Professional Documents
Culture Documents
11/12/2015
Apt B
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33305
United States
Centell Colonzo McNeil
vs.
Juan A. Davila
Dear Sir/Madam:
You are beingserved with the enclosed notice undersection 8.01-329 of the Codeof Virginia
which designates the Secretary of the Commonwealth as statutory agent for Service of Process.
If you have any questions about the matter, PLEASE contact the CLERK of the enclosed/below
mentioned court or any attorney of your choice. Our office does not accept payments on behalf
of debts. The Secretary of the Commonwealth's ONLY responsibility is to mail the enclosed
papers to you.
COURT:
Richmond, VA 23219
760CL15004577-00
Case No.
Commonwealth of Virginia
Richmond Citv Circuit Court
Circuit Court
Juan A. Davila
Richmond, VA 23219
TO THE PERSON PREPARING THIS AFFIDAVIT: You mustcomply with the appropriate requirements listedon the backof this I'omi.
Attachments;
S Summons andComplaint
Notice
D
IE! same as above CD
1. S is anon-resident ofthe Commonwealth of Virginia or aforeign corporation and Virginia Code 8.01-328.1 (A)
applies (see NON-RESIDENCE GROUNDS REQUIREMENT on reverse).
2. D is aperson whom the party seeking service, after exercising due diligence, has been unable to locate (see DUE DILIGENCE
REQUIREMENT ON BACK)
JONATHAN MICHAELARTHUR
PARTY a PART.if'S ATrORN^^ CT PARTVS AGENT ('/>rTVSJ<F.GUI.AR ANJ) HONA l-UM-:
DATE
State of
registration #76(^19
City County of
/I^.
"** ^
PRlbay^AME OF SIGNATOR\
JLj--.vIAGlSTR.-\H^t^
Q<UG1S
MTE
NoJar> R^sfra^n No
Mycommission expires;
//A
D Verification oftlie date offiling ofthe certificate ofcorj^jJliancc is requested and aself-addressed stamped envelope is proviaed.
NOTICE TOTHERECIPIENT from the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia:
You are being .served with this notice and attached pleadings under Section 8.01-329 of the Code of Virginia which designates the Secretary
of the Commonwealth as statutory agent for Ser\'ice of Process. The Secrciar>' of the Commonwealth's ONLY responsibility is tomail, by
certified mail, return receipt requested, the enclosed papers toyou. Ifyou have any questions concerning these documents, you may wish to
seek advice from a lawyer.
SERVICE OF PROCESS IS EFFECTIVE ON lilE DA I E THA T THE CERTIFICATE 01" COMPLIANCE IS l-ILED WITH THE AliOVE-
NAMED COURT.
CERTIFICATE OF COiMPLIANCE
1, the undersigned. Clerk in the Office of theSecretary of the Commonwealth, hereby certify the following:
1 On
legal sen'ice inthe above-styled case was made upon the Secretary- of the
Commonwealth, as statutory' ageni for personsto be served in accordance with Section8.01-329of the Code of Virginia, as amended.
2. On
j^Qy....l...3...2D|5
jpapers described in the Affidavit were forwarded by certified mail, return receipt
20i^
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by anagent, as to a cause of
action arising from the person's:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Causing tortious injuryin this Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth ifhe
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any otherpersistent courseof conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goodsused or consumed or services rendered in this Commonwealth;
5.
Causing injury in this Commonwealth to any person bybreach ofwarranty expressly or impliedly made in
thesale ofgoods outside tMs Commonwealth when hemight reasonably have expected such person to
use, consume, or be affected by the goods in this Commonwealth, providedthathe alsoregularly does or
solicits business, or engages in anyotherpersistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from
goodsused or consumed or services rendered in this Commonwealth;
6.
7.
8(ii), Having been ordered topay spousal support orchild support pursuant to anorder entered byany court of
competentjurisdiction in this Conamonwealth having
jurisdiction over such person; or
10. Having incurred a liability fortaxes, fines, penalties, interest, or other charges to any political subdivision
of the Commonwealth.
When the person to beserved is a resident, the signature of anattorney, party or agent ofthe person seeking ...
service on suchaffidavit shall constitute a certificate by him thatprocess hasbeendelivered to the sheriffor to a
disinterested person aspermitted by 8.01-293 for execution and, if thesheriff or disinterested person was
unable to execute suchservice, that theperson seeking service has beenunable, after exercising due diligence,
to locate the person to be served.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Summons
Case No 760CL15004577-00
The party upon whom this summons and the attached complaint are served is hereby notified
that unless within 21 days after such service, response is made by filing in the clerk's office
of this court a pleading in writing, in proper legal form, the allegations and charges may be
taken as admitted and the court may enter an order, judgment, or decree against such party
either by default or after hearing evidence.
