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Forensic Piece on Iraq War

Stephen Burns
Dr. Kleine
Advanced Persuasive Writing
September 16th, 2014
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The Iraq War has always been a deeply emotional issue, and it is very hard for
Americans to talk about it objectively. From when the Invasion began on 20 March 2003 to
when the last American troops withdrew from Iraq on 18 December 2011, a total of 4,486
Americans died and $1.7 trillion dollars was spent, and no one has been left for the better.
Perhaps worst of all, our nation has been left bitterly divided over the issue.
A war that started with a solid majority of the publics approval ended universally
condemned by a solid majority. Critics of the war increasingly pointed to inconsistencies in the
Bush Administrations misrepresentation of facts leading up to the war as supporters of the war
gradually shifted away from their initial support and grew quieter. As the death toll climbed,
financial cost rose, the Iraqi Transitional Government failed to govern its own state, the
insurgency spread, and no exit date was in sight, Americans grew ever more pessimistic of the
Wars outcome, and their evaluation of the decision to invade Iraq in the first place turned
harsher accordingly. Yet - in the eleven years from when the War began to now - little of the
facts available to the world leaders as they made the decision to invade have substantively
changed, even in the wake of the terrible aftermath of that decision.
I believe that many Americans have committed the fallacy of affirming the consequent
when it comes to the Iraq War. That is, people judge the initial decision to invade the Iraq War
based on the consequence of the war rather than on the wisdom of the decision, much the way
a person feels proud to win a coin toss and stupid to lose one. Most Americans would
immediately turn to the failure of the Bush Administration to tell the truth about Saddam
Husseins purported weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), or the truth about Husseins lack of
involvement in the September 11 Attacks. But there were many other arguments for invading

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Iraq and deposing Hussein in early 2003 - arguments about the known threats Hussein posed to
his neighbors and to the international community, and about his past of development and usage
of WMDs, and the atrocious human rights violations he committed - which I believe justified the
world leaders decision to invade Iraq, or at least might curb the intuitive though irrational
tendency of many of us to judge the War without considering these arguments.
We must judge the decision to invade Iraq based solely on the soundness of the
arguments which led our world leaders to make the decision to invade Iraq. In this essay I
defend the decision to invade Iraq using these arguments to show the reasonable thought
process which led to the decision to invade Iraq. I will focus particularly on the arguments set
forth in the Congressional Iraq Resolution, a bipartisan bill passed less than six months before
the War which lays out the most comprehensive list of arguments behind the decision to invade:

Iraq's noncompliance with the conditions of the 1991 ceasefire

agreement, including interference with U.N. weapons inspectors.

Iraq "continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and

biological weapons capability" and "actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability"
posed a "threat to the national security of the United States and international peace
and security in the Persian Gulf region."

Iraq's "brutal repression of its civilian population."

Iraq's "capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction

against other nations and its own people."

Iraq's hostility towards the United States as demonstrated by the 1993

assassination attempt on former President George H. W. Bush and firing on coalition
aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones following the 1991 Gulf War.

Members of al-Qaeda, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks

on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq.

Iraq's "continu[ing] to aid and harbor other international terrorist

organizations," including anti-United States terrorist organizations.

Iraq paid bounty to families of suicide bombers.

The efforts by the Congress and the President to fight terrorists, and
those who aided or harbored them.

The authorization by the Constitution and the Congress for the President
to fight anti-United States terrorism.

The governments in Turkey, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia feared Saddam

and wanted him removed from power.

Citing the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, the resolution reiterated that it

should be the policy of the United States to remove the Saddam Hussein regime and
promote a democratic replacement.

This essay is divided into four sections: three sections which basically summarize or
address some of the arguments in the Iraq Resolution, and a fourth section for context and
philosophical exploration. First, I discuss how Saddam Hussein had a history of making and
using WMDs, thus justifying the world leaders suspicion that Hussein was likely developing and
planning to use WMDs again. Second, I discuss how Saddam Husseins government posed a
significant threat to the international community and particularly to the Persian Gulf states, thus
justifying the world leaders fear that Hussein would continue to bully and threaten other
countries. Third, I discuss how Saddam Hussein was a ruthless dictator and human rights
abuser, thus justifying the world leaders concern that Hussein would continue to tyrannize and
oppress his own people. Fourth, I discuss how the decision to invade Iraq is consistent with
other key global decisions made by other countries, by other presidents, and at other times in
the past.
History of Hussein Developing and Using WMDs
We now know too well that Saddam Hussein did not have any of the WMDs that the
Bush Administration claimed he had. In September 2004, the Iraq Survey Group, a
multinational investigative mission sent to find Iraqs WMDs, issued a report saying that no
evidence of stocked WMDs was found. A few scant collections of decades-old mustard gas
from the Iran-Iraq War were found, but nothing that comprised a militarily significant capability.
President Bushs 100% assurance that Hussein had stockpiles of WMDs was unequivocally
proven false, and the prime motivator of the invasion was discounted.
Whether the Bush Administrations bold proclamations that Hussein had WMDs was an
outright lie, or a stretching of the truth, or just plain faulty intelligence, it reflected poorly on the
leaders who forwarded such claims. But we must remember how it is that so many world
leaders became so certain of Husseins WMD capabilities in the first place. Hussein had a long
history of possessing stockpiles of lethal biological and chemical weapons like mustard gas,
tabun nerve agent and other WMDs, and Husseins deployment of them caused horrific
catastrophe which scars the land to this day. I believe it was not unjustified to suspect beyond
reasonable doubt that Hussein was developing WMDs again in 2003 with plans to use them in
the future.

