Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)

VI.
B
FRANCISCO V. ZANDUETA, 61 PHIL. 752 DY
SYLLABUS
1. PARENT AND CHILD; SUPPORT OF CHILD WHILE HIS
CIVIL STATUS IS IN LITIGATION. In the present case the
action for support is brought by a minor, through his
guardian ad litem, who alleges that he is the son of the
petitioner; therefore it is necessary for him to prove his
civil status as such son. His alleged civil status being in
litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for
granted upon the point in issue.
2. ID.; ID. There is no law or reason which authorizes
the granting of support to a person who claims to be a
son in the same manner as to a person who establishes
by legal proof that he is such son. In the latter case legal
evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the former
there is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere
allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must
not be confounded with an established right recognized
by a final judgment.
3. ID.; ID. The civil status of sonship being denied and
this civil status, from which the right to support is
derived, being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can
be given to such a claim until an authoritative
declaration has been made as to the existence of the
cause. It is also evident that there is a substantial
difference between the capacity of a person after the
rendition of a final judgment in which that person is
declared to be in possession of the status of a son and
his capacity prior to such time when nothing exists other
that his suit or claim to be declared in possession of such
a status.
Week 7 (Support Pendente Lite)

special defense alleged that he never acknowledged and
could not have acknowledged the plaintiff as his son;
that he was not present at the baptism of the plaintiff
and that he was married at the time it is alleged that the
plaintiff was born.
Notwithstanding the denial, the judge granted the order
and Francisco moved for a reconsideration on the ground
that it was issued in excess of jurisdiction in view of the
fact that the civil status of the plaintiff was placed in
issue by the pleadings; that the plaintiff has no right to
monthly support from the defendant until his status as a
child of the latter is finally determined in his favor and
that as the guardian ad litem of the plaintiff admits his
lack of means to defray even the ordinary expenses of
existence it would be impossible for the defendant to
recover whatever amount he may have advanced to
plaintiff as support pendente lite, should it finally be
decided that he is not the father of the plaintiff.
Issue:
WON Eugenio Leopold Francisco is entitled to the support
without establishing his status as the son of Luis
Francisco?
Facts:
Petitioner, Luis Francisco, sought to annul the ruling of
respondent judge granting private respondent, Eugenio
Leopold Francisco, a support pendent lite at the amount
of Php 30/month.
Ruling:
NO.
The SC held in the previous case of Yangco vs. Rohde
that the fact of a civil status must be proved before a
right of support can be derived, to wit,In the present
case the action for the support or alimony is brought by a
woman who alleges that she is a wife; therefore it is
necessary for her to prove possession of the civil status
of a spouse that is, a marriage, without which one has
no right to the title of husband or wife, . . .. "This
evidence being lacking, and the civil status of marriage
being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken
for granted upon the point in issue. There is no law or
reason which authorizes the granting of alimony to a
person who claims to be a spouse in the same manner as
to a person who conclusively establishes by legal proof
that he or she is such a spouse, and sues for divorce or
separation. In this case the legal evidence raises a
presumption of law; in the former there is no
presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation a
fact in issue - and a simple fact in issue must not be
confounded with an established right recognized by a
final judgment or based upon a legal presumption. The
civil status of marriage being denied, and this civil
status, from which the right to support is derived, being
in issue, it is difficult to see how any effect can be given
to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has
been made as to the existence of the cause. It is evident
that there is of necessity a substantial difference
between the capacity of a person is declared to be in
possession of the status of marriage and his capacity
prior to such time when nothing exists other that his suit
or claim to be declared in possession of such status of
marriage . . .."
The respondent, through his guardian ad litem Rosario

(his mother), filed a complaint of support. It was alleged
that he is an acknowledged son of herein petitioner thus
entitling him for support. Petitioner, as defendant in that
case, answered by a general denial of each and every
material allegation contained in the complaint and as a
In the present case the action for support is brought by a

minor, through his guardian ad litem, who alleges that he
is the son of the petitioner; therefore it is necessary for
him to prove his civil status as such son. His alleged civil
status being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be
taken for granted upon the point in issue. There is no law
4. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION. The Civil Code grants the

right of support to a son. This status not appearing by a
final judgment, the respondent judge was without
jurisdiction to order the petitioner, as defendant in case
No. 47238, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P30, or any
other amount, as monthly support, pendente lite.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSENT OF PARTIES. In view of the
lack of jurisdiction of the respondent judge to grant the
plaintiff support, pendente lite, it is evident that the
attorney of the defendant is case No. 47238 could not by
his alleged consent to the granting of such support give
the trial judge jurisdiction to adjudicate such a claim
against his client. It is a universal rule of law that parties
cannot, by consent, give a court, as such, jurisdiction in a
matter which is excluded by the laws of the land.
Its not a PROVREM 2015 1
or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a

person who establishes by legal proof that he is such
son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises a
presumption of law.
The civil status of sonship being denied and this civil
status, from which the right to support is derived, being
in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such
a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made
as to the existence of the cause.
3.

-The CFI have jurisdiction over suits for divorce,
and the granting of alimony pendent lite is
incidental to this jurisdiction; consequently, an
order granting alimony, even if erroneous, is not
an excess of jurisdiction, and its enforcement
cannot be restrained by prohibition.
DIGEST:
FACTS:
Short digest:
EL Francisco sought for the support of Luis Francisco, his
alleged father, through the institution of the action by his
mother Rosario. The herein respondent alleged that he
was an acknowledged son of the petitioner. However,
petitioner
denied
the
allegationshe
never
acknowledged the child, he was married at the time of
the birth of the child, physical absence during the
baptism.
The trial court ruled in favor of the child and ordered Luis
Francisco to pay Php 30/month as support.
Issue:
WON Eugenio Leopold Francisco is entitled to the support
without establishing his status as the son of Luis
Francisco?
Ruling:
No.
It held that (t)here is no law or reason which authorizes
the granting of support to a person who claims to be a
son in the same manner as to a person who establishes
by legal proof that he is such son. In the latter case the
legal evidence raises a presumption of law, while in the
former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a
mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue
must not be confounded with an established right
recognized by a final judgment.
Additionally, the respondent judge was without
jurisdiction to order for the monthly support in light of
herein private respondents absence of aforementioned
status.
YANGCO V. RHODE, 1 PHIL. 404 FERNANDEZ
PRINCIPLES:
1.
2.
Marriage and Divorce--- Where the answer to a

complaint alleging marriage and praying for a
divorce denies the fact of marriage, the court
exceeds its jurisdiction in granting alimony, and
the enforcement of an order granting it will be
restrained by the writ of prohibition.
-The right of a wife to support depends upon her
status as such, and where the existence of the
status is put in issue by the pleading it cannot be
presumed to exist for the purpose of granting
alimony. (the fact of the civil status must be
proven first before a right of support can
be derived)
Yangco, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition, alleging

that Judge Rohde, of the CFI Manila, acted in excess of
jurisdiction when a complaint had been filed by Victorina
against the petitioner praying that she be declared the
lawful wife of the said Yangco, and that she be granted a
divorce, an allowance for alimony, and attorney's fees
during the pendency of the suit; that the demurrer filed
by the petitioner was overruled by the said judge.
A part of the ruling as follows: (just for you to know the
judgment of Rohde)
"I am of the opinion that the marriage alleged in the
complaint is valid under the laws in force, although the
question is not clear nor without doubt. The facts alleged
in the complaint compel me to resolve the doubt in favor
of the plaintiff;" and that the petitioner, in answer to the
complaint, denied the principal allegation of fact therein,
to wit, the mutual agreement to be husband and wife
alleged by the plaintiff to have been entered into before
witnesses; that while the case was in this condition the
plaintiff filed a motion for a monthly allowance as
alimony, costs, and attorney's fees; that on the 22nd of
July last the said judge ordered the petitioner to pay the
plaintiff, in advance, a monthly allowance of 250 Mexican
pesos from and after the 11th of March last past, and to
pay on the 1st day of August following all accrued
allowances, in addition to the allowance for the said
month, amounting to the sum of 1,500 pesos; that the
plaintiff in the said action owns no property, and the
judge not having required from her any security, it is
certain that the petitioner, defendant in the said action
below, should judgment be rendered in his favor, would
be unable to recover such sums as the judge might
compel him to disburse; that against the ruling of the
court he had no right of appeal or any plain, speedy, or
adequate remedy;
Y prayed to the court to render judgment declare Rohde,
that he acted in excess of his jurisdiction in attempting to
oblige petitioner to pay to the said Victorina said
allowance, and to direct that a writ of prohibition issue to
said Rohde prohibiting him from attempting to compel
petitioner to pay the said amount.
Rohde, filed a demurrer and motion to dismiss upon the
following grounds: (1) That this court is without
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action; (2) that
the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action.
Victorina acquired a right all conjugal rights, and in
particular to the allowance of alimony pendente lite."
And upon this supposition he cited articles of the Civil

