeechatthisstage.ThesecondquestionexhibitsseveraldeparturesfromadultEnglish.Inadditiontothepreviouslynotedomissionofdid,the
tenseofthesentenceisdisplayedonthemainverbasgoed.Aswewillnowsee,theinvestigationofsuchillegalpasttenseformscanrevealquiteabitabouthowthe
childorganizeslinguisticknowledge,evenatthisrelativelyearlystageofdevelopment.
IrregularityandLinguisticRepresentation
Itisquitecommontofindthatchildrenpassthroughanumberofstagesbeforetheymastercorrectirregularpasttenseforms,suchasthealternationbetweengoand
went.Kuczaj(1978)proposesthatthisdevelopmentalsequencebeginswithchildrenoccasionallyusingthecorrectpasttenseformsofirregulars(forexample,
went),withtheincorrectformsrarelyinevidence.Nexttheybegintointroduceformssuchasgoed,withsomeusesofthecorrectformsstillpersisting.Inathirdstage
childrenaddasecondtypeoferrorthatinvolvesapplyingtheregularpasttenseruletotheirregularpasttenseform(forexample,wented),althoughagainthey
continuetousetheearlierforms(wentandgoed).Finally,theincorrectformsdropoutofuse,resultinginthereliableuseofthecorrectirregularforms,althoughthis
processtakesyearstoworktocompletion.Inacarefulstudyofthefrequencyofformssuchasgoed,Marcusetal.(1992)foundthatsuchformsarequiterare,with
amediandistributionof2.5percentinover11,000irregularpasttenseutterancesoftheeightythreechildrentheystudied.However,theywereabletoconfirmthat
children'suseoftheincorrectformscontinuesataconstantrateforseveralyearsandthattheintroductionoftheseformsfollowsaperiodinwhichchildrenusethe
correctforms(aphenomenontheycallUshapeddevelopment).
Itisofconsiderableinteresttoestablishwhychildrentakethesebackwardstepsduringlanguageacquisition.Oneexplanationsuggeststhatchildrenatfirstsimply
imitatethecorrectpasttenseform,went.Atalaterpoint,aftertheyhaveacquiredthegeneralruleforpasttenseformation,theycreativelyapplyittothebaseform
go,eventhoughtheyhaveneveractuallyheardtheformgoedintheirlinguisticenvironment.Atthenextstagechildrenappeartomoveclosertotheideathatallpast
tenseformsshouldhaveovertpastmorphology(ed),yieldingasecondclassofincorrectforms.Intimechildrenmustlearnthattheirregularpasttensewentisthe
onlyappropriateform,althoughmanychildrenresistthisconclusionforsometime.
Inthiscase,then,theemergenceofalinguisticruleactuallyleadsthechildawayfromidentifyingthecorrectlinguisticforms.Ofcourse,inregularcasesthissamerule
constitutesapowerfullearningdevicethatallowsthechildtoincorporatealargenumberofcorrectformsasasingleclassofphenomenaratherthanonacaseby
casebasis.Finally,thepersistenceofincorrectformsovertimeprovidesintriguingevidencethatrevealstheextenttowhichtheacquisitionoflinguisticknowledgeis
shapedbylinguisticrulesystems.

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Althoughthisemphasisonrulesystemsasexplanationsforcognitivephenomenaisahallmarkofmostclassicalapproachestocognitivescience,intheconnectionist
paradigmitisassumedthatthefundamentalunitofprocessingandrepresentationisanelementthathasmoreincommonwithasimple(ifabstract)neuron.Onthis
view,knowledgewhetherinformationabouttheworld,memory,ortherepresentationoflinguisticgeneralizationresidesinacomplexofconnectivitythatarisesin
themindastheresultoftheinteractionofmyriadverysimpleprocessingunits.Inmostconnectionisttheories,knowledgedoesnotindeed,cannottaketheformof
abstractrulesandhigherorderstructuresthataretypicalofcontemporarylinguistictheoriesaswellasoftheaccountsoflanguageacquisitionthatdrawinspiration
fromsuchtheories.Notionsliketransformationalruleorphrasestructuretree,forexample,canhavenoindependentstatusinaconnectionistmodel,since
whateverknowledgetheyembody,likeeverythingelseinthemind,isultimatelybuiltoutofsimple,relativelyhomogeneousprocessingunitsthatarenotuniquely
dedicatedtospecialtasksliketherepresentationoflinguisticknowledge.Onthecontrary,fortheconnectionist,thereareno''executiveorotheroverseer"units
(RumelhartandMcClelland1986a)thatregulatecognitivesystems.
Connectionistmodelshavebeendevelopedinanumberofdomainsoflinguisticrepresentation,thoughasyettherearefewthatarecapableofhandlingthekindsof
problemswehavebeendiscussing.However,oneofthemostinterestingandcontroversialconnectionistmodelsisRumelhartandMcClelland's(1986b)accountof
thechild'scapacitytolearnandusetheEnglishpasttensesystem,ananalysisthatbearsonthediscussionofirregularpasttenseformsthatwehavejustdeveloped.
Tobeginwith,letusrecalltheanalysisofpasttenseformsprovidedbyasymboliclinguistictheoryofthekinddescribedinchapter6.Weassumethatthespeakerhas
learnedasetofphonologicalrulesofessentiallythefollowingform:
(5)

Pasttenseformation

Ifaverbstemendsinavoicedsegment(forexample,hug),addthepast
tenseending/d/totheendofthestem

Ifaverbstemendsinavoicelesssegment(forexample,lick),add/t/tothe
endofthestem

Unlesstheverbstemendsinacoronalstop/t/or/d/(forexample,wantor
seed),inwhichcase,add/ /regardlessofthevoicingofthefinalsegment.

Inadditiontotheserules,about150verbsinEnglishincludinggo,eat,hit,see,andleaveareunusualinthattheyundergooneofasetofspecialpasttensechanges.
Thesemightinvolveaninternalvowelchange,asinring rangorleave left,or,inthecaseofgo went,acompletelyirregularalternation.Attheheartofour
explanationofthedevelopmentalsequenceforregularandirregularpasttenseformsisthemultilayeredsetofinterrelatedrulesandrepresentationscruciallyincluding
(1)alexiconofunderlyingrepresentations,(2)asetofmorphologicalprinciplesforconstructingcomplexwordsfrombasicunderlyingrepresentations,(3)asetof
phonologicalrulesthatdeterminethephoneticpropertiesofthoserepresentations,and(4)aphoneticoutputconsistingofdirectinstructionsforpronouncingwords.
InRumelhartandMcClelland's(1986b)model(henceforthRM),therearenophonologicalruleslikethosein(5),nomorphologicalconstructssuchaswordorverb
stem,

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andnostructural/positionalnotionssuchasendofstemorwordboundary.TheRMmodel'sinternalknowledgestateisaconnectionistnetworkofweightednodes
thatdirectlyrepresentstheprobabilitiesthatcertaintypesofverbswillbeassociatedwithparticularinflected(pasttense)phoneticforms.Thisisaccomplishedby
trainingthemodelprovidingitwithsufficientexamplesofactualpairsofuninflectedandpasttenseforms.Theonlyrelevantmechanisminthemodelisapattern
associatorwithtwolayersofnodes,thefirstofwhichrepresentsuninflectedverbsasinput,andthesecondofwhichproducesinflectedpasttenseverbsasoutput.
Onthewhole,theRMmodeldoesaremarkablejobofproducingappropriatepasttenseoutputswithouteverhavingbeentrainedonordirectlyrepresentingarule.
Furthermore,themodel,ifultimatelysuccessful,wouldprovideanaccountoflinguisticknowledgeinwhichtheverynotionofanexplicitrulesystemwasunnecessary.
Ifconnectionistmodelsofthissortwereabletoaccomplishthisgoalforthefullrangeoflinguisticgeneralizationsthatlinguistscandiscern,muchofthedebatearound
thenatureoflinguisticrepresentationmightberesolved.Inparticular,therewouldbenogroundsforassumingaspecialroleforgrammar,independentofother
systemsofknowledgeineffect,therewouldbenogrammar.Thisisjustasthe(radical)connectionistswouldhaveit,sincetheirviewofcognitionisthatitisuniformly
basedonanonmodular,homogeneouslearningandrepresentationalsystem.
TheRMmodelhasbeencriticizedonanumberofcounts,however.PinkerandPrince(1988)arguethatthemodelfailsinanumberofcrucialrespectsasanaccount
oftheEnglishspeaker'sknowledgeofthepasttenseformationprocess.Foronething,whenthemodelwasaskedtoproducepasttenseformsforverbsonwhichit
hadnotbeentrained,itexhibitedahighproportionofincorrectresponses(33percent).Recallingourearlierdiscussionofthegoedwentalternation,wemightask
howtheconnectionistmodelbehavedincasesinwhichchildrenproduceincorrectpasttenseformsforirregularverbspreciselythecasesoftheovergeneralization
ofaruletoanexceptionalirregularformthatmotivatedustoprovidearulebasedaccountofthephenomenon.Indeed,theRMmodelalsoovergeneralizedinsuch
cases.But,whereasinthecourseofmaturationchildrenultimatelyacquirethecorrect,irregularadultforms,themodeldidnot(seeMarcusetal.1992foradiscussion
offurtherresearchonthistopic).
PinkerandPrince(1988)alsoinvestigatedtheclassoferrorsthattheRMmodelmade.Sincechildrenmakecertainerrorsonthewaytoacquiringadultlinguistic
competence,wewouldexpectasuccessfulmodeloflanguagelearningtofailpartofthetime,aswell.However,PinkerandPrincearguethattheRMmodelmade
mistakesofasortthatchildrendonotmake.Forexample,fortheverbsip,itoutput*sept,apparentlyfollowingthealternationinkeep/kept.Itisnoteworthythatthe
modelwasabletodiscernthisparticular(andrare)subregularityinEnglish,butitgeneralizeditinappropriately.Themodelalsoproducedirregularlikeformsthat
neitherchildrennoradultseverexhibitforinstance,*membledasthepasttenseofmail.Perhapsmoresignificantly,forabout10percentofthetestverbs,themodel
couldnotreachadecisionthresholditdidnotoutputanypasttenseformatall.Childrenwhohavebeguntoacquirethetensesystemdonotappeartohavethis
problemtheytypicallyprovidesomemorphophonemicallyalteredformtodenotepasttense.Thissuggeststhatchildrenhavelearnedthatpasttenseverbsalways
havetheunderlyingformV+PAST,wherethemorphemePASTmayberealizedinanumberofways,butmustberealizedinsomefashion.Thisabstractcondition
onverbalmorphology

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appearstoconstrainchildren'sperformance.ButnosuchconstraintisbuiltintotheRMmodelnor,apparently,doesthemodellearnit.
Considerationssuchasthesecontinuetofuelthedebatebetweenconnectionistandclassicalsymbolicmodelsofcognition.Indeed,eveninthespecificcaseof
irregularpasttenseformationnewobservationsaboutthecourseofacquisitionandthepossibilityofprovidingaconnectionistaccountofitcontinuetoberegistered
(seeMarcusetal.1992).Moregenerally,theconnectionistparadigmwillneedtodevelopincreasinglymoreconvincingaccountsoflinguisticrepresentationand
languageacquisition.Ifsuchaccountsareforthcoming,thecentralinsightsofcontemporarylinguisticanalysisanditsaccountofthelanguageacquisitiondevicewould
needtobereconceivedintheirlight.
LaterDevelopment
Afterthetwowordstagechildrenareinvolvedinexpandingtheirvocabularies,learningtherangeofconstructions(negations,passives,andsoforth)availableintheir
language,honingtheirsemanticandmorphologicalsystems,improvingtheirpronunciations,andgenerallymovingsteadfastlyclosertotheconventionsoftheadult
speechcommunity.Someoftheseaspectsofdevelopmentrequireconsiderabletimetofallintolinewithadultgrammar.Forexample,thesystematicallycorrectuse
andinterpretationofpassivesentencescantakeuntiltheearlyschoolyearstoemerge,andsentencesthatinvolvecomplicatedrulesofinterpretationsuchasThedoll
iseasytoseecantemptchildrenintomisinterpretations(inthiscasetakingdollasthesubjectofsee)atsomewhatmoreadvancedages.
Despitetheseoccasionalbugbears,mostofthelinguisticsystemismasteredbytheageofsixorseven,certainmattersofvocabulary,pronunciation,andstylistically
complexconstructionsaside.Eventhisbriefoverviewoflinguisticdevelopmenthintsatthevastamountofinformationthatmustbeacquiredandconsequentlyexposes
themagnitudeofthetaskthatmostallchildrenquiteeasilyaccomplishinthefirstfewyearsoftheirlives.Thislastcommentsetsthethemeforthenextsection,which
containsamoretheoreticallookattheprocessoflanguageacquisition,byestablishingourmostcentralquestion:iflanguageissocomplex,andyetisacquiredso
rapidlyandsowell,whatisitaboutlanguage,andwhatisitaboutchildren,thataccountsforthisapparentparadox?
9.2TheoreticalPerspectives
ThePovertyoftheStimulus
Fromthepointofviewofourtheoryofinformationprocessing,everychildwhodevelopsthecapacitytospeakanaturallanguagehasinternalizedasystemof
representationthatdistinguishesthepermissiblestructuresinthatlanguage.Onthehypothesisweareinvestigating,aninterestingpartofthatsystemofrepresentation
canbecharacterizedintheformofagrammarincludingasyntax,asemantics,andaphonology.Givenourknowledgeofthestagesthroughwhichchildrenpassonthe
waytoacquiringthisgrammar,ourknowledgeofthelinguisticenvironmentinwhichthechildlearns,andthenatureoftheendstatethegrammarthatisultimately
acquiredwecanbegintoaskhowlanguageacquisitionproceeds.
Whatevertheeventualexplanationforlanguageacquisitionlookslike,itmustaccountfortherelevantfeaturesofdevelopment.Inadditiontosuchpropertiesas

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linguisticcreativityandtheinterestingcorrelationbetweenuniversalpropertiesoflanguagesandtheorderofacquisition,anumberofotherfeaturesofthetaskof
languageacquisitionhavereceivedconsiderableattentionfromcognitivescientists.Threeoftheseissuesconcernthepovertyofthestimulusforlanguagelearning.
Thestimulusinthiscaseisthetotalinputonwhichthechilddependstodeterminethenatureofthelanguagebeinglearned.Thisincludestheutterancesofparents,
peers,andotherpeople,thesituationsinwhichthoseutterancestakeplace,thechild'sownutterancesalongwiththecorrelatedresponses,andsoforth.Many
linguistsandpsychologistshavecontendedthatinthecaseoflanguageacquisition,thestimulussituationisimpoverishedinthesensethatthereisnotenoughlinguistic
informationintheenvironmenttodirectlyaccountforwhatthechildlearns.Oneofthepointsofsuchargumentsistodeemphasizetheimportanceofsimpleimitationof
sounds,words,andsentencesasamechanismforlanguagelearninginfavorofaviewaccordingtowhichthechildabstractslinguisticrulesystemsonthebasisof
exposuretodatafromaspeechcommunity.
Thefirstmatterconcernsthequantitativeinsufficiencyoflinguisticdata.Considerthenumberofpossiblewellformedsentencesinanynaturallanguage.Sincenatural
languagesfeaturelinguisticdevicessuchascoordinationandsubordinationthatinvolverecursiverules,thenumberofthosesentencesisinfinite.Learninglanguage
thereforerequiresacquiringaninfinitecapacity,despitethefactthatallchildren(andforthatmatter,alladults)areabletoexperienceonlyafinitenumberoflinguistic
utterancesduringthecourseofacquisition.Asimplemodeloflanguagelearningthatpositsimitationasthesoleprocessofacquisitionisconsequentlyrendered
implausible,sincethechild'slinguisticenvironmentisinprincipletoolimitedtomakeavailableforimitationallofthesentencesthatthechildcomestohaveavailableas
thelanguageisacquired.Furthermore,eventhesentenceschildrenproduceintheoneandtwowordstagesontheirwaytoacquiringanadultlinguisticcapacityare
notlimitedtoimitations.Thus,neitherthemagnitudenorthecreativityoflinguisticcompetencethatchildrendisplayveryearlyoncanbeexplainedsimplyintermsof
imitationofutterancesfromthelinguisticenvironment.
Thesecondargumentforthepovertyofthestimulusconcernsnotthequantityoflinguisticexperience,butitsquality.Althoughinformedestimatesvary,thelanguage
thatchildrenhearis,tosomeextent,ungrammatical.Inadditiontothemalformedutterancesofotherlanguagelearningyoungsters,childrenareexposedtothe
occasionallinguisticmistakesofparentsandotheradults.Typically,theseerrorsarenotidentifiedassuchtothechildattemptingtoacquirethelanguageandmust
thereforecountasanunvariegatedpartofthechild'slinguisticinput.Nevertheless,childrenmanagetoacquireagrammarthatdoesnotingeneralincorporatethese
randommistakes.Arelatedbutevenmorecomplicatedsituationariseswhenchildrenareraisedbilingually.Sincetheutterancesofonelanguageareungrammatical
withrespecttotheotherlanguage,childrenmustbeabletokeepthelanguagesseparatepriortoknowingeitherlanguagefully,evenincasesinwhichthereareno
contextualcluestohelp.Indeed,althoughrelativelylittleisknownaboutbilingualacquisition,interlanguageconfusionappearstoberelativelyrare.Thesenatural
abilitiestodistinguishrelevantfromirrelevantinputdonotseemtobeeasilyaccountedforintermsofpropertiesofthelinguisticenvironment.
Thethirdargumentforthepovertyofthestimulusconcernsthenatureoflinguisticknowledgeandlinguisticdata.Childrenlearninglanguageareexposedtoutterances

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ofvariouslengthsinassociatedcontextsofuse.Theymustultimatelydeterminewhichlinguisticandnonlinguisticfeaturesoftheinputareimportantandwhichareonly
accidentallypresent.Tocomplicatematters,thesedistinctivefeaturescanvaryfromlanguagetolanguage.Letusfirstconsideraphonologicalexample.
ChildrenlearningEnglishmustlearntodisregardthepitchofasoundindeterminingtheirphonemicinventory,buttoattendtovoicingquality.ChildrenlearningZulu
musttakepitchintoconsideration(sinceZuluisatonelanguage),butnottherandompitchdifferencesbetweentwodifferentutterancesofthesamewordorthe
equallyirrelevantbutmoresystematicdifferencesinabsolutepitchproducedbymen,women,andchildren.ChildrenlearningEnglishalsomustdisregardirrelevant
interandintraspeakervariation.Forexample,thetypical[b]soundmadebyanEnglishspeakingmotherandfatherwilldifferacousticallyalonganumberof
dimensionssuchasvolumeanddurationthatarenotdistinctiveinthelanguage,andthesedifferencesmustbeoverlooked.Furthermore,thechild'sownutteranceswill
differacousticallyfromthoseofadultsindramaticways.Forinstance,owingtotherelativesmallnessofthechild'svocaltract,thepitchofmostutterancesproduced
willbehigherthanthoseofparentsandoldersiblings.
Parallelconsiderationsapplyinthedomainsofsemanticsandsyntax.Wehavealreadydiscussedthetendencyofyoungchildrentooverandundergeneralizeword
meanings.Inpart,theseerrorspresumablyarisefromthechild'smistakenassumptionsaboutwhichaspectsofasetofstimulussituationsareformalizedinameaning.
Inthecaseofsyntacticpatterns,thechildisconstantlycalledupontodiscriminaterealgeneralizationsfromseductivepseudoanalogies.Forexample,inthesentence
Themenexpectedtovoteforthemselves,theantecedentforthemselvesisthemen.Whenthesamestringofwordsappearsaspartofalongersentence,for
example,Iknowwhichwomenthemenexpectedtovoteforthemselves,theantecedentofthemselvesswitchestothewomeneventhoughsimpleanalogymight
leadustoexpectthesamereference.
Allthissuggeststhatchildrencannottakethedatatheydependonforlanguageacquisitionatfacevalue.AsChomsky(1980,34)hasputit,thereisa''vastqualitative
differencebetweentheimpoverishedandunstructuredenvironment,ontheonehand,andthehighlyspecificandintricatestructuresthatuniformlydevelop,onthe
other."Althoughtherawdataconsistofsoundsandcontexts,childrenmustsomehowabstractrulesandprinciplesthatrefertofeaturesoftheenvironmentthatare
linguisticallyimportant.Thesefeaturesmaynotalwaysbeparticularlysalientwhenjudgedbyacousticorperceptualcriteria,andofcoursetheyvaryfromlanguageto
language.Thecorrectlinguisticgeneralizationswilltypicallyrefertodistinctivefeatures,case,tense,government,phrasestructure,sets,quantifiers,andsoforth,that
arenotdirectlygiveninthewordsanddeedsthechildobserves.Furthermore,therewillbealargenumberoftemptinghypothesesthatareconsistentwiththeinput
databutareultimatelyfalseinthissense,thegrammarisunderdeterminedbythedata.Aneffectivelearningstrategymustcopewiththesegeneralrestrictionsonthe
natureoflinguisticdata.
TheLinguisticEnvironment
Giventheimpoverishedcharacterofthenaturallinguisticenvironment,itisintriguingtoaskhowlanguageacquisitionmanagestoproceedasefficientlyasitdoes.One
possibilityisthatchildrenmightreceivesupplementalinformationthatsomehowsimplifiesthelearningtask.Forexample,parentsmightprovidesystematic
reinforcement

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tochildrenintheformofattention,praise,orservices,increasingtheprobabilitythatthechildwillproducegrammaticalutterances.Anotherpossibilityisthatparents
artificiallysimplifytheirchildren'slinguisticenvironmentbytherepetitionandspecialorganizationofutterancespresentedtothem.Mothereseisthenamegiventothis
simplifiedregisterusedbyparents(notjustmothers!),whichhasbeenwidelystudied(seeSnowandFerguson1977).StudiesofEnglishmotheresehaveshownthat
ittypicallyinvolvesrelativelyshortutteranceswithexaggeratedintonation.Theproportionofquestions,declaratives,andimperativesdiffersfromthenorm,anditshifts
significantlyasthechilddevelops.
Anotherfactorthatcouldworktosimplifytheacquisitiontaskisfeedbackfromparenttochildthattellsthechildwhetherornotagivenutteranceisungrammatical.
Positivefeedbackprovidessomeindicationthatthechildhasemployedagrammaticalutterance.Itmaytaketheformofrepetitionofthechild'sutterance,asmile,
increasedattention,oroutrightapproval.Negativefeedbackcorrectsorotherwisedistinguishesungrammaticalspeech.Sometimesnegativefeedbackcanincludea
correctedversionoftheutterancethechildhadattempted.
Althoughitisclearthatsimplificationofthelinguisticenvironment,reinforcement,andfeedbackeachplayaroleineasingthetaskoflanguageacquisition,some
researchindicatesthatthesefactorsarelessimportantthaniscommonlyassumed.Inthecaseofreinforcement,parentalrewardseemstobecorrelatednotwith
grammaticalitybutwithappropriatenessorveracity(seeBrownandHanlon1970,Pinker1989,andthereferencescitedthereforarecentdiscussion).Moreover,
manyresearchershavenotedthatnegativereinforcementisnotgenerallyavailabletothechild(Baker1979).Experimentalresearchhasalsocastdoubtonthe
effectivenessofatleastsomeformsofnegativefeedback.Cazden(1965)examinedtheeffectofsystematicallyexpandingthespeechoftwelvechildrenbetweenthe
agesoftwentyeightandthirtysixmonths.Theexpansioninvolvedrespondingtothechildren'sbrief,telegraphicutteranceswithcorrect,fullyfleshedout,adult
versionsofthesentences.Forexample,ifachildutteredSamhighchair,theresearchermightrespondwithSamisinthehighchair.Usingavarietyofmeasures
includingMLU,Cazdenfoundthatchildrenintheexpansiongroupexperiencedsomeaccelerationindevelopmentwhencomparedtoacontrolgroup.However,a
thirdgroup,whichheardasmanygrammaticalsentencesastheexpansiongroupthatweremerelyconversationallyrelatedtothechildren'sutterances,developedeven
morequickly.Cazdenconcludedthattheamountofverbalinteractionmightbemoreimportantthanitscorrectivecharacter,althoughotherconclusionsarepossible
(fordiscussion,seeDale1972).
Asforsimplificationintheformofmotherese,Newport,Gleitman,andGleitman(1977)havearguedthatalthoughcertainaspectsofsyntacticdevelopment(suchas
theEnglishauxiliary)doindeedcorrelatewiththecorrespondingaspectsofparentalspeechthatarehighlighted,otheraspectsofsyntacticdevelopment(suchas
masteryofthesyntaxofsubordinateclauses)seemindependentofthefacilitativeeffectsofsimplifiedregisters.Hereagain,thereisaconnectionbetweentrendsin
acquisitionanduniversalpropertiesoflanguages:
Wehavesuggestedinoutlineaposition...inwhich(1)theacquisitionofuniversalaspectsoflanguagedesignproceedsinindifferencetothedetailsofvaryinglinguistic
environments,atleastwithintherangeofsomegrosssyntacticsimplifications(whichwouldappeartooccurnecessarilyinanyworldwhere

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motherswishtocommunicatewiththeirchildren),and(2)individualdifferencesinthelinguisticenvironment,exemplifiedbythemother,exerttheireffectsonlyontheacquisition
oflanguagespecificaspectsofsurfacestructure,andeventhenonlythroughthelisteningbiasesofthechild.(Newport,Gleitman,andGleitman1977,145)

Thisbifurcationoflanguagedevelopmentintoaspectsthatarelanguagespecificandthosethatareuniversallybasedcorrespondstoadistinctionlinguistsmake
betweenthecoreandtheperipheryofalanguage.Thecoreisthebulkofthelanguagethatinstantiatesuniversalprincipleswithinarestrictedrangeofoptions.The
peripheryistheresidualportionthatisidiosyncratic.Apparently,thelearningofthesetwodifferentsubsetsofthelanguageproceedsdifferently,parentalshapingof
linguisticdevelopmentbeingmostinfluentialinthelearningoftheperipheralportionofthelanguage.Furthermore,thereisevidencethatinsomenonWesterncultures,
motheresemaybelimited,availableatdifferentstagesindevelopment,ornonexistent(OchsandSchiefflin1984).
Inthefaceofsuchevidencesuggestingthatthechild'slinguisticenvironment,althoughdifferentfromtheadult'sincertainways,neverthelessaffordsdatathat
underdeterminethegrammarsbeinglearned,manyresearchershavelookedtotheoneothersignificantfactorintheprocessofacquisitionthechildtoattemptto
explainhowlanguageisacquired.
Inthecaseofbiologicalorgans(forexample,theliver)itiscommontoexpectthepropertiesofthematurestatetodependnotonlyontheeffectsofdaytodaylife
butalsoonthenatureofgeneticinformationthatguidestheorgan'sdevelopment.Itiscommontosearchoutabiologicalbasisforthedevelopmentofhumanphysical
systems,andalthoughithasbeenlesscommontoexpectsuchabasisforthedevelopmentofinformationprocessingsystems,Chomsky(1980)suggeststhatcognitive
systemsareequallylikelytohaveabiologicalbasis.Indeed,inthecaseoflanguageChomskyarguesthatbecausethegrammaristypicallyunderdeterminedbythe
data,inorderforlanguageacquisitiontoproceed,thechild'sdevelopmentmustbeguidedbyasetoflinguisticprinciplesthatinclinethechildtowardthecorrect
grammarforthelanguagebeingacquired.Theseprinciples,whicharepresumedtobeinnatelyspecifiedinthesamewaythatothergeneticinformationisspecified,
supplementthelinguisticdataandtheenvironmentalcuestomaketheacquisitionoflanguagepossible.Wewillnowconsiderthispositioninmoredetail.
Innateness
Intheprocessofdeducingagrammarfromlinguisticdata,thechildisoftenfacedwithasituationinwhichthereareavastnumberofhypothesesfromwhichto
choose.Mostoftheseinvolveacommitmenttorulesandprinciplesthatareincompatiblewiththeadultgrammarandwould,inthelongrun,leadthechildastray.Ifthe
childweretopursueeachoftheseoptionsinturn,theattainmentoftheadultgrammarwouldbedramaticallydelayed.Furthermore,withoutthebenefitofsubstantial
amountsofsystematicfeedbacktocorrectmistakes,itisnotclearhowthechildcouldreboundfromtheseerrorsandefficientlyzeroinonthecorrectgrammar.
Infact,thereismountingevidencethatthechildisnotlefttotestallthegrammarsthatseemtemporarilycompatiblewiththelinguisticdata.Themodelofacquisition
developedbyChomskyandhisassociatesattributestothechildalearningstrategythatrestrictstherangeofgrammarsthatmustbeevaluatedatanygivenpointinthe

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process.Therestrictioninvolvesaseriesofprinciplesthatdescribetheformthatagrammarmusttakeinordertobeconsideredbythechild.Onthisview,thechildis
instinctivelydirectedawayfromhypothesesthat,althoughcompatiblewithacorpusofavailabledata,incorporaterulesandprinciplesthatdonotsystematically
describeanyhumanlypossiblelanguage.Furthermore,sincetheserulesandprinciplesoflanguageacquisitionpresumablyplaythesamelearningtheoreticrole
regardlessofthelanguagebeinglearned,theymustbeuniversalinnature.Viewedfromaslightlydifferentperspective,theselearningprinciplesconstituteuniversal
grammaraspecificationofthegrammaticalpropertiesthatholdacrossallhumanlanguages.
Linguistictheoryshoulderstwoseparable,yetrelated,responsibilitiesinitsroleasacomponentofcognitivescience(inadditiontoitsdirectgoalofprovidinga
descriptionofeachnaturallanguage):itissimultaneouslyatheoryofthenatureofhumanlanguageandatheoryoflanguagelearning.Theplausibilityofthistheoryof
languagedependsinpartonthesuccessthatlinguistictheoryenjoysincharacterizingtheprinciplesofuniversalgrammar.Andtotheextentthatwearesuccessfulin
fleshingouttheseuniversals,wecanconsiderthemascandidatesforahypothesisrestrictingroleintheacquisitionprocess.
Cognitivescientistshavedeterminedarangeofevidencethatsupportstherich(andstillcontroversial)conceptionofuniversalgrammarwearedeveloping.Onesuch
considerationcomesfromthepreviouslymentionedstudyofthechild'sprimarylinguisticdataundertakenbyNewport,Gleitman,andGleitman(1977)intheir
investigationoftheroleofmothereseinearlyacquisition.Theyfoundthatmothereseismosthelpfulinteachingaspectsoflanguagethatareidiosyncratic,andleast
helpfulinteachingaspectsthatareconsistentwithuniversalprinciples.Ontheaccountoflanguagelearningwehavebeendiscussing,wehavestressedthattheassist
contributedbythehypothesizedinnatelearningmechanismtothelanguageacquisitiontasktakestheformofuniversalgrammaticalprinciples.Itfollows,then,thatthis
devicewillnotfacilitateorfavoracquisitionofnonuniversalaspectsoflanguages.Nevertheless,suchaspectsneedtobeacquired.Itisthereforeunderstandablethatin
thesecasesthechildwouldlooktotheresourcesofthelinguisticenvironmentinthiscase,totheexamplebeingsetbyparentstobootstraptheacquisitionprocess.
Toacquirethosefeaturesoflanguagethatarefacilitatedbyuniversalprinciples,thechildneednotrelyonenvironmentalcuestothesameextent.Wecantherefore
explaintheinterestingcorrelationbetweenuniversalaspectsofgrammaranddependenceonmothereseifweassumeaninnatebasisforlanguageacquisition.
Worksuchasthishasmotivatedcognitivescientiststoarticulateratherspecificmodelsofuniversalgrammarandtotestthemagainstlinguisticandacquisitiondata.
Onecurrentspecificationofuniversalgrammarthatisilluminatingasanaccountoflanguageandlanguagelearningisknownastheprinciplesandparameters
framework(Chomsky1986).Onthisapproach,inadditiontomanifestingpropertiescommontoalllanguages(theprinciples),universalgrammarisanalyzedas
comprisingsetsofseverelylimitedalternativepossibilitiesfromwhichlanguages"choose"(theparameters).Theintroductionofthissecondaspectofuniversal
grammarwaspromptedbytheobservationthatalthoughtherearemanyregardsinwhichlanguagesmayvary,oftenthevariationitselfislimited.Byparameterizing
universalgrammar,wecanaccountforuniformitiesthat,althoughnotuniversal,neverthelesssuggestsubstantialgeneralizationsaboutlanguagesand,aswewillsee
below,figureprominentlyinthetheoryoflanguageacquisition.

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Tomaketheconceptofaparameterclearer,letusconsideracaseinpoint.Wenotedinchapter6thatlanguagesdifferinwordorder.Althoughthebasicorderfor
EnglishisS(ubject)O(bject)V(erb),otherlanguagesuseotherbasicorders,includingSOV(Japanese)andVSO(ModemIrish).Nevertheless,ifwelookmore
closelyatwordorderacrosslanguages,wefindinterestingcommonalitieswithinthissphereofdifference.Forexample,althoughitfollowsfromthevariationinword
orderthatlanguagesmaydifferintheorderinwhichheads(verbs,nouns,adjectives,andprepositions)andtheircomplements(forexample,objectNPsor
modifiers)mayoccurwithrespecttoeachother,thetwousualcasesfoundacrosslanguagesareheadinitialandheadfinal.Tocapturethisgeneralization,thehead
parameterisproposedasaparameterofuniversalgrammarthatadmitsoftwosettings:headsrightorheadsleft.Eachnaturallanguagecaninstantiateeitheroneof
thesettings,andthisdeterminestheheadcomplementorderthroughoutthelanguage.Inparticular,thisapproachpredictsthatlanguagestendtoadoptthesameorder
acrossallphrasalcategories:therearelanguageslikeEnglishinwhichverbs,nouns,adjectives,adverbs,andprepositionstendtoprecedetheirobjectsandmodifiers
(forexample,[[Vrun]quickly],[N[books]thatIread],[[Adjtaller]thanMary],[[Advrapidly]ascanbe],and[[Pin]thedirt]),andlanguageslikeJapaneseinwhichthe
orderisreversed.
Liketheprinciplesofuniversalgrammar,parametersareconstruedassimultaneouslyexplainingthenatureofhumanlanguageandplayingaroleintheacquisitionof
language.Weturnnexttosomeoftheevidencebearingonthisclaimabouttheroleofuniversalgrammarinacquisition.
Webeginbyexaminingaproposedprincipleofuniversalgrammarandconsideritsroleinatheoryoflanguageacquisition,returningbelowtodiscusshowparameters
fitintothismodel.Letusrecalloneofthelinguisticdescriptionsdiscussedinchapter6concerninginterrogativeconstructions.Englishwhquestionsnormallyrequire
locatingthewhwordinaspecialpositiontotheleftofthesubject(forexample,Whatdidyoutouch?).Thisposition,calledthecomplementizerposition,isatypical
landingsiteforwhmovementtheredonotseemtobelanguagesthatlocatequestionwordsin"counted"positionsforinstance,inthemiddleofthesentenceorafter
thethirdwordalthoughwecouldeasilyimaginesuchpossibilities.Supposeweconsiderthisgeneralizationaboutpossiblelanguagesasaprincipleofuniversal
grammar:movementmusttakeplacetostructurallyspecifiedpositions(notlinearlyspecifiedpositions).Thisprinciple,knownasstructuredependence,willlimitthe
rangeofpossiblerulesformovinginterrogativeexpressionsinawaythatwillpermittheEnglishpatternsbutnottheimaginablebutunobservedlinearlycharacterized
possibilities(Chomsky1975Pinker1989).
Asanillustrationofthisanalysis,supposethedataconsideredbyachildlearningEnglishincludedseveralutteranceslikeJosephineknowsexactlywhatJohn
touchedyesterday,whichinvolveaquestionconstructioninasubordinateclause.Sincethewhwordislocatedtotheleftoftheembeddedsubjectpositionandnot
initsnormalargumentpositionaftertouched,thisutterancedisplayswhmovement.How,then,willthechildgoaboutdeterminingtheconstituentstructureofthis
indirectquestion,andparticularlythepositionofthewhword?Numeroushypothesesaboutquestionformationareconsistentwiththeinformationcontainedinthis
utterance,mostnotably,onethatanalyzesquestionsasbeingformedbymovingtheinterrogativepronountothecomplementizerpositionatthefrontofeachclause
andonethatassumesthatwhwordscanbemovedtothemiddleofasentence.

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Whereasthefirsthypothesisisstructuredependent,thesecondisclearlyalinearhypothesisonerequiringthatasentencebeanalyzedintermsofacountable
sequenceofelements.Althoughcoherent,succinct,andconsistentwiththedataathand,thisaccountisultimatelyincorrectasageneraldescriptionofEnglishwh
questions.Furthermore,onthepresentanalysis,itisdisqualifiedfromconsiderationbythechildbecauseitisinconsistentwiththeuniversalprincipleofstructure
dependence.Consequently,wewouldnotexpectachildlearningthisconstructiontoadopttheexcludedlinearhypothesisandtoproduceungrammaticalutterances
(forexample,*DoyouknowJohnwhatsawatthebeach?)thatarebasedonit.Theliteraturebearsouttheabsenceofthesekindsoferrors.Sinceonlystructural
hypotheses(includingthecorrectone)areavailableforthechildtoconsider,thisrestrictionofthehypothesisspacesavesthechildwastedeffort,limitstheproblemof
recoveringfromincorrectrules,andcumulativelygreasesthewheelsoftheacquisitionprocess.
Inadditiontoconsideringthelinguisticmotivationforourgeneralaccountoflanguageacquisition,wecanseekempiricalsupportbyexaminingrelevantexperimental
studiesoflanguagelearners.Topursuetheclaimthatlanguagelearnersenjoyarestrictionofthehypothesisspaceimposedbytheprincipleofstructuredependence,
CrainandNakayama(1986)investigatedhowchildrenlearning"Yes""No"questionswhoweregivendataconsistentwithbothalinearhypothesisandastructural
hypothesiscopedwiththesealternatives.
PresentingyoungchildrenwithdeclarativeslikeThemanistallandaskingthemtoformthecorresponding"Yes""No"question,CrainandNakayamaexamined
whetherchildrenwouldseizeonalinearsolutiontoquestionformation(forexample,movethethirdwordtothefrontofthesentence)orastructuralsolution(for
example,invertthemainclauseauxiliarywiththesubjectNP).Subjectsconsistentlychoseastructuralanalysis,asthepresenttheorywouldpredict.Thissortof
evidencecontributestotheviewthatlanguagelearnersarenaturallydisposedtoconstructhypothesesconsistentwithstructuredependence,aprincipleofuniversal
grammar.
Noticethatthetheoryoflanguagedevelopmentwearediscussingdoesnotsuggestthattheactualrulesofthetargetlanguageareincludedinthechild'slearning
mechanism.Clearly,childrenarenotbornwiththefullblowngrammarsofalloftheworld'slanguagesattheirdisposal,butonlywithanefficientstrategyforlearning
thesegrammars.
Themainconclusionwewishtodrawisthatchildrenseemtooperatewithaplanforlanguagelearningthateffectivelyleadsthemtowardcertainkindsofhypotheses
andawayfromothers.Inasmuchasthissortofpreferenceisnotbasedonanyobviousgenerallearningstrategy,weinferthatthehumanmindispredisposedtogo
aboutthetaskoflanguagelearningonlyalongcertainspecialpaths.However,otherresearcherscontinuetoaskwhetherthesepathsareindeeduniquelydesignedto
supportthecomplextaskoflanguageacquisition.Somearepursuingtheoriesofacquisitionthatrelyongenerallearningstrategiesthataccountforlearningirrespective
ofcognitivedomain(Anderson1983).Suchanapproachmight,inthiscase,seeksupportfortheclaimthatallserialbehaviorissuesfromstructuredependentrules,
subsumingthecaseofquestionacquisitionundergeneralpropertiesoftheacquisitionsystem.Incontrast,Chomsky(1975)hassuggestedthatstructuredependence,
aswellasotherprinciplesofuniversalgrammar,arefeaturesofanacquisitiondevicespecifictolanguagelearning,supportingthesocalledmodularviewofthe
architectureofthemind(Fodor1983,Garfield1987).

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Inadditiontoprovidinganaccountoftheprocessoflanguageacquisitioninprincipleandinpractice,atheoryofinnatenessbasedontheprinciplesandparametersof
universalgrammarprovidesanexplanationforpreviouslynotedcorrelationsobservedbyJakobson(1968)betweentheorderinwhichvariousfeaturesoflanguage
areacquiredandthedistributionofthosefeaturesacrosstheworld'slanguages.Twoinstancesofthiscorrelationthatwehavealreadydiscussedconcerntherelatively
lateacquisitionofthevowel[]andtheinterestingacquisitionsequenceforsyllablestructureinEnglish.
Asnotedinchapter6,thevowel[]israreinthesoundsystemsoftheworld'slanguages.Although[a]presumablyoccursquitefrequentlyintheEnglishlearning
child'slinguisticenvironmentandisnotdemonstrablydifficulttohearorarticulate,itisnonethelesslearnedquitelate.Thevowelsounds[i],[u],and[a],ontheother
hand,arefoundinthephonologicalinventoriesofeverylanguageintheworld,andtheyemergepriorto[]inthestandarddevelopmentalpatternforEnglish.Wecan
explainthesecorrelationsifweassumethattheprinciplesofuniversalgrammarsomehowspecifytheuniversalityof[i],[u],and[a]andtherebyfacilitatetheacquisition
ofthesesoundsforthechild.Since[]hasnoclaimtobeinguniversal,itsacquisitionwouldnotbefacilitatedinthisway,accountingforthedevelopmentallag.
Turningtothecaseofsyllablestructure,recallthatCVisthesyllabletypemostwidelydistributedacrosstheworld'slanguagesandthatconsonantclustersfrequent
inEnglisharerelativelyrarecrosslinguistically(comparedtosingletonconsonants)recallalsothestclustersarerarercrosslinguisticallythansrclusters,althoughst
clustersarepermittedinEnglishandsrclustersarenot.TheearlysyllablesproducedbyEnglishlearningchildrentendtobeoftheuniversallymorefrequentCVtype
laterCVCsyllablesemerge,eventuallygivingwaytosyllableswithconsonantclusters.Intheearliestclusterstheyproduce,Englishspeakingchildrentendtoinclude
srsequences(morecommoncrosslinguisticallybutprohibitedinEnglish)andomitstsequences(rarecrosslinguisticallybutallowedinEnglish).Inbothcasesthe
child'sdevelopmentalsequencetracksthefrequencyofdistributionofsyllabletypesacrosslanguagesratherthanthefrequencyofdistributioninEnglish.
Asinthecaseoftheacquisitionof[],wemustestablishsomeconnectionbetweenhowbroadlydistributedalinguisticfeatureisacrosslanguagesandhowreadily
learnableitis.Inthecaseofsyllablestructure,theuniversalityofCVsyllablesispresumablymarkedinthelearningmechanism,therebyfacilitatingtheacquisitionof
thissyllabletype.Toaccountfortheemergenceofsrclusters(butnotstclusters),wepositthesonorityhierarchyasauniversalprincipleoflanguagelearning.This
hierarchyentailsthateachconsonantinaclustermustbemoresonorousthantheconsonantthatprecedesit(wherethesonorityofasoundisitsrelativeloudness
comparedtoothersoundswithequalstress,length,andpitch).Sincestops(forexample,[p],[t],and[k])arelesssonorousthanfricatives(forexample,[s],[v],and
[ ),whichinturnarelesssonorousthan[r]and[l],theusualclustersequencestrandsrareexpected,butstisnot.Byassumingthatthesonorityhierarchyis
simultaneouslypartoflinguistictheoryandapropertyofthelanguageacquisitiondevice,wecanaccountfortheobserveddevelopmentalsequenceandforthe
correlationbetweenstagesofdevelopmentandthepatternofthedistributionoflinguisticfeaturesacrosslanguages.Asbefore,toconstructthistypeofexplanation
requirestheassumptionthatlearningprinciplesandpatternsastaskspecificandabstractasthesonorityhierarchyarepropertiesofachild'slanguagelearningstrategy.

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AParameterSettingModelofLanguageAcquisition
Ineachoftheexamplesoflearningwehavediscussed,whatwasatstakewasauniversalprinciplethat,markedexceptionsaside,holdsforalllanguages.Before
concludingthissection,weconsiderhowtheparameterizedfeaturesofuniversalgrammarfitintothepictureoflanguagelearningwearedeveloping.Inparameter
guidedlearninganaspectofchoicearisesthatcomplicatestherelationshipbetweenthelearningmechanismandtheprimarylinguisticdata.Whereasinthecaseof
principledrivenlanguagelearningthechild'sprimaryburdenistodeterminewhichprinciple(s)arerelevanttotheanalysisofagivendataset,inthecaseofparameter
drivenlearningthechildmustdeterminewhichsettingofwhichmultivaluedparameterisrelevant.
Toreturnbywayofexampletotheheadparameterdiscussedabove,achildtryingtolearnheaddirectionnotonlyneedstodeterminethatthisparameterisapplicable
butalsomustcalculatewhichsettingoftheparameter,headsleftorheadsright,isthecorrectchoiceforthelanguagebeinglearned.Thisdeterminationinturn
presupposesasuccessfulanalysisofphrasesintoheadsandcomplements,renderingtheacquisitionofheaddirectionafairlyinvolvedprocess.
Muchinterestingresearchhasrecentlybeendevotedtoinvestigatingjusthowchildrenchoosethecorrectsettingoflearningparametersincasessuchasthese.Among
thevariousaccountsofthismechanismisworkbyHyams(1987)andbyWexlerandManzini(1987),whichexplorestheideathatchildrencometothetaskof
languageacquisitionwithadefaultsettingofatleastsomeparameters.Hyamsinvestigatestheprodropparameter,whichdeterminesforagivenlanguagewhether
sentencesnormallyrequiresubjects.InprodroplanguageslikeItalianandHebrewtherearegrammaticalsentencesthatlackovertsubjects,whereastheparallel
casesinanonprodroplanguagelikeEnglishrequireasubject.Forexample,IspeaktranslatesintoItalianaseitherIoparloorParloIo,thefirstpersonpronoun,
isoptional.
Hyams(1987)discussesdatasuggestingthatbothItalianandEnglishlearningchildreninitiallytaketheirlanguagetobeaprodroplanguage.Thatis,eventhough
Englishlearnersarenotgenerallyexposedtosubjectlesssentences(whereasItalianlearnersare),alllearnerspassthroughastageinwhichtheytreattheirtarget
languageasaprodroplanguage.FortheItalianlearners,thisistherightchoiceofparametersettings,buttheEnglishlearnersneedtoresettheprodropparameterin
ordertocorrectly(re)analyzetheirlanguage.HyamspresentsevidencethatthisresettingtakesplacewhenEnglishlearnersdiscoverotherpropertiesofEnglishthatare
incompatiblewiththeirinitialassumptionthatEnglishisaprodroplanguage.
SincetheprimarylinguisticdataavailabletoEnglishlearnersdonotsupportthe(incorrect)initialparametersetting,Hyams'sanalysissuggeststhattheassumptionthat
alanguageisaprodroplanguageisthedefaultsettingoftheprodropparameter.Incasesinwhichthedefaultsettingfitsthelanguagebeinglearned,learningis
facilitated,butanonmatchingdefaultwilltemporarilyleadthelearnerastray.
TheSubsetPrinciple
Onthesubjectofdefaultsettings,researchers(forexample,WexlerandManzini1987andBerwick1985)haveproposedthatthereisanoverarchinglearning
principlethatdeterminestheorderinwhichthesettingsofcertainparameterswillbeestablished.TheSubsetPrinciplerequiresthatchildrenmovesuccessivelyfrom
themostconservativeparametersettingthroughprogressivelylessconservativeonesuntiltheyreachthesettingthatiscorrectfortheirtargetlanguage.Forthe
parameterstowhichthis

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principleapplies,thealternativeparametersettingsgiverisetoahierarchyoflanguagesL1,L2,L3...LnwhereL1isasubsetofL2,L2isasubsetofL3,and,ingeneral,
Ln1isasubsetofLn.
Asanexample,WexlerandManzini(1987)discussaparameterizedapproachtothebindingtheory(seechapter6).Accordingtothebindingtheory,allreflexives
mustbeboundbyantecedents,andantecedentsareprohibitedfrombeingtoofarawayfromthereflexivesthattheybind:inJohnlikeshimself,himselfandJohnare
anaphoricallylinked,butin*JohnthinksMarylikeshimselftheycannotbelinked.
Althoughthebindingtheoryrequiresreflexivestobeboundwithinacertaindomain,languagesdifferslightlyinwhatcountsastheappropriatebindingdomain.Wexler
andManzinisuggestthatthedefinitionofbindingdomainshouldbeparameterized,witheachofthefive(orso)possibilitiesfoundinthelanguagesoftheworld
constitutingadifferentparametersetting.IntheIcelandicsentenceJn rakasig'JonorderedHaraldtoshavehimself',forexample,sigandJncanbe
anaphoricallylinked,butJohnandhimselfcannotbelinkedinthecorrespondingEnglishsentence.ThisisbecausethecharacterizationofbindingdomaininEnglish
prohibitsasubjectNPfrominterveningbetweenantecedentandreflexive,butinIcelandicitdoesnot.Onthebasisoftheseandotherexamples,WexlerandManzini
arguethatEnglishismoreconservativethanIcelandicwhenitcomestoreflexivebindinganypatternthatisgrammaticalinEnglishwillbeacceptableinIcelandic,but
notviceversa.Ifwelimitourattentiontoreflexivebinding,then,thegrammaticalpossibilitiesinEnglishareasubsetofthethoseinIcelandic,aninstanceofthesubset
relationsdiagrammedinfigure9.1.
InsuchasituationtheSubsetPrinciplepredictsthatlanguagelearnerswillbeginwiththemostconservativeassumptionaboutthedomainofreflexivebindinginthis
example,choosingtheEnglishsettingoftheparameter.Ofcourse,ifthechildrenarelearningEnglish,theirinitialparametersettingwillbecorrectbutiftheyare
learningIcelandic,theywillneedtoresetthebindingtheoryparametertothelessconservativesettingrequiredbythatlanguage.Priortothisresetting,theIcelandic
learningchild'sgrammarwillundergeneratethetargetlanguagesinceonlythosepatternsconsistent

Figure9.1
Languagesinasubsetrelation

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withtheEnglishsettingoftheparameterwillbederivable.Consequently,thechildwilleventuallyconfrontgrammaticalIcelandicsentencesthatdonotsquarewiththe
initialgrammar,andthiswilltriggertheresettingofthebindingtheoryparameter.
MoreexperimentalworkisneededbeforewecanbesureoftheextenttowhichtheSubsetPrincipleguideslanguageacquisition.Fromatheoreticalperspective,
however,oneofthevirtuesofanapproachtolanguageacquisitioninwhichlearningmovesthroughprogressivelylessconservativegrammarsisthatthelearneris
dependentonlyonthepresenceofpositivelinguisticdatatomotivatetheresettingofparameters.AlthoughtheSubsetPrincipleisstillcontroversial(seeValian1990),
theworkthatisbasedonitcontributestooneofthemostexcitingareasofcurrentresearchincognitivescience,whichseekstoilluminatelanguagelearningfroma
linguisticandanexperimentalpointofview.
PhilosophicalPerspectives
Thetheoryoflanguageacquisitionwehavebeendiscussinginvolvespositinganinnatecomponentofthelanguagelearningmechanism.Inmakingtheclaimthatachild
hasapredispositiontowardconsideringcertainkindsofgrammarsgivencertainrangesoflinguisticdata,wecommitourselvestoapositionthathasbeentakento
supportaversionofphilosophicalrationalism(Chomsky1968).(Rationalismisaviewonwhichcertainknowledgeisknownpriortoexperience.)Ontheinnatist
accountofacquisition,universalgrammar,totheextentthatitcharacterizesthechild'sgeneticallyspecifiedlanguagelearningdevice,qualifiesasakindofinnately
specifiedinformationthatwemayconsiderasevidenceforrationalism.Whatisatissueishowbroadlyweconstrueknowledge.
Linguisticknowledgeisgenerallyunconscious,andthatissurelytruewhereprinciplesandparametersofuniversalgrammarareconcerned.Somephilosophersand
linguistshavemadeadistinctionbetweenknowinghowandknowingthattotrytoclarifythestatusofunconsciouslinguisticknowledge(seechapter8).Inknowing
thatsomethingisthecase,wetypicallyhaveconsciouspropositionalknowledgeaboutagivenstateofaffairs.Incontrast,wemayknowhowtodosomethingwithout
beingconsciousoftheprocedureinvolvedinourability.Knowingthatitisrainingandknowinghowtorideabicyclearerespectiveexamplesofthesetworather
differenttypesofknowledge.
Theknowledgeofagrammarbyvirtueofwhichaspeakerusesanativelanguagealsoroughlyqualifiesasaspecimenofknowledgeofthesecondsort(Chomsky
1975).Thus,weanalyzeknowinghowtospeakEnglishasanabilitythatcanbeexplainedbycharacterizingthegrammaticalknowledgethatunderliesthelinguistic
competenceofanativespeakerofEnglish.Thatthislinguisticknowledgeisunconsciousisnotsurprising,sinceinthisregarditisnodifferentfrommanyinstancesof
knowledgehow.
Itisnotonthebasisoflanguagespecificgrammaticalknowledgethatwemakeacaseforrationalism,however.Sincechildrenmustlearnthegrammarofalanguage
onthebasisofexposuretoprimarylinguisticdata,wedonotassumethatgrammarsareinnate.Thus,althoughwecanagreethatknowledgeofgrammarisaninstance
ofknowledgehow,thishaslittledirectbearingontheargumentforrationalism.Rather,itisuniversalgrammarthatisthecandidateforinnateknowledge.
Considertheprincipleofstructuredependence,asaspecificexampleofaprincipleofuniversalgrammar.Supposingittobeinnate,inwhatsensecanwesaythata
languagelearningchildknowsthisprinciple?Clearly,wecannotarguethatprinciples

