FRONTLINE INTELLIGENCE IN WW2 - (III) ALLIED T FORCES

By Keith Ellison @2013

During WW2 the Allies employed specialist task forces (S Forces) in North Africa and
Italy which were used to search newly occupied cities and towns for intelligence - strategic,
tactical, technical and economic. The initial aims had been to collect military intelligence and
counter-intelligence, but with the occupation of Rome these aims had begun to evolve.

When the Allies began to consider operations in NW Europe, they realised that technical
economic and industrial intelligence would be important both for the war against Japan and for
post-war reparations. They therefore used the S Force model to create a similar type of
intelligence collection unit the T Force, which was given the job of coordinating the collection
of a much wider type of intelligence than that collected in most S Force operations in Italy.

On 27th July 1944 SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force)

Intelligence Directive No 17 instructed 6 th and 12th Army Groups to establish T Forces. The
description of T Force given by the US Military History Institute is:

Anglo-American organization used for intelligence exploitation of scientific and

industrial targets, WWII. Its mission: seize, safeguard, and process documents,
archives, and materiel of intelligence/counterintelligence interest. Also, capture
designated enemy agents and collaborators. Established by SHAEF, G- 2, and
based in 12th Army Group HQ, G-2. Apparently modelled on S-Force of 15th
Army Group in Italy, notably in the captures of Rome and Florence. 1

This is not a full definition, however, as it concentrates only on the US 12 th Army Group
(12 AG), while in fact there were T Forces in 6th Army Group (6 AG) and the British 21st Army
Group (21 AG) areas as well. The definition given by SHAEF was:

a military unit for planning the seizure of, and thereafter seizing and holding
until examined and final disposition has been decided upon, individuals,
installations, documents, etc., termed targets, in captured or reoccupied enemy or
Allied cities or geographical districts.2

BUILDING BLOCKS

The units involved in S Force work in Italy had taken on a technical intelligence
collection role as well as combat intelligence and counter-espionage as the campaign in Italy
progressed. The reason given for this was to assess the war potential of the German economy. In
this role they were guided from 21st August 1944 by the work of the Combined Intelligence
Objectives Sub-Committee (CIOS). This was formed to ensure that the intelligence derived from
captured enemy material and personnel would be available to both SHAEF and to the various
interested US and UK government departments. CIOS was responsible to the Combined Chiefs
of Staff. CIOS functions and responsibilities included:

(1) To receive, approve and coordinate all requests of British and US

governmental departments for intelligence of military or political significance
which became availableexclusive of combat intelligence, normal technical
intelligence, and counter intelligence.

1-20
 (2) To assign priorities to such requests.

(3) To arrange the preparation of intelligence folders, for the preparation of

adequate plans, and for the provision of expert personnel for technical
investigations on the spot.

The targets were placed on Black Lists if they were of military interest or on Grey
Lists if they were industrial targets. A CIOS Black List for Buildings would usually consist of 9
columns:
Priority
Target Number
Organization or Firm
Place
Zone and Map Reference
Key Personnel
Remarks
Reliability of Information
Reference of Information Source (Ministry or Department).3

CIOS had representatives from a number of US and UK intelligence and military

departments and civilian agencies and ministries, and was responsible for providing the technical
experts to investigate targets in situ. They formed seven Combined Advanced Field Teams
(CAFTs), made up of around 70 assessors. The CAFTs were attached to each Army Group, each
team specializing in the exploitation of a number of technical items. Their mission was to assess
targets rapidly and call for investigation teams when warranted. The investigation teams in turn
reported to the T Sub-division of G2 in SHAEF, who indexed, filed and disseminated the
reports as required.

The T sub-division (later changed to Intelligence Target (T) Sub-Division) was

created by SHAEF in July 1944 as the agency responsible for all matters concerning the
investigation and exploitation of intelligence objectives or targets. It initially consisted of five
US and three British officers, and thirteen enlisted men and women. Also, within the G2s
Operation Intelligence Sub-division there was a Technical Intelligence Section, which acted as
the clearing house for all technical information obtained from the field; controlled the allocation
of all captured enemy war materials wanted for technical intelligence purposes; and cleared
requests for information from the various allied governments.

On 17th Feb 1945 T Sub-division became part of the SHAEF G2 Special Sections Sub-
division, which was principally concerned with the coordination, supervision, and facilitation of
the investigation of intelligence targets in Germany by authorised Allied agencies, and served as
the SHAEF executive agency for CIOS.4 The T Sub-division also acquired a field element, the
6800 T Force, which was about 1,700 strong by April 1945 and, with the later addition of the
GOLDCUP ministerial control parties [see below], more than 2,000 strong. During May and
June 1945, the force was able to deploy about 1,000 investigators into the field.

Planning for T Forces was eventually devolved to Army Groups, while the T Sub-
Division concentrated on planning T Forces for Berlin and Kiel.

2-20
T FORCES IN NORTHERN EUROPE

Outside of major target cities, the task of locating and searching high-priority objectives,
(such as communication nodes, centres of civil administration and headquarters of German
occupation forces, and those of organisations sympathetic to the German cause) fell normally to
the US Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and the British Field Security Sections (FSS). For
instance, the CIC were ordered on D Day

to locate, seize, and place under guard all important communications centers
and to take charge of civilian traffic control.

The FSS/CIC detachments were often assisted by local French resistance groups, which
helped the detachments to advance quickly. 4th Infantry Division CIC entered the first major
counter-intelligence target, Cherbourg, on 27th June 1944.

Documents captured in this city were so voluminous that they were turned over
to the VII Corps Order-of-Battle Team for evaluation and dissemination.5

OTHER SPECIAL UNITS

There were, however, several other specialist intelligence collecting units operating
outside of the larger target cities which later operated in the liberation of Paris under the
umbrella of T Force.

As the OSS War Diary explains,

T Forces were organized by the Supreme Commander to prevent independent

acquisition of documents and other target objectives by uncoordinated American
and British government agencies. For this reason, SHAEF policy and the policy
of each of the Army Groups dictated that for the duration of the period in which a
T Force was operating in a specific target area, no other Allied military or
government agency concurrently would be engaged in seizing, holding or
examining targets, unless clearance for doing so had been obtained from the T
Force Commander in advance.6

The British Naval Intelligence Department (NID) controlled its own collection unit.
Originally name the Intelligence Assault Unit, it was soon renamed 30 Commando, and prior to
operations in NW Europe renamed again to 30 AU (RN) - Assault Unit or Advance Unit,
depending upon the source. 30 AU had been operational since 1943 in commando-type raids on
intelligence targets in North Africa and Italy. In December 1944 the unit was tasked with
searching out intelligence targets in Germany. In January 1945 the main body of 30 AU was
moved to the continent in readiness for operations.

