REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES}: 1: 1 SUPREME COURT MANILA 10:26 EN BANC RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner, versus- G.R. No. 221538 SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MARY GRACE POR LLAMANZARES, Respondents. Public Respondent SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (“SET”), through the Office of the Solicitor General (“OSG”),! respectfully states— PREFATORY STATEMENT This case involves an inquiry into the status of foundlings under Philippine law and the right of such vulnerable class of persons against undue burdens that restrict theit membership in society, opportunities for political participation, and recognition as full citizens of the republic. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS J. ‘The present case is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a ‘Temporary Restraining Order (“FRO”) of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking to reverse and set aside A copy of the SE “ ’s Letter of Indorsement dated December 22, 2015 is attached as Annex.Comment David ». SET and Llamanzares G.R. No. 221538 Page 2 of 27 the SET’s Decision dated November. 17, 2015 in the case entitled Rigalito Y. Dawid v. Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares and docketed as SET Case No. 001-15. This Decision dismissed the petition for Quo Warranto filed by herein petitioner Rizalito David against herein private respondent Mary Grace Poe Llamanzates. 2. On December 16, 2015, the Honorable Court issued a Resolution requiring respondents to file theit Comment to the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for a TRO ot a writ of preliminary injunction within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice. Said Resolution also set the present case for Oral Arguments on January 19, 2016. 3. The SET received the Honorable Court’s Resolution on December 18, 2015. Thus, the SET has until January 2, 2016 to file its Comment. 4. Private respondent is a foundling. Her Certificate of Live Birth states that she was found in the Parish Church of Jato, Iloilo City on September 3, 1968, at about 9:30 in the morning by Mr. Edgardo Militar. The fact of her finding was reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar on September 6, 1968 by Mr. Emiliano Militar. Private respondent was registered as Mary Grace Contreras Militar? 5. When private respondent was five (5) years old, she was adopted by the couple Ronald Allan Poe (also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (also known as Susan Roces) as evidenced by a Decision dated May 13, 1974 of the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Rizal. 6 On December 13, 1986, having reached the voting age of eighteen (18) years, private respondent was issued a Voter’s ID by the Elections (“COMELEC”).4 She was issued Philippine Passports by the Ministry /Departm nt of Foreign Affairs on April 4, 1988,* April 5, 1993,* May 19, 1998," October 13, 2009,* December 19, 2013,’ and March 18, 2014."° mmission on 7. In 1988, private respondent enrolled at Boston College in Chestnull Hill, Massachusetts, United States of America (“USA”), where she * Records, Vol. 2, p. 433. * Records, Vol. 2, pp. 434-436. * Records, Vol. 2, p. 438, * Records, Vol. 2, pp. 439-440, * Records, Vol. 2, pp. 441-442. ” Recotds, Vol. 1, p. 108; Vol. 2, p. 443, * Records, Vol. 2, p. 444, ° Records, Vol. 2, p. 446, ” Records, Vol. 2, p. 445,Comment David ». SET and Llamangares GR. No. 221538 Page 3 of 27 obtained het Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies in 1991." On July 27, 1991, she mattied ‘Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, who is a citizen of both the Philippines and the USA, at the Sanctuario de San Jose Parish at San Juan City, Metto Manila. ‘Two days later, on July 29, 1991, she joined her husband in the USA." 8. Private respondent became a naturalized American citizen on October 18, 2001.'° She was issued USA Passport No. 17037793 on December 19, 2001."* 9, Private respondent came home to the Philippines in 2005'° and was issued a Tax Identification Number (“TIN”) by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on July 22, 2005." 10. On July 7, 2006, private respondent executed an “Oath of Allegiance” to the Republic of the Philippines,"” and three (3) days later, on July 10, 2006, filed with the Bureau of Immigration (“BI”) a Petition for Reacquisition of Filipino Citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (“R.A.”) No 9225." ‘The said petition was granted by the BI in an Order dated July 18, 2006 signed by Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro for Commissioner Alipio F Fernandez, Jr.” 11, Between 2006 and 2009, private respondent made several trips to the USA using her USA Passport.” 12. Private respondent was appointed Chairperson” of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (“MTRCB”) on October 6, 2010.” Prior to taking her Oath of Office as MTRCB Chairperson on October 21, 2010," private respondent executed an “Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship” on October 20, 2010. The original copy of the Affidavit was " Records, Vol. 2, p. 390. ® Records, Vol. 2, p. 390. * Records, Vol. 2, p. 382. " Records, Vol. 1, p. 109; Vol. 2, pp. 471-483. Records, Vol. 2, p. 391 " Records, Vol. 2, p. 447. " Records, Vol. 1, p. 107; Vol. 2, 449. ® Records, Vol. 1, p. 111; Vol. 2, ” Records, Vol. 1,p. 114: Vol. 2, p. 453. ® Records, Vol. 1, p. 131; Vol. 2, pp. 509-512. *_A position that requites its holder to be a natural-born citizen. (§2, Presidential Dectee No. 1986, Creating the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board) ® Records, Vol. 2, p. 459. * Records, Vol. 2, p. 462. * Records, Vol. 2, p. 460,Comment Datid v, SET and Llamangares GIR. No. 221538 Page 4 of 27 submitted to the BI also on October 20, 2010 by her legal counsel, Escudero Marasigan Valiente & E.H. Villateal.? On October 26, 2010, private respondent assumed office as MIRCB Chairperson.” 13. On July 12, 2011, private respondent executed an “Oath/ Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States” before Vice-Consul Somer B. Bessire-Briers.”” She likewise accomplished on the same date the “Questionmire Information for Determining Possible Loss of US. Citizenship.”