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ofuniversalgrammarareknowninthepropositionalsenseofknowledge(knowledgethat),sincesuchprinciplesareclearlynottokensofconsciousawareness.Itis
alsonotclearthatprinciplesofuniversalgrammarareinstancesofknowledgehow,atleastinthesensethatknowledgeofagrammaris.Allthingsbeingequal,ifa
personwhoknowsagrammarandhastheabilitytouselanguagecantranslatethatcompetenceintoperformance.Theconnectionbetweenprinciplesofuniversal
grammarandlinguisticperformance,however,ismoreindirect.Chomsky(1975,23),adaptingworkbyKenny(1973),suggeststhatprinciplesofuniversalgrammar
constituteasecondordercapacity:an''innatecapacityof[anorganism]toconstructcognitivestructures''(grammars)thatinturnconstitutetheknowledgehow
underlyinglinguisticperformance.Onthisview,theinnatelyspecifiedprinciplesofuniversalgrammararelearningprinciplesandmaybethoughtofasconstituting
knowledgeofhowtolearnagrammar.
Inrecognizingprinciplesofuniversalgrammarasinstancesofknowledge,then,wemustbewillingtorecognizeanewlevelofknowledgerepresentedatafundamental
levelofthehumaninformationprocessingsystemresponsibleforguidinglanguagedevelopment.Thisaccountofmentalcapacity,whichviewstheacquisitionof
cognitivestructuresastheoutcomeoftheinteractionof(inthiscase,linguistic)dataandprinciplesoflearning(thatis,universalgrammar),offersaveryrichandhighly
structuredconceptionofthemindanditsdevelopment.Itisaveryexcitingandequallycontroversialoutcomeofrecentworkonlanguageacquisition.
LearnabilityandParsing
Whenalinguistproposesagrammarforarangeoflinguisticdata,itssuccessismeasuredaccordingtoseverallevelsorcriteriaofadequacy.Inordertobeatall
interesting,theproposedgrammarmustofcourseaccuratelyaccountforthedataathand.Itshouldalsomakepredictionsaboutadditionallinguisticdatathatwillbe
borneoutasincreasinglylargeramountsofdataareconsidered.Aboveandbeyondthesuccessofhypothesizedgrammarsforindividuallanguages,linguistsare
interestedindevelopingatheoryofuniversalgrammarthatwilldodoubleduty.Ontheonehand,universalgrammarspecifiesthoselinguisticpropertiesand
parametersthatuniquelycharacterizetheworld'slanguages.Ontheotherhand,universalgrammarconstitutesahypothesisconcerningtheinnatelyspecified
componentofthechild'slanguagelearningmechanism.
Althoughlinguistshopethatevidencedrawnfromthestudyoflinguisticuniversalsandevidencedrawnfromthestudyoflanguagedevelopmentwillconvergeinthis
way,thereisnoguaranteethattheywill.Inparticular,itispossiblethatagivenprinciplewillaccuratelycharacterizealinguisticuniversalbutwillfailtoplayan
importantroleintheacquisitionprocess.
Letusassume,forthesakeofanexample,thatitturnsoutthatthephonemicinventoryofeverylanguagecontainedanevennumberofphonemes.Supposethisis
proposedasalinguisticuniversal.Itisunclearhowsuchaprinciplecouldfunctionasalearningprinciple,sinceitdoesnoteffectivelyrestrictthehypothesisspacethat
thechildmustsearchinanylearningsituation.
Thus,notallconceivableuniversalpropertiesoflanguageswillplayaroleinourtheoryoflanguagelearning(orlearnability,asithascometobecalled).Ingeneral,
wewillneedtoexaminetheconsequencesofincorporatingagivenprincipleintothe

Page405

theoryandtestthesepredictionsagainsttheactualcourseofacquisition(theearlierdiscussionoftheprincipleofstructuredependencebeingacaseinpoint).
Incertaincases,however,itbecomespossibletorejectacandidateprincipleonformalgroundswithouttheneedtotestitspredictionsinthisdetailedmanner.Thisis
becausenotallhypothesizedsystemsofuniversalgrammararefeasible.Feasibilityisacriterionofadequacyforuniversalgrammarrequiringthatitnotonly
characterizelinguisticuniversalsbutalsoprovideanaccountoflanguagedevelopmentthatisconsistentwiththeprinciplesofatheoryofacquisition(Wexlerand
Culicover1980).Amongotherthings,thiswillrequirethattheproposedlearningtheorycharacterizehumanlanguagesinarestrictiveenoughmannertoaccountfor
learningonthebasisofactuallinguisticdatainfinitetime.
Severalfactorsareinvolvedinthisrequirement.First,notallclassesoflanguagesarelearnableinfinitetime.Totheextentthatasetoflanguagescontainsmembers
thatoverlapsothatthelinguisticdatadonotdistinguishthem,itbecomesdifficulttodecidewhichlanguageisbeinglearned.WexlerandCulicover(1980)describea
setofformallanguagesthatoverlaptosuchadegreethatitisinprincipleimpossibletoselectauniquegrammaronthebasisofanyfiniteamountoflinguisticdata.A
universalcharacterizationoflanguagemust,ofcourse,avoidthissituationtoattainfeasibility.
Second,asuccessfullearningtheorymustaccountforlanguageacquisitiononthebasisofthetypeoflinguisticdatatowhichthechildisactuallyexposed.For
instance,givenwhatisknownaboutmothereseandthechild'slinguisticenvironmentingeneral,anaccountoflearningmustnotrelytooheavilyonoverlycomplex
sentencesinvolvingmultiplelayersofembeddedsubordinateclauses,sincethesetypesofsentencesarenotingeneralavailabletothechildnorcanitrelyontoomuch
longtermmemoryforpreviouslinguisticdata.Itmustalsoavoidrelyingonnegativefeedback,sincethisisneitherfrequentlynorsystematicallyavailabletothechild
(Baker1979WexlerandCulicover1980Pinker1984).
Itispossibletoevaluatelinguistictheoriesformallytoseewhethertheyarecapableofaccountingforlanguagelearninginfinitetimeonthebasisofreasonable
conditionsofacquisition.Infact,WexlerandCulicover(1980)discussaversionoflinguistictheoryderivedfromworkbyChomsky(1965)thatfailsasafeasible
theoryoflearnability.Theysuggestmodificationsofthetheory,which,theygoontoprove,caninprincipleaccountforlanguagelearning.Wewillnotgointothe
technicaldetailsoftheproofswhatisinterestingaboutWexlerandCulicover'slearnabilityconditionsfromthestandpointofthisdiscussionisthatmanyofthemhave
proventobeofindependentvaluetolinguistsincharacterizinguniversalgrammar(CulicoverandWexler1977BakerandMcCarthy1981).Thissortofconvergence
contributesextramotivationforasystemofuniversalgrammarcumlearnabilitytheory.
Athirdaspectofthestudyoflanguagethathasyieldedprinciplesthatpartlyconvergewiththoseoflearnabilitytheoryanduniversalgrammarisparsability.Justas
languagesmustfallundercertainprinciplesinordertobelearnedinfinitetime,sotheymusthavecertainformalpropertiesinordertobefinitelyparsable,asnatural
languagesclearlyare.Furthermore,naturallanguagesarenotonlyfinitelyparsable,butquiterapidlyparsable,andthemodelofparsingshouldaccountforthis
property.
Marcus(1980)hasdevelopedacomputationallyimplementedparsingsystemthataddressestheseconcernsforEnglishwithatwoprongedapproachthatincludes
principlesofparsingandagrammarofthelanguage.Hissystemacceptstypedinputand

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assignssyntacticstructuresofthegeneralsortdiscussedinchapter6.Berwick(1985)usesthissystemasthebasisforacomputationallyimplementedlearningsystem
thatacquiresnewrulesneededtoparseagrowingcorpusofEnglishsentencesovertime.Thesystembeginswithafixednumberofgrammaticalprinciplesandcan
developseventytoonehundredrulesonthebasisofexposuretoseveralhundredsentences.Inadditiontoacquiringnewlinguisticknowledge,thesystemputsthat
knowledgetouseinthetaskofonlineparsing.
Berwickdrawstheintriguingconclusionthattherequirementsofthecomputationtheorynecessarytoestablishthislearningsystemcanbemadequitecompatiblewith
thoseofafeasiblelearnabilitytheory.Indeed,amongtheconditionsthatBerwickimposesonhislearningmodelaretherestrictionsonlongtermmemory,complex
data,andnegativefeedbackthatformanimportantpartofWexlerandCulicover'saccountoflearnability.Inshort,thedemandsofatheoryofparsingseemtobe
compatiblewiththecomplementarytheoriesoflearnabilityanduniversalgrammar,withimportant,ongoingworkinartificialintelligence,psychology,andlinguistics
offeringthepromiseofamostinterestingunifiedtheory.
SuggestedReadings
Foranintroductiontothefieldoflanguageacquisition,seeLanguageAcquisition:ALinguisticIntroduction(Goodluck1991),LanguageDevelopment(Reich
1986),andFirstLanguageAcquisition:Method,DescriptionandExplanation(Ingram1989).SyntacticTheoryandtheAcquisitionofEnglishSyntax
(Radford1990)explorestheacquisitionofearlysyntaxfromtheperspectiveofcontemporarysyntactictheory.ParameterSetting(RoeperandWilliams1987)and
LanguageProcessingandLanguageAcquisition(FrazieranddeVilliers1990)aretwoanthologiesthatpresentaselectionofworkonlanguageacquisitionand
theoriesoflanguageandlanguageprocessing.Philosophicaldiscussionsofinnatenessarecoveredinanotheranthology,InnateIdeas(Stich1975).
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Paralleldistributedprocessing:Explorationsinthemicrostructureofcognition.Vol.2:Psychologicalandbiologicalmodels.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Salus,P.,andM.Salus(1975).Developmentneurophysiologyandphonologicalacquisitionorder.Language50,151160.
Smith,N.V.(1973).Theacquisitionofphonology:Acasestudy.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Snow,C.,andC.Ferguson,eds.(1977).Talkingtochildren:Languageinputandacquisition.(PapersfromaconferencesponsoredbytheCommitteeon
SociolinguisticsoftheSocialScienceResearchCouncil.)Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Stampe,D.(1972).WhatIdidonmysummervacation.Doctoraldissertation,UniversityofChicago,Chicago,Ill.
Stich,S.,ed.(1975).Innateideas.BerkeleyandLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.
Valian,V.(1990).Logicalandpsychologicalconstraintsontheacquisitionofsyntax.InFrazieranddeVilliers1990.
Valian,V.,J.Winzemer,andA.Errich(1981).A"littlelinguist"modelofsyntaxlearning.InS.Tavakolian,ed.,Languageacquisitionandlinguistictheory.
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Wanner,E.,andL.Gleitman(1982).Languageacquisition:Thestateoftheart.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Wexler,K.,andP.Culicover(1980).Formalprinciplesoflanguageacquisition.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Wexler,K.,andR.Manzini(1987).Parametersandlearnabilityinbindingtheory.InRoeperandWilliams1987.

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Chapter10
Semantics
10.1SemanticsandCognitiveScience
Languagerelatessoundtomeaningviasyntacticstructure.Weturnnowtowhatisconsideredbymanytobethemostcaptivatingaspectofthisrelation,thestudyof
meaning,calledsemantics.Semanticsisahighlyinterdisciplinaryareaofinquiry.Researchersfromallareasofcognitivesciencehavecontributedtoourknowledgeof
meaning,withthefieldsofphilosophy,linguistics,psychology,andartificialintelligence(AI)claimingthestudyofmeaningasacoreareaofinterest.
Thereareavarietyofreasonswhythestudyofmeaninghasbeensopopular,andparticularlysointhelastcentury.Fromthepointofviewoflinguistictheory,the
systemofmeaningthatweallmasterinbecomingnativespeakersofalanguagemustbestudiedifwearetolayclaimtounderstandinghumanlanguageability.
Speakershavethecompetencetoevaluateargumentstructure,identifycontradictionsandambiguities,provideparaphrases,andusemetaphoricalandidiomatic
constructions.Theseabilities,amongothers,constituteadomainofinquiryforthelinguisticsemanticist.
Philosophershavestudiedmeaningforotherreasons.Onephilosophicaltraditionofthetwentiethcentury,theanalytictradition,urgedthatstudyingthelinguisticform
ofphilosophicalpuzzlesthatis,thelanguageinwhichthepuzzlesarecouchedwouldilluminatetheirsolutions.Forexample,philosopherssuchasRusselland
Moorecontendedthattheanalysisofthemeaningofsentencesthatmakeethicalorexistentialassertionscanrevealconsiderableinsightintoethicsandontology.
Philosopherswhostudylogichavealsooftenfoundaninterestinnaturallanguage.Althoughsomelogicianshavefeltthatnaturallanguagesaretoovagueand
ambiguoustoyieldtologicalanalysis,othershaveattemptedtomodifyandextendtheirtechniqueswithmuchsuccess.Onefinalattractionthatthestudyofmeaning
hasheldforphilosophersstemsfromthestatusofmeaningsthemselvesandrelatedissues.Meaningshavebeenvariouslyanalyzedasmentalconcepts,behaviors,
ideas,andobjects,amongotherthings.Thestudyofmeaningalsoraisesquestionsaboutconsciousness,ontology,identity,intentions,andthemindthatprovidea
severetestformostphilosophicaltheories.
Alandpsychologyalsocountmeaningasanimportantconcern.Psychologistshavestudiedmeaningasitisinvolvedinconceptformation,affect,reasoning,and
memory.Theyhavealsotraditionallybeeninterestedinvarioustopicsinsemanticsattheintersectionoflinguisticsandpsychology(socalledpsycholinguistics),
includingtheacquisitionofmeaningbychildren,theanalysisofambiguity,andtheprocessofinterpretation.Onetopicinpsycholinguisticsthatwetakeupbelowisthe
psychologicalplausibilityofthesemantictheorywewilldevelop.Sinceoursemanticrulesystemwillturnouttobeparallelinstatustooursyntacticrulesystemsinthe
sensethatboth

Page410

arepartofatheoryoflinguisticcompetence,similarphilosophicalquestionsariseaboutthepsychologicalclaimsweareentitledtomakeforouraccount.
ResearchinAIhasexploredmeaningwithbothdirectandindirectgoalsinmind.Inordertobuildanexpertsystem,itisnecessarytoconfrontanarrayofproblems
concerningtherepresentationofsemanticinformation.Suchsystemsmustbeabletointerpretthemeaningoftheirinput,representmeaningfulinformationinmemory,
drawinferences,andrespondinalanguagethattheusercancomprehend.Allthesetasksinvolveaspectsofmeaning.Moredirectly,manyresearchersinAIhavefelt
thatcomputationalmodelsofknowledgerepresentationshedanewanddifferentlightonthenatureofmeaning.Wewillconsiderthispointofviewbrieflyattheendof
thechapter.
10.2MeaningandEntailment
Ourstudyofsemanticsproceedswithtwodifferentbutcomplementarypurposesinmind.Fromaviewpointthatcurrentlyissharedbymanylinguistsand
philosophers,wewillstudythemeaningsoflinguisticexpressions.Inthisregard,wemightbeginbyassigningameaningtoeachterminalnodeinasurfacestructure
phrasestructuretreeforagivensentence.Thesemeaningswouldthenbecombinedtodeterminethemeaningofthewholesentence.Evidencethatananalysisof
sentencemeaningmustcomposesuchmeaningsoutofthemeaningsofsubconstituentsofthesentencecomesfromtheconsiderationthatthereareaninfinitenumber
ofmeaningfulsentencesinanynaturallanguagethatarereadilyunderstandablebynativespeakers.Byassumingthatspeakersconstructthemeaningsoflarger
expressionsoutofthemeaningsoftheirparts,wecanexplainthisnaturalabilityinamannerquiteparalleltothatbywhichweaccountedfortheabilityofnative
speakerstospontaneouslymusterintuitionsofgrammaticalityfornovelutterancesandforatheoreticalinfinityofsentences.
Followinginasecond,morenarrowlyphilosophicaltradition,wewillconsiderthenatureofentailmentandargumentstructure.Forsome,thisinterestspringsfroma
moregeneralinterestinthenatureofrationality.Forexample,ournativeabilitytoreasontellsusthatitislegitimatetoconclude(Ic)if(la)and(lb),thepremisesofthe
argument,aretrue,
(1)

a.Johnnyisawhale.

b.Allwhalesaremammals.

Therefore

c.Johnnyisamammal.

butthattheconclusionin(2c)doesnotfollowfrom(2a)and(2b):
(2)

a.Johnnyisamammal.

b.Allwhalesaremammals.

Therefore

c.Johnnyisawhale.

Logicianshavetraditionallyinvestigatedthelogicalstructureofargumentstodeterminehowtodistinguishvalidarguments(thoseargumentswhoseconclusionsmustbe
trueiftheirpremisesaretrue,or,inotherwords,whoseconclusionsareentailedbytheirpremises)frominvalidarguments(thoseargumentsthetruthofwhose
conclusionsisnotentailedbythetruthoftheirpremises,or,inotherwords,thetruthof

Page411

whosepremisesiscompatiblewiththefalsityoftheirconclusions).Althoughourprimaryinterestinthischapterwillbeinconstructinganaccountofmeaning,wewill
alsodiscussargumentvalidityfromtwodifferentpointsofview.Finally,afteradiscussionofsuchmatters,weconcludethechapterbyconsideringwaysinwhich
researchinsemanticsmakescontactwithworkonlanguageprocessinginpsychologyandAI.
10.3Reference
Inourattempttoanalyzethemeaningofsentencesweimmediatelyfaceseveralcentralquestions,includingthemostbasicconcernofall:Whatismeaning?This
extremelyvexedmatterhasreceivedvariousanswersthroughouttheyears.Meaningshavebeenvariouslytreatedasconcepts,entitiesinaPlatonicheaven,objects,
andbehaviors.Somephilosophershavecometotheconclusionthatitmaynotevenmakesensetotalkaboutmeaningsperse(Austin1962).Asastartingpoint,we
mightagreethatlanguageis,atitscore,asymbolicsystem.Thisistosaythatlanguagesconsistofformsofexpressionthatstandfor(orreferto)things.Thisis
perhapsmostplausibleinthecaseofnames:itisnaturaltosaythatthenameChurchillreferstoChurchillandthatthisexhaustsitsmeaning.Wewillattempttoextend
thisinsighttootherpartsofthelanguageaswellandclaim,atleastfornow,that(forexample)snowreferstosnow.Wemight,then,provisionallyaccepttheclaimthat
toknowthemeaningofawordinvolvesknowingwhatitcanproperlybeusedtoreferto.
Aswewillsee,thissimpleassumptionisprobablynotcorrectasstated,butitwillcarryusquiteawayinourstudyofmeaning.Combiningthisprinciplewiththeidea
thatmeaningsofsentencesaredeterminedoutofthemeaningsofsubconstituentsofsentences,wewillembarkonaprogramthatspecifieswhatthebasicmeaningful
expressionsinalanguagestandforandhowtocalculatetheinterpretationsofsentencesonthebasisofthesereferencerelations.Implicitinthesenotionsisanother
leadingidea:toknowthemeaningofasentenceistoknowtheconditionsunderwhichitistrue(itstruthconditions),or,alternatively,toknowwhatmakesittrueor
howtheworldwouldhavetobeforittobetrue.Thecombinationoftheseideas,calledcompositionalityandtruthconditionalsemantics,isattheheartofmuch
ofsemanticresearchincognitivescience.BothideaswerefirstdevelopedsystematicallybytheGermanphilosopherandmathematicianGottlobFrege.
Letusbeginourinvestigationoftruthconditionalsemanticsbyconsideringthefollowingsentence:
(3)

Churchillsmoked.

Whatarethereferences(orsemanticvalues)oftheconstituentexpressions?Inthecaseofthesubject,Churchill,thesemanticvalueistheprimeministerofGreat
BritainduringWorldWarII.Wewritethisasfollows.

readingthe
notationasthesemanticvalueof...andtakingtheexpressionontherighthandsideofthe"="todenotetheman.What,then,doessmoked
haveasitssemanticvalue?Puttingasidethematterofthetense(ortimeframe)oftheverb,wecananalyzethesemanticvalueofintransitiveverbsassetsof
individualsinthiscase,

Page412

The"{...}"notationisthestandardnotationfromsettheoryforasetroughly,acollectionofthings.Setscanbeexpressedeitherbyacriterionformembership,as
in(5),orbylistingtheirmembers.So,wecouldhavesaid:

Giventhat
isthesetofthosewhosmoked,itremainstocalculatethesemanticvalueofthesentenceasawhole.Nowwecanbringtogethertheideasof
compositionalityandtruthconditionality.Thesemanticvalueofthesubjectofthissentenceisanindividual,andthesemanticvalueofthepredicateisasetwhatwe
needisawayofcomposingthesesemanticvaluestogetasemanticvalueofthesentence.Thenaturalcomposingoperationisthatofsetmembership,symbolizedin
settheoryas" ",sinceitisanoperationthatappliestoindividualsandsets.Whatismore,theresultofapplyingthisoperationisTrueifandonlyif(iff)theindividual
belongstotheset,andFalseifftheindividualdoesnot.Thisgivesusasystematicwaytocalculatethetruthconditionsofsuchasentence:itistrueifftheindividual
denotedbythesubjectofthesentenceisamemberofthesetdenotedbythepredicate.Wecanalsoseewhatthesemanticvaluesofsentenceswillbe.Sincetheywill
betheresultofcomposingthesemanticvaluesoftheirconstituents,andtheseresultsarealwayseitherTrueorFalse,thesemanticvalueofasentencewillbeitstruth
value.Letusnowworktheseideasoutinmoredetail.
Thetruthvalueofasentencesuchas(3)canbecomputedbyapplyingtherulegiveninformallyin(7)andmoreformallyin(8):
(7)

AsentenceSistrueifthesemanticvalueofthesubjectNPisanelementofthe
semanticvalueofthepredicateVP.

(8)

IfasentenceShasthestructurea b,wherea isanNPandb isaVPcontainingan

intransitiveverb,then
.

Inthecaseof(3)thisamountstoaskingwhether
(9)

Churchill {individualswhosmoked}

which,ofcourse,heis.
Quantification:FirstOrderQuantifiers
Theinsightwearedevelopingisthatthesemanticvalueofasentenceiscalculatedoutofthesemanticvaluesofitspartsandthatthesentenceasawholehasatruth
valueasitssemanticvalue.However,whenweconsiderotherexamples,weencountercomplications.Forinstance,itisnotentirelyclearwhatindividualitmightbe
thatthesubjectNPnothingreferstoin(10):
(10)

Nothingeats.

Theapparentproblemisthatthereisnoindividualfornothingtoreferto.Ifwetakeaword'smeaningtobeitsreferent,andreferencetobearelationbetweenwords
andthingsintheworld,thenitwouldappearthatthesubjectofthissentenceismeaningless,whichofcourseitisnot.
Onesolutiontothisproblem,whichallowsustoassignthissentenceasemanticvalue,involvesimportingthefirstorderpredicatecalculusintroducedbrieflyinchapter
4.(10)canbetranslatedintoarepresentationinthislogicasfollows:

Page413

(11)

(Forallthingsx,)[Itisnotthecasethatxeats]

Inthevocabularyofourlogic,(11)ismoreformallyrenderedas(12a)orequivalentlyas(12b):
(12)

a.( x)[ xeats]

b. ( x)[xeats]

"( x)"isread"forallx...,""( x)"isread''thereexistsanxsuchthat...,''and"~"standsfor"itisnotthecasethat...."Noticethatthissortofanalysisdoesnot

reallyanswerthequestionofwhatthewordnothingrefersto.Instead,nothingistranslatedintoanewvocabularythatessentiallytreatsitas"allthingsdonot"or
"theredoesnotexistathingthatdoes."Thisofcourseonlypushestheproblemofinterpreting(10)backalevel,fornowweneedaruleofinterpretationforthe
expressionsin(11)and(12).Themethodofinterpretationforsuchexamplesinvolvesconsideringinturneachthingintheworldandcheckingwhethereachsuchthing
isinthesetofeaters.Ifnoneare,then(12)(and(11))aretrueandtherefore,sois(10),sincewearetakingtheformertorepresentthemeaningofthelatter.
Thesymbol"( x)"standsfortheuniversalquantifier.Noticethatitwouldappearinthelogicaltranslation(13b)of(13a)aswellasin(12a).
(13)

a.Everythingeats
b.( x)[xeats]

Theexistentialquantifier"( x)"canalsoappearinthepositionbeforethebracketsin(13),asfollows:
(14)

( x)[xeats]

Theruleofinterpretationfor(14)willhaveuscheckforatleastoneindividualintheworldwhoisinthesetofeaters." x,"then,isafirstorderpredicatecalculus
representationforatleastone(or,roughly,something).(Theparticularchoiceofthesymbol" x "asavariableintheselastexamplesisarbitrary,although
conventional.Thus,substituting,say,"y"for" x "in(14)doesnotaffecttheinterpretationoftheformula.)
Letusstepbackforamomenttosurveythemethodwehaveemployedinoursemanticanalysis.Indeterminingfirstunderwhatconditionsasentenceistrueandthen
whetherthesentenceisinfacttrue,weare(1)translatingthesentenceintoasymbolicnotation(fornow,thelanguageofthefirstorderpredicatecalculus),(2)using
theapparatusofsetmembershipandan(informal)interpretationofthequantifiers,determiningthetruthconditionsoftheresultinglogicalformula,and(3)determining
whetherthoseconditionsinfactobtainintheworld(orourmodelofit).Weturntothisindirectinterpretiveapproachinordertoestablishasystematicwayof
calculatingsemanticvalues.
Animportantfeatureoftheanalysiswehavechosenisthatitdeterminesthesemanticfunctionsoftwodifferentmembersofasinglesyntacticcategoryindifferent
ways.So,wherenothingin(10)andChurchillin(3)(whicharebothNPs)mightappeartoplaythesamesemanticrole,ouranalysisrevealsthatoncloser
inspection,theyareinterpretedbyverydifferentprocedures.Wewillreturntothispointbelow.
Ourapproachtoquantifierslikeallandsomerunsintodifficultieswhenweconsiderotherkindsofquantifiers.Consider,forexample,thefollowingtranslationforA
dogbarksinwhich"&"standsforand:

Page414

(15)

( y)[yisadog&ybarks]

Sincetheruleofinterpretationfor"&"requiresthateachpartoftheconjunctionbetrueinorderforthewholesentencetobetrue,theruleforinterpretingexistentially
quantifiedstatementswillaskustodeterminewhetherthereisatleastoneindividualintheworldwhoisintwosets:thesetofdogsandthesetofbarkers.
Sofar,sogood,butthissortofanalysiscannotbereadilyextendedtotheseeminglyparallel(16):
(16)

Mostdogsbark.

Suppose,forexample,thatweinventanewquantifiersymbol," ,"whoseinterpretationrequirestestingtheindividualsintheworldtodeterminewhetherornot
enoughofthem(say,morethanhalf)areinthesetofdogsandthesetofbarkers,ineffectrendering(16)as(17)inthefirstorderpredicatecalculuswith :
(17)

( x)[xisadog&xbarks]

Thiscannotbearepresentationof(16),since(17)requiresthatmostthingsbedogs(andbarkers),whereas(16)seemsonlytorequirethatmostthingsthataredogs
bebarkers.Inpointoffact,(16)seemstrue,but(17)doesnot.(Forfurtherdiscussion,seeBarwiseandCooper1981.)
Fortheseandseveralotherreasons,manycognitivescientistsnolongerregardthesimpleversionofthefirstorderpredicatecalculusthatwehavepresentedasthe
optimumrepresentationforquantifierlikeexpressionsinnaturallanguages.Anumberofalternativesarecurrentlybeingstudied.BothMontague(1973)andBarwise
andCooper(1981)havedevelopedmethodsofanalysisthat,althoughdifferentininterestingways,shareacommoninsightthatintroducesanalternativetothe
analysisofquantificationabove.
Toreconsiderthecasein(10),Nothingeats,supposeweattempttoassignasemanticvaluedirectlytonothing.Wehavealreadynotedthattheredoesnotseemto
beanyrelevantindividualtowhichnothingmightrefer,butthatdoesnotruleoutcertainlessobviousalternatives.Suppose,forexample,thatweanalyzenothingas
referringtoasetofsets,whichforeaseofdescriptionwewillcallafamilyofsets.Whichsetswillbeinthisfamilyofsets?Letussaythatasetwithnomembers,or
whatiscalledtheemptyset,istheonlymemberofthisfamilyofsets.Onthismodel,somethingwillhaveasitssemanticvalueafamilyofsetseachofwhose
membershasatleastonemember,andeverythingwillhaveasitssemanticvaluethefamilyofsetswhoseonlymembercontainseverythingintheuniverseof
discourseasamember.Ifweadoptthisanalysis,itbecomespossibletoprovidearulethatcomputesthesemanticvalueofasentencelike(10)outofthesemantic
valuesofitspartsasfollows:

Since

.Thus,ifweinquirewhether

Page415

theanswerisyes,andthesentenceistrue.Bythesamesortofreasoning,youshouldbeabletodeterminethetruthvalueof[Everythingeats]].
ThissystemofinterpretationcanalsobeextendedtohandlesentencesinvolvingotherquantificationalNPs,includingdeterminerssuchasadoginAdogbarks
(discussedearlier),andeventhesentenceinvolvingmostin(16).Forexample,inordertoreceiveatreatmentparalleltothatreceivedbynothingandsomething,
mostdogswillhavetorefertoafamilyofsets.(Weleaveasidethemoretechnicalquestionofwhatmostitselfreferstoandhowthatsemanticvalueiscomposed
withthatofdogstogeneratethesemanticvalueoftheresultingNP.Fordiscussion,seeBarwiseandCooper1981.)Whichsetswillthatfamilycomprise?Itshould
bethefamilyofsetseachofwhichincludesmostdogs.Mostdogsbarkwillthenbetrueiff(20a)istrue,whichinturnistrueiff(20b)istrue:

(20b)askswhetherthesetofbarkersisoneofthosesetsthathasthepropertyofcontainingmostdogs.Now,ofcourse,manysetscontainmostdogs.Forexample,
thesetofthingsthathavefurcontainsmostdogs,sincedogsoverwhelminglyhavefur.Hereweareinterestedinwhetherthesetofbarkersistobefoundamongthe
setscontainingmostdogs.Sincefewdogsdonotbark,itis,andtherefore(16)istrue.
ThisapproachtoquantificationinEnglishinvolvestreatingthesubjectNPasacomplicatedsetofsetsandcalculatingwhetherornotthesemanticvalueofthe
predicateisinthatset.Thisseems"backward"comparedtothemannerinwhichwecomputedthesemanticvalueofsentencessuchas(3)(Churchillsmoked),in
whichwetestedthesemanticvalueofthesubjectofthesentenceforinclusioninthesemanticvalueofthepredicate.Thatis,inlightoftheinterpretationwehavejust
offeredofquantifiedNPs,wearecommittedtoanasymmetricalanalysisofsentencesdependinguponwhetherornottheycontainnames.Compare(21a)and(21b)
with(21c):

ANewTheoryofNamesandQuantifiers
Montague(1973)haspointedoutthatitispossibletoprovideauniforminterpretationfornames,descriptions,andquantifiednounphrases.Inordertoachievethis
parallelismbetweenquantifiedandnonquantifiedsentences,wemustreviseourviewofwhatnamesreferto.Earlierwesuggestedthatasentenceascribingaproperty
toanamedindividualistrueiffthatindividualisinthesetofthingshavingthatproperty.Unfortunately,givenouranalysisofquantifiers,sentenceswithnamesinsubject
positionreceiveasemanticanalysiscompletelydifferentfrom,andoppositeto,thatgiventoquantifiedsentences.
Onesolutiontothisproblemistoassignfamiliesofsetsasinterpretationstonamesaswell,takingnamestobeabbreviationsforthebundleofpropertiespossessedby
thenamedindividual.Thus,toChurchillweassignthefamilyofsetseachofwhichcontainsChurchillasamember.Thisismadeexplicitinthetreatmentofproper
namesproposedbyMontague(1973).Usingthisapproach,weinterpret(3)asfollows:

Page416

SincethesetofsmokerscontainsChurchill,thatsetwillbeoneofthemembersofthefamilyofsetstowhichChurchillrefers.Therefore,thesetofthosewho
smokedwillbeamemberofthesemanticvalueofChurchill,andthesentenceistrue.
Tobesure,thisanalysisofpropernamesiscontroversial.Initsfavoristhefactthatitallowsustotreatallsubjectexpressionsuniformly.Ontheotherhand,itdoes
someviolencetotheintuition(developedinKripke1980)thatthesemanticfunctionofanameisjusttopickoutitsbearer.Intuitively,wethinkthatChurchill,for
instance,doesnothingmorethanrefertoChurchill.Buttheapproachwehavediscussedhasitreferringtoafamilyofsets.Regardlessofthefinalverdict,wehave
seenthatsemanticanalysis,likesyntacticandphonologicalanalysis,proceedsbyhypothesisandjustificationandmaynotalwaysconformtoourfirstintuitions.In
theseregards,semanticshasmuchincommonwithotherareasofscientificinquiry,withthefirstorderpredicatecalculusandtheanalysesofMontagueandof
BarwiseandCooperconstitutingcompetingtheoriesofquantificationandnaming.Althoughthelatterapproachhasgreatpotential,foreaseofexpositionwewill
concentrateonfirstorderpredicatecalculusaswecontinueouranalysis.Ithastheadvantageofbeingbetterknownandsomewhatlessabstract,whilestillbeinga
goodillustrationofasystematicanalysisoflogicalform.
DomainofDiscourse,Tense,andIndexicality
Asisthecasewithanyhypothesis,whenwelookmorecloselyattheinterpretationsofawiderangeofsentences,wediscoveradditionaldatathatourtheorymust
confront.Infact,severalinterestingproblemsthatwehavesuppressedhavealreadycroppedup.Thus,beforeextendingouranalysistoaccommodatenewfacts,we
noteafewqualifications.Firstofall,whenanNPsuchaseverythingisusedintypicalspeech,thereisnormallyanimplicitnarrowingofwhatiscalledthedomainof
discourse.Thatis,theuniverseoverwhichwequantify(inotherwords,thestockofindividualsaboutwhichwearetalking)islimited,oftenbyanimpliedcriterionof
relevance.Thus,apersonwhosaysEverythingisfatteningwhileinarestaurantispresumablytalkingaboutthefoodonthemenuandnotabouteverythinginthe
universe.EvenquantificationalNPssuchaseverymanfallunderthisgeneralization:inusingsuchanexpression,wetypicallymakeacommentaboutalltherelevant
men(whoevertheymaybeinagivencircumstance).Ifthisintuitioninformstheanalysisofquantificationsketchedabove,wewilllimitourconsiderationtorelevant
individualsinthedomainofdiscoursewhenweconstructthesetsandfamiliesofsetsthatfigureinthecalculationofsemanticvalues.
Next,weneedtoconsidertenses.Churchillsmokedistrueonitsinterpretationasasimplepasttenseassertionwhenutteredattimesafterheacquiredthehabit.It
wasnottrueathisbirthoratanytimepriortothatevent.Moregenerally,manysentencesofnaturallanguagescanonlybeevaluatedfortruthorfalsityrelativetoa
momentofutteranceandwithrespecttoatimeframe.Thetimeframeistypicallygivenbythetensemarkerinsimplesentences.Insimplecasessuchastheoneunder
considerationpasttenserequiresthatthesentenceChurchillsmokedmusthavebeentrueatsomemomentpriortothetimeofutterance.Presenttenseismore
complicated.IfyousayBirdseat,youdonotnecessarilymeanthattheyaredoingsoatpresent.Itismorelikelythatyoumeanthattheyhabituallyeatorthattheyeat
asamatterofcourse.It

Page417

ispossibletousepresenttensetorefertothepresentmoment(as,forexample,inreportsofsportingevents:"AndJonesslidesintothirdunderthetag!"),butthisis
fairlyuncommon.
ThesearesomeoftheconcernswithtensethatamorethoroughgoingtreatmentofEnglishsemanticswouldneedtoanalyze.Recentlylinguistsandphilosophershave
developedrichlydetailedanalysesoftensesystemsthataddresstheseandrelatedfactswithinframeworkscloselyrelatedtotheonewehavebeenexamining(see
Dowty1982Partee1973),andtemporallogicsremainanactivefieldofinvestigation.
Arelatedphenomenonthatalsorequiressomewhatmoreelaborationofoursemanticsystemisindexicality.TermsinnaturallanguageslikeI,you,now,andhereare
saidtobeindexical,becausetheyrefertodifferententitiesatdifferenttimesandwhenusedbydifferentspeakersindifferentsituations.Nowreferstothepresent
momentnowbuttoadifferentonewhenusedatdifferenttimes.Hereisanywherethespeakerwhousesithappenstobe.Theaccountoftheinterpretationofsuch
expressionsandofsentencesthatcontainthemrequiresaspecificationofhowtofixthereferenceoftheseexpressionsdependinguponthesesituationalvariables.
AmbiguityandScope
Letusnowtestourtheoryagainstsomenewdata.Consider,first,aclassofambiguitiesthatinvolvequantification.Eachofthefollowingsentenceshastwodifferent
interpretations:
(23)

a.Blikisnotavailableinallareas.
b.Somebodyvotedforeverycandidate.

Sentence(23a)canbeusedbothtoassertthattheproductisavailableonlyinsomeareasandtoassertthatitisavailableinnone.Sentence(23b)meanseitherthat
someonevotedasmanytimesasittooktocastavoteforeachcandidateorthatnocandidatefailedtoreceiveavote(withthevotescomingfrompossiblydifferent
voters).Partoftheinterestintheseexamplesliesinthefactthattheirambiguitydoesnotappeartoderivefromambiguitiesinwordmeaning.Forinstance,the
ambiguityof(24)canbetracedtothetwodifferentmeaningofrecordthereisnostructuralambiguityinthesentence:
(24)

Marybroketherecord.(discorGuinness)

Theredoesnotseemtobeaparallelexplanationfor(23a)and(23b).Intheseexampleseachcomponentofeachsentencehasasingleinterpretation,yeteach
sentencehastwointerpretations.Weconcludethattheremustbetwodifferentwaysofcombiningtheinterpretationsofthepartstoproducetheinterpretationsofthe
entiresentences.Inthecaseof(23a),forexample,thecrucialissueisthepointintheinterpretationatwhichwefactorthesemanticvalueofthenegationintothe
sentence.Inotherwords,(23a)canbeconstruedasassertingeither(25)or(26):
(25)

Itisnotthecasethat[Blikisavailableinallareas]

(26)

Forallareas,itisnotthecasethat[Blikisavailableinthem]

Sentence(25),whichclaimsthatthereareatleastsomeareasinwhichBlikisnotavailable,wouldberepresentedinthefirstorderpredicatecalculusas(27a),where
xrangesoverareas,whichisequivalentto(27b):

Page418

(27)

a. ( x)[Blikisavailableinx]
b.( x)[ Blikisavailableinx]

Bycontrast,sentence(26)assertsthatBlikisnotavailableanywhere,whichwouldbe
symbolizedas(28a)or(28b):
(28)

a.( x) [Blikisavailableinx]
b. ( x)[Blikisavailableinx]

Insuchcaseswesaythattherearetwowaysofassigningscopetothenegationoperatorandthequantifier.In(27a)negationhaswidescopeovertheuniversal
quantifier,becauseitoccursoutsideofthequantifierin(28a)theuniversalquantifierhaswidescope,becauseitoccursoutsideofthereachofthenegation.In
specifyingthetruthconditionsofquantifiedsentences,oursemantictheorywillassigndifferenttruthconditionstothesetworeadings,asaresultofcomposingthe
interpretationofthesentencebyassigningdifferentrelativescopestonegationandquantification.Consequently,(27a)willbetrueiffBlik'savailabilityisnotuniversal,
and(28a)willbetruejustincaseBlikisnowheretobefound.Theimportantpointhereisthatthefirstorderpredicatecalculuscanbothexplainthisambiguityand
assignthecorrectsemanticinterpretationtoeachofthereadingsbyprovidingtwopermissiblebutmutuallyincompatiblewaysoftranslatingthisEnglishsentenceinto
thelogicandofassigningtruthconditionstoit.
Asimilarscopecontest,thistimebetweentwoquantifiers,isatworkin(23b).(23b)canberepresentedeitheras(29)
(29)

( x)( y)[xvotedfory]

(thatis,someparticularindividualxissuchthatthatindividualvotedforeachandeverycandidatey),oras(30)
(30)

( y)( x)[xvotedfory]

(thatis,foreverycandidatey,thereisatleastonevoterxsuchthatxvotedfory).Again,thesetwointerpretationsinourlogic,oneofwhichassignstheuniversal
quantifierwidescopeovertheexistentialquantifierandoneofwhichassignsscopeinthereverseorder,willhavedifferenttruthconditions,byvirtueofinterpretingthe
quantifiersindifferentordersandwithdifferentrelativescopeswhencomputingthetruthconditionsofthesentenceasawhole.Thisambiguitythusreceivesan
explanationparalleltothatof(23a).
Wehaveseenthatafairlyrigorousaccountcanbegivenofhowthemeaningofasentencecanbeconstructedfromthemeaningsofitsparts.Sofarwehavebeen
operatingundertheassumptionsthatthemeaningofalinguisticitemisitsreferentandthatthereferenceofasentenceisitstruthvalue.Inthefollowingsectionwewill
seewhythisisinfacttoosimplisticaviewofthenatureoflinguisticmeaningandhowoursemanticsmustbeenriched,andcomplicatedsomewhat,inordertoaccount
formoreofthecomplexityofnaturallanguage.
10.4Sense
Inadditiontotheideasofcompositionalityandoftruthvalueassentencereference,Fregeintroducedthedistinctionbetweenthesenseandthereferenceofa
linguisticitem.

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FortheremainderofthisdiscussionwewillbeexploringviewsinthetraditionofFrege.Althoughthisisnottheonlyapproachtosemanticanalysispracticedwithin
cognitivescience,itisimportantandrepresentative.Wewilldevelopitatsomelengthtogivesomethingoftheflavorsharedbymanyalternativetheories.
WhenFregeintroducedthesensereferencedistinction,hispurposewastochallengeapopulartheorythatanalyzedmeaningasreference.Theaccountofsemantic
interpretationwehavediscussedsofarisalsoessentiallyareferentialtheoryinthatitgenerallytakesthesemanticvalueofanexpressiontobeitsreference.Thus,
Frege'sargumentsarequiterelevanttoourposition,andtheywillinclineustoaddanewcomponenttooursemantictheory.
Wehaveseenthatthereferenceofatermisthethingintheworldthataterm(suchasanameoradescription)picksout,likeChurchillforChurchillor{allred
things}forred.Theideaofsenseismoreabstract.Briefly,theaspectofthemeaningofaword,byvirtueofwhichweunderstanditandbyvirtueofwhichitsucceeds
inpickingoutitsreferent,isitssense.Forasentence,thesenseisthewayitdescribestheworld,which,ifaccurate,makesittrue,andwhich,ifinaccurate,makesit
false.Senseisthereforethefeatureofalinguisticexpressionthatdeterminesitsreference,anditiswhatthemindgraspswhenitunderstandsanexpression.
Toseethismoreclearly,wemayconsiderthefollowingpairsofexamples:
(31)

a.Churchill

b.TheprimeministerofEnglandduringWorldWarII

(32)

a.____hasaheart

b.____hasakidney

(33)

a.ClintonisClinton.

b.ClintonisthefirstDemocraticU.S.presidentsinceJimmyCarter.

(34)

a.Carmenisabat.

b.Carmenisawingedmammal.

Themembersofeachofthesepairsareidenticalinreferencebutappeartodifferinmeaning.Consequently,ourtheoryofmeaningmustbeabletodistinguishthe
interpretationofeachmemberofthepairfromtheother.Unfortunately,aslongasweassigntheirreferenceastheirmeaning,wewillbeunabletodoso.Therefore,
followingFrege,wenotethateachoftheseexampleshasadifferentsenseandthusadifferentwayofpickingoutitsreferent.Althougheachexpressionin(31)picks
outChurchill,(31a)doessobynaminghim,whereas(31b)isadescription,whosemeaningisinturnconstructedfromthemeaningsofitsparts.Althoughithappens
tobetrueofChurchill,thereisastrongsenseinwhichitneednothavebeen.Itcouldhavebeen,forinstance,thatChamberlainretainedthatoffice.Noticethat
adoptingthisstyleofsemanticanalysisgivesuptheclaimthatmeaningequalsreferenceandadoptsthepositionthatexpressionsthatarecoreferentialmayexpress
differentsensesandthereforehavedifferentmeanings.
Similarly,although(32a)and(32b)refertothesameset,theytoohavedifferentmeanings.Thatintuitivelyratherobviousfactcanbedemonstratedsemantically.Since
(32a)and(32b)arecomplexexpressions,theirsemanticvaluesshouldbecomposedfromthesemanticvaluesoftheirparts.Theonlydifferencebetween(32a)and
(32b)isthatwhere(32a)containsheart,(32b)containskidney.Themodeofcompositionof

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themeaningofthesephraseshenceshouldbethesame.However,themeaningsofheartandkidneyaredifferent,sinceheartreferstothesetofheartsandkidneyto
thesetofkidneys.Thus,wewouldexpectthatthemeaningsofthedescriptionswoulddiffer,despitethecoincidenceoftheiridenticalreference.
Arelatedpointbringsintofocusthesortsofproblemsthatexamplessuchastheseposefortheanalysisofmeaningasreference.Supposeforthesakeofargument
thatmeaningisreference,andkeepinmindthatweareassumingthatphraseandsentencemeaningiscompositionalandthatthereferenceofasentenceisits
truthvalue.Sinceonthisaccount(32a)and(32b)havethesamemeaning,thensoshould(35a)and(35b),sincetheydifferonlyinthesamerespectsthat(32a)and
(32b)do:
(35)

a.ThefactthatJohnhasaheartexplainsthecirculationofhisblood.
b.ThefactthatJohnhasakidneyexplainsthecirculationofhisblood.

But(35a)istrue,whereas(35b)isfalse.Hence,thesesentencesdifferinreference,thoughthetwophrasesinitalicsdonot.Wethereforeneedsomeaccountof
meaningthatwilldojusticetothedifferenceintruthvalueofsentenceslike(35a)and(35b)despitetheidentityofreferenceofpairsofphraseslike(32a)and(32b),
andthekeyshouldbeassigningdifferentmeaningsto(32a)and(32b)andhencedroppingourassumptionthatreferenceismeaning.
Sentences(33a)and(33b)makethispointinaslightlydifferentway.(33a)isalogical,oranecessary,truth.Itislogicallyimpossibleforittobefalse,foreverythingis
whatitis.However,(33b),thoughtrue,istruenotbyvirtueoflogicbutbyvirtueofthefactsofhistory.Itcouldhavebeenotherwise,forinstance,ifDukakishadwon
orifClintonhaddecidednottorunforoffice.Thisdifferenceinlogicalstatusoughttobereflectedinadifferenceinmeaningofthetwosentences,despitetheir
agreementintruthvalueanddespitethefactthatthedescriptionin(33b)picksoutexactlythesameindividualasthenameitreplacesin(33a).Inparticular,the
semantictheoryshouldbeabletoexplainwhy(33a)isanecessarytruth,whereas(33b)isonlyahappenstance,orcontingent,truth.
Sentences(34a)and(34b)arebothtrue.ButFred,whocanalwaysrecognizeabatwhenheseesoneandwhoknowsCarmenwell,believesthatbatsarebirds.
Therefore,(36a)istrue,whereas(36b)isfalse:
(36)

a.FredbelievesthatCarmenisabat.
b.FredbelievesthatCarmenisawingedmammal.

Ideally,asemantictheorycouldexplainhowthisispossibledespitetheidenticalreferenceofbatandwingedmammal,andof(34a)and(34b)(whicharebothtrue
sentences),anddespitethefactthat(36a)and(36b)arealikeinallrespectsexceptforthesubstitutionofexpressionsthatdonotdifferinreference.Thekeytothe
solutionofallthesepuzzlesliesintheintroductionofsenseasthemeaningoflinguisticexpressions.
PossibleWorlds
Letusconsiderfirstwhatthenotionofsenseshouldcapture.Thesenseofasentenceshouldbe,notitstruthvalue,butwhatmakesthesentencetrueorfalsethe
senseofapredicateexpressionshouldbe,notthesettowhichitrefers,butwhatmakesthepredicateexpressionrefertothatsetandsensesshouldbewhatwe
understandwhenweunderstandanexpression.Informally,then,thesenseofasentencewhatitex

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pressesiswhattheworldwouldbelikeifitweretrue,andasentenceistrueiftheworldisinfactlikethat.Similarly,thesenseofapredicateexpressionisthe
propertythatathingwouldhavetohaveinordertobeinthesetpickedoutbythatpredicate,andasetisthereferenceofapredicateifitisthesetofindividualswith
therequisiteproperty.Tomaketheseideasclearerandmoreformal,weintroduceadevicethathasbeenimportanttothedevelopmentofnaturallanguagesemantics
intheFregeantraditioninthelastfewdecades,theconceptofapossibleworld(Montague1973Dowty,Wall,andPeters1981).Apossibleworldisnothingmore
thanawaytheworldcouldhavebeen,consistentwithlogic.So,anotherwayofsaying"Bushcouldhavebeenreelected"wouldbe"Thereisapossibleworldinwhich
Bushhadbeenreelected"or,morefancifully,anotherwayofsaying''ItispossiblethatlizardsspeakFrench"wouldbe"Thereisapossibleworldinwhichlizards
speakFrench.''Thelogicaldeviceofpossibleworldsprovidesatidyaccountofsenseanditsconnectionwithreferencethatwillinturnaffordanexplanationofboth
thesimilaritiesandthedifferencesbetweensuchpairsofsentencesasthosein(31)through(36).
Letusdevelopourpreviousroughandreadynotionsofsensemorecarefullyusingpossibleworlds.Wewillsaythatthesenseofasentence,whichwewillcalla
proposition(tousetheterminanew,technicalmanner),isjustthatsetofworldsinwhichthesentenceistrue.Itmayseemstrangeatfirsttoidentifythemeaningofa
sentencewithasetofpossibleworlds.Butconsiderwhatthisreallymeans:whensomeoneassertsasentence,suchas"Grassisgreen,"forthatsentencetobetrueis
forthisworld(theactualworld)tobeinthesetofworldsinwhichgrassisgreen.Ifthepersonhadsaid,"Grassispurple,"wewouldhaveunderstoodthatsentence
andknownittobefalse,becausetheactualworldisnotinthesetofpurplegrassworlds.Theimportantthingtounderstandisthat,althoughthissentenceisfalse,we
knowwhatitwouldbeforthatsentencetobetruenamely,foroneofthepossibleworldswithpurplegrasstobetheactualone.
Propositions,Necessity,andPropositionalAttitudes
Inthissectionwewillfirstexplorehowthenotionofpossibleworldsworksforpredicateexpressionsandthenturntotheproblemofcombiningthesensesofsubject
andpredicateexpressionstocomeupwiththepropositions.
Recallthatthesenseofapredicateexpressionisaproperty,ausagethataccordsfairlywellwithourordinarylanguageuseoftheword.Notethatwhenwe
understandawordlikered,itwouldbeoddtosaythatwhatwegraspisthesetofredthings({allredthings})thereferenceofred.Rather,whatwegraspiswhat
itistobered.Usingthelanguageofpossibleworlds,wecansaythatwhatweunderstandiswhatittakestoqualifyformembershipinthesetofredthingsinany
possibleworld.Thus,whenweunderstandred,ifweweretogotoanotherworld(usingourimagination),wewouldbeabletoidentifythesetofredthingsinthat
world.Thepropertyassociatedwithapredicate,then,isthesetcomprisingthesetofthingsinthereferenceofthatpredicateexpressionineachpossibleworld.The
mechanismofpossibleworldsallowsustotreatsenses,whichareconceptlikeinnature,assetsofreferentssetsofworlds(propositions),setsofsets(properties),
andsoforth.So,thepropertyofrednessincludes,inthisworld,thesetofallredthingsinanotherworld,thesetofallredthingsinthatworldandsoon.
Onthisaccount,whenweunderstandthemeaningofanexpression,wegraspnotitsreferencebutitssense.Thesenseofanexpression,togetherwiththewaythe
world

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is,determinesitsreference.Thus,apropositionandthefactstogetherdetermineatruthvalue(forexample,Grassisgreenandthegreennessofactualgrass
determineTrue,whereasGrassispurpleandthegreennessofactualgrassdetermineFalse).Apropertyandthewaytheworldisdetermineaset,whichisthekind
ofthingthatisthereferentofapredicateexpression(forexample,thepropertyofbeingredandthefactsaboutwhatthingsarereddetermine{allredthings}).
Next,letusconsiderthesensesofnames.Thesemanticfunctionofanameistopickoutanindividual.Bush,forinstance,picksoutBush.Sincewewanttobeableto
saythingslike"ItwaspossibleforBushtodefeatClinton"or"JohnbelievesthatBushwonreelection,"andweareattemptingtodescribethemeaningsofthese
sentencesintermsofpossibleworlds,BushmustrefertoBushineachoftheseworlds.Wewillassume,then,thatnamesdesignatethesameindividualinallpossible
worldsthesenseofanameisthereforethesetconsistingofitsbearer,ineachworld.Indiscussingreference,wenotedtheelegantuniformitythatcanbeachievedin
thesemanticsofNPexpressions,includingnames,bytreatingtheirsemanticvaluesasfamiliesofsets.Itmightappearthatbytreatingnamesasdesignatingtheir
bearersineachpossibleworld,weareindangeroflosingthisuniformity.Butthedangerisonlyapparent.Forwecan,onthisapproach,treatthesemanticvaluesof
namesasthefamilies,notofsetstowhichtheirbearersbelong,butofpropertiesthattheyhave,thusachievingexactlythesameeffect.Wewillseemoreofhowthis
worksshortly(seeDowty,Wall,andPeters1981).
Letusconsiderhowtheenrichedsemantictheoryhandlestheproblematicpairsofsentencesin(31)through(36),repeatedhere:
(31)

b.theprimeministerofEnglandduringWorldWarII
(32)

a.____hasaheart
b.____hasakidney

(33)

a.ClintonisClinton.
b.ClintonisthefirstDemocraticU.S.presidentsinceJimmyCarter.