Appearance in person is not required by this summons.
Done in the name of the Commonwealth of Virginia on,Monday, November 02, 2015
Clerk of Court: EDWARD F JEWETT
by
t
(GfcBRKyDEPUTY CLERK )
Instructions:
Hearing Official:
Attorney s name.
MOONEY, BRET H
804-783-2000
VIRGEm:
JUAN A. DAVILA,
Comes now Centell McNeil, by and throu^ counsel, and for his complaint,jointly and .
4. This court has jurisdictionpursuantto Virginia Code 17.1-513 as this is a civil case
involving a claim in excess of $4,500.00 exclusive of interest and costs.
5. Pursuantto Virginia Code 8.01-262(3), venue is proper in this circuit as the location of
6. No federal claimsor causesof action basedupon federal law are alleged herein.
' Background Facts
7. Plaintiffis a service member inthe Army National Guard and went through basic training
from March 2014 until July 2014.
8. Through basic training, Plaintiffmet another service member ofthe Army Na:tional
Guard named Travis.
"
"
12. On or about December 11,2014, Plaintiffreceived the rifle at the Southern Police
17. Upon connecting the FaceTime call with Defendant Davila, Plaintiff did not see Travis
and realized, his own rmstake.
18.X^on realizing his mistake, Plaintiffprofusely apologized to Defendant Davilafor making the FaceTime call.
DefendantDavila's numberwith the text message, "Dude y (sic) didn't u (sic) tell me t
had the wrong number the whole time I thoughtu (sic) where (sic)my cousin who I was
trying to reach for weeks lol."
22. Plaintiffalso attempted to call the Defendant Davila viatelephone torepeat hisapology
toDefaxdant Davila. Plaintiffinformed Defendant Davila thatPlaintiffis employed as a
police officer forthe Cityof Richmond Police Department.
23.Defendant Davilausedillicitlanguage in his response to Plaintiffandtold Plaintiffonthe
telephone, inter alia, '1^ me suck your dick." Defendant Davila also informed Plaintiff
that hehad posted Plaintiffspicture withtherifle onsocial media, including butnot
24. Onthesame day and soon after Defendant Davila ended thephone call wititi Plaintiff,
'Defendant Davilamade, several otherphone calls to Plaintifffrom a blocked number and
25. After Defendant Davila stopped making phone calls to Plaintiff, Plaintiffreceived
messages fromsomeunknown email account, containing racistand derogatory feinaidcs,
and other statements referencing theFaceTiine calland telephone calls from DeiS^Hant
Davila to Plaintiff.
26. Upon mformation andbelief. Defendant Davila sent the aforementioned email messages
to Plaintiff.
*messagetoPlaintiffstating,"GQPICKCOTTON"YOUNIGGER.LMFAO/V
"
28. On December 29,2014 at 12:10 p.m.. Plaintiffresponded tothe email message stating,
*T)on*t know who this isbutthis email will besaved for law enforcement purposes
thanks."
29. On December 29,2014 at 12:11 p.m,, Defendant Davila sent arqply email message to
Plaintiffstating,"AND SO WILLTHE EMAILABOUTYOU THREATENING TO
SHOOT ME."
30. Plaintiffnever sent Defendant Davila anemail with any threatening content and/or
statements.
31. Joshua Boyle, the owner ofthe email account that was used to send the racist messages to'
Plaintiff, subsequently contacted Plaintiffto apologize for tiie messages.
32. Joshua Boyle informed Plaintiffthat Joshua. Boyle used tobefiiends with Defendant
Davila.
33. Joshua Boyle learned that Defendant Davila had hacked his email account to send the
34.Defendant Davila owns andoperates a personal Facebook account underthe name John
Melecio Davila.
35. Defendant Company owns and operates a Facebook account ^d a Twitter account, the
Facebook account under the name Antonio Biaggi Davila, and the Twitter accoimt liiider
the name Antonio Biaggi xxx, @X!Cxbiaggi.
3.Defendant Davila is an actor in thepornography industry who uses theactor name
Antonio Biaggi.
37. Defendant Davila istiae owner ofthe Defendant Company, a pornography production
company named Biaggi Productions, LLC.
39. Defendant Company's social media accounts feature the website link to the Defendant
Company's pornographic videos at www.biagfijvideos.com.
,42. Beginnmg on or about December 29,2014 at 8:46 a.m., the Defendants published
Twitter accounts, containing information that they knew orshould have.Im6wn contained
false and defamatory stat^ents of fact of or concerningplaintiff causing damage to
43. The statements were published to third persons, including without liitnitation to Twitter
users, and others containing false factual statements including butnotlimited to the
following statement that the Defendants published in Spanish on the Defendant
Company's Twitteraccount @XxxBiaggi on.December29,2014at 8:46a.m. (hereinafter
"the Twitter posf*):
'
6
44. The English translation ofthe foregoing Twitter post is'*this [bastard] [motherjEucker]
/
[similar derogatory term] from Hopewell-, Virginia FaceTime calls me that he isgoing to
kill me. The police are" in myhouse more infolater."