* Private respondent’s Certificate of Loss of Nationality was executed by Vice Consul Jason Galian on December 9, 2011? and was approved by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on February 3, 2012. 14, In the 2013 elections, private respondent ran for the position of Senator, Her Certificate of Candidacy (“COC”), executed on September 27, 2012, was filed with the COMELEC on October 2, 2012.” She was declared senator-elect by the COMELEC on May 16, 2013, 15. On August 6, 2015, petitioner filed before the SET a petition for Quo Warranto against private respondent, contesting her election as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines for failure to comply with the citizenship and residency requirements under the 1987 Constitution." 16. During the preliminary conference, petitioner agreed to drop the issue of residency.” 17. On November 17, 2015, the SET dismissing the petition for Qxo Warranto, sued the assailed Dex 18. Petitioner filed on November 23, 2015 a Verified Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the S$ in its Resolution dated December 4, 2015. 19. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorati before the Honorable Court. Records, Vol. 2, p. 461. Records, Vol. 2, p. 463. * Records, Vol. 2, p. 464 ® Records, Vol. 2, pp. 465-469. ® Records, Vol. 2, p. 470. ™ Records, Vol. 2, p. 483-A. * Records, Vol. 1, pp. 29-63. © TSN, Preliminary Conference, September 11, 2015, p. 3.ComMENt David 2. SET and Llamangares G.R. No. 221538 Page 5 of 27 ISSUES I. WHETHER OR NOT THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN. Il. WHETHER OR NOT THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT VALIDLY REACQUIRED HER NATURAL-BORN PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9225. Til. WHETHER OR NOT THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT VALIDLY RENOUNCED HER FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP TO QUALIFY HER FOR PUBLIC OFFICE. Iv. WHETHER OR NOT THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S USE OF HER U.S. PASSPORT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A RECANTATION OF HER RENUNCIATION OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP.ComMENT David ». SET and Llamangares GR. No. 221538 Page 6 of 27 ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION I, THE SET DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN. 20. The SET Decision embodies a legally grounded, reasonable, and just interpretation of Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. Foundlings are citizens of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution. 21, The deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention indicate the intention to categorize foundlings as a class of persons considered as Philippine citizens. The relevant exchange is reproduced in the Decision of the SET— SR. RAFOLS: For an amendment, I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: “The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father. PRESIDENT: [We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children of to any kind of illegitimate children? SR. RAFOLS: To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate childten of unknown parents. SR. MONTINOLA: For clarification. ‘The gentleman said “of unknown parents.” Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish tettitory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknownCommenT David ». SET and Llamanzares G.R. No. 221538 Page 7 of 27 parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need... SR. RAFOLS: ‘There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino. SR. MONTINOLA: But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for the amendment. SR. RAFOLS: The amendment should read thus: “Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown parentage.” SR. BRION! ‘The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage. SR. RAFOLS: ‘The son of a Filipina to a foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not unknown. PRESIDENT: Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not? SR. RAFOLS: I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. ‘Theit parentage is not unknown and I think those children of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize should also be considered as Filipinos. PRESIDENT: ‘The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones. MR. BULSON: Mr. President, don’t you think it would be better to leave the matter in the hands of the Legislature. SR. ROXAS: Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the ptinciple that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively.Comment David ». SET and Llamangares GR. No. 221538 Page 8 of 27 22. Reasonable conclusions follow from this exchange st. ‘The 1934 Constitutional Convention specifically tackled the problem involving the potential vagueness of the political status of foundlings (‘“‘childsen of unknown parents”), and the proposed solution was an inclusive policy the effect of which was to recognize them, explicitly or implicitly, as lipino citizens Second. The exchange among the members of the Convention was not whether to recognize foundlings as Filipinos, but only whether they should be specifically mentioned in the constitution as Filipinos, that is, whether there was even a need to have them specifically recognized as Filipinos. ‘There was no question about the need to protect foundlings Third. Regardless of whether foundlings should be specifically mentioned in the proposed Constitution as Filipinos, the basis for considering them as such was the understanding that the rule under the Spanish Code which considered a foundling as “the son of a Spaniard” was also the governing rule in the Philippines. 23. These conclusions trump petitioner’s argument that the absence of a specific recognition of foundlings as Filipino citizens amounts to a textual exclusion of such class of persons from the category of Filipino citizens, much less a deliberate intent to legally put them in harm’s way by leaving unstable their political status. ‘The deliberations reveal quite the opposite 24. As opposed to the argument that the textual silence of the 1935 Constitution evinces an exclusionary policy that would in effect make them stateless and legally vulnerable, the deliberations plainly show a benevolent, if practical, policy of inclusion. In other words, this silence is not borne of malice or disregard. 