Another specialist unit was the Alsos Mission, seeking nuclear scientists, paperwork and
raw materials associated with the German nuclear weapons program. Alsos was recalled from
Italy to London to form part of an expanded group under Col Boris Pash, preparing for D Day.
On 4th August, 8 US Division cleared Rennes as the first Alsos target. Their operation provided
useful information on target scientists. Alsos then moved to join T Force elements in
Rambouillet on 24th August, preparing to enter Paris.

3-20
 It was normal for such units to work under T Force during the occupation of large city
targets, or else obtain permission from the T Force commander to operate separately. Outside of
major target cities, they would concentrate on their own missions.

THE PARIS T FORCE

The first deployment of T Force was the liberation of Paris, mainly using 12 AG
elements. It was to move into the city within a few hours of the end of fighting, and so needed to
be a self-contained mobile force with sufficient combat troops to guard buildings; remove mines,
booby traps and explosives; man a detention centre; and provide physical security for
intelligence personnel. It consisted of 1,805 men in total, 1,057 of whom were combat troops
(including 77 from 30 AU and 80 from the French Special Service Unit). 548 members came
from various branches of 10 allied intelligence agencies, including 63 from teams sent by the
Combined Intelligence Priorities Committee and 18 from Alsos. They entered Paris at 2200 hrs
on 25th August 1944.7

The organic composition of the T Force staff included eight officers and three enlisted
men. Col Francis P Tompkins was commander and Lt Col Harold C Lyon his Executive Officer.
The Counter-Intelligence Branch (CIB), 12 AG provided four additional officers as
reinforcements, under Col T J Sands, GSC, Deputy Commander.

A Document Section was located in the HQ at Petit Palais under Lt Vandemaele of the S2
Section. The original aim had been to handle documents in situ by sealing off target buildings,
but insufficient guard forces lead to the documents being transported by the attacking teams.
When the attacking team was composed of specialists, documents of particular interest were kept
in their custody and S2 Section notified other interested agencies. If the attacking team was a
regular Target Team, the documents were delivered to the Document Section. When the building
targets which had been sealed under the original plan were to be unsealed, the Document Section
visited the buildings, examined all documents and removed those of interest and delivered them
to the garage at 19 Ave Foch. The documents were handed to CIB, G2, Communications Zone on
6th September and later transported to 72 Ave Foch under the custody of the SHAEF Documents
Section.

A Civilian Interrogation Centre was initially located at the Petit Palais but later moved to
19 Ave Foch. Between Aug and Sep 1944 the Centre processed 243 people, 62 of whom were
target cases. 44 were transferred to French authorities, 20 to the POW cage, eight were evacuated
to the UK and seven were released to the T Force Special Counter-Intelligence Unit (SCIU) for
further exploitation.8

The T Force operation covered 896 targets (382 buildings and 514 persons). Action on
all but 54 buildings was achieved before the T Force was withdrawn. About 12% of the
personality targets were detained and processed through the T Force interrogation centre. 181
additional arrests were made. According to a subsequent report, important items of intelligence
derived from the operation included a prisoner with information on and key for an exceedingly
rare cipher system, a rare set of maps of Indo-China, a German map disclosing the plan of
mining, demolitions and booby trapping at Dunkerque plus other maps and finds of technical
intelligence interest.9
There were 15 numbered Target Teams consisting of a target team commander, an
interpreter where necessary, a French representative, CIC personnel, an NCO, and three or four
enlisted men from the headquarters company. These were augmented later by people from the
4-20
special intelligence agencies which organized and operated special field teams or collating
agencies. The numbered Target Teams each had their assigned geographical areas.

Representatives of special intelligence agencies with T Force functioned as

special teams to investigate targets of particular interest to their agencies.

For example a four-man team from MI6, attached to SHAEF, was on the strength of T
Force as at 3rd September, billeted at 18 Rue Petrarque and attached to the T Force SCI Unit.
The team leader was Maj Arthur G Trevor-Wilson, and included Maj Malcolm Muggeridge, Lt
Col Lord Victor Rothschild and Sgt Tredel. There were also Air Ministry, MIS, APWIU from 9 th
Air Force, CIC, 30 AU, Alsos, and other special agencies attached to T Force. The S2s
Information Room disseminated the target information, S3 Operations would issue the
instructions to the teams, and all teams were required to submit reports on their targets.10

On 9th Oct 44 Maj Dana B Durand, commanding SCI Unit 12 AG, wrote a letter to the
CO T Force in which he stated:

Through the T Force operation, SCI succeeded in obtaining a large volume of

important CE material, documents seized in various headquarters of the German
secret services, the Sipo and SD. This material is now being subjected to long
range exploitation by the present staff of X2 OSS, now established in Paris.
Moreover, through the arrest of numerous agents and informers, carried out by T
Force Target teams, SCI has been able to make substantial contribution to short
and long range military security. Important members of the Abwehr and SD were
picked up, a number of whom have given us valuable information for both French
and German clean-up operations. More than one of these individuals is now
working for us in penetration or deception capacities.11

Maj Charles Hostler, a member of 31 SCIU, was placed in command of one of the
specialist teams covering the 5th and 6th arrondissements. Among his targets were known
enemy agents high on the priority list for turning into double agents (the main task of SCI), and
the securing and safe-keeping of Madame Curies laboratories, where they were researching
atomic theory. He located this objective, only to find the Alsos team already there. 12 After
negotiations at a higher level the Alsos team was left in control of that target.
The main Alsos target in Paris had been Jean Frdric Joliot-Curie and the Curie
laboratories. They found the man and some of his staff wearing resistance armbands at the
College de France, and spent several days debriefing him on the activities of German scientists
who had made use of his laboratory. While they went to some pains in trying to hide the reasons
for their interest, it was soon clear that Joliot-Curie had realized why they had such an interest.
Alsos also used Paris to get information on new targets not available from CIOS, OSS or the US
MIS.

After Paris, Pash went with an Alsos sub-team to Brussels. Col David Strangeways -
commanding R Force, a deception unit similar to A Force in Italy and North Africa - provided
support units to enable them to collect information from the factories at Olen, 28kms East of
Antwerp. The information concerned uranium ore which had been sent to the Germans from
Olen.

