Shell Exploration & Production

HEMP and HAZID

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File Title

Copyright: Shell Exploration & Production Ltd.

HEMP (Hazard and Effects

Management Process) and its
associated tools

Design
Integrity

Technical
Integrity

Operating
Integrity

Shell Exploration & Production

HEMP (Hazard & Effects Management Process)

HEMP = four steps:

Identify - what hazards are present in our
activities. Are people, environment, assets or
reputation exposed to potential harm?
Produce a list of these hazards
Assess - we need to know how the hazard
can be released, how likely is loss of control,
what are the potential consequences, and
thus how important each hazard is to us. In
this way we can prioritise. We also ask the
question can we remove the hazard? - is the
hazard an inherent part of our business or can
we remove it and still function.
Control - for all identified hazards we ask the
questions: Can we eliminate the causes
which release the hazard? and What
controls are needed to prevent the release?
How effective are these controls?
Recover - Can the potential consequences or
effects be mitigated? What recovery
measures are needed? Are recovery
capabilities suitable and sufficient?

In Identify & Assess, use the Bow Tie

model
HAZID a structured brainstorming to
identify potential hazards early in the
project
EP2005-0300 HEMP Process (full set of
procedures, specifications, standards,
guidelines)
HEMP (WIKI)

CONSEQUENCE

H
A
Z
A
R
D

SCENARIO

Top
Event
THREAT
BARRIERS OR
CONTROLS

Control (keep within control limits)

reduce likelihood
(proactive)

CONSEQUENCE

RECOVERY
MEASURES

CONSEQUENCE

Prepare for emergencies

mitigate consequences and re-instate

(reactive)

Accountability DCAF states that this is with the HSS

Discipline in EPE it is with Safety Engineering
Bow Tie Model
HAZID

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HEMP (Hazard & Effects

Management Process)

THREATS

ESCALATION
Hazard :
Hydrocarbon gas
under pressure

Examples:
Corrosion
Erosion
Impact

Fire

Pressure Vessel

Example 1

Rupture and Leak

Hazardous
Event

Leak !

Fire

First Hazardous Event

or
Top Event
Inspection

Corrosion
Allowance

Threat Barriers

CAUSATION

Detection
Process
Shutdown

Detection
ESD

Plant
Separation

Recovery Preparedness Measures

and Mitigation Measures

CONSEQUENCE

Detection
and
Deluge

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FAULT TREE
(Causes)

EVENT TREE
(Consequences)

e.g.maloperation

e.g. overpressure

H
A
Z
A
R
D

e.g.loss of
gas
containment

e.g.ESD
bypassed

Hazardous Event
(release of hazard)

E
S
C
A
L
e.g.detector failure
A
T
I
O
e.g.deluge failure
N
e.g. explosion

sequence of faults and causes

leading to a hazardous event

sequence of events and failures leading

to the escalation of a hazardous event

CAUSE CONSEQUENCE DIAGRAM (BOW TIE)

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Event:
Well Kick

HEMP (Hazard & Effects

Management Process)

Threats

Example 2

Blow
out

Escalation

Loss of Hydrostatic head

Swabbing

Hazard:
HC under pressure

Well kick
First Hazardous Event
Or
Top event

Accurate
Pressure
info

Mud
Weight
Control

Kick
detection

Blow
out

Well
design

BOPs

Emergency
Plan

Threat Barriers

Recovery Preparedness Measures

And Mitigation Measures

Causation

Consequences

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FAULT TREE
(Causes)

EVENT TREE
(Consequences)

Mud weight too low

H
A
Z
A
R
D

Well
Kick

Mud Pit level

alarm by passed

Hazardous Event
Losses

(release of hazard)

sequence of faults and causes

leading to a hazardous event

Rig floor equipment

S
not X-proof

C
A
L
BOP leaking
A
T
I
O
Bad casing design
N

sequence of events and failures leading

to the escalation of a hazardous event

CAUSE CONSEQUENCE DIAGRAM (BOW TIE)

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What is ALARP?

When is safe, safe enough.

ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) is the level of risk (tolerability)

below which the money, time and trouble involved in reducing the risk
further would become unreasonably (grossly) disproportionate.

