5.

Distribution and closure of estate (Rule 90)

Cases:
Fe Quita v CA and Blandina Dandan
Facts:
1. Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. No children
were born out of their marriage.
2. On July 23, 1954, Quita obtained a final judgment of divorce in San Francisco, U.S.A. In the
divorce proceeding, she submitted a private writing evidencing their agreement to live
separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties.
4. Three (3) weeks after she married Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also
ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
3. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC
for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine
Trust Company.
4. Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo and the surviving children, all
surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition.
5. RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of
Arturo in 1972, and that the marriage existed between Blandina and Arturo was clearly void
since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
6. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Issues:
1. WON the case be remanded to the lower court?
2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?
Held:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or
as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because
there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary shares.
Blandina is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab
inito under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving spouse.
The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.

Emilio Pacioles v Miguela Ching (mother of Meguelita)

Facts:
1. Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties, stock investments, bank deposits, and
interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, Emilio, and their two minor
children. Emilio Pacioles filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelitas
estate.
2. Miguelitas mother, Miguela, filed an opposition, on the grounds that petitioner is incompetent
and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and the bulk of Miguelitas estate is
composed of paraphernal properties.
3. Emilio moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and
material interest in the estate. Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in
the estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both
of them would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of
business partners. She then nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.
4. The intestate court then issued an order appointing Emilio and Emmanuel as joint regular
administrators of the estate and then declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only
compulsory heirs of Miguelita. Emilio then submitted to the intestate court an inventory of
Miguelitas estate. Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
5. Emilio filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion that an Order be issued directing the:
1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs;
and 3) payment of attorneys fees.
6. Miguelat opposed on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is premature
and precipitate, considering that there is yet no determination whether the properties specified
in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.
7. The intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorneys fees but denied
petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed
premature. It also ordered that a hearing on oppositors claim as indicated in her opposition to
the instant petition is necessary to determine whether the properties listed in the amended
complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased,
or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.
8. Emilio questioned this order but the MR was denied. Therefore a Petition for Certiorari with the
CA.
Issue: Did the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering that a hearing be set
to determine the ownership of the properties in an intestate proceeding?
Held: The general rule is that the intestate court cannot hear and pass upon questions of
ownership. However the intestate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership
provisionally and when merely incidental if the purpose is to determine whether or not a
property should be included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased.
But this case does not fall under the exception, thus the RTC acted with grave abuse
of discretion in ordering that a hearing be set for determining the ownership of the
properties in question.
The facts of this case show that the inventorty is not disputed. In fact, in repondents
Manifestation and Opposition, respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared
by petitioner.

Note: Miguelas recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The
intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership
over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate given that she had Torrens title over
such properties.

III. ESCHEATS Rule 91

A. Concept
It is an incident or attribute of sovereignty and rests on the principle of ultimate ownership by the
state of all property within its jurisdiction.
It is a substantial right of the state and is not a claim based on charity, gratuity or unearned
benefit.
A. When to file
(1) Person dies intestate;
(2) Seized of real property in the Philippines; and
(3) Leaves no heir or person by law entitled to the same
B. Requisites for filing of petition
(1) A person died intestate
(2) He left no heirs or persons by law entitled to the same
(3) Deceased left properties
Note:
Must be initiated by the Government through the Solicitor General.
Fix a date and place for hearing, which shall not be more than 6 months after the entry of the
order
Direct a copy of the order to be published before the hearing at least once a week for 6
successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province
Court shall adjudge.

B. Compare and contrast Escheats v Settlement of estate

Escheats
1. Dies intestate
2. Left no heir

Settlement of estate
1. Dies testate or intestate
2. Left an heir

Case:
Republic (represented by Register of Deeds) v CA and Amada Solano (represented by Romeo
Solano) GR 143483
FACTS:
1. Amada Solano is the helper of Elizabeth Hankins for 30 years

2. Amada was her constant companion since no relative is available to tend her needs
3. In recognition, Ms. Hankins executed 2 deeds of donation involving 2 parcels of land in favor of
Amada. She allegedly misplaced the deeds and can't be found
4. During the absence of the deed of donation, Republic filed a petition for escheat of the estate
of Hankins; Romeo Solano (spouse of Amada) filed for intervention but was denied by court
because "they miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in question."
5. It was established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties, the
Lower Court escheated the estate in favor of Republic of the Philippines
6. Amada claimed she accidentally found the deeds of donation.
7. She filed for petition before CA for the annulment of the LC's decision escheating the property
in favor of the Republic. She invokes lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the part of
respondent RTC to entertain the escheat proceedings because the parcels of land have been
earlier donated prior to the death of said Hankins; and therefore, respondent court could not
have ordered the escheat of said properties in favor of the Republic of the Philippines
8. CA annulled LC's decision
ISSUE: Whether the lower court had jurisdiction to declare a parcel of land escheated in favor of
the state
HELD: YES. We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, whereby the state, by virtue of its
sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate
leaving no heir.
Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe
the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5)
years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title
to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the
proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever."
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27
June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when
private respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for
annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals.
With the lapse of the 5-yearperiod therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost her right to
claim and the supposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify
the escheat judgment which has long attained finality.
The Court of Appeals therefore cannot perfunctorily presuppose that the subject properties were
no longer part of the decedent's estate at the time the lower court handed down its decision on
the strength of a belated allegation that the same had previously been disposed of by the owner.