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The burden of evidence for such a conclusion about Husseins WMDs is of course
higher when such harsh countermeasures as a full-blown invasion are being considered. To
understand what evidence the world was basing its suspicion of Hussein on, it is necessary to
recount the dictators long, dark history with WMDs. The first known usage of WMDs by
Hussein was in 1983 during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). From that year on Hussein
continued to use WMDs against his blood rival, peaking in 1988 with five separate attacks that
year alone. Additionally, Hussein used WMDs against the Kurdish minority in Iraqi Kurdistan
which had informally sided with the Iranian Ayatollah during the War. Below is a chart showing
the different times and places Hussein used WMDs to retaliate during the War. In every case,
Iranian or Kurdish civilian centers were targeted, with the vast majority of the casualties being
noncombatants, women and children.

Location

Weapon Used

Date

Casualties

Haij Umran

Mustard

August 1983

fewer than 100

Iranian/Kurdish

Panjwin

Mustard

OctoberNovember
1983

3,001 Iranian/Kurdish

Majnoon Island

Mustard

FebruaryMarch 1984 2,500 Iranians

al-Basrah

Tabun

March 1984

50-100 Iranians

Hawizah Marsh

Mustard & Tabun

March 1985

3,000 Iranians

al-Faw

Mustard & Tabun

February 1986

8,000 to 10,000 Iranians

Um ar-Rasas

Mustard

December 1986

1,000s Iranians

al-Basrah

Mustard & Tabun

April 1987

5,000 Iranians

Sumar/Mehran

Mustard & nerve

agent

October 1987

3,000 Iranians

Halabja

Mustard & nerve

agent

March 1988

7,000s Kurdish/Iranian

al-Faw

Mustard & nerve

agent

April 1988

1,000s Iranians

Fish Lake

Mustard & nerve

agent

May 1988

100s or 1,000s Iranians

Majnoon Islands

Mustard & nerve

agent

June 1988

100s or 1,000s Iranians

South-central
border

Mustard & nerve

agent

July 1988

100s or 1,000s Iranians

an-Najaf Karbala area

Nerve agent & CS

March 1991

Unknown

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During the Iran-Iraq War the world largely stood by and watched - too disgusted with
either country to take sides on the usage of WMDs. But when the War ended on 20 August
1988, world leaders began taking a keen interest in Husseins possession of WMDs. Without an
arch rival like Iran to contend with, many feared Hussein would use his WMDs against other
Persian Gulf states, or against the Kurds. On 2 August 1990, the day the Gulf War began,
Hussein had WMDs stored over from the Iran-Iraq War and additionally a stockpile of 550 short
tons of yellowcake uranium. At first the only goal of the US-led coalition was to defend Saudi
Arabia from an expected Iraqi attack and to drive Iraqi soldiers out of Kuwait. But growing
concern over Iraqs WMD production capabilities and Husseins wanton aggression against
Kuwait prompted the coalition to push into Iraq. Within 100 hours, coalition forces had come
within 150 miles of Baghdad, and Hussein sued for peace. On 28 February 1991 Hussein
agreed to the Gulf War Ceasefire Agreement, which, among other things, mandated that
Hussein destroy all his preexisting WMDs and any capacity for creating more WMDs in the
future. Iraqs Chemical, Nuclear and Biological Programs was ended and the UN Special
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was established to carry out intermittent and random
inspections of Iraqi weapons facilities, with the specific purpose of ensuring Hussein did not
resume production of WMDs.
From 1991 to 1998, UN inspectors probed Hussein for any sign of resuming production
of WMDs. The inspectors were frequently impeded in their progress; the Iraqi government often
falsified or fudged reports about its preexisting chemical and biological programs. By early 1998
the Iraqi government had declared a total of seven chemical programs and three biological
programs. But UNSCOM reported that the declarations gave insufficient evidence that the
stockpiles produced by these programs were adequately destroyed. Hussein grew increasingly
belligerent, and in August 1998 UNSCOM weapons inspectors left Iraq. Scott Ritter, a UN
weapons inspector, resigned at that time, claiming that the United States and the international
community were not being hard enough on Hussein. "Iraq is not disarming", Ritter said in an
official statement. He added, "Iraq retains the capability to launch a chemical strike." During
this time period the UN scolded Hussein numerous times. In addition, the UN passed a total of
thirteen additional resolutions which cited Husseins failures to comply with the Ceasefire
Agreement.
From 1992 to 1998 Hussein increasingly disregarded, obstructed, or delayed UN
inspectors while overtly disrespecting the international communitys pleas for a safer and more
open Iraqi regime. Horrific stories of human rights abused, fears that Iraq still maintained
purportedly destroyed WMDs from before the Gulf War, and countless provocations of Iraqi

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militants firing on Coalition planes patrolling the Iraqi no-fly zones all aggravated the
international community, and things finally came to a head in 1998. Clinton, with widespread
support from a fed-up American populace, signed the Iraq Liberation Act on 31 October 1998.
The Act prescribed no set actions, but a general policy of contempt between the United States
and Husseins Iraq. The Act further explicitly called for the deposing of Hussein and offered
assistance to any group who would try to overthrow him. Then, unanimously adopted on 9
September 1998, the UN Security Council Resolution 1194 condemned Hussein for failing to
cooperate with UNSCOM and warned that harsher measures would be taken to keep him in line
if he didnt comply. Hussein declared that Iraq no longer had any relations with UNSCOM and
that UN inspectors would no longer be permitted into Iraq. For the next four years no UN
inspectors would enter Iraq.
On 16 December 1998 President Clinton ordered a four-day bombing campaign, with the
stated mission of striking military and security targets in Iraq that contributed to Iraqs ability to
produce, store, maintain and deliver weapons of mass destruction. Clinton Administration
officials reasoned that since UN inspectors were not permitted to investigate Iraqi weapons
facilities properly, the worst could be assumed. The December 1998 Bombing Campaign
resulted in the destruction of much of Iraqs weapons-producing capabilities and anti-air
capabilities, but Hussein did not relent in his posture towards the rest of the world. The four-day
bombing campaign was the last significant United States military action against Iraq until the
2003 Invasion.
From mid-1998 to 2002, Husseins Iraq was largely hidden from the world. Provocations
where Iraqis tried to shoot down coalition planes continued, and sanctions against Iraq sat
stubbornly inert, but little else happened to give the United States and its allies particular reason
to stir the pot with Iraq any more. Then, the September 11 Attacks happened. The whole world
was put on high alert for terrorist attacks from then on. On 14 September 2001 Congress
passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, giving the Chief Executive
broadened powers in dealing with terrorist organizations around the world. In mid-2002 to early
2003, Iraq did what it had done many times before: defying the international community and
hiding its potentially lethal weapons capabilities from the world. The memory of the 2,977
innocent victims of the September 11 Attacks were very fresh, and fears that a greater attack
brought about by Iraqi WMDs abounded.
Throughout 2002, President Bush repeatedly warned Hussein that military force would
be used if he continued to obstruct UN inspections. On 16 October 2002 the Iraq Resolution
was passed in the US congress with bipartisan support, basically given President Bush a free

