1. ELCANO V.

HILL 77 SCRA 98
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but
Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and
his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by
his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact
that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate
civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration
in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. While it is true
that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the
consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however ruled since at the time of
the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a matter of equity.
2. TAYLOR V. MERALCO 16 PHIL 8 16 Phil. 18 Civil Law Torts and Damages Element Quasi Delicts
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able to learn some principles
of mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dads office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he
was also employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day all said, Taylor was mature well beyond his
age. One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric power plant where they found
20-30 blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented until he
succeeded in opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps
causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye. Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that
because the company left the caps exposed to children, they are liable for damages due to the companys
negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows: (1) Damages to the plaintiff. (2) Negligence by
act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty. (3) The
connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. In the case at bar, it is true that Manila
Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused
damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection between the companys negligence and the injuries sustained by
Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various
experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence

the injuries. Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically
than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical
draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well
qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of
the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an
explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his
efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the
applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be
any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous. The just thing is that a
man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he cannot demand reparation
therefor from another.
3. ARANETA V. DE JOYA

Facts: Respondent De Joya, general manager, proposed to the board of Ace

Advsertising Corp., to send Ricardo Taylor to the US to take up special studies in
television. The Board did not act upon the proposal. Nevertheless, sent Taylor to the
US. Respondent assured Antonio Araneta, a compny director, that expenses will be
handled by other parties which later was confirmed through a memorandum. While
abroad, Taylor continued to receive his salaries. The items corresponding to his
salaries appeared in vouchers prepared upon orders of, and approved by, the
respondent. Petitioner Luis Araneta, signed three of the vouchers, others signed by
either respondent or Vicente Araneta, the company treasurer. All told, Ace
Advertising disbursed P5,043.20 on account of Taylors travel and studies. Then a
year after, Ace Advertising filed a complaint before the CFI against respondent for
the recovery of the total sum disbursed to Taylor alleging that the trip was made
without its knowledge, authority or ratification. The respondent in his answer denied
the charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless ratified by the companys
board and at any event he had the discretion as general manager to authorize the
trip which was for the companys benefit. A third party complaint was file by
respondent against, Vicente and Luis and Taylor. Respondent proved that some of
the checks to cover the expenses of Taylor were signed by Vicente and Luis. In their
defense, Luis and Vicente claimed that they signed the checks in good faith as they
were approved by respondent. The CFI rendered judgement ordering the respondent
to pay Ace for the amount disbursed with interest at a legal rate until full payment
and dismissed the third party complaint. Respondent appealed to CA. CA affirmed
the decision of trial court with regard to its decision in favor of Ace but reversed the
dismissal of the 3rd party complaint. CA found as a factthat Taylors trip had neither
been authorized nor ratified by Ace. It held that Luis and Vicente were also privy to
the authorized disbursement of corporate monies with the respondent. That when
they approved signed the checks, they have given their stamp of approval. As it is
established that corporate funds were disbursed unauthorized, the case is of a
simple quasi-delict committed by them against the corporation. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict, notwithstanding that he
was occupying a contractual position at Ace? Otherwise stated, whether or not
quasi-delict (tort) may be committed a party in a contract?
Held: Yes. The existence of a contract between the parties constitutes no bar to the
commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of

damages. His guilt is manifest on account of, in spite of his being a vice-president
and director of Ace, petitioner remained passive, throughout the period of Taylors
trip and to the payment of the latters salary. As such he neglected to perform his
duties properly to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer.
4. AIR FRANCE V. CARRASCOSO 18 SCRA 155 Civil Law Torts and Damages Negligence Malfeasance
Quasi-Delict Remedial Law Evidence Hearsay Rule Res Gestae Startling Event
In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome from Manila.
Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked
by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a better right than him.
Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up
his seat and was transferred to the planes tourist class. After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the
Philippines, he sued Air France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso
testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the planes pantry where he
was approached by a plane purser who told him that he noted in the planes journal the following: First-class
passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene The said
testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso.
This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers
that the issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class
because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties. Air France also questioned the
admissibility of Carrascosos testimony regarding the note made by the purser because the said note was never
presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis. ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony
of Carrasoso regarding the note which was not presented in court is admissible in evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana. Culpa
Contractual There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to furnish
Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air France failed to furnish first
class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air Frances employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth after he was already, seated and to take a seat in the
tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. The Supreme
Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the issuance of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an
assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible. Culpa Aquiliana Here, the SC ruled,
even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on
culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air
Frances contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascosos action is placed upon
his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper. HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The subject of inquiry is
not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best
evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser
happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as

yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the
purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident.
Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res
gestae.

