SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Compilation CASE DIGESTS

72
Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules

VDA DE MANALO VS. CA (2001)
Arcilla, Jay
FACTS:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of Sampaloc, Manila, died
intestate in 1992. He was survived by his wife and his eleven
children, who are all of legal age. He left several real properties
located in Manila and in Tarlac including a business- Manalos
Machine Shop with offices at Quezon City and at Valenzuela. In
November, the respondents, who are eight of the
surviving children filed a petition with the RTC for the judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father and for the
appointment of their brother, Romeo, ias administrator thereof.
The trial court issued an order setting the said petition for
hearing and directing the publication of the order for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
Metro Manila, and directing service by registered mail of the
order. The trial court issued an order declaring the whole world
in default, except the government, and set the reception
of evidence of the petitioners.
However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial
court upon motion of the petitioners who were granted ten(10)
days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
The trial court called resolved such issues in the
following manner:
1. admitted the opposition for the purpose of considering the
merits 2. denied the hearing for such affirmative defenses are
irrelevant and immaterial 3.declared that the court had
jurisdiction 4.denied the motion for inhibition 5.) set the
application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular
administrator in the for hearing.
CA dismissed; MR was denied. Hence, this petition for

review.
ISSUES:
W/N CA erred in upholding the questioned orders of the
RTC which denied their motion for the outright dismissal
of the petition for judicial settlement of estate ?
RULING:
NO. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate is a
SPECIAL PROCEEDING and, as such, it is a remedy
whereby the respondents seek to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact..
In the determination of the nature of an action
or
proceeding,
the averments and the character of
the relief sought in the complaint shall be controlling.
A careful scrutiny of the petition belies the claim that the same
is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition
contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a
petition for
the
settlement
of
estate
of
a
deceased person such as the fact of death and
his residence
which are foundation
facts
upon
which
all
the
subsequent
proceedings
in
the
administration
of
the
estate
rest.
It
also
contains an enumeration of the names of his legal
heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by
the deceased which are sought to be settled in
the
probate
proceedings. In addition, the reliefs
Page 60
RULE
The MR of the petitioners was denied; hence, they filed a

petition forcertiorari, contending that:
(1) the venue was improperly laid; (2) the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the
surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings;
(4)there
was
absence
of
earnest
efforts
toward
compromise among members of the
same
family, in
accordance with Article 222 of NCC, and (5) no certification of
non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016
DISPOSITION:Petition is denied for lack of merit
PATRICIA NATCHER VS. HON. COURT OFAPPEALS

Arcilla, Jay
FACTS:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra
were registered owners of a parcel of land in Manila .Upon the
death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six
children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
Graciana's estate. They adjudicated and divided among
themselves the real property .Under the agreement: Graciano
received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14
share of the said property .The heirs executed and forged an
"Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with
Waiver of Rights"- they subdivided among themselves the
parcel of land. Graciano then donated to his children, share and
share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to
4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square
meters registered under Graciano's name .The land was
further subdivided into two separate lots. Graciano sold the 1 st
lot to a third person but retained ownership over the 2ndlot.
Graciano married petitioner Patricia Natcher .He sold the
2nd lot to Natcher, a title was issued under her name. Graciano
dies leaving his 6 children and Natcher as heirs .
A civil case was filed a complaint before the RTC of Manila by
the 6 children; alleging that Natcher through the employment
of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired the 2nd

lot by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale
in her favour; that their legitimes have been impaired. In her
reply, Natcher averred that she was legally married to
Graciano on 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she
was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the
latter .RTC ruled that the deed of sale executed by the late
Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by
law and thus a complete nullity, that no evidence that a
separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements nor there has been decreed a judicial separation of
property between them ,hence, the spouses are prohibited
from entering into a contract of sale. It is not also a valid
donation BUT can be regarded as an extension of
advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a
compulsory heir of the deceased. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the lower courts decision
ratiocinating t is the probate court that has exclusive
jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for
reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its
jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased
person.
ISSUE:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general
jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance/ annulment of title
with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to
advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the
heirs?
HELD:
NO. CA decision is AFFIRMED.
Page 60
prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt

as regard the intention to seek judicial settlement of the
estate of their deceased father.
FACTS:
ISSUE: whether or not Judge Ruiz is correct in dismissing the

case for failure of parties to submit amicable settlement?
RULING: Judge Ruiz erred when it dismissed the case for failure
of parties to submit amicable settlement. While a compromise
agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly
encouraged, the failure to consummate one does not warrant
any procedural sanction, much less provide an authority for the
court to jettison the case. Sp. Proc. No. 5198 should not have
been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on account of
the mere failure of the parties to submit the promised amicable
settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment Based On An
Amicable Settlement. Given the non-contentious nature of
special proceedings (which do not depend on the will of an
actor, but on a state or condition of things or persons not
entirely within the control of the parties interested), its
dismissal should be ordered only in the extreme case where the
termination of the proceeding is the sole remedy consistent
with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the
parties therein. The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which
authorizes the motu propio dismissal of a case if the plaintiff
fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court, cannot
even be used to justify the convenient, though erroneous,
termination of the proceedings herein. An examination of the
December 6, 2004 Order readily reveals that the trial court
neither required the submission of the amicable settlement or
the aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned the parties that
TABUADA VS. RUIZ