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hand to use military force against Iraq if Hussein would not respond to diplomatic pressure. The
UN Resolution 1441 passed on 8 November 2002 represented a similar consensus of policy
from the international community. The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) had found no hard evidence of WMDs, but the committee speculated
that Hussein could easily have been working on WMDs and that they didnt know due to lack of
cooperation. Intelligence agencies around the world believed Hussein had WMDs. None of
them had direct evidence of it, but they all noted circumstantial evidence and patterns in
Husseins past behavior as likely indicators that - like in the Gulf War - Iraq had WMDs again.
The intelligence agencies of Britain, China, Germany, France and numerous other
nations agreed that Iraq was most likely continuing its past Chemical, Nuclear and Biological
Programs in pursuit of WMDs. Chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix noted just before the war
how 1,000 short tons of chemical agent were unaccounted for, information on Iraq's VX nerve
agent program was missing, and that "no convincing evidence" was presented for the
destruction of 8,500 liters of anthrax that had been declared. The French government believed
that Hussein had stockpiles of anthrax and botulism toxin, and the ability to produce VX nerve
agent gas. More dramatically, an Iraqi scientist Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi codenamed
"Curveball" told the CIA that Hussein was developing biological weapons. Even Hans Blix, who
had been slow and cautious to jump to conclusions about Iraqs WMD capacity, said in a final
report before the invasion, "The discovery of a number of ... chemical rocket warheads in a
bunker at a storage depot 170 km southwest of Baghdad was much publicized. This was a
relatively new bunker, and therefore the rockets must have been moved there in the past few
years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions.... They could also be the tip of a
submerged iceberg. The discovery points to the issue of several thousands of chemical
rockets that are unaccounted for."
All of this intelligence data pointed to one reasonable conclusion: Saddam Hussein
probably had WMDs. And based on Husseins history of using WMDs and his utter disregard
for human life, one could reasonably infer he would use them again. President Clintons
Security Adviser Sandy Berger warned, "[Saddam] will use those [WMDs] again, as he has ten
times since 1983." The Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration - as well as
numerous foreign administrations - regarded Hussein as a threat to the national security of the
United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region." The decision to
invade Iraq in 2003 is actually quite similar to a more everyday example: Suppose you were the
judge of a murder trial. The defendant is a gas station clerk who was manning the shop when
another man entered the gas station and began threatening the clerk. You are told that the man

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appeared to like wild and angry and had what looked like a gun under his shirt. The clerk did
not verify whether the shape under his shirt was a gun or a hand, but he quickly responded by
shooting the man. When the police came, the dead man was found to be unarmed. And now
the man stands before the court. What do you do?
As a judge, the primary factor in your judgment will be the intent of the clerk: What was
his intention, and how reasonably did he act on that intention. It may be that any rational human
being would have seen that it was clearly a mans hand under the shirt and not a gun. Or
perhaps this particular man had a history of violence which the gas station clerk knew about.
The clerk certainly couldnt ask the man to show his weapon, or reach up the mans shirt to
check. And given the danger and unpredictability of the situation, the clerk had little time to act,
and inaction itself is risky given the mans wild temperament. The fact that the man was found
to have no gun by the police bears no significance in determining the intent of the clerk. In
short, did the clerk have evidence beyond reasonable doubt to believe that the man was armed
and dangerous?
The scope and details of the analogy differ significantly from that of the decision to
invade Iraq, but they both share the same heart of any forensic claim: Was the decision
reasonably made based on the information available to the decider at the time of decisionmaking? In the case of the Iraq War, the decision to invade Iraq parallels the clerks decision to
shoot the purportedly armed man, the gun is the WMDs, the world leaders who decided to
invade are the defendants, and we contemporary Americans are the judge looking back on
history. The world leaders who decided to invade did not physically see Saddam Husseins
WMDs, but based on Husseins previous behavior and concealment of his current weaponsproducing facilities, they had every right to be suspicious. Husseins Iraq appeared wild and
angry, and they were implicitly threatening the world with their concealed capabilities, posing the
world leaders with an imminent and dire threat which required quick action. When the coalition
occupying forces and UN inspectors entered Iraq and found no WMDs, the decision
immediately became suspect, and ever since then the decision has been getting hashed out in
the grand trial of the world academia and through media outlets.
Interestingly, evidence turned up after the invasion show that Hussein was seriously
planning to develop WMDs after the UN inspections would stop. In 2006, the Iraq Survey Group
interviewed numerous regime officials who stated that Hussein had always kept weapon
scientists employed and that he fully intended to revive Iraqs WMD program as soon as the
inspections were lifted. They specifically noted Husseins desire to develop nuclear weapons at
that time. In 1998, President Clintons Secretary of State Madeleine Albright summarized the