5. Zulueta vs. Pan Am

Facts: Mr. Zulueta and his wife and child boarded a flight of Pan Am from Wake Island to the Phil. Mr. Zulueta,
however, had to relieve himself and thus looked for a secluded place in the beach. As a result, he was delayed in
boarding for some 20 or 30 minutes. While Mr. Zulueta was reaching the ramp, the captain of the plane demonstrated
an intemperate and arrogant tone thereby impelling Mr. Zulueta to answer back. Thus, Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded.
The airport manager of then sent Mr. Zulueta a letter stating that his stay in Wake Island would be for a minimum of
one week during which he would be charged $13.30 per day.
Issue: WON Pan Am should be held liable.
Held: Yes. Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded to retaliate and punish him for the embarrassment and loss of face thus
suffered by defendants agent. The Zuluetas had a contract of carriage with the defendant, as a common carrier,
pursuant to which the latter was bound, for a substantial monetary consideration paid by the former, not merely to
transport them to Manila, but, also, to do so with extraordinary diligence or utmost diligence. The responsibility of
the common carrier, under said contract, as regards the passengers safety, is of such a nature, affecting as it does
public interest, that it cannot be dispensed with or even lessenedby stipulation, by the posting of notices, by
statements on tickets, or otherwise. In the present case, the defendant did not only fail to comply with its obligation to
transport Mr. Zulueta to Manila, but, also, acted in a manner calculated to humiliate him, to chastise him, to make him
suffer, to cause to him the greatest possible inconvenience. With regard to
DAMAGES It is obvious, however, that in off-loading plaintiff at Wake Island, under the circumstances, defendants
agents had acted with malice aforethought and evident bad faith. If gross negligence warrants the award of
exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and
tainted with bad faith. The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an
example or correction for public good. Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court, as stated
earlier, may award exemplary damages in addition to moral damages

6. BARREDO V. GARCIA AND ALMARIO 73 Phil 607 73 Phil 607 Torts and Damages Civil Liability from
Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino
Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit.
Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo the owner of the
taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the
selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the
separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers.
Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more
expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It
was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had

multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia
not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo
is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own negligence in
selecting his employee (Article 1903).
7. Padua vs. Robles 66 SCRA 485 s
Facts: The citation of the case was a negligent act, homicide through reckless imprudence filed to driver Romeo
Punzalan and defendants - appellees as subsidiary liable, which give rise to two separate liabilities, namely (1) the
civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil negligence or so called culpa
aquiliana.
Issue:Whether or not that negligent act of Punzalan gives rise to the two separate and independent liabilities.
Held: It is by now settled beyond all cavil as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a negligent act such as
that committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate and independent kinds of liabilities, (1) the civil liability
arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana.
These two concepts of fault are so distinct from each other that exoneration from one does not result in exoneration
from the other. Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separately and independently of each other,
although Article 2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission,
which means that should there be varying amounts awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect,
only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff has already been ordered paid an amount in one case and in the
other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second case only to the excess over the one
fixed in the first case, but if he has already been paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may not recover anymore in
the second case. Thus, in the case at bar, inasmuch as Punzalan had already been sentenced to pay the herein
petitioners the amounts above-stated, in the subsequent criminal case, he could not be adjudged to pay a higher
amount.
8. JOCSON V. GLORIOSO

For the death of a three-year-old boy who was run over by a passenger jeepney, two actions were
filed by the parents, the first, against its owner and the driver for culpa aquiliana, and the other,
against the driver for homicide thru reckless imprudence, the criminal action having been instituted
while the civil case was pending trial. The civil case was dismissed, the lower court being of the
opinion that "in conscience" it could not "hold the . . . defendant driver guilty of negligence or lack of
care resulting in or contributory to, the said accident." 1 There was an appeal, but it did not prosper,
the Court of Appeals dismissing it for failure of appellants to pay the docketing fees.
The accused driver appealed raising as one of the issues "the propriety of sentencing the driver to
pay indemnity to the parents of the deceased child, considering the fact that the civil action for
damages brought by the parents of the child against the driver and the owner of the vehicle was
dismissed."
The parents, now plaintiffs-appellees, in an action with the Court of First Instance of Manila against
defendant, now appellant, sought to enforce such civil liability against her as owner of the jeepney,
pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

9. MENDOZA V. LA MALLORCA 82 SCRA 245 Civil Law Torts and Damages Distinction of Liability of
Employers Under Article 2180 and Their Liability Under the Revised Penal Code

