THE DEFINITION AND METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2015.

Definition of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is defined as the science of being as being (ens qua ens). Science here is not
understood in the reductionistic and positivistic sense as referring solely to the experimental
particular sciences, like biology and chemistry, but in the classical sense of certain knowledge
through causes. What is metaphysics material object and formal object?1 Paul Glenn explains
that the object of a science is its scope, its field of investigation, its subject matter. Further, it is
the special way in which it does its work in its field, or it is the special purpose which guides it
in its work. Thus the object of any science is two-fold. The subject-matter, the field of inquiry, is
the material object of the science. The special way, or purpose, or end-in-view, which a science
has in dealing with its subject-matter or material object is the formal object of that science. Many
sciences may have the same material object, for many more or less independent inquiries may be
prosecuted in the same general field. But each science has its own distinct and distinctive formal
object which it shares completely with no other science. That is why this object is called formal;
it gives formal character to the science; it makes the science just what it is formally or as such.
To illustrate all this. Many sciences deal with the earth under one aspect or another. Such, for
example, are geology, geodisy, geography, geonomy, geogony, and even geometry. All these
sciences study the earth; they have therefore the same material object. But no two of these
sciences study the earth in the same special way or with the same special purpose. Geology
studies the earth in its rock formations; geodisy studies the earth in its contours; geography
studies the earth in its natural or artificial partitions; geonomy studies the earth as subject to
certain physical laws; geogeny studies the earth to discover its origins; geometry in its first form
was a study of the earth in its mensurable bulk and its mensurable movements. Thus, while all
these sciences have the same material object, each of them has its own formal object. If two
sciences were to have the one identical formal object, they would not really be two sciences at
all, but one science. It is manifest that a science is formally constituted in its special character by
its formal object; it is equally manifest that a science is distinguished from all other sciences by
its formal object.2
Metaphysics material object (that is, its subject matter or field of inquiry) is being. Its
formal object (or the particular point of view or aspect in which the subject matter or field of
inquiry is studied) is being as being (ens qua ens, ens inquantum est ens). Now, sciences are
formally constituted in their special character, and differentiated from one another, by reason of

Cf. M. DE ANDREA, Soggetto e oggetto della metafisica secondo S. Tommaso, Angelicum, 27 (1950), pp. 165195.
2
P. GLENN, Theodicy, B. Herder Book Co., St. Louis, 1950, pp. 4-5.

their formal object.3 By taking the material object and the formal object of metaphysics together
we obtain the definition of metaphysics as the science of being as being.4
Describing the material object and formal object of metaphysics, William Wallace writes:
In its material object, or the number of things it studies, metaphysics is all-inclusive, extending
to everything and every aspect of whatever is or can exist, whether of a sensible, material,
physical nature or of a higher, non-material nature. Its formal object is being precisely as being
(ens qua ens), i.e., according to the relation that any thing or aspect of things has to existence,
rather to one of the particular aspects treated in the other branches of philosophy. The unity of
this point of view, centered on what is most fundamental to all reality, enables metaphysics to
investigate the way in which the many are interrelated to the one in the deepest ontological
sense. Further, since things are reflected in knowledge, it enables metaphysics to order and
evaluate the various types of speculative and practical knowledge, on which account it is also
called wisdom.5
Metaphysics is the science of ens qua ens, its properties and its causes. Metaphysics
studies being as being, its properties and its causes. Regarding the properties and causes of
being, Alvira, Clavell and Melendo write: In tackling its object of study, every science must
study its characteristics and everything that is in any way related to it. As Physics studies the
consequences of physical properties of bodies such as their mass or energy, metaphysics studies
properties of beings insofar as they are beings. It is also the task of metaphysics to discover
aspects of being as such (for example, truth), as well as those aspects which do not belong to
being as being (such as matter or corporeal nature).
Furthermore, any science studies a specific type of things and their proper causes,
because knowledge is not complete unless of good grasp of the causes is reached. Metaphysics,
therefore, must study the cause of all beings insofar as they are beings: this is one of the principal
areas of study within its proper object. Just as medicine seeks the causes of bodily health (e.g.,
nutrition, climate, hygiene), metaphysics leads us to the cause of the act of being of all things
God, as Creator.6
The Method of Metaphysics
The method of a science is the way in which it renders its object intelligible. Metaphysics
utilizes both resolutio7 and compositio,8 the former being utilized first before the latter. The
3