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problem when she said, "Iraq is a long way from [America], but what happens there matters a
great deal here. For the risk that the leaders of a rogue state will use nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons against us or our allies is the greatest security threat we face." This
information was not available to the world leaders at the time of the decision to invade, but it
largely confirms the ill motives of the dictator which world leaders had already assumed from
other consistencies in Husseins past behavior.
It is important to keep in mind that while the decision to invade Iraq was sold primarily on
the threat of WMDs, there were other serious arguments for deposing Hussein and his regime.
In December 2009, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that he "would still have thought
it right to remove [Saddam Hussein]" regardless of whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass
destruction or not. Some senators in the United States like Senator Lieberman have voiced
similar continued support for the Iraq War despite not finding WMDs. And in May 2003 a Gallup
poll found that 79% of Americans thought the Iraq War was justified - with or without conclusive
evidence of WMDs. Following a decade of constant media and political focus on Husseins
alleged possession of WMDs has led many Americans to forget the other factors which weighed
in to the decision. The fact that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair manipulated the
evidence about Husseins WMDs reflects negatively on the Bush Administration, but it does not
prove that the other world leaders - and more generally the decision to invade - is unjustified
and warrants indictment, as if the gas station clerk had shot the man knowing full well he was
unarmed and not dangerous. Lets now discuss the wild and angry appearance of Hussein:
his history as a bully of the region and destabilizer of world peace.
History of Hussein as an Aggressor
The fact that Saddam Hussein had such a long and dark history with WMDs through the
1980s and early 1990s does not justify the view of Hussein as being such a dangerous figure by
itself. After all, the United States and its allies didnt attack other countries like North Korea and
Pakistan when they got their first nuclear weapons. So what made Husseins Iraq such a
threat? Were the United States and its allies acting in excessive force?
First of all, the very nature of WMDs makes it an ominous affair whenever a country
chooses to develop them. From earlier uses of WMDs by other countries such as the German
use of mustard gas in World War I and the American use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, WMDs have shown to be imprecise and unpredictable weapons. By their very
nature, WMDs are indiscriminate in the scope of their destruction, often leading to unintended
casualties and excessive suffering. Some dozens of countries now possess WMDs of some

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sort, and their possession of them often times gains little attention from the world community.
What made the situation of Hussein acquiring WMDs uniquely frightening was how Husseins
government generally behaved towards other countries. Hussein was a bully, and he spent his
time in office either bullying neighbors or defying the international community.
By the time of President George H. W. Bush, Husseins Iraq had already established its
reputation for being hostile and violent toward other states. In September 1980 Iraq invaded
Iran in what would become one of the bloodiest wars of the twentieth century. At the start of the
war, Iran was still in disorder from the Revolution of 1979, and Hussein jumped at the
opportunity to set up Iraq as the predominant Gulf state. The Iran-Iraq War quickly stalemated
when Iran was able to hold its ground, at which point long trench lines and conventional armies
bunkered down and engaged each other over a World War I-reminiscent style of fighting over
the next eight years. By the Wars end in August 1988, over one million casualties had
occurred. Over 100,000 of those casualties were civilians.
Desperate to break the stalemate, Hussein turned to chemical and biological weapons,
and on at least fifteen occasions he deployed chemical or biological WMDs against the Iranians
or the Kurds. The most infamous of these attacks was the attack on Halabja. In 15-19 March
1988 Iraqi fighter planes dropped cyanide bombs on Halabja. It was a civilian center with no
soldiers, and haunting photographs of the aftereffects show the burned bodies of some of the
Iranian adult men who survived and the lifeless bodies of the women and children whod died
and collapsed on the streets or in their homes. Some four or five thousand Iranian civilians died
and around 10,000 were injured at the Halabja Gas Attack alone. In total Hussein killed some
50,000 Iranians with chemical weapons by the end of the war, and the total casualties inflicted
now climbs above 100,000 as locals continue to die from the long-term effects of the chemical
attacks.
The Gulf War was a similar case of aggression toward neighboring states - this time
picking on the much smaller state of Kuwait. On 2 August 1990, Hussein invaded Kuwait for
the purpose of eliminating an opponent in the oil market and making a blatant land grab with
what was the fourth largest army of the world at that time. After three days, the Kuwaiti armed
forces were overrun and Hussein declared Kuwait the 19th province of Iraq, occupying Kuwait
from August 1990 until March of the next year when coalition forces drove him back. In the few
years leading up to the Invasion of Kuwait, tensions between Iraq and the international
community had been quickly escalating. Speculations about what Hussein would do with his
known remaining stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons gained international concern,
and Hussein had recently threatened invade Israel over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The

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Invasion of Kuwait - and an imminently expected invasion of Saudi Arabia - goaded the United
States and its allies to war. Starting in late January, the US-led coalition pushed Husseins
forces out of Kuwait and bombed some of Iraqs more dangerous military infrastructure,
rendering Hussein largely incapable of launching another offensive or utilizing his pre-existing
stockpiles of WMDs. By late February and the death or injury of about 100,000 soldiers of the
Iraqi Republican Guard, Hussein sued for peace and agreed to the Gulf War Ceasefire
Agreement.
The Ceasefire Agreement required Hussein to pay reparations to Kuwait, allow
UNSCOM to investigate their weapons capabilities, destroy their pre-existing stockpiles of
WMDs, avoid building SCUD missiles capable of launching 150 kilometers or further (such
missiles had been used to target Saudi Arabia and coalition forces during the War,) and the
creation of no-fly zones meant to inhibit Husseins ability to launch military campaigns against
portions of his own population. The Ceasefire Agreement essentially were meant to hinder
Husseins ability to build up his military or develop weapons capabilities in secret.
After the Ceasefire, Hussein immediately started violating the terms hed agreed to.
Iraqi forces repeatedly fired on coalition planes enforcing the no-fly zones. The first major
provocation was in December 1992 when a US F-16 fighter patrolling the southern no-fly zone
had to shoot down an Iraqi MiG-25 Foxbat fighter which had locked onto it. No coalition planes
were ever shot down, but the provocations always presented a clear risk to the planes and
could have resulted in deaths. Whenever another provocation occurred around the no-fly
zones, coalition fighter planes would respond by targeting SAM sites in Iraq. Hussein
personally offered $14,000 to any Iraqi soldier who successfully downed a manned coalition
aircraft. After the December 1998 Bombing Campaign, Hussein declared he would no longer
respect the no-fly zones altogether, and provocations against patrolling coalition planes
continued. The provocations reached a climax in the first half 2001, when about 320
provocations of firing on allied aircraft were committed. By 2002 the provocations largely
subsided as Hussein became increasingly paranoid of more serious Allied action against Iraq.
But for about ten years between the Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War Hussein was almost
constantly defying the no-fly zones and threatening the lives of the coalition forces who were
ultimately there to defend the Iraqi people from Husseins regime.
Saddam Hussein was a vindictive and violent dictator, and one of his greatest violations
of world peace stemmed from a very personal vendetta he held against President George H. W.
Bush. On April 13 1993, fourteen men paid by Hussein attempted to assassinate Bush with a
car bomb while he was on an official visit to Kuwait University. The plot was foiled when Kuwaiti