In April 1950, the freight truck owned by Mendoza was bumped by a bus owned by La Mallorca Bus Company.
Mendoza sued the bus driver for damage to property thru reckless imprudence. Mendoza reserved his right to file a
separate civil action. The bus driver was subsequently convicted of the crime charged. Mendoza then filed a civil case
based on Article 2180 against LMBC as the employer of the bus driver. However, the civil case was dismissed by
reason of prescription as the case was filed 6 years after the collision. Mendoza then filed a new suit against LMBC
this time under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. LMBC argued that the dismissal of the civil case is a bar for
filing another case under Article 103 of the RPC by reason of res judicata. The lower court as well as the Court of
Appeals agreed with LMBC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the civil case based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code is a bar for filing another
action based on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD: No. Civil action based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the civil action based on Article 103 of the RPC
are two independent and separate actions based on distinct causes of actions therefore res judicata can not lie.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code makes an employer primarily and directly liable for reason of his own negligence, either
in the selection or supervision of his driver. Article 103 of the RPC makes an employer subsidiarily liable for damages
caused by his negligent employee who is convicted from a previous criminal suit. In other words, Article 2180 of the
CC is predicated upon the employers own negligence while Article 103 of the RPC is predicated upon the a crime
committed by an employee of the employer.

10. Jose Cangco vs Manila Railroad Co. 30 Phil 768 Civil Law Torts and Damages Distinction of Liability
of Employers Under Article 2180 and Their Liability for Breach of Contract
On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee of the latter
and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm,
he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which
was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact
that it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and
he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down. It was established
that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that
Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people are doing
so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so
risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person.
He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the
place was dimly lit. The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under Article 2180
and their liability for breach of contract [of carriage]: NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence
whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within
the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract
between the master and the person injured. The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a
voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to
another. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the

source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties. Manresa: Whether negligence
occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or in itself the source of an extracontractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. Vinculum Juris: (def) It means an
obligation of law, or the right of the obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court of law.

11. TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL H. SAYNES G.R. No.
L-40570. 30 January 1976. Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI of Pangasinan. Esguerra, J.:
Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the
banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the
electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to
the ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it,
but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it.
Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just
on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy
was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event- storm; (2) WON boys parents
negligence exempts petitioner from liability.
Ruling: Decision affirmed. (1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on
the part of defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. With ordinary
foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line
would be endangered by banana plants being blown down. (2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the
plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendants' (petitioners) lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability.
Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.
12. PLDT v CA GR No. 57079 September 29, 1989
Facts: Spouses Esteban were riding their jeep when they ran over an earth mound and fell in an open trench on the
road resulting to slight injuries to the husband and serious injuries to the wife. The windshield of the jeep was also
shattered due to the accident Spouses Esteban accused PLDT of negligence because of lack of warning signs placed
near the manhole dug resulting on the earth mound on the road causing injuries to the wife. PLDT contends the
injuries were the result of the negligence of the independent contractor the company hired (Barte) and should be the
one held liable and not the company. RTC ruled in favour of the spouses while the CA under Justice Agrava as
ponente reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: W/N PLDT can be held liable for the injuries caused to spouses Esteban
Held: PLDT and Barte contends that the independent contractor placed signs on the road and that it was the fault of
Mr. Esteban because he did not diligently drive the jeepney. Mr. Esteban had quickly swerved from the outer lane
thereby hitting the earth mound. SC finds no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that
the accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was
not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. The findings clearly show that the negligence of
respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause

of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover
damages. The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said
signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already
knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the
jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane
towards the accident mound.