Code as to rights enjoyed by a married woman by virtue
of the marriage, and those which she may further
exercise by reason of divorce pending litigation and
those granted to her finally in case of a favorable
judgment.
The respondents judge had jurisdiction to try the divorce
case and its incidents, among others that of alimony; in
an interlocutory ruling he held that the alleged
matrimony existed, although it appeared to him to be a
matter not clear or free from doubt; in another
interlocutory order, notwithstanding the fact that the
existence of the marriage is not clear or free from doubt,
he directed the allowance of alimony pendente lite in
favor of the plaintiff; against this interlocutory order no
appeal lies on behalf of the alleged husband who is to
pay this allowance; this alleged husband must pay it
without any guaranty of recovery in the event that the
proof should established a contrary condition of affairs to
that assumed to be correct, notwithstanding the fact that
the question is not clear or free from doubt; and as the
judge is not devoid of jurisdiction, and as no appeal lies
against an interlocutory order, that such an opinion, such
an interlocutory order so rendered, although erroneous
and causing irreparable damage, can not be reviewed by
any other court during the course of the trial.
Under article 1591 of the old Code any person believing
himself entitled to that provisional alimony or support
was required to file with the complaint documents
proving conclusively the title by virtue of which the same
was sued for. If the title was based upon a right created
by law, it was necessary to present the documents
establishing the bond of relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant or the circumstances which gave
a right to the alimony, such evidence to be completed by
the testimony of witnesses if necessary. The judge, under
article 1592, could not admit the complaint unless the
documents referred to in the preceding article were
submitted. It is evident from this that under the
provisions of the law then in force a suit for alimony
could not prosper upon the mere opinion of the judge
expressed, not in a final judgment causing status, but in
an interlocutory order which has no other purpose than
to facilitate the continuance of the trial.
The necessity of founding the action for support or
alimony on a title, and a title supported by documentary
evidence, is a consequence of the precepts of article 143
of the Civil Code cited by the respondent judge himself.
In this article the right to support is granted (1) to
spouses inter se; (2) to legitimate descendants and
ascendants inter se; (3) to parents and certain
legitimated and acknowledged natural children; (4) to
other illegitimate children, and (5) to brothers and
sisters. In all these cases in is a civil status or a juridical
relation which is the basis of the action for support the
civil status of marriage or that of relationship.
In the present case the action for the support or alimony
is brought by a woman who alleges that she is a wife;
therefore it is necessary for her to prove possession of
the civil status of a spouse that is, a marriage, without
which one has no right to the title to husband or wife.

Marriages celebrated before the adoption of the Civil
Code must be proven by the means established by the
former laws. This evidence being lacking, and the civil
status of marriage being in litigation, it is evident that
nothing can be taken for granted upon the point in issue.
There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting
of alimony to a person who claims to be a spouse in the
same manner as to a person who conclusively
establishes by legal proof that he or she is such spouse,
and sues for divorce or separation. In this case the legal
evidence raises a presumption of law; in the former there
is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation
a fact in issue and a simple fact in issue must not
be confounded with an established right recognized by a
final judgment or based upon a legal presumption.
On the issue of the remedy of prohibition, this remedy
must be based upon a lack of jurisdiction or an excess in
the exercise of jurisdiction in order that the judge may be
prohibited from continuing the proceedings.
The court below had jurisdiction to try the divorce suit,
but he was without jurisdiction to grant alimony when the
right to claim alimony had not accrued in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code. This Code only
grants the rights to alimony to a wife. This status not
appearing by a final judgment, the court is without
jurisdiction to make any order in the matter.
Therefore mandamus is the proper remedy upon the
facts related.
It is not necessary to decide at this time if an exception
could be made with respect to a case in which the fact of
the marriage is admitted of record by the defendant. In
the case before us this fact was denied. The motion and
demurrer are overruled and the defendant is authorized
to answer the complaint within twenty days from this
date.
QUICK DIGEST:
Victorina (V) filed a complaint against Yangco (Y) praying
that she be declared the lawful wife of said Yangco, and
that she be granted a divorce, an allowance for alimony,
and attorney's fees during the pendency of the suit. In
Ys answer to the complaint, he denied the fact of
marriage between him and V. Support was granted by
Judge Rohde (R).(Note: the judge granted the allowance
for alimony even if there is DOUBT as to the existence of
marriage)
Issue:
Whether the R is correct.
SC Ruling:
No. (V is not entitled for support)
Under the old Code any person believing himself entitled
to that provisional alimony or support was required to file
with the complaint documents proving conclusively the
title by virtue of which the same was sued for. If the title
was based upon a right created by law, it was necessary
to present the documents establishing the bond of

relationship between the plaintiff and defendant or the
circumstances which gave a right to the alimony, such
evidence to be completed by the testimony of witnesses
if necessary.
The right of a wife to support depends upon her status as
such, and where the existence of the status is put in
issue by the pleading it cannot be presumed to exist for
the purpose of granting alimony. The fact of the civil
status must be proven first before a right of
support can be derived.
In the present case the action for the support or alimony
is brought by a woman who alleges that she is a wife;
therefore it is necessary for her to prove possession of
the civil status of a spouse that is, a marriage, without
which one has no right to the title to husband or wife.
Marriages celebrated before the adoption of the Civil
Code must be proven by the means established by the
former laws. This evidence being lacking, and the civil
status of marriage being in litigation, it is evident that
nothing can be taken for granted upon the point in issue.
There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting
of alimony to a person who claims to be a spouse in the
same manner as to a person who conclusively
establishes by legal proof that he or she is such spouse,
and sues for divorce or separation
COQUIA V. BALTAZAR, G.R. NO. L-2942,
DECEMBER 29, 1949 ECNEROL
Facts:
Respondents Gaspara, Francisca, Dionisio, Alfredo, and
Salvador Coquia, assisted by their mother and guardian
ad litem Maria Dalori, filed an action in the Court of the
First Instance of Leyte against the spouses Silvestra
Coquia and Luis Carandang to recover the possession as
owner of four parcels of land. They alleged that they are
acknowledged natural children and the sole heirs of the
latter. The petitioners (Silvestra and Luis) in their answer
denied that the respondents are acknowledged natural
children of the deceased Alfredo Coquia.
Pending the trial of the case said respondents (plaintiff's
below) filed a petition for alimony pendente lite which
Judge Edmundo S. Piccio granted in the sum of P200 a
month (subsequently reduced to P100 a month).
The respondent judge, Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, a
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. He held
that the order of Judge Piccio for alimony pendente lite
was well founded. On February 26, 1949, ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution against the herein
petitioners to collect the sum of P400 corresponding to
four months of unpaid alimony.
Petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari to
annul the above mentioned orders.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in granting
the petition for alimony pendent lite, writ of execution,
and order of denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Ruling:

YES. Rule 63 of the Rules of the Court, which authorizes
the granting of alimony pendente lite" at the
commencement of the proper action, or at any time
afterwards but prior to the final judgment," is not
applicable to this case. The action commenced before
the respondent judge was not for support but for the
recovery of the ownership and possession of real
property. Manifestly such an action is not "the proper
action" contemplated by said rule The mere fact that the
plaintiffs have legal and equitable rights in the property
they seek to recover (Q. E. D. ) does not authorize the
court to compel the defendants to support the plaintiffs
pending the determination of the suit. Moreover, the
petitioners, who are sister and brother-in law,
respectively, of the deceased Alfredo Coquia, are not
bound to support the alleged natural children of the
latter. Under the article 143 of the Civil Code only the
following are bound to support each other: (1) husband
and wife: (2) legitimate ascendants and descendants:
and (3) parents and acknowledged natural children, and
the legitimate descendants of the latter.
Even in an action for divorce and alimony, it has been
held that the court has no jurisdiction to grant alimony
pendente lite where the answer to the complaint alleging
marriage and praying for divorce denies the fact of
marriage, because the right of a wife to support depends
upon her status as such, and where the existence of such
status is put in issue by the pleading, it cannot be
presumed to exist for the purpose of granting alimony.
PETITION IS GRANTED. ORDERS complained of are SET
ASIDE.
QUICK DIGEST:
Facts:
Respondents Gaspara, Francisca, Dionisio, Alfredo, and
Salvador Coquia, assisted by their mother and guardian
ad litem Maria Dalori, filed an action in the Court of the
First Instance of Leyte against the spouses Silvestra
Coquia and Luis Carandang to recover the possession as
owner of four parcels of land. They alleged that they are
acknowledged natural children and the sole heirs of the
latter. The petitioners (Silvestra and Luis) in their answer
denied that the respondents are acknowledged natural
children of the deceased Alfredo Coquia. Pending the trial
of the case said respondents (plaintiff's below) filed a
petition for alimony pendente lite which Judge Edmundo
S. Piccio granted in the sum of P200 a month
(subsequently reduced to P100 a month).
The respondent judge, Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, a
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. He held
that the order of Judge Piccio for alimony pendente lite
was well founded. On February 26, 1949, ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution against the herein
petitioners to collect the sum of P400 corresponding to
four months of unpaid alimony. Petitioners filed the
present petition for certiorari to annul the above
mentioned orders.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in granting
the petition for alimony pendent lite, writ of execution,
and order of denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Ruling:
YES. Rule 63 of the Rules of the Court, which authorizes
the granting of alimony pendente lite" at the
afterwards but prior to the final judgment," is not
applicable to this case. The action commenced before
the respondent judge was not for support but for the
recovery of the ownership and possession of real
property. Manifestly such an action is not "the proper
action" contemplated by said rule The mere fact that the
plaintiffs have legal and equitable rights in the property
they seek to recover (Q. E. D. ) does not authorize the
court to compel the defendants to support the plaintiffs
pending the determination of the suit. Moreover, the
petitioners, who are sister and brother-in law,
respectively, of the deceased Alfredo Coquia, are not
bound to support the alleged natural children of the
latter. Under the article 143 of the Civil Code only the
following are bound to support each other: (1) husband
and wife: (2) legitimate ascendants and descendants:
and (3) parents and acknowledged natural children, and
the legitimate descendants of the latter.
VERSION 2: (DOCTRINE)
The action in the present case was not for support but for
the recovery of the ownership and possession of real
property. Manifestly such an action is not the proper
action contemplated by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
The mere fact that the plaintiffs have legal and equitable
rights in the property they seeks to recover (Q .E. D.)
does not authorize the court to compel the defendants to
support the plaintiffs pending the determination of the
suit.
Villanueva v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92 TRIXIE
MAGOMA V. MACADAEG, G.R. NO. L-5153,
DECEMBER 10, 1951 FAITH RAVENS
PRINCIPLE: Before action is taken on the matter [of
support pendente lite], an opportunity should be given
him to be heard, considering the serious nature of his
special defense.
LONG DIGEST:
Facts:
Respondent Candelaria Bautista filed an action against
petitioner seeking the separation of the property of the
spouses and the consequent dissolution and liquidation
of their conjugal partnership. Months thereafter, prior to
the trial on the merits, respondent prayed the court that
pending the determination of the case, she and her
daughter Leticia be given support pendente lite in the
amount of P1,000 a month and that petitioner be ordered
to act accordingly. Her motion is based on the following
ground: On August 30, 1945, while their marriage was
still subsisting, petitioner contracted another marriage
with one Luceria Bernardo; in January, 1946, petitioner
abandoned respondent and two minor daughters and
went to live with his second wife; while the bigamy case
against petitioner was under investigation by the City
Fiscal of Manila, petitioner refused to give any support to
respondent and her children for their maintenance;
petitioner and respondent, through their joint effort and