(34)

a.Carmenisabat.
b.Carmenisawingedmammal.

(35)

a.ThefactthatJohnhasaheartexplainsthecirculationofhisblood.
b.ThefactthatJohnhasakidneyexplainsthecirculationofhisblood.

(36)

a.Churchill

a.FredbelievesthatCarmenisabat.
b.FredbelievesthatCarmenisawingedmammal.

Churchillin(31)referstoChurchill,asdoestheprimeministerofEnglandduringWorldWarII,butthesemanticvalueofChurchillwillpickoutChurchillin
everypossibleworld,whereasthesemanticvalueoftheprimeministerofEnglandduringWorldWarIIwillpickout,ineachworld,whoeverhappenstoholdthat
office.Intheactualworldthesesensesdeterminethesamereference.Butourintuitionthatthisfactismerelyhappenstanceisnicelyaccountedforbythepossible
worldssemantics.Althoughintheactualworld,beingtheprimeministerwasoneofChurchill'sproperties,itisnotsoinallpossibleworlds.Inotherwords,itis
possiblethatChurchillwasnotprimeministerduringWorldWarII.Wethusexplainboththesamenessofreferenceofthese

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expressions(Churchill)andtheirdifferenceinsense(Churchill'sproperties,orChurchillinallworldsversuswhoever,inanyworld,isprimeministerofEnglandduring
WorldWarIIinthatworld).
Withrespectto(32),wenotethatalthoughintheactualworld{thingswithaheart}={thingswithakidney},thisdoesnotmeanthatthesesetsarethesameinall
worlds.Thefactthatwecandescribeapossibleworldwherethereareheartlessbutkidneyedcreatures,orviceversa,tellsusthatthesensesofthesetwo
expressionsdifferthatalthoughtheirsensespickoutthesamesetintheactualworld,theypickoutdifferentsetsinotherworlds.Itishencenosurprisethat(35a)
and(35b)expressdifferentpropositions,byvirtueofbeingcomposedofconstituentswithdifferentsenses,orthatoneofthemexpressesapropositionthatistruein
thisworld,whereastheotherexpressesapropositionthatisfalseinthisworld.
BothoccurrencesofClintonin(33a)pickoutClintonineveryworld.Itwouldfollow,then,that(33a)expressesapropositiontrueinallpossibleworldsinother
words,alogicallynecessaryproposition.ButwhereasClintonpicksoutClintoninallworlds,thefirstDemocraticU.S.presidentsinceJimmyCarterpicksout
differentindividualsinmanyofthedifferentworldswemightimagine.Andofcourse,thereareplentyofworldswhereitssensepicksoutanindividualdistinctfrom
Clinton,worldsinwhich(33b)isfalse.Insomeworlds,then,thefamilyofClinton'spropertiesincludesthepropertyofbeingthefirstDemocraticU.S.presidentsince
JimmyCarter,whereasinothersitdoesnotbutineachworldClinton'spropertysetisselfidentical.Wecanthereforeunderstandwhythesetwosentencesexpress
differentpropositionsbothtrue,butonetruenecessarily,andonemerelycontingently.
Finally,wereturntothesentencesin(34)and(36).Thesentencesin(36)attributebeliefstoFred.Asnotedinchapter8,philosophershavetermedstatessuchas
beliefspropositionalattitudes.Wearenowinapositiontoseejustwhyitissofruitfulfromthestandpointsofbothphilosophyandlinguisticstoseethesestatesas
connectingpersonstopropositions,asopposed,say,toconnectingthemtothethingsreferredtobythesentencestheybelieve(truthvalues,onthecurrentanalysis)
ortothethingsreferredtobytheconstituentsofthosesentences(objectsandsets).WeknowthatthesenseofCarmenpicksoutCarmen(or,moreexactly,the
correspondingfamilyofsets)ineveryworldandthatthesensesofbatandwingedmammalpickoutsetsofthingsineachworld.Now,inthisworldthosearethe
samesets,andifwhatFredbelievedwasrelatedinsomesimplewayjusttothereferenceofeither(34a),(34b),orofanyoftheirconstituents,itwouldbeimpossible
for(36a)and(36b)todifferintruthvalue.ButsupposethatFredbelievesthesenseof(34a)anddisbelievesthesenseof(34b).Therearecertainlyplentyofworlds
inwhich{bats}doesnotequal{wingedmammals}.FredbelievesthattheactualworldisoneofthoseandthatCarmen,althoughamemberof{bats},isnota
memberof{wingedmammals}.Solongasbeliefisthekindofthingthatrelatesbelieverstopropositions,ratherthantothereferentsofthesentencesthatexpress
themortothereferentsoftheirconstituents,wehavenotrouble,giventhedifferenceinsensebetween(34a)and(34b),indistinguishing(36a)from(36b).
Becauseitexplainssuchawiderangeofsemanticphenomena,thenotionofsensehasgainedgreatfavorinsemantics.Thisanalysisallowsustoretainourintuitionthat
thesemanticsofcomplexexpressionsiscompositional(thatis,thatcomplexmeaningsarebuiltupsystematicallyfromthemeaningsofconstituentparts)andthe
intuitionthattounderstandasentenceisroughlytoknowunderwhatcircumstancesitistrue.Thisapproachalsohasthevirtueofprovidingthesametypesof
interpretationsfor

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constituentsofsentencesthataresyntacticallysimilar,thusconfirminganintuitionthatsyntactictheoryandsemantictheorygohandinhandintheaccountofhowwe
mapfromstructuretomeaning.Despitethesemanyvirtues,however,thisapproachtosemantictheorydoesencountercertainproblems,andalternativeapproaches
thataddresssomeoftheseissueshavebeenproposed.
10.5ProblemsinPossibleWorldsSemantics
Thefirsttwoofthethreeproblemswewillconsiderarecloselyrelated.Theybotharisefromthefactthatpropositionsareidentifiedwiththesetsofworldsinwhich
thesentencesthatexpressthemaretrue.Forinstance,Adogdiedexpressesthepropositionthatisthesetofworldsineachofwhichatleastonedogdiedtobelieve
thatadogdiedistobelievethattheactualworldisoneofthoseforittobepossiblethatadogdiedisfortheretobeatleastoneworldinwhichadogdied,andso
on.
Thefirstproblemistheproblemoftheequivalenceofnecessarytruths.Considerthefollowingsentences:
(37)

b.JohnbelievesthatChurchillisChurchill.
(38)

a.2+2=4.
b.Johnbelievesthat2+2=4.

(39)

a.ChurchillisChurchill.

a.Thereareinfinitelymanyprimenumbers.
b.Johnbelievesthatthereareinfinitelymanyprimenumbers.

Eachofthesentences(37a),(38a),and(39a)expressesanecessarytruth.Thatis,eachofthesesentencesistrueineverypossibleworld.But,giventheaccountwe
havedevelopedofpropositions,thismeansthattheyallexpressthesamepropositionandhencemeanthesamething.Butthisseemswrong.(37a)isaboutChurchill,
(38a)isanelementarytruthofarithmetic,and(39a)isatheoremthatrequiressomemathematicalsophisticationtoprove.Moreover,ifoursemanticsisreally
compositional,thensincethe(a)sentencesof(37)through(39)meanthesamething,andsincetheonlydifferencebetweenthe(b)sentencesof(37)through(39)is
thatthecontentofJohn'sbeliefisspecifiedineachbytherespective(a)sentence,itwouldseemthatthe(b)sentencesshouldmeanthesamethingandtherefore
shouldhavethesametruthvalueinallpossibleworlds.Clearly,theydonot:Johnmighthavenoproblemwith(37a)and(38a),forinstance,butnotknowenough
mathematicstoevenunderstand(39a),muchlessbelieveit,withtheresultthat(39b)wouldbefalse.Itseemsthatoursemantictheorymakesafalseprediction
herenamely,thatallnecessarytruthsexpressthesameproposition,ifwearetounderstandpropositionsasthemeaningsofsentences.
Whatseemstobewrongisthatourwayofclassifyingpropositionsistoocoarse.Thatis,finerdistinctionsmustbedrawnbetweendifferentpropositionsthanthose
determinedbynotingtheworldsinwhicheachistrue.Ideally,semantictheoryshouldassigndifferentinterpretationstothe(a)sentencesof(37)through(39)andyet
explainwhytheyarealltrueinjustthesamepossibleworlds,inthewaythatourtheoryexplainswhy(31)through(34)havedifferentsensesyethavethesame
referenceintheactualworld.Ananalysisthatwouldmeetthisdemandisthegoalofmuchongoingresearchinsemantics(BarwiseandPerry1983,Cresswell1985).

Page425

Thesecondproblem,theproblemoflogicalomniscience,isverycloselyrelatedtothefirst.ConsideraSherlockHolmesstory,inwhichbothHolmesandWatson
knowallofthecluesinthecase.Holmesperformshis"elementary"deductionandnowalsoknowswhodidit.Watsonisstillinthedark,however,andwillremainso
untilHolmespatientlyleadshimthroughthetrainofcomplexbutlogicallyvalidreasoningfromtheevidencetotheconclusion.Thisallseemsatleastpossible.The
problemisthatonthesemanticanalysiswehavebeenconsidering,Watson'sstateofbelievingallthepremisesofHolmes'sreasoningbutofnotyetbelievingthe
conclusionisanimpossiblestatetobein.Forconsider:whatmakesHolmes'sreasoningvalidisthatinallpossibleworldswhereallofthepremisesaretrue(thatis,
wheretheevidenceisashesaysitis)theconclusionofhisreasoningistrue(thebutlerdidit).ButifWatsonbelievesallthepremises,andifwhathebelievesbyvirtue
ofbelievingthemisaproposition(thatis,asetofworlds),andifthebutlerdiditinallthoseworlds,thenitwouldseemthatWatsonwouldbelievethepropositionthat
thebutlerdidit.Thisisjusttheproblemoftheequivalenceofallnecessarilytruepropositionsindifferentclothing.Ourmodelisnotfinegrainedenoughtodistinguish
propositionsfromwhattheyentailandhencedoesnotallowfortheexistenceoflessthanperfectdeducers.TheworkofCresswell(1985),BarwiseandPerry
(1983),andKamp(1984),amongothers,hasbeendirectedtowardtheproblemofdevelopingmodeltheoretictreatmentsthatpreservetheadvantagesoftheFrege
Montagueapproachbutdonothavetheseuntowardconsequences.
Athirddifficultythatthisapproachhasencounteredfromthestandpointofcognitivescienceconcernsthepsychologicalplausibilityofsemantictheory.The
semantictheorywehavebeendevelopinghasassignedveryabstractsets,includingevensetsofpossibleworlds,asthemeaningsoflinguisticexpressions.Being
abstract,sometimesdownrightunreal,and(mostimportant)infinitelylargerepresentations,suchsettheoreticentitiescannotliterallyberepresentedinpeoples'(finite)
brainsoreveninmachines.Butascognitivescientists,weareinterestedinanexplanationofhowactualinformationprocessingoccurs,andwewouldliketoknow,in
thecaseoflanguageunderstanding,justhowhumansmanagetounderstandlinguisticexpressions.Theproblemappearstobethataswehavesketchedcompositional
modeltheoreticsemantics,althoughitis(outstandingdifficultiesaside)anelegantcompositionaltheoryassigningmeaningstolinguisticexpressions,itisnotafinite
representation.Consequently,itdoesnotseemtobeabletosaymuchabouthumansemanticprocessing,norhasanyevidenceinitsfavorderivedfromexperimental
resultsmeasuringhumansemanticperformancebeenpresented.
Aplausibleresolution(suggestedinPartee1979)istopointoutthatalthoughmodeltheoreticsemanticsdoesnotdirectlyspecifypsychologicalorcomputational
mechanismsthatmaybeatworkinnaturallanguageunderstanding,andalthoughthesemanticstructuresitpositsarenotliterallyinspeakers'heads,itprovidesauseful
abstractcharacterizationofthepsychologicallyandcomputationallyrelevantstructuresthatmediateandexplainlanguageunderstanding.Consider,forclarification,a
relatedproblemwithmathematicalmodels.Multiplicationcanbedescribedasafunctionmappingpairsofnumbersintotheirproducts.However,nofinitecomputation
device(personormachine)candirectlyrepresentthisinfinitefunction,althoughouractualmentalprocessesmustbefunctionallyparalleltotheinfinitefunction,atleast
overawiderangeofcases.Similarly,thesemanticistmightsay,althoughwedonotbelievethatsetsofpossibleworldsorfamiliesofpropertiesareliterallyin
speakers'

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heads,weareshowingthatwhateverrepresentationsareintheheadsoflanguageunderstanders,byvirtueofwhichtheyunderstandlanguage,mustbeabstractly
describablebythesekindsofstructuresandthatwhateverkindsofpsychologicalorcomputationalprocessesoperateontheserepresentationsmustgenerallypreserve
thiskindofstructure.Onthisview,semanticsprovidesaconstraintonempiricaltheoriestellingtheexperimentalistwhatkindsoftheorieswouldcountaslanguage
understandingmechanismsandprovidesaguidetoempiricalresearchbysuggestingmodelstoinvestigate.
Whenviewedinthisway,semanticresearchisseenasanindispensabletoolintheefforttounderstandhumanlinguisticinformationprocessingandintheeffortto
designmachineunderstandingsystems.Itprovidestheinitialabstractcharacterizationofthegoalstobeachieved,constrainstherangeofmodelsthatcanbe
proposed,andsuggestsprocessesthatmightwork.Whenelaboratedmorecompletely,itmayevendescribeessentialfeaturesofthedatastructureinvolvedin
understandinglanguage.Inthenextsectionwewillconsiderbrieflythewaysinwhichsemanticsisinfusedintothecognitivepsychologyoflanguageprocessingandinto
AIresearchinnaturallanguageprocessing,andthewaysinwhichthesefieldscontributetoresearchinlinguisticsandphilosophy.
10.6CognitiveandComputationalModelsofSemanticProcessing
Letusbeginbyclarifyingthedistinctionbetweenprooftheoreticandmodeltheoreticanalysesofargumentvalidity.Recallourearlierdiscussionofargument
structurecenteringonexamples(lac)and(2ac).Inthelogicaltraditiontherearetwowaysofdistinguishingarguments.Aprooftheoreticapproachwouldtranslate
thepremisesoftheseargumentsintoalogicalrepresentationsuchasthefirstorderpredicatecalculus.Byappealingtoaxioms(certainlogicalassumptions)andrules
ofdeduction,wecanprovethatcertainsentencesfollowfromthepremisesonthebasisoftheirlogicalstructure.Forexample,ifaconjunction(say,Abirdeatsanda
fishswims)appearsasalineinourproof,itfollowsbytheruleofdeductionknownasconjunctsimplificationthatthefirstconjunct(Abirdeats)canbeinferred.
TheessenceofthisruleisthatifasentenceoftheformPandQistrue(wherePandQstandforthefirstandsecondconjuncts,respectively),thenPalonemustbe
true.Noticethatthisproceduredoesnottakeintoconsiderationthemeaningofanyofthecontentwordsusedintheargument.Whatthesentencesareaboutissimply
notafactorincalculatinginferencesprooftheoretically.Thelogicalstructureofthesentencesinthiscase,thefactthattheargumentcontainsaconjunctionis
crucial.Additionalrulesofdeductionpertainingtoquantifiersandimplicationwouldallowustoanalyzeanddistinguishtheargumentsin(lac)and(2ac)(seeWall
1973).
Amodeltheoreticanalysisofvaliditytakestheinterpretationsoflinguisticexpressionsseriously.Byassigningsettheoreticinterpretationsandderivingthetruth
conditionsofsentences,wecandeterminethetruthorfalsityofagivensentenceinagivenstateofaffairs.Afterdeterminingwhatittakesforaparticularsentenceto
betrue,wecanthenseewhetheranothergivensentencewouldbetrueinthatcircumstance.Ifso,thenthefirstsentenceentailsthesecond,andwehavedetermined
argumentvaliditymodeltheoretically.InthecaseofAbirdeatsandafishflies,itwouldbestraightforwardtoshowthatanystateofaffairsinwhichtheconjunction
istruemustinvolveaneatingbird,andthatcircumstancesufficesforthetruthofAbirdeats.Thisprocedure,too,canbeformalizedandextendedtoalargefragment
ofnaturallanguage.

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Giventhesetworatherdifferentapproachestoascertainingvalidity,itisinterestingtoaskwhichmodelofdeductionprovidesthemoreexplanatoryaccountofthe
(realtime)humanreasoningprocess.Aswesawinchapter3,JohnsonLaird(1975)hasarguedthatthemodeltheoreticapproachhasgreaterplausibilityinthatit
yieldsabetteraccountofwhichargumentformsaremoredifficultforpeopletofollow.
Nowsupposethatthemodeltheoreticsystemofsemanticinterpretationsketchedearlierturnsouttobethebesttheoryofmeaninginnaturallanguage.The
psychologist'sproblem,then,istofindawayofimplementingthistheoryinaninformationprocessingmodel.Onepromisingintegrationofmodeltheoreticsemantics
intoatheoryofrealtimelanguageunderstandingisachievedbytheworkofJohnsonLaird(1983)andhiscolleaguesonwhattheycallmentalmodels.Byadopting
thementalmodelsapproach,onecommitsoneselftotheclaimthathumaninformationprocessinginvolvesmodelconstructionandthatreasoningtypicallyinvolves
morethanprooftheoreticdeduction.Onthisview,aperson'sworldismentallyrepresentedintheformofadatabase,andinformationisprocessedbymanipulating
theseinternalmodels.
Themodelsthatthemindconstructsinthecourseofunderstandingasentencemusthavetheformalfeaturesspecifiedinoursemantics:thesemanticvaluesofthe
primitivesmustbeofthetypethatoursemanticssaystheyare,andtheymustcomposeinthewayoursemanticssaystheycompose.So,stickingtothesimplest
accountofnamesandpredicatesdiscussedearlierforpurposesofillustration,thevalueofChurchillwouldbeanindividualinthementalmodel,andthevalueof
smokesinamentalmodelwouldbethepropertyofsmoking.Butthesemodelscannotinvolveobscureandinfiniteabstractentities,onpainoflosingtheirplausibility
asanaccountofsemanticprocessing.Appropriaterepresentationsofindividualsastokensandoffinitesetsofindividualsaslistsareeasytorepresentinartificial
informationprocessingsystems,andpresumablyinthemindaswell.TheycouldincludearepresentedindividualcalledChurchillandarepresentationofasetof
individualscalledsmokers(possiblydifferentonesindifferentpossibleworlds).ForthismentalmodeltorepresentthepropositionexpressedbyChurchillsmokes,
then,wouldbefortheChurchillindividualtobeinthesetofsmokersintheactualworld.Onthisaccount,realworlds,individuals,andsmokingpropertiesdonothave
tosomehowenterourpsychologyrather,internallyrepresenteddatastructuresthatcapturetherelationsspecifiedbyoursemantictheorywillsuffice.
Inthisregard,consideranimportantfeatureofouranalysisofquantification.Wehaveactuallynotbeenuniquelycharacterizingentitiesinstead,wehavebeen
characterizingclassesofentitiesasspecifiedbytheirstructureandinterrelations.Forinstance,foroursemanticpurposes,wedonotcarewhetherthesentenceAdog
diedismadetruebytheaccidentaldemiseofFidoorthedeliberateshootingofScruffy.Anydogandanydeaththereofwilldotomakethesentencetrue.This
suggeststhatinordertoconstructamentalmodelthatwouldserveasthesemanticrepresentationofasentenceoralongerdiscourse,likeaparagraph,astory,ora
conversation,itisnotnecessarytopickoutanyparticularindividuals,properties,worlds,orwhateverjustsomethatarerelatedtooneanotherinthewaythetext
saystheyare.
Suchasemanticprocessingtheorywillthenhavetoincludedescriptionsandexplanationsofatleastthreeimportantkindsofpsychologicalstructuresofcrucialinterest
tosemantics:amechanismforrepresentingpropositions,asetofsemanticmodelconstructingandmodifyingprocedures,andthemodelsthemselves.Letusexamine

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eachofthesecomponentsinturn,withaviewtoseeinghowtheinterplaybetweensemanticandpsychologicaltheoryoccurs.
Considerfirstthatwearelistenerstryingtounderstandthefollowingdiscourse:
(40)

Adogdied.Churchillsmoked.Hedied,too.Somewhaleseat.

Ourfirsttaskistoconstructarepresentationofthesentenceswehaveheardthatwillenableustoidentifytheirsemanticstructuresothatwewillknowwhatkinds
ofsemanticrepresentationstoassigntoeachone.Intheend,thepsychologistwillhavethetaskofdeterminingexactlyhowthistranslationgoes,butthesemanticist
willclaimthatitshouldgeneratesomethinglikethis(ignoringtenseandusingthefirstorderpredicatecalculusnotation):
(41)

a.( x)[xisadog&xdied]

b.[Churchillsmoked]

c.[Churchilldied]

d.( x)[xisawhale&xeats]

Thatis,semanticscantellpsychologywhattheresultsofthetranslationrepresentationprocessesinvolvedinunderstandingshouldbe,sothatpsychologycanset
aboutdiscoveringprocessesthatcanperformtherequiredtransformations
Ournexttaskaslistenersistoconstructamentalmodelofthisdiscourse.Tobeginwith,oneproceduremightsee(41a),addanentitytothemodelx,andtwosets,
{dogs}and{deadthings},andputxintoeachofthem.AnotherprocedurewouldseethenameChurchillandaddasecondentitytothemodel,calledChurchill,
whereuponanotherprocedurewouldaddhimtothealreadyexistingsetofdeadthingsstillanotherprocedurewouldconstructanewsetofsmokerswithChurchill
amongitsmembersandsoonuntilwewouldhaveacompletemodellookingsomethinglikethis:
{Deadthings}={x,Churchill,y,z}
{smokers}={Churchill,y,w}
{dogs}={x,Fido,n}
{whales}={a,b,c,z,d,e,f}
{eaters}={a,b,c,d,Churchill,x,Fido}

Severalpointsaboutthismentalmodeldeservemention.First,andmostimportant,giventhesemantictheorywehavebeenexploring,theentirediscourse(40)istrue
onthismodel.Second,moreisrepresentedinthismodelthaniscontainedin(40)or(41).Inpartthisisforced,because(41d)couldnotbesatisfiedwithoutanumber
ofwhalesandanumberofeaters.Someofthisinformationmayhavebeensuppliedfromourownknowledgeaslisteners.Somemaybeconjecture,suchasthe
impliedstarvationofz.Now,semanticscanspecifywhatthenecessaryfeaturesofsuchmentalmodelsareandcangoalongwaytowardspecifyingthegeneral
structureoftheproceduresthatconstructsuchmodels.Butdetailingexactlywhattheseproceduresare,howtheyarerepresented,andwhattriggersthemand
specifyingwhatkindsofextrainformationspeakersandhearersputintotheirmodels,andunderwhatconditionsmodelsaremerged,scrapped,andalteredisatask
forexperimentalpsychology.Itshouldbeclearfromthisexample,however,thatthiskindofresearchintosemanticinformationprocessingwouldbeimpossible
withoutthecollaborationofsemanticsandpsychology.

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Beforeweleavethetopicofmentalmodels,itisworthmakinganobservationabouttheinsightthisapproachaffordsintojudgmentsaboutargumentvalidity.Earlier
wenotedthatsemanticsmustprovideanaturalaccountofwhenthepremisesofanargumententailitsconclusion,andweconsidereddifferentapproachestothistask.
Tothedetrimentofourtheory,inthediscussionofWatsonandHolmeswenotedcertainproblemsinvolvedinconstructingthesetofworldsassociatedwithasetof
sentencesexpressingknowledgeandbeliefs.Oftenwefindthatwehaveconstructedasetofworldsineachofwhichotherirrelevantsentences(forexample,the
logicalentailmentsoftheoriginalsentences)aretrue,distortingouraccountofpropositionalattitudes.However,mentalmodelssuggestasolutiontothedilemmathat
ariseswhensemanticmodelsconfrontthelogicalfallibilityofactualhumanreasoners.Mentalmodelsarepartialtheyrepresentonlyasmallpartofwhatwetaketo
beongoingrealityatanygivenmoment.Thisfollowsfromlimitationsonhumanmemory,attention,andsoforth,butperhapsmostdirectlyfrompsychological
judgmentsofrelevance.Wetendnottomodelirrelevantmatters,eveniftheyhappentobepartofthepassingscene.
Ofcourse,relevanceinvolvesjudgment,andwemayoftendisregardfactsorconnectionsbetweenfactsthatareindeedrelevantbutarejudgednottobe.Watsonand
Holmesprovidesuchanexample:althoughacompleteformalsemanticmodelwouldestablishtheidentityofthemurderer,Watson'spartialmodelfailstoestablishall
thenecessaryconnectionsortoconsideralltherelevantrelationsbetweentheindividualsinvolved.Viewedfromthisperspective,semanticmodelscapturethenature
ofknowledgeandthelawsofreasonintheidealcase,whereasmentalmodelsarehumanapproximationstothisideal.
Finally,bydevelopingmentalmodels,wecanalsoaccountforaratherdifferentsortoferrorofreasoningthatisnotdirectlymodeledbyourformalsemantictheory.
AlthoughWatson'smistakewasinfailingtonoticewhatwastheretobenoticed,weoftenerrbyassumingtoomuch.Forexample,supposeyouaretoldthatthese
daysmanyAmericansareexercisingregularlyandthatmanyAmericansarehealthy.Thementalmodelweassociatewiththispropositionneedstoestablishasetof
AmericanswhoexerciseandasetofAmericanswhoarehealthy.Butwhatistherelationshipbetweenthosetwosets?Manypeoplewillmentallyconstructthesesets
withthesamemembers,asinthissamplementalmodel,
American(a)&Exercising(a)&Healthy(a)
American(b)&Exercising(b)&Healthy(b)
American(c)&Lazy(c)&Sickly(c)
American(d)&Exercising(d)&Healthy(d)
Albanian(e)&Exercising(e)&Healthy(e)
Albanian(f)&Lazy(f)&Sickly(f)

ineffecttakingthepropositiontoimply:
(42)

Youwillbehealthyifandonlyifyouexercise.

Infact,theactualpropositioninquestiondoesnotinvolvesuchanimplicationatallithastheformofaconjunction,roughlyasshownin(43),
(43)

(Many)Americansareexercisingand(Many)Americansarehealthy.

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whichdoesnotentitleustoassumeanynecessaryconnectionbetweenthetwosetsofAmericans.Itcouldaswellbesatisfiedbythefollowingmodel:
American(a)&Exercising(a)&Healthy(a)
American(b)&Exercising(b)&Sickly(b)
American(c)&Lazy(c)&Healthy(c)
American(d)&Exercising(d)&Healthy(d)
Albanian(e)&Exercising(e)&Sickly(e)
Albanian(f)&Lazy(f)&Healthy(f)

Hereagain,thediscrepancybetweenaformalsemantictheoryandourhumanreasoningbehaviorcanbebetterunderstoodbyinvestigatinghowweconstructmental
models.
Aswesawinchapter3,thesetypesoferrorsinmodelconstructionmayalsoprovidethebasisforanaccountofthefallaciesofdeductivereasoning.Forallthese
reasons,thestudyofrulesofdeductionandofmodelconstructionfromthepsychologicalperspectiveisapromisingandimportantareaincognitivescience.
Finally,letusconsidersomefurtherconnectionsbetweensemantictheoryandresearchinpsychologyandAI.Historically,therelationshipwithAIhastakenanumber
ofdifferentshapesasaresultofthedifferingattitudesintheAIcommunityconcerningtheroleofformalsemantictheoryinacomputationalmodelofnaturallanguage
understanding.Inchapter4webrieflyexploredthepossibilityofincorporatingthefirstorderpredicatecalculusasalevelofrepresentationinanAIsystem.These
implementationsofthepredicatecalculushavenotbeenentirelysuccessful,however,andthereisdisagreementoverthenatureofthesolutiontotheproblem.Some
contendthatthelogicoughttobedevelopedfurther,andcustomized,throughthedevelopmentofnonstandardordeviantlogics,toprovidealogicmoreappropriate
toamodelofnaturallanguageandhumanreason.Thispositionisreallynodifferentfromtheoneweadoptedearlierwhenwewereconsideringthemeritsofreplacing
thefirstorderpredicatecalculuswithananalysisofquantificationalongthelinessuggestedbyMontagueandbyBarwiseandCooper.Suppose,forexample,we
wereinterestedinbuildingamachinethatcaninterpretEnglishsentences,perhapsasapartofalargertask.Suchasystemmightassignasyntacticanalysistoitsinput,
translatethesyntacticrepresentationintoasuitablelogicalrepresentation,anddeterminethetruthorfalsityoftheinputbycomparingthetruthconditionsexpressedby
thelogicalrepresentationwiththecurrentstateofaffairsinarepresentedmodel.
Thiskindofprojectcombinesthesyntacticandsemantictheoriesdevelopedbylinguistsandphilosophersinanonlinesystem.Furtherpotentialexistsforbringing
psychologicaldataconcerningprocessingspeedanderrorstobearonthedevelopmentofthisresearch,leadingusclosertoacomputationalmodelofintelligent
humanbehavior.
Inadditiontothelinesofresearchthathavepursuedlogicallinguisticstylesofinquiry,considerableresearchinAlandpsychologyhasfocusedonratherdifferent
approachestomeaningandunderstanding.Logicalanalysesofmeaningtendnottoprovideacompleteaccountofthemeaningofthenonlogical(content)wordsofthe
language.Forexample,althoughaformalsemantictheorymightrepresentthesemanticvalueofanintransitiveverbasasetofindividuals,itdoesnotexplainwhat
propertyanindividualmusthaveinordertocountasamemberofthesetinquestion.Thus,thissortofanalysissimplydoesnotprovideanaccountofthemeaningof

Page431

individualwords(asopposedtoanaccountoftherulesforcombiningthesemeaningsoncetheyaregiven).
Researchersincognitivesciencehavepursuedthestudyoflexicalsemanticsfromavarietyofperspectives(Putnam1975Rosch1973KatzandFodor1963
Quillian1968).Forexample,wesawinchapters2,3,and4thatsemanticnetworkscanbeusedtorepresentconceptsor,roughlyequivalently,themeaningsof
words.Semanticnetworksarecompatiblewiththeapproachfollowedinthischapterbecausetheycanbeviewedasanalternativerepresentationalformatfor
structuredlogicalexpressions.ResearchersinAIandpsychologyhavebeeninterestedinsemanticnetworksnotbecausetheirexpressivepowerdiffersfrom
predicatecalculuslikenotationsbutbecausetheexplicitrepresentationofassociativerelationsamongconceptsandpropositionscanbeusedtoorganizelongterm
memoryandtofacilitatetheretrievalofrelevantinformationfrommemoryduringcognitiveprocessing.
Inclassicalsystems,propositionsthatareretrievedfrom(oractivatedin)semanticnetworkscanbefedintosymbolicreasoningprocessesthatemployeitherproof
theoreticrulesofinferenceorfinitementalmodels.Shastri's(1992)connectionistimplementationofsemanticnetworks,introducedinchapter3,significantlyincreases
theirprocessingpowerbyallowinginferencesthatarebaseddirectlyonconceptmeaningtobecarriedoutbypatternsofactivationspreadingthroughthenetwork.
Theinnovationhereconcernsprocessingefficiencyandthesolutionoftheproblemofvariablebindinginnetworks.Therepresentationsandinferencesare
straightforwardlyequivalenttotheircounterpartsinthepredicatecalculus,and,therefore,theycouldbeassignedsemanticvaluesofthekindconsideredinthis
chapter.Thegeneralproblemoflogicaldeduction,ortheoremproving,hasalsobeenstudiedbyconnectionists(Ballard1987).Inonetypeofconnectionistmodel,
nodesassociatedwithapropositionwouldbeassociatedwiththenodesassociatedwithitsentailments.Forexample,P&QwouldbeconnectedtoPandtoQ,and
activationofthepremisewouldbepasseddowntoactivateitsconclusions.Manyfurtherdetails,whichwillnotbediscussedhere,areneededtomakesucha
networkworkwell.TheapproachmustalsobeconsideredInlightoftheargumentsbyFodorandPylyshyn(1988),introducedinchapter2,thatnonsymbolic
connectionistnetworkscannotfunctionasgeneralreasoningsystems.
Somerecentworkonconceptrepresentationintheconnectionistparadigmbearsamoreuncertainrelationshiptotheworkdescribedinthischapter.Smolensky
(1988)andotherproponentsofdistributedrepresentationsarguethatthemomentaryrepresentationofaconceptorwordisthepatternofactivationoveralargeset
ofsemanticmicrofeatures,eachofwhichparticipatesintherepresentationofmanyconcepts,andnoneofwhichfunctionssinglyastherepresentationofaconceptat
thesymboliclevelofanalysis.Thecontextualvariabilityofpatternsofactivationisapotentiallyattractivewayofhandlingtheproblemofthecontextualsensitivityof
meaning,discussedearlierinthischapter.However,connectionistmodelswithdistributedrepresentationstypicallycontainnofacilitiesforexplicitlyrepresenting
structuredsymbolicexpressions,overwhichtherulesofsemanticinterpretationandtherulesofdeductiondiscussedinthischapteraredefined.Onepossiblesolution
tothisproblem,sketchedbySmolensky(1988),isthatconceptualmeaningishandledbyasubsymbolicintuitiveprocessor,whereasthemeaningsoflinguistic
expressionsarehandledbyasymbolic,conscious,rulegovernedprocessor.Thesymbolicprocessorisaproductionsystemthatcantakeinputsfromandsend
outputstothesubsymbolicprocessor.Theproposalofanintuitive,subsymbolicsystemofmeaningisnotconsideredfeasibleby

Page432

proponentsofthephysicalsymbolsystemhypothesis,suchasFodorandPylyshyn(1988),whoarguethatallthought(includingnonverbalthought)involvesstructured
symbolicrepresentationsthathaveacompositionalsemanticsofthetypesketchedinthischapter.Smolensky'sdualsystemproposalmightalsobethoughttobe
prematureinthesensethatitshouldnotbeadopteduntilresearcherscanfullyexplorethesemanticsofdistributedrepresentations.Itisamatteroffurtherresearch
whetheritisbettertomapvectorsofactivationontofamiliesofsetsorpossibleworldsortocharacterizetheirsemanticsentirelyintermsoftheabilityofdistributed
connectionistnetworkstomapinputsontoappropriateoutputs,thusdispensingwithtraditionalsemanticvalues.
Proceduralsemantics,thefinallineofinquirytobeconsideredhere,employsproceduresinplaceofsemanticvalues.Thefundamentalclaimofproceduralsemantics
hasmuchincommonwithsomeconnectionistviews.Theideaisthatknowingalanguageinvolvesknowinghowtorespondappropriatelytotheverbalandnonverbal
environment.Forexample,Winograd's(1972)SHRDLUprogramanswersquestionsaboutandactsina''blocksworld''filledwithobjectsofvariousgeometric
shapes.Theprogramallowsscreenrepresentationsofblockstobemovedaboutoncommand,anditcanrespondtoinquiriesaboutitschangingdatabasesuchas
"Whichcubeissittingonthetable?"or"Howmanyblocksarenotinthebox?"Thesemanticanalyzerreliesonworddefinitions,informationaboutgrammatical
structure,contextualinformation,anddeductiveprocedures.Ultimately,however,"Forthecomputer,thefinal'meaning'ofaphraseorsentenceisaninternalprogram
thattellswhatactionsitmusttake"(Winograd1974)movingablock,printingananswer,searchingmemory,orupdatingthedatabase,asappropriate.
Althoughtheproposedcomputationalmechanismsarejustvariantsofclassicalsymbolicmodels,proceduralsemanticsseekstoprovideanewparadigmforthestudy
ofmeaning.Themeaningsofexpressionsaretreatednotintermsofmappingstotheworld(orpossibleworlds)butintermsoftheactions(internalorexternal)that
theytrigger.Likethemoreradicalconnectionistapproachestomeaning,proceduralsemanticsishighlycontroversialasasemantictheory(seeJ.A.Fodor1978),
thoughlesssoasastyleofsemanticprocessingtheory.
SuggestedReadings
AsummaryofMontague'ssemanticsystemispresentedin"AnOverviewofMontagueSemantics"(Weisler1991).ForamorerigorousintroductiontoMontague
Grammarandformalsemantics,seeIntroductiontoMontagueSemantics(Dowty,Wall,andPeters1981).Amorebasicintroductiontologicisavailableinthe
beginningchaptersofWall'sIntroductiontoMathematicalLinguistics(Wall1973)orinTheLanguageofFirstOrderLogic(includingtheMacintoshProgram
Tarski'sWorld)(BarwiseandEtchemendy1990),whichalsodiscussesmodeltheoreticinterpretation.MeaningandGrammar:AnIntroductiontoSemantics
(ChierchiaandMcConnellGinet1990)discussesrecentapproachestothestandardproblemsinthetheoryofmeaning.Manyimportantarticlesinphilosophyof
languageandsemanticsareconvenientlyanthologized.TwosuchbooksareLogicandPhilosophyforLinguists:ABookofReadings(Moravcsik1974)and
ReadingsinthePhilosophyofLanguage(RosenbergandTravis1971).Forahistoryofsemanticsintheearlyandmorerecentperiodsofgenerativegrammar,see
Semantics:TheoriesofMeaninginGenerativeGrammar(J.D.Fodor1977).

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Forabroaderperspectiveonworkonmeaningfromavarietyofpointsofview,seeSemantics:AnInterdisciplinaryReaderinPhilosophy,Linguistics,and
Psychology(SteinbergandJakobovits1971).
References
Austin,J.L.(1962).Howtodothingswithwords.Oxford:ClarendonPress.
Ballard,D.H.(1987).Parallellogicalinferenceandenergyminimization.ReportTR142,ComputerScienceDepartment,UniversityofRochester,Rochester,N.Y.
Barwise,J.,andR.Cooper(1981).Generalizedquantifiersandnaturallanguage.LinguisticsandPhilosophy4,159219.
Barwise,J.,andJ.Etchemendy(1990).Thelanguageoffirstorderlogic.PaloAlto,Calif.:CenterfortheStudyofLanguageandInformation.
Barwise,J.,andJ.Perry(1983).Situationsandattitudes.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Chierchia,G.,andS.McConnellGinet(1990).Meaningandgrammar:Anintroductiontosemantics.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Cresswell,M.(1985).Thesemanticsofpropositionalattitudes.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Dowty,D.(1982).Tenses,timeadverbsandcompositionalsemantictheory.LinguisticsandPhilosophy5,2355.
Dowty,D.,R.Wall,andS.Peters(1981).IntroductiontoMontaguesemantics.Dordrecht:Reidel.
Fodor,J.A.(1978).TomSwiftandhisproceduralgrandmother.Cognition6,229247.
Fodor,J.A.,andZ.W.Pylyshyn(1988).Connectionismandcognitivearchitecture.InS.PinkerandJ.Mehler,eds.,Connectionsandsymbols.Cambridge,Mass.:
MITPress.
Fodor,J.D.(1977).Semantics:Theoriesofmeaningingenerativegrammar.NewYork:ThomasY.Crowell.
JohnsonLaird,P.N.(1975).Modelsofdeduction.InR.Falmagne,ed.,Reasoning:Representationandprocess.Hillsdale,N.J.:Erlbaum.
JohnsonLaird,P.N.(1983).Mentalmodels.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.
Kamp,H.(1984).Atheoryoftruthandsemanticrepresentation.InJ.Groenendijk,T.Jassen,andM.Stokof,eds.,Truth,interpretationandinformation.
Dordrecht:Foris.
Katz,J.,andJ.A.Fodor(1963).Thestructureofasemantictheory.Language39,170210.
Kripke,S.(1980).Namingandnecessity.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.
Montague,R.(1973).ThepropertreatmentofquantificationinordinaryEnglish.InR.Thomason,ed.,Formalphilosophy.NewHaven,Conn.:YaleUniversity
Press.
Moravcsik,J.M.E.(1974).Logicandphilosophyforlinguists:Abookofreadings.TheHague:Mouton.
Partee,B.(1973).Somestructuralanalogiesbetweentensesandpronouns.JournalofPhilosophy70,601609.
Partee,B.(1979).Semanticsmathematicsorpsychology?InR.Bauerleetal.,eds.,Semanticsfromdifferentpointsofview.BerlinSpringerVerlag.
Putnam,H.(1975).Mind,language,andreality.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Quillian,M.R.(1968).Semanticmemory.InM.Minsky,ed.,Semanticinformationprocessing.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Rosch,E.(1973).Ontheinternalstructureofperceptualandsemanticcategories.InT.E.Moore,ed.,Cognition,developmentandtheacquisitionoflanguage.
NewYork:AcademicPress.
Rosenberg,J.,andC.Travis(1971).Readingsinthephilosophyoflanguage.EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:PrenticeHall.
Shastri,L.,andV.Ajjanagadde(1992).Fromsimpleassociationstosystematicreasoning:Aconnectionistrepresentationofrules,variables,anddynamicbindings
usingtemporalsynchrony.TechnicalReport:MSCIS9005.Philadelphia,PA:ComputerandInformationScienceDepartment,UniversityofPennsylvania.
Smolensky,P.(1988).Onthepropertreatmentofconnectionism.BehavioralandBrainSciences11,174.
Steinberg,D.,andL.Jakobovits(1971).Semantics:Aninterdisciplinaryreaderinphilosophy,linguistics,andpsychology.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press.
Wall,R.(1973).Introductiontomathematicallinguistics.EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:PrenticeHall.
Weisler,S.(1991).AnoverviewofMontaguesemantics.InJ.GarfieldandM.Kiteley,eds.Meaningandtruth:Theessentialreadingsinmodernsemantics.
NewYork:ParagonHouse.
Winograd,T.(1972).Understandingnaturallanguage.NewYork:AcademicPress.
Winograd,T.(1974).Artificialintelligence:Whenwillcomputersunderstandpeople?PsychologyToday,May,7379.

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Chapter11
NaturalLanguageProcessing
InhisnowclassictreatiseonvisionDavidMarr(1982)arguesthatanyinformationprocessingsystemmustbeunderstoodatthreelevels:(1)asacomputational
theory,(2)intermsofrepresentationandalgorithm,and(3)asahardwareimplementation.Ascharacterizedinchapter6,agrammarcanberegardedasa
computationaltheoryapreciselydefinedabstractaccountofthepropertiesofalanguage,dedicatedtothetaskofcharacterizingthesetofwellformedutterances
forthatlanguage.Inchapter7weaddressedthequestionofthe"hardware"implementationoflanguageinthehumanbrainandnervoussystem.Nowweturnour
attentiontothesecondofMarr'slevelstoanunderstandingofthementalalgorithmsthatcarryoutthevarioustasksoflinguisticprocessing.
Marr(1982,25)suggeststhat"sincethethreelevelsareonlyratherlooselyrelated,somephenomenamaybeexplainedatonlyoneortwoofthem."Towhatdegree
thethreelevelsinteract,andtowhatdegreeeachlevelcanbeunderstoodintermsoftheothers,isthereforeanopenandinterestingquestion.Grammars,inthesense
ofchapter6,aretheoriesofabstractlinguisticcompetence,buttheymayormaynotprovideanappropriateframeworkforunderstandingthementalprocessingof
language.Inthischapterwewillexploreanumberofaccountsofnaturallanguageprocessing(NLP),payingspecialattentiontotherolethatlinguisticgrammarsplay
inthem.Aswewillsee,someapproachesassignaspecialandprivilegedroletogrammaticalinformation.Othersseethegrammarasonlyoneofseveralkindsof
informationthatarebroughttobearasweperceiveandproducesentences.StillotherapproachestoNLPmakelittleifanyuseofthestructuresandpropertiesof
formalgrammarsaslinguistsconceivethem.
11.1Preliminaries
Aswesawinchapter6,alanguagecanberegardedasamappingfromsomephysicalformtoarepresentationofmeaning.Thatmappingischaracterizedbyaformal
grammar,someofwhosepropertiesareuniversalandsomeofwhicharespecifictoparticularlanguages.Onegeneralapproachtotheproblemofnaturallanguage
processingassumesthattheprocessor(aroughandreadytermfortheactualmentalrepresentationsandalgorithmsthatenableustoproduceandinterpretlinguistic
utterances)directlyinvolvesthevariousrulesandrepresentationsofthegrammar.Wewillrefertothisasthegrammaticalparsingview.Thistermshouldnotbe
takentosuggestthatgrammaticalknowledgeistheonlykindofinformationthatisusedinlanguageprocessing,sinceitissurelythecasethateveryaccountofNLP
willrequireasignificantinterfacewithaspectsofgeneralknowledgeabouttheworld.Butthegrammaticalparsingviewisdistinctiveinthatitascribesaspecial,well
definedroletolinguistic

Page436

knowledgegrammaticalprinciplesandstructuresarehypothesizedtoplayaprimary(andgenerallyearly)roleintheprocessingoflanguage.
Bycontrast,othercognitivescientiststakethepositionthatthemappingbetweenformandmeaningisaccomplishedbyasystemthatusesstronglyinteracting
componentsofgrammaticalknowledgealongwithotherkindsofinformation,especiallyaboutthecontextofdiscourseandgeneralworldknowledge,without
accordingspecialprivilegetotheroleofgrammaticalinformation.Onthisview,theremayberelativelylessprimary,earlyrecoursetostructuresorinformationspecific
tolinguisticgrammars(orinsomecases,particularlywithintheconnectionistframework,littleornoneatall).Wewillrefertothisastheintegratedknowledgeview.
Thispositionhasstrongproponentsamongpsycholinguistsandalso,inaratherdifferentvein,intheAIcommunity.Inparticular,thoseintheconnectionistcamphold
thatlinguisticpropertiesarisefromverygeneralprocessingmechanisms,andmanyconnectionistsmaintainthatgrammarsbasedonprinciplesandrulesspecificto
languageareanalyticartifactsplayingnoroleinactualmentalrepresentation.
Thedebateabouttheroleofgrammarsinonlinelinguisticprocessingalsoraisesimportantquestionsaboutthegeneralarchitectureofthemind.Specifically,wewill
investigatewhether,asmanyproponentsofthegrammaticalparsingviewwouldhaveit,grammaticalinformationisautonomouslyprocessedinanessentially
modularfashion,thatis,insulatedandisolatedfromotherkindsofinformationthatmaybebroughttobearonthetaskoflanguageprocessing.Theargumentfor
modularity(seeFodor1983Garfield1987)constitutesoneofthemajorthemesofresearchincognitivescienceingeneral.Arehumaninformationprocessing
systemscomposedofdiscretecomponentswithspecialproperties,whoserepresentationshavelittleornoaccesstoinformationinothersystems?Orarecognitive
systemsnonmodularandinteractive,givingandtakingdatafromcomponenttocomponent(or,indeed,composedofnospeciallystructuredcomponentsatall)?
Debateabouttheseissuesisstillactiveandheated.AlthoughsomecurrentworkinNLPprovidescompellingevidencesuggestingthatthemindmayindeedbe
organizedinmodularfashion,otherresearchsuggeststhattheremaybeimportantinteractivecomponentsinlanguageprocessing.
Incontrast,itisclearthatlanguageprocessingcannotbeexplainedentirelyintermsofgrammaticalinformation.Thus,althoughsomeworkersinNLPmayunderplay
theroleofgrammar,itisimportantnottoundervaluethesignificanceofgeneralknowledgeandcontextualinformationinlanguageunderstanding.
11.2OntheRoleofGrammarinLanguageProcessing
Ungrammaticality
Letusbeginbylookingatsomeverysimplebutrealproblemsinlanguageprocessing.Consider,forexample,howthehumanlanguageprocessormightbepresumed
todealwithaminimalutterancelike(1):
(1)

Marysnores.

Givenwhatweknowabouttheworld(andthemeaningoflexicalitems),wecanassignaninterpretationtoMary(anamedesignatingafemalehumanwhocanbethe
actororagentinanutterance)andonetosnore(anactionrequiringananimateagentinvolvingtheproductionofaparticularnoiseduringsleep).Wecanassumethat
thesemeaningsarecombinedtoprovideafullunderstandingoftheutterancethat

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thereissomefemalehumannamedMarywhomakesnoisewhileshesleeps(seechapter10fordiscussion).Next,considerhowthelanguageprocessorwillreactto
(2):
(2)

SnoresMary.

Itisclearthat(2)isnotasentenceofEnglish.BythiswemeanthatnativeEnglishspeakerswillreliablyreject(2)aswellformedevenwhentheyhaveonlyarough
andreadyconsciousconceptionofgrammaticality.Furthermore,thereisevidencesuggestingthatanEnglishspeakerwillnotprocess(I)and(2)inthesamefashion.
Indeed,quickintrospectionshouldconvinceyouthat(2)isnotassignedanormalsententialmeaningatall,or,atbest,themeaningemergesonlyafteramomentof
recognitionthattheutteranceisnot"normal"insomesense.Thereisalsoexperimentalevidencethatungrammaticalsentencesinvolvelongerprocessingtimesthan
grammaticalsentences.Floresd'Arcais(1982)foundthatsyntacticungrammaticalityprolongedreadingtimeevenwhensubjectswerenotawareofthesyntactic
violation.
Whatmakes(2)difficulttoprocessisthatthenormalsyntacticorderofsimpleEnglishsentencesisviolated.Butitisimportanttonotethatsincelanguagesdoexist
wheretheverbnormallyprecedesthesubject(forinstance,Tagalog),wecannotassumethatthelanguageprocessorautomatically(asageneralspeciescharacteristic)
rejectsverbfirstutterancesasimpossibleortreatsthemasintrinsicallydifficulttoprocess.Rather,weinferfromthesedatathatgrammaticalitysupportsnormal
processingandthatadeterminationofungrammaticalityforcestheprocessorintoanunusual(andtimeconsuming)mode.
Inasimilarvein,considerthetwosyntacticallywellformedsentencesin(3):
(3)

a.SelmadisqualifiedHarry.
b.HarrydisqualifiedSelma.

Anapproachbasedpurelyonknowledgeaboutthemeaningandreferentsofthewordsin(3a)and(3b)willnotbeabletodistinguishbetweentheirquitedistinct
meanings.Thediscoursecontextmightprovideenoughinformationtodeterminetheappropriatemeanings,butitmightnot.Imagineaconversationliketheonein(4):
(4)

SpeakerA:You'llneverguesswhodisqualifiedwhointhefirstround!

SpeakerB:Iwasn'tthere.HowcouldIknow?

SpeakerA:Well,I'lltellyou...SelmadisqualifiedHarry.