13. PICART V SMITH

In December 1912, Amado Picart was riding his horse and while they were on a 75
meter long bridge, he saw Frank Smith Jr.s car approaching. Smith blew his horn
thrice while he was still at a distance away because Picart and his horse were on
Smiths lane. But Picart did not move his horse to the other lane, instead he moved
his horse closer to the railing. Smith continued driving towards Picart without
slowing down and when he was already so near the horse he swerved to the other
lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body across the bridge; the horse
struck the car and its limb got broken. Picart suffered injuries which required several
days of medical attention while the horse eventually died.
ISSUE: Whether or not Smith is negligent.
HELD: Yes. And so was Picart for planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But
Smiths negligence succeeded that of Picart. Smith saw at a distance when he blew
his horn that Picart and his horse did not move to the other lane so he should have
steered his car to the other lane at that point instead of swerving at the last minute.
He therefore had the last clear chance to avoid the unfortunate incident. When
Smiths car has approached the horse at such proximity it left no chance for Picart
extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert injury. Picart can therefore
recover damages from Smith but such should be proportioned by reason of his
contributory negligence.
14. Spouses Africa et al vs Caltex Philippines, Boquiren and the Court of Appeals 16 SCRA 448 Civil Law
Torts and Damages Res Ipsa Loquitur
In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing gasoline into the underground storage of Caltex.
Apparently, a fire broke out from the gasoline station and the fire spread and burned several houses including the
house of Spouses Bernabe and Soledad Africa. Allegedly, someone (a passerby) threw a cigarette while gasoline was
being transferred which caused the fire. But there was no evidence presented to prove this theory and no other
explanation can be had as to the real reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and the branch owner (Mateo
Boquiren) failed to install a concrete firewall to contain fire if in case one happens.
ISSUE: Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.
HELD: Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself)
which states: where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of
the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendants
want of care. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of Caltex
and Boquiren. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or

could have known how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but they gave no explanation
thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care. Note that
ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur is the exception because the burden of
proof is shifted to the party charged of negligence as the latter is the one who had exclusive control of the thing that
caused the injury complained of.
15. City of Manila vs. Teotico City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CA G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA Concepcion, J.:
Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a
"loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney he
hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against the City which dismissed the
same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages.
Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the damages
suffered by Teotico.
Ruling: Decision affirmed. In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and
have been constantly kept in good conditionand manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers
concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and
supervision. Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P.
Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from the City's
"control or supervision."
16. Tamargo vs CA GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992
FACTS: In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing
injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against
the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident. In December 1981, the
spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the
tragic incident.
ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the
indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the
biological parents.
HELD: Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental
authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting
incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the
child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code. SC did not consider that retroactive effect may
be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when
they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this
case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence,
actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto. Petition for review was hereby granted.4

17. TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL H. SAYNES G.R. No. L40570. 30 January 1976. Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI of Pangasinan. Esguerra, J.:
Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the
banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the
electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to
the ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it,
but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it.
Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just
on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy
was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event- storm; (2) WON boys parents
negligence exempts petitioner from liability.
Ruling: Decision affirmed. (1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on
the part of defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. With ordinary
foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line
would be endangered by banana plants being blown down. (2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the
plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendants' (petitioners) lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability.
Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.
18. Martinez, E. Layugan vs. IAC GR No. 13998 Nov. 1988
FACTS: 1. While Layugan and a companion was fixing a truck parked along the right side of the highway, a cargo
truck driven by Serrano bumped Layugan, causing injury resulting to amputation. Based on the testimony of the cargo
truck driver, there was a problem in the breaks. 2. Layugan sued the cargo truck owner, Isidro for damages. 3. Isidro,
in his defense, claimed that the driver of the parked truck failed to install early warning device which was the
proximate cause of the incident. 4. RTC ruled in favor of Layugan. But IAC reversed the decision of RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Layugan, as found by iac, is the one who is negligent (under res ipsa).
HELD: No. It is Isidro who is negligent. RATIO: 1. On res ipsa: Res ipsa posits that "where the thing which causes
injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords a reasonable evidence in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." In this case, res ipsa does
not apply because the cause of injury is established, which is the bumping. In res ipsa, precisely the cause of injury is
not known and resort to this rule is necessary in the absence of direct evidence of fact of injury. 2. On the liability of
Isidro: He is liable because he failed to prove exercise of diligence of a good father in supervising his driver and the
mechanic. Also, Isisdro should have checked the vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. DISPOSTIVE: Granted.

19. PLDT vs. CA

Facts: On July, 30, 1968, respondent spouses Esteban had their jeep ran over a sand of earth and fell into an open
trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system.
Respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping
darkness and the lack of warning light or signs. Respondent spouses suffered physical injuries and their jeeps
windshield was shattered. PLDT alleged that the respondents were negligent and that it should be the independent
contractor L.R. Barte and Company which undertook said conduit system to be the one liable.The latter claimed to
have complied with its contract and had installed necessary barricades.
Issue: WON PLDT and L.R. Barte and Co. are liable.
Ruling: Private Respondents negligence was not merely contributory but goes to the very cause of the accident,
hence he has no right to recover damages for the injuries which he and his wife suffered. Private respondent cannot
recover notwithstanding the negligence he imputes on PLDT considering that he had the last clear chance, to avoid
the injury. One who claims damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proof to show existence of such
fault or negligence causative thereof

Stress