By the formal object of a science is understood that by reason of which and in the light of which the material
object is studied or examined. It is the formal object of a science which not only gives that science its unity but at
the same time also distinguishes it from every other field of inquiry(R. J. KREYCHE, First Philosophy, Henry Holt
and Co., New York, 1959, p. 12).
4
Cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, book IV, ch. 1, 1003a 21.
5
W. WALLACE, The Elements of Philosophy, Alba House, New York, 1977, p. 85.
6
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 7.
7
Studies on resolutio utilized in metaphysics: L.-M. RGIS, Analyse et synthse dans loeuvre de saint Thomas, in
Studia Mediaevalia in honorem admodum reverendi Patris Raymundi Josephi Martin, Bruges, 1948, pp. 303-30 ; S.
E. DOLAN, Resolution and Composition in Speculative and Practical Discourse, Laval thologique et
philosophique, 6 (1950), pp. 9-62 ; R. J. HENLE, Method in Metaphysics, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee,
1951 ; B. VON BRANDENSTEIN, A Note on the Method of Metaphysics, International Philosophical Quarterly,
1 (1961), pp. 264-272 ; J. A. AERTSEN, Method and Metaphysics: The via resolutionis in Thomas Aquinas, The

method of metaphysics is resolutio-compositio (although it is primarily a resolutio, priority is to

be given to the resolutio). The via resolutionis is a movement of analysis, in which the reason
proceeds from effect to cause, from the particular to the universal, from the multiple to the
simple. The via compositionis, on the other hand, proceeds in the opposite direction and is a
movement of synthesis, in which the reason goes from cause to effect, from the universal to the
particular, from the simple to the multiple.9
Resolutio
Regarding the resolutio or via resolutionis in metaphysics and philosophy of God, Jason
Mitchell explains that for Thomas Aquinas, the subiectum of philosophical theology is identical
to that of metaphysics: ens qua ens.10 It is erroneous, on the basis of a pedagogical distinction, to
posit two separate philosophical disciplines and propose God as the subiectum of philosophical
theology. One and the same philosophical science seeks the intrinsic and extrinsic causes of ens
qua ens: the part called metaphysics seeks to know the ultimate, intrinsic causes and
transcendental properties of ens qua ens, while philosophical theology seeks to know the
ultimate, extrinsic causes of ens qua ens and its properties.
The metaphysical method that adequately corresponds to this twofold causal search is
called resolutio (Latin for the Greek analysis). In metaphysics, the via resolutionis refers
principally to the path of reasoning which resolves things into their principles.11 It is a
movement from ratio (reasoning) to intellectus (understanding). According to Aquinas, this
resolutio is twofold: resolutio secundum rationem progresses by means of intrinsic causes to the
consideratio entis and to the transcendentals; resolutio secundum rem progresses by means of
extrinsic causes to knowledge of the ultimate, supreme cause of created being.12
The first resolutio is labeled secundum rationem since its progress does not involve the
passage from one substance to another, but rather, by means of rational discourse, one mentally
separates that which is really distinct in re.13 For example, to solve the problem of accidental
change and multiplicity, one mentally separates accidents (what changes) from substance (what
New Scholasticism, 63 (1989), pp. 405-418 ; J. J. SANGUINETI, Il triplice senso della resolutio in San Tommaso,
in Atti del IX Congresso Tomistico internazionale, vol. 2, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1991, pp. 126132 ; M. TAVUZZI, Aquinas on Resolution in Metaphysics, The Thomist, 55 (1991), pp. 199-227 ; E. C.
SWEENEY, Three Notions of Resolutio and the Structure of Reasoning, The Thomist, 58 (1994), pp. 197-243 ; J.
VILLAGRASA, La resolutio come metodo della metafisica secondo Cornelio Fabro, Alpha Omega, 4.1 (2001),
pp. 35-66 ; J. MITCHELL, Resolutio secundum rem, the Dionysian triplex via and Thomistic Philosophical
Theology, in Proceedings Metaphysics 2009: 4th World Conference, Rome, November 5-7, 2009, edited by P.
Zordan, D. Murray, R. Badillo, M. Lafuente, Editorial Dykinson, Madrid, 2011, pp. 398-406 ; J. MITCHELL, The
Method of Resolutio and the Structure of the Five Ways, Alpha Omega, 15.3 (2012), pp. 339-381.
8
Cf. B. MONDIN, Manuale di filosofia sistematica, vol. 3 (Ontologia e metafisica), ESD, Bologna, 2007, pp. 128129.
9
Cf. In Boethii De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 1.
10
Cf. In Boethii De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 4.
11
E. SWEENEY, Three Notions of Resolutio and the Structure of Reasoning in Aquinas, The Thomist, 58 (1994),
p. 221.
12
In Boethii De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 1; J. AERTSEN, Method and Metaphysics: The via resolutionis in Thomas
Aquinas, The New Scholasticism, 63 (1989), p. 414.
13
Cf. J. VILLAGRASA, La resolutio come metodo della metafisica secondo Cornelio Fabro, Alpha Omega, 4
(2001), p. 63.