5-20
 CIOS teams were also ordered to send representatives to Brussels to participate in the
occupation of Eindhoven, while Alsos was charged with securing 70 tons of uranium ore at Olen,
supported by Strangeways R Force. A Philips plant in the area was already under the protection
of a strong detachment from R Force, who refused to even let an officer from one of the CIOS
teams to have access! Strangeways also had over 400 men searching Eindhoven for intelligence
targets. The Eindhoven operation came under the command of British Lt Col Johnny
Cave, who had participated in the liberation of Paris and had been an IO in the Rome S Force, so
he was well aware of the potential opportunities in intelligence collection. Brussels itself had
been an intelligence target occupied by a British ad-hoc Intelligence Corps Battle Group, with
a strength of 155, and with the task of securing all the Intelligence Targets in the City.13

BRITISH ARMY T FORCES (21st Army Group)

According to a history of T Force activities in 21st Army Group (21 AG), no special T
Force was created in 21 AG during operations in France and Belgium, despite a SHAEF
Directive of July 1944 recommending such an organisation This was partly due to a lack of
manpower, but also because of a desire to try out T Force activities with existing resources
designed for other purposes.14 The history goes on: A T Force role was allotted, first for
ROUEN and then BRUSSELS, to certain engineer, signal and intelligence units, whose normal
occupation was deception and camouflage. (A probable reference to R Force mentioned
above). While the staff for this force undertook the T Force operations, they were not entirely
successful, mainly due to the extreme meagreness and lateness in arrival of information on the
targets.
Strangeways, Commander of the R Force Deception Unit, had been in charge of the first
S Force operation in Tunis in 1943.15 The S Force operation in Tunis and the lack of other
designated forces lead to his R Force being co-opted for similar operations in NW Europe:

the operation was a success and much later on during the war, Strangeways was
asked to do similar jobs in Rouen and Brussels.16

The 2 I/C of R Force, Maj Philip Curtis, discussing the activities of this unit after the
main deception operations had been completed, reportedly said:

I think the great value of R Force then was that we would rush ahead and
capture all the maps and bits of intelligence. We were generally searching for
German documents to find out whether wed been doing any good or not. The
fighting troops never had a chance to do that, they were too busy chasing the
enemy. All the way to Caen and on to Brussels, we were always looking for enemy
plans and in particular any reaction to what R Force had been doing.17

These units were unable to continue long-term as T Forces, and staff shortages within 21
AG made the creation of a separate T Branch impossible. It was decided instead in October
1944 to add the responsibilities of T Force to those of the Brigadier, Chemical Warfare, within
21 AG. His staff read through the existing material on T Forces and prepared dossiers on
potential targets and guides for the sub-units of 21 AG to explain their purpose. In early 1945 it
was realised that the T Forces of 21 AG would need to be highly mobile and capable of being
split into a number of self-contained units. At this time a number of units were allocated to
operate as part of T Force, including two Bomb Disposal companies. Selected NCOs from these
6-20
companies attended safe-breaking/burglary courses back in the UK and had specialist equipment
allocated to assist them in this role.
In February 1945 the 5th Battalion, Kings Regiment became the lead unit of the British T
Force in Belgium. On 30th March 1945 the T Force was placed under the command of 2nd
Army, which was advancing on the Rhine. On 31 st March the main T Force moved to occupy
Maasbree, while detaching companies to Hengelo in Holland under 43 Division and to 12 Corps
for targets in Rheine. Sean Longdens book T-Force describes the activities of the Kings and
other military units involved in British T Force operations.
The Order of Battle for the British T Forces attached to 2nd British Army and 1st Canadian
Army between March and May 1945 were:

2 Br Army:
5 Kings Regt with 2 attached companies 1 Bucks Regt
805, 806, 845, 846 Pioneer Companies
803 Pioneer Company (1 platoon)
19 Bomb Disposal Company RE
1 Can Army:
1 Bucks Regt (minus 2 companies)
30 Royal Berkshire Regt (for ops in West Holland)
803 Pioneer Company (minus 1 platoon)
810 Pioneer Company
5 Bomb Disposal Company RE
Both units also had Detachments from 30 AU, 21 AG Documents Teams, and Interpreters
from 21 AG Interpreters Pool. 18

The British T Force received its first specialist assessors in the German city of Gescher,
near the border with the Netherlands. An impromptu intelligence and briefing organization was
immediately set up. There would generally be a floating population of 40-90 British and
American officers from all services to be fed, briefed, and housed.

The following procedure was evolved for conducting T Force operations. When a target
area was about to be taken, the G2 of 21 AG would arrange for the T Force to come under local
command. When the targets were important, G2 would provide a dossier and maps to the Corps
staff, who would then brief the forward troops to guard the locations until T Force relieved them.
Once T Force had control of the target and the area was deemed safe, assessors would be
dispatched to investigate the site. The assessors would inform 21 AG if any further investigators
were required after they had done a preliminary inspection. This system was similar to that used
by the US T Forces.
Local Military Government (Mil Gov) units would often provide T Force with additional
targets of opportunity, as well as the T Force doing its own reconnaissance. In this way the
physics laboratory of Dr Wilhelm Groth (an expert on centrifuges) was located by accident,
hidden in a silk factory in Celle. The find was reported to T Force who immediately secured the
site.
According to the T Force Bulletin for 21 AG, at the Focke-Wulf factory in Celle many
technical documents and much equipment in this large underground plant have been seized and
are under guard.19 The next weekly report recorded that:
7-20
 An eminent scientist, evacuated from Hamburg University, was discovered to be
conducting experiments of a highly secret nature, on behalf of the OKW [sic -
German Military High Command], in a laboratory in a silk factory in this town.
He has subsequently been flown to UK for detailed interrogation. The laboratory
remains under guard pending evacuation of the equipment.20

When the T Force HQ moved to Osnabrueck two companies were dispatched to

Hannover to assist Ninth US Army (9 Army). They secured the HQ of Wehrkreis XI in almost
complete working order. This was an important intelligence target as it enabled the occupying
forces to quickly take control of the civilian authorities. The T Force company in Celle sent out
detachments to secure the Chemical Warfare Station at Raubkammer and the Ordnance Testing
Station at Munster Unterluss. Both sites came under attack from SS troops hiding in nearby
forests.

At Munsterlager they found the central OKW CW research station which had been
evacuated from Spandau Citadel in Berlin. Preliminary investigation found few personnel but
indicated that much information on the enemy CW offensive policy would be forthcoming.
Shortly afterwards, Col Hirsch a senior officer from the station - surrendered himself and
admitted to full knowledge of German CW development and was debriefed.

Bremen was taken by assaults from North and South, with separate T Forces attached to
both groups. Their most important target was the Deschimag U-boat assembly yard, where
sixteen new U-boats and a Narvik-class destroyer were captured.

Hamburg surrendered on 2nd May, and three T Force companies were dispatched to cover
the 106 listed targets. One company secured the great Deutsche Waffen- und Munitionsfabriken
(DWM) works in Lubeck, which was still being investigated by Ordnance experts over a month
later. The T Force Bulletin reported the DWM organisation was of prime importance from the
point of view of ammunition development, ballistics, explosives and propellants, including work
on caseless ammunition for fuel-injection guns and cartridge cases made of propellant.21

On 4th-5th May the Kiel T Force, consisting of two companies of about 200 men, was
confused by instructions given by higher headquarters and advanced to its target where it was
met by a garrison of 12,000 Germans. In spite of a somewhat hostile and sceptical reception from
the German staff officers in charge, the force secured the cruiser Hipper and a number of U boats
and maintained control of the garrison until relieved on 8 th May. They were assisted in the
exploitation of several intelligence targets in the area by 30 AU. After this the T Force was
directed onto targets in Denmark.
As mentioned above, Kiel was also the target for 30 AU. They secured a most valuable
objective, Walterwerke, together with the owner, Dr Walter, a leading expert on jet propulsion.
Although he had spent four days burning his documents prior to the arrival of the Allies, he was
convinced to reveal the location of microfilm of the most important documents, which he had
previously hidden away. 30 AU were also able to secure the intact prototype of a jet-propelled
submarine capable of 25 knots under water. 22 Walter revealed that the design of the Me 163
rocket-propelled plane had been given to the Japanese six months before.
The 21 AG T Force Bulletin No 7 for the period 19-30 th May 45 notes in its first
paragraph:

8-20
 The short term investigation of targets in North West Europe is drawing to a
close and the long term exploitation is now commencing. At the same time T
Forces are retracing their steps in order to unearth installations and research
establishments about which no information was available prior to the crossing of
the RHINE.23

Bulletin No 8 (1-20th Jun 45) explained further that:

there has been a change of emphasis in the subjects under investigation. A new
list of subjects which are not concerned solely with GERMAN war potential, but
cover rather the secrets of GERMAN industrial and technical processes, is now
being covered. It includes among other items metallurgy, plastics, textiles,
forestry, building machinery, utilities and railway equipment.24

By June 1945 it was estimated that nearly 1,000 tons of captured equipment had been
evacuated by the T Force.

INDEPENDENT T FORCE TEAMS

One of the tasks of Intelligence Targets (T) Sub-Division was to make arrangements
with Army Groups

for further search of combat areas for items of intelligence interest after T
Forces have ceased to operate in such areas and for similar searches in areas
where T Forces are not operating.25

The history of one such T Force team is recorded in the online memoirs of Jack Heslop-
Harrison, a Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineer (REME) officer who commanded a T
Force team immediately after the war ended in May 1945. About a dozen REME officers were
assembled north of Brussels from different locations to take charge of individual teams. They
were briefed to -
get to their individually allocated targets;
collect any information available;
collaborate with such RE and other units as were in the vicinity about the earmarking and
possible acquisition and transporting of potentially valuable equipment;
and then report back from a number of set contact points.
Heslop had with him a 2nd Lieutenant, a Royal Artillery sergeant and five other ranks.
Their main target was the Kriegsmarine Research Station at Pelzerhaken on the Baltic coast,
north of Lbeck , close to the Danish border. The 2nd British Army had advanced to Lbeck,
arriving on 2nd May, before proceeding north to liberate Denmark with the Canadian 1st Army.
The previously unidentified Pelzerhaken Research Station had been discovered on the coast to
the east of the main line of advance and by-passed by the frontline troops.)
The teams instructions were to assess the Pelzerhaken Research Stations facilities and
functions and make a decision as to whether it would require further, more expert, investigation.
They found the Station unguarded and were only able to determine its work with the help of the
head of research, Dr stertag, and one or two of his colleagues. A lack of electric power meant
that they were unable to test any of the equipment.

9-20
 While mainly intended for naval research, projects in progress covered a considerably
wider span. The most active radar research was on anti-reflection measures, including methods
for masking U-boat conning-towers and schnorkels. The Allied bombing campaign had meant
that people and equipment had been moved to Pelzerhaken as a still-undamaged safe haven. For
example, research continued on infrared detection systems under Professor Dr Mller, previously
based in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin. When his Institute had been largely destroyed he
had escaped with his family and files of research results to a house in the Black Forest, and
afterwards to Pelzerhaken. Heslop reported him as someone who should be given facilities to
recover his material and possibly to be taken to the UK.
The team briefly visited the aircraft factory and shipyards of Blohm and Voss, located
east of Lubeck, near Travemuende. The site was untouched, with partially and fully constructed
hulls standing unguarded. There was nothing the team could do about this site except report
what was seen and urge that guards be sent. Heslops team left northern Germany in mid-June at
the end of their mission for a short debriefing in Holland. 26 It was indicative of the thinness on
the ground of Allied technical investigators in the north-western area that Heslop met no other
teams with similar assignments.

US ARMY T FORCES - 12 AG T FORCE

After the completion of 12 AGs T Force operations in Paris on 6th September, most of
the attached units and personnel were withdrawn by their parent organizations.

Some of the new personnel assigned for future operations were not made available before
the T Force HQ moved to Verdun, from where the operations against Luxembourg, Nancy and
Metz were dispatched simultaneously. Col Francis P Tompkins USA was the T Force
commander, and he proceeded to Luxembourg with the main HQ element. Capt William E Johns
(Assistant S-3 for the Paris T Force under Tompkins) commanded the Nancy T Force, which
rejoined the main force in Luxembourg once its mission was concluded. There was prolonged
enemy resistance in Metz which prevented the Metz T Force under 2 Lt William E Bell from
entering the city, so the unit withdrew to rejoin the main T Force without completing its mission.

From Luxembourg, 12 AG T Force moved to Spa in Belgium where the rest of the
assigned troops joined the HQ. Between October and December 1944 the unit moved to
Remouchamps and was reinforced with an Armoured Infantry Battalion, Signals
Communications personnel and various intelligence units and detachments. Col John H F
Haskell replaced Tompkins on 28th December. During January and February 1945, Allied forces
were recovering from the Battle of the Bulge and T Force was preparing to enter German
territory. In March the unit entered Germany and established a Command Post (CP) at
Eschweiler. One sub-force was dispatched to search Bonn while the main unit entered Cologne
on 6th March.

The Bonn T Force had 51 building targets plus 12 targets of opportunity, and 30
personality targets, of which 12 were found and processed. A second sub-force was sent on 9 th
March to Coblenz, where they were able to search 67 buildings and process 58 persons from the
target lists. On completion of their missions both forces rejoined T Force in Cologne.

Cologne had 246 building targets, plus 39 targets of opportunity. 201 personality targets
were processed between 6-13th March. 215 additional investigators from 24 separate intelligence
agencies were processed by the T Force during the stay in Cologne.
10-20
 At this time the T Force was split in two. The main force was to operate with 9 th Army in
the Ruhr, while the other T Force was to operate with 3rd US Army in Frankfurt and Wiesbaden.
The units departed Cologne on 26th March. The Commanding Officer of 12 AG T Force, Col
Haskell, was subsequently wounded at Neuss and evacuated on 2nd April, being replaced by Col
William P Blair on 4th April.

T Force Main operated in the Ruhr from 25th March to 1st May, while the junior element,
called T Force Lucky, moved into Frankfurt on 28th March and dispatched a smaller element to
operate in Wiesbaden. Frankfurt had 171 building and 109 personality targets. All the buildings
were searched and about 10% of the personality targets were arrested. In Wiesbaden there were
73 buildings and 40 persons on the target lists. Nine further building targets of opportunity
were exploited. The personality targets had already been covered by CIC elements with 80 th
Division. In one of the building targets, the HQ of Wehrkreis Kommando XII, important signals
intelligence relating to codes and ciphers was recovered.