25. This evident concern to recognize foundlings as citizens under the constitution is founded on a fundamental question of injustice inflicted on innocent children abandoned by their parents who, in all likelihood, have Filipino patents. ‘The recognition of their status as Filipinos therefore not only flows from practical teason—the near-certainty that their parents are Filipinos—but also from the need to address a basic question of justic suffered by foundlings. : how to reduce the systemic unfairne:Comment David ». SET and Llamangares GR No, 221538 Page 9 of 27 26. To the question why foundlings were not specifically recognized as citizens, the answer of the framers appears rather simple: there mas no need for it, Thus, in contrast to a discriminatory policy of exclusion and non-recognition for which thete is no evidence on record, the deliberations serve to explain and justify why foundlings were not specifically mentioned as Filipino citizens in the 1935 Constitution. ‘The SET accurately captuted this intention— From the above-quoted exchanges, in particular, the statement made by St. Roxas, we discern that it was never the intention of the framers of the 1935 Constitution to exclude foundling from natural-born Philippine citizenship. There was @ recognition that “children or people born in a country of unknown parents ate citizens of this nation” and the only reason that there was no specific reference of foundlings in the 1935 Constitution was that foundiing are “few and far between” so that “it is not necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively.” 27. Put differently, the absence in the text did not indicate any disctiminatory animus against foundlings under the 1935 Constitution, but instead an understandable effort at linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. Indeed, in this sense, the 1935 Constitution is classical in the sense that it followed the United States model of a short constitution written in concise form and language. 28. It is in this context that we should view the rejection of the proposal of Rafols to expressly consider as Filipinos the “{tJhe natural children of unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.” 29. The context is clear and understandable: Montinola was simply of the view that they already are Filipinos under domestic law, while Roxas was of the view that they already are Filipinos under international law. And because they were drafting the first principles of the nation, it did not even matter whether Montinola and Roxas were right or wrong in their view of the status of domestic or international law. What matters only is that they were constitutionalizing their ideas or incorporating their opinions into the records of the convention to explain the lack of necessity for the explicit recognition of the political status of foundlings. The point is not the legal correctness of their views, but the motivation that informed their views. 30. Furthermore, as between two interpretations of the Constitution, one discriminatory and the other inclusive, it is reasonable to take that interpretation that is consistent with the grander principles of the Constitution. The 1935 Constitution’s silence cannot simply be interpreted as indicative of an Decision, p. 24COMMENT David ». SET and Llamangares G.R. No, 221538 Page 10 of 27, intent to entrench a disadvantaged class in their tragedy. Not only is there no evidence of such intent, but also that the silence can be explained in a compassionate light, one that is geared towards addressing a fundamental question of justice. 31. Quite rationally, the framers of the 1935 Constitution did not see foundlings as a suspect class of strangers carrying “dangerous blood” but as persons entitled to protection. Considering the reality that the overwhelming members of the class of foundlings in the Philippines would most likely be the sons and daughters of Filipino parents who abandoned them, it is not at all difficult to see why there was an attempt to protect such class by recognizing them en masse as citizens. The only question among the framers was whether such protection should be textualized in the Constitution itself, 32. To insist on the simplistic view that the absence in the text of a recognition of the political status of foundlings meant a denial of such status would be to impute on the framers of the 1935 Constitution a discriminatory intent that is nowhere in the records, and as if the members of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 were so fixated with the racial purity of Filipinos. 33. The foregoing explanation is sufficient justification for concluding that the SET not only did not commit grave abuse of discretion but also was in fact legally correct in holding that private respondent is a Filipino under the 1935 Constitution. Foundlings are natural-born citizens of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution. 34. ‘The understanding that foundlings are citizens of the Philippines rests on the rational and practical assumption that a child of unknown Parentage is the son of a Filipino. ‘This assumption makes foundlings in the Philippines natural-born citizens, The deliberations are, again, instructive on this matter— SR. MONTINOLA: For clarification. ‘The gentleman said “of unknown parents.” Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown Patentage is the son of a Spaniard. ‘This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need.Comment David ». SET and Llamangars GR No. 221538 Page 11 of 27 SR. RAFOLS: ‘There is a need, because we ate relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino, SR. MONTINOLA: But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for the amendment. 35. Plainly, the exchange between delegates Montinola and Rafols is not about whether foundlings should be considered Filipino citizens but about the explicitness of the recognition to be afforded them. Whereas Rafols wanted the recognition expressed in the text of the proposed Constitution, Montinola argued for the lack of need for it as the matter can be resolved in Rafols’ favor anyway through interpretation. 