Azarcon, Pia Lea
Special proceeding # 5198 (settlement of intestate

estate of Calaliman) was filed in RTC Iloilo. RTC rendered a
decision that they will no longer be setting any hearing as
parties assured that they are going to submit a "Motion for
judgment based on an amicable settlement" on or before
December 25, 2004. On March 2, 2005, RTC terminated the
proceedings for failure to submit amicable settlement invoking
Sec.3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner and Calaliman
filed MR. On the ground that it was premature there being yet
no payment of debt and distribution of estate and that they
have prepared necessary papers for amicable settlement. MR,
denied.Hence this petition.
Page 60
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this
wise: a) A civil actionis one by which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to
specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. A special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right or a particular fact. There lies a marked
distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An
actionis a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in
the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the
method of applying legal remedies according to definite
established rules. The term special proceedingmay be
defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status
or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the
statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion
It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include
those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted
according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to
actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings
include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense,
but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special
mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without
summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are
characteristics of ordinary actions. A special proceeding must
therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent
proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted
independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon
notice
HILADO VS. CA
Azarcon, Pia Lea
Facts:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died
intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private
respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto),
and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At the time
of his death, there were two pending civil cases against
Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, was then pending
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44,
with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein.
The second was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City,
Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First
Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.
Thereafter, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed
with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Revised Rules of Court. the Manila RTC issued an order
appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of
her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in
her favor. In January 2001, private respondent submitted an
Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties,
and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. In the List
of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent
included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two
pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City

courts.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they
be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining
to the intestate proceedings. petitioners filed an omnibus
motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the
submission by private respondent of the required inventory of
the decedent's estate. Petitioners also filed other pleadings or
motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of
private respondent in her administration of the estate, and
assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as
unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion,
on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within
the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the
intestate proceedings. CA likewise dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
WON creditors whose credit is based on contingent claim
have the right to participate in the settlement proceeding by
way of intervention under Rule 19
Won petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of
the deceased person, are entitled to copies of all processes and
orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
RULING:
Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set
forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent
whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of
"intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate
contingent claims.
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
Page 60
should they fail to submit the compromise within the given

period, their case would be dismissed. Hence, it cannot be
categorized as an order requiring compliance to the extent that
its defiance becomes an affront to the court and the rules. And
even if it were worded in coercive language, the parties cannot
be forced to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly
encouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate a
compromise. An order requiring submission of an amicable
settlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and is
premised on an erroneous interpretation and application of the
law and rules.
Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of
claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under
Rule 86. These actions, being as they are civil, survive the
death of the decedent and may be commenced against the
administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87.
#2
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do
not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate,
the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or
intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific
instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to
intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to
seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief
sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and
there is no other modality under the Rules by which such
interests can be protected.
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the
records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable
precedent than mandating the service of court processes and
pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor
in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed
of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied.
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special
Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties"
the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such
notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested
parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the
time and place of examining and allowing the account of the

executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning
the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell
personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber
real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for
the application for an order for distribution of the estate
residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in
her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases
filed by the petitioners.
RULE
73
Venue and Process
EUSEBIO V. EUSEBIO
Alvarez, Miguel Lorenzo
FACTS:
In the instant case, petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with
the CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as administrator
of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his
father, who died on November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon City.
Eugenios siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and
Carlos),on the other hand, who claim that they are illegitimate
children of Andres, opposed the petition and alleged that
Andres was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed
for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the venue had
been improperly laid.
The CFI of Rizal ruled in favor of Eugenio Eusebio. Hence the
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not venue had been properly laid in Rizal?
RULING:
Page 60
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the

custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1,
Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening
in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that
the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and
material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant."
Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City

permanently. There is no direct evidence of such intent Andres
did not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely;
Eugenio did not testify thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not
presented to testify on the matter. Andres did not part with, or
alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his
children remained in that municipality. In the deed of sale of his
house at 889 A Espana Ext., Andres gave San Fernando,
Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage contract signed by
Andres when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion
Villanueva two days prior to his death stated that his residence
is San Fernando, Pampanga.
The requisites for a change of domicile include (1)
capacity to choose and freedom of choice, (2) physical presence
at the place chosen, (3) intention to stay therein permanently.
Although Andres complied with the first two requisites, there is
no change of domicile because the third requisite is absent.
With respect to the contention that appellants submitted
themselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal because they
introduced evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must
be noted that appellants specifically made of record that they
were NOT submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court,
except for the purpose only of assailing the same.
In the whole, the Court found that Andres was, at the