45. Tjie Twitter post also included apicture ofPlaintiffwith PlaintifPs personal email
address.
46. Specifically, the picture inthe Twitter post displayed Plaintiffs upper body and face,
with Plaintiffwearing awhite tank undershirt, holding a rifle inhisright hand, and with
Plaintiffs personal gmail address listed onthe top left ofthe picture.
47. Theforegoing statement on the Twitter postis false.
48. Uponinformation andbelief, the policewere neverin Defendant Davila's houseat 8:46
a.m. on December 29,2014.
50. Tke Twitter post generated 20 rq)lies, and 5 retweets from other Twitter users. .
51. Among the 20replifes to the Twitter post, Twitter users published statements indicating
thattheybelievedthe veracity of the Twitter post.
52. Onesuch Twitter user, @emmdoll, replied onDecember 29,2014 at 10:00 im. "Es!de'
verdad?" which translates in Engli^ to "is this true?"
53. The Defendants replied to @emmdoll onDecember 29,2014 at 11:31 a.m. stating, "Si
Yallame lapolicia y FBP'which translates to "yes I already called thepolice and FBI."
"Jason Ander from NY and Centell Mcneil (sic) police from Virginia, (sic) he
shouldbe a shame (sic) of him self (sic) for doingthis shit, (sic) where the people
involvedin this Ugly and F Stupid (sic)move to FaceTimeme I don't how (sic)
theygot my info, but (sic) thismorning theyFaceTime morethan 25 timesto
show me guns on Camera, (sic)the policealready has a (sic)investigation..
57. Plaintiff did not FaceTimethe DefendantDavila more than 25 times to show him gun(s)
/on camera.
59.The Facebookpost also included a picture of Plaintiff with Plaintiff's personal emMl
address.
d. "I would think that Ms intentions whether as a threat or harassment are illegal and
X
should be investigated as such. You did the right thing by notifyingthe police!"
e. "He is totally Loco (sic)."
The Timelme Post
63. Additionally, the Defendants posted another statement (hereinafter "the Timeline post")
' on or around December 29,2014, concerning Plaintiff on the Defendant Company's
"this person call (sic) me saying he is going to kill me, if you guys get FaceTime
65. Plaintiffnever told Defendant Davila that Plaintiffis going tokill Defendant Dayila.
66.Plaintiff does not live at 3919 Grovewood Rd., Hopewell,Virginia.
67. Upon information and belief, the police never visited Defendantpavila's house on
December 29,2014.
68. The Defendants' statements to social media users falsely impute that Plaintiffthreatened
to kill Defendant Davila.
69. The Defendants' statements tosocial media users falsely impute thatPlaintiffis athreat
to otherindividuals and,^ven the chance. Plaintiffwould harass and/or threaten other
individuals, asimplied in thestatement, "ifyou guys getFaceTime call (sic) from this
person report him."
70. The Defendants' statements- tothe social media users onFacebook and Twitter falsely
impute that Plaintiff was under investigation fora criminal actand/or police misconduct.
71. TheDefendants' statements to the social media users on Facebook andTwitter falsely
impute that Plaintiffis unfit to'perform his duties and/orwork in his trade or profession
72. Upon information and belief, on orabout December 29,2014, the Defendants published
statements to theRichmond.Police Dqjartment and to theFe'deral Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) that, in haec yerha^ Plaintiffthreatened to kill Defendant Davila.
,r
that they knew or shouldhave known containedfalse and defamatory stateraents of fapt
"..
74. Upon information and belief, the statements of the Defendants-werefalse and the
believing it to be true, the Defendants lacked reasonable grounds for suchbeliefox acted
negligently in failing to ascertain the facts on which the stetement was based,,when
77.The Defendants' statements to Richmond PoliceDepartment, to the FBI, and to the social
78.The Defendants' statements to Richmond PoliceDepartment, to the FBI, andto the social
media users on Facebook and Twitter damaged Plaintiffs reputation and caused Plaintiff
to suffer damages.
Malice
79. ITbie Defendants' statements to the social media users on Facebook and Twitter were
madeto andheardby those who didnot have the dutyor authority to receivethe
information and were accompanied by malice.