36. More important, regardless of whether one follows Rafols or Montinola, there can be no other conclusion than that foundlings, as Filipinos, are natural-born citizens. Had Rafols succeeded in his intent to explicitly have foundlings recognized as Filipino citizens, they would have qualified as such “without having to perform any act to acquire ot perfect their citizenship.”™ On the other hand, Montinola’s view assumed foundlings had, at the very least, a Filipino father. Under either view, foundlings are natural-born citizens. ‘The silence of the 1935 Constitution only meant that Montinola’s (and Roxas’) position prevailed. 37. In any case, what must not be missed is the idea that clearly the framers of the 1935 Constitution had wanted to address the fundamental problem that besets foundlings, their unknown parentage, which is the basis of their vulnerable status. They therefore dabbled with solutions that are understandably inclusive, as can be gleaned from their deliberations. It is significant to note that nothing in the deliberations indicate that this policy of inclusion was opposed on the ground that foundlings, as such, should not be considered Filipinos 38. At the same time, the constitutional recognition of the political status of foundlings as natural-born citizens of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution presented the framers a global, just, and practical solution to the problem considering that in all likelihood, in the overwhelming majority of cases, these foundlings are the sons and daughters of Filipino parents. 39. ‘Thus, from the point of view of justice and reason, it made sense for the framers to remedy the alteady-disadvantaged position of foundlings by “See Art. IIL, §4 1973 Const; ARTT 42. ConstComment David », SET and Llamanares GR_No. 221538 Page 12 of 27 simply assuming that their parents are Filipinos, given the probabilities arising, from context and reality. ‘To assume otherwise would be to further disable such vulnerable class of persons by denying them political status for reasons not of their making, 40, To assume otherwise would also be unreasonable, given out social reality and the facts on the ground. As opposed to the possibility that the Philippines is a haven for foreigners who abandon their childlings, the weight of probability decidedly tilts in favor of the fact that foundlings in the Philippines are children of Filipino parents. In the language of our procedural rules, these situations relate to “things [or events that have] happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.” Evidence is in favor of private respondent being a natural-born en of the Philippines. 4 Even on the assumption that the 1935 Constitution does not recognize foundlings as natural-born Filipinos en masse, private respondent should nonetheless be considered a natural-born citizen, given the facts of her case. Thus, the SET did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it held that the burden is on petitioner to prove that private respondent is not a natural- born citizen. 42. ‘The basic argument of petitioner is a syllogism: that foundlings ate persons whose parents are unknown; the Philippines adopts rule, requiting blood relationship to establish natural-born citizenship; because private respondent is a foundling, she cannot be a natural-born citizen, the jus sanguinis Jt ns 43. ‘This syllogism is the beginning, not the end, of the analysis. It is also false 44, As correctly pointed out by the SET— ‘To our mind, the fact that Petitioner was able to show that Respondent is a foundling did not necessarily carry with it the proof that Respondent's parents were/are not citizens of the Philippines. On the contraty, it did not exclude the possibility that her parents are citizens of the Philippines. As admitted by Petitioner’s counsel during the Oral Argument * See Rule 131, Section 3(y) of the Rules of CourtComment David », SET and Llamangares GR. No, 221538 Page 13 of 27 SEN. LEGARDA: So the unknown father could be a foreigner but the unknown father could also be a Filipino, Is that correct? ATTY. LUNA: Yes, Your Honor. SEN. LEGARDA: And you cannot exclude for certain the possibility that one or both of the parents of Senator Poe are Filipinos. ATTY. LUNA: Yes, Your Honor. SEN. LEGARDA: So in the end there’s always a possibility that one or both parents were actually Filipinos. ATTY, LUNA: ‘That's possible, Your Honor.% 45, Presumption in favor of those with known parents. On the assumption that the Constitution does not recognize foundlings as natural-born Filipinos, what that only means is that private respondent, as a foundling, cannot rely on the presumption normally accorded a citizen who has a birth certificate evidencing his ot het Filipino parentage, But it certainly does not preclude her from proving her Filipino parentage by other means 46. To be sure, those who assert that they ate natural-born Filipin are able to do so not by showing DNA samples of their Filipino parents, but by producing evidence of such status in the form of their birth certificates which name a Filipino parent on record. On this basis, Filipinos who assert natural- born status (to occupy an office requiring natural-born status) are able to prove their filiation to a Filipino parent without further evidence admissible under the Rules of Court 47. In reality, natural-born Filipinos are not necessarily those who establish with scientific levels—or any level—of certainty theit Filipino Parentage but only those who we can reasonably assume to have a specific Filipino parent because of our reliance on presumptions in favor of bitth certificates, which ate public documents under Rule 132, Section 23 of the °CTSN, Oral Argument, September 21, 2015, pp. 24-27Comment David », SET and Llamangares GR. No. 221538 Page 14 of 27 Rules of Court.” By this standard, everyone who is natural-born is considered as such only by operation of this presumption, which stands until the contrary is established. The net effect is that the whole class of public officers requited to be natural-born citizens are able to assume office only on the basis of a prima facie evidence in their favor. 48. ‘Thus, for example, everyone who wants to run for an elective position requiring a natural-born status only has to submit a copy of his/her birth cestificate to prove his/her natural-born status, and such compliance is treated in the ordinary course of business by the COMELEC as an administrative matter. No one is required to prove the facts stated in anyone's birth certificate because of the presumptions in favor of such documents. 