Operations in both cities were completed by 12th April, and T Force Lucky moved north
towards T Force Main, operating in the Wuppertal area from 14th April to 1st May. On 3rd May
the two forces were reunited at Herten. Most of the attached elements were reassigned on 6th
May, and the T Force HQ and HQ Company moved to Wiesbaden.27

OPERATION DRAGOON

For Operation Dragoon, the invasion of the South of France, a number of US 7 th Army
personnel with S Force experience joined with personnel from 1st French Army to form a T
Force operating in the South of France. On 15 August 1944 the Allies landed in the South of
France. A small Allied Combat Propaganda Team (CPT) landed at St Tropez, tasked to gather
political intelligence for the Political Warfare Department of SHAEF. One member of this team
was Capt Yurka Galitzine, a Russian prince with an English mother. He was drafted for a T
Force operation consisting of three officers, one French, one American, one British. Their job
was to report in detail on what the retreating German Army had left behind. They visited the
Gestapo HQ in Nice, where they found 11 bodies in the cellar one was the daughter of the local
mayor, seven month pregnant,28 a stark reminder that some T Force targets were likely to be
dangerous for the hunters.

Following SHAEF Intelligence Directive No 17, instructing 6 th and 12th Army Groups to
establish T Forces, 6 AG established a provisional T Force using staff from its No 2 Intelligence
Collection Unit (successor to S Force) on 12th October 1944. The task given to the formation
was to identify the intelligence assets of a target city and establish a plan to capture and hold its
assets. It was not the T Force mission to analyse the captured assets. Prior to an operation,
therefore, the T Force would therefore have an influx of intelligence specialists from various
agencies to do this analysis. Strasbourg was the first major city targeted by 6 AG. Most of the
Americans of the main T Force in this area were used to form the nucleus of the 6860th
Headquarters Detachment, Intelligence Assault Force (T Force).

The T Force entered Strasbourg on 23rd November 1944, after having already suffered
casualties overnight from delayed action mines and German artillery on and around their
Command Post in Saarbourg. A signal from G2 7 th Army to G2 SHAEF dated 18th December 44
recommended the deployment of appropriate intelligence specialists to Strasbourg to examine
and secure documents and records in the Gauleitung building. The building contained party

11-20
records, official correspondence, Volksturm records, official documents pertaining to the
execution of Allied airmen, local civil service and political records, Gestapo records and more.29

T Force not only captured Gestapo files, they also found the plans for the first jet aircraft
engine as well as a prototype engine at the SA Junkers 88 plant at Matford (a fusion of the Ford
and French Mathis factories in Strasbourg).30 The plant, listed as CIOS Target 19/21, had a
dismantled model of the engine in a secret room. 31 On 7th December 1944 it was arranged for
CIOS expert Flt Lt Sproule to travel to Paris, where Air Int SHAEF arranged transport for him to
Strasbourg to investigate the engine.32

Alsos were also in Strasbourg. They found working with 6 AGs T Force so restrictive
they withdrew from the T Force and got the US 7th Army to both authorise their independent
entry, and provide local T Force support to help guard Alsos targets in Strasbourg.33

A truckload of Sicherheitsdienst (SD) records was taken by Ensign Allan Oakley

Hunter USNR, an OSS officer with the 6AG SCIU. He and Lt Lewis Allbee USNR convinced a
force of 60 SS troops armed with automatic pistols that the war was over and that they should
march towards Freiburg to be taken as PoW by the Americans rather than the French. 34 Capt
Akeley P Quirk USN, the OC of the SCIU, found an operational German Hellschreiber (an
electronic device like a teletype machine, except that it automatically scrambles outgoing
messages and unscrambles incoming messages). The machine was recovered from the SD HQ,
along with a diagram of the Gestapo teleprinter network throughout Germany, with their call-
signs. The SCIU spent a further 4 days searching through the HQ building.35

Strasbourg was Phase 1 of a four stage operational plan for the T Force. They moved on
to operations against Frankenthal-Ludwigshafen, Mannheim, Heidelburg, Karlsruhe and
Wurzburg in Phase 2; Stuttgart, Munich and Berchtesgarden in Phase 3; and Augsburg and Ulm
were designated as part of the last phase (though this phase may not have been completed).

Col Pumpelly and his T Force entered Ludwigshafen around 22nd March. 6 AG SCIU
picked up several Gestapo officials and transported them back to a gaol they had commandeered
in Frankenthal. They used one of the political prisoners released from this prison as a spotter to
identify Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst in Ludwigshafen. The city had been bombed once or
twice daily for over four months, and there was literally not a single building standing in town
that was not undamaged, and most of them were knocked flat. 36 The remaining population had
been living inside their underground shelters for months. (The Alsos mission beat the T Force to
the IG Farben plant in Ludwigshafen, arriving a day earlier, on 23rd March.)

On 25th March the T Force entered Mannheim, and took the Daimler-Benz factory on 26 th
March as their HQ. Capt Quirk of 6 AG SCIU had to divert to Kaiserslautern and then Vittel to
deal with three captured German agents. He then moved to Trois-Epee to see several captured
men from Otto Skorzenys sabotage unit, along with some items of their equipment. This
included a cane made from plastic explosive with a time delay detonator, and an overcoat made
of soft plastic explosive material resembling rubber. They contained enough explosive to destroy
a ten-room house.37 This explosive was called nipolit. According to the Official History of the
British Security Service, written immediately post-war, the Allies had only obtained their first
sample of this explosive in September 1944, when a sample disguised as a leather belt was
acquired by a Turkish double agent. Samples were later obtained in many other forms, including
underwater bombs twenty feet long and six feet in diameter!38

12-20
 In Heidelburg in April 1945 the T Force was able to locate important documents and
personnel of Brown Bovari and Company and IG Farben, both regarded as important intelligence
targets. Much of the captured material collected here was transported back to the USA for
exploitation, and was microfilmed before being returned to the new German government.

Munich had been entered on 30th April and the radio station, which had still been
operating, was seized. In May the T Force helped with the liberation of Dachau Concentration
Camp and went with 7th Army elements into the Nazi Redoubt region, where they uncovered tons
of valuable documents hidden in caves and sunk to the bottom of lakes in special containers. 39 1st
Lt Raymond F Newkirk and Sgt James Utrecht of X2 OSS were assigned as an SCIU to Y Force,
6 AG.

Together with a Major McGettigan of T Force they conducted a number of interrogations

at Hermann Goerings staff HQ, from which they identified the location of Goerings hidden art
treasures in the Berchtesgaden area (Goering himself had surrendered to the US Army in
Berchtesgaden). Although very well hidden, the artwork was unprotected from the damp
conditions and would have been ruined if they had not been found so promptly. The loot was
passed to the care of US 7th Army and the OSS X2 Art Unit was informed.40
According to OSS records the OSS SCI units operating with T Forces at 6 AG and 12AG
seized large quantities of counterespionage material, which was forwarded through Army
Documents channels to the Counter intelligence War Room in London.