industry, acquired considerable property which, added to
the earnings of petitioner from his various kinds of
business, yields a net income of at least P5,000 a month;
petitioner owes them in arrears by way of support a total
of P6,000 from January 17, 1951.
Petitioner objected to the motion pendente lite on the
following grounds: Respondent abandoned the conjugal
home to live with an American soldier from January to
August 1946; later in 1947, respondent also lived with
one Celestino Fernandez up to October 1949; having
committed adultery, respondent, therefore, is not
entitled to support; due to repeated civil and criminal
cases filed against him by respondent, petitioner had to
close his titles factory. at present petitioner is heavily
indebted to several banks and because of the lis
pendens annotated on his certificate of title upon
respondent's request, he is placed in a position where he
could not pay his obligation due to his inability to
negotiate with said properties. Wherefore, petitioner
prayed that the motion for support pendente lite be
denied.
Before petitioner has had a chance to present his
evidence on his special defenses, respondent judge
issued on September 28, 1951, an order granting the
motion and ordering petitioner to give support pendente
lite to his wife and daughter Leticia.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the Court of First Instance
should be declared null and void.
Ruling:
Yes. In the case of Sanchez vs. Zulueta, 68 Phil., 110:
Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to
present his evidence for the purpose of determining
whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the
application.
The facts of this case show that petitioner has not also
been given an opportunity to adduce evidence in support
of the defense he has set up against the motion for
support pendente lite. It is true several trials were held
before the deputy clerk of court, but there is nothing to
show that petitioner has resorted to dilatory tactics as to
justify that action on the motion be taken without
receiving his evidence. Therefore, before action is taken
on the matter, an opportunity should be given him to be
heard, considering the serious nature of his special
defense. In line with the ruling of this Court in the
Sanchez case, supra, there is no other alternative than to
remand this case to the lower court in order that
immediate steps may be taken relative to the reception
of the evidence of petitioner in support of his opposition.
SHORT DIGEST:
Facts:
Respondent Candelaria Bautista filed an action against
petitioner seeking the separation of the property of the
spouses and the consequent dissolution and liquidation
of their conjugal partnership. Months thereafter, prior to
the trial on the merits, respondent prayed the court that
pending the determination of the case, she and her
daughter Leticia be given support pendente lite.
Petitioner objected to the motion pendente lite on the

following grounds: Respondent abandoned the conjugal
home to live with an American soldier from January to
August 1946; later in 1947, respondent also lived with
one Celestino Fernandez up to October 1949; having
committed adultery, respondent, therefore, is not
entitled to support.
Before petitioner has had a chance to present his
evidence on his special defenses, respondent judge
issued on September 28, 1951, an order granting the
motion and ordering petitioner to give support pendente
lite to his wife and daughter Leticia.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the Court of First Instance
should be declared null and void.
Ruling:
Yes. In the case of Sanchez vs. Zulueta, 68 Phil., 110:
Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to
present his evidence for the purpose of determining
whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the
application.
Therefore, before action is taken on the matter, an
opportunity should be given him to be heard, considering
the serious nature of his special defense.
RAMOS V. CA, L-31897, JUNE 30, 1972
EDOMBINGO
Principle:
The Rules of Court clearly authorizes the granting
of support pendente lite, even prior to the rendition of
judgment by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals can grant support pendent
lite pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, even with
the lower court did not grant such.
The refusal of the trial court to grant said
alimony pendente lite did not and cannot deprive the
appellate court of said authority, or even dent the
wisdom of the action taken by the latter, considering that
the former did not give any plausible reason for its
aforementioned refusal and that the same may have, in
fact, been due to the appeal taken by the defendant,
whose record on appeal had already been approved.
Long digest:
FACTS:
Assisted by their mother, Felisa and Lorraine
Lagos, both minors, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Batangas, a complaint against petitioner Luis T.
Ramos, for support and damages, alleging that she bore
said children, born on August 27, 1963 and June 21,
1965, respectively, in consequence of illicit relations with
said Ramos, who had failed and refused to support said
minors, notwithstanding repeated demands, and despite
the fact that he has, as a municipal mayor, the means
therefor, which she does not have. Ramos having denied

the main allegations of the complaint set up a
counterclaim for damages.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs,
sentencing Ramos to pay each of said minors the sum of
P75.00 monthly, in addition to the aggregate sum of
"P2,075.00 representing the support in arrears for the
elder child, that is, from July 17, 1964, when defendant
stopped giving him the support, up to the filing of the
complaint on September 3, 1965," and "the support in
arrears in the amount of P180.00 for the younger child,
or from June 21, 1965, when she was born, up to
September 3, 1965, when the complaint for support was
filed," apart from "the sum of P500.00 representing
attorney's fees and costs of suit suffered by the
plaintiffs."
Ramos then appealed to the Court of Appeals,
plaintiffs-appellees moved therein for support pendente
lite. In a reasoned and signed resolution dated November
21, 1969, Ramos was ordered by the Court of Appeals to
deposit with its Clerk the sum of P4, 727.50
representing one-half of the amount due under the
appealed decision to the foresaid plaintiffs "within 15
days from notice, otherwise he will be cited for contempt.
Once the amount is deposited, the Clerk of this Court is
directed to deliver the same to plaintiff-appellee Felisa
Lagos." Subsequent reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the matter was elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA abused its discretion in
issuing the aforementioned resolution "there having been
neither a recognition of paternity by the petitioner nor its
establishment by final judgment"
RULING:
The Supreme Court opined that the Court of
Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to present
his evidence for the purpose of determining whether it is
sufficient prima facie to overcome the application.
Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against
an action for support (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285).
Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it
is the fruit of such adulterous relations, for in that case, it
would not be the child of the defendant and, hence
would not be entitled to support as such. But as this
defense should be established, and not merely alleged, it
would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is
not of course necessary to go fully into merits of the
case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind
of amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to
enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or
take other, in view of the merely provisional character of
take resolution to be entered.
In the case at bar not only had evidence on the
alleged relation between the minors and Ramos been
introduced. Judgment had, moreover, been rendered
finding that said relation had been duly established,
although an appeal from said judgment was and is still
pending in the Court of Appeals.
Indeed, the Rules of Court clearly authorizes the
granting of support pendente lite, even prior to the
rendition of judgment by the trial court. Sections 1 and 5
of Rule 61 provide:

SEC. 1. Application. The plaintiff, at the
afterwards but prior to final judgment, may file an
application for support pendente lite, stating the grounds
for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties,
and shall be accompanied by affidavits, depositions or
other authentic documents in support thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 5. Order. The court shall determine
provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render
such order as equity and justice may require, having due
regard to the necessities of the applicant, the means of
the adverse party, the probable outcome of the case,
and such other circumstances as may aid in the proper
elucidation of the question involved. If the application is
granted, the court shall fix the amount of money to be
provisionally paid, and the terms of payment. ... .
It goes without saying that if, before the rendition
of judgment, the trial court may "provisionally" grant
alimony pendente lite, with more reason may an
appellate court exercise a similar authority, after a full
dress trial and a decision of the trial court on the merits
finding that the claim of filiation and support has been
adequately proven
in the case at bar, beyond doubt even if
such decision were still pending appeal taken by the
party adjudged to be bound to give such support.
Needless to say, the refusal of the trial court to
grant, said alimony pendente lite did not and cannot
deprive the appellate court of said authority, or even
dent the wisdom of the action taken by the latter,
considering that the former did not give any plausible
reason for its aforementioned refusal and that the same
may have, in fact, been due to the appeal taken by the
defendant, whose record on appeal had already been
approved.
Neither did the failure of the Court of Appeals to
hear petitioner herein on oral argument before denying
his motion for reconsideration or to grant him "a 10-day
abeyance in the implementation" of said resolution
constitute a grave abuse of discretion, for petitioner is
not entitled as a matter of right to said oral argument,
which was discretionary for said appellate court, as was
its authority to grant or deny the aforementioned period
of ten (10) days. Furthermore, petitioner has not shown
that he could have adduced substantial reasons to
warrant a reversal of the contested resolution had this
period been granted or said oral argument taken place.
Again, the grant to the minors who had merely
asked "a monthly support of P75.00 for each child," or
P150.00 a month for both, and, through their mother,
had offered to file a bond of the aggregate sum of P4,
727.50, without requiring a bond therefor, did not
constitute a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, in the light of the circumstances
surrounding the case. Paraphrasing Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, the circumstances obtaining in the present case
suggest that this is an instance where, in view of the
poverty of herein private respondents, "it would be a
travesty of justice" to refuse them support until the
decision of the trial judge "is sustained on appeal."
PETITION DISMISSED.
Short digest:
FACTS:
Assisted by their mother, Felisa and Lorraine
Lagos, both minors, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, a complaint against petitioner Luis
T. Ramos, for support and damages, who had failed and
refused to support said minors, notwithstanding repeated
demands, and despite the fact that he has, as a
municipal mayor, the means to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA abused its discretion in
issuing the aforementioned resolution "there having been
neither a recognition of paternity by the petitioner nor its
establishment by final judgment"
RULING:
The Rules of Court clearly authorizes the granting
of support pendente lite, even prior to the rendition of
judgment by the trial court. Sections 1 and 5 of Rule 61
provide:
SEC. 1. Application. The plaintiff, at the
afterwards but prior to final judgment, may file an
application for support pendente lite, stating the grounds
for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties,
and shall be accompanied by affidavits, depositions or
other authentic documents in support thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 5. Order. The court shall determine
provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render
such order as equity and justice may require, having due
regard to the necessities of the applicant, the means of
the adverse party, the probable outcome of the case,
and such other circumstances as may aid in the proper
elucidation of the question involved. If the application is
granted, the court shall fix the amount of money to be
provisionally paid, and the terms of payment. ... .
It goes without saying that if, before the rendition
of judgment, the trial court may "provisionally" grant
alimony pendente lite, with more reason may an
appellate court exercise a similar authority, after a full
dress trial and a decision of the trial court on the merits
finding that the claim of filiation and support has been
adequately proven in the case at bar, beyond doubt
even if such decision were still pending appeal taken by
the party adjudged to be bound to give such support.
Needless to say, the refusal of the trial court to
grant, said alimony pendente lite did not and cannot
deprive the appellate court of said authority, or even
dent the wisdom of the action taken by the latter,
considering that the former did not give any plausible
reason for its aforementioned refusal and that the same
may have, in fact, been due to the appeal taken by the
defendant, whose record on appeal had already been
approved.
SPOUSES LIM V. LIM, G.R. NO. 163209, 30
OCTOBER 2009 HIYAS
PRINCIPLE:
Support pendente lite by virtue of Title IX

Civil Code obliges the ascendants to provide
legal support not only upon default of the parents

but also for the latters inability to provide
sufficient support.
The ascendants liability only extends to
the descdents (grandchildren and other
legitimate descendants).
Notwithstanding at the time of application
for support pendente lite the applicant has
exercised parental authority over the
children, if found that they are unable to
support or support is insufficient still the
ascendants are obliged to support.
FACTS:
Respondent Cheryl S. Lim married Edward Lim.
She bore Edward three children, they resided at the
house of herein petitioners (Edwards parents) in Forbes
Park, Makati City together with Edwards ailing
grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim
(Mariano). Edwards family business, which provided him
with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family
expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.
Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence,
bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a
violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with
the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court
described a very compromising situation.
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued
petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants)
in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for support.
RTC RULING:
Ordered Edward and petitioners to jointly
provide P40,000 monthly support to respondents, with
Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance
of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
Petitioners argued that while Edwards income is
insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by
providing that legal support should be in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family under Article 194 of
the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209
(The Family Code of the Philippines).
CA RULING:
affirmed the trial court invoking Article
195 of the Family Code as well as Article 200
paragraph (3) of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward
to provide support to respondents.
RULING:
YES., with modification by limiting petitioners liability to
the amount of monthly support needed by respondents.
Petitioners Liable to Provide Support
but only to their Grandchildren

Petitioners rely heavily in Title IX of the Civil
Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, they theorize
that their liability is activated only upon default of
parental
authority,
conceivably
either
by
its
termination[12] or suspension[13] during the childrens
minority. Because at the time respondents sued for
support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental
authority over their children,[14] petitioners submit
that the obligation to support the latters offspring ends
with them.
while parental authority under Title IX (and the
correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, passing
to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension,
the obligation to provide legal support passes on to
ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also
for the latters inability to provide sufficient support.
Professor Pineda is of the view that
grandchildren cannot demand support
directly from their grandparents if they
have parents (ascendants of nearest
degree) who
are
capable
of
supporting them. This is so because we
have to follow the order of support under
Art. 199.
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to
discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal
support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also
undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to
give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to
meet respondents basic needs. This inability of
Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their
children shifts a portion of their obligation to the
ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal
(petitioners) and maternal [19]lines, following the ordering
in
Article
199. Petitioners
partial
concurrent
obligation extends only to their descendants.
Hence, Cheryls right to receive support from the
Lim family extends only to her husband Edward,
arising from their marital bond.
Petitioners Precluded from Availing
of the Alternative Option Under
Article 204 of the Civil Code, as Amended
The application of Article 204 which provides that
The person obliged to give support shall
have the option to fulfill the obligation
either by paying the allowance fixed, or
by receiving and maintaining in the
family dwelling the person who has a
right to receive support. The latter
alternative cannot be availed of in
case
there
is
a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
Here, the persons entitled to receive support are
petitioners grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting
petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to
the grandchildren a well-provided future; however,
it will also force Cheryl to return to the house
which, for her, is the scene of her husbands

infidelity.

attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family.
C(Cheryl Lim) and E (Edward Lim) are married with three

children. They resided with X and Y (who are Edwards
grandparents). C and Es marriage end when E has an
illicit relationship with other woman.
AMOUNT OF SUPPORT VARIABLE - Thus, the amount of

support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment
on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be
in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and
the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or
increased proportionately according to the reduction or
increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to support.
Hence, C initiate an action for support against E, X and Y.
FACTS:
The trial court rendered judgment ordering E, X and Y to

be jointly liable for support pendente lite. This was
opposed by X and Y alleging that in Title IX of the Civil
Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, they theorize
that their liability is activated only upon default of
parental
authority,
conceivably
either
by
its
termination[12] or suspension[13] during the childrens
minority and since C when appliying for support
pendente lite still E and C exercised parental
authority over their children HENCE the obligation to
support the latters offspring ends with them.
Buling sued Gotardo for compulsory recognition and

support pendente lite claiming that the petitioner is the
father of her child Gliffze.
Petition denied.
QUICK DIGEST:
CA affirmed Trial courts decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether X and Y are are concurrently liable with Edward
to provide support to respondents (C and children).
RULING:
Yes. But only to the children.
while parental authority under Title IX (and the
correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, passing
to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension,
the obligation to provide legal support passes on to
ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also
for the latters inability to provide sufficient support.
Here, there is no question that C is unable to discharge
her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her
children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that
the amount of support E is able to give to
respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet
respondents basic needs.
However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation
extends only to their descendants as this word is
commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of
lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by blood, only
respondents. Cs right to receive support from the Lim
family extends only to her husband Es, arising from their
marital bond.
GOTARDO V. BULING, G.R. NO. 165166, 15
AUGUST 2012CLAROS
Principle:
WHAT CONSISTS SUPPORT - Since filiation is beyond
question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a
parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate
or
illegitimate.
Support
consists
of
everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
RTC - During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the

respondents motion,24 granted a P2,000.00 monthly
child support, retroactive from March 1995
RTC Final Decision - the RTC dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffzes filiation (Buling
was inconsistent as to when they first had sex). RTC
ordered the respondent to return the amount of
support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to
pay P 10,000.00 as attorneys fees
CA Decision - set aside the RTC decision noting that the
petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship
even before August 1994; that the respondent had only
one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to
August 1994; and that the petitioners allegation that the
respondent had previous relationships with other men
remained unsubstantiated and ordered the petitioner
to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also
reinstated the RTC order granting a P 2,000.00
monthly child support. 28
ISSUE: whether the CA committed a reversible error
when it set aside the RTCs findings and ordered the
petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his
minor son Gliffze.
HELD:
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows
as a matter of obligation (The court found the
inconsistencies
negligible
- We
find
that
the
contradictions are for the most part more apparent than
real, having resulted from the failure of the respondent to
comprehend
the
question
posed,
but
this
misunderstanding was later corrected and satisfactorily
explained.)
A parent is obliged to support his child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate.45 Support consists of
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing,
medical
attendance,
education
and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family.46 Thus, the amount of support is variable and,
for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of
support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and the necessities
of the recipient.47 It may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of
the necessities of the recipient and the resources or

means of the person obliged to support.48
In this case, we sustain the award of P 2,000.00 monthly
child support, without prejudice to the filing of the proper
motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in
arrears, considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during
the pendency of this case.
BAYOT V. CA, G.R. NO. 155635, 7 NOVEMBER
2008CABUENAS
PRINCIPLES:
a.
b.
c.
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, a

husband could no longer be subject to a
husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He
cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to his spouse.
The issue of right and entitlement to support
pendente litehinges on the tenability of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The property of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership be answerable for the
support of the spouses and their children during
the proceedings for:Legal separation, Annulment
of marriage or Declaration of nullity of marriage
After final judgment granting the petition, the

obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases
.
LONG DIGEST
FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an
American, were married in Muntinlupa. The Marriage
Certificate identified Rebecca, to be an American citizen
born in Agaa, Guam, USAThey had a child name Alix,
born in November 27, 1982 in California.From then on,
Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to
have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated
divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
In February 22, 1996, the Dominican court ordered the
dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to
remarry after completing the legal requirements," but
giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. The
same court settled the couple's property relations
pursuant to an Agreement. Said agreement specifically
stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired
during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property
and all the improvements and personal properties
therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang,
Muntinlupa.
Meanwhile,
Rebecca
executed
an
Affidavit
of
Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an
American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have
been living separately; and that she is carrying a child
not of Vicente