49. Obviously, foundlings cannot take advantage of _ these presumptions in birth certificates considering their unfortunate circumstance, ‘This, howeve . does not—and should not—preclude them from establishing their natural-born status by ways other than by producing their birth certificate. 50. Evidence preponderates in favor of private respondent. ‘The lack of a birth certificate evidencing Filipino parentage notwithstanding, foundlings may nonetheless establish, by means other than the use of a birth certificate, evidence of their Filipino parentage. ‘The Constitution, after all, only requires that a person asserting natural-born status be able to prove that s/he has a Filipino parent, not that such parent be actually identified 51. The SET therefore reasonably and correctly ruled that proof of private respondent's status as a foundling did not necessarily equate to the lack of proof of Filipino parentage. Neither did it translate to an inability to prove Filipino parentage. 52. ‘The SET held that it did not exclude the possibility that private tespondent’s parents are citizens of the Philippines,” as in fact the evidence preponderates in favor of that fact— Sach possibility is strengthened by the Respondent's physical features as well as the circumstances surrounding Respondent’s abandonment and discovery. Respondent is only 5 ft. 2 inches tall. She has brown eyes and dark brown (black) hair, low nasal bridge and an oval-shaped face, which are "Section 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima fade evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave tise to their execution and of the date of the latter. * SET Decision, p. 19.Comment David ». SET and Llamangares G.R. No, 221538 Page 15 of 27 consistent with the physical featutes of the ordinary Filipino. She was found abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Jaro, lloilo, the population of was predominantly Filipinos, These undisputed facts, are in accord with “things that happened according to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary habits of life” that give rise to a disputable presumption that her ilipinos. Such disputable presumption is satisfactory, if uncontradicted.” Thus, as elicited by the Tribunal Member Senator Loren B. which Parents are Legarda duting the Oral Argument: SEN. LEGARDA: So perhaps Senator Poe has a typical height of a Filipino, just probably. I am not even talking about legalities here, just possibilities ATTY. LUNA: Usually, southeast-asian people have that patticular profile, SEN. LEGARDA: .... You've seen the hair of Senator Poe, is it black, and she has typical Filipino features, and she was, found in 2 Roman Catholic Church. Are we not 80% Catholics in this country, more or less? ATTY. LUNA: I think so, Your Honor. SEN. LEGARDA: And do you have proof that in 1968 or at any other time, the population of Iloilo, the city where she was found in the Philippines, were predominantly foreigners? ATTY. LUNA: What I'm sure about is that majority are Filipinos, Your Honor. SEN. LEGARDA: I would just like to ask you, could you possibly give me a reason why a foreigner who is about to give birth would actually leave her country of otigin to give birth in the Philippines? Would it perhaps not be more reasonable to assume that the pregnant foreigner would give birth in her own country for her family is there and a state support? ATTY. LUNA: Maybe many reasons, Your Honot, and your guess may be as good as mine because we're just basing all of these on probabilities. So we cannot certainly say what was the reason for that decision on the part of the mother to abandon a poor child. ” Supra at note 35COMMENT David 2, SET and Llamangares G.R. No. 221538 Page 16 of 27 SEN. LEGARDA: In 1968, did Toilo already have an international airport? ATTY. LUNA: I’m not sure, Your Honor. SEN. LEGARDA: And a pregnant foreigner in 1968 would have found it easier to give birth in Manila pethaps where the international airport was. But what boggles the mind is why would she want to give birth in Iloilo? Would you have a reason for that? ATTY. LUNA: It would be very difficult for us to speculate, Your Honor, and we ate not sure even if her mother is a foreigner because as you have said, it’s also possible that her mother is a Filipino. SEN. LEGARDA: Would you agree with me that most of the time, parents, people who abandon children is due to poverty? ATTY. LUNA: Correct, Your Honor. SEN. LEGARDA: Could you kindly tell me how in 1968 an impoverished foreigner would leave the country, travel to the Philippines, and travel all the way to the Philippines to give birth and abandon her baby? ATTY. LUNA: We cannot speculate on that, Your Honor, because that’s clearly without foundation considering that the question is anchored on probabilities. We are not sure of the particular circumstances that lead that mother to abandon her pot child on September 3, 1968, SENATOR LEGARDA: Would it not be a more probable scenario that in 1968, an impoverished Roman Catholic Filipina living in Moilo City which was then, as now, overwhelmingly populated by Filipinos, gave birth to Senator Poe and left the baby in the church of her faith? ATTY. LUNA: That's also possible, Your Honor." Considering that Respondent, although a foundling enjoyed in her favor the disputable presumption that she was, bor of Filipinos, it temained incumbent upon Petitioner to destroy such presumption by proving that her parents are foreigners. This, Petitioner was unable to do. Hence, the burden of ptoof did not shift to Respondent. “TSN, Oral Argument, September 21, 2015, pp. 27-31Comment David ». SET and Llamangares GR. No. 221538 Page 17 of 27 53. What we therefore have, in lieu of a birth certificate evidencing Filipino parentage, are relevant pieces of evidence, properly admissible under the Rules of Court, that private respondent has, at least, a Filipino mother or Filipino father and, most likely, both. ‘They are facts, admitted by petitioner, that a reasonable mind can accept as sufficient and credible to reach the conclusion that private respondent has a Filipino parent. In this case, the weight of these facts also indubitably preponderates in favor of the finding that Private respondent is a natural-born Filipino. 