time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that
the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having
been laid improperly.
GARCIA FULE V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died, he owned
property in Calamba, Laguna. On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule
filed with CFI Laguna a petition for letters of administration and
exparte appointment as special administratrix over the estate.
Subsequently, the motion was granted..There was an allegation
that the wife was Carolina Carpio
Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and nn behalf of
their child: Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which was denied by
CFI. Preciosa alleged that Fule was a creditor of the estate, and
as a mere illegitimate sister of thedeceased is not entitled to
succeed from him.
The Court of Appeals reversed and annulled the
appointment of Fule. Preciosa became special administratrix
upon a bond of P30, 000.00.
ISSUES:
a.)What is the distinction between venue and jurisdiction
b.)What does the word resides in Revised Rules of
Court Rule 73, Section 1 mean?
RULING:
Rule 73, Section 1.if the decedent is an inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled at the CFI in theprovince in
which he resides at the time of his death, And if he is an
Page 60
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Don Andres

Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a house
and lot at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City because his
son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P.
Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was able to transfer
to the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was
forced to live in his sons residence. It is well settled that
domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place
merely for one owns health even if coupled with knowledge
that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return
home. Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the
presumption is that Andres retained such domicile.
inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in which

he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to theexclusion
of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
thelocation of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, inthe original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Fules own submitted Death Certificate shows that the
deceased resided in QC at the time of his death, therefore the
venueof Laguna was improper.
Venue is subject to waiver (Rule 4, Section 4), but
Preciosa
did
not
waive
it,
merely
requested
for
alternativeremedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse.
However, venue is distinct from jurisdiction which is conferred
by Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended to bewith CFIs
independently from the place of residence of the deceased.
Piy Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his
children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely,
Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco
Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and
Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in
Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and
Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco,
the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for
the probate of the last will and testament, where she was
named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to
dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution
over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the
probate proceedings.
Rule 79 Section 2, demands that the petition should

show
the
existence
of
jurisdiction
to
make
the
appointmentsought, and should allege all the necessary facts
such as death, name, last residence, existence, situs of assets,
intestacy, right of person who seeks administration as next of
kin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI

Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper
venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss
were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and
issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
Resides ex vi termini actual residence-Elastic and

should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it isemployed.-Same meaning as
inhabitant.
The CA ruled in the following manner:

Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, covers both
testate and intestate proceedings. The Special Proceeding of
the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose
jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that
court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual
issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid
will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu
at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in
the Cebu CFI), it follows that the said court must exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the
FACTS:
In 1964, Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila Doctors
Hospital survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco and their two (2) minor sons all residing at 69
Page 60
CUENCO VS. CA
Balanay, Rendel Bryan
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that the judge of
the Cebu CFI, stated that the petition for appointment of special
administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of the
Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon,
it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
proceeding ..." It is sufficient to state in this connection that the
said judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction
over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the
moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of
jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all
events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and
does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial judge.
ISSUE
Whether or not in Special Proceedings, the court with
whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires
exclusive jurisdiction.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in
issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court
from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and
setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission
to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond
pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts, not the court with whom the
estate or intestate petition is first filed. Since the Quezon City
court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and
assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and
deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be
left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not
an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of
venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt
administration of justice. It would be an unfair imposition upon
petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the
decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance
therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue
and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more
time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the
Cebu court every time she has an important matter of the
estate to take up with the probate court.
In the case at bar, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance
of the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the
testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in
effect asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence
of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and
testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the
estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City.
Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's
assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the
basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow
and finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence of
the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein
with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court
could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the
original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly
provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record" could probably be properly invoked, had
Page 60
petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano

Cuenco. The said respondent should assert her rights within the
framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of
invoking the jurisdiction of another court.
Finally, venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the

Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in
avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's
exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent
(with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its
admission to probate of his last will and testament and
appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond
in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders
and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be
approved and authorized rather than to annul all such
proceedings regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same
proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to
the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed
and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on
the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of
record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the
decedent.
SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted
three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on
March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August
11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on
May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom
he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee,
an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody
on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
Felicidad San Luis (marriage solemnized at California, U.S.A.),
then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondent
but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage
up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death of

Felicisimo, Felicidad (respondent in this case) sought the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she
filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna
because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his
death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
legally married to Merry Lee.
The RTC ruled that Felicidad, as a widow of the decedent,
possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that the
venue was properly laid. Mila, one of the children by first
marriage, filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan.
The motion was granted and the case was reraffled to Branch
134 presided by Judge Arcangel. Same issues were raised at the
second trial. However, the trial court dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the the time of
Felicisimos death, he was duly elected governor and a resident
of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for
letters of administration because her marriage with the
decedent was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
On appeal to the CA, it reversed the decision of the RTC. The
appellate court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules
of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate,
refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from
legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo
Page 60
such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City

court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise
shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition
before it and assumed jurisdiction.
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist

that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, "residence" is
synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They
claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given
time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether venue was properly laid.
RULING:
Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in
which he resides at the time of his death." The term "resides"
connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and
rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
such nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. The word "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay

thereat.
In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and
also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length
of time of residence is required though; however, the residence
must be more than temporary. There is a distinction between
"residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
"residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms,
that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his
legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person
may have his residence in one place and domicile in another. In
the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo
was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he
also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982
up to the time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that
Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. The subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction
over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject
petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City.
Petition is DENIED.
Page 60
discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually

resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
FACTS:
On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix)
executed a notarized will wherein she devised Lot no. 288-A to
her grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan. During her lifetime, the
testatrix herself filed the petition for the probate. Later, the
testatrix executed a codicil modifying her will by devising the
said Lot 288-A in favor of her four children Bernardo (the
executor), Simplicia, Huillerma and Juan, and her grandson
Mangulabnan to the extent of 1/5 each.
Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by
executor Patulandong of the title of Lot 288-A, but Patulandong
refused to heed the request because of the codicil which
modified the will of the testatrix. Thus, Mangulabnan filed an
action for partition against Patulandong in the RTC. The court
in this partition ordered the partitioning of the property.
However, the court holds that the partition is without prejudice
to the probate of the codicil in accordance with the Rules of
Court. Hence, subsequently, Patulandong filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija a petition for probate of the
codicil of the testatrix.
Meanwhile, by virtue of the decision in the partition case,
Mangulabnan caused the cancellation of the title of the testatrix
over Lot No. 288-A and a new TCT was issued in his name. He
later on sold the lot to herein petitioner, Camayas.
Finally, when the RTC ruled on admitting the petition filed by
Patulandong for probate of the codicil, the RTC likewise declared
that the sale between Mangulabnan and Camayas, null and
void.
ISSUE:
Does the RTC Nueva Ecija as probate court have
jurisdiction to declare the sale between Mangulabnan and
Camayas null and void?
PACIOLES VS. CHUATOCO-CHING

Borja, Catherine
FACTS:
Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties, stock
investments, bank deposits and interests in certain businesses.
She was survived by her husband, petitioner, and their two
minor children. Milio Pacioles husband of deceased Miguelita
filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of
Miguelitas estate.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela, filed an opposition, on the grounds
that petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of
an administrator; and the bulk of Miguelitas estate is composed
of paraphernal properties.
Page 60
CAMAYA VS. PATULANDON

Borja, Catherine
RULING:
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in
charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part
of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside
parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is
to determine whether they should or should not be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot
do so.
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in
question was in the possession of third parties and more
important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the
name of such third parties, the respondent court should have
denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
excluded the property in question from the inventory of the
property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third
persons of their possession and ownership of the property
Moreover, Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree provides
that certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
ISSUE:
May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and
pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed
to be part of the decedents estate?
RULING:
It is already recognized that probate court may hear and
pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to
determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely
incidental and provisional.
However, it is apparent from the Resolutions that the purpose of
the hearing set by the intestate court was actually to determine
the propriety of oppositors (respondents) claim. According to

the intestate court, if it is true that the oppositor (respondent)
owns the bulk of (Miguelitas) properties, then it means that she
has a material and direct interest in the estate and, hence, she
should be given her day in court. The intended day in court or
hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of
respondents contention that she is the true owner of the bulk
of Miguelitas estate.
Although, the respondent made it appear that her only intent
was to determine the accuracy of petitioners inventory,
however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings reveals
her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped
its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a
hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this
jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of
decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of
property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased
person, but claimed by some other person to be his property,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but
by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such
question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or
probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no
jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
as a regional trial court.
REYES vs. SOTERO
Bueno, Jirene Mercy
FACTS:
Private Respondent Corazon Chichioco filed a petition for
the settlement of estate of Elena Lising, claiming that she is the
niece and heir of the latter who died intestate.Petitioner Reyes
filed for an Opposition claiming that she was an adopted child of
Elena Lising and the latters husband Serafin Delos Santos,
hence the petition should be dismissed and that she be
appointed administrator of the estate.
Page 60
Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition,

alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the
estate. Respondent countered that she has direct and material
interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited
properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them would
undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the
capacity of business partners.
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the intestate court an
omnibus motion that an Order be issued directing the: 1)
payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the
estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorneys
fees. Respondent opposed on the ground that the partition and
distribution of the estate is premature and precipitate,
considering that there is yet no determination whether the
properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal
or owned in a joint venture.
The intestate court allowed the payment of the estate
taxes and attorneys fees but denied petitioners prayer for
partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed
premature. It also ordered that a hearing on oppositors claim
as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is
necessary to determine whether the properties listed in the
amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or
the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership
between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership
venture.
In her Supplemental she attached Certification issued be