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officials found the bomb and arrested the terrorists. After investigations it was discovered that
the Iraqi Intelligence Service had been directly behind the plot. President Clinton, who had just
been in office a few months, responded by ordering cruise missile strikes against Iraq. This
would be the first of numerous missile strikes Clinton would launch against the rogue leader.
However, Hussein survived all of these missile attacks, and they typically did little to curb
Husseins reckless behavior or defiance of international law.
During all this time, Hussein created difficulties for the international community and
disrupted peace in a different way: sponsoring terrorist organizations. From as early as 1979
the United States listed Iraq as an official State Sponsor of Terror. Hussein was known to give
$25,000 to the families of suicide bombers who attacked Israel, and Iraq gave harbor and
financial assistance to terrorist organizations from neighboring states as they carried out their
attacks. Perhaps the most infamous of such groups was the Abu Nidal Organization, which
conducted attacks in over twenty countries - most famously the Rome and Vienna Airport
Attacks of 27 December 1985, killing 20 civilians, and the Neve Shalom Synagogue Attack of 6
September 1986, killing 22. The terrorist cells harbored by Hussein were a threat to the world
and included targets within Western Europe and even within the United States.
Allegations of Husseins connection with Al-Qaeda became a hot topic for speculation
after the September 11 Attacks, and the Iraq Resolution cited this particular connection as one
of its casus belli. Investigations by the UN and evidence from interrogated Iraqi regime officials
following the 2003 Invasion revealed that Hussein did not play any direct role in the September
11 Attacks, nor in any other operations by Al-Qaeda. Husseins Iraq did provide harbor for the
terrorist group, but this alone certainly does not legitimize the claim by the Bush Administration
that Hussein played any role in the planning and execution of the September 11 Attacks. Yet at
some level, one could suppose that a state which is willing to harbor such dangerous
organizations as Al-Qaeda in the first place assume at least some responsibility for the actions
of those organizations. In any case, Husseins Iraq had been continuing to aid and harbor
international terrorist organizations which threatened regional and international peace.
Husseins aggression toward Iran, his flagrant usage of WMDs, his support of terrorist
organizations, and other acts of rashness and hostility prompted increasingly harsh criticism
from the international community throughout mid-1990s and early 2000s. On 31 October 1998,
President Clinton condemned Hussein formally through the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act.
The Congressional Act entailed no explicit action, but it explicitly disregarded Husseins right to
lead Iraq and offered support for any organizations which would work to depose him.
Presenting the Act, Clinton spoke ominously about the danger Hussein posed:

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Now, let's imagine the future. What if he fails to comply and we fail to act, or we take
some ambiguous third route, which gives him yet more opportunities to develop this
program of weapons of mass destruction and continue to press for the release of the
sanctions and continue to ignore the solemn commitments that he made? Well, he will
conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he
can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. And some
day, some way, I guarantee you he'll use the arsenal....
This Act effectively served as a definitive policy statement for American presidents to
follow in their dealings with Saddam Hussein from then on. The December 1998 Bombing
Campaign was largely justified through this Act, as was the 2003 Invasion of Iraq.
This very long series of provocations, sponsoring of terrorist organizations, bullying
neighboring countries, threatening to develop and use WMDs, and generally destabilizing the
region and the international community produced the atmosphere of heightened suspicion and
anger which defined the US-Iraq relationship in the later Clinton years and particularly in the
Bush years. When Congress passed the Authorization for Military Use Against Terrorists on 15
September 2001 in response to the 9/11 Attacks, immediate murmurs of possible military action
against Iraq began immediately. The fact that everyone so quickly identified Iraq as a likely
candidate for the September 11 Attacks itself speaks volumes about the criminal record of
Husseins Iraq. In 2002 public support for military action against Iraq increased as people saw
provocations by Hussein on the news every night. As noted in the Iraq Resolution, several of
Iraqs neighbors - specifically Turkey, Kuwait and Syria - feared Husseins regime and wanted
him removed from power. UN inspectors were unable to do their inspections, and fears of the
horrific secrets brewing behind Husseins closed borders swelled in the public media.
The Iraq Resolution was passed on 16 October 2002 as Americas final ultimatum to
Husseins Iraq. The Resolution supported and encouraged diplomatic efforts by President
Bush to "strictly enforce through the U.N. Security Council all relevant Security Council
resolutions regarding Iraq" and "obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to
ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion, and noncompliance and promptly and
strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq." The United States
Resolution was followed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1441 on 8 November 2002,
where the international community essentially echoed the points of the Iraq Resolution as a
warning to Hussein. This period from October 2002 to the beginning of 2003 was effectively