However, on2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this
time before the Muntinlupa City RTCon the ground of
Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. She also
sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains with application for support pendente lite for her
and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay
a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alixin
the amount of P 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is
barred by the prior judgment of divorce.Rebecca
interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino
citizenship and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce
to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted
another marriage, and Rebecca commenced several
criminal complaints against each other. Specifically,
Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against
Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente
with bigamy and concubinage.
RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss, instead granted
Rebecca's application for support pendente lite and
ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to
Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings
relative to the instant Petition. As to the grant of support
pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation
of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude
her from receiving legal support.
CA dismissed and set aside RTC's incidental orders.
According the the CA, RTC ought to have granted
Vicente's motion to dismiss because Rebecca had no
cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity
of marriage., since the marriage between the spouses is
already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted
and Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied
for the decree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca
in Dominican Republic is valid and whether or not the
application for support pendente lite is still tenable?
HELD:
Yes, the divorce decree is valid and the application for
support pendent lite is no longer tenable.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a
Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. The reckoning point is not
the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the
time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad.
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the
time she applied for and obtained her divorce from
Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one.
The following are compelling circumstances indicative of
her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa,

Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this
American territory granting American citizenship to those
who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a
holder of an American passport.
The validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca,
the same shall be given a res judicata effect in Philippine
jurisdiction. Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband
and wife to each other. The marriage between them is
dissolved leaving them free to remarry. Consequent to
the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer
be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code.
He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.As
regards their property relations, the Agreement provided
that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only
their family homebind both Rebecca and Vicente.
The Court does not lose sight of the legal obligation of
Vicente and Rebecca to support the needs of their
daughter, Alix. Alix, having been born on November 27,
1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000,
or four months before her mother initiated her petition
for declaration of nullity. The issue of back support, which
allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best
litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In
this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be
proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente
and Rebecca.
The Court no longer delve into the issue of Rebecca's
right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement
to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
dismissal of petition by the CA veritably removed any
legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for
support pendente lite.

The validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Y, the
same shall be given a res judicata effect in Philippine
jurisdiction. X and Y are no longer husband and wife to
each other.Consequent to the dissolution of the
marriage, X could no longer be obliged to live with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Y. The
Court no longer delve into the issue of support pendente
lite. The entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the
tenability of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The dismissal of petition veritably removed
any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the
claim for support pendente lite.
NEPOMUCENO V. LOPEZ, G.R. NO. 181258, 18
MARCH 2010 DAPANAS
Principle: A notarial agreement to support a child
whose filiation is admitted by the putative father
is considered acceptable evidence. The notarial
agreement must be accompanied by the putative
fathers admission of filiation to be an acceptable
evidence of filiation.
BAR Alike Question:
X represented by her mother Y filed a case of
Recognition and Support in Court against Z based on the
latter handwritten note obligating himself to give
financial support to X.
The said note contained the
amount of support in bi-monthly terms signed by Z. Is
the handwritten note is enough evidence to established
filiation and thus X will be entitled to be recognized as a
child and for the support pendente lite?
Case:
BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO, vs. ARHBENCEL
ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother ARACELI
LOPEZ, G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010
Facts:
SHORT DIGEST
FACTS:
X, Filipino and Y, foreigner were married in Muntinlupa.
They had a child named Z. Their marital relationship
seemed to have soured Y, initiated divorce proceedings
in the foreign country. The foreign court ordered the
dissolution of the couple's marriage. However, after
several years, Y filed another petition, this time before
the Muntinlupa City RTCon the ground of X 's alleged
psychological incapacity. Y also sought the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and her child Z. Y also
prayed that X be ordered to pay a permanent monthly
support for their child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce decree is valid and support
pendente lite is tenable?
HELD:
Yes, the divorce decree is valid and the application for
support pendent lite is no longer tenable.
This is a case of recognition and support

against petitioner from his alleged daughter Arhbencel
represented by her mother Araceli. Born out of an
extramarital affair; that petitioner refused to affix his
signature on her Certificate of Birth; and that, by a
handwritten note, petitioner obligated himself to give
her financial support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th
and 30th days of each month. The handwritten note
reads:
Manila, Aug. 7, 1999
I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to
give and provide financial support in the amount
of P1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth day of each
month for a total of P3,000.00 a month starting Aug. 15,
1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the custody
of her mother Araceli Lopez without the necessity of
demand, subject to adjustment later depending on the
needs of the child and my income.
Defendants prayer: Since her filiation was
established by the handwritten note, that petitioner be
ordered to: (1) recognize her as his child, (2) give her
support pendente lite in the increased amount of P8,000
a month, and (3) give her adequate monthly financial
support until she reaches the age of majority.
Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he
was the father of Arhbencel -- absent explicit statement,

recognition or acknowledgment & was only forced to
execute the handwritten note on account of NPA threats.
1ST RTC Ruling: Favorable to ArhbencelDefendant, BUT on the basis of petitioners handwritten
note which it treated as "contractual support" since the
issue of filiation had yet to be determined during the
hearing on the merits, granted prayer for support
pendente lite in the amount of P3,000 a month.
2nd RTC Ruling: Favorable to NepomucenoPetitioner, he filed a demurrer to evidence which the
trial court granted by Order thus the case was dismissed
for insufficiency of evidence. It held that: Certificate of
Birth was not prima facie evidence of her filiation to
petitioner as it did not bear his signature; that
handwritten undertaking to provide support did not
contain a categorical acknowledgment; and that there
was no showing that he performed any overt act of
acknowledgment.
CA
Ruling:
Favorable
to
ArhbencelDefendant, reversed the trial courts decision, declared
Arhbencel to be his illegitimate daughter and ordered
him to give her financial support in the increased amount
of P4,000 every 15th and 30th days of the month,
or a total of P8,000 a month. CA found that from
petitioners payment hospital bills and subsequent
commitment to provide monthly financial support, the
only logical conclusion: he is the father; that petitioner
merely acted in bad faith in omitting a statement of
paternity in his handwritten & P8,000 a month was
reasonable and not burdensome.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA ruling based on defendants
contention (see 1st paragraph, Arhbencel prayer)
clearly established evidence of filiation as
provided by law.
Held:
No. As held by the SC [in the case of Herrera v.
Alba] it summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on
establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part as
follows:
Family Code relevant provisions: ART. 175. Illegitimate
children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument
and
signed
by
the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.
This Court's rulings further specify what
incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to
establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often
cites, SC stated that the issue of paternity still has
to be resolved by such conventional evidence as
the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts
by the putative father:
1. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code,
voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in
the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the
putative father himself and the writing must be the
writing of the putative father.
2. A notarial agreement to support a child
whose filiation is admitted by the putative father
was considered acceptable evidence.
3. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good
father to the child and pictures of the putative father
cuddling the child on various occasions, together with
the certificate of live birth, proved filiation.
BUT NOT:
A student permanent record, a
written consent to a father's operation, or a marriage
contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot
be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a
certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to
establish filiation.
And the relevant provisions of the Family
Code that treat of the right to support are Articles 194,
195 & 196, thus: Particularly Article 195. Subject to the
provisions of the succeeding articles, the following
are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set
forth in the preceding article: xxxx 4. Parents and their
illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter; and
IN THE PRESENT CASE, Arhbencels demand
for support, being based on her claim of filiation to
petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article
195(4). As such, her entitlement to support from
petitioner is dependent on the determination of her
filiation.
The handwritten note does not contain any
statement whatsoever about Arhbencels filiation to
petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of Article
172(2) vis--vis Article 175 of the Family Code which
admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an
admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same
weight as the notarial agreement to support the child
referred to in Herrera. For it is not even notarized. And
Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be
accompanied by the putative fathers admission of
filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here,
however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation
through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently
denied it.
The only other documentary evidence
submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of
Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to

petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
Thefore, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision of July 20, 2007 is SET ASIDE. The
Order dated June 7, 2006 of Branch 130 of the Caloocan
City RTC dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence is REINSTATED
VI.E
MANGONON V. CA, G.R. NO. 125041, JUNE 30,
2006 DUYONGCO
PRINCIPLE:
A court may temporarily grant support pendente
lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order.
Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need
to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can
settle an application for this relief. All that a court is
tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of
evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve
the application. It is enough that the facts be established
by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in
the record.
Facts:
Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor
children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of
Legitimacy and Support, with application for support
pendente lite. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16
February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico
Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge
Eleuterio Agudo. At that time, petitioner was only 21
years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years
old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required
consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was
annulled on 11 August 1975.
Within seven months after the annulment of their
marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina.
According to petitioner, private respondents had totally
abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the
petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the
(USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and
second husband, had moved to and finally settled in.
Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts,
while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University
and Western New England College. Despite their
admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were,
however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate
education.
Petitioner likewise averred that demands were made
upon Federico and the latters father, Francisco, for
general support and for the payment of the required
college education of Rica and Rina.
Petitioner also alleged that Rica and Rina are her
legitimate daughters by respondent Federico since the
twin sisters were born within seven months from the date
of the annulment of her marriage to respondent Federico.