the Municipal Civil Registrar stating that she was adopted by
the spouses pursuant to a decision rendered by the Court of
First Instance promulgated and duly registered with the Office of
Civil Registrar. Also presenting a copy of Judicial Form indicating
that the adoption decree was on file in the RTC-Tarlac City and a
Decree of Final Distribution issued by the Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that benefits were paid to Elena
Lising, widow of Serafin Delos Santos and his daughter Anna
Joyce Delos Santos.
Respondent filed before the CA a petition for annulment of the
adoption decree claiming that no proceedings for adoption ever
took place. Upon Motion, RTC suspended the hearing, however
CA dismissed the petition which became final and executory.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for immediate
resolution of her opposition. RTC issued a Resolution deferring
resolution pending the outcome of the criminal case filed
against the Petitioner for falsification of public documents.
Respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special
Administrator before the RTC, praying that the Branch Clerk of
Court Atty. Paulino Saguyod be appointed as such, which the
court granted.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration for the appointment of Atty
Saguyod reiterating his contention that she is the sole heir of
the decedent and that the former was appointed without being
required to file a bond. Petitioner subsequently filed a special
civil action before the CA alleging that said resolution. CA
nullified the resolution of the RTC and it held that the presiding
Respondent Judge Cesar Sotero gravely abused his discretion in
appointing Atty. Saguyod as special administrator.
ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner need to prove the validity of her
adoption as assailed by the respondents in the proceeding of
settlement of estate.
RULING:
No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any
evidence other than those which she had already presented
before the trial court. The documents presented by the
Petitioners were issued under the seal of the issuing offices and
were signed by the proper officers.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. Mere imputations of
irregularities will not cast a cloud of doubt on the adoption
decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed
valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
In this regard it must be pointed out that such contrary proof
can be presented only in a separate action brought principally
for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. It cannot be
assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of
decedents estate as held in Santos v. Aranzanso.
Respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of
the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioners claim that
she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical
pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of
adoption is void, the certifications regarding the matter as well
as the facts stated should be deemed legitimate, genuine and
real.
Petitioners status as an adopted child of the decedent remains
rebutted and no serious challenge has been brought against her
standing as such. Therefore as long as petitioners adoption is
considered valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the
decedents estate.
COCA VS. BORROMEO
Bueno, Jirene Mercy
FACTS:
Spouses Juan and Teresa Pangilinan died intestate. They
Page 60
A Special Proceeding was instituted for the settlement of estate

of the deceased spouses Pangilinan. The administrator
presented a project partition combining Lots 1927 and 1112
with an area of 22 hectares. The partition are as follows: 3
hectares for Crispin Borromeo for his attorneys fees; 5.3
hectares for Francis; 6.33 hectares for Prima and 7.3 hectares
for Concepcion. It was also provided therein that the sum of
5,O88.50 pesos as alleged debt of Concepcion should equally
divided among the 3 heirs.
Heirs of Francisco opposed the said partition contending that in
an order of the court in December 6, 1963, Francisco owned 12
hectares in 18 hectares of Lot 1112 because Prima sold her
share to Francis and what is left for Concepcion is only 6
hectares and that the payment for Concepcions debt was not
properly allowed.
The lower court deferred action on the partition until ownership
of the 12 hectares is determined in an ordinary action.. Heirs of
Francisco moreover filed a supplemental opposition praying that
Lot 1920 with 8 hectares should also be included in the project
partition.
No separate action had been filed with regard to the ownership
of the 12 hectare land hence the trial court approve the project
partition excluding the 12 hectares. Petitioners headed by
Filomena Coca, as administrator assailed the lower courts
decision, which however was sustained by the CA.
Petitioners appealed contending that the lower court as a
probate court has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the
12 hectare portion of Lot 1112.
ISSUE:
Whether the ownership of the 12 hectare land should be

decided in the intestate proceeding or in a separate action.
RULING:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter
should be resolved by the CFI in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a
jurisdictional question. It is a procedural question involving a
mode of practice which may be waived.
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not
be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That
question should be ventilated in a separate action. However
that general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by
expediency and convenience.
Although generally, probate court may not decide a question of
title of ownership yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or
the question is one of collation or advancement or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired then the probate
court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
We held that the instant case may be treated as an exception to
the general rule. Here the probate court had already received
evidence on the ownership of the 12 hectare land during the
hearing of the motion for its exclusion from the inventory. The
only interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in
the intestate proceeding.
As pointed out by the appellees they belong to the poor stratum
of society, they should not be forced to incur additional
expenses by bringing a separate action to determine the
ownership of the 12-hectare land. The just, expeditious and
inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco to file in
the intestate proceeding , Special Proceeding, a motion in the
form of a complaint wherein they should set forth their claim for
Page 60
possessed property namely Lot 1927 with an area of 3.97

hectares covered by OCT under the name of Juan Pangilinan;
Lot 1112 with an area of 18.02 hectares covered by OCT in the
name of heirs of Juan Pangilinan and Lot 1920 with an area of 8
hectares which was surveyed in the name of Concepcion
Pangilinan. The spouses had 3 children namely, Prima,
Concepcion, and Francisco all surnamed Pangilinan.
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR.,