14
Saddam Husseins last chance to avoid war and turn the tide of aggression back to mid- to late1990s levels. If Hussein had consented to the demands of the international community - even
begrudgingly, as he had done in 1991 and 1998 - he would certainly find himself again at odds
with the international community, but safe from an invasion and unchallenged continuation of
the Hussein regime in Iraq.
Saddam Hussein was an aggressive, unpredictable, deceitful leader, and his past
behavior suggests that he would have repeated those dangerous behaviors if he had remained
in control of Iraq. Time and again, Hussein had backed down from a hostile policy when
necessary, only to ramp up hostilities as the world leaders got tired of trying to tame the rogue
state. But this time he pushed it a little too far. The world became too wary of the threat he
posed in remembrance of the September 11 Attacks, and on 20 March 2003 the US-led coalition
invaded Iraq. Remember what Clinton said about Hussein in 1998. Sooner or later, he was
going to start another war, or actually build more WMDs, or harbor a terrorist organization which
the United States could not abide being harbored in Iraq, or successfully shooting down a
coalition plane. Yet perhaps all these acts of aggression and hostility on the international level
pale in comparison to the acts of human rights abuses and genocide he committed right within
his own borders. While these latter acts did not comprise the same threat to the international
community that the former did, it is nonetheless crucial to consider the moral depravity of
Husseins regime, and the moral culpability the world faced in stopping such wrongdoing.
History of Humans Rights Violations and Hussein
One could argue that a discussion of Saddam Husseins human rights violations is
inappropriate for whether the decision by the world leaders to invade Iraq was justified. After all,
what Hussein does to other countries is everyones business, but what he does to his own
people is a strictly Iraqi affair. Arguments to the contrary put America and its allies in the
position of having to play world police all the time - rushing around the world deposing dictators
and bombing rogue states and controlling anything other world leaders do which the American
public deems unacceptable. However, what I want to argue in this section of the essay is an
extreme case of a particular countrys brutal repression of its own civilian population - a fight
between a malicious dictator and a helpless, oppressed people. Some Americans believe that
we should abide by strict isolationism, and in light of the failure of the Iraq War to produce a
functional democracy or safer Iraq, I might be more inclined to agree with them. But if ever
another countrys civil actions warranted international intervention, I believe Saddam Husseins
Iraq was it.

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Lets start with a basic definition of what rights we are talking about when we accuse a
state or leader of violating basic human rights. On 10 December 1948 the UN made its
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which basically lays out the most basic rights that
modern developed countries have agreed upon:

Right to self-determination
Right to liberty
Right to due process of law
Right to freedom of movement
Right to freedom of thought
Right to freedom of religion
Right to freedom of expression
Right to peaceably assemble
Right to freedom of association
These rights have basically been agreed upon by all members of the international
community as universal rights which every state should give its citizens. A state which withholds
one or more of these rights from its citizenry is considered in violation of basic human rights and
is often reprimanded by the international community. Upholding all states to these standards
creates a safer, more moral world where individual life is valued above the needs of the state
and citizens do not become utterly oppressed by their leaders.
Saddam Husseins Iraq flagrantly violated all of these basic human rights, and the result
was a deeply oppressed populace - around 24 million people as of Iraqs population just before
the 2003 Invasion. Under Hussein, only members of the Baath Party could vote. Comprising
only 8% of the more privileged Sunni members of society, the government was not very
inclusive, and dissenting voices were either ignored or violently oppressed. Iraqi citizens were
denied the freedom to assemble in any way unless it was to express support for the Hussein
regime. Freedom of speech was nonexistent, and the state-controlled public media preached
virulently against the United States and the international community in general, contributing
greatly to the general hostility and xenophobia which plagues the Iraqi people to this day.
Citizens had no freedom of movement to travel across the country easily due to police
checkpoints on Iraqs roads and highways, and leaving the country was nearly impossible due
to expensive exit visas and the requirement of posting severe collateral. Female Iraqis were not
allowed to travel outside the country without a relative male escort. Violations of any law were
met with severe penalties; amputation, branding, capital punishment for criminal offenses like
theft, corruption and currency speculation were all enacted, while Baath members and
Husseins family members were immune from any of these punishments.

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Another serious offense against basic human rights was the indoctrination of children in
Husseins Iraq. In 2000, two human rights groups, International Federation of Human Rights
Leagues and the Coalition for Justice in Iraq, released a joint report documenting how Hussein
indoctrinated children into a fighting force. Children as young as five were separated from their
parents to be recruited into Saddams Cubs and undergo military training. Parents objecting to
this recruitment would be executed and the children jailed if they failed to comply. One could
certainly surmise this practice of raising children in military camps denied their right to selfdetermination, and the right to due process of law was denied to the parents who were
imprisoned without any trial or fair hearing.
The widespread use of torture in Husseins Iraq presents a particularly horrific example
of Husseins human rights abuses. Methods of torture included assault with brass knuckles and
wooden bludgeons, electric shocks to the genitalia, scorched metal rods being forced into body
orifices, burning with cigarette butts, poisoning with thallium (a chemical once used in rat
poison), the crushing of toes and removal of toenails, the crushing of bones, burning off limbs,
the amputation of ears, limbs, and tongues, the gouging of eyes, lowering prisoners into vats of
acid, and raping women in front of their family members. In April 2003 CNN revealed threats by
Hussein that some of their own journalists had been threatened with tortured, and many Iraqi
informants had been tortured and killed for speaking freely with journalists.
In 2002, a resolution from the European Unions Human Rights board stated that there
had been no improvement in the human rights crisis in Iraq. The statement condemned
Hussein's government for its "systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law." These crimes certainly were grave and deserved
international condemnation, but do they really constitute such an abuse of rights that the world
should have invaded in 2003?
The abuse of rights which most warranted international action was the mass genocides
of the Hussein Regime and the hundreds of thousands left dead in their wake. As early as
1975, Hussein was killing and deporting Iraqi Kurds, whom he always perceived as a potential
threat to his rule. The first big case of genocide didnt come until the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.
Throughout the War Hussein was fighting on and off with pockets of Kurdish resistance in Iraqi
Kurdistan who decidedly preferred Iranian governance over Hussein. In 1988 the war with Iran
was coming to a close, and Hussein started to turn his attention to the Kurds. The Al-Anfal
Campaign, also known as the Kurdish Genocide, was Husseins first great campaign to
exterminate the 3.5 million Kurdish minorities in Iraq. The Campaign included a massive ground
offensive and aerial bombardment of Kurdish villages throughout Iraq. It resulted in the