Whodisqualifiedwhomisafunctionoftheorderoflinguisticelements.Ourknowledgeaboutwhichlinguisticelementcorrespondstowhichthematicrole(actor,
agent,patient,andsoforthseechapter6fordiscussion)isnotpartofourknowledgeaboutthingsintheworld:itisafunctionofnormalsyntacticwordorder,thatis,
apropertyofthegrammaroftheparticularlanguagethatwespeak.
Ambiguity
Inthesimplecasesabove,thegrammaticalutteranceseachadmittedofonlyasingleinterpretation.Eventhosesimplecasesrequiredustorecruitinformationaboutthe
syntacticstructureofthesentence.Utterancesthatcanbeinterpretedinmorethanonewayprovideanadditionalperspectiveonthekindofknowledgetheprocessor
requires.
Consider,forexample,asimplesentencelikeTimeflies.Underoneinterpretation,ithastheidiomaticmeaningthat"timegoesbyquickly."Butitcanalsobe
construedas

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Figure11.1
ANeckercube

acommandtouseastopwatchtomeasureinsectbehavior.Gluestickscanbeastatementaboutglue'sadhesivequalitiesoracommandtousegluetojoinpiecesof
wood.AsWaltzandPollack(1985)note,thesekindsofsentenceshavethefeelofalinguistic"Neckercube"avisualillusioninwhichweperceiveatwo
dimensionalrepresentationofacubetoflipbackandforthbetweentwointerpretationsofitsdepthcharacteristics(seefigure11.1).AswiththeNeckercube,wecan
"see"bothmeanings,butnotatthesametime.
Itisnotdifficulttoseehowtheselinguisticambiguitiesarise.Inthecasesdiscussedabovebothwordscanbelongtomorethanonesyntacticcategory.Ineachcase
thefirstword,timeorglue,canbeinterpretedasanoun,whichcanserveasthesimplesubjectofthesentence,orasaverb,servingtomarkthe(subjectless)
imperative.Thesecondword,fliesorsticks,canlikewisebeinterpretedasathirdpersonverborasapluralnoun.Ourmultipleinterpretationsoftheseutterances
canbeunderstoodquitesimplyasafunctionofthosealternatecategoricalproperties.
Interestingly,athirdinterpretationisalsopossibleforeachutterance.Ifwetakebothwordstobenouns,gluestickscanbeconstruedasacompoundnounmeaning
"sticksofglue,"andtimefliescanbeconstrued(likedragonflies)asyetanotherspeciesofinsect.Butitisnotpossible,ineithercase,toconstruebothofthewords
intheseutterancesasverbs.Whyshouldthisbe?Theanswerisstraightforwardifweassumethatthementallanguageprocessorispayingattentiontothegrammarof
English.Thegrammarprovidespossiblestructuresforthesimpledeclaratives,theimperatives,andthecompoundnounsbutitdoesnotcountenancesequencesof
verbs.Thesewordscanmeansomethingtous,normally,onlywithintheconfinesofwhatisgrammaticallypossible(forEnglish).
Theabovecasesstronglysuggestthatnormalinterpretationrequiresatleastsomepurelygrammaticalinformation.Inothersituationswheremorethanasingle
meaningfulinterpretationispossible,therolesofgrammaticalandothertypesofinformationmaybeconsiderablymorecomplex.Consider,forinstance,asentence
like(5),takenfromtheearlyworkofWinograd(1972),whoseSHRDLUprogramwasapioneeringattempttomodelnaturallanguageprocessingintheAI
framework:
(5)

Puttheredcubeontheblockinthebox.

Suchasentencecanbereadintwoways,assuggestedbythealternativebracketingsin(6):

Page439

(6)

a.Put[theredcubeontheblock]in[thebox].
b.Put[theredcube]on[theblockinthebox].

InSHRDLUahighlyrestricteddomainofdiscourseisestablishedinwhicha"robot"ispresumedtoinhabita"blocksworld."Inthisworldvariouslyshapedand
coloredobjectsexistinavarietyofrelationshipstooneanother.TherobotispresentedwithEnglishsentencesthatrefertotheblocksworldandisaskedtoperform
manipulationsofobjectsthatareconsistentwiththepropertiesofthatworld.Inthiswaytherobotcanbesaid,inareasonablesense,to"understand''thesentences
thatdealwithsuchproperties.
Winograd'smodelpresumedacertaindegreeofsyntacticknowledge:forexample,theabilitytoparseanutterancelike(5)forthepurposeofidentifyingnounphrases.
But,as(6ab)demonstrate,thereismorethanonesuchparsingof(5).Itisthecommon,introspectiveexperienceofhumanlanguageusersthat,inordinarydiscourse,
ambiguitiesofthissortdonotseemtointerferewiththesmoothcourseofprocessingwesomehowfindasingle,appropriatereadingofambiguoussentences,and
oftenwemustbeledexplicitlytorecognizetheexistenceofasecondinterpretation.Onalargelygrammardrivenviewofprocessing,wemightwelltrytoexplainthis
perceptionbydiscoveringgeneralsyntacticprinciplesthatfavoronereadingoveranotherinamoreinteractiveframework,wemightexpecttouncoverpropertiesof
thedomainofdiscoursetheimmediatecontext,andknowledgeabouttheworldthatdirecttheprocessortofavorsomeparticularreading.
Winograd'ssolutionutilizessuch"realworld"knowledge(or"blocksworld"knowledge,inthislimitedcase).Therobotproceedsbyexaminingitssimulatedworld
anddeterminingwhetherinthatworldthereexistsauniquereferencetosomeconfigurationofredcubesandboxes.Theprogramdetermineswhetherthenounphrase
(NP)[redcube]hasareferent.Ifthereisauniquereferent(onlyoneredcube),thereadingin(6b)isinvoked,butiftheblocksworldcontainsmorethanonered
cubesay,oneonablockandoneonthetabletheprograminvokesthereadingthatismostsuccessfulinuniquelyidentifyingareferent,giventheinformationinthe
sentence.Inthiscaseitwillbetheredcubeontheblock,thereadingin(6a).Thisprinciple,calledthePrincipleofReferentialSuccessbyCrainandSteedman
(1982)inthecontextofamodelofhumanlanguageprocessing,isclearlyinteractive:itisinformationaboutthesentence'smeaninganditsuse,ratherthanprinciples
operatingoveritsstructure,thatdeterminestheactionoftheprocessor.
Nowitmayatfirstblushseemreasonablethatahumanbeing,intheblocksworld,wouldfollowasimilarstrategy.Itseemsrightthatahumanobserverwhoactually
perceivedaredcubeonablockunderthesecircumstanceswouldultimatelyhitonreading(6a).Ifthetaskcanbeaccomplishedwithoutrecoursetoanyadditional
intermediatesyntacticanalysis,itwouldbemorecomputationallyefficienttoaccomplishitwithoutsuchastepintheprocess.
Suchanassumptionmaybeperfectlyappropriatetoanenterprisewhosegoalistosimulatelanguageunderstandinginacomputer:themeasureoftheprogram's
successisitsabilitytomanipulateitsworldappropriately,andtodosoinawaythatplacestheleastburdenonthecomputingdevice.Inthecaseofhumanbeings,
however,thereisanadditionalempiricalburden:wecannotsimplyassumethatanapproachthatiscomputationallyeffectiveforaparticularclassofcontemporary
computersistheonethatguideshumaninformationprocessinginthisdomain.The

Page440

assumptionmaywellbeareasonabledefaultposition,intheabsenceoffurtherevidence.But,aswewillnowsee,thereisabodyofexperimentalresearchthatargues
againstsuchaviewforhumanlanguageprocessing.
GardenPathEffects
Considerthesentencein(7),firstdiscussedbyBever(1970):
(7)

Thehorseracedpastthebarnfell.

Onfirsthearingorreadingit,nativespeakersofEnglishtypicallyrejectthiskindofutteranceasungrammatical.Itisaclassicexampleofagardenpathsentencein
whichthelistenerorreaderseemstobe"leddownagardenpath"inassumingthatracedisthemainverbofasimplesentence.Unliketheearliercaseswewere
considering,thiskindofsentenceisnotambiguousinthesenseofhavingtwooverallpossibleinterpretations.Rather,(7)exhibitsakindoftemporaryorlocal
ambiguitythatisresolvedasprocessingprogresses.Thus,onlywhenitencountersthefinalverbfelldoesthegardenpathedprocessorrealizethatamistakehasbeen
made:(7)isnotagrammaticalsentenceofEnglishundertheassumptionthatthefirstsixwordsconstituteasimplesentenceinwhichthehorsewasactivelyracing.The
only(grammatical)interpretationisthatthehorsewasbeingraced(byanunspecifiedagent).Consequently,(7)canonlymeanthesameas(8):
(8)

Thehorsethatwasraced(bysomeone)pastthebarnfell.

Moreover,theambiguitydisappearswhenadifferentpastparticipleverbform(likeridden)isemployed.AstheprocessorproceedstoparseasentencelikeThe
horseriddenpastthebarnfell,itisnotgardenpathedbecauseriddencannotbeanalyzedasthemainverbofthesentencewhosesubjectisthehorse.
AGrammaticalParsingAnalysis
Why,then,areweconfoundedwhenwetrytointerpret(7)?Frazier(1987),andothershaveproposedaprocessingmodelthatassumesthatthespeakerinitially
constructsasyntacticrepresentationoftheutterance,quiteindependentlyofmeaningorcontext.Themodelworksoninputsentencesfromlefttoright,assigningeach
incomingwordtosomesyntacticstructureaccordingtothefollowinglanguageindependentprinciple:
(9)

MinimalAttachmentPrinciple(CliftonandFerreira1987)

Eachnewincomingitemisaddedtothephrasestructurerepresentation

withtheleastpossiblenumberofnewsyntacticphrasenodesneeded

atthemomentofitsarrival.

TheMinimalAttachmentPrincipledirectstheprocessortoconstructthesinglesimplestsyntacticconstituentthatisconsistentwithincomingdata.Assumingthe
processorisworkingfromlefttoright,theapproachwillunfortunatelyproduceanincorrectresultinthiskindofcase:thesimplestanalysis(part(b)offigure11.2)
presumesthatthereisnoembeddedsentence(hence,noadditionalSnode)inthesubjectNP(comparepart(a))andgoesontomaketheincorrectassumptionthat
(7)beginswithasimplesentenceonlytofailwhenitcomesacrossfell,whichcannotbeattachedtothetree,sincethereisnophrasestructureruleofEnglishthat
willallowaverbasthefinalelementinaprepositionalphrase.

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Figure11.2
Syntacticstructureforthewellformed
interpretationof(7)

Figure11.3
Syntacticstructureofthe"gardenpath"
interpretationof(7)

Sincethestructureinfigure11.3is"minimal"inthatitcontainsjustfourmajorcategorynodes,whereasthefirststructure(thecorrectone)containsfivenodes,the
MinimalAttachmentPrinciplecorrectlypredictsthattheprocessorwillincorrectlyinitiallychoosethesecondstructureoverthefirst.
WecandiscernfurtherevidenceforamodelincorporatingtheMinimalAttachmentPrinciplebyexamininganotherclassofstructurallyambiguoussentences.Consider
asentencelike(10):
(10)

Alplayedtherecordsonthestereo.

(10)isnormallyfirstunderstoodtomeanthatAlusedthestereoasaninstrumenttoplaytherecords.Thereisalsoasecond,lesslikelyinterpretation,namely,thatAl
playedrecordsthatwerelocatedonthestereo(say,onitsplasticcover).
Whatdeterminesthepreferred"instrumental"readingof(10)?TheMinimalAttachmentPrinciplemakesjusttherightprediction.Examinethetreestructuresinfigure
11.4.
Observethatinpart(a)offigure11.4,thestructurefortheinstrumentalreading,thePrepositionalPhrase(PP)onthestereoisattachedto(andmodifies)theVerb
Phrase(VP).ItisasimplemattertoshowthatthePPisnotinsidetheNPconstituent.Forinstance,itcannotbepassivizedasawholewiththeNP:Therecordson
thestereowereplayedbyAlisnotaparaphraseofthefirstinterpretation.Bycontrast,thePPinpart(b)offigure11.4,thestructureunderlyingthesecond
interpretation,lieswithinthe(object)NP,andthewholeNPissubjecttopassivization.Indeed,TherecordsonthestereowereplayedbyAlisaproperparaphrase
ofthenoninstrumentalreading.

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Figure11.4
AlternativesyntacticstructuresforAlplayedtherecordsonthestereo.(a)isthestructure
fortheinstrumentalreading,and(b)isthestructureforthenoninstrumentalreading

Furthermore,thestructureinpart(a)isminimallyattachedsinceitcontainsonenodefewerthanthestructureinpart(b),andthisexplainswhyitcorrespondstothe
preferredfirstinterpretationoftheutterance.
TheRoleofPragmaticsandDiscourse
WecanalsoentertainanalternativeexplanationforthepreferredreadingbasednotonaspecialsyntacticparsingstrategyliketheoneembodiedintheMinimal
AttachmentPrinciplebutonthe(nonmodular)assumptionthatnonlinguisticknowledgeisinvolvedinthesentenceunderstandingprocesssimultaneouslywiththe
determinationoftheutterance'sgrammaticalstructure.Playingrecords,wemightargueasamatterofourknowledgeaboutsuchthings,isanactivitythatrequiresan
instrument:wedonotsimplyplayrecords,weplaythemonsomething.Asentenceprocessorthatrecruitsknowledgeabouttheworldasitassignsasyntactic
structurewouldleantowardastructurethatisconsistentwiththatknowledge.
Itseems,then,thatanapproachtolinguisticprocessingincorporatingpragmaticprinciplesandbasedonworldknowledgemaybeabletoaccountforthesamedata
asagrammaticallybasedanalysisincorporatingtheMinimalAttachmentPrinciple.Howmightwechoosebetweenthesealternatives(withtheirquitedifferent
implicationsforourunderstandingoftheorganizationofcognitiveprocesses)?
Toadjudicatethisquestion,letusreturntotheissueofgardenpathsentences.Itiseasytoimaginenonlinguisticinformationthatcouldhelpkeeptheprocessoroffthe
gardenpath.SupposeweweretoembedthesentenceThehorseracedpastthebarnfellinalargerdiscourselikethefollowing:Twohorseswerebeingraced
downonthefarm.Onejockeyrodehishorsearoundthepasture.Asecondwasridingnearthebarn.Thehorseinthepasturehadnotrouble.Butthehorse
racedpastthebarnfell.Givensuchadiscourse,agreatdealof(nonlinguistic)informationisavailabletotheprocessorthatmightbeexpectedtoalleviatethe
temporaryambiguityinthesentenceinquestion.Thatis,aninteractiveprocessorthatsimultaneouslyutilizeslinguisticandnonlinguisticknowledgewouldbeexpected
toavoidgardenpathinginsuchcases.
CrainandSteedman(1985)adoptacontextdependentviewofNLPthat,asnotedearlier,makesuseofmechanismslikethePrincipleofReferentialSuccess.Ona
viewsuchasCrainandSteedman's,thecomplexsubjectsinclassicgardenpathsentences

Page443

likethemangiventhebook,thehorseriddenpastthebarn,orthehorseracedpastthebarn(intheappropriatesense)haveaspecialpragmaticfunction,
namely,topickoutauniquereferentfromasetofpossiblereferentsinarelevantdiscourse.Theexpectedroleofsuchdescriptionsinadiscoursecontainingmany
horsesistospecifyasingleparticularhorse.So,ifthediscourseincludesacharacterizationofsomesetofhorses,andthespeakercansucceedinpickingoutahorse
thatwasindeedracedpastabarnbysomeone,thenanaturalinterpretationconsistentwiththePrincipleofReferentialSuccesswillbeassigned.However,whena
sentencelike(7)ispresentedwithoutanydiscourse,thelistenerisleddownthegardenpathsincethereisnopreviouslyestablishedsetofrelevanthorsesinthe
discourseandconsequentlynoreasontoexpectanydistinguishingdescriptionofanyhorse.Thus,thepragmaticfunctionofthecomplexsubjectparseiseliminated,
andtheprocessoristrickedintotryingtofindsomealternateinterpretation.Togeneralizethisposition,wewouldexpectthatpragmaticanddiscourseinformationwill
typicallybeusefultotheprocessorinresolvingambiguitiesandassigninginterpretations.
Bycontrast,amodular,grammaticalparsingviewpredictsthatgardenpathingwilloccurregardlessofthediscoursecontextsincetheprocessorispresumedtobe(at
leasttemporarily)insulatedfrominformationoutsidethesyntacticprocessingmodule.Ferreira(1985)andCliftonandFerreira(1987)providesomecompelling
evidencethatinformationinadiscoursedoesnot,infact,eliminatetheprocessingdifficultythatisinherentingardenpathsentences.InFerreira'sexperimentssubjects
arepresentedtemporarilyambiguousgardenpathsentences,embeddedincontextswherediscoursefactorsoughttobeabletoplayafacilitativeroleinthe
processing.Examplesaregivenin(llad):
(11)

a.Johnworkedasareporterforabigcitynewspaper.Hesensedthatamajorstory
wasbrewingoverthecityhallscandal,andheobtainedsomeevidencethathe
believedprettymuchestablishedthemayor'sguilt.Hewenttohiseditorswithatape
andsomephotosbecauseheneededtheirapprovalbeforehecouldgoaheadwith
thestory....Heranatapeforoneofhiseditors,andheshowedsomephotosto
theother.Theeditorplayedthetapeagreedthestorywasabigone.Theother
editorurgedJohntobecautious.

b....Hegaveatapetohiseditorandtoldhimtolistentoit.Theeditorplayedthe
tapeandagreedthestorywasabigone.TheothereditorurgedJohntobe
cautious.

c....Hebroughtoutatapeforoneofhiseditorsandtoldhimtolistencarefullyto
it.Theeditorplayedthetapeagreedthestorywasabigone.Theothereditor
urgedJohntobecautious.

d....Hebroughtoutatapeforoneofhiseditorsandtoldhimtolistencarefullyto
it.Theeditorplayedthetapeandagreedthestorywasabigone.Theother
editorurgedJohntobecautious.

In(1a)thetargetsentence(italicized)requiresanonminimalsyntacticanalysis.However,sincethediscoursecontextcontainstwoeditorswhocanbedistinguishedby
thedescriptionplayedthetape,wemightexpectaprocessorthatisinformedbydiscourseinformationattheearlieststagesofparsingtoavoidgoingdownthe
gardenpath.In(l1b),thetargetsentencerequirestheminimalattachmentanalysis(andthediscoursecontextthatsupportsthisinterpretation).Suchasentenceshould
involvelittleprocessingdifficulty.

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In(11c)thetargetsentencerequiresnonminimalattachment,butthediscoursedoesnothelptocuethegrammaticalinterpretation.Consequently,(11c)shouldbea
difficultsentencetoprocessfrombothpointsofview.Finally,thetargetsentencein(11d)requirestheminimalattachmentanalysishowever,itsdiscoursecontext
mightleadtheprocessorto(inappropriately)consideranonminimallyattachedstructuresinceitcontainsasetofeditorsthatcouldbeprofitablyseparatedoutbythe
fulldescriptionthatwouldbelongtothecomplexsubjectstructure[NPtheeditorplayedthetape](recallthePrincipleofReferentialsuccess).
Onthegrammaticalparsingapproach,(11a)and(11c)shouldbemoredifficulttoprocessthan(11b)and(11d),sinceeachrequiresanonminimallyattachedsyntactic
analysis.Butifthereisaccesstodiscourseinformationthatcanguidethesyntacticparser,thenonly(11c)shouldrepresentaprocessingdifficulty,sincethecontext
seemsrichenoughtoleadtheprocessortothecorrectparsein(11a).Furthermore,ifdiscourseinformationcanoverridethesyntacticparser,wemightexpect(11d)
toproducesomeprocessingdifficultysincethediscourseinvitesanunavailableparse.
Ferreira'ssubjectswererequiredtoreadpassageslikethosein(11ad),andreadingtimesweremeasuredbytrackingeyemovementsandfixationperiods.
Processingdifficulties,whethertheyarisefromconstructingasyntacticanalysisoradiscoursemodel,wouldbereflectedinlongerfixationtimes.Theresultsof
Ferreira'sexperimentwereconsistentwiththemodularsyntacticprocessingview:onlythenonminimallyattachedstructures(11a)and(11c)involvedagreater
processingload(i.e.,longerreadingtimes)evenwhen,ontheinteractiveview,thediscoursecontextshouldhavealleviatedthedifficulty.
EvidenceforaNonmodularApproach
However,otherstudiessuggestthatnonlinguisticinformationdoesplayanimportantroleinlanguageunderstanding,evenatearlystagesofprocessing.Inaseriesof
experimentsTylerandMarslenWilson(1980)presentedsubjectswithsentenceslikethosein(12):
(12)

a.Thecrowdwaswaitingeagerly.Theyoungmangrabbedtheguitar
and...

b.Thecrowdwaswaitingeagerly.Theyoungmanburiedtheguitarand..
.

c.Thecrowdwaswaitingeagerly.Theyoungmandranktheguitarand...

d.Thecrowdwaswaitingeagerly.Theyoungmanslepttheguitarand...

Thefirsttwoutterances,(12a)and(12b),aresyntacticallynormal.But(12b)ispragmaticallyoddsinceguitarsarenotcustomarilyburiedonstage.(12c)is
semanticallyillformed,becausethemeaningofdrinknormallyrequiresaliquidobject.(12d)isdeviantatthelexicalsyntacticlevel:sleptisanintransitiveverbthat
cannottakeanNPobjectliketheguitar.InTylerandMarslenWilson'sexperimentssubjectswereaskedtopressakeywhentheyheardatargetwordlikeguitar,
andtheirreactiontimesweremeasured.Theresultsshowedthatsubjectswereslowertopressthekeyinallofthenonnormalconditionsthantheywereinacaselike
(12a),wherenoexpectationssyntactic,pragmatic,orsemanticwereviolated.Meanresponsetimeforthenormalcondition(12a)was241milliseconds.Forthe
othercasestheresponsetimes

Page445

wereprogressivelylonger:forthepragmaticallyunlikelysentence(12b),268millisecondsforthesemanticanomaly(12c),291millisecondsandforthesyntacticallyill
formedsentence(12d),320milliseconds.
Undertheautonomousparsingmodel,asyntacticanalysisisaninsulatedprocessthatdoesnotdirectlyrecruitnonlinguisticinformation.Thelongresponsetimesinthe
caseofthesyntacticillformednessdescribedabovedosuggestthatthehearerisindeedtryingtoassignasyntacticstructuretoincomingutterances.Butthefactthat
pragmaticimplausibilityproducedasmall(butstatisticallysignificant)increaseinresponsetimecanbeconstruedaslendingsupporttoamodelinwhichconsiderations
ofworldknowledgearebroughttobearatanextremelyearlypointinprocessing.Muchcurrentresearch(see,forexample,CowartandCairns1987)isdevotedto
developingamoreprecisepictureofthecharacterandtimingoftheseprocesses,inanefforttoclarifythedifficultquestionofwhethersyntacticprocessingisindeed
modularandautonomousincharacter.
11.3ConnectionistModels
Intheconnectionistparadigmitisassumedthatknowledgebeitinformationabouttheworld,memory,ortherepresentationoflinguisticgeneralizationsresidesin
thecomplexpatternsofconnectivitythatcanariseinthemindasaconsequenceoftheinteractionofmyriadverysimpleprocessingunits.Inmostconnectionist
theories,knowledgedoesnottaketheformofthekindofabstractrulesandhigherorderstructuresthataretypicaloflinguistictheory.NotionslikeMinimal
Attachment,orevenphrasestructure,mayhavenoindependentstatusinaconnectionistmodel,sincewhateverknowledgetheyembodyisultimatelybuiltoutof
simple,relativelyhomogeneousprocessingunitsthat,bydefinition,arenotuniquelyormodularlydedicatedtospecialtaskslikelanguageprocessing.
ConnectionistmodelshavebeendevelopedinanumberofdomainsofinteresttothestudentofNLP.Forexample,suchmodelshavebeenadvancedtoaccountfor
linguisticphenomenaofdirectrelevancetothesentenceprocessingissuesthatwediscussedearlier.WaltzandPollack(1985),forexample,arguethataformof
''semantic"gardenpathingcanbeinsightfullyunderstoodwithinastronginteractivemodelofprocessingdesignedonconnectionistprinciples.Theyconsidersentences
likethosein(13):
(13)

a.Theastronomermarriedthestar.
b.Thesailorateasubmarine.

Eachofthesesentencesis(lexically)ambiguous.ButWaltzandPollackassertthathearersatfirstgenerallyexperienceonlyonereading,indeed,thesemantically
bizarreinterpretation(theastronomertookacelestialbodyasaspouseandthesailorconsumedaboat).Ittakessometimeandthoughttorecognizethat(13a)can
meanthattheastronomermarriedamoviecelebrityorthat(13b)canmeanthatthesailorateasandwich.Inasense,theprocessorisleddownthegardenpathonce
again.Onceitassignsasemanticinterpretationtosailororastronomer,itisnowprimedtomakefurthersemanticinterpretationswithinthesentencethatareinsome
senseassociatedwiththemeaningofthatsubjectNP.Butthisprimingeffectconfoundstheprocessor,whichexpectsaverblikeeattohaveanedibleobject.

Page446

Figure11.5
AcycleofaconnectionistnetforthesentenceTheastronomermarriedthestar.(AdaptedfromWaltz
andPollack1985.)

Accountsofprocessinginwhicheachlexicalitemhasadiscrete,selfcontainedmeaningarehardpressedtoaccountforthiseffect.Butinadistributedconnectionist
modelofthelexicon,WaltzandPollackargue,thegardenpatheffecthasastraightforwardexplanation.ThesubjectNPsailorcanbepresumedtohaveastrong
connectiontoasetoftermswithnauticalmeanings,includingsubmarine,andamuchweakerconnectiontothefoodtermsthatincludethesandwichmeaningof
submarine(seefigure11.5).
Insuchamodeltheactivationofsailorwillproduceahighlevelofactivationforthenauticalmeaningofsubmarine.Indeed,itwilldosorelativelyquickly,accounting
forthenatureoftheinitialinterpretation.Ultimately,however,theprocessorwillhavetodealwiththefactthateatalsoexpectsanedibleobject,andtheactivation
levelofthesandwichmeaningofsubmarinewilleventuallyrise,whiletheprocessorsearchesforaconnectiontoanodewithfoodlikefeatures.

Page447

Anassociationrichdistributedmodelofthelexiconalsoprovidesareadyframeworkinwhichtomakesenseofthecontexteffectsonprocessingthathavebeen
adducedbyMarslenWilson,Tyler,andothers.IfPDPmodelersultimatelywerealsoabletoaccountdirectlyforthesyntacticeffectsobservedbyworkerslike
Frazier,Clifton,andtheircolleagues,theconnectionistparadigmwouldbeamajorcontenderasabroadlyempiricallyadequatemodelofnaturallanguageprocessing.
11.4OntheRoleofDiscourse
Althoughsomeoftheresultsdiscussedearliersuggestthatcontextualinformationdoesnotnecessarilyobviateanyroleforsyntacticstructureinsentenceprocessing,
wehavealsoseenevidencethatcontextandgeneralknowledgeplayamajorpartinthetaskoflanguageunderstanding.InFerreira'sexperiments,forinstance,
readingtimewasdependentonlinguisticstructureandseemedtobeunaffectedbydiscourseinformation.ButFerreiraalsosubmittedhersubjectstoacomprehension
taskandfoundthatreadersretainedmoreinformationmorereliablywhenthediscoursecontextwasbiasedinfavorofthestructureofthetargetsentence.This
suggeststhatspecialdiscoursemechanismsmaywellbeoperativeatsomeleveloflanguageprocessingthatfollowstheinitialparsingstage.Itseemsentirelyplausible,
forinstance,thatsomeprinciplelike"referentialsuccess,"inCrainandSteedman'ssense,shouldcontributetotheoverallcoherenceofadiscourseinawaythat
enhancesgeneralunderstanding.Ifthegrammaticalinterpretationofgardenpathsentencesdoesindeedpresupposeasetofcontextuallyrelevantentitiesinthe
discourse,andtheyarenotpresent,wemaywellexpecttheprocessortohavedifficultyinrecallingandcharacterizinginformationaboutthem.
Therelationshipbetweengrammaticalinformationandotherkindsofinformationrelevanttodiscourseunderstandingremainsaverycomplexissue.Considerthecase
ofpronominalization,illustratedinthelittlediscoursesin(14)and(15):
(14)

SpeakerB:Johnlosthisumbrella.
(15)

SpeakerA:What'sthematterwithHarry?
SpeakerA:What'sthematterwithHarry?
SpeakerB:HelostJohn'sumbrella.

Ineachcasethelanguageprocessingsystemmustassignareferenttotheitalicizedpronoun.What,then,istheroleofthediscoursecontextintheprocessof
interpretingthepronounsinthesesentences?
HerewemightrecallCrainandSteedman'sPrincipleofReferentialSuccess,whichmaintainsthat"ifthereisareadingthatsucceedsinreferringtoanentityalready
establishedinthehearer'smentalmodelofthedomainofdiscourse,thenitisfavoredoveronethatdoesnot"(CrainandSteedman1985).Inthediscoursein(14)
Harryisestablishedasthetopicofthediscourse,andwemightsupposethatitisthetopicthatis"established,"inCrainandSteedman'ssense.Suchananalysiswould
explainwhythemostlikelyinterpretationofSpeakerB'sreplytakeshisumbrellatobeHarry'sumbrella.Itisindeedpossibletoconstrue(14)todescribeasituation
whereHarryisupsetbecauseJohnhaslosthisownumbrellaperhapsitwasanexpensivepresentfromHarry.Butthisisclearlynotthefavoredreading,asCrainand
Steedmanwouldpredict.

Page448

Whatthenof(15)?HereHarryisonceagainanentityalreadyestablishedinthehearer'smentalmodelofthediscourse,andonceagainthehearerinterpretsthe
pronoun(nowhe)tobecoreferentialwithHarry.Butthisisnotsimplythefavoredreadingof(15)itistheonlyreadingthatispossible.PronominalizationinEnglishis
governedbyapurelystructuralconstraintthatpreventshefrombeingcoreferentialwithJohnwithinspeakerB'sreplyin(15),regardlessofthediscoursecontext.
Now,ifthelanguageprocessingsystemwerenotdirectlyguidedbypropertiesofgrammar,thereisnoreasonwhythesecondreading(albeitlesslikelyintermsof
discoursecoherence)shouldbeimpossible.Indeed,weoughttobeabletoconstructasomewhatricherdiscourseinwhichtheillegalcoreferenceisrendered
plausible.Butwecannot.Thepronominalizationfactsin(15)leadusagaintotheconclusionthatspecial,uniquelygrammaticalinformationisoperativeandimposes
strongconstraintsonprocessing.Grammaticalprinciplesplayapowerfulinitialroleinprocessing,evenincontextsbeyondthesentence.Butthefactsin(14)
demonstratethatgrammaticalconstraintswillnotalwaysprovideasufficientbasisforunderstanding.
Moreover,therearetypesoflinguisticrepresentationsthatinvolvecoreferencebutdosowithoutpronominalformsofthesortthataresubjecttothekindsof
pronominalconstraintswehavebeendiscussing.Consideratextlike(16):
(16)

Marycouldn'tdecidewhethertobuysteakorhamburger.Shefinallydecided
tobuythemoreexpensivemeat.

Tanenhaus,Carlson,andSeidenberg(1985),towhomthisexampleisdue,conductedanexperimentdemonstratingthatspeakersexpendconsiderableprocessing
timeinassigninganinterpretationinthediscoursetothemoreexpensivemeat.WhenthesecondsentenceinvolvedacontextuallyneutralstatementlikeShefinally
decidedtogotoanothernearbystore,processingtimewasreduced.Heretheinterpretationisclearlyafunctionofknowledgeabouttheworld:speakerswhoknow
thatsteakcostsmorethanhamburgerwillunderstandthemoreexpensivemeattorefertosteak.Tanenhaus,Carlson,andSeidenbergconcludethatthisinference
fromrealworldknowledgetakesprocessingtimethatisnotrequiredbytheneutralcontext.
PragmaticsandWorldKnowledge
Ourearlierdiscussionofstructuralpronominalizationshowedthatworldknowledgealonedoesnotprovideageneralexplanationfortheinterpretationofreferencein
discourse.Thispointcanbeshowninanotherway.Labov(1972)citesanargumenttotheeffectthatworldknowledgeisindeedessentialtothecoherent
understandingofdiscourseslike(17):
(17)

SpeakerA:EveryoneshouldreadtheBible.
SpeakerB:Yes,Deuteronomyisagreatbook.

Contrast(17)with(18):
(18)

SpeakerA:EveryoneshouldreadtheBible.
SpeakerB:Yes,CrimeandPunishmentisagreatbook.

OurknowledgeaboutbooksandabouttheBible(andnotpropertiesofgrammarorofrulesofdiscourse)mightarguablybetakentoleadtothejudgmentthat(17)is
coherentand(18)isincoherent.ButStubbs(1983)pointsoutthatthisviewiswrong:ourunderstandingofsuchsentencescannotbesaidtodependonknowledge
about

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particularfactsabouttheworld.Henotesthatthefollowingkindofdiscourseisperfectlycoherent:
(19)

SpeakerA:EveryoneshouldreadWombatsGalore.
SpeakerB:Yes,McQuarrieisagreatauthor.

ItdoesnotmattertoourunderstandingofthisdiscoursewhethertherereallyisabookcalledWombatsGaloreorwhetheritwasindeedwrittenbysomeonenamed
McQuarrie.Certainly,ifthesefactsarepartofourknowledge,wemaybeabletojudgetheveracityofthestatementsortheirrelevancetooneanother,andifwe
knowthatMcQuarriedidnotwriteWombatsGalore,wemaylookforanotherconnectionbetweenthetwospeakers'statementsin(19).Butinthealternative
circumstanceinwhichweknownothingabouttheauthorshipofWombatsGalore,theprocessingofsuchsentencesdoesnotappeartobeimpededbylimitationson
ourabilitytoaccessparticularitemsinourgeneralknowledgerepresentations.
Insuchcasesoflimitedknowledge,whatisatstakeisasetofpragmaticrulesandconventionsthatregulatealargepartoflanguageunderstanding.In(19),for
instance,weinferfromthediscoursethatMcQuarrieistheauthorofabookcalledWombatsGalore.Theimmediatetransitioninthediscoursefromabooktitletoa
person'snameleadstheprocessortoconcludethatthenamedpersonisthewriterof(orapersonhighlyrelevantto)thebook.Whyshouldthisbe?Grice(1971,
1975)proposesthatdiscoursesareguidedbyasetofconversationalmaximsthatrequireutterancestobeinformative,relevant(tocontext),andtruthful.
AlthoughGricewasinterestedinwhathappenswhenthesemaximsareflouted,wewillconsiderwhatroletheycanplayinguidingdiscourseprocessing.
Withregardtothediscoursein(19),supposethatyouareathirdparty,C,whoisinterestedintheconversation.IfGrice'smaximsareoperativeasyoutrytoprocess
thediscourse,youwillassumethatwhenBreferstoMcQuarrie,Bisprovidinginformation.Youwillassumethatthisinformationisrelevanttothediscourse,andyou
willassumethatBisnotinventingtheinformation.Relevanceis,ofcourse,amatterofgeneralknowledgeaswellasofknowledgeabouttheparticulardiscourse,butit
isnotnecessarilyamatterofdetailedparticularknowledgeaboutbooks,wombats,orsomeonenamedMcQuarrie.Whatisrequiredisthegeneralknowledgethat
peoplewritebooks.Here,Grice'smaximscanbeunderstoodtoleadtheprocessortothefollowingreasonableinterpretationofthediscourse:Bisproviding
informationrelevanttoA'sremark,Bisnotlying,andthepertinentrelevanceconditionisthatapersonnamedinrelationtoabookislikelytobeitsauthor.The
conclusionisthatMcQuarriewroteWombatsGalore.
SinceGrice'smaximsarenotbindinglaws,itmayofcoursebethatAwasviolatingoneoranotherofthemandtheconversationmayneedtobeinterpretedindirectly
(seeGrice1971,1975fordiscussion).Thatis,althoughGrice'smaximsareoperativeintheprocessor'snormal(default)state,andweordinarilyassumethatspeakers
areprovidingrelevant,trueinformation,indiscoursecontextslike(20)anonliteralinterpretationiscalledfor:
(20)

Afamilyofsixisseatedatthekitchentable.Thestoveisburning
everyonefeelsuncomfortablyhot.Themotherturnstoonechildand

says''I'mhot."Thechildsays"Allright"andproceedstoopenthe

window.

Page450

EventhoughI'mhotmightliterallybeinterpretedtodescribeaninternalstateofthemotherorasimpledescriptionoftheroomtemperature,inthiscontextitisoften
takentobearequest(orevenademand).Whyshouldthisbeso?Sinceitisirrelevantforspeakerssimplytodeclaretheirinternalstates,andthisirrelevancetothe
contextisreadilydeterminedandreadilygaugedtobepurposeful,thelistenerisledtoinferthatthisutterancemustberelevanttothediscoursecontextinsome
indirectway.Inthisparticularcontextwhereallthespeakersareaffectedbytheheat,thechildtakestheutterancetohaveapragmaticforcethatisrelevanttotheir
sharedinformationnamely,arequestorordertodosomethingthatwillaffectthetemperature.
Thereare,ofcourse,otherwaystoreducetheheatforexample,turningoffthestove,leavingtheroomtodecreasethenumberofwarmbodies,oreven(perversely)
bringinginlargeblocksoficewoulddothetrick.However,thechild'sunderstandingofthesentence,andconsequentaction,isalsoguidedbygeneralplausibility
assumptions,bypriorexperience,andsoforth.Thepointisthatthenormaldefaultstateoftheprocessormustbeguidedbyprinciplesthatderivemeaningfrommore
thantheformoflinguisticevents.
SpeechActsandPragmaticForce
Linguisticmeaning(discussedinchapter10)ischaracterizedintermsofstructural(grammaticalandlogical)propertiesofsentences,perhapsconstruedintermsof
formallogicoramentalmodel.Butthediscoursemeaningofutterancesisnotalwayslimitedbysemanticproperties.Sentencesastheyareactuallyusedalso
constituterealactionsintheexternalworld,andtheirveryusecontributestotheirmeaning(andhencetoourunderstandingofthem).TheyarewhatwriterslikeAustin
(1962)andSearle(1969)callspeechacts.
Thecentralinsightinspeechacttheoryisthatsentencescandischargearangeofdifferentfunctions.Aspeakerwhouttersasentencesay,Marywonthe
electionhascarriedoutanutteranceactsimplybyvirtueofproducingthesentence.Thespeakermightbeshoutingsuchasentenceveryloudlyinanoisyroomfor
thesolepurposeofdrawingattentionorinducingquiet.Utterancescanalsoconstitutepropositionalactsthatprovideinformation.Indeed,aspeakermightshouta
sentencelikeMarywontheelectionwiththedoubleintentionofdrawingattentionasanutteranceactandalsooflettingitbeknownthattheelectionresultswere
inapropositionalact.
Speechactsalsohaveapragmaticforcewithregardtotheactpotentialoftheutterance,thespeaker'sintentions,andtheultimateeffectonthehearer.Forexample,
thesentenceIpromiseyouthatIwillbebackatfouritselfcountsasanactofpromisingbyvirtueofthespeaker'sutteringitinthefirstperson.Thatis,simplyby
sayingIpromise...,thespeakerisactuallycarryingouttheactionofpromising.Thistypeofspeechactinwhichtheutteranceautomaticallyconstitutesaneffective
actintheworldistypicallyaconsequenceofutteringsentencescontainingsocalledperformativeverbslikepromise,report,convince,insist,tell,request,and
demandtheycanoftenbeidentifiedbecausetheycancooccurwiththeadverbhereby,renderingtheirperformativeforceapparent.IherebyreportthatIhavea
seriouscontagiousdiseaseisaperformativeactsincebyutteringsuchasentence,thespeakerisperformingtheactofreporting.
Utterancesmayalsodischargenonperformativefunctionsthatestablishdifferentaspectsofaspeaker'smeaning.Thislevelofdiscourseinterpretation,socalled
illocutionaryforce,considersthespeaker'sintentioninproducinganutterance.Forinstance,utteringIhaveaseriouscontagiousdiseasemayhavetheillocutionary
forceofathreat,

Page451

awarning,orapleaforpity,dependingonwhatthespeakerhasinmind.Bycontrast,theperlocutionaryforceofaspeechactconstitutesitseffectonthehearer:ifa
speakeruttersthesentenceIhaveaseriouscontagiousdisease,itmightvariouslyproducediscomfort,concern,orthedesiretoleavetheroom.Finally,itshouldbe
clearthatspeechactutterancescansimultaneouslyhavemultiplepragmaticforces:Ihaveaseriouscontagiousdiseaseisatonceanutteranceactanda
propositionalactwithanillocutionaryandaperlocutionaryforce.
Speechacttheoryprovidesarichframeworkinwhichtothinkaboutthenatureofthelanguageprocessorworkingondiscourse.Recallthescenein(20).The
utteranceactI'mhotisthespeecheventthattriggerstheprocessorandconstitutesitsinput.Inaddition,theprocessormustdealwiththeutteranceactasa
propositionalactanddeterminethereferentsandpredicationsinquestion.Moreover,itmustcalculatetheillocutionaryand/orperlocutionaryforceoftheutterance.It
isreasonabletopresumethatmanyspeechactsofmotherstowardchildrenforegroundthemother'sillocutionarycontent,anditisclearlytheindirectpragmaticforce
ofthemother'sutterancethatproducesthedesiredperlocutionaryresponseinthechild.Thetaskofthechild'slanguageprocessoristodeterminetheillocutionary
forceofthatutterancethat,inturn,determinestheperlocutionaryforce.Initsliteralmeaning,thesentenceI'mhotisreadilyconstruedasareport.Buttheburdenon
theprocessoristoweighthisillocutionaryinterpretationagainstothers(forexample,thelikelyinterpretationasarequestorademand),usingGrice'smaximsas
guidelines.Partofthisburdenisbornebygrammar,inasmuchasmanyspeechactsaresimplyencodedinparticularsyntacticformsbymeansofperformativeverbs,
questionandimperative(command)structures,andthelike.ButasweseeinthisdiscussionofindirectcommandslikeI'mhot,nongrammaticalprinciplesseemtobe
atworkaswell.
Therehavebeenseveralattemptstoimplementcomputersystemsforunderstandingnaturallanguagethatrecruitdiscourseandpragmaticinsights.Awellknown
exampleistheworkofAllen(1983),AllenandPerrault(1980),andCohen,Perrault,andAllen(1982).Theyhavedesignedaquerysystem,forinstance,thatmodels
theinteractionofarailroadticketagentandacustomer.Thesystemisabletodealappropriatelywithsomeofthequestionsthatariseinthissituationinnormal
discourse,bybuildingassumptionsaboutthegoalsandintentionsofthediscourseparticipantsintotheprogram.
Forexample,facedwithaquerysuchasDoyouknowwhenthenexttrainleavesforChicago?,anadequatemodelshouldnotrespondwitha"Yes"ora"No,"
eventhoughthesyntacticformofa"Yes"''No"questionofthissortmightelicitsuchananswerinothercircumstances.
Putanotherway,thelinguisticformoftheutterance(possiblyapolitenessconvention)isnotsufficientbyitselftodeterminehowtocarryonaconversation.Rather,
Allenandhiscoworkerspropose,alanguageunderstandermustworkfromaplanasetofrulesthatleadsfromasetofexpectationsaboutnormalgoalstoasetof
effectiveactionstoachievethosegoals.
Itisplausibletoassumethatthecustomer'sintentioninadiscourseofthissortistoattainspecificinformationaboutthetrainnottodeterminewhethertheticket
agentknowssomething,butwhattheagentknows.IntermsofoneofGrice'spostulates,theticketagentoughttorespondinarelevantmannertotheinquiry.How
doestheprogramknowthata"Yes"or"No"answeris,byitself,irrelevanttotheconversation?InthemodeldevisedbyAllenandhiscoworkers,thecustomerinthis
contextis

Page452

presumedtohaveastartinggoaltogetonthetrain,ortomeetsomeoneonitandtheprogramplansforresponsesthatwilladvancetheattainingofthatgoal.Simply
lettingthecustomerknowthattheagentisawareofthetrainschedule,withoutelaboration,doesnotmakeprogresstowardthegoal.Butprovidingrelevant
informationwillindeeddoso.Knowingthetimeofdeparturealreadyrequested,ifimplicitlyisrelevant.Soistheplaceofdeparture,thetrain'sgate.Eventhough
thecustomer'sutterancemakesnomentionofthetrain'slocation,themodelprovidesthatinformationbecauseitisrelevanttoaneffectiveplanforattaininga
presumedgoal.
11.5MoreontheRoleofGeneralKnowledge
Ourinvestigationsthusfarhaveledtothefollowingpictureofthehumanlanguageprocessingsystem.Wehaveseensomeevidencefortheviewthatthelanguage
processorcontainsadiscrete(modular)grammaticalprocessingsubsystem,aparser,thatoperatesintheinitialstagesoflanguagecomprehensiontoconstructpurely
syntacticrepresentations.Butlanguageunderstandingindiscoursealsorequirespragmaticprinciples,includingthosethatregulateouruseoflanguageinits
communicativefunction.Wehavealsoseenanumberofcaseswherenonlinguisticknowledge(neithergrammaticalnorpragmatic)playsaroleinprocessing.Wenow
lookinmoredetailattheinteractionbetweenlinguisticinformationandgeneralknowledgeabouttheworld.
AmongtheresearchersinAIwhohavebeenpredominantlyresponsibleforworkinthisdomain,Schankandhisassociatesarerepresentative(see,e.g.,Schankand
Abelson1977,Lehnert1981).Thepositiontheyholdisthatthereisnosignificant,autonomoussyntacticparsingsysteminprocessing.Thisviewderivesinpartfrom
thekindofproblemsinlanguageunderstandingthattheseresearchershaveconcentratedon.Theystressthatinmanynarrativeaccountsofordinaryevents,the
amountandtypeoflinguisticinformationunderdeterminesourcapacitytointerprettheevents.Foratypicalexample,considerthefollowingsimplestory:
(21)

Awomanwalkedintoarestaurant.Thewaitershowedhertoatable.

Sheorderedararesteakandabottleofbeer.Assheleft,shesmiled

atthecashier.

Thisstoryposesnospecialdifficultiesfromthestandpointofparsing.Thereisnostructuralandlittlelexicalambiguity,andpronominalizationseemstobeasimple
affair.Whatisinterestingisthatthereadercanrecoverinformationfromthestorythatisnotpresentinanylinguisticallyovert(orrecoverable)form.Morespecifically,
nothingissaidaboutchairs,butweinferthatthewomansatdownonachairatthetable.Nothingissaidaboutthewaiter'ssubsequentbehavior,butweassumethat
hebroughtthewomanherfood.Nothingissaidabouttheactofeatingitself,butthereaderconcludesthatthewomandidindeedeathersteakanddrinkherbeer.
Thestorydoesnotsaythatshepaidherbill,butthereaderunderstandsthatshedidso.
Astoryunderstandingapproachholdsthatourcomprehensionofthiskindofstoryisdependentonawelldefinedknowledgeframe,ascript,thatisspecifictoa
particulartypeofevent.Visitingrestaurantsisastereotypedactivity:weknowwhattoexpectasfarasphysicalaccoutrementslikechairsandtablesareconcerned
weknowthat,onorderingfood,itnormallyarrivesatthetableweknowthatrestaurantpatronsnormallyeat(atleastsomeof)whattheyorderandweknowthat
theynormallypaytheirbillwhenfinished.Thelanguageprocessorcanbethoughtofasworkinginteractively

Page453

withascriptofthissort.Wherethestoryfitsthecharacteristicsoftheconventionalscript,theprocessorworksasusualbutwhenelementsofthescriptarenot
representedbysentencesinthestory,theyareautomaticallyfilledinbyascriptimplementingmechanismthataugmentsthemoreskeletallinguisticrepresentation.
InearlyworkSchankandhisstudentswroteaScriptApplierMechanism(SAM)programthattreatedworldknowledgeaboutparticularsituationsasstereotyped,
selfcontaineddatastructures.Itisplausibletoassumethatsomeelementsofscriptknowledgeentailothersubscripts.Forinstance,onemightassumethatthereisa
subscriptinvolvingpaymentincommercialestablishmentsthataccountsfortheinferencethatthecustomerpaidherbill.Butitisalsoclearthatthenotionofafixed
scripthassomeseverelimitations.Considerastorylike(22),citedbySchank(1984,146):
(22)

Johnwantedmoney.Hegotagunandwalkedintoaliquorstore.He

toldtheownerhewantedsomemoney.TheownergaveJohnthe

moneyandJohnleft.

Hereagain,thereaderunderstandsthatJohndidnotintendtopurchaseanything,thathethreatenedtheownerwiththegun,thattheownergavehimthemoney
unwillingly,andthatJohninfactrobbedthestore.SchanknotesthatSAMtypemodelsrequiresituationspecificscripts(inthiscase,somekindof"robbery"script)
andobservesthat,onhisaccount,aspeakerwouldhavetoknowtheparticularscriptinordertounderstandthestory.Manyspeakers,hesuggests,willnothavehad
theexperiencenecessarytoacquiresuchascript,yetanycompetentspeakershouldbeabletounderstandastorylike(22),completewithitsinferences.Amore
adequatemodel,then,wouldhavetobeabletogeneralizefromalreadyacquiredscriptstonewones,ortomodifiedversionsoforiginalstereotypicalscripts.Sucha
modelclearlyrequiresoverarchingprinciplesofknowledgerepresentationthatarefarmorepowerfulthanthestaticdatastructuresoflocalscripts.
Schankandhiscoworkershavedevelopedanumberofelegantprogramsthatattempttoincorporatesuchprinciples.Forinstance,recentprogramsinthisparadigm
areabletoincorporatenewknowledgeinwaysthatbreakdownsomeofthestereotypedrigidityofthescriptscheme.Butevenwithamorepowerfulinference
generatoranda(limited)capacityforlearning,itshouldbeapparentthatthemodelstillrequiresanastronomicalnumberofbasicscriptsinordertoaccountforthe
interactionbetweengeneralknowledgeandlanguageunderstanding.Moreover,asSchankandBimbaum(1984)suggest,scriptbasedknowledge(whateverits
particularcharacter)maynotbeindependentofgeneralmemory.TheyciteBower,Black,andTurner(1979),whohaveobservedthatsubjectsconfuseeventsthat
transpireinsimilarscripts.Theyalsoobservethatmemoriesofinstanceswhenascriptisviolatedoftenariseonotheroccasionswhenaneventdoesnotgoaccording
toscript.Forinstance,whenwereadastoryaboutarestaurantcustomerwhofailstopayhisbill,wemayberemindedofsimilaranecdotesthatinformour
understandingofthestory.Sinceviolationsare,bydefinition,not"partofthescript,"theseinvestigatorsconcludethatscriptsmustbeintegratedinmemorywithother
information.
Tocircumventsomeoftheselimitations,othersystemshavebeendevelopedthatrecruitamoreabstractclassofknowledgestructures.Oneexampleisthethematic
affectunit(TAU)ofDyerandLehnert(1980).DyerandLehnertattempt,amongotherthings,tocapturethekindofgeneralcommonsenseinferentialmechanisms
thatareimplicitineverydayadagesandproverbs.Thus,onhearingastoryabouta

Page454

multimilliondollarbridgethatcollapsedbecauseitsbuildersusedcheaprivets,thelistenermayconcludethatitwouldnothavedonesohadthecontractorused
higherqualitymaterial."Pennywiseandpoundfoolish,"onemightsay.Butonhearinganotherstory,thistimeaboutanexpensiveluxurycar,repletewithothersafety
devices,whoseinexpensiveandinadequateseatbeltsledtoahighfatalityrateinaccidents,thelistenermightunderstanditinthesameway.Sincethetwosituationsare
quitedifferentintheirdetailsandvocabulary,whatisneededisahigherordermechanismaTAUthatencodestheplanningassumptionsoftheproverbsothatitcan
applytoarangeofrelevantstories.Furthermore,Dyer(1981)reportsonexperimentalworksuggestingthatTAUsmayalsoberealmentalorganizingprinciples,aside
fromtheirroleinfacilitatingmachineunderstandingoflanguage:inastudybySeifert(1980),subjectsgroupedstoriestogetherthatsharedaTAUevenwhentheir
contentsweredistinct.
11.6Production
Wenowturntotherelatedandimportantquestionoflanguageproduction,theoutputsideofprocessing.Muchofwhatisknownaboutperceptionisrelevantto
productionaswell.Grammaticalknowledgemustplayanimportantroleinproduction.Sincethevastmajorityofactualutterancesarewellformedbutnovel
sentences,itisreasonabletoconcludethatspeakersareguidedbyrule,inthesensediscussedinchapter6.Moreover,context,generalknowledge,thediscourse
situation,andthespeaker'smotivationsanddispositionsclearlyplayaverylargeroleinproduction,sincespeakersdonotproduceutterancesinavacuum.
Consequently,languagegenerationisthoughttobeguidedbyavastcomplexofdiscourseprinciples,socialandsociolinguisticinformation,generalknowledge,and
idiosyncraticfactorsrelevanttoindividualspeakers.Still,atthisjuncturelittleisunderstoodabouttheexactprocessesthatusethiskindofinformationinthe
productionofutterancesinordinarylife.Certainly,notheoreticalmodelisclosetobeingabletopredictthethingsthatspeakerswillsayinagivencircumstance.
Indeed,thismaybeasintractableaproblemaspredictingthebehaviorofanindividualhumanbeingorofsocialgroupsatlarge.
ComputerModelsofLanguageProduction
Despitetheoveralldifficultyofexplaininglinguisticproduction,someprogresshasbeenmadeindevelopinglanguagegeneratingsystemsasapracticaloutgrowthof
researchinAI.QUALM,forinstance,aquestionansweringsystemdesignedbyLehnert(1981),isaimedatenablingacomputerprogramnotonlytoreadand
understandstories(likeSAM)butalsotoanswerquestionsabouttheminnaturallanguage.Indeed,thereisarelativelylonghistoryofeffortsatmakingcomputers
"talk,"oratleastprovidingthesemblanceofanactivelanguageproducingcapacity.Thefieldofnaturallanguagegenerationhasreceivedagreatdealofattentionfrom
computerscientistsbecause,manybelieve,theidealformofinteractionbetweenhumansandcomputersshouldbeinanordinarylanguage,avoidingtheneedtouse
specializedprotocolsorartificiallanguagesincommunicatingwithcomputersandinstructingthemtoperformtasks.Weizenbaum'swellknownELIZAprogram,
developedinthe1970s,isanearlyexample.ELIZAisasimulationofaRogerianpsychotherapist,capableofaskingitsinterlocutorsrelevantquestionsandofmaking
promptingremarksthatrelatetothe"patient's"owndiscourse:

Page455

(23)

"Patient":I'mnotfeelingveryhappytoday.
ELIZA:Tellmewhyyou'renotfeelinghappy.