remains) and affirms a real distinction a negation of identity between the two, according to
the notions of act and potency. The problem of substantial change is solved in a similar way by
distinguishing substantial form from prime matter. At the meta-physical level, the problem of the
diversity of beings and their varying degrees of perfection is partially solved by a common
resolution of all things into that-which-is (id quod est) and esse, namely by distinguishing
essence from actus essendi in created ens.14 In resolutio secundum rationem, one proceeds from
the composite to the constitutive principles and, therefore, from the more particular forms to the
universal forms. [] The ultimate resolutive terminus secundum rationem are those constitutive
principles which are common analogically the same to all beings, and that which pertains to
being as being.15 In metaphysics, then, resolutio secundum rationem is an intrinsic analysis
which comes to the ultimate formal principle, the act of being (esse), whereby a thing is a being
(ens).16
Resolutio secundum rationem is also employed in the establishment of the
transcendental properties of ens qua ens, since one does not move from one thing to another to
affirm that all being is good, but rather one finds that all being is good to some degree and that a
beings goodness is proportional to its degree of being (esse). In this resolutio, one reduces
bonum to the ratio of appetibility, appetibility to perfection, perfection to act, and act to esse.
Furthermore, the resolutio involved is called secundum rationem since transcendentals such as
bonum are identical to ens according to the thing (secundum rem) but differ according to the
notion (secundum rationem).
The resolutio proper to philosophical theology is called secundum rem since its
progress involves the passage from one thing to another insofar as the latter is the extrinsic cause
of the former.17 Accordingly, the goal of philosophical theology is knowledge of the efficient,
exemplary and final cause of ens qua ens and of its transcendental properties. Because this via
resolutionis passes from id quod finite participat esse to knowledge of God as Ipsum Esse
Subsistens, it involves Aquinas Dionysian triplex via.18
Compositio
Regarding the role of the compositio in metaphysics, Prez de Laborda writes: Con
questo momento risolutivo certamente non finisce il metodo della metafisica: possibile tornare
poi dalle cause e dai principi agli effetti e ai principiati, per vederli in un modo nuovo alla luce
del loro fondamento. Questa nuova dimensione metodologica si pu chiamare sintesi o
compositio.19 In his Il ruolo della compositio in metafisica (2004), Prez de Laborda gives a
clear example of St. Thomass use of the via compositionis in the reduction of the
14

De substantiis separatis, ch. 9: Oportet igitur communem quamdam resolutionem in omnibus huiusmodi fieri,
secundum quod unumquodque eorum intellectu resolvitur in id quod est, et in suum esse.
15
J. VILLAGRASA, Metafisica II. La comunanza dellessere, APRA, Rome, 2009, p. 240.
16
Cf. J. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, Brill, Leiden, 1996, pp. 134-135.
17
Since it is not an intrinsic analysis, Aquinas qualifies it as a quasi resolutio.
18
J. MITCHELL, Resolutio secumdum rem, the Dionysian triplex via and Thomistic Philosophical Theology, in
Proceedings Metaphysics 2009: 4th World Conference, Rome, November 5-7, 2009, edited by P. Zordan, D. Murray,
R. Badillo, M. Lafuente, Editorial Dykinson, Madrid, 2011, pp. 398-400.
19
Cf. M. PREZ DE LABORDA, Il ruolo della compositio in metafisica, in Tommaso dAquino e loggetto della
metafisica, edited by Stephen L. Brock, Armando, Rome, 2004, pp. 49-64.

transcendentals and the categories to the notion of being (ens) by way of the additio,20 a via
compositionis in the double additio to ens within the context of explaining the notions of verum
(De Veritate q. 1, a. 1) and bonum (De Veritate, q. 21, a. 2).21

20

Cf. De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1 and De Veritate, q. 21, q. 1 ; Cf. M. TAVUZZI, Aquinas on the Operation of Additio,
The New Scholasticism, 62 (1988), pp. 297-318.
21
M. PREZ DE LABORDA, op. cit., pp. 57-58.