17
systematic, wholesale destruction of approximately 4,500 Kurdish villages, the arbitrary
imprisonment of tens of thousands of women, children and elderly people for months at a time
in conditions of extreme depravity, mass shootings, mass deportations, the usage of WMDs
such as at the Halabja Gas Attack, torture, and the displacement of over a million Kurds. It is
estimated that over 100,000 noncombatant Kurds were massacred during the Campaign.
The Al-Anfal Campaign basically halted as a result of the UN-mediated ceasefire which
ended the Iran-Iraq War, and for the next few years abuses and targeting of the Kurds returned
to historic norms. The next genocide came in 1991 in the final months of the Gulf War. Hussein
was losing the War, and any prospect of retaking Kuwait or launching an offensive against Saudi
Arabia diminished. So he turned on his own people again. He ordered to separate campaigns
within his own borders - one against the Kurds in the northern part of Iraq and one against the
Shia in the southern part of Iraq. The two campaigns resulted in the deaths of over 60,000
Shiites and over 40,000 Kurds. When the coalition forces were advancing toward Baghdad,
they came across several dungeons where enemies of Husseins regime had been held in
inhumane and unsanitary conditions. It is estimated that 1,000 inmates died every day for a
period of months before the Coalition liberated them. A number of them had been held in
complete isolation and had no idea about current events, such as who the leader of Iraq was or
that the country was at war. The two no-fly zones created by the Gulf War Ceasefire Agreement
were specifically designed to prevent Hussein from launching similar campaigns against the
Kurds in the north or Shia in the south again.
After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, numerous mass graves were discovered all across Iraq.
They were generally unmarked and contained at least six bodies - some graves containing
upwards of 3,000 bodies. The graves were generally located away from populated centers in
the desert, where Iraqi soldiers frequently led prisoners who were to be executed. International
experts estimate that around 300,000 victims are in these mass graves all around the country,
but the complete lack of care in burial has led the bodies to deteriorate so thoroughly that its
impossible to say for certain how many bodies there are.
A third and final genocide nearly happened when Hussein invaded Erbil, the capital of
Iraqi Kurdistan, on 31 August 1996. President Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes in
retaliation, and Hussein withdrew before triggering further international retribution. Tensions
and occasional conflicts persisted between Hussein and the Kurd minority until the 2003
Invasion, but no more genocide was committed anywhere near the scale of the Al-Anfal
Campaign in Iraq again.

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No one knows what would have happened between the Hussein regime and the Kurds
and the Shia if the 2003 Invasion of Iraq had not happened and Saddam Hussein remained in
power. But his repeated horrific massacres and denials of basic human rights showed a
consistent pattern of moral depravity which doubtless would have continued to greater or lesser
levels into the 2000s depending on how much leeway the international community would give
him. Hussein could not be trusted to provide the Iraqi people with even the most minimal
human rights that any moral society should give its people. Evidence of Husseins corrupt
courts or indoctrination of children or methods of torture may not constitute a need for
international intervention alone, but the degree of the brutal suppression of the civilian
population, both in numbers affected and in the severity of the acts committed, was particularly
horrific. Based on Husseins repeated crimes against humanity, I believe it was very reasonable
on the part of the international community to suspect he would continue such immoral state
practices and even possibly repeat the genocide.
Historical Consistency of the Decision to Invade
So far I have made a case in defense of the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 based
mostly on circumstantial evidence. Detailing the crimes of Saddam Hussein and his history with
WMDs is direct evidence as far as condemning Hussein as an immoral dictator is concerned,
but this evidence is only circumstantial in showing why that means the decision to invade Iraq
was justified. What I hope to do in this section of the essay is offer a more philosophical
approach to analyzing the decision to invade Iraq and to explore the greater context of the
Invasion within history.
First of all, I want to redress the most oft-cited criticism of the Iraq War: the false
allegation that Saddam Hussein had WMDs. There is no question that President Bush and his
Administration exaggerated the evidence about Iraqs weapons capabilities. In Colin Powells
speech to the UN on 5 February 2003, he presented Americas evidence and summarized its
position toward Hussein. In his speech he presented direct evidence on Husseins possession
of WMDs - most infamously photos of mobile bio-labs and of poison and explosives training
camps - asserting with certainty that Hussein was developing WMDs. Powell later admitted that
the evidence he presented concerning the WMDs was exaggerated and even directly
misleading to make the case for Husseins WMDs look more certain. Without a doubt, the
Bush Administration manipulated evidence to get its way and justify an invasion of Iraq. The
flaque President Bush and his colleagues took on the matter of whether he lied has been at
least partially deserved.

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My answer to the charge that President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair lied is a
largely unsatisfying and cynical one. I believe all world leaders lie. All world leaders use
rhetoric to exaggerate their case. Otherwise people dont get motivated to get behind them.
People dont want to get behind a big decision like declaring war or adopting a broad new social
programs if the leader gives them a probability for chance of success. People want to hear bold
assertions and resolve from their leaders - especially from the Commander and Chief in the
United States. In the case of the United States, this use of exaggerated certainty in rhetoric has
been notably pertinent in President Obamas public statements on Ebola. Every day another
assurance from the Obama Administration seems to be undermined by the seemingly
unstoppable spread of Ebola. It is becoming clearer and clearer the Obama Administration had
not understood the virus as well at the offset of this latest crisis as their rhetoric would make
them sound. The fact is, leaders dont get things done unless they sell it to the public as a bold
certainty, and I believe President Bush and Prime Minister Blair were doing no less in
exaggerating the evidence to get the public behind them in light of what they most likely thought
in their heart of hearts: an Iraq with WMD capabilities.
Secondly, I want to address the decision to invade Iraq as being consistent with other
presidential actions in the past. The designated and intended role of the Chief Executive is
foreign affairs, and its no coincidence that all American presidents actually agree pretty closely
on this issue - in their actions if not in their words. I believe whoever was president in 2003 Republican or Democrat - would have invaded Iraq based on the same facts President Bush
had to base his decision on. In Frank Harveys colorful political book Explaining the Iraq War,
he argues that Al Gore would have invaded Iraq had he been president in 2003. He points to
Gores strong support of various US interventions during the Clinton Era (Iraq in 1991 and 1998,
Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1998), to his and his advisers hawkish position toward Iraq, and
to his statement that the Iraq War was legal based on the earlier UN resolutions. I believe
President Clinton too would have gone to war in Iraq in 2003. He explicitly supported his
successors decision to invade Iraq at the time, and the 2003 Invasion was only really a
stronger, more committed version of his own previous interventions with Iraq. Rhetoric from the
Clinton Administration sounds remarkably similar to that of the Bush Administration regarding
Saddam Hussein and Iraq.
It is important to remember that the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was not just the
decision of President Bush or the Republican Party; it was a decision with bipartisan support
from the US Congress and with considerable international support. The Iraq Resolution
garnered wide bipartisan support; the vast majority of Senate Republicans and 58% of Senate