Asakindof"parlorgame,"ELIZAiseffectiveandcompelling.Forawhile,atleast,ELIZA'sinterlocutorsareoftenconvincedthattheyarecommunicatingwitha
humanbeing.ButinmostanysustainedinteractionwithELIZA,itbecomesapparentthatvirtuallyallofitsresponsesareeither"canned"ordirectlycuedbyasingle
wordorphraseintheinterlocutor'sremarks.Furthermore,suchsystemsoftenhavesmalllexiconsrestrictedtoalimiteddiscoursedomain,andtypicallytheyrespond
tounknownwordswiththe(alltoofrequent)messageIDON'TUNDERSTAND(word).Languagegeneratingsystemsofthissortwerebuiltintopopulartextbased
computergameswiththevirtueofenablingsomenaturallanguageinteractionbetweenhumanusersandcomputers.Buttheyarenot,onthewhole,goodmodelsof
normalhumanlanguageproduction.
Moresophisticatedlanguagegenerationmodelsforinstance,theTEXTsystemofMcKeown(1985)useschemas(scripts)andsemanticnetrepresentationsto
provideaknowledgebaseandestablishacoherentdiscoursecontextinwhichsentences(oftenanswerstoquestions)areproduced.Asconversationsproceedand
thesetofappropriateresponsesbecomesmorevaried,TEXTalsousesafocusingmechanismtodeterminethemostrelevantresponse.Itdoesthisbytrackingthe
syntacticstructureoftheinterlocutor'ssentences,lookingforcluessuchastopicalizationorpassivemorphology.Thesystemthenlimitsthechoiceofresponsesothat
itisappropriatetothecenterofthespeaker'sattention.Thus,tothequestionDocatshuntbirds?alikelyresponsemightbeYes,becausecatsarepredatoryby
nature.ButtothequestionArebirdshuntedbycats?theanswermightwellbeYes,becausebirdsarethenaturalpreyofcats.Thecontentoftheseanswers
would,ofcourse,dependontheparticularpropertiesofbirdsandcatsthatareincludedintheknowledgebase,andthefocusingmechanismdependsstronglyona
parsingmodulethatcanderivefocusinformationfromlinguisticstructure.Thelatterproblemisthetargetofmuchcurrentresearchwithinlinguistictheoryitisaneven
morecomplexproblemwhentheinputisphonologicalratherthanwritten(forexample,incaseswherethefocusofattentionisdefinedbyacousticcuessuchas
intonationorloudness).Successfullyimplemented,thiskindofsystempromisestoaddsignificantlytothenaturalnessofcomputergeneratedconversation.
TheKAMPsystemofAppelt(1985),andrelatedapproaches,dealwiththeproblemoflanguagegenerationfromasomewhatdifferentpointofview.Implicitin
KAMP(KnowledgeandModalitiesPlanner)istheassumptionthatlanguagegenerationbearsastrongrelationshiptoplanningmechanismsingeneralcognitionand
action.Plansareprocessesthatdefineandregulatetheorderinwhichaseriesofactionstowardaparticulargoalarecarriedout.Itisnotunreasonabletothinkofa
linguisticdiscourse(onthepartofeitherparticipant,actingasspeakerorhearer)asasetofplanstorequest,toorder,ortoinform.KAMPplansspeechacts,rather
thanactionsintherealworld.Insodoing,itisinpartguidedbypragmaticconstraintsofthesortdiscussedearlier,inthatitisdesignedtogenerateutterancesthatare
(atleast)relevant,truthful,andinformativewithrespecttoagivenplan.AskedWhattimedoesthetraintoNewHavenleave?,aspeechactbasedsystemlike
KAMPwillinterprettheutterancenotonlyasaquestionbutalsoastheinitialstepinaplantoacquireinformationfortravel.Inotherwords,inadditiontotakingthe
questiontobearequestandrespondingrelevantly,itwillprovideotherinformationthatisbothtrueandrelevanttoatravel

Page456

plan(forexample,timetableinformationthatmaycontainnotonlythedeparturetimebutalsothenumberofthetrackonwhichthetrainleaves),becausesuchplans
requirethatinformationaswell,atlaterstages.Asaresult,thediscoursethatspeechactbasedlanguagegeneratingsystemsproducecanhavesomeofthefeelof
naturallinguisticinteraction.
HumanLanguageProductionandtheRoleofGrammar
Ofcourse,itisnotenoughforacomputertomodelthediscourseconditionsofspeech,sincenolanguagegeneratingsystemwill"feelnatural"unlesstheutterances
thatitproducesarealsogrammaticalsentencesofthelanguageinvolved.Robotsthatspeakinamechanicalmonotone,withoutstressorintonationcontours,donot
meetthatcriterion.NordocomputersthatusesimplifiedtelegraphicutteranceslikeFilesavedorInsertdisknow.Nor,forthatmatter,dosystemslikeELIZA,
whichrelyonasmallsetofprecompiledsyntacticstructuresanddonotrecognizeinfinitelymanymembersoftheinfinitelylargesetofsentencestructuresthat
characterizeanyhumanlanguage.Although(aswehaveseen)thereismuchdebateaboutthecentralityandeventhenecessityoflinguisticgrammarsintheperception
andprocessingoflanguage,thereismuchlessdoubtthatlanguagegenerationmustincorporateagrammar,orsomeequivalentknowledgesystem(perhapsa
connectionistmodel),thatisalso,inprinciple,fullycapableofcharacterizingthesetofgrammaticalsentencesinagivenlanguage.Howeverpossibleitmaybeto
understandlanguagewithoutrecoursetogrammar,itdoesnotseempossibletoconstrainlanguageproductionbymeaningorbycontextinwaysthatwouldguarantee
linguisticallywellformedoutput.
Curiously,perhaps,relativelylittlescientificattentionhasbeenpaidtohumanlanguageproduction.Inpart,thismaybebecausetheinitialstageofproductionthe
generationoftheintentions,thoughts,andemotionsthatareultimatelyencodedinlanguageremainsdeeplymysterious.Butiftheinputtotheproductionsystemis
opaquetous,theoutputisreadilyobservableintheformofactualspeech.Byworkingbackwardinasense,itisstillpossibletomakesomeimportantifindirect
inferencesabouttherolethatgrammarsandlinguisticstructuresplayintheplanningandproductionofspeech.
Infact,paradoxically,muchofwhatweknowabouttheproductionofnormal,naturalspeechderivesfromthestudyofabnormalspeechtheerrorsthatare
commonlyproducedevenbyfluentspeakers.Althoughnaturalspeechlargelyconformstothegeneralizationsthatlinguistshavediscerned,virtuallyallspeakerson
occasionexhibitaricharrayofdysfluenciesandmistakes.Thesespeecherrorscanoffersubstantialinsightintotherepresentationandorganizationoflinguistic
knowledge.First,thereisevidencethatlanguageproductionrecruitsthekindofhierarchicalrepresentationsthatarehypothesizedwithintheoriesofgrammar,atboth
thephonologicalandsyntacticlevels,ratherthanproceedinginastrictlylinear,wordbywordfashion.Forexample,considerthekindoferrorthatisrepresentedby
classicalspoonerisms,ortranspositionsoftheinitialsegmentsofwords,asinqueerolddeanfordearoldqueen.Whilethespeakerpreparestoinitiatethephrase,
intendingtosaythefirstword,the(/d/initial)adjectivedear,the/kw/initialnounqueenhasalreadybeenreadied,andthespeakerretrievesitsinitialsegmentsinan
anticipatoryerror.Sucherrorsarequitegenerallyconfinedtoanticipationswithinasinglelinguisticconstituent,inthiscaseanounphrase.Bythesametoken,such
transpositionscaninvolvephonemesfromthesamepositioninthehierarchicalsyllablestructureofthewordsinvolvedboth/d/

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and/kw/aresyllableonsets.Speakersvirtuallynevertransposesoundsbetweenasyllableonsetandasyllablecoda,whichwouldresultin nearoldqueed.Another
caseistheonecitedbyGarrett(1988),whereaspeakerproducestheutteranceanangwagelacquisitiondeviceforalanguageacquisitiondevice.Herethe
initial/l/oflanguagehasbeentransposedintothesyllableonsetpositionofacquisition.Whatisstrikingaboutthisexampleisthatthephoneticformoftheindefinite
article(aoran),whichdependsonwhetherthefollowingnounbeginswithavoweloraconsonant,musthavebeendeterminedafterthetranspositionerrorwas
made.
*

Theseobservationssuggestthatstructuresdefinedbygrammars,andrulesofgrammar,areactive,online,andcentralintheplanningofproduction.Morespecifically,
theysuggestthattherearemultiplelevelsintheproductionprocess.Garrett(1975,1984,1988)proposesamodelwiththreesuchlevels:amessagelevelatwhich
theunderlyingintentionandmeaningoftheutterancearedetermined,afunctionallevelatwhichlexicalitemsarechosenandassignedasyntacticstructure,anda
positionallevelatwhichthefinalorderandpositionofelementsarefixed.OnGarrett'sview,itisthepositionalrepresentationthatprovidestheinputtothe
articulatorymechanismsthatgenerateaphoneticoutput.
Therearealsocasesinwhichalexicalitemasawholeissubjecttoproductionerror.Weoftenhearspeakersinadvertentlyreplaceanintendedwordwithanotherone
towhichitissemanticallyrelated:IputthedogoutforIputthecatout,andThemoonisshiningforThesunisshining.Butitisrareindeedtohearspeakers
erroneouslyproducesentenceslikeIranoutofstalagmiteswhenIranoutofeggswasintended.Sucherrorsareconsistentwithamodelofthementaldictionaryin
whichlexicalitemsareorganizedaccordingtosemanticcategoryitisalsocompatiblewithconnectionistmodelsoflexicalrepresentationwheresemanticrelatednessis
capturedbyassumingnodeconnectionswithhighlevelsofactivation.
Erroneouslexicalsubstitutionsmayalsoinvolvesomedegreeofphonologicalsimilarity,inwhichcasetheyareoftencalledmalapropisms.Thus,aspeakerata
philanthropicdinnerwasreportedtosayThankyouforthelovelyrecession,whenThankyouforthelovelyreceptionwasintended.Malapropismsoftenstrikeus
asamusing,becausethewordproducedinerrormaysharelittleifanysemanticrelationtotheintendedtargetwordandmaybestrikinglyinappropriate.Rather,as
FayeandCutler(1977)observe,malapropismssharesegmental,syllabic,andrhythmicpropertieswiththewordstheyreplace,andtheyarealsoinvariablyofthe
samesyntacticcategory.Thisphenomenonsuggestsamodelofthementallexiconinwhichphonologicalinformationplaysanimportantroleatmanylevels.Production
errorcreepsinwhenthesectionofthelexiconcontainingtheintendedwordhasbeencorrectlyaccessed,buttheretrievalmechanism"slips"andpicksupanitem
whosephonologicalrepresentationisclosetothatoftheintendedword,butnotatpreciselytherightaddress.
Socalledtipofthetonguephenomenasuggestarelatedformoflexicalproductiondifficulty.Inthesecasesspeakersreportknowingaword'smeaningbutcannot
recallitsfullphoneticform.Nonetheless,thespeakertypicallyhasapowerfulsenseofknowingwhatthewordis,canoftenidentifyitsinitialsegment,andcanreport
thecorrectnumberofsyllablesandtheword'soverallprosodicpattern.Thespeakerisintherightsemanticspaceinthelexicon,typicallyknowswhatsyntactic
categoryisinvolved,andevenhasaccesstocertainpartsofphonologicalrepresentation,butcannotretrieveinformationaboutthecompletesegmentalformofthe
word.

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Takenasawhole,aconsiderationoferrorssuchasslipsofthetongue,lexicalsubstitutions,malapropisms,andtipofthetonguephenomenaconveysapictureof
productionthatinvolvesmanylevelsofprocessingandrecruitssomeratherabstractpropertiesoflinguisticrepresentation.
11.7Conclusion
Ontheviewthatwehavedevelopedhere,naturallanguageprocessingisaremarkablycomplexphenomenon.Wehaveexaminedandfoundmuchsupportforthe
viewthatcomprehensioninvolvesaspecial,modularparsingsystemthatdependscruciallyongrammaticalrepresentationsandoperatesindependentlyofother
componentsoflanguageprocessingandofgeneralknowledge.Butwehavealsoseenevidencethatthepragmaticfunctionsforwhichsentencestructuresareused
mayalsoplayaroleinsentenceunderstanding,aswellasa(perhapslarger)roleinthecomprehensionofdiscourses.Forinstance,theprocessormustassesstheroles
ofdistinctspeechacttypes,inthelightofatheoryofconversationalconventions.Wealsosawthatlanguageunderstandingingeneral,evenifnottheinitialstagesof
processing,dependsstronglyoninteractionswithgeneralknowledgeabouttheworld.Finally,weexaminedissuesinlanguageproduction(incomputermodelsaswell
asinhumanspeakers)thatsuggestanimportantroleforbothgrammaticalandworldknowledge.Theremayalsobeahostofotherfactors,aboutwhichwehavesaid
verylittle,thatinfluencelanguageprocessing.Manyotheraspectsofourmentallives(forinstance,ourbeliefsystems,humor,empathy,creativedrives,andemotional
states)areobviouslydeeplysignificantintheprocessoflanguageunderstandingandproduction.Still,givencurrentstatesofknowledge,theseissuesarenotfully
understood.Oneimportantmoralforthestudentofcognitivescienceisthattheenterpriseofexplainingthesecomplexlyintertwinedcomponentscouldhardlybe
carriedoutbyworkerswithinasinglefield.Itisonlythroughasynthesisoftheeffortsoflinguists,psychologists,AIresearchers,andphilosophersthatweare
beginningtomakeanyrealprogressincomprehendingthemechanismsresponsiblefortheprocessingandproductionofnaturallanguage.
SuggestedReadings
Forabroadintroductiontoissuesinlanguageprocessing,seethegeneralintroductorytextPsycholinguistics(FossandHakes1978).ComputersandHuman
Language(Smith1991)providesanintroductoryoverviewofcurrentworkonlanguageprocessingfromacomputationalviewpoint,includingrecentworkonAI.For
someexamplesoftheprofessionalliteratureonparsingwithanemphasisontheroleofgrammar,seeNaturalLanguageParsing(Dowty,Karttunen,andZwicky
1985).GettingComputerstoTalklikeYouandMe(Reichman1985)offersanextensivediscussionoftheroleofdiscourseandpragmaticsinlanguageprocessing.
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Allen,J.,andC.R.Perrault(1980).Analysingintentioninutterances.ArtificialIntelligence15,143178.

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Appelt,D.(1985).Planningnaturallanguageutterancestosatisfymultiplegoals.Doctoraldissertation,UniversityofToronto.
Austin,J.L.(1962).Howtodothingswithwords.Oxford:ClarendonPress.
Bever,T.G.(1970).Thecognitivebasisforlinguisticstructures.InJ.R.Hayes,ed.,Cognitionandthedevelopmentoflanguage.NewYork:Wiley.
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language.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
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Press.
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Joshi,A.,B.Webber,andI.Sag,eds.(1981).Elementsofdiscourseunderstanding.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Labov,W.(1972).Rulesforritualinsults.InW.Labov,ed.,Languageintheinnercity.Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress.
Lehnert,W.G.(1981).Humanquestionanswering.InJoshi,Webber,andSag1981.
Marr,D.(1982).Vision.NewYork:W.H.Freeman.
McKeown,K.R.(1985).Textgeneration:Usingdiscoursestrategiesandfocusconstraintstogeneratenaturallanguagediscourse.Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress.
Reichman,R.(1985).Gettingcomputerstotalklikeyouandme.Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress.
Schank,R.(1984).Thecognitivecomputer.Reading,Mass.:AddisonWesley.
Schank,R.,andR.Abelson(1977).Scripts,plans,goalsandunderstanding:Aninquiryintohumanknowledgestructures.Hillsdale,N.J.:Erlbaum.
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Seifert,C.M.(1980).PreliminaryexperimentsonTAUs.Ms.,YaleUniversity,NewHaven,Conn.
Smith,G.W.(1991).ComputersandHumanLanguage.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
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Tanenhaus,M.K.,G.N.Carlson,andM.S.Seidenberg(1985).Dolistenerscomputelinguisticrepresentations?InDowty,Karttunen,andZwicky1985.
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Winograd,T.(1972).Understandingnaturallanguage.NewYork:AcademicPress.

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Chapter12
Vision
12.1TheProblemofVision
TheInputtotheVisualSystem
Visionispossiblebecausethelightreflectedfromphysicalsurfacesisapotentialsourceofinformationaboutthephysicalworld.Thelightenteringeacheyepasses
throughthecorneaandlens,whichfocusitintoatwodimensionalimageontherearoftheeyeball,muchlikeacameralensfocusesanimageontofilm.The
fundamentalinformationprocessingtaskofthehumanvisualsystemistoextractinformationaboutthethreedimensionalphysicalworldfromthisconstantlychanging
pairoftwodimensionalimages.
Formally,animageissimplyatwodimensionalarrayofvalues.Eachpointontheimagehasaspatialpositionthatcanberepresentedbytwocoordinatevaluesxand
y(thepoint(0,0)canbeconsideredthecenteroftheimage).TheintensityofthelightateachpointintheimagecanberepresentedbyI(x,y).Thus,intensityisa
functionofspatialposition.IfI(x,y)=0,thennolightispresentatpoint(x,y).IfI(x,y)>0,thenlightispresent,andincreasingvaluesofIrepresentincreasing
intensity,orluminance.
Inthehumanvisualsystemtheinitialencodingoftheimageoccursintheretina,alayerofneuralcellsattherearoftheeyeball.Theretinacontainsatwodimensional
layerofsensorycells,calledrodsandcones,whicharesensitivetolight.Eachofthesecellsisatransducerthatiscapableofgeneratinganeuralsignalwhenstruck
bylight.Asafirstapproximation,theactivityinthesensorycellscanbeconsideredadirect,analogrepresentationoftheimagecurrentlyfocusedonthecells.Thatis,
ateachmomentthesensorycellsrecordthevalueI(x,y)ataverylarge,butfinite,numberofpoints.Thisapproximationhelpsusfocusonthecontributionsof
interdisciplinaryvisionresearch,althoughitdisregardsanumberoffascinatingcomplexitiesintheresponsesoftherodsandconestolight,whichallowthehumaneye
torespondtoanenormousrangeofintensitiesandtoseecolors(Cornsweet1970).
Inordertoappreciatethestaggeringcapabilitiesofthehumanvisualsystemandtheproblemfacedbytheresearcherwhowishestounderstandit,theausterityofthe
imagemustbeappreciated.Althoughtheimageinsomesensecontainstheinformationneededtoseeobjectsinspace,onlyintensityvaluesatpointsareexplicitly
representedintheimage.Allotherinformationmustbebuiltupbyprocessesthatbegintheirworkontheseintensityvalues.Figure12.1illustratesthispoint
graphically.Part(a)ofthefigureisapicture.Whenthepictureisdeliveredtothevisualsystemintheformofreflectedlight,thevisualsystemperformsitsinformation
processes,andweseetheobjectsinthepictureclearly.Part(b)ofthefigureisacomputerprintoutofthenumericalintensityvaluesinaregionofthefigure.Whenthe
pictureisdeliveredintheformofanarrayofnumericalintensityvalues,itisimpossibletoimmediately

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Figure12.1
Invisualsystemsanimageisinitiallyrepresentedasatwodimensional
arrayofintensityvalues.(a)isaphotographoftheimageofascene
displayedonthemonitorscreenofacomputer.Atelevisioncamerawas
focusedonthescene,andtheoutputofthecamerawasconvertedinto
anarrayofintensityvalues,whichwerestoredinthecomputer.The
computerthenconvertedtheintensityarraybackintoatelevisionsignal,
whichwasdisplayedonthemonitorandphotographed.(b)isaprintout
oftheintensityvaluesintherectangularregionhighlightedinthephotograph.

discernthecontentofthepicture.Yetintensityvaluesarewhatvisualinformationprocessingbeginswith.
Computervisionsystemsalsotakeimagearraysastheirinput.Theintensityvaluesinfigure12.1wereprintedoutfromanimagearraystoredinacomputer'smemory.
Thevaluesinthearraywereformedbyhookingatelevisioncamerauptothecomputerandpointingthecameraatthescenepicturedinpart(a)ofthefigure.The
computerrapidlysamplesthesignalcomingoutofthecameratoformanimagearray.Inthiscasethearrayhas512 512=262,144points(sometimescalledpixels
for''pictureelements'').Part(a)ofthefigureisaphotographofaredisplayoftheimagearrayonatelevisionscreen,showingthata512 512arraycapturesenough
informationforthehumanvisualsystemtoidentifyobjectsandperceivetheirspatialrelations.Itshouldberealized,however,thatthehumanretinacontainsabout126
millionsensorycells(about500timesthenumberofpixelsinthecomputerimage).Furthermore,thehumansystemcancontinuouslyprocesstheimageregisteredby
thesecellsrapidlyenoughtosupportvisualskillssuchasreadingordrivingacar.Thisefficiencyislargelyduetotheparallelstructureofthevisualsystem.Until
recently,computervisionsystemswereforcedtosimulatethisparallelism.Asaresult,computervision

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Figure12.1(cont.)

systemstookfromminutestohourstoprocessasingleimage.Manycurrentcomputervisionsystemsnowincorporateasignificantdegreeofparallelismatthe
hardwarelevel,makingthemmoreefficientandpractical.Ourinterestincomputervisionhere,however,isnotinitspracticalitybutinitspotentialtotesthypotheses
aboutbiologicalvision.
TheOutputoftheVisualSystem
Althoughunderstandingtheoutputofthevisualsysteminformaltermsisthetargetofongoingresearch,ourperceptualexperiencegivesusareasonableinitialideaof
thecognitivefunctionsthattheoutputmustsupport.Wecandifferentiatetheobjectsinavisualscene.Weareawareoftheirpositionsinspace,theirmotions,their
sizes,theirshapes,andtheirsurfacetextures.Weareawareofourmovementsinspaceandcanguidethemsoastoregulatespeed,reachspatialgoals,andavoid
collisions.Weareabletorecognizeobjectsandplacesthatwehaveseenbefore.Therefore,theoutputofthevisualsystemmustinsomewaybestorableinmemory.
Wearealsoabletojudgethatanovelobjectissimilartoonewehaveseenbeforeorthatitfitsacategorythathasbeendefinedpropositionally.Therefore,theoutput
ofthesystemmustlenditselftocategorizationprocessesandtocomplexinterfacingwithothercognitivesystems.

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12.2LowLevelVisualProcesses
Theresearchproblem,then,istodiscoverinformationprocessesthatcangetfromanintensityarrayI(x,y)torepresentationsthatsupporthighlyflexiblevisual
cognitionandbehavior.Itisnowgenerallyagreedthatsimpleprocessesworkingonintensityvaluescannotrecovertheoutputinformationdirectly.Thisconclusionhas
arisenfromcomputationalworkonvisionaswellasfromworkontheanatomyandphysiologyofbiologicalvisualsystems.Computationalstudiesusuallydividethe
problemofvisionintoanumberofsomewhatindependentsubtasks,eachofwhichrequirestheextractionandrefinementofinformationatseveralsuccessivelevelsof
analysis.Thesubtaskscanbepursuedinparallel,althoughtheiroutputsareusuallyassumedtocooperateatvariouspointsinthesystemtosettleonsomeaspectof
thedevelopingrepresentation.
IssuesintheTheoryofLowLevelVision
Researchonlowlevelvisionisconcentratedondiscoveringwhatinformationabouttheworldcanbeinitiallyextractedfromtheimage.Animmediatequestionis
whetherbottomupprocessesthattakeimagedataasinputsmustbeguidedbytopdownexpectationsaboutwhatispresentintheimage.Wewillbeginwiththe
assumptionthatagreatdealofusefulinformationcanbeextractedfromtheimagebybottomupprocessingalone.ThisviewwasfirstdevelopedfullyinAlbyDavid
Marr(1982)andinpsychologybyJ.J.Gibson(1966),althoughGibsondidnotutilizethecomputationalframeworkindevelopinghisideas(FodorandPylyshyn
1981).Regardlessofitslimits,thebottomupviewisanextremelyusefulheuristicforresearchonlowlevelprocessing,becauseitforcestheresearchertostudythe
informationcontentofimagesintensively.
Researchonlowlevelvisionhasbeenguidedbyseveralassumptions.Awidelyacceptedassumptionisthatearlyvisualcomputationishighlyparallelandlocal.That
is,allareasoftheimageareworkedonsimultaneously,andthecomputationsoneachpointintheimageareaffectedonlybycomputationsonimmediatelyadjacent
areasandnotbycomputationsondistantpartsoftheimage.Astrongsourceofsupportforthisassumptionistheanatomicalandelectrophysiologicalstudyofthe
visualsystem.Theretinaandtheprimaryvisualcortexseemtobewireduptoperformlocal,parallelcomputations.
Asecondassumptionisthatearlyvisualcomputationhasamodularorganization.Theimagecontainsseveraldistinctsourcesofinformation,andeachtypeof
informationcanberepresentedindependentlyandatleastpartiallyextractedbyanindependentcomputationalmechanism.Forexample,thereareseveralsourcesof
informationaboutdepth,orthedistanceofanobjectfromtheobserver.Onesourceisstereopsis.Becausethetwoeyesarelocatedintwodifferentpositionsinthe
head,eacheyegetsaslightlydifferentviewofanobject.Thisdifference,calledthebinoculardisparity,isasourceofinformationaboutdepth,becausetheamountof
disparityissystematicallycorrelatedwiththedistanceoftheobjectfromtheviewer.Computingthedisparityvaluesforapairofimages,however,requiresmatching
eachpointinoneimagewiththecorrespondingpointintheother.Therearemanypotentialmatchesforanyonepoint,andthecomputationmustsomehowfindthe
bestglobalsetofmatchesforthewholeimage.Theresearcherexploringthebottomup,modularapproachwouldattempttodevelopalgorithmsthatcancomputethe
disparityofeachpointinthe

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image,withoutmakinguseofothersourcesofinformation,andwouldattempttofindpsychologicalandphysiologicalevidencethatdisparitycomputationsareindeed
modularinthehumanvisualsystem.
Anothersourceofinformationaboutdepthcomesfromthemotionofobjectsintheworld.Whenanobjectmoves,itsimageisspatiallydisplacedontheretina.
Certaincharacteristicsofthedisplacementoftheimagearesystematicallycorrelatedwithdepth.Togiveasimpleexample,iftheimageoftheobjectexpands,the
objectismovingtowardtheviewer,andiftheimagecontracts,theobjectismovingawayfromtheviewer.Toappreciatethefactthatthissourceofinformationis
potentiallyindependentofstereopsisinformation,notethatonlyoneeyeisneededtoregisterit.Theresearcherexploringthebottomup,modularapproachwould
attempttodevelopalgorithmsthatcanextractdepthinformationfromdisplacementintheimageandtodiscoverpsychologicalandneurophysiologicalevidencethat
depthisrecoveredfromdisplacementinformationindependentlyfromothersourcesofdepthinformation.Iftheevidenceindicatesthatthevariousdepthcomputations
arenotcompletelymodular,orindependent,thentheresearchercanexplorewaysofintroducingcooperationamongthecomputationssothattheymutuallyconstrain
eachotherduringcomputation.Insomecasesfurtherconstraintsarisingfromthetopdownflowofhighlevelinformationmightbehypothesized.
Athirdassumptionguidingresearchonlowlevelprocessesisthatthephysicsofimageformationconstrainsthestructureofimagesinsuchawaythatbottomup
processescanbeinformative.Thelowlevelprocessescantakeadvantageofthefactthatthephysicsofimageformationnormallyensurescertaincorrelations
betweenpropertiesoftheworldandpropertiesoftheimage.Toputitanotherway,thephysicspreventsthebreakdownofthesecorrelationsundernormal
conditions.Supposewelivedinaworldwhereobjectsregularlyexpandedandcontractedinasmoothmanner,ratherlikeballoonsthatcouldspontaneouslytakeon
andletoutair.Insuchaworldopticalflowwouldnotbeareliablesourceofdepthinformation.Theexpansionofanobject'simageontheretinawouldsometimes
signalitsapproachtowardtheviewerandwouldsometimessignalthatitwastakingonair,whileremainingstationary.Butwedonotliveinsuchaworld.Fewobjects
inourworldundergofrequent,smoothinflationordeflation.Thus,theassumptionthatopticalflowgivesreliableinformationaboutdepthcanbebuiltintoavisual
system.OnepieceofevidencethattheassumptionisbuiltintothehumanvisualsystemcomesfromanexperimentbyIttelsonandKilpatrick(1958)inwhichhuman
viewersmistooktheexpansionandcontractionofstationaryballoonsfortheapproachandretreatofballoonsofconstantsize.Animportantconsequenceoftheview
thatthevisualsystemisadaptedtophysicalconstraintsisthatresearchinvisionshouldinpartbeastudyoftheseconstraints.
Finally,earlyvisionresearchmustbeguidedbysomeassumptionaboutwhattheoutputofearlyvisualprocessingis,thatis,aboutwhatrepresentationsitcomputes.
Thereislessagreementamongresearchersinthisareathanintheothers.Gibson(1966)assumedthatearlyvisualprocessesareabletodeterminethelayoutof
surfacesinthreedimensionalspace.Objectsareessentiallyvolumesenclosedbytwodimensionalsurfaces,andthegroundisessentiallyatwodimensionalsurface.
Thenotionofsurfacelayoutisthatthevisualsystemcansegregatethepointsinanimageintosurfaces.Foreachpointthatisamemberofagivensurface,thesystem
candetermineitsdistancefromtheviewerandtheorientationandcurvatureofthesurfaceatthatpoint.Thus,earlyvisualprocessesrepresentinformationsuchasthe
following:thepointat(x,y)on

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theimagerepresentsapointintheworldthatisfortyfeetdirectlyaheadlyingonaverticalplanarsurfacethatisrecedingtotheright.Theydonot,however,represent
moreglobalfacts,suchasthefollowing:thesurfaceistherightwallofatwostoryeighteenthcenturyNewEnglandfarmhouse.
Marr's(1982)theoryofthe2.5Dsketch(section12.3)representsahypothesisquitesimilartoGibson's.However,Marrproposedthatearlyvisualprocessesalso
computeanotherrepresentationcalledtheprimalsketch,whichGibsonprobablywouldhavearguedagainst.Theprimalsketchisarepresentationoflocalfeaturesof
animagethatarelikelytobereliableindicatorsofphysicalfeaturesoftheworld,suchaselongated,orientedblobs.
Marr'sTheoryofthePrimalSketch
Cognitivescientistsinterestedinintegratingresultsfrompsychology,AI,andneurophysiologyhavefoundMarr's(1976,1982)notionoftheprimalsketchtobeone
ofthemostinterestingproposalsconcerningtheearliestvisualprocesses.Wewilluseitasourexamplehere.Thetheorycontainsseveralparts,whichwewilldiscuss
inturn:(I)anaccountofthewaythatthephysicalpropertiesofsurfacesandreflectedlightdeterminetheinformationinimagesthatcanbeimmediatelyextractedby
lowlevelprocesses,(2)adetailedtheoryoftheveryearliestvisualprocesses,whichcomputewhatiscalledtherawprimalsketch,and(3)atheoryofgrouping
processesthatoperateontherawprimalsketchtoproducethefullprimalsketch.
TheInformationAvailableforEarlyVisualProcessesThevisibleworldiscomposedofphysicalsurfaces.Thestartingpointoftheprimalsketchtheoryisthat
muchoftheusefulinformationaboutsurfacesisencodedinchangesintheintensityofreflectedlight.Forexample,imaginetwovisiblesurfacesatdifferentorientations
thatmeetinanedge.Innearlyallsituationstheamountoflightreachingtheeyefromonesurfacewilldifferfromtheamountoflightreachingtheeyefromtheother.In
theimagetheedgewillshowupasalinedefinedbyasuddenchangeinintensity.Theideaisthatearlyvisionshouldbeorganizedtodetectandexplicitlyrepresent
suchinformationrichchangesinintensity.
Thetaskoflocating,representing,andinterpretingtheintensitychangesinanimageisnotsimple,however.Thestraightforwardexampleoftwosurfacesmeetingatan
edgeismisleading.Itisnotthecasethatallthelocalintensitychangesinanimageformgloballinesthatsignaltheboundariesofsurfacesintheworld.Thereare
severalreasonsforthis.
Onefactoristhatmanysuddenintensitychangesoccurwithinasurfacearearatherthanatitsboundaries.Thatis,surfacesarenotuniformlycolored.Rather,they
oftenhavevariouskindsofmarkingsortexture.Thegrainofawoodensurfaceortheindividualstonesonagraveldrivewillcausemanylocalchangesinintensityto
showuponanimagethatdonotsignalboundariesbetweenthemajorsurfacesinthescene.Thus,thevisualsystemcannotassumethateverylocalintensitychange
signalsanedge.
Afurtheraspectofsurfacemarkingsisthatthephysicalcompositionofasurfacecancausethelocalintensitychangestobeorganizedindifferentwaysatdifferent
spatialscales.Forexample,atthesmallestscaletheindividualthreadsinaherringbonetweedfabricarevisibleandgiverisetolocalintensitychangesinanimageof
thefabric.Ataslightlylargerspatialscaletheintensitychangesareorganizedintoshortdiagonal

Page467

linesegments,whichreflectthewayinwhichthreadsofdifferentcolorsareinterwoven.Atastilllargerspatialscaleparallelsetsofthesediagonallinesareorganized
intoverticalstripes.Note,however,thattheedgeofaverticalstripeisnotdefinedbyacontinuouschangefromdarktolight.Instead,theedgeisdefinedbythefact
thattheendsoftheparalleldiagonallinesareverticallyaligned.Thehumanvisualsystemeasilyregisterstheorganizationatthedifferentspatialscales,eventhoughonly
thesmallestscalecanbedefineddirectlyintermsofintensitychanges.Theimplicationisthatthetheorymustallowthelocalintensitychangesthatareinitiallypicked
uptobereorganizedatvariousspatialscalesbymoreabstractattributes,suchasthealignmentofterminations.
Asecondfactoristhatsomeimportantphysicalprocessesgiverisetogradualchangesinintensityratherthantothesuddenchangetypicaloftwoflatsurfacesmeeting
inasharpedge.Shadows,forexample,oftenhaveblurryedgesthatshowupinanimageasagradualchangeinintensity.Anotherexampleisthecurvedsurfaceofa
uniformlycoloredcylinderilluminatedfromonedirection.Theintensityoftheimageofsuchasurfacechangesgradually.Asystemthatonlydetectssharpchangesin
intensitywillmisssuchgradualchanges,whichsignalimportantaspectsofthephysicalworldsuchaschangesinilluminationandsurfaceorientation.
Theoverallconclusionisthatintensitychangesintheimageareabasicsourceofinformationforlowlevelvision.However,sincewedonotinhabitauniformly
illuminatedworldofsmooth,flatsurfacesthatmeeteachotheratcrispedges,ourvisualsystemscannotsimplylookonlyforsharpintensitychangesandinterpretthem
assurfaceboundaries.Intheactualphysicalworldthereareanumberofprocessesthatgiverisetointensitychanges.Thevisualsystemmustdetectbothrapidand
gradualchanges,anditmustrepresenttheminawaythatallowsvariousinterpretationstobemade.
ComputingConvolutionsByhypothesis,theearliestvisualprocesseslocateandrepresenttheintensitychangesintheimageusinglocalandparallelcomputations.A
localprocessmustbeabletodeterminewhetherthereisanintensitychangeatagivenpointintheimagebylookingonlyattheimmediate(local)spatialneighborhood
ofthatpoint.Theentireimagecanbeprocessedinparallelifthelocalprocessisperformedsimultaneouslyonallpointsintheimage.
Digitizedimagesmakeiteasytothinkintuitivelyaboutlocalprocessesfordetectingintensitychanges.Theimageisatwodimensionalarrayofpixels,eachofwhich
hasanintensityvalue.Tomakealocaldecisionaboutwhetherthereisanintensitychangeataparticularpixel,wemustrestrictourselvestoasmallwindowof
neighboringpixels.Figure12.2illustratesasimpleschemeforcomputingtheintensitychangesinanimage.Part(a)showsasmallpartofthedigitizedimageofadark
verticalbaronalightbackground.Supposewewantedtofindthepointsintheimagewheretheintensityvaluechangesinthehorizontaldirection(notethatinthis
imagetherearenointensitychangesintheverticaldirection).Asimplewaytodothisistotakethedifferencebetweeneachadjacentpairofpixelvalues,by
subtractingtheleftmemberofthepairfromtheright.Ifthetwointensityvaluesareequal,thedifferencewillbe0,indicatingnochange.Anegativedifferencesignalsa
decreaseinintensity,andapositivedifferencesignalsanincreaseinintensity.
Thiscomputationisconvenientlydescribedastheapplicationofafirstorderdifferenceoperatortoeachpixelintheimage.Ingeneral,anoperatorconsistsofa
fixed

Page468

Figure12.2
Computingconvolutions.(a)showsasmallportionofahypotheticalnoise
freedigitizedimageofathindarkbar(I=2)onalightbackground(I=8).
(b)showstheconvolutionarraythatresultsfromapplyingalocal,firstorder
operator(1,+1)totheimagetofindthegradientofintensityinthehorizontal
direction.Edgesintheimageappearaspositiveandnegativepeaksinthegradient
array.(c)showstheconvolutionarraythatresultsfromapplyingasecondorder
operator(1,+2,1)totheimagetofindthechangeintheintensitygradient.
Edgesintheimageappearaszerocrossingsinthisarray.Whenthewindowof
anoperatoroverlapstheedgeoftheimage,itsresultisshownasundefined()
in(b)and(c).

window,ormask,whichisplacedoverthepixeltobeprocessedandsomeofitsneighbors.Eachlocationinthewindowisassociatedwithaweight.Tocompute
thevalueoftheoperatorataparticularlocation,eachintensityvalueinthewindowismultipliedbyitsassociatedweight,andtheproductsareaddedup.Ourversion
ofthefirstorderdifferenceoperatorhasatwopixelwindowwithweightsof1and+1.The+1locationinthewindowisplacedoverthepixeltobeprocessedand
theweightedsumiscomputed,givingthedifferencebetweenthetwoadjacentintensityvalues.
Toexplicitlyrepresenttheresultsofapplyingalocaloperatortoeachpixelinanimagearray,wesimplycreateanewarray,replacingeachintensityvaluewiththe
valueoftheoperatoratthatpoint.Part(b)offigure12.2showsanarrayinwhichtheintensityvalueateachpointhasbeenreplacedbythefirstorderdifferenceat
thatpoint.Sucharraysareoftencalledconvolutionarraysbecause,mathematically,theyaretheresultoftakingtheconvolutionoftheintensityfunctionandthe
operator.Noticethatthedifferencearraycontainsnonzerovalueswhereverintensityischangingandzeroswhereitisnot.Thenonzerovaluesareadiscrete
approximationoftheslope,orfirstpartialderivative I/ x,oftheintensityfunctioninthehorizontaldirection.

Page469

Althoughthefirstorderdifference,orgradient,arrayisabletoexplicitlyrepresenttheedgesofthebarinoursimpleexample,itdoesnotdosowellincaseswherea
gradientisspreadoveraregionofspace.Inthiscasethegradientarraywillshowmanynonzerovalues,andthetransitionsbetweenimportantregionsoftheimagewill
besignaledbypeaks(maxima)andtroughs(minima)inthesenonzerovalues.Furtheroperationswouldhavetobeperformedonthegradientarraytofindand
representthepeaksandtroughs.Thetransitionsintheimagecanbefoundmoreeasilybycomputingthegradientofthegradient,usinganoperatorthattakesthe
differencebetweenadjacentfirstorderdifferences.Part(c)offigure12.2illustratesanoperatorforsuchsecondorderdifferencesinthehorizontaldirection.Peaks
andtroughsinthegradientshowupaszerocrossingsinthesecondorderconvolutionarray,whichisafiniteapproximationtothesecondpartialderivativeofthe
intensityfunction 2I/ x 2.Thezerocrossingsinthesecondorderarraycanbefoundrelativelyeasilybyanoperatorthatlooksforchangesinsign.
Computingconvolutionsonadigitalcomputerisstraightforward.Althoughparallelmachinesthatcancomputeconvolutionshavebeendeveloped,convolutionscan
alsobecomputedpointbypointonstandardserialcomputers.Onecanimaginesimplymovingtheoperatorwindowalongtheimagearrayfrompixeltopixeland
storingeachresultinanewconvolutionarray.Thecomputationoneachpixelvalueislogicallyindependentofthecomputationsonalltheothervalues,however,so
thatconvolutionscanbecomputedinparallel.Imagineeachintensityvalueintheimagearraytorepresentareceptorcellandeachvalueintheconvolutionarrayto
representa"convolutionoutputcell."Theneachconvolutionoutputcellcouldbewiredtoitswindowofreceptorcellssoastocomputetheappropriateoperator.For
example,asecondorderconvolutioncellwouldbewiredtoawindowofthreereceptorcells,receivingastrongexcitatoryinputfromthecentralcellandweaklateral
inhibitoryinputfromthetwoflankingcells.Networksofneuronsappeartoworkinjustthisway.Aslightcomplicationinnervenetworksisthatneuronscannothave
negativefiringrates.Therefore,itisnecessarytohavetwoarraysofconvolutioncells,oneforthepositivevaluesandoneforthenegativevaluesoftheconvolution(for
details,seeFrisby1980).
ZeroCrossingsinComplexImagesThesecondorderoperatoroffigure12.2isnotsuitableforcomputingthezerocrossingsinrealimages.Ithastwoproblems.
First,itdetectszerocrossingsonlyinthehorizontaldirection.Obviously,theimportantintensitychangesinanimagecanbeorientedinanydirection.Second,because
ithasafixed,smallwindowsize,itdoesnotdiscriminatezerocrossingsthatarisefromsharpintensitychangesfromthosethatarisefromgradualchanges.Butwe
havearguedthatdifferentphysicalprocessesproduceintensitychangeswithdifferentspatialextents.Marr'stheoryoftheprimalsketchbeginswiththebasicinsight
aboutzerocrossingsandreformulatesittoaddressthesetwoproblems.
Therearetwopossibleapproachestothedirectionalityproblem.Thefirst,whichhasbeenpursuedinanumberofcomputervisionsystems,istohavetwoormore
operators,whichmeasureintensitychangeattwoormoreorientations(HansonandRiseman1978a).Thisapproachhastheadvantageofexplicitlydetectingand
representingtheorientationofalocalboundary.MarrandHildreth(1980)havearguedforasecondapproach,proposingasingleoperatorthatisequallysensitive,or
isotropic,tozerocrossingsatallorientations.Althoughthisoperatorlosesorientationinformation,itappearstobeagoodmodeloftheearliestprocessesinbiological
visionsystems.Mathematically,theoperatorisknownastheLaplacian,( 2I/ x 2+ 2I/ y2).

Page470

Figure12.3
Isotropicoperators.(a)isadiagrammaticrepresentationofthecircularwindow,orreceptive
field,ofanisotropicoperatorwithpositivelyweightedcenterandnegativelyweightedsurround.
(b)isagraphoftheoperator'sresponseprofile.(c)demonstratesgraphicallythattheoperatoris
isotropic,orinsensitivetodirection.Iftwoedgesofdifferentorientationcoverthesameamount
ofpositivelyandnegativelyweightedarea,theoperatorwillgivethesameresponse.Thus,the
operatorcannotsignaltheorientationoftheedgeitisrespondingto.

Intuitively,onecanthinkofcreatingtheisotropicLaplacianoperatorbyspinningthedirectionalsecondorderoperatorinfigure12.2arounditscenter,creatinga
circularwindowwithpositiveweightsinitscentralareaandnegativeweightsinasurroundingring.Thiscircularlysymmetricoperatorisillustratedinfigure12.3.
Circularoperatorscanbecharacterizedintermsoftheirweightingprofiles,orcrosssections.Theprofileisthesequenceofweightsalongadiameterofthecircle.
Obviously,foranisotropicoperator,theprofilewillbethesameregardlessoftheorientationofthediameter,sotheprofileinasensetellsuseverythingweneedto
knowabouttheoperator.Wecouldlistthenumericalvaluesoftheweightsinaprofile,butitisoftenmoreinformativetographthem,asdemonstratedinthefigure.
Figure12.3alsographicallyillustratesthatthecircularoperatorwillrespondtoanintensitychangewithanyorientation.Theoperatoristhussimplecomputationally,
butthedirectionalinformationitlosesmustberecoveredbylaterprocesses.Itfitsthepsychologicalandphysiologicaldatafromhumanandanimalvisionverywell
whencombinedwithsomefurtherassumptions,whichwenowconsider.
Thesecondproblemthatthetheorymustaddressisthatofdiscriminatingbetweengradualandsuddenchangesinthegradient.Themoststraightforwardapproachto
thisproblemistoapplytwoormoreoperatorswithvaryingwindowsizes.Theoperatorswehavebeenconsideringsubtracttheweightedsumofthenegativepixels
fromthe

Page471

Figure12.4
TheresponseprofileoftheMexicanhatoperator,
obtainedwhenaprofileofthetypeshowninpart
(b)offigure12.3issmoothedwithanormal,or
Gaussian,function.(AdaptedfromMarrandHildreth1980.)

weightedsumofthepositivepixels.Asthewindowsizegrows,moreandmorepixelscontributetothesums,andeachindividualpixeliscontributinglessandless.
Largeroperatorsareessentiallyaveragingoveraspatialarea,blurringtheimage.Asaresult,theywillmisshighlylocalizedintensitychangesbyaveragingthemout,but
theywillbesensitivetogradualchangesthatsmalleroperatorscanmiss.
MarrandHildreth(1980)haveshownthattherectangularweightingprofilesthatwehavebeenusingforillustrationcauseavoidableerrors.Theyarguethatthe
optimalweightingfunctionforblurringtheimageisthenormal,orGaussian,function.TheprofileoftheGaussianissimplythewellknownbellshapedcurveof
statistics.WhentheLaplacianisappliedtotheGaussian,thesmoothlyvaryingprofileshowninfigure12.4isproduced.This"Mexicanhat"profileemphasizesthe
intensityvaluesinthecentralportionsofthepositiveandnegativeareas.Theresultisthatforagivenwindowsize,morezerocrossingsarefound,andtheyare
assignedmoreaccuratespatiallocations.
TheRawPrimalSketchTherawprimalsketchisafirstdescriptionofthezerocrossingsdetectedbytheoperators,orchannels,ofdifferentsizes.Theresultsfrom
thedifferentoperatorsarecomparedtosortoutzerocrossingsthathavedifferentphysicalcauses.Thesuddenintensitychangethatseparatesadarkbarwillhavetwo
zerocrossingsinthesmallestchannel,whichmaybeaveragedoutinlargerchannels.Agradualintensitychangemaynotbedetectedbythesmallestchannel,butitwill
showupintwoormorelargerchannels.
Characteristicsofthezerocrossingswithinchannelsarealsoexplicitlyrepresented.Figure12.5showsthezerocrossingsthatarisefromafairlysmallchannelapplied
toanaturalimage.Ascanbeseeninthefigure,zerocrossingsformclosedandcontinuoustracks.Tobeginformingtheprimalsketch,nearbyzerocrossingsare
groupedtogetherintoshortedgesegments.Theorientationandcontrastofeachsegmentaredetermined.Itisusefultoexplicitlydevelopsomefurtherdescriptive
informationaboutthesesegments,whichisillustratedinthefigure.Whenasmallsetofsegmentsenclosesasmallarea,theyareexplicitlylabeledasablob.Two
nearby,parallelsegmentscanbelabeledabar.Theterminationsandsuddendiscontinuitiesinlinesarealsomarked.Allofthesedescriptorscanbedevelopedby
localoperations.Therawprimal

Page472

Figure12.5
Theprimalsketch.(a)Aphotograph.(b)Aplotofthezerocrossings
detectedbyasmallsizedcircularoperatorwiththeprofileshown
infigure12.4.(c),(d),and(e)aregraphicdisplaysofthedescriptorsbuilt

Page473

sketchisadescriptionoftheimagethatishypothesizedtosatisfytwocriteria.First,itisdesignedtoreflectthephysicalprocessesinthevisualworldthatproduce
intensitychangesintheimage.Second,itisdesignedtobeausefuldescriptionforbuildinguphigherleveldescriptionsofthescenesuchassurfacelayoutandfor
recognizingobjects.
PsychologicalEvidenceforChannelsofDifferentSizesOureverydayperceptualexperiencedoesnotprovideanyconfirmationofthetheorythatthereareearly
visualchannelswithdifferentwindowsizes.Wearedirectlyconsciousofthephenomenaintheworld,suchasedges,shadows,andsurfacecurvature,butwearenot
consciousofthehypothesizedprocessesthatdetectintensitychangesatdifferentscalesandcombinetheminordertomakethecorrectphysicalinterpretations.
Nevertheless,itispossibletosetupcontrolledsituations,calledpsychophysicalexperiments,thatdemonstratetheexistenceofthechannels.
Manyoftheseexperimentsinvolvevisualstimulithatcontainintensitychangesinonlyonedirectionandatonlyonespatialscale,orspatialfrequency.Thesestimuli
arecalledsinusoidalgratings.Figure12.6showspicturesoftwosinusoidalgratingsandplotsoftheirintensityprofilesinthehorizontaldirection.Bothintensity
profilesaresinewaveswiththesamespatialfrequency.Thatis,theintensityrisesandfallsatthesamerate.However,thetwoprofilesdifferinamplitude,orthe
heightsoftheirpeaksandtroughs.Thedifferenceinamplitudeisreflectedasaperceiveddifferenceincontrastbetweenthetwogratings.Asthecontrastofagratingis
reduced,iteventuallybecomesindistinguishablefromauniformstimulusthathasthesameaveragebrightnessbutnospatialvariation.Thecontrastatwhichagrating
becomesjustbarelyvisibleiscalleditscontrastthreshold.
BlakemoreandCampbell(1969)measuredthecontrastthresholdatvariousspatialfrequencies,producingthecontrastsensitivityfunctionshownasasolidlinein
figure12.7.Thecontrastsensitivityfunctionplotstheobserver'ssensitivityateachspatialfrequency.Sensitivityissimplytheinverseofthecontrastthresholdthatis,
thelowerthethreshold,thehigherthesensitivity.Notsurprisingly,sensitivityishighestatthespatialfrequenciesthattypicallyoccurinrealimagesandfallsoffatlower
andhigherfrequencies.
BlakemoreandCampbellthentestedthehypothesisthattheoverallcontrastsensitivityfunctionresultsfromacombinationofseveralchannels,eachofwhichis
maximallysensitivetointensitychangesataparticularspatialscaledefinedbyabandofspatialfrequencies.Theirtestemployedtheadaptationtechnique,whichrests
onthe
upfromthezerocrossings.(c)displaysthelocationsandsizesoftheblobs.(d)displaystheedgesegments,and(e)displaysthebars.Intheprimalsketchrepresentationthe
descriptorsactuallyexplicitlyencodeinformationthatisonlyimplicitlysuggestedinthesegraphicdisplays.Thus,thedescriptors,markedwitharowsin(c),(d),and(e),explicitly
representthefollowingclustersofinformation:
BLOB

EDGE

BAR

(position146,21)

(position184,23)

(position118,34)

(orientation105)

(orientation128)

(orientation128)

(contrast76)

(contrast25)

(contrast25)

(length16)

(length25)

(length25)

(width6)

(width4)

(width4)

(ReprintedwithpermissionfromMarrandHildreth1980.)