54. In other words, notwithstanding private respondent’s lack of proof of a speafic, identifiable Filipino parent, she was nonetheless able to prove her Filipino parentage. To reject these facts on record as evidence in her favor is to reject common sense, practical considerations that furnish reasonable people with sufficient basis for making conclusions. Save for those who deal in legal absolutes, reasonable observers would conclude that the facts as established in the proceedings before the SET do really show that private respondent’s parents are Filipinos. 55. To teject these facts is contrary to the Rules of the SET. Under these Rules, the quantum of evidence required to prove one’s case is preponderance of evidence."' In this case, it is clear that all evidence presented, and the facts admitted by petitioner, clearly outweigh the bare assertion that foundlings cannot establish theit Filipino parentage. 56. Given the evidence in favor of private respondent, it was incumbent upon petitioner to provide contrary evidence to debunk the facts on record. In the absence of any such contrary evidence, one cannot possibly consider as grave abuse of discretion the decision of the SET acknowledging, private respondent as a natural-born Filipino citizen. To reject available evidence in favor of private respondent is to impose an undue burden on the exercise of a fundamental right of a member of a discrete and insular minority. 57. To be sure, for the SET to have rejected the preponderant, if not overwhelming, evidence in favor of private respondent's natural-born status " Rule 73, 2013 Rules of the Senate Flectoral Tribunal.Comment David . SET and Llamangares GAR. No, 221538 Page 18 of 27 would have placed an undue burden on the exercise of a fundamental political right of a member of a discrete and insular minority.” 58. Foundlings as a Vulnerable Class. There is a need to acknowledge the reality that the uncertainty in the status of foundlings arises from the fact that they are a class of victims, that their situation—lack of knowledge of parentage—is a contingency not of their own doing. ‘This uncertainty normally results in poverty, stateless nd Jack of community, among others 1es 59. As applied to this particular case, the disadvantage suffered by foundlings is precisely their inability to establish Filipino filiation through the normal route of producing an ordinary birth certificate, a public document that attests to the fact that they have a Filipino parent. ‘The Honorable Court need not convert this inability into a legal disability. 60. In essence, what the SET only did was to allow evidence of her natural-born status by means other than evidence of such status through an ordinary birth certificate. This is logical—the absence of an ordinary birth certificate does not mean one’s parents are not in fact Filipinos. ‘This is legal— the quantum of proof under the SET Rules and the Rules of Court allow proof of a fact by any means. This is practical—there is no reason to reject the facts accepted by the SET as relevant to establish her Filipino filiation, as in fact they are the types of relevant evidence needed for this form of inquiry 61 A contrary position would be unfair and cruel, well as unconstitutional, 62. First To adopt “certainty” as an evidentiaty standard for proving, private respondent's natural-born status is downright discriminatory. No public institution has ever required of an applicant for a public position requiring natural-born status to prove with certainty that s/he has a Filipino parent. Public institutions simply require the production of a bitth certificate videncing Filipino filiation even if the “facts” stated therein may not sarily be true. nece! 63. Any person who contests the facts stated in a birth certificate is required to adduce evidence to the contrary. Thete is no reason why petitioner should not be burdened to offer evidence to debunk the facts adduced in favor of private respondent. See United States ». Carolene Products Co., 304 US. 144 (1938), footnote 4; See also White Light Conporation, et al. #. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009; Serrano ». Gallant Maritione Services, G.R. No. 167614, Match 24, 2009; Disini, Jr, ef af. ». Uhe Secretary of Justice, et al, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014.(COMMENT David ». SET and Llamanzares G.R. No. 221538 Page 19 of 27 64. To impose scientific levels of certainty, as by way of a DNA sample of a Filipino parent, as the only acceptable means to prove one’s filiation, would be to impose a burden significantly higher than that which is normally required for these proceedings. We ought to be mindful of the tragedy of a foundling desperately scrounging for DNA evidence of Filipino Parentage—of parents who abandoned her—just so she can offer herself for consideration for public service. 65. Second. To reject evidence of a foundling’s Filipino filiation is to impose an undue burden on an entire class’—all foundlings—ability to prove they are qualified to exercise fundamental political rights. A core constitutional value is the principle of non-discrimination, especially against discrete and insular minorities on matters that bear upon their exercise of rights to full citizenship. 66. Private respondent is not asking for government welfare of largesse, and her status as a Filipinos is “non-tivalrous”—her being a Filipino does not reduce anyone else’s citizenship. All she is asking is for the Honorable Court, as the SET did, to consider the preponderant evidence in her favor so she may be considered a full citizen of the republic, with the right to vote and be voted upon, G7. If at all, our constitutional tradition teaches us to protect disadvantaged groups and prevent substantive and procedural burdens against their right to be included in society. In the face of all evidence adduced before and accepted by the SET’ tending to establish private respondent's Filipino filiation, any discriminatory animus against the recognition of private respondent's natural-born status would need to survive strict scrutiny. 