20
Democrats voted for the Resolution, including such prominent Democrat figures as Senator
Dianne Feinstein, Senator Hillary Clinton and Senator Joe Lieberman. Internationally, the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 - the international equivalent of the United
States Iraq Resolution - was voted for unanimously by such countries as the United Kingdom,
China, France, Norway, Russia, Cameroon, and others. (When was the last time the United
States, China and Russia could all agree on anything?) Three countries besides the US
deployed troops for the initial invasion (the UK, Australia and Poland), and an additional 37
countries provided some number of troops to support the military occupation of Iraq subsequent
to the Invasion.
Third, and perhaps most important of all, is a general principle which remains as true
today as ever before. Every now and then, things just go wrong. They can go wrong even
when the world leaders are doing everything right. And they almost always result in the leader
getting the shaft for it. President Truman deployed US troops to Korea in June 1950 in what
began as a wildly popular war. But by February 1952, the majority of the public disapproved,
and political historians attribute Trumans loss in the 1952 presidential election directly to public
opinion towards the War. President Johnson inherited the Vietnam War in late 1963 and had no
real means of getting out; he just wanted to push through his Great Society proposal. But with
the Tet Offensive (which, by the way, is generally considered by historians as an intelligence
failure on the part of General Westmoreland) and rising public disapproval of the War, Johnsons
approval rating plummeted and he didnt even bother trying to run for a second term in 1968.
Carter suffered a similar fate with the Iranian Hostage Crisis and only got one term in office
before getting defeated in his 1980 re-election campaign. He couldnt even take credit for the
Canadian Caper - the joint covert operation of the Canadian government and the US Central
Intelligence Agency to rescue six American diplomats in Iran - because it would have risked the
Ayatollah retaliating against the remaining hostages. When presidents do a good job, or military
interventions go well, the public doesnt hear much about it. Its only when they make big
mistakes - or rather, when good decisions produce bad results anyway - that the public gets
fired up about something. Look at whats happening with Obamacare!
Saddam Hussein was a real problem, and President Bushs response to that problem
produced terrible results. With so much time, lives and money spent and so little gained, its
hard not to blame Bush for the whole thing. But viewed relative to other executive actions,
Bushs decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was not an anomaly. For decades presidents have been
intervening in similar fashions, and they have risen or fallen with the tides of success on the
battlefield. The decision to invade Iraq was not the decision of any one man, or any one political

21
party or country, but the collective decision of an international community. Moreover, its a
decision which I think would have been repeated in times past, and likely again will be made by
some other president caught in a pickle between the political necessities of today and the
political fallout of tomorrow.
Conclusion
While our class was workshopping on these essays I had a debate with my classmate
Patrick. He criticized the paper of sounding more like a lawyers approach than a scientists
approach to the matter. I contemplated this criticism for a moment, and then agreed with him
wholeheartedly. Thats exactly what I wanted to do with this essay, I told him.
The Iraq War cant be proven right or wrong in the scientific sense. It must be proven
in a legal sense, and I believe the public has falsely accepted the consequent in its verdict of the
Iraq War. The War has failed - without a doubt - and the fact that no WMDs ever turned up in
Iraq adds insult to injury. But like in a court trial, a case must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. What I hope I accomplished in this essay was to persuade the reader that the
circumstances which preceded the decision to invade Iraq justified that decision. At the very
least, I hope to have encouraged the reader to view the decision to invade Iraq more holistically
- taking into account the circumstantial evidence concerning the threat Saddam Hussein posed
to the region, to the world and to his own people, and the reasons why Husseins past behaviors
made it so easy and reasonable to infer these threats were real and dire as of early 2003.
Personally, I think the biggest mistake in the Iraq War was that the US and its allies
permanently banned the Baath Party in 2003, removing all members of the top four tiers of the
party from their posts as doctors, professors, teachers and bureaucrats. They were replaced
with less experienced, less reliable individuals who frequently put politics and vengeance above
unifying the nation and forming an efficient government. When General Patton and General
Eisenhower established new governments in the newly captured territories of Europe at the end
of World War II, they often kept Nazi officials in their posts in order to run an efficient an orderly
state. If more of the Baath Party officials had been kept in place, I believe the government of
Iraq would have been more balanced and cohesive, Iraq would now be a safer, better place,
and public opinion on the Iraq War wouldnt be so negative.
We live in a dangerous world where rogue states have always been a problem and will
always be a threat. Perhaps the Iraq War revealed weaknesses in past policies which should
now be corrected. But to view the decision to invade Iraq purely based on the facts available to
the decision makers when the decision was being made, I believe their decision was justified.

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Now that America seems to be edging toward yet another war in Iraq in the wake of the
advances of the Islamic State, it will be interesting to see what our nation learned from the past
War in Iraq and how we might handle foreign diplomacy better or differently.