Page474

Figure12.6
Sinusoidalgratings.(a)Ahighcontrastgratingproducedona
computergraphicssystem.Aplotoftheintensityvariationisshown
belowthegrating.(b)Alowercontrastgratingwiththesamespatial
frequencyas(a).Theintensityplotshowsthatintensityisvaryingat
thesameratebutwithinasmallerrange.

Figure12.7
DatafromBlakemoreandCampbell'sadaptation
procedure.Thesolidlineshowsthecontrastsensitivity
functionforahumansubject.Thedatapointsshow
thecontrastsensitivityatvariousspatialfrequencies
whilethesubjectwasadaptedtothefrequency
indicatedbythearrowonthegraph.(Redrawnwith
permissionfromBlakemoreandCampbell1969.)

Page475

Figure12.8
TwostimuluspatternsfromJuleszandBergen'stexturediscriminationexperiments.
Intheirexperimentsartificialtexturesarecreatedbyrepeatingsimpleelementsat
randomorientations.Inbothofthesepatternsasquareregionoftexturecomposed
ofoneelementisembeddedwithinalargerregioncomposedofadifferentelement.
Enlargedcopiesoftheelementsareshownaboveeachpattern.Theembeddedtexture
ismucheasiertodiscriminatein(a)thanin(b).Inthelaboratorythedifferencein
discriminabilitycanbequantifiedbyanalyzingerrorrateswhenpatternswithand
withouttexturedifferencesareexposedforverybriefdurations.Thesuperior
discriminabilityof(a)suggeststhatlineterminationsarerepresentedintheprimal
sketch.Thetwoelementsusedtogenerate(a)containthesamelinelengthsand
orientationsbutdifferinthenumberofterminations.Thetwoelementsusedto
generate(b)containthesamelinelengthsandorientationsandalsocontainthe
samenumberofterminations.(ReproducedwithpermissionfromJuleszandBergen1983.)

followinglogic.Ingeneral,ifaneuralchannelreceivesprolonged,intensestimulation,itsresponseweakens,anditssensitivitytoweakstimulationdeclines.Therefore,
prolongedexposuretoahighcontrastgratingataparticularspatialfrequencyshouldreducesensitivityinthechannelthatisbesttunedtothatfrequencywithout
reducingsensitivityinchannelsthatarenotsensitivetothatfrequency.Thecontrastsensitivityfunctionshouldthereforebereducedatsomespatialfrequenciesandnot
atothers.Ascanbeseenfromfigure12.7,theresultsfitthepredictionverynicely.FurtherpsychophysicalworksupportsboththeMexicanhatprofileandthe
hypothesisthatthereisarelativelysmallnumberofzerocrossingdetectionchannelsthataretunedtointensitychangesatvariousspatialscales(Wilson1983Wilson
andBergen1979).
Psychophysicalevidencealsobearsonotheraspectsofrawprimalsketchtheory.Thetheorystatesthattheterminationsanddiscontinuitiesinlinesofzerocrossings
areexplicitlyrepresented.InterestingevidenceforthiscomesfromastudybyJuleszandBergen(1983).Part(a)offigure12.8demonstratesthattexturescomposed
ofelementsthatdifferinthenumberofterminationsareeasilydistinguishable.Part(b)

Page476

demonstratesthatthetexturesaremuchmoredifficulttodistinguishiftheelementshavethesamenumberofterminations.Inacontrolledlaboratoryexperimentthe
effectisdemonstratedbypresentingthepatternsforbriefdurationsandaskingsubjectstojudgewhetherthereisatexturedifference.Discriminationisreliablefor
patternsliketheonesinpart(a)whentheexposuretimeisroughly100milliseconds.Atthisdurationdiscriminationofdifferencesliketheoneinpart(b)isessentially
impossible.Therearequestionsaboutjustwhatfeaturesshouldbeexplicitlymarkedintheprimalsketch(Treisman1985andBurtonandRuddock1978provide
examples).Ithasalsobeenshownthatsomeoftheprimitivefeaturesthathavebeenproposedcanbedetectedbyfilteringprocessesthatarenotdedicatedto
computingjustthosefeatures(BergenandAdelson1988Caelli1985).
PhysiologicalEvidenceforthePrimalSketchKuffler(1953)demonstratedthattheganglioncellsinthecat'sretinashowthekindofcircularreceptivefields
specifiedbyprimalsketchtheory.Thereceptivefieldsofsomecellshaveexcitatorycentersandinhibitorysurrounds(oncentercells),andothershaveinhibitory
centersandexcitatorysurrounds(offcentercells).Ifaspotoflightisprojectedonthecenterofthereceptivefieldofanoffcentercell,theresponserateofthecellis
inhibitedthatis,itgoesbelowitsrestingrate.
Laterresearchers(RodieckandStone1965EnrothCugellandRobson1966)showedthatthereceptivefieldsofganglioncellshaveaMexicanhatresponseprofile.
MarrandUllman(1981)showthattheresponseratesofthecellstovariouskindsoflocalintensitychange,suchasedgesandbars,canbepreciselypredictedbythe
theorythattheycomputetheisotropicMexicanhatoperator.Sincenervecellscannothavenegativefiringrates,theoncentercellsarehypothesizedtocarrythe
positiveportionoftheLaplacianoperator,andtheoffcentercellsthenegative.
Thenextstepintheprimalsketchcomputationisthelocationofthezerocrossingsandtheexplicitrepresentationoflocal,orientedzerocrossingsegments.Marrand
Hildreth(1980)presentasimpleschemeforinterconnectingoncenterandoffcentercellsforthedetectionoforientedzerocrossingsegments.Figure12.9illustrates
thescheme.Zerocrossingscanbelocatedbylookingforchangesinsignintheconvolutionimage.Therefore,intheneuralrepresentation,ifanoncenteranda
nearbyoffcentercellarebothfiring,thenazerocrossingmustoccurbetweenthem.Acellthatdetectsthezerocrossingcanbeconnectedtotheonandoffcenter
cellsinsuchawaythatitfiresonlywhenbothofthemfire.ThistypeofconnectioniscalledalogicalANDgate.Ifthefiringrateofthedetectorcellreflectsthesum
oftheinputrates,thenitalsosignalsthecontrastoftheintensitychange.
HubelandWiesel(1979)foundcellsinthevisualcortexesofthemonkeyandcatthatrespondinexactlythemannerrequiredbyMarrandHildreth'smodel.These
simplecellsrespondtolocal,orientededgesegmentswithintheirreceptivefields(seechapter7).Further,HubelandWieselshowedthatthesecellsarelaidoutina
uniform,modulararchitecturethatsuggeststhattheyaredevotedtotheparallelrepresentationofzerocrossingsegmentsand,throughtheirlocalinteractions,tothe
parallelcomputationofthevariouspatternsofrespondingthatarerequiredtocomputetheprimalsketchandthefurtherrepresentationsoflowlevelvision.
Theretinalimageisrepresentedtopographicallyonthevisualcortex.Thatis,thereceptivefieldsofadjacentareasonthecortexareadjacentontheretina.Not
surprisingly,giventhesuperiorvisualacuityinthecentralareaoftheretina,largerregionsof

Page477

Figure12.9
Ahypothesizedphysiologicalmechanismfordetectingorientedzero
crossingsegments.(a)ThecellslabeledGhavecircularreceptivefields
ontheimage.ThereceptivefieldsoftheoncenterG+cellshave
excitatorycentersandinhibitorysurrounds.Thereceptivefieldsofthe
offcenterGcellshaveinhibitorycentersandexcitatorysurrounds.
Theganglioncellsintheretinaandthecellsofthelateralgeniculate
nucleusinthebrainhavebeenshowntohavethesekindsofreceptive
fields.TwonearbyG+andGcellsdriveacelllabeledZCinsuchaway
thatcellZCfiresonlyifbothG+andGarefiring.TheG+andG
cellswillbeactivesimultaneouslyonlyifazerocrossingpassesbetween
them.Therefore,theZCcellfunctionsasalocalzerocrossingdetector.
(b)RowsofGcellscanbeconnectedtoazerocrossingdetectorthat
detectstheorientedzerocrossingsegmentsneededforprimalsketch
computations.Thezerocrossingsegmentdetector,ZCS,isconnectedto
parallelrowsofG+andGcellsinsuchawaythatalloftheGcellshave
tobeactiveinorderfortheZCScelltobeactive.Thesimultaneousactivity
oftheGcellswilloccuronlywhenazerocrossingpassesbetweenthetworows
ofreceptivefieldsontheimage.Thesimplecellsofthevisualcortexinthebrain
dorespondtopreciselyorientedbarsandedges.Thefigurediagrammaticallyillustrates
thelayeredorganizationofearlyvisualcomputationsinthenervoussystem.Alayerof
receptorcellsthatencodeintensityvaluesintheimagefeedsalayerofcellsthatperform
theMexicanhatoperator.Thislayerofcellsinturnfeedsalayerofcellsthatextractprimal
sketchprimitives.(BasedonMarrandHildreth1980.)

thevisualcortexaredevotedtoit.Thevisualcortexhasanumberofhorizontallayersthataredefinedbydifferenttypesofcellsandfibers.Forexample,thelayer
commonlylabeled4containsthesimplecells,andthelayerslabeled2,3,5,and6containthecomplexcells.Thevisualcortexisorganizedintoverticalcolumns.If
recordingsaremadefromseveralcellsbydrivinganelectrodeintothecortexperpendiculartoitssurface,thenallofthecellsrespondpreferentiallytothesame
orientationandtothesameeye(calledoculardominance).
Theorientationandoculardominancecolumnsareorganizedintoamodularunitcalledthehypercolumnthatisregularlyrepeatedoverthesurfaceofthevisual
cortex.Eachhypercolumncontainscellsthatrespondtoalocalregionoftheimage.Thecellscoverallorientationsandrespondtobotheyes.Figure12.10showsina
highlyschematicmannerhowthehypercolumnstructurearisesfromtheintersectionoforientationslabsandoculardominanceslabsthatrunindifferentdirections
throughthecortex.

Page478

Figure12.10
Thehypercolumnisthebasiccomputationalunitofthevisual
cortex.Itisanorganizedblockofcellsaboutamillimetersquare
thatprocessesasmallpatchoftheinputimage.Itcontainsa
completesetoforientationslabs,whichprocessedgesandbars
atallorientationsinstepsofabout10degrees,andasetofocular
dominanceslabs,oneofwhichispreferentiallyresponsivetothe
righteyeandtheothertothelefteye.Hypercolumnsarelaidout
topographicallyontheprimaryvisualcortex.Thatis,adjacent
hypercolumnsprocessadjacentareasoftheretinalimage.(Adapted
withpermissionfromHubelandWiesel1979.)

Thehypercolumnstructurewasconfirmedbyaremarkableradioactivelabelingtechnique(Hubel,Wiesel,andStryker1978).Ananimalisinjectedwitharadioactive
formof2deoxyglucose,achemicalthatisusedbythemetabolicprocessesinneuronsandthatleavesradioactivemetabolicproductsbehindintheneurons.The
animalisthenexposedfor45minutestoavisualstimulusconsistingofstripesinasingleorientation.Activeneuronstakeupmoreoftheradioactivesubstancethan
inactiveneuronsandhencebecomeradioactively''labeled.''Theanimalisimmediatelysacrificed,anditsvisualcortexiscutintoverythinslicesthatarelaidonto
radiosensitivephotographicplates.Whenthese"autoradiographs"aredeveloped,theorientationslabsshowupasdarkstripesonhorizontalslicesofcortex.
Theprimalsketchtheoryalsorequiresthatzerocrossingsegmentsbedetectedatdifferentspatialscales,andindeedcorticalsimplecellsaremaximallyresponsiveto
differentspatialfrequencies.Asinthepsychophysicalexperimentsdiscussedpreviously,thiscanbeshownbyprojectingorientedsinusoidalgratingswithvarying
frequenciesontothereceptivefieldsofthecellsandrecordingtheresponses(MaffeiandFiorentini1973).Therehasbeensomedisputeaboutwhetherandhow
variationinspatialscaleisincorporatedintothehypercolumn,butsomeautoradiographicevidencesuggeststhattherearealsospatialfrequencycolumnswithinthe
hypercolumn(Tootell,Silverman,andDeValois1981seeMaffeiandFiorentini1977forconflictingevidence).

Page479

Figure12.11
Detectingorganizationintheprimalsketch.Thevisualsystem
readilyclustersnearbysimilaritemsintolargeunits.Thus,the
dotsandlinesegmentsinthisimageareorganizedintohigher
levelelongatedandorientedblobs.Nearbyblobswithsimilar
shapeandorientationareclusteredagain,andavirtualboundary
betweenthetwoclustersthatdividestheimageinhalfcanbe
detected.Thelowerpanelofthefigureisadiagrammatic
representationofthisfinalleveloforganization.(Reprinted
withpermissionfromMarr1982.)

12.3IntermediateProcessesandRepresentationsinVision
RepresentingtheOrganizationinthePrimalSketch
Sofarwehavediscussedtheevidencefortheideathattheimageisinitiallyprocessedinparallelforintensitychangesatseveralspatialscales,andwehavelooked
morespecificallyatonecomputationalanalysisofthisverylowlevelprocess,Marr's(1982)theoryoftherawprimalsketch.Arepresentationofthissortcapturesthe
lowestlevelofinformationintheimagethatisreliablycorrelatedwithpropertiesofthephysicalsurfacesintherealworld.Therepresentationisstillextremelylocaland
twodimensional,however.Manyresearchersbelievethatfurthercomputationsareperformedontheprimalsketchtodetectmoreglobaltwodimensionalstructureor
pattern.Marrusedthetermfullprimalsketchforarepresentationthatexplicitlyencodesglobalpatternsoforganizationintheprimalsketch.
Tworelatedkindsofprocessingaretypicallyhypothesizedtobeinvolvedinfindingtheorganizationoftheprimalsketch:(1)theclusteringoflocallysimilaritems(bars,
blobs,andsoforth)atvariousscalesintohigherorderitems,and(2)thedetectionofboundariesbetweenregions.Boundariesaresometimesmarkedbyasetofedge
segmentsthatformacontinuouslineorcontour.Otherboundariesare"virtual"boundariesbetweenclustersofitemsthatdifferintheirpropertiesorparametervalues.
Figure12.11illustratesthetwoprocessesschematically.Clustersofsimilarrawsketchitems

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formhigherorder,oriented,barlikeshapes,whicharequiteeasilyperceptible.Aboundaryrunningverticallydownthecenterofthefigureisalsoperceptible.Itis
definedbythefactthatallthehigherordertokensontheleftsideofthefigurehaveoneorientation,andallthehigherordertokensontherightsideofthefigurehave
another.Theperceptionoftheboundaryrequiresfirstthattheuniformityoforientationinthetwoareasbemeasured,andsecondthatadiscontinuityinthis
measurementbetweenthetwoareas,whichformstheboundary,bedetected.Exactlywhichaspectsofthissortofgroupingandboundarydetectionaregenuinelypart
ofearlyvisionhasnotbeenclearlyestablished.Acomputationalanalysismustestablishthatlowlevelprocessescandetectaparticulartypeoforganization.
Psychophysicalandphysiologicalexperimentsmustestablishthatbiologicalvisualsystemsdoinfactmakethecomputation.
Figure12.12illustratestwotypesofvisualstimulithathavebeenutilizedinpsychophysicalexperiments.Part(a)ofthefigureisaGlasspattern,whichwasproduced
bysuperimposingtwocopiesofarandomdotpattern.Intheleftpanelonecopyisrotatedslightly,andintherightpanelonecopyisexpandedslightly.Experimental
subjectscandetecttheresultingcircularandlinearstructuresinthepatternsinextremelybriefexposuresoflessthan80milliseconds,whichisevidencethatthe
structureisrecoveredbyearlyvisualprocesses.Stevens(1978)arguedthatsuchstructurecanbedetectedbyalocal,parallelprocessthatlooksatthevirtuallines
thatconnectpointsinlocalneighborhoods.Thelocallypredominantvirtuallineorientationpredictstheperceivedstructureofthepatterns.
Part(b)offigure12.12showstwocaseswhereaboundarybetweentwotexturedregionscanbeperceivedonthebasisofadifferencebetweenthetworegionsin
theaveragevalueofaparameter.Intheleftpaneltheaveragesizeoftheelementsdiffers.Intherightpaneltheaverageorientationoftheelementsdiffers.
Experimentalsubjectscannoteadifferenceoftextureandperceivetheshapeoftheboundaryinexposuresoflessthan200milliseconds.Thisresultsuggeststhatearly
visualprocessesrepresentboththeaveragevalueofparameterssuchassizeandorientationandtheboundariesbetweenregionswithdifferingaveragevalues.
Thetheoreticalreasonforhypothesizingtheexistenceofcomputationsthatdetectlargerscaletwodimensionalstructureisthatsuchorganizationisverylikelyto
reflectimportantphysicalpropertiesofthesurfacesintheworld.Suchthingsaslinesoredgeswithconsiderablelength,setsofparallellinesorstripes,andregionsof
similarelementsareunlikelytoariseasaresultoffactorssuchasaccidentsofilluminationandviewpoint,randommarkingsonsurfaces,ornoiseintheimagingprocess
(WitkinandTenenbaum1983).
IntrinsicImages
Althoughafullprimalsketchcontainsagreatdealofinformationthatisreliablycorrelatedwithpropertiesofthevisiblethreedimensionalworld,itdoesnotmakeany
explicitcommitmentsaboutpropertiesoftheworld.Itexplicitlyrepresentsonlytheorganizationoftheintensitychangesintheimage.Forexample,supposethata
numberofedgesegmentslineuptoformalong,continuouscontourthatisidentifiedinthefullprimalsketch.Suchacontourmightrepresentamarkingonthesurface
ofanobject,oritmightrepresentthevisibleboundaryofasurface,whichseparatesanobjectfromitsbackground.Theprimalsketchdoesnotdecidebetweenthese
possibilitiesitsaysonlythatanimportantcontourthatrequiresinterpretationispresent.The

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Figure12.12
Evidencefororganizationalprocesses.(a)TheradialandcircularorganizationofthesetwoGlass
patternscanberapidlydetected.Alocalprocessthatextractsandorganizesvirtuallinesamong
primalsketchelementsmightberesponsiblefortherapidperception.(b)Texturalboundariesare
perceivedwhentwotexturesdifferintheaveragevalueofaparameter.Intheleftpatternthe
averagesizeoftheelementsinthetwotexturesdiffers,andintherightpatterntheaverage
orientationdiffers.(Part(a)reprintedwithpermissionfromStevens1978,andpart(b)reprinted
withpermissionfromMarr1982.)

nextcriticalquestionaboutvisualprocessingishowtomakethetransitionfromlowlevel,imagebasedrepresentationstointermediaterepresentationsthatexplicitly
encodetheintrinsicpropertiesofthescenethatgaverisetotheimage.Suchrepresentationshavebeenreferredtoasintrinsicimagesorrepresentations(Barrowand
Tenenbaum1978).
ArepresentativeproposalisMarr's(1982)notionofthe2.5Dsketch,arepresentationofvisiblesurfacesinthreedimensions.Figure12.13illustratesthenatureof
the2.5Dsketch.Therepresentationlocallyencodesthedistanceandorientationofthevisiblesurfaces.Discontinuitiesinsurfaceorientationanddepthareexplicitly
represented.Unliketheprimalsketch,the2.5Dsketchassignsportionsoftheimagetosurfacesintheworldandspecifiesthedistanceandorientationofthose
surfacesrelativetotheviewer.Forvariousreasonsthe2.5Dsketchisnotacomplete

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Figure12.13
Adiagrammaticrepresentationofthe2.5Dsketchforawedding
cakesuspendedinfrontofawall.The2.5Dsketchencodes
theorientationrelativetotheviewerofeachsmallpatchofsurface.
Inthediagramtheorientationinformationissymbolizedbyasmall
arrowperpendiculartoeachpatchofsurface.Thearrowsforthe
wallbehindthecakeappearasdotsbecausetheyarepointingdirectly
attheviewer.Thesketchalsoencodespointswherethereare
discontinuitiesdiscontinuitiesinsurfaceorientationareshownasdotted
linesinthediagram,anddiscontinuitiesindepthbetweentwosurface
patchesareshownasblacklines.Finally,thesketchencodesthedistance
ofeachpatchofsurfacefromtheviewer,whichisnotrepresentedon
thediagram.(ReprintedwithpermissionfromMarrandNishihara1978.)

threedimensionalrepresentation.Forexample,thesurfaceshavenotbeengroupedintoobjectsthateitherareorcouldbeidentified.
Somethinglikea2.5Dor3Dsketchmustbecomputedbythevisualsystem,becauseitcaptureskeyaspectsofourvisualawarenessandperformance.Thelayout
ofsurfacesinspaceseemstobenaturallyavailableincognitionandbehavior,evenwhennoidentifiableobjectsarepresentinthescene.Sucharepresentationcannot
becomputedonlyfromaprimalsketchrepresentation,however.Thecomputationmustdrawonanumberofdifferenttypesofinformation,anditislikelythatsome
typesaredevelopedindistinctcomputationalmodules.Thetypesofinformationincludestereopsis,motion,surfacetexture,shapefromshading,andcolor.Wewill
discussvisualmotionfurtherhereasarepresentativeexample.
VisualMotion
Undernormalconditionstheimageinputtothevisualsystemundergoesconstantchangeovertime.Movementoftheperceiver'seyes,head,orbodycausestheentire
imagetoshiftontheretina.Movementofanobjectintheworldcausestheimageoftheobjecttoshiftontheretina.Ournotionofanimageasafunctionspecifying
intensityatspatialpositions,I(x,y),shouldbeaugmentedtospecifyintensityataspatialpositionataparticulartimeI(x,y,t).Thetemporaldimensionoftheinput
imageposestremendousproblemsforvisualcomputation,sinceaparticularpointintheimagedoesnotnecessarilyrepresentthesamebitoftheworldatdifferent
momentsintime.Whenmotionoccurs,thevisualsystemmustfigureoutthatatdifferenttimes,

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differentpartsoftheimagerepresentthesamepartoftheworld.Theproblemiscompoundedbythefactthatmotioncomputationsmustbemadeextremelyrapidly.
Somewhatparadoxically,giventhatavisualsystemcancopewithvisualmotion,thetemporaldimensionoftheimageisapotentiallyrichsourceofinformation.For
example,whentheperceiverismovingforward,therateofexpansionintheimagespecifiestheperceiver'svelocity,andthedirectionofmotionofapointontheimage
specifieswhetheritwillpasstotheleftortherightof,orcollidewith,theperceiver.Inthiscaseaparticularkindofvisualmotion,oftencalledopticalflow,provides
detailedinformationaboutmotionintheworld.Inaddition,visualmotionisapotentialsourceofinformationabouttheboundariesandshapesofobjects.Ifanobject
movesinaplaneperpendiculartothelineofsight,allpointsonitsimagemovetogether.Thiscorrelatedmotioncouldhelpthevisualsystemtosegregatetheobject
fromitsbackground.Itcanalsobeshownmathematicallythatundersomeconditionsvisualmotioncanspecifytheshapeofanobject(Ullman1979).
PsychologicalEvidenceonVisualMotionPerceptionInformalobservationsuggeststhatthehumanvisualsystemhasaremarkableabilitytoprocessandutilize
motioninformation.Considerapassreceiverinfootball,runningatfullspeedandsimultaneouslyjudgingthemotionsoftheballandanapproachingdefender.Or
considerthedegreetowhichourabilitytopickoutabirdorsmallanimalinfoliageisaidedbyitsmovement.Psychologicalexperimentsconfirmandextendthis
impression.Someofthemoststrikingexperimentsshowthatwecanindeedrecoverthreedimensionalshapefrommotioninformation.InonestudyWallachand
O'Connell(1953)bentpiecesofwireintoabstractthreedimensionalshapesandmountedthemonarotatingturntable.Theyplacedalightbehindtherotatingshapein
suchawaythatitcastasharp,everchangingshadowonascreen,whichwasobservedbythesubject.Theshadowwasatwodimensionalimagevaryingintime.All
otherinformationthatwaspresentwhenviewingtherotatingshapedirectlyhadbeenremoved.Thesubjectsperceivedthethreedimensionalformofthewireshape
withnotroubleatallinfact,theperceptionofthreedimensionalformissostronginthissituationthatitisimpossibletoperceivetheshadowasarubberytwo
dimensionalfigure.
Psychologicalresearchmakesitclearthatmotionperceptionisacomplexprocess.Experimentsontheminimumconditionsforvisualmotionperceptionhaveledto
thehypothesisthatatleasttworatherdifferentprocessesareinvolved(Braddick1979Nakayama1985).Thefirstprocessisashortrangeprocessthatapparently
canregisterthelocalizedmotionoflowlevelvisualinformation,suchasintensitygradientsorzerocrossings.Braddick(1974,1979)studiedthisprocesswithvisual
displaysthatalternatedbetweentwosquarearraysofblackandwhitedots.Thetwoarrayswererandomanduncorrelatedexceptforacentralrectangularpatchthat
wassimplyshiftedhorizontallyfromonearraytotheother.Whenviewedalone,eacharrayappearedtobearandomarrangementofblackandwhitedots.Whenthe
twoarrayswerealternatedintime,subjectsclearlyperceivedarectangularobjectmovingbackandforth.However,aclearperceptionoftherectangleonlyoccurred
whentheamountofshiftwasunder15minutesofangulardisplacement,andthetimebetweenthetwodisplayswaslessthan100milliseconds.Thesetightconstraints
onspaceandtimeapproximateconditionsofactualcontinuousmotionacrosstheretina,eventhoughthedisplayisdiscrete.

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Theevidenceforasecond,longrangeprocessofmotionperceptioncomesfromstudiesofapparentmotion,whichissometimescalledthephiphenomenon.This
processcanapparentlytrackidentifiablehigherlevelvisualelementssuchasedgesorlinesoverlongertimespansanddistances.Apparentmotionexperiments
demonstratethisdramaticallybyalternatelyflashingtwodisplaysthatarequitewidelyseparatedinspaceandtime.Forexample,thetwoframesofdisplaycanconsist
ofasingleblackdotonawhitebackground,withthedothorizontallydisplacedbetweentheframes.Thedotappearstomovecontinuouslybackandforthevenfor
spatialdisplacementsofmanydegreesofvisualangleandforinterframeintervalsof300milliseconds.Theperceptionofcontinuousmotioninsuchhighlydiscrete
displayssuggeststhatthereisaprocessthatdetectscorrespondencesbetweenimageelementsoverlongrangesofspaceandtimeandinterpretsthemintermsof
motionintheimageandtheworld.Inthestroboscopicapparentmotiondisplaythelongrangeprocessinasense"fillsin"motionthatisnotactuallypresent.Inthe
naturalworldthelongrangeprocessdoesnotleadtoillusionsbecausethereisnonaturalclassofvisibleobjectsthatjumparounddiscretelyinspaceandthatmustbe
discriminatedfromsmoothlymovingobjects.Giventheexistenceofthelongrangeprocess,anicepuzzleiswhetherandhowweinfactknowthattherearenot
discretelymovingvisibleobjectsintherealworldthatwehavenevernoticedbecausetheyappeartomovesmoothly.
PhysiologicalEvidenceonVisualMotionThereisconsiderableevidencefortheexistenceofspecializedneurophysiologicalcircuitryformotionprocessing.Motion
specificchannelsorneuronsshouldshowsignsofadaptationorfatiguewithprolongedstimulation,and,indeed,compellingmotionaftereffectsareeasytoproduce.
Thewaterfallillusioncanbeexperiencedbystaringsteadilyatawaterfallforseveralminutesandthenturningtolookatthesurroundingstationaryscenery.A
profoundlyambivalentperceptionoccurs:thesceneryappearstobemovingupward,andyetitremainsinthesameplace.Theillusioncanbeexplainedbythe
existenceofafatigueablephysiologicalchannelthatisspecifictodownwardmotionandseparatefromotherchannelsthatcanindependentlyregisterthespatial
positionofobjectsinthescene.Thespiralaftereffectcanbeproducedbymountingapaintedspiralonarotatingturntable,viewingitforseveralminutes,andthen
stoppingtheturntable.Thespiralappearstorotateintheoppositedirection.Thedirectionalspecificityofsucheffectshasbeenstudiedquantitativelyusingcontrast
thresholdsforsinusoidalgratings.Prolongedviewingofagratingmovinginaparticulardirectionelevatesitscontrastthresholdrelativetothethresholdforthesame
gratingmovingintheoppositedirection(Pantle1978).
Physiologicalrecordingsfromsingleneuronsinthevisualsystemsofseveralspeciesalsostronglysuggesttheexistenceofspecializedmotiondetectionmachinery.
Manysimpleandcomplexcellsintheprimaryvisualcortexrespondpreferentiallytostimulimovinginaparticulardirection(forexample,29percentofthecells
sampledbyDeValois,Yund,andHepler1982).Thus,ifthebeststimulusforacellisathinverticalline,thecellmightrespondstronglyifthelineismovedfromleftto
rightacrossitsreceptivefieldandnotrespondatallifthelineismovedfromrighttoleft.Thesecellsmaybeinvolvedinshortrangemotionperception(Marrand
Ullman1981).
Cellssensitivetovisualmotionhavealsobeenfoundoutsideofthevisualcortex.Forexample,asmallareaonthetemporallobe,calledMT,containsneuronswith
largereceptivefieldsthatrespondpreferentiallynotonlytomotioninaspecificdirection

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butalsotoaspecificvelocity(Nakayama1985).Unlikecorticalcells,whichhaveaparticularoptimalstimulus,thesecellsrespondtoawidervarietyofstimuliaslong
astheyaremovingattherightspeedintherightdirection.Thistypeofresponserequiresagooddealofcomputationtoseparateoutspeedanddirectionfromother
propertiesofthestimulation,soitisnotsurprisingthatthecellsoccurnotinthevisualcortexbutinsteadinanareathatreceivesinputfibersfromthevisualcortex.
ThereisnowsubstantialevidencethatMTneuronsareoutputneuronsformotionperception.InaseriesofexperimentsonmonkeysMovshon,Newsome,and
severalcolleagues(MovshonandNewsome1992)wereabletoshowthatMTneuronsarebothnecessaryandsufficientformotiondiscrimination.Part(a)offigure
12.14diagrammaticallyillustratesthestimuli,whichtheexperimentersdisplayedonaCRT.Arandommotiontrialconsistsofarapidsequenceofframes,each
containingrandomlyplaceddots.Successiveframesareseparatedbyabout50milliseconds,whichisbriefenoughforshortrangemotiondetection,butthereisno
correlationinthepositionsofthedotsonsuccessiveframes,sonomotionisdetected.Ina100percentcorrelationtrial,theinitialpositionsofthedotsarerandom,but
successiveframesdisplaceallofthedotsslightlyinthesamedirection.Suchadisplayproducesastrongperceptionofcoherent,continuousmotion(althoughthedots
donotinfactmovecontinuouslyacrossthescreen).Ina50percentcorrelationtrial,successiveframesdisplacehalfofthedotsinthesamedirectionandputtherest
ofthedotsinrandompositions.Thepercentageofcorrelateddotscouldbevariedthroughouttherangefrom0to100percent.Thespeedofmotioncouldalsobe
variedbyvaryingtheamountofdisplacementfromframetoframe.Asshowninpart(b)ofthefigure,smalllesionstoMTproducedadramatic(temporary)
decrementinthemonkeys'abilitytodiscriminatemotioninthesedisplays.
InasecondexperimenttheresearchersshowedthattheresponsesofMTneuronsaccuratelypredictedmonkeys'discriminationofthedirectionofmotion.Inthis
experimentanMTneuronwaslocatedwithelectrodes,anditspreferreddirectionofmotionwasdeterminedthroughelectrophysiologicalrecordingduringstrong
motionstimulation.Stimuliwithvaryingdirectionsofmotionandvaryingdegreesofcorrelationwerethenpresentedintheportionofthevisualfieldtowhichthecell
responded.Overalargenumberofneuronsintwomonkeys,theresponsesoftheneuronswerecomparedwiththemonkeys'behavioralperformance(monkeys
choseadirectionbymovingtheireyestowardoneoftwosmalllights,oneofwhichwasinthetruedirectionofmotion).Theresponsesoftheneuronspredictedthe
monkeys'choicesnearlyperfectly.
Inathirdexperimentsmallpopulationsofabout100MTneuronsweregivenweakelectricalstimulationviaanelectrode.Sincenearbyneuronstendtohavesimilar
preferreddirections,itwaslikelythatthestimulatedneuronswouldberelativelyhomogeneousintheirdirectionalpreferences.Stimulationincreasedthemonkeys'
tendencytochoosethepreferreddirection.Althoughthesizeoftheeffectvaried,probablyduetochancevariationinthehomogeneityofthestimulatedpopulations,
theeffectwasequivalenttoaddingafixedamountofcorrelatedmotiontothedisplay.
TheseexperimentsprovidestrongevidencethatMTisprimarilyconcernedwithmotionandthatitplaysastrongroleinthediscriminationofmotionintheimage.They
arealsoapowerfuldemonstrationofthemodularityofthevisualsystem.TherepresentationprovidedbyMTneuronsisprobablynotthefinaloutputrepresentation
formotionperception,however.AlthoughMTneuronsdoencodetheroughdistance

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Figure12.14
NewsomeandPare's(1988)experimentonthenecessityofMTsignalsformotion
discrimination.(a)Diagrammaticillustrationofthestimuli.Arrowsrepresentthedirection
andextentofmotionfromframetoframe.Emptycirclesrepresentrandomlydisplaced
dots.Filledcirclesrepresentdotswithcorrelateddisplacements.Seetextforfurther
explanation.(b)EffectofasmallunilateralMTlesiononmotiondiscriminationperformance.
Eachpanelplotsthethresholdofmotiondetectionatvariousspeedsofvisualmotion.The
thresholdisexpressedastheamountofcorrelationthatmustbeintroducedintothestimulus
formotiontobeperceived.SincetheMTareaontheleftsideofthebrainonlyrespondsto
therighthalfofthevisualfield,andviceversa,eachanimalservedasitsownpostlesion
control.Theleftpanelshowspreandpostlesionperformancewhenthestimulusisdelivered
tothevisualhalffieldthatstimulatesthelesionedMTarea.Therightpanelshowsthesame
datawhenthestimulusisdeliveredtothevisualhalffieldthatstimulatestheunlesionedMT
area.Performanceinthelesionhalffielddeterioratedbyaboutafactorof10.Performance
inthecontrolhalffieldwasunaffected.(AdaptedwithpermissionfromNewsomeandPare1988.)

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betweentheorganismandaregionintheimage,theydonotencodewhetherthemotioninthatregionoftheimageistowardorawayfromtheorganism(Maunsell
andVanEssen1983).Thus,theneuronsencodeimagemotioncorrelatedwithslicesindepthratherthanthreedimensionalmotionintheworld.Localmotioninthe
imageisambiguouswithrespecttomotionindepth,sinceaparticularrateanddirectionofimagemotioncanbeproducedbymanymotiontrajectoriesindepthinthe
world.ThecomputationofthreedimensionalmotionrequiresmoreintegrationovertimeandspacethanisapparentlycomputedinMT(Saitoetal.1986)andmaybe
enhancedbycontributionsfromothersourcesofinformation.
VisualMotionComputationsThecomputationalanalysisofvisualmotionhasproventobedifficult.Firstthetwodimensionalmotionintheimagemustbemeasured,
andthenitmustbeinterpretedtoyieldinformationaboutthethreedimensionalworld.Hildreth's(1984a,b)workonthemeasurementofshortrange,orcontinuous,
imagemotionillustratessomeofthecomplexitiesoftheproblem.AtaninstantintimethemotionatapointintheimagecanbeexpressedasavectorV,which
specifiesthevelocityanddirectionofthemotionatthatpoint.Thecomputationalproblemofmeasuringthemotioninthechangingimageisthustorecoverthese
vectorsfromthechangingintensityvaluesintheimage.Formally,theproblemistocomputethetwodimensionalvectorfieldV(x,y,t)fromthechangingimageI(x,y,
t).V(x,y,t)iscalledthevelocityfield.
HildrethhypothesizesthattheinitiallocalmeasurementsremadeonzerocrossingsdetectedbyMexicanhattypespatialfilters.Therearetwocomputational
argumentsforthisapproach.First,sincethezerocrossingsarecorrelatedwithphysicalfeaturesoftheworld,themotionmeasurementswillalsobecorrelatedwith
thesefeatures.Second,thezerocrossingsoccurwhereintensitychangesintheimageareatamaximum.Whentheseintensitygradientsmoveintheimage,theylead
tomaximumchangeovertime.Thus,measurementsatzerocrossingswillbethemostaccuratepossible.Aswehaveseen,thereisalsogoodphysiologicalevidence
thatspatialfilteringisthefirststepinthevisualprocess.
Unfortunately,thevelocityfieldcannotbedirectlyrecoveredfromlocalmeasurements,becauseoftheapertureproblem.Supposethattheshortrangemotion
measurementsaremadebydirectionsensitivesimplecellsinthecortexthatrespondtothemovementofshortzerocrossingsegments.Eachcellisessentiallylooking
throughasmallwindow,oraperture,atalocalpartofacontour.Itcannottellwhichdirectionthecontourisreallymovingin.Figure12.15showswhythisisthecase.
Eachlocalmeasurementconstrainsthevectoratthatpoint,butitdoesnotfullyspecifyit.Thecomputationmustcombinetheconstraintsprovidedbythelocal
measurementstocomeupwithafull,consistentvelocityfield.
Attemptstocombinethelocalconstraintsintoasinglefieldrunupagainstasecondproblem.Manyvelocityfieldsareconsistentwiththelocalmeasurements.The
constraintsprovidedbythelocalmeasurementsmustbesupplementedbysomefurtherconstraintinordertocomputeauniquevelocityfield.Onepossibleapproach
wouldbetotrytoapplyconstraintsfromlongerrangemotionmeasurementsorfromotherinformationsources,suchasstereopsisorshape.Hildreth,however,
exploredthepossibilitiesforconstrainingthecomputationwithoutusingothersourcesofinformationintheimage.Thesmoothnessconstraintarisesfromabasic
propertyofthephysicalworld:thesurfacesofobjectsaresmoothrelativetotheirdistancefromtheviewer.

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Figure12.15
Theapertureproblem.(a)Thearrowsillustratetwopossiblemovements
ofalineviewedthroughasmallcircularaperture.Thedottedvector
producesthedottedline,andthesolidvectorproducesthesolidline.
Thetwomovementsproducethesameresultwithintheapertureand
thereforeareindistinguishabletoanylocalprocessthatisrestrictedto
theaperture.(b)Thesolidvectorin(a),symbolizedV,canbedecomposed
intotwocomponents.ThecomponentVpisperpendiculartothemoving
contour(andhappenstobeidenticaltothedottedvectorin(a)).The
componentV istangenttothecontour.Ingeneral,alocaloperatorcanonly
t

measuretheperpendicularcomponentofvisualmotion.Thetangent
componentmustberecoveredbyintegratinganumberoflocalmeasurements.
(BasedonHildreth1984a.)

Smoothsurfacesinmotiongiverisetosmoothvelocityfieldsintheimagethatis,thedirectionsandvelocitiesofnearbymotionvectorstendtovarycontinuously.
However,therearestillmanysmoothvelocityfieldsthatareconsistentwithanysetoflocalmeasurements.ThisledHildrethtoproposethefurtherconstraintof
choosingthesmoothvelocityfieldwiththeleastoverallvariation.Hildrethprovedthatunderquitegeneralconditionsauniquesmoothfieldwithminimumvariation
existsandcanbecomputedfromthelocalmeasurements.
Thisversionofthesmoothnessconstraintoftenyieldsanincorrectvelocityfield,however.Thatis,theactualvelocityfieldintheimageisdifferentfromthesmoothfield
withtheleastvariation.Thus,aperceptualsystemthatutilizesthesmoothnessconstraintwillincorrectlyperceivethemotionsandshapesofobjects.Atthispointthe
theoristhasanumberofoptions,whichincludeformulatinganotherconstraintorutilizingothersourcesofinformation.Hildrethalsoconsideredthepossibilitythatthe
humanvisualsystemactuallydoesobeythesmoothnessconstraint,makingitsusceptibletocertainkindsofmotionillusions.Computationsbasedonthesmoothness
constraintagreewellwithanumberofknownpsychologicalphenomenainmotionperception(Hildreth1984a,b),predictingbothcasesofcorrectandcasesofillusory
perception.Figure12.16illustratestheresultforthebarberpoleillusion.Thehelicalstripeonabarberpoleappearstomovedownward(orupward),althougheach
pointontheimageofthestripemoveshorizontally.Thesmoothestvelocityfieldforthebarberpolestripeturnsouttobevertical,predictingtheillusion.The
perceptionofthepoleisprofoundlyambivalentbecausewesimultaneouslyperceivedownwardmotionandthefixedpositionofthepole.Theperceptionofthefixed
positionofthepoleandourknowledgethatitismerelyrotatingcannotovercometheperceptionofverticalmovement,however.Thissuggeststhatthemotion
computationinvolvedisprimitiveandisolatedfromsomeoftheothersourcesofinformationthatmightinformit.

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Figure12.16
Thebarberpoleillusion.(a)Arotating,transparentbarberpole
withasinglehelicalstripe.(b)Theimageofthestripeandthe
actualvelocityfield,symbolizedbytheshortlinesegments
attachedtovariousportionsoftheimage.(c)Theinitial
perpendicularvelocityvectorsextractedbylocal,aperturerestricted
measurements.(d)Thevelocityfieldcomputedbyintegratingthe
localmeasurementsusingtheleastvariationconstraint.The
computedvelocityfieldisincorrect,showinguniformdownward
motioninsteadofthehorizontalmotionsin(b),butitagreeswith
ourillusoryperception.(ReprintedwithpermissionfromHildreth1984b.)

NeuralNetworkModelsofMotionComputationAnumberof.connectionistandneuralnetworkmodelsofvisualmotioncomputationhavebeenproposed.Wang,
Mathur,andKoch(1990)arguethattheactivityofdirectionselectiveMTneuronsrepresentsthevelocity,oropticalflow,field.Theyproposeaneuralnetworkfor
computingtheopticalflowfieldthatincorporatesthesmoothnessconstraint.Althoughthemathematicalfoundationsofthemodelaretoocomplicatedtopresenthere,
ablockdiagramispresentedinfigure12.17.Theresponsesofunitsinthemodelcloselyparalleltheresponsesofactualneuronstostimuli,similartothebarberpole,
thatproduceillusorydirectionsofmotion.Inonesuchexperimentapatternofverticalstripesmovinghorizontallyissuperimposedonapatternofhorizontalstripes
movingvertically.Humanobserversperceiveaplaidpatternmovinginadiagonaldirection,eventhoughallpointsintheimagearemovingeitherhorizontallyor
vertically.Thediagonaldirectionispredictedbythesmoothnessconstraint.ThirtypercentofMTneuronsandtheopticalflowunitsatthetoplevelofthemodel
respondwiththeperceiveddiagonaldirection.Directionsensitiveneuronsintheprimaryvisualcortexandtheinitial

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Figure12.17
AblockdiagramofWang,Mathur,andKoch'sopticalflowmodelwithpossibleneuronal
correspondences.Thesustainedchannelcarriestheoutputsofretinalunitsthatcomputethe
local,circularMexicanhatoperatordiscussedearlierinthechapter(seefigures12.3and12.4).
Theseunitsrespondtolocalspatialvariationsinintensitythatarerelativelystableovertime.The
transientchannelcarriessignalsfromunitsthathavethesamespatialprofilesbutthatrespondonly
torapidtemporalchangesinlocalcontrast.Theorientationselectiveunitscorrespondtothecortical
simplecellsdescribedearlier(figures12.9and12.10).Themodelcombinesthesignalsinthe
sustainedandtransientchannelstofeeddirectionselectivecorticalsimplecellsthataresensitiveto
orientededgesthataremovinginadirectionperpendiculartotheedge.Bothtypesofunitsare
commonintheprimaryvisualcortex.Anopticalflowunitrepresentsaparticularspatiallocationand
directionofimagemotion.Foreachpointintheimagethereareflowunitsthatrepresentanumberof
differentdirectionsofmotion.Thecodingofdirectionisrelativelycoarse,andtheopticalflowateach
pointintheimageisrepresentedbythepopulationofresponsesofalltheflowunitsforthatpoint.
Eachflowunitreceivesinputfromallorientationselectiveanddirectionselectiveunitsatitsspatial
location.Theseinputstendtoforceflowcellstorespondintermsofthelocalmotiondatathatthey
carry.Eachflowunitisalsoconnectedtootherflowunitsthatencodeotherdirectionsofmotionand
neighboringspatiallocations.Theselateralinteractionsadjusttheresponsesoftheflowunitssothat
theyyieldasmoothflowfieldinwhichmotiondirectionsinnearbyregionsaresimilar.Thejoint
influenceofthelowerlevelunitsandthelateralinteractionsproducesasmoothflowfieldthatis
reasonablyconsistentwiththelowerleveldataandthatagreeswithperceivedopticalflowforvarious
laboratorydisplays(seetext).(AdaptedwithpermissionfromWang,Mathur,andKoch1990.)

directionselectiveunitsinthemodelrespondonlytothehorizontalandverticaldirectionsofthecomponentstripedpatterns.ThemodelthusmakesthecasethatMT
computesasmoothedvelocityfieldthatisnotpresentatlowerlevelsofthevisualpathway.
12.4HighLevelVisualProcesses
TheGoalsofHighLevelProcessing
Highlevelvisualprocessescompletethejobofdeliveringacoherentinterpretationoftheimage.Itisassumedthatthelowlevelandintermediateprocessesmake
availableauseful,segmentedrepresentationofthetwoandthreedimensionalstructureoftheimage.Thehighlevelprocessesmustdeterminewhatobjectsare
presentinthesceneandinterprettheirinterrelations.Forexample,theintermediaterepresentationofanoutdoorscenemightcontainalarge,greenish,texturedblob,
connectedtoahorizontal,greenish,texturedsurfacebelowitbyabrownish,verticallyoriented,cylindrical

Page491

shapethatbifurcatesintotheblob.Highlevelprocessesmightinterpretthesesegmentsasthecrownofatree,alawn,andthetree'strunk.Thehighlevelprocesses
mightalsoidentifyseveralconnectedrectilinearsurfacesasthewallsandroofofahouseandmightconfirmthatonewallofthehouseextendsbehindthecrownofthe
tree.Obviously,theidentificationofobjectsandtheirinterrelationsprovidestheinterfacebetweenvisionandgeneralknowledge.Forexample,identifyingalarge
objectinasceneasahousevastlyexpandstherangeofpotentialthoughtsandactionsbearingontheobject.Withouttheidentificationtheperceiverwouldbeableto
approachthehouse,avoidcollidingwithit,determinewhetheritstopsurfaceswereaccessiblefromthebranchedobjectnexttoit,andsoon.Withtheidentification
anastonishingrangeofhighlydetailedinformationbecomesinstantlyavailable,whichcanbeusedtoguidemundaneactionssuchasopeningthefrontdooror
sophisticatedproblemsolvingprocessessuchasestimatingtheprobableincomeandpoliticalviewsoftheinhabitants.Thispowerfulinterfacebetweenvisionand
generalknowledgeisperhapsthemostimportantthingthatdistinguisheshumanvisionfromthevisualcapacitiesofotheranimals.
Anadditional,controversialproblemconcerninghighlevelvisionistheextenttowhichhighlevelprocessesassisttheoperationoflowerlevelprocesses,throughthe
topdownflowofhypothesesaboutwhatispresentintheimage.Forexample,theidentificationofthehouseandtreeintheoutdoorscenemightassistlowerlevel
processesintheirsegmentationoftheareaoftheimageintheregionofthetree,makingitpossibletoconfirmthehypothesisthatawallofthehouseextends
continuouslybehindthetree,formingasinglesurfacethatispartiallyoccludedandshadowedbythetree.Manycomputervisionsystemsmakeextensiveuseofthis
kindofmodelorhypothesisdriventopdownprocessing(HansonandRiseman1978bBinford1982).Althoughtheroleoftopdownprocessinginhumanvisionis
hotlydebated,wewilllargelyassumethatlowerlevelprocessesdeliverrelativelyreliableinformation,allowingustoconcentrateonproblemsthatarespecifictohigh
levelvision.Morespecifically,wewillconcentrateontheproblemofidentifyingindividualobjectsandleaveasidetheadditionalproblemsthatarisewhentryingto
arriveatarepresentationofanentirescenecontainingmultipleobjects,supportingorbackgroundsurfaces,andpossiblyahorizonorskyline.
TheProblemsofHighLevelProcessing
Evenifweassumethathighlevelprocessesoperateonreliablerepresentations,thejobofinterpretationisformidable.Theinformationintheintermediate
representationmustsomehowbematchedtoinformationabouttheappearanceofthousandsofobjectsthatisstoredinalongtermmemory.Theintermediate
representationisrelativetothepointofviewoftheperceiver.Itisaviewercenteredrepresentation.Muchoftheinformationinitisnotstrictlyrelevanttothe
categorymembershipoftheobjectsinthescene.Forexample,thedistancefromtheviewerandtheorientationrelativetotheviewerofanobject'ssurfacesarenot
intrinsiccharacteristicsoftheobject.Arefrigeratordoesnotceasetobearefrigeratorifitismovedclosertotheobserverorrotatedslightlyrelativetotheobserver.
Furthermore,inaviewercenteredrepresentationinformationthatisrelevanttotheidentificationofanobjectcanbeoccludedbytheobjectitselforbyotherobjects.
Fourofthesixsidesofarefrigeratormightbeinvisiblefromaparticularobservationpoint,andhalfofoneofthevisiblesidesmightbeoccludedbynearbycabinetry.