68. Third. This case involves basic eligibility or requirements that need only be reasonably established through presumptions, not mathematical or scientific certainty. One’s age, for example, is treated as presumptively established through the birth certificate, even if it may not be accurate ot even downright false. Similarly, one’s parentage is presumptively established through the same document even if the child may have been replaced with another person’s child at the maternity unit. ‘The reality is that everyone's qualifications for public offices are established by way of presumptions about these facts, not by evidence of their certainty. 69. One must therefore be similarly mindful of the almost-comical scale with which we are scrutinizing the purity of private respondent's blood, as. if purity of blood were a standard for capacity to govern—as if our nation belonged to House Slytherin; and this scrutiny assumes an ironic twist when considered against the backdrop of our aggressive attempts to justify theComment David » SET and LJarsangares GR. No, 221538 Page 20 of 27 Filipino citizenship of others just so we may, as a nation, improve our athletic or cultural profile The Honorable Court has even allowed the use of inferences to establish citizenship qualification of others running for high public ottices. 70. ‘That the Honorable Court may sesott to various methods to determine one’s eligibility for high public offices is evident from the Coutt’s previous ruling regarding the citizenship of another person who tan for the presidency, private respondent's adoptive father. 8 the Honorable Court resorted to TI. In Teccon », COMELEC; inferences in determining the citizenship of Poe’s father, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, populatly known as Fernando Poe Jr., to establish his qualification for running for public office (3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMBLEG, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent PJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether ot not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of tespondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FP} has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate ot illegitimate.** ® GAR. No. 161434, March 3, 2004, * Emphasis supplied.Comment David ». SET and Llamangares GR. No, 221538 Page 21 of 27 72. _ If, in Teeson, the Honorable Coutt resorted to logical inferences to arrive at what it considered to be a reasonable decision, with more reason should the Court admit evidence tending to establish private respondent's natural-born status. Il. THE SET DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT — PRIVATE RESPONDENT. VALIDLY REACQUIRED HER NATURAL-BORN CITIZENSHIP UNDER R.A. No, 9225. 73. ‘The SEY correctly ruled that private respondent, who became a naturalized citizen of the United States on October 18, 2001,° validly reacquired het natural-born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, ot the Citizenship and Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. 74, The SET based its finding on the following undisputed facts: (1) on July 7, 2006, private respondent executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, (2) on July 10, 2006, private respondent filed with the Bl a petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship; and (3) in an Order dated July 18, 2006, the BI granted private respondent's petition.” 75. Under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who lost such status due to their naturalization as citizens of foreign countries shall be deemed to have reacquired their citizenship upon taking the required oath of allegiance to the Republic 76, Thus, being a natural-born Philippine citizen who subsequently lost such status through naturalization, private respondent reacquited her natural-born Philippine citizenship when she executed an’ Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 2006. The execution of the Oath of Allegiance is the final act necessary for the reacquisition of citizenship. 77. This reading of Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 is consistent with the principle in the Honorable Court’s decision in Bengson IIT ». House of Representative Ekctoral Tribunal,” where the Honorable Court categorically held “ SET Decision, p. 2. “ SET Decision, pp. 27-28. Pla ““See Bureau of Immigration Memorandum Circular No. AFP. 05-002, or the Revised Rules Implementing R.A. No. 9225. GR. No. 142840. May 7, 2001COMMENT David ». SET and Llamangares GR. No. 221538 Page 22 of 27 that Filipino citizens who were originally natural-born citizens before they lost their citizenship shall be restored to their former status as natural-born Filipinos upon reacquisition of their citizenship. 78, The judicial pronouncement in Bengsom III is also consistent with the declared policy under Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225 stating that Philippine citizens who become naturalized citizens of another country shall be deemed “not to have lost” their Philippine citizenship.” II, THE SET DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT — PRIVATE RESPONDENT VALIDLY RENOUNCED HER FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP. 79. The SET correctly ruled that private respondent validly renounced her U.S. citizenship when she executed a sworn affidavit of renunciation of U.S. citizenship.” 80. Under Section 5 of R.A. No, 9225, those who have reacquired natural-born Philippine citizenship shall enjoy full civil and political rights subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines. For those seeking public office, the following conditions additionally apply: 2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candida make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce theie oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; 81. In ruling that private respondent validly renounced her US. citizenship at the time she filed her COC for senator on October 12, 2012, the SET considered the following undisputed facts: (1) on October 20, 2010, ot before assuming her position as Chairperson of the MIRCB, private ® Section 2. Declaration of Polig:—It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. * SET Decision, pp. 28-30.Comment David 1. SET and Llamanzares GR. No. 221538 Page 23 of 27 respondent executed before Notary Public Conrada A. Balboa an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship where she expressly and voluntarily renounced her US nationality/American citizenship, together with all rights and privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity prevailing thereunto; (2) on October 21, 2010, she furnished the BI of a copy of such Affidavit of Renunciation, (3) on July 11, 2011, private respondent executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S.A. Embassy in Manila an Oath/ Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States; and (4) on February 3, 2012, the Overseas Citizens Service, Department of State of the U.S. approved private respondent’s Centficate of Loss of Nationality? 