The head of the War Room estimated that one such T Force operation,
concluded in three days, netted identifying information on more than 20,000
German intelligence personnel. This virtually doubled the information on
German intelligence personnel which had been made available through all
previous Allied counterespionage operations during the war.41

DIVIDING THE SPOILS FRIENDS AND FOES

As the stories of 30 AU and the Alsos Mission have hinted, the Allies were in a race for
technical intelligence. The numerous British and American intelligence collecting teams under
the umbrella of the T Forces were often working in competition, not only with the French and
the Russians, but also with each other. As well as CI units like the SCIUs, CIC and FSS, T
Forces were responsible for scientific and technical teams such as:

CIOS
Alsos
Chemical Warfare Services.
Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service (EEIS) - located Axis equipment, such as new
aircraft, tanks, ammunition, metalworking equipment, etc. for evaluation and to instruct
Allied personnel in its use. Later, the unit was used to evaluate German industrial
equipment in general.
US Army Ordnance Rocket Branch.
Strategic Bombing Survey teams (investigating the effects of the bombing on the
German Economy).
Technical Industrial Intelligence Branch (TIIB; later the TIIC, Technical Industrial
Intelligence Committee) - established as an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but
transferred to the Department of Commerce in January 1946. Its task was to investigate
13-20
 German industries and obtain any information that might be of interest to American
companies. The Annual Report of the Secretary of Commerce for 1946 talks about
3,500,000 pages that TIIB selected for copying.42 TIIB collected more than 300,000
pounds of German equipment and product samples as well as 200 tons of materials
captured by the Army and Navy;
Navy Technical Mission, Europe - originally a part of the Alsos Mission, assigned to
investigate German advances in synthetic fuels and lubricants of interest to the Navy.
TOM (Technical Oil Mission) - A non-military group sponsored by the U.S. Bureau of
Mines, made up of American and British petroleum experts and charged with
investigating the industrial production of synthetic fuels and lubricants from coal using
the Fischer-Tropsch method;
and other specialists such as 30 AU and MIST (French Mission d'Information
Scientifique et Technique).

Under the auspices of CIOS the French government deployed their Mission
d'Information Scientifique et Technique (MIST) in occupied Germany during the second half of
1945, tracking down atomic scientists and secret weapons on behalf of the French. 30 AU
personnel reported that they had been successful in small teams searching their targets in the
Paris area immediately after the occupation, but after several days they found several of their
targets already searched and cleaned out by the French Deuxieme Bureau. They claimed that
the documents seized from these targets were never made available to the British or the
Americans.43

OTHER TEAMS

Besides T Force, there were a number of other specialist teams who had been assigned
specific targets of their own, such as:

TICOM- a joint US_British mission to collect Sigint.

Special Mission V-2 Team a US Rocket Branch mission to obtain V2 technology and
personnel.
Watsons Whizzers (Operation Lusty) tasked to collect aircraft technology.
GOLDCUP teams from the US Group Control Council (to uncover intact parts of the
German government and its archives). GOLDCUP teams by the end of May 1945
collected 750 tons of documents and nearly a thousand German ministerial personnel.
In the summer, GOLDCUPs collection increased to 1,420 tons of documents, 46 tons
of microfilm, and 1,300 Germans.'' 44
GOLD RUSH/SAFEHAVEN teams (trying to track down Nazi treasures and funds
moved abroad which were intended for rebuilding German industry port-war).
Library of Congress Foreign Mission - sent to gather books and journals published in
Germany (and the rest of Europe) and not available for purchase through normal channels
once the war had been declared.
The Documents Research Center, A-2, United States Air Forces in Europe - organized
for the purpose of collecting and processing all captured German air documents.
USAAFs Air Technical Intelligence (ATI) teams was the active arm in the field. The
organization was moved to Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio, in 1946. Before the move from
Europe it was estimated that the total collection of German air documents would be
between 1,000 and 1,500 tons. However, the final screened library and collection sent to
Wright Field consisted of approximately 220 tons.45 Large technical libraries held by

14-20
 various German aircraft manufacturers were left virtually untouched and most of the
German aircraft industry was located in the Russian occupied zone.
While members of these teams might occasionally have operated under the umbrella of T
Force, quite often they worked alone in part because they had agendas which did not agree
with those of T Force, which was organized so that information and equipment might be shared
by the Allies equally; and also because they operated in areas outside the main T Force target
zones, much like the smaller independent T Force Teams mentioned above. Many of these
organisations only became operational after the war in Europe ceased, when they then made use
of T Force/ FIAT facilities to aid their investigations. One author states that as of March 1945
in western Germany alone, the United States had fourteen scientific intelligence teams from the
army, navy and air corps operating independently and often in competition with each other as
well as their allies.46 Some of these specialist teams have been covered in more detail in books
and articles, as well as online.

For example, the ATI teams competed with 32 allied technical intelligence groups.47 In
April 1945, the USAAF combined technical and post-hostilities intelligence objectives under the
Exploitation Division as Operation LUSTY. With the aim of exploiting captured German
scientific documents, research facilities, and aircraft, the ATI Teams and Watsons Whizzers
under Operation LUSTY swept up 16,280 items (6,200 tons) for examination, of which 2,398
separate items were chosen for technical analysis.48

FIELD INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TECHNICAL.

Post-war the T Force work was continued by an American operation, the Field
Information Agency Technical (FIAT), which had been set up by SHAEF as a combined
organization.
FIAT was conceived as a post-hostilities agency early in 1945 by Secretary of War
Stimson. It was to inherit a wartime mission from the Special Sections Subdivision, searching for
information to use against Japan; but the longer-term goal was aimed toward civilian interests.
Chief among its interests would be

"the securing of the major, and perhaps only, material reward of victory, namely,
the advancement of science and the improvement of production and standards of
living in the United Nations by proper exploitation of German methods in these
fields."49

FIAT's scope was extended to take in scientific and industrial processes and patents
having civilian as well as military applications. Since the new organization would have to remain
a combined operation for as long as SHAEF existed, British Brigadier R. J. Maunsell, who was
already chief of the SHAEF Special Sections Subdivision, was designated head of the new
organisation.

Although envisioned as having exclusive "control and actual handling of operations

concerning enemy personnel, documents, and equipment of scientific and industrial interest," in
its charter, issued at the end of May, FIAT was authorized to "coordinate, integrate, and direct
the activities of the various missions and agencies" interested in scientific and technical
intelligence but prohibited from collecting and exploiting such information on its own

15-20
responsibility.50 The one new T Force operation in the FIAT period was conducted in Berlin in
July and August.

FIAT investigators scoured Germany looking for anything that might be suitable war
compensation. Once SHAEF ceased to exist the organisation came under the joint administration
of the US Group Control Council and USFET.