VS.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN
Borlagdatan, April
FACTS:
It appears from the records that Jose Portugal (Portugal,
Sr.) contracted two marriages.
1st marriage with Paz Lazo in 1942 whom he had a daughter
named Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal (respondent) 2nd
marriage with Isabel de la Puerta in 1948, who gave birth to a
boy named Jose Douglas Portugal, Jr. (petitioners).
By virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of
Rights executed by Portugal Sr. and his 4 siblings, over the
estate of their father, a parcel of land n Caloocan was issued a
TCT in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo.
Paz died in 1984, while Portugal Sr. died intestate in 1985.
In 1988, Leonila executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole
Heir of Estate of Deceased Person, adjudicating to herself the
Caloocan parcel of land, and was subsequently registered
(1988) in her name Leonila Portugal Beltran, married to
Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.
In 1996, Isabel and Portugal, Jr. (petitioners) filed a complaint
against Leonila for cancellation of Affidavit of Adjudication and
TCT issued in her name, alleging that Leonila is not related
whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, Sr., hence, not entitled to
inherit the Caloocan parcel of land, and accordingly prayed that
said TCT be cancelled and a new one be issued in their
(petitioners) name.
A Pre-Trial Order was issued & after trial, the trial court
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction without resolving the issues as stated in the pre-trial
order, on the ground that petitioners status and right as
putative heirs had not been established before a probate court.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to CA, citing the case of Carino
vs. Carino. In this case, the SC ratiocinates that the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the
parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential
to the determination of the case.
However, the CA found Carino to be inapplicable. The appellate
court held that in Carino case, the main issue was the validity of
the two marriages, whereas in the instant case, the main issue
is the annulment of title to property. Thus, the CA affirmed the
TCs dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to

determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case
for annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of
the TCT issued in her name.
RULING: NO.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or
wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugals estate,
executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of
Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it
should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will,
or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
Page 60
the 12 hectare land in question stating the ultimate facts in

support of their claim.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal.

A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to
declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
RULING:No.
CALMA VS. TANEDO
1)
Institution of testate or intestate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased spouse
Doctrine: Debts chargeable against the conjugal property

should be filed in the testamentary proceeding of the deceased
wife.
FACTS:
Spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were owners of
the subject property, being their conjugal property. They were
indebted to respondent Esperanza Tanedo, chargeable against
the conjugal property. Fausta died leaving a will wherein she
appointed her daughter, Maria Calma as administratrix of her
properties. In the probate proceedings, Maria was appointed as
judicial administratrix of the properties of the deceased.
While probate proceedings were pending, respondent Tanedo
filed a complaint against Eulalio Calma for the recovery of the
debt. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent. In the
execution of the judgment, the subject property was sold by the
sheriff.
Maria Calma ,as administratrix of the estate of Fausta, filed the
present action to annul the sale of the property and prays that
the estate of the deceased be declared as the absolute owner.
The probate proceedings of the deceased were instituted in
accordance with Act No. 3176.
ISSUE: Whether the debts may be recovered against the
husband of the deceased.
2) An ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of the

property of a conjugal partnership.
These remedies cannot be availed of at the same time.
In the present case, a testamentary proceeding was already
instituted for the partition of the conjugal property. It follows
then that when respondent filed a suit, the power of Eulalio
Calma as legal administrator of the conjugal property while
Fausta was living had ceased and passed to Maria Calma as
administratrix appointed in the testamentary proceedings.
Hence, the claim for the debts which is chargeable against the
conjugal property should have been filed in the testamentary
proceedings of the deceased and not against the husband of
the deceased who had already ceased as administrator of the
conjugal property.
The court also annulled the sale of the subject property. The
property should be demed subject to the testamentary
proceedings of the deceased Fausta.
OCAMPO VS. POTENCIANO
Castillo, Shain Ann
Doctrine: Husband is no longer an administrator of the
conjugal estate of deceased wife.
FACTS:
Page 60
Shain Ann C.
Under Act No. 3176, there are two actions/remedies for the
liquidation of conjugal property:
On the same day, Ocampo signed another document, making it

appear that, for an annual rental, the spouses Potenciano were
leasing the house to him for the duration of the redemption
period.
Petitioner spouses failed to repurchase the property. Thus, an
affidavit for consolidation of title was filed by Potenciano, on the
strength of which, the Register of Deeds issued TCT in the name
of spouses Potenciano.
When Edilberto Ocampo and Rufina Reyes died, respondent
Potenciano gave Paz Yatco another option to repurchase the
property. Yatco sought to exercise the option and deposited the
money in court, when Potenciano rejected the same. Yatco
brought an action to compel respondent to accept the money
and to have the property reinstated in her name and that of her
husband. She also alleged that the real transaction between
them was an equitable mortgage.
Potencianos children intervened and filed a cross-complaint,
alleging that the option to repurchase was null and void as to
the share of their mother Rufina Reyes in the property which
share passed to them by right of inheritance.
ISSUES:
(1) What is the real contract between the parties?
(2) Whether the surviving spouse (Potenciano) has the
authority to enter in anagreement of repurchase after the death
of his wife.
RULING:
(1) The real contract entered into between petitioner and
respondent was an equitable mortgage. Therefore, the
consolidation of title effected by respondent Potenciano
was null and void. As a consequence, Potencianos
children has no right over the subject property, since the
property never passed to their parents.
(2) Potenciano had no such authority. The rule that upon the
dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the
husband must liquidate the partnership affairs is now
obsolete.
The present rules of court now provides that,when the
marriage is dissolved by the death of either husband or
wife, the partnership affairs must be liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse.
RULE
74
Summary Settlement of Estates
MALAHACAN VS. IGNACIO