Page492

Muchobjectidentificationisalsomoreproperlycharacterizedasvisualcategorization.Thatis,itrequirestheassignmentofanovelobjecttoacategoryforexample,
recognizingthatapreviouslyunseenrectangularsolidisarefrigeratorratherthanatelephoneboothorachinacabinet.Aviewofaparticularobjectcontainsa
tremendousamountofvisualdetail,onlysomeofwhichisrelevanttoitscategorymembership.Thedetailsofarefrigeratormightincludethedoorhandleandthecolor
ofthedoorthehandle,whichmightbepartiallyoccludedbyadishtowelthreadedthroughit,isrelevanttoitsidentity,andthecolor,whichmightbehighlysalient,is
not.Somehow,theconcretedetailavailableinintermediaterepresentationsmustbematchedagainstthenecessarilyabstractrepresentationsofvisualcategories.
Finally,humanobjectidentificationisremarkablenotonlyforitsflexibilitybutalsoforitsspeed.Atypicalresultfromlaboratoryexperimentsinpsychologyisthata
photographofanarbitrarycommonobjectwithnosceniccontextcanbeidentifiedinanexposureof100millisecondsorless(Biederman1985).Givensuchabrief
exposure,asubjectcantypicallyspeakthenameoftheobjectinabout800milliseconds.Suchresultsconfirmtheefficiencyoflowlevelvisualprocesses,butthey
alsodemonstratetherapidactivationofvisualcategoriesinlongtermmemorybyvisualinput.Biederman(1985)hasestimatedthattheaverageadultcanrecognize
exemplarsfromroughly3,000basicvisualcategories,manyofwhichcontainseveraldistinctvisualtypes(forexample,floorlampsversustablelamps).The
recognitionofeachofthesecategoriesiscomplicatedbythefactorsjustmentioned,suchasvariationsinorientation,occlusion,andtheabstractnessofthecategories.
Atheoryofobjectrecognitionshouldgivesomeaccountofthisremarkableefficiency.
BasicIngredientsofHighLevelProcessing
Thecentraltheoreticalprobleminobjectrecognition,then,istoexplainhowabstractrepresentationsofvisualcategoriesinlongtermmemory(LTM)canberapidly
retrieved,orindexed,bytheinformationpresentinloworintermediatelevelrepresentationsofvisualinput.AproposedLTMrepresentationmustexpressthe
distinguishingcharacteristicsofvisualcategoriesinavocabularythatiseitherimmediatelyavailableoreasilycomputablefromintermediaterepresentation.Inorderto
handlethehumanabilitytomasternewvisualcategories,therepresentationmustinsomesensealsobehighlygeneral.
Acrucialsubproblemistospecifyhowthedecompositionofobjectsintopartsfiguresintherecognitionprocess.Ourknowledgeofobjectsintimatelydependsonour
knowledgeoftheirparts,anditseemslikelythatdecompositionintopartsplaysanimportantroleintherecognitionprocessaswell.Forexample,incasesofpartial
occlusiontherecognitionofapartcandrivetherecognitionoftheentireobject.Aslapstickexampleisrecognizingthepresenceofanotherpersoninaroomfrom
seeingapairoffeetprotrudingbeneathacurtain.Theuseofpartsalsoseemslikelytobecrucialinrecognizingdeformableornonrigidobjects,suchasshirts,people,
orbeercans.However,partscanbeusefulinrecognitiononlyiftheycanbeatleastpartiallydeterminedonthebasisoftheintermediaterepresentationpriorto
identification.Thatis,thesystemmustbeabletocarveanobjectupintoitspartsbeforerecognizingit.Inasense,thisisanotheraspectofthesegmentationproblem.
Afinalprobleminobjectrecognitionistherepresentationofshape.Althoughfeaturessuchassize,color,andtextureplayaroleinrecognition,shapeisacriticaland
oftendominantfactor.Ourabilitytoeasilyrecognizeblackandwhitelinedrawingsof

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commonobjectsprovidesinformalevidenceofthecentralroleofshapeinrecognition.Linedrawingslacktherichvariationincolor,texture,andshadingthatis
presentinnaturalandphotographicimages,yetinlaboratorysettingstheycanberecognizedandnamedwithvirtuallyequalspeedandaccuracy(Biederman1985).
Comingupwithaplausibletheoryofshaperepresentationisadauntingproblemforthetheorist,however.Shapesseemtohavelimitlessvarietyandsubtletyandto
evokecomplexestheticresponses.WouldanyvisualtheoristdaretakeontheproblemofexplainingthepainterGeorgiaO'Keeffe's(1976)mentalrepresentationof
organicforms,forexample?Someresearchershaveaddressedtheproblembydevelopinggeneralmathematicaldescriptionsofshapethatmakenocommitments
regardinghumanshapeprocessing(Bradyetal.1985).Themathematicalprerequisitesforthisapproachruleoutfurtherdiscussionofithere.Othershaverestricted
themselvestotheproblemofrapidrecognition,arguingthattheinitialactivationofLTMshapedescriptionsinvolvesaratherqualitative,finite,andcoarseencoding
(Biederman1985RichardsandHoffman1985).Crudelyput,theargumentisthatrecognizinganirisorapearinonetenthofasecondrequiresaroughandready
formofshapeindexingthatdoesnotencodethedetailedconfigurationoftheparticularshape.Wewillsaymoreaboutthissecondapproachinthefollowingsection.
TheoriesofObjectRecognition
Therequirementsjustdiscussedsuggesttheoutlineofahighlevelprocessorthatiscapableofrecognizinganobjectinanimage.Theobjectasawholemustbe
segmentedfromtherestoftheimage.Here,weassumethatlowerlevelprocessesaccomplishthisjob.Theobjectmustbesegmentedintoparts.Theshapesofthe
partsandtheirinterrelationsmustthenberepresentedinawaythatissuitableforindexingacatalogueofvisualcategories.
FindingPartsHoffmanandRichards(1984)haveshownthatanobjectcanbenaturallysegmentedintopartspriortodescribingtheshapesoftheparts.Theybase
theiranalysisofpartsonapowerfulgeometricregularitycalledthetransversalityprinciplethatapplieswhenatwopartobjectisformedbystickingtwopieces
together.Figure12.18illustratesthatthejointbetweenthetwopartsformsadiscontinuitythatisconcave,orpointingintotheobject.Giventhisregularity,wecan
dividethesurfaceofathreedimensionalobjectintopartsbyfindingcontoursofconcavediscontinuity.Asthefigureillustrates,thejointbetweentwoclearly
perceivablepartsofanobjectcanalsobesmooth.Insuchcasesthetransversalityprinciplefailsbecausetherearenodiscontinuouscreasesontheobject:theentire
surfaceoftheobjectiscontinuous,orsmooth.Tocoverthesecases,HoffmanandRichardsdevelopageneralizationoftransversalitythatfindslocalpointswherethe
curvatureofthesurfacehasthegreatestconcavityrelativetothesurroundingarea.
Segmentinganobjectatthepointsofmaximumlocalconcavitygenerallyaccordswellwithimmediateintuitionsabouttheboundariesofparts(asidefromsome
interestingquestionsaboutthestatusofdepressionsandholes).Amoresubtleindicationofthepsychologicalcorrectnessoftheprincipleisthatitpredictsthe
segmentationofwellknownreversingfigures,someofwhichareillustratedinfigure12.19.
Assumingtheusefulnessoftheprincipleofsegmentingobjectsattheirconcavities,thenextquestioniswhethertheconcavitiescanbelocatedreliablyinlowor
intermediatelevelvisualrepresentations.HoffmanandRichardsarguethatthethree

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Figure12.18
Thetransversalityprinciple.(a)Whenonepieceofstovepipe
isstuckintoanotherone,thejointbetweenthetwoparts,marked
byadottedline,isaconcavecrease.Ingeneral,suchcreasesidentify
boundariesbetweenparts.(b)Inmanycases,suchasthistreebranch,
theboundarybetweenpartsissmooth.Inthesecasesthepartboundary
canbeidentifiedwithacontourthatfollowspointsofmaximumconcave
curvature.(BasedonHoffmanandRichards1984.)

dimensionalpartboundariescanindeedberecoveredfromlowerlevelrepresentations.Forexample,aconcavityonthesurfaceofanobjectcanshowupasa
concavityinthelinethatdefinestheboundary,orsilhouette,oftheobjectintheimage.Conversely,concavitiesinthetwodimensionalsilhouetteofanobjectcanbe
interpretedascuestothepresenceofthreedimensionalparts.Thisconcavityprincipleisqualitativeinthesensethatthepresenceofapartcanbedetectedovera
widerangeoforientations.
HoffmanandRichards'sworkisanotherexampleofthesearchforhighlygeneralconstraintsoruniformitiesinthephysicalworldthatareencodedbytheimage
formationprocess.Theirgeneralizationofthetransversalityprinciplehassomeverypromisingpropertiesforthedevelopmentofatheoryofhighlevelvisual
processing.Partscanbeidentifiedinanintermediaterepresentationthatcontainsonlylocalinformationaboutsurfacecurvature.Thus,thedescriptionoftheglobal
shapeofanobjectoritspartsdoesnothavetoprecedesegmentationintoparts.Sincetheprocedurefindsthesamecutpointsoverarangeoforientations,italso
doesnotrequireanintermediaterepresentationthatcontainshighlyaccuratedepthinformation.
RepresentingShapeAwidelysharedapproachtoshaperepresentationistodecomposetheproblemofrepresentingtheshapeofanentireobjectintotheproblemof

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Figure12.19
HoffmanandRichards'ssegmentationprincipleshelpexplaintheappearance
ofreversingfigures.(a)Thereversinggobletcanbeseeneitherasagoblet
orastwohumanprofiles.Whyarethetwoperceptionssoincompatible?One
reasonisthatthesegmentationpointsforthegobletaredifferentfromthose
fortheface.Thetoparrowisasegmentationpointforthegobletbecauseitis
alocalpointofmaximumconcavecurvature,whereconcavityisdefinedas
''pointinginto''thefigure.Whenthefacesareperceived,thefigureshiftstothe
othersideofthecontourconcavitiesbecomeconvexitiesandviceversa.Thus,
theupperarrownolongermarksasegmentationpoint,andthelowerarrowmarks
anewsegmentationpoint.Whatwasapointofconvexityonthegoblethasbecome
apointofconcavityontheface.(b)Thereversingstaircasecanbeseeneitherasa
staircaseviewedfromaboveorasastaircaseviewedfrombelow(formostviewers
thebelowviewemergesspontaneouslyafterstaringatthefigureforawhile).Inthe
aboveviewthetwodotsonthestaircaseappeartobeonthesamestairbecausethe
edgebetweenthemisconvexrelativetothestaircase.Inthebelowviewthetwo
dotsappeartolieondifferentstairsbecausetheedgebetweenthemisnowconcave
relativetothestaircase.(AdaptedfromHoffmanandRichards1984.)

representingtheshapesofitspartsandthenrepresentingthespatialrelationsoftheparts.Ifanobjectissegmentedatconcavities,thenthereisalimittothecomplexity
oftheshapeofasinglepart.Itisstillaformidableproblemtodevelopaplausiblerepresentationforsimplepartsandtestitforpsychologicalvalidity.
Researchershavetypicallyarguedagainstdetailedtemplatesforshapeandinfavorofdescriptionsbuiltfromsomefiniteprimitivevocabularythatallowsthebasic
formofaparttobecompactlydescribed.Anumberofplausiblesystemsofshapedescriptionhavebeeninvestigated.Wewilldiscussthetechniqueofgeneralized
cylinders(orcones),whichhasplayedakeyroleinseveraltheoriesofshape.Theconceptisillustratedinfigure12.20.Wecanthinkofacylinderasgeneratedby
movingacirclealongastraightlinethatisperpendiculartoitscenter.Wecanthengeneralizethisnotioninvariousways:wecanmoveanytwodimensionalshape
alonganaxiswecanallowtheshapetoexpandorcontractwecanallowtheaxistobecurved.Clearly,therepresentationofanobjectasageneralizedcylindercan
bequitecompact,consistingofdescriptionsofitscrosssectionalshape,theundulationsofitsaxis,andtherateofexpansionandcontractionofthecrosssection.The
representationalproblemisfurthersimplifiedifwerestrictourselvestodescribingparts,becauseacomplexgeneralizedcylinderwillgenerallyhavelocalconcavities
thattriggersegmentationintoparts.Forexample,althoughthewineglassinthefigureisasingle,rathercomplexgeneralized

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Figure12.20
Generalizedcylinders.Ineachobjectthedashedline
representsthecentralaxisoftheobject.Theobjectscan
bedescribedintermsofthemovementofacrosssectional
shapealonganaxis.Cylinder:acirclemovesalongastraight
axis.Cone:acirclecontractsasitmovesalongastraightaxis.
Pyramid:asquarecontractsasitmovesalongastraightaxis.
Americanfootball:acircleexpandsandthencontractsasit
movesalongastraightaxis.Horn:acirclecontractsasit
movesalongacurvedaxis.Wineglass:acirclecontracts
andthenexpands,creatingconcavesegmentationpoints
markedbyarrows.

cylinder,itcanbesegmentedintoabowl,astem,andabase,eachofwhichhasasimpledescription.Animportantresearchquestion,ofcourse,isjusthowadequate
thegeneralizedcylinderrepresentationisfortherangeofobjectsthatthehumanvisualsystemcandealwith.
Assumingthatgeneralizedcylindersareusedtorepresentparts,thenextquestioniswhetherthecorrectrepresentationofapartcanbederivedfromitsmoreprimitive
andlocalrepresentationintheloworintermediateleveldata.Marr(1977)andBiederman(1985)havearguedthattheinformationavailableatlowerlevelscandrive
theconstructionofgeneralizedcylinderrepresentationsquitenaturally.Biederman,forexample,proposesthataloworintermediatelevelrepresentationthathas
beensegmentedforpartsallowstheefficientidentificationoffourparametersforgeneralizedcylinders,whereeachparametercantakeononlytwoorthreequalitative
values.Hisschemeisgivenintable12.1.
Biedermanarguesthateachoftheparametervaluesisreflectedinaregularityinlowerlevelrepresentations.Forexample,acurvedcontourintheimagealwaysarises
fromacurvedthreedimensionalcontour.Astraightcontourtypicallyarisesfromastraightthreedimensionalcontour(withtheexceptionofrareviewsofcurved
contourswherethecurvatureliesstrictlyinaplanethatcontainsthelineofsight).Thus,thetwoparametersthatinvolveaqualitativedistinctionbetweenstraightness
andcurvaturecanbeidentifiedwithhighreliabilityfromlowerlevelrepresentations.Theiridentificationisalsonotverysensitivetoshiftsinviewpoint.Similar,though
somewhatmorecomplex,argumentscanbemadeconcerningthesymmetryandconstancyofcrosssectionparameters.

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Table12.1

ThefourshapeparametersinBiederman's(1985)theoryofrapidobjectidentification
Parameter

Possiblevalues

Example

Edgesofcrosssection

Straight

Rectangle

Curved

Circle

Symmetryofcrosssection

Shapeunchangedbyrotationor
reflection

Circle,square

Shapeunchangedbyreflection

Ellipse,rectangle

Asymmetrical

Trianglewiththreeunequalsides

Sizechangeofcrosssection

Constant

Cylinder

Expands

Cone

Expandsandcontracts

Football

Curvatureofaxis

Straight

Cone

Curved

Horn

Inprinciple,thissimplifiedsetofparametersisrichenoughtosupportrapidobjectrecognition.Sincethevalueofeachparametercancombinewithanyofthevalues
oftheotherparameters,Biederman'sschemegenerates36typesofparts(2 3 3 2).Ifweassumethatobjectstypicallyhavetwoormorepartsandthatthe
partscanbejoinedintwoormoreways,aspaceofseveralmillionpotentialobjectsisgenerated.Anumberofotherapproachestoshaperecognitionhaveasimilar
thrust,forexample,thoseofMarrandNishihara(1978)andRichardsandHoffman(1985).
TheimportanceofthesegmentationprocessissuggestedbyoneofBiederman's(1985)psychologicalexperiments.Linedrawingsofcommonobjectsweredegraded
intwowaysbydeletingpartsoftheircontours.Nonrecoverabledeletionswereperformedbydeletingtheconcavitiesthatspecifythesegmentationoftheobjectinto
itsparts.Enoughoftheregionoftheconcavitywasdeletedthatthecontourscouldnotberecoveredbyextendingwhatremainedintothedeletedarea.Recoverable
deletionsweremadebydeletinganequalamountofcontourinplacesthatdidnotdestroythesegmentation.Whensubjectstriedtoidentifytheobjectsafterbrief
exposuresrangingfrom100millisecondsto5seconds,therecoverablepicturesprovedtobemuchmoreidentifiablethanthenonrecoverablepictures.Thisresult
demonstratesthehighinformationvalueofregionsofconcavityandbyinferencetheiruseinsegmentation.
RepresentingtheEntireObjectAtheoryofobjectrepresentationmustspecifynotonlyavocabularyofpartsbutalsoamethodofdescribingthearrangementsof
partsintoentireobjects.Thisisoneofthemostdifficultproblemsinhighlevelvision.Manyresearchershavearguedthatthepartsofanobjectoughttobegivena
hierarchicalrepresentationinwhichsomepartsarerepresentedrelativetooraspartofotherparts(MarrandNishihara1978).Forexample,anarmcanbethought
ofasasinglepartofthehumanbody.Itcanalsobebrokendownintothreeparts:theupperarm,theforearm,andthehand.Thehandcanbefurtherbrokendown
intofingers,andsoon.
Hierarchicalrepresentations,inwhichtheobjectisbrokendownintopartsthatareinturnbrokendownintoparts,havevarioustheoreticaladvantages.Theycapture
naturallythevaryingsizes,orspatialscales,ofparts,whichpotentiallyallowsaparttobeidentifiedfromacrudelargescaledescriptionwithoutreferencetoits
subparts.

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Thus,anarmcouldbeidentifiedsimplyasanelongatedcylinderwithoutrequiringfullsegmentationofthehandandfingers.Similarly,afingercouldbeidentifiedasa
smallerscaleelongatedcylinder,ignoringawartthatwassegmentedasapartbutisirrelevanttoidentification.Hierarchicalrepresentationcanalsohelpsolvethe
problemofrepresentingvariationinhowthepartsofanobjectarearranged.Afinger,forexample,canhavemanydifferentspatialrelationstotherestofthebody,
causedbyarm,hand,andfingermovement.Clearly,therangeoffingerpositionsshouldbedescribedrelativetothehandandnotrelativetothearmortotheentire
body(sinceonoccasionthetipoftherightlittlefingerwillappear,forexample,stuckintotheleftear).
Ifthepartsofanobjectarerepresentedasgeneralizedcylinders,thenmuchoftheinformationaboutthespatialarrangementofthepartscanbecapturedby
describinghowtheaxesofthecylindersareinterrelated(MarrandNishihara1978).Thus,wecanrepresenttheaxisofafootrelativetotheaxisofaleg:theendof
thefootaxisbeginsroughlyattheendofthelegaxisitisorientedatroughlyrightanglestothelegaxisitpointsinaforwarddirectionundernormalconditionsitcan
rotatetoaspecifiedrangeofpositionsthatcombinesidetosideandupwarddownwardmovement.Inthiskindofrepresentationthepositionoftheaxisofevery
subpartisdescribedrelativetotheaxisofitsimmediatesuperordinatepart.Theultimatereferenceaxisistheoverallaxisofthebiggestpartortheentireobject.The
majoraxisforthehumanbodywouldbetheaxisofthetorso.Suchrepresentationsaregenuinelyobjectcenteredbecausetheymakenoreferencetotheviewpointon
theobjectinanimagethatis,themajoraxisisnotrequiredtobepositionedinanyspecifiedwayrelativetotheimagecoordinates.Thehumanbodywouldbe
accordedthesamedescriptioninfrontviewandthreequarterview,forexample.SuchrepresentationsarealsocalledcanonicalbecauseasingleLTMdescription
characterizestheobjectregardlessofviewpoint.
Ahierarchicalrepresentationthatisorganizedaroundaqualitativedescriptionofpartsandtheirrelationsisclearlycloselyrelatedtoformsofknowledge
representationthathavebeenhypothesizedfornonvisualconcepts.Itisaschemaorframeforrepresentingvisualinformation.Atthislevelofencoding,visualand
nonvisualknowledgeareinasimilarenoughformattointeracteasily,andmanyofthegeneraltechniquesdevelopedfornonvisualknowledgecanbeappliedinthe
visualdomain.Wecanmakeuseofpointerstootherframes,defaultvalues,rangesofvalues,andexceptionhandling.Infact,weinnocentlyusedexamplesofvisual
knowledgeinearlierchapterswithoutexploringallofthecomplexitiesinvolved.Ifourframeforabactriancamelspecifiestwohumps,wenowknowsomethingabout
howtodescribethehumpsinawaythatisusefultohighlevelvisualprocessing:theymaybedescribedasgeneralizedcylinderswithacertainparametricdescription,
andtheiraxeshaveaspecifiedspatialrelationtotheaxisofthecamel'sbody.Furthermore,wenowhaveabetterideahowthehumpsmightbeidentifiedintheimage,
beginningwithlowlevelprocessesthatfindthelocalintensitychangesthatmarktheirboundariesandcontinuingontoahighlevelprocessthatsegmentsthemfrom
therestofthecamel.
TheRetrievalProcessLetusfinallyconsidertheremainingproblemsthatmustbeovercomebyaprocessthatcanretrieveanobjectcenteredrepresentationfroma
largeLTMcatalogueonthebasisoflowerlevelinformation.Anobjectcenteredrepresentationmustbebuiltfromthelowerlevelinformation.TheLTMcatalogue
mustthenbesearchedforpossiblematches.Wecanimaginethisbeingaonestepprocessora

Page499

cooperativeprocessinwhichpartialdescriptionsactivatepossiblematchesthatguidetherefinementofthedescription.
Oneproblemthatcanariseinbuildingahighleveldescriptionisthattheviewpointontheobjectmaydistortsomeoftheneededparametersbeyondrapidrecovery.
Forexample,theaxisofageneralizedcylinderisseverelydistortedintheimageifitisnearlyalignedwiththelineofsight.Itmaybedifficulttorecoverit,even
qualitatively.Asecondproblemisthatoneormorepartsmaybepartlyorcompletelyoccludedintheimage.Figure12.21suggeststhatthehighlevelprocessesinthe
humanvisualsystemareaffectedbythesefactors.Anuprightwineglasswithitsmajoraxisfairlyperpendiculartothelineofsightseemsmorefamiliarandeasierto
identifythanforeshortenedandoccludedviews.
Psychologicalexperimentsconfirmthisimpression.Palmer,Rosch,andChase(1981)photographedasetofcommonobjectsfromtwelvedifferentviewpoints.One
groupofsubjectsratedeachviewpointofeachobjectfortypicalityorfamiliarity.Anothergroupofsubjectshadtonamethephotographsinarapididentificationtask
inwhichtheirnamingresponsetimeswererecorded.Thetypicalityratingsoftheviewpointspredictedtheresponsetimesverywell.Itisimportanttonotethatthis
experimentalso

Figure12.21
Somedistortionsthatcaninterferewithrapidobject
identification.(a)Anidealviewofawineglass.The
partsandtheirsegmentationpointsarevisible.The
majoraxisoftheshape,shownbythearrow,isroughly
perpendiculartothelineofsight,allowingeasyrecovery
ofageneralizedcylinderdescription.(b)Aforeshortened
viewofthewineglass.Oneofthesegmentationpointsis
completelyoccludedandtheimageofthemajoraxisof
theglassismuchshorterthantheactualaxisinthree
dimensionalspace.(c)Thewineglassisoccludedbyanother
surface,makingitdifficulttofindanddescribeallofthe
parts.(d)Aradicallyforeshortenedview.Thestemiscompletely
occludedbytheglassitself,andthemajoraxisisseverely
distorted.(e)Aninvertedview.Inversioncanleadto
misdescriptionbecausetheidentificationprocesstendsto
assumethatobjectsappearinstandardverticalorientations.
Thatis,thetopoftheobjectdefinedintermsofthecurrent
viewpointisassumedtocorrespondtothetopoftheobject
definedintermsofobjectcenteredcoordinates.Inthiscase
whatisactuallythebaseoftheglassmightbemisdescribedasitstop.

Page500

confirmsthathumanhighlevelvisualprocessescancopewithunusualviews,althoughatreducedefficiency.
Anatypicalornonpreferredviewmightslowtheidentificationprocessdowninseveralways.Becauseofocclusionorsevereforeshortening,onlyafewofthepartsof
theobjectmightbedescribable.Retrievalonthebasisofafewpartsmightbeslowerthanwhenmorepartsarepresent.Forexample,Palmer,Rosch,andChase's
rearviewofahorsecompletelyobscurestheaxisofthetorso,oneofthefrontlegs,andtheface.However,theneck,thetail,andthreeofthelegs(althoughnottheir
positioningonthetorso)areclearlyvisible.ItmighttakelongerforthisreduceddescriptiontoactivatetheLTMrepresentationofahorse.Theactivationmightalsobe
soweakthatthehighlevelprocessesmightrefinethedescriptionoftheimageonthebasisofthehorsehypothesisinordertocheckitscorrectness.Therefinement
processmightnoticetheears,whicharebarelyvisible,oritmightchecktomakesurethatthepositionsofthelegsintheimageareconsistentwiththeLTMmodel
underforeshortening.
Humanhighlevelvisualprocessesalsoseemtohavesomespecialpropertiesthatreflectourecologicalnicheandpossiblysomeneurophysiologicaldesign
compromises.Onepropertyisthepervasivenessofthegravitationallydefinedupwarddirectioninvisualprocessing(ShepardandHurwitz1984).Theupdown
directionintheenvironmentissometimesassignedbydefaultasthemajoraxisofanobjectintheimage,andtheupwarddirectionisassignedbydefaultasindicating
theheadortopoftheobject(Rock1973).Theinvertedwineglassinfigure12.20isaweakcaseofthisphenomenon,whichdoesnotinterfereverystronglywith
identification.Toappreciatethepointbetter,noticethatitisrelativelyeasytoseetheinvertedwineglassasaflaskwithaplaterestingonitstop,whereasitis
somewhatmoredifficulttoseeanuprightwineglassasaninvertedflaskrestingonaplate.ItseemsthatmanyLTMrepresentationsspecifythatthemajoraxisofthe
objecthasaspecificorientationwithrespecttogravity.Unexpectedorientationscanslowdownorintroduceerrorsintotheidentificationprocess.
Theremarkablebutveryslowactingprocessofmentalrotation,whichwasdescribedinchapter2,issometimesrequiredtoconstructcomplexdescriptionsof
disorientedobjectsbeforetheycanbematchedtorepresentationsinmemory.Mentalrotationisnotrequiredtoidentifyaninvertedwineglassbecausetheaxesofits
threepartsaresimplyconnectedendtoendandtheentireobjecthasahighdegreeofsymmetry.Objectswithleftrightasymmetryandmorecomplexdescriptions,
however,oftencannotbematchedwithoutmentalrotation.Asstatedinchapter2,thereissomeevidencethatsuchfinegrainedmatchesarenotevenperformed
directlyonschematicdescriptions.Instead,itappearsthattheschemasmustbereadintoaspecialvisualbufferthatrepresentstheobjectfromaviewpointandthus
hasmanyofthepropertiesofa"highlevel"butstillviewercenteredrepresentation.
AlternativeApproachestoObjectRecognitionTheapproachtoobjectrecognitiondevelopedabovewasmotivatedinpartbytherecognitionthatthemany
possibleviewsofanyreasonablycomplexobjectwillproduceawiderangeoflowleveldescriptionsthathavelittleincommonwitheachother.Thus,theLTM
representationcouldnotbeanimagecenteredorviewercenteredtemplateoflowlevelinformation(intensityvalues,contours,orthelike)thatcouldbematched
directlyagainsttheimage(aftersomerepositioningandsizescaling)inrecognition.Insupportofthisintuition,templatematchingapproacheshadanearlyhistoryof
limitedsuccessincomputervision.

Page501

Bybreakinguptheimageofanobjectintonaturalparts,classifyingthepartsintermsoforientationindependentproperties,anddescribingthestructuralrelationsof
theparts,therecognitionbycomponentsschemedescribedabove,andsimilarschemes,attempttoovercomethechallengestoobjectrecognition.
Morerecently,analternativemethodofobjectrecognition,calledthealignmentapproach(Ullman1989),hasbeenshowntohavemuchoftherequiredflexibilityas
wellassomeuniquestrengths.Thealignmentapproachwasmotivatedinpartbysomepotentialdifficultieswiththeuseofsimplepartsandrelationsforobject
recognition.Oneproblemisthecrudenessofthepartdescriptions.Partswithdifferentappearanceswilloftenbeassignedthesameshapedescriptionifwearelimited
totheparametersintable12.1.Thesamedescription,forexample,mightbegiventotworatherdifferentwineglasses,theoneinfigure12.21andanotherwitha
shorterstemandwiderbowlofthesameheight.Asecondproblemisthatsomethreedimensionalobjectsaredifficulttobreakintotheappropriatekindsofparts
(Ullmangivestheexampleofashoe).
Inthesimplestversionofthealignmentmethodthelongtermrepresentation,ormodel,ofanobjectisapictorialview,whichrepresentsthecontoursoftheobject
fromapointofview.Threealignmentpointsarealsoassociatedwiththeobject.Thesepointsarelocatedateasilyidentifiablepositions,suchasconcavitiesor
curvaturemaxima.Whenanovelobjectispresented,amodelcanbematchedagainstitinathreestageprocess.First,threecorrespondingalignmentpointsarefound
ontheimage.Second,themodelandtheimagearealignedbymappingthepointsinthemodelontothepointsintheimage.Themathematicalrelationshipbetweenthe
twosetsofpointsuniquelydetermineshowmuchthemodelwouldhavetoberescaledinsizeandrotatedinordertomatchtheimage.Thereasonforthisisthatthere
aregeometricallydeterminedlimitstothemannerinwhichthespatialrelationsamongthealignmentpointsintheimagecanchangewithchangingviews.Inthethird
stepthealignmentpointsintheimagearebroughtintoregistrationwiththealignmentpointsontherescaledandrotatedmodel,andthedegreeofmatchbetweenthe
entireimageandtheentiremodeliscalculatedbymeasuringhowcloselytheircontoursagree.Iftheimageisindeedanimageofthemodeledobject,thegeometryof
themethodguaranteesaclosematch.
Thisversionofthemethodcannotcopewithmanyproblemsdiscussedabove,butUllmanhasproposedvariousplausibleextensions,includingtheuseofmore
alignmentpoints,theuseofmultiplemodelviewsofanobject,andcombiningtheapproachwiththeuseofdescriptions.Healsoarguesthatthealignmentprocessisas
feasiblecomputationallyasprocessesthatusepartsandrelations.Computerimplementationsofthemethodhavebeensuccessfulinrestrictedvisualdomains.
Thereissomeevidencefromhumanobjectrecognitionthatisconsistentwiththealignmenttheory.Sensitivityofobjectrecognitiontovariationsinsizeandorientation,
forexample,couldreflectanalignmentstage.Ontheotherhand,Biederman'sapproachalsopredictsmanyoftheseeffects,andithandleseffectsthatposesome
difficultyforthealignmenttheory(HummelandBiederman1992).Forexample,thedegreeofmatchinthealignmentmethodismeasuredalongallofanobject's
contours,regardlessoftheobject'sdescriptionintermsofparts.But,aswaspointedoutabove,humanrecognitionisdifferentiallyaffectedbynonrecoverableas
opposedtorecoverablecontourdeletions.

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12.5TheArchitectureofVisualComputation
Wehavefocusedonafewofthetasksofvision,forexample,theextractionofcontour,texturalgrouping,theextractionofmotion,findingparts,anddescribing
objects.Thereareanumberofothertasksthatwehavenothadthetimetoaddressindetail,suchastheperceptionofcolorandbrightness,theperceptionofshape
fromshading,andtheperceptionofdepth.Acrucialadditionalissueinthecomputationalstudyofvision,however,ishowthemanytasksofvision,atboththelower
andthehigherlevels,areintegratedintoafunctioningsystem.Therearequestionsabouthowindependentlyeachofthetasksofvisioniscarriedout,aboutthepoints
atwhichtheyshouldinfluenceeachother,andabouthowtheyarebroughttogethertoproducethefinaloutputsofthesystem.Addressingthesequestionstendsto
raisetheissueofhowvisualcomputationisactuallyimplementedinneuralcircuitry.Wecanapproachthembylookingfurtheratwhatisactuallyknownaboutvisual
anatomyandphysiologyandbylookingatconnectionistmodelsthattacklesomeofthelargerproblemsofvision.
VisionandtheBrain
Wehaveseenthatthecomputationofeachtypeofinformationtendstobeintenselyparallel.Inlowlevelvisualprocesses,forexample,thesamecomputationis
performedonallofthe(overlapping)localareasoftheentireimage.Suchcomputationsareintrinsicallyparallelinthesensethatthecomputationineachlocalareais
independentoftheresultsinalloftheotherareas.Allofthelocalcomputationscanproceedsimultaneously.Inthecaseofcontourextractionandmotiondetectionwe
sawthatbiologicalvisionsystemsdoindeedcomputeinparallel.Onalargerscale,fromfigure7.10,wehavethegeneralnotionthatbiologicalsensorypathwaysare
organizedintoparallelpathways,eachofwhichhashierarchicalstructureaswell.Computationally,visioniswellsuitedtothisorganizationbecausethereareanumber
ofdifferenttypesofinformationthatcanbeextractedfromimagesindependently(color,depth,contour,etc.)andbecausetheoverallproblemiscomplicatedenough
thatinformationhastoberefinedandcombinedthroughanumberofstagesinordertocomputethedesiredoutputs.
ThePrimateVisualPathwayThereisconsiderableevidencethatatthehigherlevelsvisualcomputationisorganizedintotwomaincomponents,awhatsystem,
concernedmainlywithidentifyingorcategorizingtheobjectsinthevisualfield,andawheresystem,concernedwithlocationsofobjectsandsurfacesinthevisualfield.
Attheoutputlevel,thewhatsystemisassociatedwiththeinferiortemporallobe,andthewheresystemisassociatedwiththeparietallobe(seefigure7.3and
associatedtext).Althoughthetwosystemsmustinteractinordertobindobjectidentitiestopositionsinspace,theyoperatewithconsiderableintegrity.Forexample,
UngerliederandMishkin(1982)trainedmonkeystoassociatefoodeitherwithashapeonthecoverofacontainerorwiththespatiallocationofthecontainer.
Monkeyswithparietallesionscouldperformtheshapetask,buttheirperformanceonthespatiallocationtaskwasseverelyimpaired.Monkeyswithtemporallesions
couldperformthespatiallocationtaskbutwereseverelyimpairedontheshapetask.Recordingsfromsinglecellsinthetworegionsconfirmthispicture.Temporal
cellshavelargereceptivefieldsthatincludethecentralportionoftheretina(fovea),andsomeofthemrespondtospecificshapes,suchasfacesorhands(Desimone
1991).Parietalcellsaresensitivetospatialpropertiesofvisualstimulation.Forexample,thedirectionofgazemodulatestheresponsesof

Page503

somecellsthathavelocalizedreceptivefieldsontheretinalimage(Andersen,Essick,andSiegel1985).Suchcellsareprobablyinvolvedinthetransformationfrom
imagebasedspatialrepresentationtoheadbasedspatialrepresentationthatmustbeaccomplishedbythevisualsystem.Thistransformationisnecessarybecausethe
systemultimatelymustcomputewherethingsareintheworldasopposedtowheretheyareontheimage.Thecorrelationbetweenimagepositionandworldposition
changeswitheyemovement.ZipserandAndersen(1988)havedevelopedaconnectionistmodelinwhichhiddenunitslearntocomputethetransformationbetween
thetwocoordinatesystems.
Thefunctionalsignificanceofthewhatwhereseparationisprobablythenaturaldistinctionbetweentheidentityofanobjectanditsposition.Generally,spatialposition
relativetoviewpointisnotcorrelatedwithobjectidentity,sinceobjectsoccuratvariousdistancesandanglesofview.Itwouldbeinefficientandperhapsimpossibleto
wireupacorticalmapinsuchawaythatafullsetofobjectrecognitionmachinerywaspresentateverylocationinthemap.Itmakesmoresensetohaveasingle
systemforobjectrecognitionandtheabilitytodynamicallybindcurrentobjectstospatialpositions.Amechanismofvisualattentionisalsorequiredtorestrictobject
recognitionmachinerytoasingleobjectatagivenmoment,aswellasawayofcomputingamapofthreedimensionalvisualspacethatisindependentofpriorobject
recognition.
Thevariouskindsofinformationavailabletolowlevelvisionmustbecomputedanddeliveredappropriatelytothewhatandwheresystems.Theprincipalknown
anatomicalpathwaysfromretinatoinferotemporalandparietalcortexareshownschematicallyinfigure12.22.Aswesawinchapter7,thesegregationofvisual
processingintoparallelstreams,orsystems,beginswiththeganglioncellsontheretina(figure12.9).Therearetwotypesofganglioncells,distinguishedbythesizesof
theircellbodies,theshapesoftheirdendritictrees,andtheirresponseproperties.ThesmallPcellsprojecttotheparvocellularlayersofthelateralgeniculatenucleus
(LGN)ofthethalamus(figure7.3),andthelargeMcellsprojecttothemagnocellularlayers.Intheprimaryvisualcortex(VI)themagnocellular(M)streamis
maintained,andthePstreamdividesintotwoseparatestreams,theparvointerblob(PI)andtheparvoblob(PB).Thethreestreamsaremaintained,withvarious
crossconnections,throughfurtherprocessinginvariouscorticalareasuntiltheyfinallyfeedtheoutputsystems.
Therelationshipsbetweenthetripartiteanatomyandcomputationalfunctionarecomplexandfarfromfullyunderstood(DeYoeandVanEssen1988Livingstoneand
Hubel1988).ThecomplicatedrelationshipsbeginwiththeprimitivedistinctionbetweenMandPcellsintheretinaandLGN.Thetwotypesofcellsarespecialized
forthedetectionofdifferenttypesofprimitiveimageinformation.TheparvocellsintheLGNhavesmallreceptivefields,makingthemsensitivetolocalcontrastthey
respondslowlybutgivesustainedresponsestheyoperateathighcontrastandtheyhavewavelengthpreferences.Theresponsepropertiesofmagnocellsare
complementary.Theyhavelargereceptivefields,makingthemsensitivetoareacontrasttheyrespondquicklyandtransiently(thatis,theirresponsetoastimulusdies
outveryrapidly)theyoperateatverylowcontraststheyarenotwavelengthselective.Sincebothtypesofcellsexistinbotheyes,binoculardisparityinformationcan
becomputedinprocessingstreamsthatderivefrombothchannelsaswell.ThehighspatialresolvingpowerandwavelengthselectivityoftheparvoLGNcellssuggest
thatthePstreamofprocessingwillbeheavilyconcernedwiththeperceptionofshapeandcolor.ThetransientpropertiesandhighsensitivityofthemagnoLGNcells
suggeststhattheMstreamof

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Figure12.22
Schematicdiagramoftheprimatevisualpathway.VIthroughV5areareasofthevisualcortex.Layers
refertothefactthatthecortexismadeupofdistinctlayersofcells.Blobsandstripesrefertothe
microscopicappearanceofareasofthecortexafterstaining.Solidlinesrepresentextensiveconnections.
Althoughthediscussionemphasizestheflowofinformationfromlowertohigherlevelsofrepresentation,
thereareextensivebackwardconnectionsinmostcases.Dottedlinesrepresentpossibleconnections.
(AdaptedwithpermissionfromDeYoeandVanEssen1988andfromKandel1991).

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processingwillbeheavilyconcernedwithmotioncomputations.Theseexpectationshavelargelybeenborneout,withanumberofcomplications.
ThePBstream,whicharisesfromparvocellularinputs,appearstobededicatedtocolorperception.Cellsinthispathwaytendtoshowwavelengthselectivitybutnot
otherkindsofselectivity,forexample,formotionororientation.Thehierarchicalstagesofthepathwayareprobablyinpartrequiredforcolorconstancy
computations.Thespectralcompositionofthelightreflectedfromasurfacevarieswiththespectralcompositionoftheilluminatinglight.Byandlarge,weseea
particularsurfaceashavingaconstantcolorunderchangingillumination.Somehowthevisualsystemmanagestocompensatefortheeffectsoftheillumination.The
responsesofPBcellsintheprimaryvisualcortex,however,arenotcolorconstant.Theconstancymustariseatalaterstage(perhapsinV4)viaspatialinteractions
acrosstheimage.
ThePIpathwayisamajorinputtotheinferotemporalcortex.PIcellstendtobeorientationsensitiveandtohavehighacuity.Thesefactssuggestthatthestream's
primaryjobistheanalysisofshapeviacontour.ThepresenceofwavelengthsensitivityinPIprocessingisprobablyduetotheusefulnessofcolorcontrasts(inaddition
tointensitycontrasts)incontourdetection.ColordifferencesinthischannelmayconstitutewhatDeYoeandVanEssen(1988)callaconcealedcuetoform.Thatis,
thewavelengthinformationiscontributingtoformperceptionratherthantocolorperception.Binoculardisparity,orstereopsis,informationmayalsobepresentinthe
PIpathwayinpartbecauseofitsusefulnessinshapeperception.Stereoscopicinformationcanspecifythatdifferentpartsofanobjectareatdifferentdistancesfrom
theperceiverandthushelptocontributethethirddimensiontotheperceptionofashape.TheconnectionfromthePIstreamtotheparietalcortexprobablyreflects
thepotentialPIcontributionstospaceperception.Stereoinformationfromahighacuitychannelandperspectivecuesfromcontourinformationcouldcontributeto
spaceperception.
ThemultipleconnectionsoftheMpathwaytoareaMTarenotsurprising,giventheevidence,discussedabove,thatitisconcernedwithmotioncomputations.The
presenceofstereoselectivityintheMstreamprobablyreflectstheneedtoultimatelycomputemotionindepth(althoughitappearsthatMTdoesnotfullyaccomplish
this).Thepresenceoforientationinformationmayreflecttheusefulnessoflocalcontrastinformationinmotiontracking,aswellastheneedtocomputethemotionof
entirecontoursasopposedtolocalizedspots.TheconnectionfromthePIsystemtotheMsystemconfirmsWang,Mathur,andKoch'stheory(figure12.17)that
sustainedcontourinformationisneededtoconstrainthevelocityfieldsmoothingcomputationswithinMT.SignalsfromtheMtothePIpathwayalsomakesense,
becauseinformationabouttheshapeofanobjectcanberecoveredfromitsmotion.
LimitstoParallelisminVisionFigure12.22suggestsacompleteparallelisminthevisualpathway,butdetailedshapeanalysisandobjectrecognitioncannotbedone
inparallelacrossthevisualfield.Inpartthisisbecauseoftheindependenceoftheinferotemporalshapeanalysissystemfromspatialposition,notedabove,andinpart
itisbecauseofanunequaldivisionofresourcesbetweenthecentralregionoftheimageandtheperiphery,whichextendsfromtheretinathroughthevisualcortex.
Manyoftheganglioncellsinthecentral,fovealportionoftheretinahaveverysmallreceptivefields,makingtheiroutputssuitablefordetailedpatternanalysis.The
ganglioncellsintheperipheryhavelargerreceptivefields.Theperipheralretinaisessentiallyspecializedforaroughertakeontheimage.Eyemovements,whichare
oftencuedbymotionintheperiphery,functiontobringregionsofthevisualfieldtothecenteroftheretinal

Page506

image,initiatingmoredetailedprocessing,particularlyhighresolutionpatternprocessing.Thecentralportionoftheretina,whichisonlyabout2.5degreesindiameter,
projectstoabout25percentoftheprimaryvisualcortex(DeValoisandDeValois1990).Fullvisualanalysisofascenerequiresaseriesofeyemovementsand
fixations,allowingdifferentregionsofthescenetoenterthelimitedwindowofmaximumqualityvisualcomputation.
Oneaspectofvisualattention,then,isvoluntaryeyemovements.Therealsoseemstobeanadditionalinternalattentionalmechanismthatisrequiredtoprocess
objects.Thereisevidenceofvariouskindsthattheextraordinaryparallelismofthevisualsystembreaksdownataboutthepointwherethevarioussourcesof
informationavailableinaregionoftheimagehavetobeboundtogetherintoarepresentationofanobject.Treisman(1985)foundevidenceofillusoryconjunctions
ofsimplevisualfeaturesinpreattentivevision.Forexample,inabrieflyexposedarrayofseverallettersofdifferentcolorsasubjectwilloftenreportlettercolor
combinationsthatwerenotpresentinthedisplay.Ifthesubjecthastolocatealetterofaparticularcolor(e.g.,agreenT)inafieldofdistractors(redTsandgreen
Ss),responsetimeriseswiththenumberofdistractorspresent,indicatingthatthesubjecthastomakeanattentiondemandingserialsearchforthetargetconjunction.
Targetsthataredistinguishedbyasinglelowlevelfeature(e.g.,agreenTamongredTs)seemto''popout,''howeverresponsetimestaysconstantwithincreasing
numbersofdistractors.Inthiscasethesearchisdoneinparallel,reflectingtheparallelorganizationoflowerlevelvision.Inadditiontofeaturebinding,visualattention
appearstoberequiredforotherrelativelysimplevisualtasks,suchasdecidingwhetheroneobjectisinsideoroutsidetheboundariesofanother.Ullman(1984)calls
therequiredprocessesvisualroutines.Theneurallocusofvisualattentionisunknown(CrickandKoch1990explorestheissue).
Treisman(1992)andothers(e.g.,Feldman1985)havepointedoutthatthephenomenaofvisualattentionandeyemovementsrequiretheexistenceofascenebuffer
ofsomesortthatcanholdtherepresentationofasceneasitisbuiltup.Forexample,theremustbeatemporaryrepresentationofthecurrentoccurrenceofanobject
(anobjecttoken)inadditiontoitslongtermrepresentation,whichisusedforobjectrecognition.Theneuralmechanismsinvolvedareagainunknown,althoughthe
needfortemporaryobjecttokenssuggeststhattheinferotemporalareashouldnotbelookeduponasmerelyarepositoryofvisualcategoryinformation.
ConnectionistApproachestoVision
Itisimportanttorealizethattheanatomicalconnectionsandneuronalresponseselectivitiesdiscussedabovefallfarshortofprovidingacompletetheoryoftheneural
architectureofvision.Evenatlowlevelsofthesystem,andincreasinglyathigherlevels,verylittleisknownabouthowtheneuralrepresentationatagivenlevelis
actuallycomputedbyneuralcircuitry,or,inmanycases,evenaboutjustwhattheneuralrepresentationis.Theincreasinglydetailedknowledgeofanatomical
connectionsandcellresponseproperties,however,providesafertilegroundforconnectionistmodeling.Theknownneurophysiologicaldetailscanbeusedto
constrainconnectionistmodels,andthemodelscanbeusedtoguidefurtherresearchintoneuralcomputation.ThemodelsofWang,Mathur,andKoch(1990)andof
ZipserandAndersen(1988),mentionedabove,arebothcaseswhereknowledgeoftheinputsandoutputsofaneuralsystemwereusedsuccessfullytoconstrainthe
developmentofaneuralnetworkmodel.

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AnotherinstructiveexampleisLehkyandSejnowski's(1990)modelofshapefromshading.Theproblemofshapefromshadingistocomputeinformationaboutthe
threedimensionalshapeofanobject'ssurfacesfromtheshadingofthesurfaces.TheinputunitstothemodelhadstandardMexicanhatreceptivefieldsontheimage.
Theoutputunitscodedtheorientationandcurvatureofthesurfacesdepictedintheinputimage.Ahiddenlayerofunitswastrainedwiththebackpropagation
algorithmtocomputethemappingfromtheinputunitstotheshapeunits.Surprisingly,withtraining,thehiddenunitsdevelopedresponsepropertiesthatweresimilarto
thoseofcorticalsimplecells.Thatis,theyrespondedmaximallytoorientedlocaledgesorbars.Onelessonthattheresearchersdrewfromthemodelwasthatthe
computationalfunctionofapopulationofneuronscannotalwaysbededuceddirectlyfromtheneuronalresponseproperties.Itisusuallyassumedthatthecortical
simplecellsareengagedinthecomputationofcontours,sincetheyrespondtoorientededges.Yetthemodeldemonstratedthatsuchcellscancomputeshapefrom
shading(undertheconditionsusedinthesimulation).
Theconnectionistliteraturecontainsmanyideasabouthowdifferenttypesoflowerlevelinformationcaninteractinthecomputationofhigherlevelinformation.In
somecasesaconstraintrelationshipexistsbetweentwotypesofinformationthatcanbecomputedindependently.Oneexampleisthatinformationabouttheedgeofa
surfacecomingfromedgecomputationcanconstrainthecomputationofsurfaceorientationfromshading.Althoughthisconstraintisrathermathematicalinthegeneral
case,BarrowandTenenbaum(1981)presentasimpledemonstrationofaspecialcase,showninfigure12.23.Whentheedgeofasurfaceisqualitativelyinconsistent
withitsshading,thecurvatureduetoshadingisnotperceived.Thiskindofconstraintcouldbeimplementedbyconnectionsbetweenaprimalsketchsubsystemanda
shapefromshadingsubsystem.
Inothercaseslocalrepresentationsmustbeaggregatedtoexplicitlycodemoreglobalsegments.Here,unitsrepresentingthemoreglobalsegmentsmustbeexcitedor
inhibitedbyunitsrepresentingrelevantlowerlevellocalfeatures.Onesimpleexampleistheuseofconnectionstofindlong,straightlinesfromarawprimalsketchthat
containsonlyshort,locallinesegments.Figure12.24showsthatalinecanberepresentedasapairofvalues:adistancefromtheoriginandanorientation.Wecan

Figure12.23Anexampleoftheinteractionofintrinsicimagecomputations.Theshadingin
both(a)and(b)indicatescurvaturearoundaverticalaxis.Theoutlinein(a)isconsistentwith
thiscurvature.Theoutlinein(b)indicatescurvaturearoundahorizontalaxisandthusis
inconsistentwiththeshading.Inthiscasetheoutlineinformationdominatestheperception,
andtheinconsistentshadinginformationseemstobesuppressed.(AdaptedfromBarrowand
Tenenbaum1981.)

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Figure12.24
Anexampleofhowconnectionscanbeusedtoachieveglobalsegmentations
fromlocalfeatures.Inthiscasethelocalorientededgesegmentsfoundbyprimal
sketchcomputationsmustbegroupedintothelinesthattheyarepartof.Attheline
representationlevelthereisaunitforeachpossiblegloballine.Thecircleontheline
representationgraphrepresentssuchaunit.Alineintheimagecanbedescribedbytwo
parameters:adistancefromtheorigin,andananglethatthedistancevectormakeswith
thexaxis.Thus,eachlinerepresentationunitrepresentsapotentiallineintheimagewitha
particulardistancefromtheoriginandorientation.Connectionsbetweenprimalsketchunits
andlineunitscanbemadeinsuchawaythateachprimalsketchunitisconnectedtothe
lineunitsthatitisconsistentwith.Theconnectionsbetweenthreeprimalsketchunitsand
theconsistentlineunitareshowninthefigure.Whenalineispresentinanimage,it
activatesmanyedgesegmentunitsattheprimalsketchlevel,whichinturnactivatea
singlegloballineunitatthelinerepresentationlevel.(Redrawnwithpermissionfrom
Ballard1984.)

postulatealevelofrepresentationinwhichthereisaunitforeachpossiblecombinationofdistanceandorientation.Intherawprimalsketchalinesegmentis
representedbyits(x,y)locationandorientation.Wehavealreadypostulatedalevelofrepresentationatwhichthereisaseparateunitforeverycombinationof
locationandlocalorientation.Infact,thesimplecorticalcellsseemtobepreciselysucharepresentation.Now,wecanimagineexcitatoryconnectionsbetweeneach
localsegmentunitandthegloballineunitswithwhichitisconsistent.Agloballineunitwillbecomehighlyactivatedonlyifitis"votedfor"bymanylocalsegments.
Grossbergandhiscolleagues(GrossbergandMingolla1985isarepresentativepaper)havedevelopedanetworkmodelofvisionthatstressestheinterplaybetween
aboundarycontoursystem(BCS)andafeaturalfillinginsystem(FCS).TheBCSdevelopscontourinformationinmuchthewaywehavedescribed,althoughit
containsinterestingmechanismsforextendingandcompletingcontours.TheFCStendstospreadfeatures,suchascolor,butthespreadingisstoppedatboundaries
byinhibitoryconnectionsfromtheBCS.Themodelexplainsanumberofcounterintuitivephenomenaincontour,texture,andcolorperception.
Theapplicabilityofconnectionistideasshouldextendtohighlevelvision.Withinthefocusofvisualattention,forexample,therecognitionofsimpleobjectstakes
underasecondandisthereforesubjecttothehundredsteprule(seechapter2).Anywelldevelopedtheoryofobjectrecognitionposessignificantchallengesfor
connectionistmodeling,however.Aswesawabove,Biederman'stheoryofobjectrecognition,forexample,requiresquiteabitofstructuraldescription.Thefeatures
ofeachofthepartsofanobject,calledgeons,mustbeinaparticulararrangement(e.g.,circularcrosssection,parallelsides),andthegeonsthemselvesmustbeina
particularspatialarrangement(inawineglassthebaseisattachedtothestem,whichisattachedtothebowl).

Page509

Figure12.25
AnoverviewofthefirstthreelayersofHummelandBiederman'smodel,indicatingtherepresentation
activatedateachlayerbytheimageinthekey.Inlayer3largedotsindicateactiveunits,andsmall
dotsinactiveunits.UnitsinlayerIrepresentlocaledgesegments.Unitsinlayer2representvertices,
axes,andblobs(enclosedareas)definedbyconjunctionsofedgesinLayer1.Layer3representsthe
geonsintheimageintermsoftheirdefiningdimensions:axisshape,straight(s)orcurved(c)cross
sectionshape,straightorcurvedwhetherthesidesareparallel(p)ornonparallel(n)coarseorientation,
vertical(v),diagonal(d),orhorizontal(h)aspectratio,elongated(long)toflattened(flat)fine
orientation,vertical,diagonaltotheleft,diagonaltotheright,orhorizontalinoneoffourpossible
orientationsindepthhorizontalpositioninthevisualfield,left(1)toright(r)verticalpositioninthe
visualfield,bottom(b)totop(t)size,small(near0percentofthevisualfield)tolarge(near100
percentofthevisualfield).Notethataparticulargeonattributecanbeexcitedbymorethanonegeon
intheinputforexample,bothgeonsintheinputshown(coneandbrick)havestraightcrosssections.
(AdaptedwithpermissionfromHummelandBiederman1992.)

Wesawinchapters2and3thatstructuredrepresentationscanbedifficulttoencodeinconnectionistnetworks.Biederman'sobjectdescriptionsposeasevere
versionofthebindingproblem,introducedinsection3.3.Thefeaturesofeachgeoninanobjectmustbeproperlyboundtogether,andallthegeonsmustthenbe
properlyboundtoeachother.However,HummelandBiederman(1992)havedevelopedaconnectionistmodelfortherecognitionbycomponentstheory.Like
ShastriandAjjanagadde(1992),theysolvethebindingproblemviathesynchronousfiringofnodes(seefigure3.5andtheaccompanyingdiscussion).Throughoutthe
model,unitsrepresentingitemsthatareboundtogetherfireinphase.
Theinputunitstothenetworkencodelocaledgeinformation,andtheoutputunitsrepresentobjectidentities.Thecomputationbreaksdownintotworoughstages:
findingthegeonsandfindingtheirrelations.Thefirstthreelayersofthemodelarediagrammedinfigure12.25.Thereareappropriateexcitatoryandinhibitory

Page510

Figure12.26
ConnectionsbetweenlayerIandlayer2ofHummelandBiederman'smodel.(a)Thetypesofvertices
detectedinlayer2.(b).Anillustrationofthemappingfromtheedgeunitsatagivenimagelocationin
layer1toavertexunitinthecorrespondinglocationinlayer2.Ateachimagelocationinlayer1there
isafullcomplementofunitsthatdetectlocaledgetypes.Segmentunitsdetectstraightorcurvedoriented
edgesthatrunthroughtheentirereceptivefield.Terminationunitsdetectstraightorcurvedorientededges
thatterminatewithinthereceptivefield.Ateachimagelocationinlayer2thereisaunitforeachtypeof
vertexateachorientation.Detectingavertexofaparticulartypeandorientationataparticularlocationis
amatterofdetectingaconjunctionofappropriateedgeterminations.Thus,asshown,eachvertexunit
receivesexcitatoryconnectionsfromitsconstituentterminationunitsinlayerIandinhibitoryinputfrom
inconsistentedgeunitsinlayer1.(AdaptedwithpermissionfromHummelandBiederman1992.)