Mobile FIAT microfilm teams were sent to major plants and industrial facilities to copy
material identified by FIAT experts as valuable. The targets included human resources. About
1,000 Germans many scientists and technicians from Germanys rocket and nuclear
programmes were recruited to work in the USA. 51 German scientists were prime targets of
FIAT investigators, whose job included finding suitable candidates for a top-secret program
called "Overcast." As Simpson reported in his book "Blowback", the Joint Chiefs of Staff
initiated that program in July 1945 to, according to a military memo, "exploit chosen rare minds
whose continuing intellectual productivity we wish to use."
Overcast evolved into Operation Paperclip. It was the responsibility of FIAT investigators
to screen German scientists, supposedly to ensure that no war criminals were brought to the
United States. Instead, they amended the records of Nazi Party members and war criminals to
allow their immigration to America.
FIAT provided (from its office in Frankfurt and branches in Paris, London, and Berlin)
the accreditation, support, and services to civilian investigators from the Technical Industrial
Intelligence Committee (Foreign Economic Administration) who were sent to Europe in large
numbers to comb German plants and laboratories for information on everything from plastics to
shipbuilding and building materials to chemicals. Also, FIAT often became the custodian of the
documents and equipment collected by military units being redeployed from gathering technical
intelligence.

The military intelligence projects were completed and phased out in late 1945 and early
1946, but the civilian investigations increased. By the end of the first year of the occupation,
FIAT had processed over 23,000 reports, shipped 108 items of equipment (whole plants
sometimes were counted as single items), and collected 53 tons of documents.52 FIAT separated
into its British and US components with the dissolution of SHAEF. 53 FIAT continued operating
until the summer of 1947. The French Occupation Forces maintained liaison detachments with
FIAT, and an exchange of information was done through joint Allied operations and trading of
investigators. The Russians, in asking for German reparations, estimated the cash value of the
FIAT efforts alone at ten billion dollars.54

THE RUSSIAN TEAMS

While the British, Americans and French were busy scouring the newly liberated and
occupied territories in NW Europe, The Russians appeared slower to grasp the opportunity on
offer.

Although the Russians entered Berlin first, and were reported to have their own
intelligence collection units working in the area, the Americans believed they found their prime
intelligence targets untouched when they were finally given permission to enter the city. This
was important as many of the targets provided the Allies with intelligence on the Soviet Union.
The targeting of such intelligence had become more important to T Force as the British
intelligence services saw the potential of places like German map depots, which would be
16-20
expected to have up-to-date coverage of Soviet territory. Col Andrew J Boyle, the officer in
overall command of T Force operations in SHAEF, described the Allied preparations to search
Berlin:

We had organized a parachute operation for Berlin purely for intelligence. We

had T Forces with targets in Berlin. We had hoped to jump into Berlin as a part
of a larger operation. Obviously, of course, with our agreement with the Russians
[to permit them to capture Berlin] it never came off. As a consequence, we didnt
get into Berlin for some time after the Russians had gotten in thereIt was very
interesting that the Russians had not organized any such intelligence effort like
this at all. All the prime targets that we wanted were still in Berlin.55

It should be noted, however, that the Soviets were much more effective in gathering up
intelligence, technical information and staff than previously believed. Several websites provide
details of the Soviet search for aircraft technology, rocketry and atomic technology and raw
materials.56 The work of the intelligence services on these areas as well as counter-intelligence is
covered in several books and the current evidence indicates that Col Boyle grossly
underestimated the efforts of the Soviets.57

CONCLUSIONS

While the Allies succeeded in sweeping up a large amount of technical information, much
of the information on industrial and technological developments was released to the public and to
its foreign allies at no more than the cost of copying the CIOS and FIAT reports issued by the
various specialist teams. President Truman had established the Publications Board to review all
scientific and technical information developed with government funds during the war with a
view toward declassifying and publishing it. Post hostilities, the President also ordered "prompt,
public and general dissemination" of scientific and industrial information obtained from the
enemy.58

The Russian Mission to the US made full use of this opportunity to obtain copies of the
information. It might therefore be legitimately claimed that the Soviets obtained much of the
information far more cheaply and easily, and in some cases in a more digestible form, through
the Americans than if they had obtained the information firsthand.

The acquisition of the scientists and technical staff of the Third Reich proved a more
precious treasure; their work in the USA and the UK was more closely guarded by their new
employers as the Iron Curtain fell over war-torn Europe.