Petitioner also claimed that she was constrained to seek
support pendente lite from private respondents - who are
millionaires with extensive assets both here and abroad in view of the imminent opening of classes, the
possibility of a protracted litigation, and Rica and Rinas
lack of financial means to pursue their college education
in the USA.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations,
respondents are hereby directed to provide a monthly
support (pendente lite) of P5,000.00 each.
Unsatisfied with the Order of the trial court, petitioner
brought the case to the Court of Appeals via Petition for
Certiorari. The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of
the trial court.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied
ISSUE: whether or not Francisco is liable for support for
her granddaughters education?
YES.
SEC. 4. Order.- The court shall determine provisionally
the pertinent facts, and shall render such orders as
justice and equity may require, having due regard to the
probable outcome of the case and such other
circumstances as may aid in the proper resolution of the
question involved. If the application is granted, the court
shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally paid or
such other forms of support as should be provided,
taking into account the necessities of the applicant and
the resources or means of the adverse party, and the
terms of payment or mode for providing the support. If
the application is denied, the principal case shall be tried
and decided as early as possible.
Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant
support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment
or final order. Because of its provisional nature, a court
does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case
before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a
court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of
the record.
After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as
the evidence presented, we find that petitioner was able
to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin
daughters to private respondents and the twins
entitlement to support pendente lite. In the words of the
trial court
By and large, the status of the twins as children of
Federico cannot be denied. As a matter of fact,
respondent Francisco admitted having wrote several
letters to Rica and Rina. In the said letters, particularly at
the bottom thereof, respondent Francisco wrote the
names of Rica and Rina Delgado. He therefore was very
well aware that they bear the surname Delgado.
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we

take our bearings from the provision of the law
mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to
the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we
hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of
school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support
pendente lite.Considering, however, that the twin sisters
may have already been done with their education by the
time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it
proper to award support pendente lite in arrears to be
computed from the time they entered college until they
had finished their respective studies.
WHEREFORE, premises
PARTIALLY GRANTED.
considered,
this
Petition
is
ROXAS V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 139337,

15 AUGUST 2001 BELLEZA
Principle:
The proceedings and orders issued by trial court
judge in the application for support pendente
lite in the re-filed case, were not rendered null and
void by the omission of a statement in the
certificate of non-forum shopping regarding the
prior filing and dismissal without prejudice.
Facts:
Carminia Roxas (Carminia) filed before RTC-Paraaque a
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological in capacity with an application for support
pendente lite for their four (4) minor children against her
husband Jose Antonio Roxas (Jose). Said case was raffled
to RTC257 (Judge How). However, prior to service to
respondent and before the latter could file a responsive
pleading, Carminia filed a notice of dismissal without
prejudice pursuant Sec. 1, Rule 17. She later on re-filed
the case and was raffled to RTC260 (Judge Ricafort).
Judge Ricafort rendered an order granting the application
for support. Jose was ordered to pay P42,292.50 per
month as support and 50% of his childrens tuition fee.
However, respondent Jose failed to comply with the order
thus Carminia asks the court to cite Jose in contempt.
Thus, Jose petitioned for certiorari before the CA. CA
rendered a decision granting Joses petition and declared
the trial courts orders NULL and VOID for the reason that
the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petitioner
(Carminia) did not mention the prior filing of Civil Case
No. 97-0523 before the sala of Judge How and the
dismissal thereof without prejudice.
Issue:
WON the proceedings and orders of the trial court are
null and void.
Ruling:

It is our considered view and we hold that the
proceedings and orders issued by Judge BautistaRicafort in the application for support pendente
lite (and the main complaint for annulment of
marriage) in the re-filed case, that is, in Civil Case
No. 97-0608 were not rendered null and void by
the omission of a statement in the certificate of
non-forum shopping regarding the prior filing and
dismissal without prejudice of Civil Case No. 970523 which involves the same parties and issues.
Forum shopping is an act of a party against whom an
adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of
seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in
another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil
action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. The language of the Supreme
Court circular (now the above-quoted Section 5, Rule 7,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) distinctly suggests that it
is primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an
incipient application of a party asserting a claim for
relief.10 The most important factor in determining the
existence of forum shopping is the "vexation caused the
courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different
courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the
same or substantially the same reliefs."
Since a party resorts to forum shopping in order to
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or
action, it has been held that a party cannot be said to
have sought to improve his chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action where no unfavorable
decision has ever been rendered against him in any of
the cases he has brought before the courts. Forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendencia are
present, and where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other. For the principle
of res judicata to apply, the following must be present:
(1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two
actions involve identical parties, subject matter and
causes of action.
In the case at bar, there was no adverse decision against
the petitioner in Civil Case No. 97-0523 which was the
first case filed and raffled to the sala (Branch 257) of
Judge How. The dismissal without prejudice of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 97-0523 at the instance of the
petitioner was pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure considering that it was done
before service of answer or any responsive pleading. The
dismissal does not amount to litis pendencia nor to res
judicata. There is no litis pendencia since the first case
before Judge How was dismissed or withdrawn by the
plaintiff (herein petitioner), without prejudice, upon her
filing of a notice of dismissal, pursuant to Section 1, Rule
17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. To use the
wording of that rule, Judge Hows order is one merely
"confirming the dismissal" of the complaint by the
plaintiff (herein petitioner). Neither is there res
judicata for the reason that the order of dismissal was
not a decision on the merits but a dismissal "without
prejudice".
The petition for certiorari in the case at bar on the

ground of alleged forum shopping in the trial court is
premature for the reason that there is an adequate and
speedy remedy available in the ordinary course of law to
private respondent, i.e., a motion to dismiss or a motion
for reconsideration on the ground of either litis
pendencia or res judicata before the trial court. But
private respondent did not file such a motion based on
either of said grounds. And where the ground is short
of res judicata or litis pendencia, as in the case at bar,
the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it granted the
petition for certiorari filed by herein private respondent.
The trial court should have been given an opportunity to
rule on the matter of alleged forum shopping in
consonance with the hierarchy of courts.
BAR QUESTION:
W filed a declaration of nullity of Marriage against H with
prayer for support pendent lite of their 4 minor children.
It was raffled to RTC 257 but W filed a Notice of Dismissal
pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 17. W re-filed the case and the
same was raffled to RTC 260. Judge R granted Ws prayer
and ordered H to pay 50% of their childrens tuition fees
and P 42, 292.50. H failed to comply with the court order
thus he was cited in contempt. He petitioned to CA and
the latter granted his petition and rendered orders of trial
court NULL and VOID for the reason that W did not state
in her Certificate of Non-forum Shopping that the case
was previously dismissed.
CALDERON V. ROXAS, G.R. NO. 185595, 9
JANUARY 2013 LIM
Principle:
The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of
support pendentelite which may be availed of at the
commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at
any time prior to the judgment or final order. On March 4,
2003, this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional
Orders which shall govern the issuance of provisional
orders during the pendency of cases for the declaration
of nullity of marriage, annulment of voidable marriage
and legal separation. These include orders for spousal
support, child support, child custody, visitation rights,
hold departure, protection and administration of common
property.
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
assailing the Decision dated September 9, 2008 and
Resolution dated December 15, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85384.
Petitioner Calderon and Respondent Roxas were married.
Subsequently they filed an amended complaint for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an Ordergranting
petitioners application for support pendente lite.
On motion of petitioners counsel, the trial court issued
an Order directing private respondent to give support in
the amount of P42,292.50 per month starting April 1,
1999 pursuant to the May 19, 1998 Order.
Private respondent then filed a Motion to Reduce Support
.After hearing, the trial court issued an Orderdated March
7, 2005 granting the motion to reduce support and
denying petitioners motion for spousal support, increase
of the childrens monthly support pendente lite and
support-in-arrears. Petitioners motion for partial
reconsideration of the March 7, 2005 Order was denied
on May 4, 2005.
On May 16, 2005, the trial court rendered its Decision in
Civil Case No. 97-0608 decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
(sic):
1. Declaring null and void the marriage between plaintiff
[Ma.] Carmina C. Roxas and defendant Jose Antonio
Roxasxxx
2. Awarding the custody of the parties minor xxx to their
mother, herein petitioner xxx
3. Ordering the respondent Jose Antonio Roxas to provide
support to the children in the amount of P30,000.00 a
month xxx
xxx
Petitioner through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal from
the Orders dated March 7, 2005.
The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that granting
the appeal would disturb the RTC Decision of May 16,
2005 which had long become final and executory. The CA
further noted that petitioner failed to avail of the proper
remedy to question an interlocutory order.
Issue:
Whether the March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005 Orders on
the matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory or
final.
Ruling:
Interlocutory. This Court has laid down the distinction
between interlocutory and final orders, as follows:
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of
a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in
respect thereto.
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the
case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating
the parties contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates
that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
interlocutory. Unlike a final judgment or order, which
is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory
order may not be questioned on appeal except only as
part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the
final judgment rendered in the case.1
The assailed orders relative to the incident of support
pendente lite and support in arrears, as the term
suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the

decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of
marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They did not
finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final
adjudication of the merits of petitioners claims as to the
ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as
child custody, support and conjugal assets.
The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of
support pendentelite which may be availed of at the
commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at
any time prior to the judgment or final order. On March 4,
2003, this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional
Orderswhich shall govern the issuance of provisional
orders during the pendency of cases for the declaration
of nullity of marriage, annulment of voidable marriage
and legal separation. These include orders for spousal
support, child support, child custody, visitation rights,
hold departure, protection and administration of common
property.
Provisional remedies are writs and processes available
during the pendency of the action which may be resorted
to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of
the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They
are provisional because they constitute temporary
measures availed of during the pendency of the action,
and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in
and are dependent upon the result of the main
action.The subject orders on the matter of support
pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
LUA V. LUA, G.R. NOS. 175279-80, 5 JUNE 2013
DESCALLAR
PRINCIPLE:
As a matter of law, the amount of support which
those related by marriage and family relationship is
generally obliged to give each other shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to
the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing,
medical
attendance,
education
and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family.
In determining the amount of provisional support,
the court may likewise consider the following factors: (1)
the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial
parent and those of the child; (2) the physical and
emotional health of the child and his or her special needs
and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living the child has
been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary contributions
that the parents will make toward the care and wellbeing of the child.
The general rule is to the effect that when a
father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the
mother money for the support of their dependent
children and the unpaid and accrued installments
become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter
of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily
made directly to the children. However, special
considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court

in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the
mother, when that can be done without injustice to her.
FACTS:
On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed
an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-29346 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 14.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her
two children, petitioner sought the amount of
P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondents
huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several
companies and businesses here and abroad.4
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued
an Order5 dated March 31, 2004 granting support
pendente lite.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7 asserting
that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support
considering that she does not maintain for herself a
separate dwelling from their children and respondent has
continued to support the family for their sustenance and
well-being in accordance with familys social and
financial standing. As to the P250,000.00 granted by the
trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as
theP1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found
it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law
for not having considered the needs of the respondent.
In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the
March 31, 2004 Order had become final and executory
since respondents motion for reconsideration is treated
as a mere scrap of paper for violation of the three day
notice period under Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, and therefore did not
interrupt the running of the period to appeal.
His second motion for reconsideration having been
denied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the
CA.
COURT OF APPEALS RULING (1ST)
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,9 finding
merit in respondents contention that the trial court
gravely abused its discretion in granting P250,000.00
monthly support to petitioner without evidence to prove
his actual income. The said court thus decreed:
a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente
lite of P115,000.00 beginning the month of April 2005
and every month thereafter within the first five (5) days
thereof;
b) to pay the private respondent the amount of
P115,000.00 a month multiplied by the number of
months starting from September 2003 until March 2005
less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to
the private respondent as her and their two (2) children
monthly support; and
c) to pay the costs.
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In
a Compliance11 dated June 28, 2005, respondent

attached a copy of a check he issued in the amount of
P162,651.90 payable to petitioner. Respondent explained
that, as decreed in the CA decision, he deducted from
the amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to
March 2005) ordered by the CA -- P2,185,000.00 -- plus
P460,000.00 (April, May, June and July 2005),
totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his
children and petitioner in the sum of P2,482,348.16.
In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance
of a Writ of Execution,12 petitioner asserted that none of
the expenses deducted by respondent may be
chargeable as part of the monthly support contemplated
by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an
Order13 granting petitioners motion for issuance of a
writ of execution as it rejected respondents
interpretation of the CA decision. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and subsequently also filed a
motion for inhibition of Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. On
November 25, 2005, Judge Yrastorza, Sr. issued an
Order14 denying both motions.
Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the
support in arrears pendente lite, petitioner filed in the CA
a Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 01154. Respondent, on the other hand,
filed CA-G.R. SP No. 01315, a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The two cases were
consolidated.
COURT OF APPEALS RULING (2ND)
By Decision dated April 20, 2006, the CA set aside the
assailed orders of the trial court.
The appellate court said that the trial court should not
have completely disregarded the expenses incurred by
respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance
of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses,
and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry
goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit
not only of the two children, but their mother (petitioner)
as well. It held that respondents act of deferring the
monthly support adjudged in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 was
not contumacious as it was anchored on valid and
justifiable reasons. Respondent said he just wanted the
issue of whether to deduct his advances be settled first
in view of the different interpretation by the trial court of
the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. It
also noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in
the joint obligation of spouses to support their children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether certain expenses already incurred by the
respondent may be deducted from the total support in
arrears owing to petitioner and her children pursuant to
the Decision dated April 12, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
84740.
RULING:
The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the
Philippines provides:
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable

for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported
referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his
schooling or training for some profession, trade or
vocation,
even
beyond
the
age
of
majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and
from school, or to and from place of work. (Emphasis
supplied.)
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those
related by marriage and family relationship is generally
obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the
recipient.18
Such
support
comprises
everything
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of
voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any
time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or
upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian
or designated custodian, may temporarily grant support
pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order.19 Because of its provisional nature, a court does
not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before
it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court
is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of
the record.20
In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite
for petitioner and her two children was determined after
due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by
the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court
was reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly
support pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA
was intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner
and her children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers
and house helpers, and other household expenses.
Petitioners testimony also mentioned the cost of regular
therapy for her scoliosis and vitamins/medicines.
As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is
beyond doubt that he can solely provide for the
subsistence, education, transportation, health/medical
needs and recreational activities of his children, as well
as those of petitioner who was then unemployed and a
full-time housewife. Despite this, respondents counsel
manifested during the same hearing that respondent was
willing to grant the amount of only P75,000.00 as
monthly support pendente lite both for the children and
petitioner as spousal support. Though the receipts of
expenses submitted in court unmistakably show how
much respondent lavished on his children, it appears that
the matter of spousal support was a different matter
altogether. Rejecting petitioners prayer for P500,000.00
monthly support and finding the P75,000.00 monthly
support offered by respondent as insufficient, the trial
court fixed the monthly support pendente lite at

P250,000.00. However, since the supposed income in
millions of respondent was based merely on the
allegations of petitioner in her complaint and registration
documents of various corporations which respondent
insisted are owned not by him but his parents and
siblings, the CA reduced the amount of support pendente
lite toP115,000.00, which ruling was no longer
questioned by both parties.

the contribution of each spouse to the marriage,
including services rendered in home-making, child care,
education, and career building of the other spouse; (7)
the age and health of the spouses; (8) the physical and
emotional conditions of the spouses; (9) the ability of the
supporting spouse to give support, taking into account
that spouses earning capacity, earned and unearned
income, assets, and standard of living; and (10) any
other factor the court may deem just and equitable.
Controversy between the parties resurfaced when

respondents compliance with the final CA decision
indicated that he deducted from the total amount in
arrears (P2,645,000.00) the sum of P2,482,348.16,
representing the value of the two cars for the children,
their cost of maintenance and advances given to
petitioner and his children. Respondent explained that
the deductions were made consistent with the fallo of the
CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordering him to pay
support pendente lite in arrears less the amount
supposedly given by him to petitioner as her and their
two childrens monthly support.
(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the

provisional support from the salary of the spouse.
After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions,

respondent filed a motion for reconsideration further
asserting amounts with supporting receipts be
considered as additional advances given to petitioner
and the children.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the

court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) the
financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial
parent and those of the child; (2) the physical and
emotional health of the child and his or her special needs
and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living the child has
been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary contributions
that the parents will make toward the care and wellbeing of the child.
The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the
foregoing expenses already incurred by the respondent
should, in equity, be considered advances which may be
properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the
petitioner and the two children. Said court also noted the
absence of petitioners contribution to the joint obligation
of support for their children.
We reverse in part the decision of the CA.
Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases
of legal separation and petitions for declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage are guided by the following
provisions of the Rule on Provisional Orders24
Sec. 2. Spousal Support.In determining support for the
spouses, the court may be guided by the following rules:
(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written
agreement between the spouses, the spouses may be
supported from the properties of the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership.
(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such
amount and for such period of time as the court may
deem just and reasonable based on their standard of
living during the marriage.
(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors:
(1) whether the spouse seeking support is the custodian
of a child whose circumstances make it appropriate for
that spouse not to seek outside employment; (2) the
time necessary to acquire sufficient education and
training to enable the spouse seeking support to find
appropriate employment, and that spouses future
earning capacity; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4)
the comparative financial resources of the spouses,
including their comparative earning abilities in the labor
market; (5) the needs and obligations of each spouse; (6)
Sec. 3. Child Support.The common children of the

spouses shall be supported from the properties of the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent
or both may be ordered to give an amount necessary for
the support, maintenance, and education of the child. It
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the
giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the

provisional support from the salary of the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as
fixed by the CA was not appealed by either party, there is
no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness.
The dispute concerns the deductions made by
respondent in settling the support in arrears.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is
required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother money
for the support of their dependent children and the
unpaid and accrued installments become judgments in
her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on
account of payments voluntarily made directly to the
children. However, special considerations of an equitable
nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on
his indebtedness to the mother, when that can be done
without injustice to her. The courts are justifiably
reluctant to lay down any general rules as to when such
credits may be allowed.
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses
incurred by respondent to be credited against the
accrued support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the
monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court
was intended primarily for food, household expenses
such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also
petitioners scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value
of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his
children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of
petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of
items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing)
should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to
the judgment awarding support pendente lite. While it is