Page511

Figure12.27
Anexampleofhowfeaturesaregroupedintogeonsusingchainsoffastenablinglinks
(FELchains).Thecirclesontheimageillustratetheareaoftheimagerepresentedby
LayerIcellsrespondingtothatportionoftheimage.Forexample,theunitslabeledIand
3respondtothefront,upper,leftvertexofthebrick.Theconnectionsbetweenunitsshown
areFELs.ThenumbersintheunitsrepresentstepsintheFELchainoriginatingatpointA
andterminatingatpointBonthebrick.WhenunitI,representingpointA,fires,itcauses
unit2tofireinsynchronyviaaFELsignal.Thiseventcausescellslabeled3tofire,and
soonuntiltheprocessreachespointB(unit11).BecauseofthepropertiesofFELsignals,
allunitsarethenfiringinsynchrony.

connectionsbetweenedgeunitsinlayerIandthevertex,axis,andblobunitsinlayer2.Figure12.26illustrateshowedgeunitsareconnectedtovertexunits.Layer3
isnotanimagemap.Thereisoneunitforeachgeonfeature,atotaloffiftyeight.Unitsinlayer2exciteconsistentgeonfeaturesinlayer3.Forexample,forkand
arrowvertexunitsinlayer2excitethestraightcrosssectionunitinlayer3.CurvedLandtangentYvertexunitsexcitethecurvedcrosssectionunitinlayer3.Within
layer3thereareinhibitoryconnectionsbetweeninconsistentgeonfeatures.Forexample,thestraightandcurvedcrosssectionunitsinhibiteachother.
Themodelassofardescribeddoesnotsolvethebindingproblem.Forexample,thereisnorepresentationofwhichverticesaregroupedintothesamegeon.Infigure
12.25sixLvertexunitswillfireinlayer2,butthereisnorepresentationofthefactthatthreeofthembelongtotheconeandthreetothebrick.Thebindingproblemis
solvedbyamechanismthatcausesthevertex,axis,andblobunitsbelongingtothesamegeontofireinsynchrony.Differentgeonsarerandomlyassignedtodifferent
phases.Forexample,infigure12.25thelayer2unitsbelongingtotheconewillfiretogetherinonephase,andtheunitsbelongingtothebrickwillfiretogetherina

Page512

differentphase.Geonattributeunitsinlayer3fireinphasewiththegeonstheybelongto.
SynchronousfiringisachievedinHummelandBiederman'smodelusingasecondkindofconnection,calledthefastenablinglink(FEL).FELsareindependentof
standardconnections.IftwounitsareactiveandshareaFEL,theyfireinsynchrony.TransmissionalongFELsisassumedtobefastenoughthatifachainofactive
unitsisconnectedbyFELs(aFELchain),alltheunitsfireinsynchrony.BindingviaFELchainsisillustratedinfigure12.27.Asimilarstrategyofsynchronousfiringis
alsousedhigherinthenetworktorepresentthestructuralrelationsofthegeons.
InmanyrespectsHummelandBiederman'smodelandtheircomputersimulationsofitarehighlyoversimplified.Themodelhasanimpoverishedvocabularyofgeons
andrelations.Itsonlyinputisacleanrepresentationoflocaledgeinformation.Naturalisticvisualinputisnoisierbutincludesmanymoresourcesofinformation.The
FELmechanismalsohasnoknownneurophysiologicalsubstrate.Nevertheless,themodelillustratesthataconnectionistapproachtocomplexobjectrecognitionis
feasible.
Researchonvisionisoneofthemostexcitingareasofcognitivesciencebecauseknowledgeoftheinputs,outputs,andneuralhardwareofthevisualsystemhas
advancedtothepointwheredetailedcomputationalmodelswithconsiderableneuralplausibilitycanbedeveloped.
SuggestedReadings
Seeing:Illusion,Brain,andMind(Frisby1980)isanintroductory,butveryrigorous,treatmentofsomeofthemainideasinthischapter.Vision:AComputational
InvestigationintotheHumanRepresentationandProcessingofVisualInformation(Marr1982)isaclassicbecauseofitsclearanddetaileddevelopmentofthe
cognitivescienceperspective.AlthoughsomeofMarr'sspecifictheoriesarelosinginfluence,thebookcontinuestorepaycarefulreadingforitsphilosophical
perspectiveanditsintegrationofthemethodsofAI,psychology,andneuroscience.Perception(SekulerandBlake1990)coversmanytopicsinthepsychologyand
physiologyofvisionandtheothersensesthatcouldnotbeincludedinthischapter.TheComputationalBrain(ChurchlandandSejnowski1992)introducesthe
connectionistapproachtovision.
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Page517

Index
A
A*algorithm,187189
Abeles,M.,306
Abelson,R.P.,33,112,163,452
Abrahamsen,A.,83,326
Abrams,T.W.,283
Absentqualiaproblem,365
Accusativecase,251260
Acetylcholine,280,282
Acheson,A.,287
Actionpotential,276280,284,297,324
Adams,M.J.,43
Adelson,E.H.,476
Adjective(Adjectivephrase),239,246,265,398
Afferentnerves,274
Ajjanagadde,V.,78,121,509
Akindof(AKO)hierarchies.SeeIsa,hierarchies
Alcock,J.,219
Algorithms,510,12,21,41,71
backpropagation,6870,76,94,115,168,198,324,325,507
andbiologicalrealism,323,324
learning,72,73,83,114,194,195,199,202212,325
linguistic,217
parallel,77,79
retrieval,73
search,177189
forvisualdepth,464465
Alignmentapproachtoobjectrecognition,501
Allen,J.,451
Allophones,229
Allport,F.,381
Alzheimer'sdisease,286
AM,142144,155,160,161,167,168,189,190,191,194,200,201,202,203
Amaral,D.G.,314
Ambiguity,242,252,368,409,417418,437445
Amnesia,62,109110,112114,312314
Analogcomputation,4853,339341
Anastasio,T.J.,325
Andersen,R.A.,274,325,502,503,506
Anderson,J.R.,20,31,34,58,59,60,63,83,103,104,105,123,135,399
Andy,O.J.,274
Anglin,J.,384
Apertureproblem,487488
Aphasia,314318
Apparentmotion,483
Appelt,D.,455
Appenzeller,T.,273,314
Aram,D.M.,290
Architectureofcognition.SeeCognitivearchitecture
ARCHLEARNER,157159,193,194,201,202,203,209,212
Armstrong,L.,12
Armstrong,S.L.,99
Ashley,K.D.,148,151,173
Aspiration,226230,234237,385
Assaf,A.A.,290
Associativenetworks,3032,36,37,3942,90,107,110,431.
SeealsoPropositionalnetworksSemanticnetworks
Atkins,P.,83
Attention,30,3742,5560,87,94,100,101,103,109,114,125,126,129,142,190,244,273
inimagery,4547
inlanguageacquisition,385,388
visual,503,506
Auditorycortex,298,299
Austin,J.L.,411,450
Automaticprocesses,5563,99,109,132135
Autonomyprinciple(Stich's),357358,361
Autosegments,237239
Availabilityheuristic,125127
Axons,276280,
growth,287290
ofganglioncells,294
B
Babbling,380381
Bach,K.,358
Backpropagationalgorithm,68
inAI,198
inconceptlearning,9495
andmemory,115
inNETtalk,76
neuralplausibility,324,325
andvision,325,507

Page518

Backwardchaining,130131,147148,166167,173,189190
Baker,C.L.,405
Baldi,P.,304
Ball,T.M.,47,48
Ballard,D.H.,71,431,508
Banerji,R.,203
Barlow,H.B.,294
Barr,A.,212
Barrow,H.G.,481,507
Barsalou,L.W.,95,96,97,98,135
Barwise,J.,414,415,424,425,432
Basalganglia,270,272
Basiclevelcategories,90
Bastiani,M.J.,288
Bauchot,R.,274
Baudry,M.,284
Bechtel,W.,83,326
Beethoven,L.van,17
Behaviorism,334,335337,338,339,350
Belew,R.K.,168
Bellugi,U.,385,388
Bern,S.L.,36
Benson,D.F.,309
Bergen,J.R.,475,476
Berman,H.J.,212
Bernstein,S.,36
Berwick,R.,387,401,406
Bestfitprinciple,73,82
Bever,T.G.,241,381,440
Biederman,I.,492,493,496,497,501,509
Bilabialstopconsonants,75,226228
Bindingtheory,262264,402403
Binford,T.,491
Binoculardisparity,294,464,503,505.
SeealsoStereopsis
Birnbaum,L.,453
Bjork,R.A.,101,107
Black,J.B.,34,105,106,112,453
Blackboardcontrolsystems,168,191193
Blake,R.,512
Blakemore,C.,321,473
Blaxton,T.A.,111
Blindsearch,177,178,182187
Bliss,T.V.P.,284
Block,N.,341,363,364
Bloom,L.,387
Bottomupprocesses,99,192,307,464,465.
SeealsoDatadrivenprocesses
Boundingtheory,264
Bower,G.H.,34,105,106,453
Bowerman,M.,387
Brachman,R.J.,155,157
Braddick,O.J.,483
Bradshaw,G.L.,104
Bradshaw,J.M.,108
Brady,M.,493
Braine,M.,386
Bransford,J.D.,104,107
Branting,L.K.,167
Breadthfirstsearch,182185,189
Broadbent,D.A.,41
Broca'saphasia,314318
Broca'sarea,274,309,314,318
Brown,J.S.,144
Brown,R.,386,388,395
Bryden,M.P.,319
Buchanan,B.G.,144,145,200
Burge,T.,360
Burton,G.J.,476
Byrne,R.M.J.,119
C
Caelli,T.,476
Cairns,H.,445
Campbell,F.W.,473
Candidateeliminationalgorithm(CEA),203,206,207,209,212
Cantor,J.,47
Cantor,N.,33,35
Caplan,D.,317
Caramazza,A.,311,318
Carbonell,J.,212
Carew,T.J.,283
Carey,S.,384
Carlson,G.N.,448
Carmichael,L.,381
Carpenter,P.A.,52
Cartesiandualism,332.
SeealsoDualism
Case(Linguistic),251260,261,263,265,266
Casebasedreasoning(CBR),118,148151,168,173,195,198,203
Categoricalperception,265,266,385
Categoriesandcategorization.SeeConcepts
Cazden,C.,388
Cellmigrationerrors,287288,322
Centralnervoussystem(CNS),270290
Centralstateidentitytheory(CSIT),350
Cerebellum,272,276
Cerebraldominance,318323
Cermak,L.S.,102
Chaffin,R.,28
Challis,B.H.,110
Changeux,J.,289,290
Changeux,J.P.,274,305
Chapman,J.P.,126
Chapman,L.J.,126
Charniak,E.,212
Chase,P.,499
Chase,W.G.,61,133
CHECKERPLAYER,193,203
Chiesi,H.L.,105,107
Cheng,P.W.,60,118
Cherniak,C.,273,277
Chessplaying,41,55,61,95,129130,132134,178,187,343,345,352353
Chi,M.T.H.,135

Page519

Chierchia,G.,432
Childs,B.,323
Chitty,A.J.,292
Chomsky,N.,219,241,244,252,260,261,262,265,267,334,394,396,397,398,399,403,404,405
Chugani,H.T.,289
Chunking,41,42,55,59,62,87,114,133,159,160,197,198
Churchland,P.M.,344,345,362,366,374,375
Churchland,P.S.,14,81,270,304,307,310,320,323,325,345,362,366,374,375,512
ChurchTuringthesis,21
Clancey,W.J.,164
Clark,E.,384
Classicalapproachtocognitivescience,20,63,7882,87,324,345
Clements,G.N.,267
Clifton,C.,440,443
Coarsecoding,303304,493.
SeealsoDistributedrepresentations
COBWEB,195
Cognitivearchitecture,1526
ofartificialintelligenceprograms,188192,197,199207
andautomaticprocesses,6163
blackboard,168
centralsystems,20
classicalapproach,1563,72,7882
andcognitiveskills,5563
connectionistapproach,31,6383
andgoalorientedthought,3739
globalview,1826
hybrid,167
individualdifferencesin,1618
inputandoutputsystems,19
andlanguage,231,240,266,269,399,436
andmemory,99,100,103,107,108114,312
andthephysicalsymbolsystemhypothesis,2026
andpropositional/schematicrepresentation,2637,87
andreasoning,117,120,121,129
andvision,502512
andvisualimagery,4254
andworkingmemoryandattention,3742
Cognitivepenetrability,43
Cohen,N.J.,115
Cohen,P.,451
Cohen,P.R.,212
Coindexing,252,256
Cole,W.,91
Collins,A.,90
Coltheart,M.,83,307
Columnarorganizationinthecerebralcortex,298,477478
Combinatorialsystems,5
Competence,34,7,82
linguistic,217219,244,373,403,404,409,435
Compiledprocesses,55,5960,61,134135
Complementarydistribution,227,229
Complementizers,218,398
Completenesstheorem,172
Complexcells,294,477,484
Compositionality(semantic),5,25,80,411,412,424,425,432
Compoundnouns,239,438
Computablefunctions,21
Computationalmapsinthecerebralcortex,301
Computers.SeeDigitalcomputers
Computersimulation,1112,72,323
Concatenation,4
Concepts,26,28,33,8799,384,409,411,431
inartificialintelligence,142144,153,160161,167168,173,195,198,200,201,208,209,212
basiclevel,90,195
complexityof,9598
forconcreteobjects,8790
connectionistapproach,7374,9395,301304
definitional(classical)theoryof,8788,99
exemplarmodels,9293
familyresemblancetheory,8890
propositionalnetworksfor,9092
theoreticalnatureof,9899
visual,498
Connectionism,20,26,6383,9698,198,341,342,344,351,361,431,436
attractionsof,7077
basicideas,6370
andthebrain,310,324325
andcognitivearchitecture,7782
cognitiveplausibilityof,7274
conceptlearningmodels,9395
hybridsystems,168
andlanguageacquisition,389391
andlanguageprocessing,445447,457
memorymodels,114116
neuralplausibilityof,7072
reasoningmodels,121123
visionmodels,488489,503,506512
Consonants,77,224,234,237,262,381,385,400
Constituencytests,242
Constituentstructure,242,248250,264,398
Contentaddressedmemory,36,73
Contrastivedistribution,227
Contrastsensitivityfunction,473475
Controlledprocesses,5558,60,61,130
ControlofprocessinAl,140141,142,168,177,189192
Convolutions,467469
Cooper,L.A.,49,52
Cooper,R.,414,415
Corkin,S.,312
Cornsweet,T.N.,461
Corpuscallosum,320

Page520

Cortex(cerebral),54,271,272275
columnarorganization,298
computationalmapsin,301
contralateralrepresentation,318319
development,287,289290,305
languageareas,309,314318
memoryareas,314
sensoryareas,293296
topographicmapsin,298299
visual,464,476478,484487,489,502506
Courchesne,E.,272
Cowan,W.M.,287,289
Cowart,W.,445
Craik,F.I.M.,102
Crain,S.,399,439,442,447
Crane,M.,36
Cresswell,M.,424,425
Crick,F.H.C.,324,506
Criticalperiods,290,306
Culicover,P.,405
Cummins,R.,375
Curtis,B.,83
Cutler,A.,457
Cutting,J.E.,266
Cynader,M.S.,298
D
Dale,P.,382,383
Danchin,A.,290
D'Andrade,R.,117
Datadrivenprocesses,56,166,190,192.
SeealsoBottomupprocesses
Davidoff,J.,311
Davis,L.,366
Davis,R.,142,164
Declarativeknowledge,26,30,32,33,5556,58,6162,100,108,109111,114,130,312314,369372
Deductivereasoning,1,116123,426427
inAlsystems,153,164,168173,197,203
connectionistmodels,120123,431
andmentalmodels,119120
andpragmaticreasoningschemas,118119
intheselectiontask,117118
Defaultvalues
inframes,159160
oflinguisticparameters,401
inobjectrecognition,500
DeFries,J.C.,323
deGroot,A.D.,132
Deletiontransformations,250251
Dell,G.S.,114
Dendrites,276277,289,324
Dennett,D.C.,191,352,354,374
Dennis,M.,291
Depthfirstsearch,182185
Descartes,331334
Desimone,R.,294,502
Determiners,247,388,415
Deutsch,G.,321
DeValois,K.K.,506
DeValois,R.L.,478,484,506
deVilliers,J.,383,406
deVilliers,P.,383
DevoicingruleinEnglish,232233
DeYoe,E.A.,503,505
Diamond,M.C.,305
Differenceoperatortable,192
Digitalcomputers,1112,2223,24,41,4546,71,78,79,81,111,171,337339,344,347,462,469
Digitalrepresentations,339341
Distalaccesstosymbols,24,36
Distributedrepresentations,72,8182,9697,351,361,431432,445
inNETtalk,7477
vs.singlecellrepresentationsinthebrain,301305
Dodd,D.H.,108
Doe,C.Q.,288
Domainofdiscourse,170,416,447
Dowty,D.,417,421,422,432,458
Dreyfus,H.,340,375
Dualism,332,337,338
Dudai,Y.,298,301,305
Duffy,C.J.,304
Dumais,S.T.,57
Dunbar,K.,93
Dyer,M.G.,453,454
Dyslexia,287288,307308,322
E
Easter,S.S.,289
Edelman,G.M.,305
Efferentnerves,274
Egar,M.,288
Eimas,P.D.,385
Ekelman,B.L.,290
Elaborationinhumanmemory,101106,107,108,110,114
Encodingspecificity,107
Encodingstrategiesinhumanmemory,101106,107
Engle,R.W.,47
EnrothCugell,C.,476
Entailment,410411,425,429,431
Episodicmemory,111114,116,195,312314
Epistemology,334,367373
Ericsson,K.A.,61
Erlich,A.,380
Erman,L.D.,191
Essick,G.K.,274,502
Etchemendy,J.,432
Ettlinger,G.,321
Evans,J.S.B.T.,118
Eventrelatedpotentials(ERP),306
Expectationdrivenprocessing,160.
SeealsoGoaldrivenprocessingTopdownprocessing

Page521

Expertproblemsolving,129,132135,140,166,192
Expertsystems,144148,164,190
Explanationbasedgeneralization(EBG),195198
Eyewitnesstestimony,106,108
F
Falkenhainer,B.,167
Familyresemblancetheoryofconcepts,8890,169
Fawcett,J.W.,289
Faye,D.,457
Feedforwardnetworks,63,74
Feigenbaum,E.A.,212
Feirtag,M.,325
Feldman,J.A.,71,506
Feldman,L.S.,318
Feldman,R.S.,284
Feltovich,P.J.,135
Ferguson,C.,395
Ferreira,F.,440,443
Fikes,R.E.,172
Finke,R.A.,48
Finucci,J.M.,323
Fiorentini,A.,478
Firstorderdifferenceoperator,467469
Firstorderpredicatecalculus(FOPC),117,168173,412415,417418,426,430
completeness,172
Fisher,D.H.,194
Fisk,A.D.,57,60
Fiske,S.T.,83,125
Fitts,P.M.,58,59
Flanagan,O.J.,375
Floresd'Arcais,F.B.,437
Flynn,M.S.,108
Fodor,J.A.,19,20,24,26,79,81,122,241,261,332,344,351,356,360,363,370,371,375,399,431,432,436,464
Fodor,J.D.,432
Folkpsychology,3
Fong,G.T.,128
Forbus,K.D.,167
Forebrain,271273
Formallevelofanalysis,57,910
Formalnatureofcomputation,611,2021,116117
Foss,D.,458
Fox,P.T.,110
Frames,33,96,142143,149150,159161,164,190191,368369,498.
SeealsoSchemasScripts
Franks,J.J.,107
Fraser,B.,386
Frazier,L.,406,440
Freerecall,101
Freeman,W.J.,298
Frege,G.,169,383,411,418,419,425
Fricative,220,225,400
Friedman,J.,318
Frisby,J.P.,469,512
Frontallobes,273274
development,279,289,290
andhandpreference,321
andlanguage,309,314
andmemory,110,113
Frostig,R.D.,292
Functionalpathwaysinthebrain,292297,502505
Functionalism,346355
generic,349352
machine,347348
psychofunctionalism,348349
G
Galaburda,A.M.,288,319,321,322,323
Gametrees,178,179,180,193
Ganglioncells,293294,476,503,505
Gapping,251
Gardenpathsentences,440,442443,445447
Gardner,A.v.d.L.,173
Gardner,H.,14,315,317
Garey,L.J.,289
Garfield,J.L.,261,360,375,399,436
Garon,J.,351
Garraghty,P.E.,298
Garrett,M.F.,241,457
Gazdar,G.,261
Gazzaniga,M.S.,320
Gee,J.P.,267
Gellman,L.,52
Genderschemas,36
Generalproblemsolver(GPS),129132,192
Generalizedcylinders,495499
Generalizeddeltarule.SeeBackpropagation
Generativegrammar,241,380
Generativerules,217
Genitivecase,251
Gentner,D.,167
Georgopoulos,A.P.,292,304
Gerstein,G.L.,306
Geschwind,N.,309,319,321
Gibson,J.J.,464,465
Gilbert,J.H.V.,290
Gillespie,L.L.,290
Glaser,R.,135
Glass,G.,28
Gleitman,H.,99,385,395,396,397
Gleitman,L.R.,99,385,395,396,397
Glialcells,275276
Globalminimum,68
Gluck,M.A.,324
Goals
andconceptlearning,9899
importanceincognition,23
andlanguageprocessing,451452
andmemory,107
insearchalgorithms,179,181189

Page522

Goals(cont.)
inSOAR,197
Goaldirectedthought,20,30,3742,55,61,116118,129,274.
SeealsoGeneralproblemsolver
Goaldrivenprocessing,165166,189,190,192.
SeealsoExpectationdrivenprocessingTopdownprocessing
Gdel'sincompletenesstheorem,172
Golding,A.R.,168
Goldman,A.,375
Goldsmith,J.,237,238,239,267
Goodglass,H.,317
Goodluck,H.,381,382,385,406
Gordon,H.W.,320
Governingdomain,253254
Government,caseassignmentunder,252259
Governmentandbinding(GB),241
GPS.SeeGeneralproblemsolver
Gracefuldegradation,71,73,80
Graf,P.,313
Grammar,215219,225,229,241
andlanguageacquisition,372373,379380,391,396
inlanguageprocessing,435,436445,456458
(seealsoUniversalgrammar)
Grammaticalintuitions,13,241,244,410
Gray,C.M.,123
Greene,E.,108
Greiner,W.R.,212
Grice,H.P.,449
Griffin,M.,108
Grillner,S.,292
Grinvald,A.,292,306
Gross,C.G.,294
Grossberg,S.,324,508
Guha,R.V.,164
Gustafsson,B.,284
H
Hakes,D.,458
Hall,A.K.,287
Halle,M.,267
Haller,M.,83
Hamilton,D.L.,127
Handpreference,321323
Hanlon,C.,395
Hanna,F.K.,144
Hanson,A.R.,469,491
Hanson,S.J.,324
Harmon,P.,164
Hasher,L.,108
Hashtroudi,S.,108
Haugeland,J.,343,368,375
Hawkins,R.D.,283,284
Hayes,B.,239
Hayes,J.R.,61
HayesRoth,B.,191
Headparameter,265,398,401
HEARSAYII,191192
Hebb,D.O.,283
HechtNielsen,R.,270
Heiligenberg,W.,304
Helfand,S.L.,288
Hepler,N.,484
Herrmann,D.J.,28
Heuristics
inAI,142144,169,172173,190,195,196,201,203206
inproblemsolving,129132
inreasoning,120,125128
Heuristicsearch,177178,187189
Hierarchicalphonologicalrepresentation.SeePhonologicalrepresentation
Highlevelvision,490501,508
Hildreth,E.C.,469,471,476,487,488
Hillclimbingsearch,182,185187
Hinton,G.E.,68,76,78,83,304
Hippocampus,272,284,291,314
Hobbes,T.,1,333334
Hochberg,J.,52
Hoffman,D.D.,493,497
Hofstadter,D.R.,172,375
Hollander,M.,83
Holophrasticspeech,383
Holyoak,K.J.,118
Hubel,D.H.,290,292,293,294,298,476,477,503
Hughes,J.,285
HughlingsJackson,J.,318
Hummel,J.E.,501,509
Humphrey,K.,290
100steprule,71,79
Hurwitz,S.,500
Huttenlocher,P.R.,279,289,323
Hyams,N.,401
Hyde,T.S.,102
Hyperacuity,303304
Hypercolumns,477478
HYPO/COUNSELLOR,142,148151,160,167,173,190
I
ID3,194
IFTHENrules.SeeProductionrules
Illocutionaryforce,450451
Illusoryconjunctions,506
Illusorycorrelation,126
Imagery(visual),4254,72,133,269,305,340341
Images
incomputervision,462
retinal,293294,303,325,461462,476,482,503,505
Implicitvs.explicitmemory,109111
Incidentallearning,102
Incompletenesstheorem(Gdel),172
Indexicality,416417

Page523

Individualism,356362
Inductiveheuristics,125127
Inductivelearning,142,157,194195,198
Inductivereasoning,125.
SeealsoNondeductivereasoning
Inferiorcolliculus,295,296,301
Ingram,D.,406
Inheritanceofproperties,116,156157,160,190
Inhibition(neural),277,280282,285,469,476,507,508,509,511
Innatenesshypothesis,265,396400.
SeealsoUniversalGrammar
Instrumentalism,352354
Intentionality,2,341344
Intermediateprocessesinvision,479490,492,496
Interpreters,2123,79,82,152,153,156,165166,318
Interpretiveprocessinginhumancognition,3940,5556,5859,61,127,130,134135
Intrinsicimages,480482
Introspectionism,334,335
Isa
relations,28
hierarchies,155157,160,190,208,209
Isomorphism,5,8,341343
Ittelson,W.H.,465
Iversen,L.L.,284
J
Jakobovits,L.,433
Jakobson,R.,383,400
Jenkins,J.T.,102
Jepson,D.,127
Jespersen,O.,381
Johnson,M.K.,108
JohnsonLaird,P.N.,28,117,119,427
Jordan,M.I.,67
Julesz,B.,475
Jusczyk,P.,385
Just,M.A.,52
K
Kahn,D.,236
Kahneman,D.,125,126,127
Kamp,H.,425
Kandel,E.R.,283,284
Kaplan,E.,317
Karttunen,L.,458
Katz,J.,431
Kenny,A.,404
Kenstowicz,M.,267
Kilpatrick,F.P.,465
King,D.,164
Kintsch,W.,28
Kisseberth,C.,267
Klein,E.,261
Klein,R.E.,385
Knight,P.L.,299
Knowinghowvs.knowingthat,369370,403
Knowledgelevelofanalysis,23,9
Knowledgerepresentation,46,367373
inAI,140,151173
andcognitiveskills,6163
andconnectionism,7374,7677,7982,9596,121123,198
exemplarbased,9295
ofimages,4247
andlanguageprocessing,452454
logicbased,168173
mentalmodels,119120
perceptionbased,98,110111
propositional/schematic,2637,89,92,96,155164
rulebased,164168
theorybased,9899
invisualobjectrecognition,493501
Koch,C.,323,325,489,506
Koenig,O.,44,54
Kolb,B.,290,321,326
Kolodner,J.L.,34,195,202
Konishi,M.,289,290,294,295,301
Korsakoff'sdisease,314
Kosslyn,S.M.,44,47,48,54
Kosterlitz,H.W.,285
Krampe,R.T.,61
Krantz,D.H.,127,128
Kratz,K.E.,305
Kripke,S.,416
Kruschke,J.K.,93,115,126
Kuczaj,S.A.,389
Kuffler,S.W.,476
Kuhl,P.,265
Kuhn,T.S.,210
L
LaBerge,D.,58,59,60
Labov,W.,448
Ladefoged,P.,267
Laird,J.E.,20,197
Lakatos,I.,210
Landau,B.,99,385
Langston,C.,129
Languageproduction,454457
Languageuniversals,7,219,383,392,395397.
SeealsoInnatenesshypothesisUniversalGrammar
Larkin,J.H.,130,131,135
Lasky,R.E.,385
Lateralgeniculatenucleus(LGN),272,290,293294,503
Lateralinhibition,469
Lateralization,318323
Lawoflargenumbers,127
Lea,G.,200
Learnabilityoflanguages,404406
Learning,20.
SeealsoProblemsolving
algorithmsfor,208209

Page524

Learning(cont.)
inAI,141142,157159,192212
inamnesia,62,109,312313
andaprioriknowledge,208
andthebrain,272,287,304,305306,310,312313,325
ofchess,133
ofconcepts,9395,98
inconnectionistsystems,6870,71,7273,7677,80,83,9395,114116,198,310,324,325,503
disabilities,322
incidental,102
intentional,102
oflegalconcepts,209212
inLEX,203207
ofnormativerules,127128
pairedassociate,103
ofphysics,135
ofpragmaticreasoningschemas,118
roleofexamplesin,201202
ofscripts,34,36,40
ofskills,5863
inSOAR,197198
typesof,202203
Learningsystemarchitecture,199200
Lebowitz,M.,195
LeDoux,J.E.,320
Legalreasoning,148151,167168,197,209212
Lehky,S.R.,325,507
Lehnert,W.,163,452,453,454
Lenat,D.B.,142,144,164,194
Leuba,G.,289
Levelsofanalysis,711
andthebrain,270271
andconnectionism,7782
Levelt,W.J.M.,241
Levi,E.H.,210,212
Levinthal,C.,305
LEX,194,203207,208,209
Lexicalinsertion,247
Lexicon,220,226,228229,247,384,390,445,457
Liberman,M.,239
Lieberman,P.,266,318
Lieke,E.,292
Lightfoot,D.,267
Limbicsystem,271,272
Lindsay,D.S.,107,108
Lindsay,R.,164
Lineandedgedetectors,294,476
Linearseparability,66
Linebarger,M.C.,318
Linguisticenvironmentandlanguageacquisition,380381,382,389,393396,397,400,405
Livingstone,M.S.,294,503
Lloyd,D.,375
Localminima,70
Localpotentials,277278,280
Loftus,E.F.,90,91,106,108,112
Logic,1,116120,127,164,189,409,410,430.
SeealsoFirstorderpredicatecalculusKnowledgerepresentationReasoning
Logicalconnectives,117,171
Logicalomniscience,424
Lomo,T.,284
Longtermmemory,30,3637,4042,46,100114,491492,500501
andthebrain,273,312314
Longtermpotentiation(LTP),284
Lopresti,U.,305
Lowlevelvision,463478,502503
Luminance,461
Lynch,G.,284
M
Macagno,E.R.,305
Maffei,L.,478
Magneticresonanceimaging(MRI),306
Magnocellular,294,503
Mandler,G.,313
Manktelow,K.I.,118
Manzini,R.,401,402
Marcus,G.F.,83,389,391,392
Marcus,M.,405
Markus,H.,33,35,36
Marler,P.,219
Marr,D.,435,464,466,469,471,476,479,481,484,496,497,498,512
Marshall,J.C.,307,317
MarslenWilson,W.D.,444
Mathematicalknowledgeandlearning,142144,160161,194,203207
Mathur,B.,489,506
Matsubara,J.,298
Maunsell,J.H.R.,486
Maximalonsetprinciple,234237,260,262
Maximsofconversation(Gricean),449451
McCarthy,J.,164,173
McCarthy,J.,405
McClelland,J.L.,83,304,326,390
McCloskey,M.,83,106,115,311
McConnellGinet,S.,432
McCormick,D.A.,272
McDermott,D.,212
McDermott,J.,164
Mcells,294,503
McGinn,C.,358,360,375
McKeown,K.R.,455
McKoon,G.,31,114
McNeill,D.,381,386
Meanlengthofutterance(MLU),388
Meansendsanalysis,3940,129131,134135,192
Medicaldiagnosis,144148,164,190
Medin,D.L.,90,92,98,169

Page525

Memory.SeeElaborationEyewitnesstestimonyLongtermmemoryWorkingmemory
Memoryconsolidation,313314
Memorytrace,35,100,101,103.
SeealsoLongtermmemory
Mentalimagery.SeeImagery
Mentalmodels,119120,125,427430,447448
Mentalrotation,4853,54,340,341,500
Mentalscanning,43,4748,341
Menyuk,P.,381
Mervis,C.B.,88,89,195
Merzenich,M.M.,298,299
Metamathematics,172
Methodologicalsolipsism,332333,356358
Metricalstructureinlanguage,239240,261
Mexicanhatoperator,471,475476,487,507
Michalski,R.S.,212
Microfeatures,74,9698,431
Microstructureofcognition,72,74,324
Miller,A.D.,304
Miller,J.,265
Millikan,R.G.,375
Milner,B.,312,321
Mingolla,E.,508
Minimalattachmentprinciple,440445
Minimalpairtest,225,228,230,231
Minsky,M.,33,66,139,159,164
Mintun,M.,110
Mischel,W.,33,35
Mishkin,M.,273,298,314
Mistlin,A.J.,292
Mitchell,D.B.,48
Mitchell,T.M.,195,203,209,213
Modularity(incognitivearchitecture),1619,307,310,343344
inartificialintelligence,153,189,203
andlanguageacquisition,391,399
oflanguageprocessing,436,442445,452
andlanguageuniversals,261,265,266
ofvision,458,464465,476,477,482,485
Modusponens,116123,169,171,190
Modustollens,117
Montague,R.,414,415,421
Moravcsik,J.M.E.,432
Moravec,H.,71
Morphemes,220,222,231233,239,241,388,391
Morphophonemicalternation,231233
Morris,C.D.,107
Motherese,395397,405
Motionperception.SeeVisualmotion
Motorcortex,274,304
Motorneurons,279,282
Motter,B.C.,304
Movementtransformations,249250
Movshon,J.A.,485
MT(areaofthetemporallobe),484487,489490,505
MYCIN,144148,164,166
Myelin,275,279
Myelination,279
N
Nadel,L.,272,324
Nakayama,K.,483,485
Nakayama,M.,399
Nathans,J.,17
Naturalisticindividualism,356,358360
Nauta,W.J.H.,325
Necessarytruth,420,424
Neisser,U.,106
NETtalk,7477,80,95
Neuralcircuits,10,72,82,291,294298,305,307,313,506
Neuraldevelopment,286291
Neuralnetworks.SeeConnectionism
Neuralplasticity,71,289291,299,313
Neuralrepresentation,291306
Neuroanatomy,271275
Neuromuscularjunction,19
Neurons,7072,123,274,275286
Neuropsychology,54,62,110,114,306323
Neurotransmitters,270,279285,324
Newcombe,F.,307
Newell,A.,14,20,23,24,62,129,192,197,198,337
Newport,E.,395,396,397
Newsome,W.T.,485
Nickerson,R.S.,43
Nilsson,N.J.,172,182
Nisbett,R.E.,127,128,129
Nishihara,H.K.,497,498
Nominativecase,251,252,254,256,258,259,260
Nondeductivereasoning,123129,153.
SeealsoDeductivereasoning
Nordlander,R.H.,288
Norman,D.A.,60
Nosofsky,R.M.,92
Nottebohm,F.,290
Nounphrases(NP),2425,218,239,245,247,248,387,456
semanticsof,415,439
O
Objectrecognition,293,294,490501
Occipitallobe,54,273,298,321.
SeealsoVisualcortex
Ochs,E.,396
O'Connell,D.N.,483
Oculardominance,477
Offcentercells,476
Ojemann,G.A.,318
O'Keefe,J.,272
O'Keeffe,G.,493
Oldfield,R.C.,321

Page526

O'Leary,D.D.,289
Olson,C.R.,324
Oncentercells,476
Opticalflow,465,483,489
Ortony,A.,34
Overextensionsinchildspeech,384
Owens,J.,105,106
P
Pairedassociatelearning,103
Palmer,J.C.,106
Palmer,S.E.,499
PANDEMONIUM,193
Pantle,A.,484
Papert,S.,66
Paralleldistributedprocessing(PDP).SeeConnectionism
Parallelprocessing,10,31,57.
SeealsoConnectionism
inAlsystems,166,168,197
inthebrain,270,294298
inconceptlearning,9394
inconnectionistsystems,7172,73,77,79
inreasoning,122
invision,462,464,467469,476,479,502506
Parameters.SeeUniversalGrammar
Parietallobe,273274
andmemory,314
andreading,309
andvisualimagery,54
andvision,325,502503,505
Parsing,318,384,404406,435,440445,447,452,455,458
Partee,B.,417,425
Parvocellular,294,503
Passingham,R.E.,274,275
Pasttense(English),246,389392
Patterson,K.E.,307
Pcells,294,503
Pennington,B.F.,83
Perceptrons,66
Performance(vs.competence).SeeCompetence
Performativeverbs,450
Peripheralnervoussystem,271,272,279,280,282,292,298
Perlocutionaryforce,450451
Perrault,C.R.,451
Perrett,D.I.,292
Perry,J.,424,425
Personschemas,35
Peters,S.,421,422,432
Petersen,S.E.,110
Phaselocking,insoundlocalization,295297
Phelps,M.E.,289
Phonemes,7477,191,225233,307,318,381382,385,456
Phonemetier,237
Phoneticfeatures,75,222,230,385
Phoneticsymbols,220,221
Phonologicalrepresentation,229,231232,233240
Phonologicalrules,222,228230,236,383,390
Phonologicaluniversals,262,383,399400
Phonotacticrules,226
Photoreceptors,19.
SeealsoRetina
Phrasemarkers,245248
Phrasestructure,245248,264265,386388,390
Physicallevelofanalysis,711
Physicalsymbolsystems,2026,337,338,344,431
Physicsproblemsolving,130131,134135
PiatelliPalmerini,M.,261
Pinel,J.P.J.,284
Pinker,S.,48,83,389,391,392,395,398,405
Pixel,45,462,467471
Placecoding,297
Pluralization(English),218,220222,231233,251
Pollack,J.B.,438,445
Polya,G.,142
Pons,T.P.,298
Populationcoding,302304.
SeealsoCoarsecodingDistributedrepresentations
Positronemissiontomography(PET),54,110,275,289,306
Posner,M.I.,110
Possibleworlds,420426
andconnectionistmodels,432
andmentalmodels,427
Povertyofstimulusinlanguageacquisition,392394
Pragmaticforce,450
Pragmaticreasoningschemas,118119
Pragmatics,318,442445,448452,455,458
Predicates,2728,74,80,122,167,169170,412,420422,427.
SeealsoFirstorderpredicatecalculus
Premack,D.,261
Press,G.A.,272
Primalsketch,466478,507508
Priming,3132,60,91,9697,103,445
repetition,109111,312313
Prince,A.,239,240,391
Principlesandparametersframework,262265,397.
SeealsoUniversalGrammar
Problemreduction,179180,204
Problemsolving,24,37,40,81,121,192.
SeealsoGeneralproblemsolver
byexperts,132135,166
bynovices,129132
Problemspace,129131,192,197.
SeealsoGeneralproblemsolver
Proceduralattachment,159160,190191
Proceduralknowledge,6163,72,110,369372.
SeealsoDeclarativeknowledge
Proceduralsemantics,432

Page527

Prodropparameter,401
Productionrules,56,59,6263
inAI,145,164168,189191,197
andconnectionism,73,74,76,7881
anddeclarativememory,109
andproblemsolving,133135
andreasoning,117,118,121122,127
Productionsystems,63,78,123,164165,189191,372,431
Productivityincognitivesystems,5,25,36,8081
ProgramarchitectureinAI,189192
PROLOG,189
Pronominalization,447448
Prooftheoreticsemantics,426427,431
Properties,421
Propositionalact,450451
Propositionalattitudes,354362,421424,429.
SeealsoQualia
Propositionalnetworks,2832.
SeealsoAssociativenetworksSchemasSemanticnetworks
andconcepts,9092
andmemory,101,103105
Propositionalrepresentation,2632,3637,54,7374.
SeealsoConceptsKnowledgerepresentationLogicPropositionalnetworksSchemas
andvisualimagery,4348
Prototypetheory,89,9293,159,169
Pullum,G.,261
Purves,D.,289
Putnam,H.,332,347,356,431
Pylyshyn,Z.W.,14,20,24,43,48,52,79,81,83,122,351,358,359,375,431,432,464
Q
Qualia,362367.
SeealsoPropositionalattitudes
QUALM,454
Quantifiers(andquantification),117,169172,412418,427
Quenzer,L.F.,284
Quillian,M.R.,155,431
Quine,W.V.O.,363
Quinlin,J.R.,194
R
Radford,A.,386,387,388,406
Radin,M.,212
Raichle,M.E.,110
Rakic,P.,289,290
Ramsey,W.,351
Randomaccessmemory,22
Rasmussen,T.,321
Ratcliff,R.,31,114,115
Rationalism,403
Realisticinterpretationoftheories,352355,361
Reasoning.SeeDeductivereasoningNondeductivereasoning
Recall,35,101108,312314.
SeealsoElaborationLongtermmemory
Receptorcells,19,293,295,303,305,469
Receptorsforneurotransmitters,280282
Recognitionmemory,27,31,35,101,102,106109.
SeealsoLongtermmemory
inconnectionistmodels,115
Reconstructioninmemory,104108
Recoverabilityofdeletion
inlanguage,251
invision,497,501
Recursiverulesandprocesses,179,197,243244,393
Reder,L.M.,103
Reducedvowels,223
Reference.SeealsoSense
andlanguageacquisition,383384
andlanguageprocessing,439,448
andsemantics,411418,424
Referentialsuccess(principleof),439,442444,447
Regionalcerebralbloodflowscanning(rCBF),54
Rehearsal,100101,103,107
Reich,P.A.,381,382,385,406
Reichman,R.,458
Reiser,B.J.,47,48,112
Relativeclauses,218,265
Replacementargument(Stich's),358
Representation,34.
SeealsoKnowledgerepresentation
Representationalskepticism,332333
Representativenessheuristic,125128
Resolutionmethodoftheoremproving,171
Restructuringinskillacquisition,60
Retina,19,293294,303304,325,461462,476,502,503,505
Retinotopicmaps,298,476
Retrievalfrommemory,100101,107108,312.
SeealsoAssociativenetworksMemory
inAIsystems,153
inassociativenetworks,3637
indirect,103104
inobjectidentification,498500
inphysicalsymbolsystems,24
ofproductions,73
inTuringmachines,22
Richards,W.,493,497
Richman,C.L.,48
Riemsdijk,H.van,267
Riesbeck,C.K.,118
Rips,L.J.,89,98,117
Riseman,E.M.,469,491
Rissland,E.L.,148,151,161,168,173,200,202
Ritchie,G.D.,144
Robinson,D.A.,325
Robinson,J.A.,171
Robson,D.,476

Page528

Rock,I.,500
Rodieck,R.W.,476
Roediger,H.L.I.,110
Roeper,T.,406
Rolls,E.T.,291
Rosch,E.,88,89,90,195,431,499
Rose,D.E.,168
Rosen,G.D.,288,323
Rosen,T.J.,83
Rosenberg,C.R.,74,77
Rosenberg,J.,432
Rosenbloom,P.S.,20,168
Rosner,B.S.,266
Ross,J.R.,260
Roth,G.L.,299
Ruddock,K.H.,476
Rulebasedrepresentation,145,164168,197,369.
SeealsoProductionrules
Rumelhart,D.E.,34,60,68,70,83,304,324,326,390
Rutishauser,U.,287
Ryle,G.,337,370
S
Sachs,J.S.,27
Sacks,O.,325
Saffran,E.M.,318
Sag,I.,261
SAINT,203
Saito,H.,487
Salus,M.,382
Salus,P.,382
Samuel,A.L.,193
Saul,R.,321
Schacter,D.L.,110
Schaffer,M.M.,92
Schank,R.C.,33,34,118,163,452,453
Schemas,3237,40.
SeealsoConceptsFramesScripts
andconnectionism,73
anddeclarativeknowledge,61,96
andgoalorientedcognition,39
andlanguageprocessing,455
andlongtermmemory,105107,108,110113
andreasoning,118119,121,125
forvisualconcepts,498
andvisualimagery,4447
andworkingmemory,41
Schiefflin,B.,396
Schneider,W.,56,57,59,60
Schoben,E.J.,89
Schor,R.H.,304
SchwainsertionruleinEnglish,233
Schwanncells,279
Schwartz,E.L.,323,324
Schwartz,J.C.,35
Schwartz,M.F.,318
Scopeofquantification,417418
Scoville,W.B.,312
Scripts,3335,161164.
SeealsoFramesSchemas
andlanguageprocessing,452453
andlongtermmemory,105,112
Search,9
inAI,140141,177189
andconnectionism,68,76
inhumanproblemsolving,129132,135
Searle,J.,342,367,374,375,450
Secondordercapacity,404
Secondorderoperator,469
Seidenberg,M.S.,83,448
Seifert,C.M.,454
Sejnowki,T.J.,74,77,270,304,307,310,323,325,507,512
Sekuler,R.,512
Selfridge,O.G.,193
Selfschema,33,3536
Selkirk,E.,236,239,240
Sellars,W.,363
Sells,P.,241,261,267
Semanticinterpretation,5,411
Semanticmemory,111114
Semanticnetworks,9092,122,155159,431.
SeealsoAssociativenetworksPropositionalnetworksSchemas
Semanticvalues,411
Sense(vs.reference),418424.
SeealsoReference
Sensorypathwaysinthebrain,292297,502505
Shallice,T.,76,83,310
Shaperepresentation,492,494497,509512
Shastri,L.,78,121,431,509
Shepard,R.N.,49,52,500
Shepherd,G.M.,277,324,325
Sherman,G.F.,288,323
Sherman,V.,219
Shiffrin,R.M.,56,57,59
Shimamura,A.P.,113
Shoemaker,S.,367
Shortliffe,E.H.,144,145
Shorttermmemory,40,100101,312.
SeealsoWorkingmemory
visual,45
SHRDLU,432,438439
Siegel,R.M.,274,502
Siladi,M.,36
Silverman,M.S.,478
Simon,H.A.,20,44,61,129,133,192,200,337
Simplecells,294,476478,487,507
Singer,M.,288
Singer,W.,123
Singlecellvs.distributedrepresentationinthebrain,301305
Singley,M.K.,63
Siqueland,E.R.,385
Skalak,D.B.,168,173
Skarda,C.A.,298

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Skillacquisition,5862
inamnesia,62,312313
inproblemsolving,135
Slagle,J.,203
Smith,A.,320
Smith,D.C.,305
Smith,E.E.,89,90,129,169
Smith,G.W.,458
Smith,N.V.,382,383
Smolensky,P.,74,81,82,122,324,344,431
Smoothnessconstraint,487
Snow,C.,395
Snyder,A.Z.,110
Snyder,S.H.,284,285,286
SOAR,192,197198
Sociolinguisticvariation,216
Softconstraints,73,82
Somatosensorycortex,274,298299
Sonorityhierarchy,400
Soundlocalization,294297
Sourcemonitoring,107108,111112
Spatialfrequency,473
channels,473475
columns,478
Spear,P.D.,305
Spectrographicanalysisofsound,224,226
Speechacts,450452
Speecherrors,228,456
Sperry,R.W.,288,320,321
Spilich,G.J.,105,107
Spreadingactivation,3032,36,91.
SeealsoAssociativenetworks
Springer,S.P.,321
Squire,L.R.,62,113,272,312,313,314
Sridharan,N.S.,200
Stampe,D.,383
Stanfill,C.,168
Steedman,M.,439,442,447
Stein,B.S.,104,107
Steinberg,D.,433
Steinmetz,M.A.,304
Stephen,H.,274
Stereopsis,464,465,482,487,505.
SeealsoBinoculardisparity
Stevens,K.A.,480
Stich,S.,351,354,356,358,360,362,363,375,406
Stillings,N.A.,129
Stone,G.O.,83
Stone,J.,476
Stopconsonants,224
Storageofmemories,37,4041,62,100101,107108,273,312.
SeealsoElaborationinhumanmemoryMemoryRetrievalfrommemory
Stridentsounds,231233
Strings,4
STRIPS,172
Structuredependenceingrammars,398399,403404
Structuresensitivecomputation,24,8082,121,344
Stryker,M.P.,477
Stubbs,M.,448
Subcategorizationframes,247
Subgoals,3739,129,165,189.
SeealsoGeneralproblemsolverProductionsystems
Subjacency,264
Subordinateclauses,254260
Subsetprincipleinlanguageacquisition,401403
Substitutiontest,242
Subsymboliclevelofanalysis,74,82,97,324,431
Suga,N.,301,303
Swindale,N.V.,298,301
Syllables,233240
Symbolicparadigm,63
Synapses,71,280284,289,324
Synchronous(inphase)firing,122123,305,509
Syntax,4
ofnaturallanguages,241260
SyrdalLasky,A.,385
Systematicityincognitivesystems,25,8082
T
Tacitknowledge,44,48,218,369372
Tanaka,K.,487
Tanenhaus,M.K.,448
Taylor,S.E.,83,125
Telegraphicspeech,388389
Templatematching,495,500
Temporallobe,273,309,316,319,484,502
Tenenbaum,J.M.,480,481,507
Tense,245247,254259,263264,416417.
SeealsoPasttense
TeschRmer,C.,61
Teuber,H.L.,312
Thalamus,272,293,314
Thematicaffectunit(TAU),453
Thetatheory,264
Thompson,R.F.,272,325
Tokenidentitytheory,338,350351
Tomko,D.L.,304
Tonaltier,237
Tonotopicmapping,298,299
Tootell,R.B.,478
Topdownprocessing,99,192,464465,491
Topographicmapsinthecerebralcortex,298299,476478
Touretsky,D.S.,78
TowerofHanoiproblem,62,179,188189,313
Transformations(linguistic),248251,388,390
Transducers,19,295,461
Travis,C.,432
Trees
phonological,240
phrasestructure,245,248,390,410,440
search,178189

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Trehub,A.,304
Treisman,A.,476,506
Truthconditionalsemantics,411
Truthconditions,412413
Truthvalues,27,169,412
Tulving,E.,102,107,112,113
Turing,A.M.,21
Turingmachines,2122,24,346347
Turing'sthesis,21
Turner,T.J.,34,106,453
Tversky,A.,125,126,127
2.5Dsketch,466,481482
Tyler,L.K.,444
Typeidentitytheory,350
U
Ullman,M.,83,389,391,392
Ullman,S.,476,483,484,501,506
Undecidabilitytheorem(Church),172
Uniformcostsearch,185
UniversalGrammar(UG),231,240,251,260267
andlanguageacquisition,397406
(seealsoGrammarInnatenesshypothesis)
Universalmachines,2123,347
Universalquantifier.SeeQuantifiers
Ushapeddevelopment,389
Utteranceact,450451
Utgoff,P.E.,194,203,206,208
V
Valian,V.,380,403
vanEssen,D.,486,503,505
vanGelder,T.,81
VanOrden,G.C.,83
Variablebinding,121123,431,508
Vectors,67
Velarconsonant,224
Velocityfield,487489
Velum(softpalate),224
Venezky,R.L.,307
Verbphrase,246247,258
Virtualarchitecture,46
Visualbuffer,4548,5253,54,500
Visualcortex,290,294,476478,484,503,505506
Visualimagery.SeeImagery
Visualmotion,294,465,482490,505
Voicelessconsonants,224,225.
SeealsoAspiration
Voiceonsettime,385
VonderMalsburg,C.,305
vonNeumann,J.,22
vonNeumannmachine,2224,81,111
Voss,J.F.,105,107
Vowelnucleus,234,262
Vowels,223,224,381,382,400
W
Wall,R.,421,422,426,432
Wallach,H.,483
Waltz,D.,168,438,445
Wang,H.T.,489,506
Warrington,E.K.,313
Wason,P.C.,117
Wasow,T.,241,261,267
Weinberg,A.,387
Weiskrantz,L.,313
Weisler,S.,432
Weizenbaum,J.,454
Weldon,M.S.,110
Werker,J.F.,290
Wemicke'saphasia,317318
Wemicke'sarea,317
Wexler,K.,401,402,405
Whatvs.wheresysteminvision,502503
Whishaw,I.Q.,290,321,326
Whitaker,H.A.,291
Whquestions,248250,389,398399
Wiesel,T.N.,290,293,476,477
Wigstrom,H.,284
Wiliams,E.,267,406
Williams,R.J.,68
Willshaw,D.,305
Wilson,H.R.,475
Winograd,T.,122,432,438
Winston,P.H.,155,157,193,212
Winzemer,J.,380
Witkin,A.P.,480
Wittgenstein,L.,88
Woolsey,C.N.,299
Workingmemory,3742,55,109,314.
SeealsoControlledprocessesShorttermmemory
incomputers,22
inSOAR,197
X
XORproblem,6370
Xu,F.,83
Y
YeungCourchesne,R.,272
Yu,V.L.,147
Yukie,M.,487
Yund,E.W.,484
Z
Zaidel,L.,320
Zaragoza,M.,106
Zerocrossings,469471,475478
Zipser,D.,324,325,503,506
ZolaMorgan,S.,314
Zurif,E.B.,318
Zwicky,A.,458