17-20
1
ENDNOTES
T Force/S Force a Bibliography of MHI Sources, USAMHI Ref Branch, Jan 88, Jun 92.
2
War Diary, X-2 Branch, OSS London, England, Vol 1, Book II, Oct-Dec 1944, Commanding Officer, OSS
Accessions S91, Microfilm Ref M1623, Roll 10 of 10 rolls, Target 8. Also, T Forces, Present Position of OSS
Relative to, report by Maj C Brooks Peters, USMCR, Plans and Operations Staff, HQ & HQ Detachment, OSS,
ETOUSA (Main), dated 11 January 1945, RG226/Entry 115/Box 52/Folder 3/Item 29.
3
RG331/Box 138.
4
Report of the General Board, US Forces, European Theater, on Organisation and Operation of the Theater
Intelligence Services in the European Theater of Operations, provided by the US Army Military History Institute.
5
Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II, by the Counter Intelligence Corps School,
Fort Holabird, Baltimore (undated), 40.
6
War Diary, X-2 Branch, OSS London, England, Vol 1, Book II, Jan-Mar 1945, Commanding Officer, OSS
Accessions S91, Microfilm Ref M1623, Roll 10 of 10 rolls, Target 8. Also, T Forces, Present Position of OSS
Relative to, report by Maj C Brooks Peters, USMCR, Plans and Operations Staff, HQ & HQ Detachment, OSS,
ETOUSA (Main), dated 11 January 1945, RG226/Entry 115/Box 52/Folder 3/Item 29.
7
Americas Secret Army, by I Sayer and D Botting, 146.
8
HQ T Force 12 AG Draft T Force Report on Target PARIS, dated October 1944, RG331/Box 53.
9
G2 Section (Pts V-VII) 12th Army Group Report of Operations (Final After Action Report), Vol IV, from US
Army Military History Institute.
10
HQ T Force 12 AG Draft T Force Report on Target PARIS, dated October 1944, RG331/Box 53.
11
Activities of SCI in connection with T Force Paris, SCI Unit 12 AG letter dated 9 Oct 44, RG331/Box 53.
12
Operatives, Spies and Saboteurs, by Patrick K ODonnell, Citadel Press Books 2004, 204-205.
13
FSS Field Security Section (reminiscences of W. Sedgwick-Rough), by Bob Steers, 1996, 225.
14
History of T Force Activities in 21 Army Group, undated, FO 1031/49 (UK National Archives).
15
Frontline Intelligence in WW2 - (II) Allies in N Africa and Italy, by Keith Ellison, 2012.
16
Trojan Horses, by Martin Young and Robbie Stamp, 1989, The Bodley Head Ltd, London, 38.
17
Trojan Horses, by Martin Young and Robbie Stamp, 1989, The Bodley Head Ltd, London, 51-52.
18
A Short History of T Force Operations In North West Europe During the Second World War, produced by the
5th Kings/No 2 T Force Old Comrades Association.
19
T Force Bulletin No 2 Period 10-15 Apr 45, 21 Army Group Area, US National Archives ref:
MR/CRR/243/15W4-19-9-D, ENV 69, Section 3.
20
T Force Bulletin No 3 Period 16-24 Apr 45, 21 Army Group Area, US National Archives ref:
MR/CRR/243/15W4-19-9-D, ENV 69, Section 3.
21
T Force Bulletin No 5 Period 2-10 May 45, 21 Army Group Area, US National Archives ref:
MR/CRR/243/15W4-19-9-D, ENV 69, Section 3.
22
WO 205/1049, Comments on T Force Activities in Second British Army from 31 Mar to 15 Jun 1945, dated 18
June 1945, by G2 30 Corps, District T Force (UK National Archives).
23
T Force Bulletin No 7 Period 19-30 May 45, 21 Army Group Area, US National Archives ref:
MR/CRR/243/15W4-19-9-D, ENV 69, Section 3.
24
T Force Bulletin No Period 1-20 Jun 45, 21 Army Group Area, US National Archives ref:
MR/CRR/243/15W4-19-9-D, ENV 69, Section 3.
25
Activities of Intelligence Target T Sub-Division, dated 31 december 1944, SHAEF Office of ACOS, G-2;
NARA MR/CRR/331 7W4-11-16-C-D Box 137.
26
J Heslop-Harrison Autobiography: War Service Part 7, T Force (online at
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/genomes/jhhpdfs/orig11wartf.pdf).
27
G2 Section (Pts V-VII) 12th Army Group Report of Operations (Final After Action Report), Vol IV, from US
Army Military History Institute.
28
The Secret Hunters, by Anthony Kemp, Michael OMara Books, 1986, 36-37.
29
WO 219/818, G2 7th Army signal to G2 SHAEF MAIN dtd 18 Dec 1944, (UK National Archives).
30
The 6860th Headquarters Detachment Intelligence Assault Force (T Force), by Les Hughes, 1977.
31
WO 219/818, 6 AG G2 signal to SHAEF MAIN for Strong dtd 27 Nov 1944, (UK National Archives).
32
WO 219/818, SHAEF REAR signal from Strong from Magnus SHAEF MAIN dtd 7 Dec 1944, (UK National
Archives).
33
The ALSOS Mission, by Col Boris T Pash, 136.
34
Recollections of World War II, by Akeley P Quirk, USNR (Ret), Sultana Press 1981, 103.
35
Recollections of World War II, by Akeley P Quirk, USNR (Ret), Sultana Press 1981, 75-76.
36
Recollections of World War II, by Akeley P Quirk, USNR (Ret), Sultana Press 1981, 98.
37
Recollections of World War II, by Akeley P Quirk, USNR (Ret), Sultana Press 1981, 98-100.
38
The Security Service 1908-1945, the Official History, by John Curry, 239.
39
The 6860th Headquarters Detachment Intelligence Assault Force (T Force), by Les Hughes, 1977.
40
Recollections of World War II, by Akeley P Quirk, USNR (Ret), Sultana Press 1981, 121-122.
41
History of US CI Vol 2, (Footnotes), RG226, Entry 176, Box 2 of 2.
42
United States Department of Commerce. Report of the Secretary of Commerce, 34th, 1946. Washington, DC:
GPO, 1946
43
History of 30 AU, by Guy Allan Farrin, (ebook) 2007, 68-69.
44
The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944-1946, By Earl Frederick Ziemke, Center of Military History
US Army 1975, quoting:
(1) Lt Col Joseph S. Piram, Background and History of Field Information Agency, Technical, 8 Jul 44-30 Jun 46, in
EUCOM, T 298-1/2.
(2) OMGUS, 7771 Document Center, General History, 28 Apr 47, in OMGUS 21-1/5.
(3) Memo, SHAEF, AG, for CG, 12th AGp, sub: Ministerial Collecting Center, 13 Jun 45, in SHAEF G-2,
GBI/CI/CS/091.1-3. (4) Memo, SHAEF, AG, for CG, 12th AGp, sub: Special Detention Centers, 27 May 45, in SHAEF G-
2, 383.6-4
45
'Aeronautical Science. German Documents.' By Richard Eells, Library of Congress Quarterly Journal of Current
Acquisitions 3 (4) Aug. 1946.
46
Secret Waepons of World War II, by William B Breuer, Castle Books NY 2000, 212.
47
Operation LUSTY, National Museum of the US Air Force, Posted
2/7/2011,http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets.
48
The Wind and Beyond. By Theodore Von Karman, Little, Brown & Co. Boston, MA 1967.
49
Memo, SHAEF, ACofS G-2, for CofS, sub: Establishment of a Field Information Agency, Technical, 2 Jun 45,
in OPD, 336, sec. V, Class 104.
50
(1) SHAEF, CoS, sub: Establishment of FIAT, 31 May 45, in OPD, 336, sec. V, Class 104-. (2) Memo, Hqs,
US Gp CC, for Distribution, sub: Establishment of FIAT, US Gp CC, 14 Jul 45, in USFET SGS 322.
51
The 6860th Headquarters Detachment Intelligence Assault Force (T Force), by Les Hughes, 1977.
52
FIAT continued investigations until 30 June 1947 and continued microfilming until 30 September of that year.
The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944-1946, By Earl Frederick Ziemke, Center of Military History US
Army 1975, quoting:
(1) Background and History of Field Information Agency, Technical, 8 Jul 44-30 Jun 46, by Lt Col Joseph S. Piram in
EUCOM, T 298-1 /2.
(2) Memo, Actg Ch, CAD, for Sec War, sub: Termination Date for FIAT, 11 Jun 47, in CAD, 014.
53
EUCOM, Office of the Chief Historian, Organization and Administration of the European Theater and Its
Headquarters, 1947, in CMH file 8-3.1, CA 5.
54
The Armys Technical Detectives, by Maj Franklin M Davis Jr, in May 1948 Military Review, Vol XXVIII,
Number 2.
55
Interview between Lt Gen AJ Boyle and Lt Col Frank Walton, Vol 1, The Andrew J Boyle Papers, US Military
History Institute.
56
See www.russianspaceweb.com for soviet research into German rocketry and space flight;
www.airpages.ru/eng/ru/troph.shtml for soviet acquisition of aircraft technology; and
http://www.tutorgig.com/ed/Russian_Alsos for the race for atomic research materials and personnel.
57
See SMERSH, by Vadim J Birstein, Birebeck Publishing CO London 2011; Special Tasks, by Pavel & Anatoli Sudoplatov
with J L & L P Schecter, Little, Brown & Co (USA) 1995; Loyal Comrades, Ruthless Killers, by Slava Katamidze, Lewis
International Inc 2003; and Ultimate Deception, by Jerry Dan, Rare Books & Berry, Porlock Somerset UK 2003.
58
Executive Order 9568, 8 Jun 45, and Executive Order 9604, 28 Aug 45, in Federal Register, vol. 10, pp. 9568
and 10960.