81. The conductcomplained of herein (including the defamatory statements) was done
intentionally, puiposefuHy and without lawfuljustification, with full knowledge of the
11
falsity ofthe statements, and/orwith reckless and willful disregard forthe truth orfalsity
of the statements and ahi^ degree of awareness that thestatements were probably false,
when Plaintiffapologized to Defendant Davila on multiple occasions for theinadvertent
call (via telephone, via FaceTime, viatext message) explainifig that Plaintiffwas trying
to reach hisfriend, when Plaintiffnever toldDefendant Davila he wasgoing to kill
*'Defendant Davila, whenPlaintiffinformed Defendant Davila thatPlaintiffis a police
officer.
telephone, via FaceTirne, via text message) explainingthat Plaintiff was trying to reach,
theDefendants knew the statements were false ormade it with reckless disregard of
wiiether it was false ornot; or (b) thestatements were deliberately made in such a way
tihat theywereheard by persons having no interest or duty in the subject of the statdiient,
in particular, to the socialmediaiisers; or (c) the statements were unnecessarily insulting;
statements were made because ofpersonal spite, orillwill, independent ofliie occasion
on which the communication was made.
84. The Defendants apted with malice.
Damages
85. Plaintiffwas injured inhis personal reputation and professional reputation byreason of
theconduct of theDefendants described herein. These damages include butarenot
mental suffering, injury to his reputation, and actual out-of-pocket losses that were
caused by the statements and conduct ofthe Defendants.
statements and statements with factually false insinuations, about Plaintiff tottod parties
without privilege (orinabuse thereof,), justification, or excuse onDefendant Company's
Twitter account, @Xxxbiaggi. '
Here^ the statements published by the Defendants aredefamatory and also aredefaniatory perse,In Vjrgln|a,'
defamation perse consist ofstatements that are "(1) Those which impute to a person the commission ofsome
criminal offense involving moral turpitude, forwhich the party, ifthe charge Is trye,may be indicted and.punished.
(2) Those which impute that a person is'mfected with some contagious-disease, where ifthe charge istrue," it
would excludethe party from society.(3)Thosewhich impute to a person unfltness to perform the duties of an
office or employment of profit, or want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of sUch an office or
employment, Those which prejudice such person in hi's or her profession ortrade. All otherdefamatory words
which, though not inthemselves actionable, occasion a person special dainages are actionable." t^leming v.iVloore.
221 Va. 884,889 (1981).
'13
89. The Defendants published such statements intentionally and maliciously, knowinghis
insinuations were fectually false or with reckless disregard for the truth.
90. The Defendants' conduct complained of herein directly and proximately causedPlaintiff
damages, as alleged herein.
91. Plaintiffis entitledto presumed damages becauseinter alia the statements impiite that
Plaintiff is unfit to performhis duties,and which prejudicehim in his profession.
92. The jury may also award punitive damages, based on the foregoing.
94. The allegations in this complaint, 1-86 are incoiporated here by reference.
95. On December 29,2014, the Defendants published factually false and defamatory
statements and statements with factuallyfelse insinuations, about Plaintiff to third parties
without privilege (or in abuse thereof,), justification, or excuse on Defendant Company's
Facebook account under the name Antonio Biaggi Davila.
98. Plaintiffis entitled,to presumed damages because inter alia the statements imputethat
Plaintiff is unfit to perform his duties, and whichprejudice him in his profession.
99. The jury may also award punitive damages, based on the foregoing.
100.
101.
102.
103.
Plaintiffdamages, as allegedherein.
105.
that Plaintiffis imfitto perform his duties, and whichprejudice him in his profession.
106.
107...
108.
109.
third parties \wthout privilege (orin abuse thereof,), justification, or excuse tothe:
Richmond Police Department.
110.
his insinuations werefectually f^e or with reckless disregard for the truth.
111.
112.
"that Plaintiffis unfitto perform his duties, andwhichprejudice him in his profession.
.
15
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
.119.
that Plaintiffis unfit to perform his duties, andwhichprejudice him in his profession.
120..
121.
122.
here by reference.
123.
'
statements with factually false insinuations, about Plaintiffto third parties \wthout
privilege (or in abuse thereof)Justification, or excuse.
16
""
124.
126.
. _
128.
129.
," . . . '
incoiporatedhere by reference:
COUNT 10 - Unauthorized Use of Name and Pictare in Trade
130.
here by reference.
131.
8.01-40.
132.
Plaintiff did not consent, whether in writing or otherwise, to have hisname and
17.
133.
portrait, or picture,is used without having first obtained the written consent of such
person... for advertising puiposesor for the puiposes of trade, suchpersons may
134.
136.
The Defendants knew that useofthe Plaintiff's name and picture forthe ptiiposes".
137.
The Defendants knowingly used thePlaintiffs name and picture for thepurposes
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ADDAMNUM
Respectfully requested,
CENTELL MCNEIL
Counsel
Street
19