82. Clearly, private respondent complied with all conditions necessary for the operation of Section 5(3) of RA. No. 9225. Under said provision, Private respondent need only execute a sworn renunciation of her U.S. citizenship to qualify for an elective post. This, private respondent did as early as October 20, 2010, or around two (2) years before she filed her COC for senator for the 2013 national elections on October 12, 2012. IV. THE SET pip NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S USE OF HER U.S. PASSPORT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A RECANTATION OF HER RENUNCIATION OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP. 83. The SET correctly ruled that private respondent cannot be deemed to have recanted her renunciation of U.S. Citizenship when she used her U.S. Passport in travelling to and from the Philippines for the period November 1, 2006 to March 27, 2010. 84. While it is true that the use of a foreign passport may be considered as a repudiation of an oath of renunciation of foreign citizenship,“this purported rule does not apply in private respondent's case. ‘This is because, in all instances that she had used her U.S. Passpott, she had not yet executed an oath of renunciation of her U.S. citizenship 85. ‘The records of the BI show that private respondent used her US. Passport after she had reacquired her natural-born citizenship on July 7, 2006, ® SET Decision, p. 29. ® SET Decision, pp. 30-31 *Maguling v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195549, Aptil 16, 2013.CommenT David ». SET and Llamangares G.R. No. 221538, Page 24 of 27 but not after she had formally renounced her U.S. Citizenship on October 20, 2010. 86. ‘The last time private respondent used her U.S. Passport No. 170377935 was on Match 27, 2010. On said date, private respondent's status was that of a dual-citizen as she had already by then reacquired her natutal- born citizenship while also retaining her U.S. citizenship. Notably, on this date, private respondent had not yet executed her Affidavit of Renunciation. As such, on said date, she had no renunciation to repudiate. PRAYER WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court DISMISS the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction for lack of metit. All other reliefs, just and equitable under the circumstances, are equally prayed for. Makati City for Manila, December 30, 2015.Comment Dawid v. SET and Llamanzares GR. No. 221538 Page 25 of 27 OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL 134 Amorsolo St. Legaspi Village 1229 Makati City Tel. No.: 8186301 to 09 (Irunkline) Fax No.: 8176037 Website: www.osg.gov.ph Email: docket@osg.gov.ph lg Stiicitor General, Roll No. 449! IBP Lifetime Membership No. 08505 MCLE Exemption No. V-000908, 12/3/2015 < tak Ooer— [ERMES L. OCAMPO Assistant Solicitor General Roll No. 40169 IBP Lifetime Membership No. 09135, MCLE Exemption No. V - 000777, 10/27/2015 41 4A. RAYMUND I. RIGODON Senior State Solicitor Roll No. 39730 IBP Lifetime Membership No. 013395 MCLE Compliance No. IV-0019451, 02/02/2015 GERMAINE L. CHUA Associate Solicitor Roll No. 59797 IBP No. 987719, 1/7/2015 MCLE Compliance No. TV-0007295, 08/13/2012Comment David «. SET and Llamangares GR No. 221538 Page 26 of 27 DYAN La, LIM Associate Solicitor Roll No. 59125 IBP No. 987709, 01/07/2015 MCLE Compliance No. IV-0017900, 04/22/2013 ‘For: bees GERARDO E. MENDOZA Associate Solicitor Roll No. 62511 IBP No. 965933, 03/11/2015 MCLE Compliance No. V-000327 eee Cc! Perez Associate Solicitor Roll No. 62428 IBP No. 1005409, 7/7/2015 Admitted to the Bar: 2013 __ Biaee6ucen SA ssllcaie Solicitor Roll No. 63647 IBP No. 945095, 01/06/15 Admitted to the Bar: 2014 fh RAI INCITO C. PAREL Assoctate Soltator Roll No, 60581 IBP O.R. No. 994640, 02/02/15 MCLE Compliance No. I'V-0014484Commenr David ». SET and Llamangars GR. No. 221538 Page 27 of 27 DIANNE MARGARE . DE LOS REYES Associate Solicitor Roll No. 62485, IBP Roll No. 1016721, 12/21/2015 MCLE Compliance No. V-0008867, 07/01/2015 sume a Neeithozs ee Solicitor Rfill No. 62540 IBP Lifetime Membership No. 012404 Admitted to the Bar: 2013 at EXPLANATION (Pursuant to Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) ‘The foregoing Comment is being filed and served by registered mail, personal filing and service being impracticable due to lack of personnel MARYCH! 1. MENDOZA Ady fate Soli¢ito? Copy fernisbed: Atty. Manuelito R. Luna Counsel for Petitioner David Rm. 421, FEMI Building Annex A. Soriano, Jr. Avenue Intramutos, Manila Senate Electoral Tribunal Respondent Blectoral Tribunals Building COA Compound, Batasan Road corner Commonwealth Avenue Quezon City Atty. Alexander J. Poblador POBLADOR BAUTISTA & REYE Counsel for Respondent Llamanzares 5" Floor, SEDCCO I Building 120 Rada commer Legaspi Streets, Legaspi Village, Makati CityANNEX 1 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL COA-NCR Bldg,, Batasan Road, Quezon City 22 December 2015 The Honorable FLORIN T. HILBAY Solicitor General 134 Amorsolo Street Legaspi Village, Makati City Dear Solicitor General Hilbay: May we request your good office to represent the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) before the Supreme Court in the Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by Mr. Rizalito Y. David, docketed as G.R. No 221538 (Rizalito Y. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal and Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares), seeking to set aside the Decision in SET Case No. 001-15 (Rizalito Y. David vs. Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares). Thank you Very truly yours, {Meds ATTY/ IRENE R. GUEVARI Secretary of the Tribunal Tel. Nos. 931-7786 and 288-5913