true that the dispositive portion of the executory decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein respondent to
pay the support in arrears "less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent
as her and their two (2) children monthly support," the
deductions should be limited to those basic needs and
expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts.
The assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge deductions
from the accrued monthly support of petitioner and her
children, while correct insofar as it commends the
generosity of the respondent to his children, is clearly
inconsistent with the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 84740. More important, it completely ignores the
unfair consequences to petitioner whose sustenance and
well-being, was given due regard by the trial and
appellate courts. This is evident from the March 31, 2004
Order granting support pendente lite to petitioner and
her children, when the trial court observed:
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is
giving some forms of financial assistance to his two (2)
children via their credit cards and paying for their school
expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form of
spousal support to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time,
while the action for nullity of marriage is still to be heard,
it is incumbent upon the defendant, considering the
physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the
overwhelming capacity of defendant, to extend support
unto the latter. x x x29
On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740
reduced the amount of monthly support fixed by the trial
court, it nevertheless held that considering respondents
financial resources, it is but fair and just that he give a
monthly support for the sustenance and basic necessities
of petitioner and his children. This would imply that any
amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly
support should only cover those incurred for sustenance
and household expenses.
In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has
been admitted by petitioner that aside from paying the
expenses of their two (2) childrens schooling, he gave
his two (2) children two (2) cars and credit cards of which
the expenses for various items namely: clothes, grocery
items and repairs of their cars were chargeable to him
which totaled an amount of more than One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) for each of them and
considering that as testified by the private respondent
that she needs the total amount of P113,000.00 for the
maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous
expenses and considering further that petitioner can
afford to buy cars for his two (2) children, and to pay the
expenses incurred by them which are chargeable to him
through the credit cards he provided them in the amount
of P100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the
monthly support pendente lite for his wife, herein private
respondent, be fixed as of the present in the amount of
P115,000.00 which would be sufficient enough to take
care of the household and other needs. This monthly
support pendente lite to private respondent in the
amount of P115,000.00 excludes the amount of One
Hundred ThirtyFive (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for
medical attendance expenses needed by private
respondent for the operation of both her eyes which is

demandable upon the conduct of such operation.
Likewise, this monthly support of P115,000.00 is without
prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that the
trial court may grant private respondent as the
circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof
submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the
main action for support.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children,
being a commendable act of petitioner, should be
continued by him considering the vast financial resources
at his disposal.30 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving
of monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial
court, which is immediately executory. However, we
agree with the CA that respondents act was not
contumacious considering that he had not been remiss in
actually providing for the needs of his children. It is a
matter of record that respondent continued shouldering
the full cost of their education and even beyond their
basic necessities in keeping with the familys social
status. Moreover, respondent believed in good faith that
the trial and appellate courts, upon equitable grounds,
would allow him to offset the substantial amounts he had
spent or paid directly to his children.
Respondent complains that petitioner is very much
capacitated to generate income on her own because she
presently maintains a boutique at the Ayala Center Mall
in Cebu City and at the same time engages in the
business of lending money. He also claims that the two
children have finished their education and are now
employed in the family business earning their own
salaries.
Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction
of support should be submitted to the trial court in which
the action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed,
as this Court is not a trier of facts. The amount of support
may be reduced or increased proportionately according
to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the
recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to support.34 As we held in Advincula v.
Advincula35
Judgment for support does not become final. The right
to support is of such nature that its allowance is
essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a
needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may
be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased
or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It
cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.36
QUICK DIGEST:
Susan Lim-Lua, petitioner v. Danilo Y. Lua, respondent
G.R. No. 175279-80, June 5, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent
Danilo Y. Lua. In her prayer for support pendente lite for
herself and her two children, petitioner sought the
amount ofP500,000.00 as monthly support, citing
respondents huge earnings from salaries and dividends

in several companies and businesses here and abroad.
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued
an Order granting support pendente lite, forthe amount
of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos
would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the
plaintiff. This amount excludes the One hundred thirtyfive (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical
attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the
operation of both her eyes which is demandable upon
the conduct of such operation. The amounts already
extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable
act of defendant, should be continued by him considering
the vast financial resources at his disposal.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting
that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support
considering that she does not maintain for herself a
separate dwelling from their children and respondent has
continued to support the family for their sustenance and
well-being in accordance with familys social and
financial standing. CA rendered its Decision, finding merit
in respondents contention that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in granting P250,000.00 monthly
support to petitioner without evidence to prove his actual
income.
Issue:
Whether certain expenses already incurred by the
respondent may be deducted from the total support in
arrears owing to petitioner and her children?
Ruling:
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those
related by marriage and family relationship is generally
obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the
recipient.
Such
support
comprises
everything
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of
voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any
time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or
upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian
or designated custodian, may temporarily grant support
pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not
need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it
can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is
tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of
the record.
In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite
for petitioner and her two children was determined after
due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by
the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court
was reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly

support pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA
was intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner
and her children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers
and house helpers, and other household expenses.
Petitioners testimony also mentioned the cost of regular
therapy for her scoliosis and vitamins/medicines.
As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is
beyond doubt that he can solely provide for the
subsistence, education, transportation, health/medical
needs and recreational activities of his.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the
provisional support from the salary of the parent.Since
the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by
the CA was not appealed by either party, there is no
controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The
dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in
settling the support in arrears. The amounts already
extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable
act of petitioner, should be continued by him considering
the vast financial resources at his disposal.
VI.H SAAVEDRA V. YBAEZ ESTRADA, 56 PHIL. 33
REALINO
Principle:
Abrogation of order where main suit is dismissedAn order for support pendente lite is intended to be
operative exclusively during the pendency of the
litigation. Hence, the voluntary dismissal of the action by
the plaintiff has the necessary effect of abrogating the
order. An order pendente lite is in its very nature
contingent, and the dismissal of the action had the effect
of abrogating the order.
Long Digest:
FACTS:
The parties in this case are husband and wife, who were
married in January, 1904, in Dumaguete, Oriental Negros.
As a result of their marriage nine children have been
born, three of whom are dead and six living. The married
life of the spouses appears not to have been happy,
owing to the loose morals and violent disposition of the
defendant and his frequent and persistent mistreatment
of his wife. In order to escape from his abuse, the plaintiff
was compelled in to take refuge with all her children in
the house of a neighbor. Upon promise upon the part of
the husband to mend his ways, marital life was resumed
towards the end of the same year. Four years later, she
was maltreated again and thus left with her children for
San Jose asylum in Cebu. She there remained for some
time under the care of the sisters of charity, giving birth
to her last child. About September, 1920, the plaintiff
was forced to present a civil action seeking an order
requiring the defendant to supply maintenance for
herself and children, but in 1926 the defendant prevailed
upon her to dismiss said action upon his promise to
supply her needs. This promise was not kept.
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu by Aleida Saavedra against her husband, Ceferino
Ybaez Estrada. The purpose of the complaint is to
secure a judgment for maintenance for the plaintiff and

her children from the defendant, who is her husband, and
to obtain an order requiring him to pay such
maintenance not only in the future but for a period in the
past, beginning in 1920, during which the defendant has
contributed nothing for the support of his family. The
petitory part of the complaint asks for other incidental
relief consisting of an accounting, and a writ of injunction
to prohibit the defendant, his attorneys, agents and
representatives from selling, mortgaging, or in any
manner transferring the property pertaining to the
conjugal partnership, without express authorization from
the court.
Short digest:
The Trial Court entered an order requiring the defendant

to pay the plaintiff the sum of P200 per month
beginning September, 1929, the date of the filing
of this action, and ending with the month of March 30,
1930, when this decision was promulgated, after which
he required the defendant to pay, in future installments,
a monthly stipend of P200, and further to reimburse the
plaintiff in the amount of P2,000 for attorneys' fees, and
the costs of the action. From this judgment the plaintiff
appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not

awarding the judgment for past due maintenance
accruing under a preliminary order from September,
1920 running until the present action was instituted.
About September, 1920, the plaintiff was forced to

present a civil action seeking an order requiring the
defendant to supply maintenance for herself and
children, but in 1926 the defendant prevailed upon her to
dismiss said action upon his promise to supply her needs.
In a later action, the trial court entered an order requiring
the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P200 per
month beginning September, 1929, the date of the filing
of this action, and ending with the month of March 30,
1930, when this decision was promulgated.
RULING: NO. An order for support pendente lite is

intended to be operative exclusively during the pendency
of the litigation. Hence, the voluntary dismissal of the
action by the plaintiff has the necessary effect of
abrogating the order, and has thus placed the plaintiff in
a position where she is unable to enforce that order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not awarding the
judgment for past due maintenance accruing under a
preliminary order from September, 1920 running until
the present action was instituted.
RULING:
NO. It appears that an order for maintenance pendente
lite was entered by the trial court in the first case filed by
plaintiff and nothing has ever been paid upon said
account. Nevertheless, it appears that plaintiff cause said
action to be dismissed in the first case, in reliance upon
the defendant's promises. The dismissal of the said
case necessarily had the effect of abrogating the
order for maintenance pendente lite, and placed
the plaintiff in a position where she is unable to
enforce that order. An order pendente lite is in its
very nature contingent, and the dismissal of the
action had the effect of abrogating the order.
It appears, however, that as a result of the failure of the
defendant to pay said maintenance under the order
referred to, the present plaintiff has been compelled to
incur debts for the maintenance of herself and family,
and to pay these debts, so far as they have been paid,
she has been compelled to sacrifice valuable paraphernal
property under authority granted by the court. The
amount which the plaintiff has been compelled to
disburse in this way, and the value of the paraphernal
property sacrificed, or obligations incurred, have not
been proved; and while it is obvious that the defendant is
under an obligation to reimburse the plaintiff for these
outlays and sacrifices, we are not in a position to give her
relief as to such items, under the prayer of the present
complaint. But the order hereinafter made for the
affirmance of the judgment in this respect will be made
without prejudice to her right hereafter, by independent
action, or in the ultimate liquidation of the conjugal
estate, to be reimbursed as to the matters mentioned.

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VI.