120

Risk

100
80

Risk to
stakeholders

60

Sacrifice (cost)

40
20
0

Legal
Requirements,
Standards

A
L
A
R
P

Risk reduction options

Shell Exploration & Production

HEMP cont. - tools

Tools and (structured) techniques to identify hazards and/or assess the consequences and/or the
level of risk

Examples:
HAZID
Job Hazard Analysis/TRA
Explosion study
HAZOP
Pollution study
Fire modelling (and FirePran)
Escape and evacuation analysis
RIE (Health Risk Assessment)
Sustainable development assessment
Ergonomic layout study
QRA

Technical studies:
IPF/SIL-classification
FMECA
Structural analysis

Shell Exploration & Production

HEMP Tools cont. - 1: HAZID (Hazard Identification Study)

Team session
Involving all disciplines
Independent chairman/facilitator
(qualified)
EP200712228168,

Select Plant AREA or NODE & Section,

Select CATEGORY, Discuss and agree INTENT

Be creative!
Addresses environmental and project
risks

Identify Hazard
Determine threats/barriers
Assess (risk ranking)
Action?

HAZARD

GUIDE WORD

HAZID procedure EPE

IS IT POSSIBLE
IS IT LIKELY ?
NO

YES

BRAINSTORM
THREATS & CAUSES

ASSESS
CONTROLS
WHAT BARRIERS OR CONTROLS
ARE REQUIRED TO PREVENT OR
CONTROL THE EFFECT?

The HAZID
Process

IDENTIFY

http://sww.shell.com/ep/epe/engineering_maintenance/safety_engineering/safety_engineering_hazop_intro.html

Shell Exploration & Production

HEMP Tool 2: HAZOP-technique

Identification of hazards and operability

issues
Team session
Multi-disciplinary
Separate chairman (qualified)
Very rigorous
Relevant for process changes eg. UBD, tie-in
to vent system, flaring.
Decision not to HAZOP to be signed off by a
Process TA2
Ref. EP200712228168
HAZOPprocedure EPE

http://sww.shell.com/ep/epe/engineering_maintenance/safety_engineering/safety_engineering_hazop_intro.html

Shell Exploration & Production

Shell Exploration & Production

HEMP Tool 3.

QRA

Complex situations
(process hazards)
Comparison between
options (helicopter vs
basket)
Statistics may help but
have limitations
Caution about the absolute
level of risk

(Quantitative Risk Assessments)

10-2
INTOLERABLE
Fundamental improvements
needed

Daily commuting
by helicopter

10-3
TOO HIGH
Significant effort required
to improve
HIGH
Investigate alternatives

LOW
Consider cost
effective alternatives

NEGLIGABLE
Maintain normal
precautions

10-4

10-5
10-6

10-7

10-8

Individual risk

Mining
E&P contractors
Average all industries
Traffic accident
Workers in safest
industries
Living near nuclear
installations
Fire or explosion
from gas at home

Lightning (UK)

Shell Exploration & Production

Shell Exploration & Production

Exercise 1: Gas detection

Structural
Integrity

Process
Containment

Ignition
Control

Protection
Systems

Detection
Systems

Gas detection system out of service

- cup of coffee fell into the control
panel:
- unmanned onshore location
- Unmanned offshore location
- manned installation

Shutdown
Systems

Emergency
Response

Lifesaving

Major Accident
HazardEscalating
Consequences

1. What is/are the hazards?

2. What is the source of energy?
3. Barriers - preventive (any additional?)
- mitigative (any additional?)
4. What is the consequence?
5. What is the probability and (level of )Risk?
(with and without additional measures)

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Exercise 2: Tank level calibration

Condensate storage tank (750 m3)
Level alarm (to control room) @ 70%
Automated shutdown @ 90%
Instrument has been calibrated for water tank iso stabilised
condensate s.g. = 0,85
Tank does contain a pressure relief valve and a local level
indicator

1. What is/are the hazards?

2. What is the source of energy?
3. Barriers - preventive (any additional?)
- mitigative (any additional?)
4. What is the consequence?
5. What is the probability and (level of )Risk?
(with and without additional measures)

Shell Exploration & Production

Exercise 3: Gas leak

-

flange-leak (natural gas) x-mas tree (approx. 7 mm)

Ignited
Pressure 80 bar
Well spacing 20 meters

1. What is/are the hazards?

2. What is the source of energy?
3. Barriers - preventive (any additional?)
- mitigative (any additional?)
4. What is the consequence?
5. What is the probability and (level of )Risk?
(with and without additional measures)

Shell Exploration & Production

Exercise 4: Valve in wrong position

-

Locked open in stead of locked closed (due to drawing error or

maloperation reading error)
4Valve is connected to a 2-phase separator (150 bar)
In use as a manual drain connection for annual maintenance
Drain system has design rating of 10 bar
Drain tank is located on the lowest deck

1. What is/are the hazards (gevaren)?

2. What is the source of energy?
3. Barriers - preventive (any additional?)
- mitigative (any additional?)
4. What is the consequence?
5. What is the probability and (level of )Risk?
(with and without additional measures)