Castillo, Rochelle Jane
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the subprovince of Marinduque, Province of Tayabas,
the Hon. J.S. Powell presiding, awarding the possession of the
lands described in the complaint to the plaintiff, with costs. The
action is brought by Simon Malahacan as administrator of the
goods, chattels, and credits of Guillerma Martinez, deceased,
against the defendants, the only heirs at law of the said
deceased, to recover possession of the real estate of which the
said Guillerma Martinez died seized, which said real estate the
Page 60
Spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco executed a

deed to convey to spouses Conrado Potenciano and Rufina
Reyes by way of sale with pacto de retro a town lot with a
house. The subject property though registered in the name of
Ocampo, in reality it belonged to him and his wife as conjugal
property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Simon Malahacan can validly demand
the recovery of possession from the Ignacio?
RULING:
No. Under the provisions of the Civil Code the ownership
of real estate passes to the heirs of the owner instantly in his
death. Guillerma Martinez, having died seized of the lands
involved in this suit, leaving the defendants as her only heirs at
law, it follows that said heirs instantly became the owners and
were entitled to the immediate possession thereof. It is not
alleged in the complaint nor does it appear from the record or
the evidence in this case that there were debts outstanding
against Guillerma Martinez at the time of her death. The only
ground upon which an administrator can demand of the heirs at
law possession of the real estate of which his intestate died
seized is that such land will be required to be sold to pay the
debts of the deceased. In the case of Ilustre, administrator of
the estate of the deceased Calzado vs. Alaras Frondosa (17 Phil.
Rep., 321), this court said: "x x x The Code of Procedure in Civil
Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for
partition in case they can not mutually agree in the division.
When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is
certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in
the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs.
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts,
there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the
costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging
absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against
the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any
way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs."
ARCILLAS VS. MONTEJO
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge acted properly in

dismissing the administration proceedings under the authority
of section 1, rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon averments
that the estate left no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in
its distribution are all of age?
RULING:
No. Under section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court,
if the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs and
legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see
FACTS:
Filed before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga on

November 12 and 16, 1962, respectively, are two separate
petitions having direct and special reference to Lot No. 276. This
lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-244 (2155 (0656), forms a major part of the estate of the late Eustaquio
Arcillas who died intestate on March 8, 1958 in the City of
Zamboanga. In the petition dated November 12 Geronimo
Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased, sought the
cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name of the deceased and
prayed for the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names
of the heirs in the enumerated proportions alleged in the
petition. It was claimed that at various dates after the death of
the deceased, several transactions affecting Lot No. 276
transpired, prominent among which were the separate sales of
their respective shares and participation in Lot No. 276
executed by four (4) other children of the deceased in favor of
co-heir Vicente Arcillas. Invoking section 112 of Act No. 496
(Land Registration Act), Geronimo Arcillas argued that the
proportion of each heir's participation in said lot should be
accurately reflected in a new certificate of title. But before any
other material pleading could be filed with respect to this
petition, five (5) other children of the deceased filed the
November 16 petition aforementioned. This later petition,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 632, prayed for the
issuance of letters of administration in favor of herein petitioner
preparatory to the final settlement of the deceased's estate.
Page 60
defendants had been occupying for some years before the

commencement of this action.
fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the

Register of Deeds and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. And primarily anchored on the
proposition that inasmuch as in the present case the minimum
requirements of the aforementioned section obtain, i.e. the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age,
respondents claim that there is no necessity for the institution
of special proceedings and the appointment of an administrator
for the settlement of the estate for the reason that it is
superfluous and unnecessary. In other words, respondents
apparently view section 1 of Rule 74 as mandatory upon the
heirs so long as the deceased left no will nor any pending
obligations to be paid and his heirs are all of age. We cannot
entirely agree with the respondents. On a similar contention in
the past, we had occasion to explain in Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan,
et al., 92 Phil. 273: ... section I does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no
debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows
the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may
see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a
different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or
compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of
the word may. If the intention were otherwise the framer of the
rule would have employed the word shall as was done in other
provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word
may its used not only once but in the whole section which
indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the
discretion of the heirs.
PEREIRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Cadavis, Albert
Rita instituted a special proceeding before the RTC for

the issuance of letters of administration in her favor
alleging that:
1) She and Victoria are the only surviving heirs;
2) Deceased left no will;
3) There are no creditors;
4) He left several properties his death benefits to PAL,
PALEA, PESALA and SSS as well as savings deposit
with PNB and PCIB
5) 300 sqm lot
6) That the spouse is working in London as an auxiliary
nurse and of her salary forms part of the estate.
Petitioner filed her opposition and a motion to dismiss

alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for
purposes of administration and if an estate exists, the
letters of administration be issued in her favor as the
surviving spouse.
RTC appointed Rita administratrix of the estate of the

deceased upon a bond posted by her in the amount of
1k. The Trial Court ordered her to take custody of the
real and personal properties and make an inventory
thereof.
Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed the decision.
Andres Pereira is an employee of PAL. He died without a

will and survived by his spouse victoria herein petitioner
and his sister Rita herein private respondent.
ISSUES:
1) WON there exists an estate of the deceased Andres for
purposes of administration?
Page 60
FACTS:
RULING:
1) Petitioner contends that there exists no estate for
purposes of administration for the reason: First, the
death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and SSS belong
exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and she
submitted letter-replies to support her claim showing
that she is the exclusive beneficiary. Second, the savings
deposit of her husband from PNB and PCIB had been
used to defray the funeral expenses. Finally, only real
property of the deceased extrajudicially settled between
them as the only surviving heirs.
Respondent argues that it is not for petitioner to decide
what properties form part of the estate and to
appropriate for herself. She also points out that this
function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate
proceedings.
Petitioner asks this court to declare that the properties
specified do not belong to the estate of the deceased on
the basis of her bare allegations and handful documents.
Since this court is the trier of facts, the court cannot
order unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of
the property involved from the estate.
The resolution is better left to the probate court before
which the administration proceeding are pending. The
trial court is in the best position to receive evidence. The
function of resolving WON the property should be
included in the inventory or list of properties is one
clearly within the competence of the probate court.
2) The general rule is that when a person dies leaving

property, the same should be judicially administered and
the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator established in sec. 6 rule 78, in case the
deceased left no will or in case he had left one, or should
he fail to name an executor therein. An exception to this
rule, when all of the heirs of lawful age and there are no
debts due to the estate, they may agree in writing to
partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an
administrator.
Sec.1 of Rule 74, does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings even if the estate
has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to
resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for
partition. While Sec. 1 allows the heirs to divide the
estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to
resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said
provision does not compel them to do so if they have
good reasons to take a different course of action. It
should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned
only if the heirs have good reason for not resorting to an
action for partition.
When partition is possible, either in or out of court, the
estate should not be burdened with an administration
proceeding without good or compelling reasons.
The court see no reason not to apply the doctrine to the
case at bar. There are 2 surviving heirs, and admitted
that there are no debts. What is apparent is that these 2
are not in good terms. The reason why private
Page 60
2) WON a judicial administration proceeding is necessary

where there are no debts lefts by decedent?
respondent seeks the appointment is her to obtain

possession for her own purposes, since these properties
are presently in the hands of the petitioner who
supposedly disposed in fraudulently.
The court is of the opinion that this is not a compelling
reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of
the estate of the deceased.
The Court hold that, the Trial court which the
administration proceedings are pending was not justified
in issuing the letters of administration there being no
good reasons for burdening the estate.
which they, however, never registered in the office of

the Registrar of Deed.
Both
Ananias and Marciano, represented by his

daughter, Maria, that cadastral Lot as allocated
during the said partition. Then Ananias died, his
daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of
said property. Juanita Pada sold to engr. ernesto Paderes,
the right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner.
L a t e r o n , M a r i a Pa d a s e l l t h e c o o w n e r s h i p r i
ght of
his father, Marciano.
Private
respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the
buyer.
PADA-KILARIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Cadavis, Albert
Private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses
FACTS:
Jacinto Pada had six children, namely, Marciano,
Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta.
He died intestate.
Private respondent filed in the MCTC, a complaint for
coconut land in Leyte. It is the northern portion

cadastral Lot which is the subject to the instant
controversy.
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother,

feliciano Pada, obtained permission from him to build a
house on the northern. Then feliciano died, his son,
Pastor, continued living in the house together with his
eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada hilario, one of
Pastor/s children, has been living in that house.
The
heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an

extrajudicial
partition
of
his
estate.
For
this purpose,
they executed
a private
document
ejectment with prayer for damages against petitioner

spouses. However, the heirs of Amador Pada executed a
Deed of Donation transferring to petitioner Verona Pada
hilario, their respective shares as co-owners of the lot.
Petitioner spouses alleged that the northern portion of
the Lot had already been donated to them by the heirs
of Amador Pada.
They contended that the extra-judicial partition of the
estate of Jacinto Pada executed was invalid and
ineffectual
since
no
special power of attorney
was executed by Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor
of their respective children presented them in the
extrajudicial partition.
Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private
document that was never registered in the office of
the Registrar of Deeds of leyte. the MCTC rendered
judgment in favor of petitioner spouses.
Private respondent appealed to the Regional trial court
and render the reversal of judgment. Petitioners filed
Page 60
His estate included a parcel land a residential and
vacate the northern portion so his family can utilize the

said area. The amicable settlement was failed.
in the court of Appeals a petition for relief and later on, a

Motion
for Reconsideration,
however,
bot
here
dismissed. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial partition of the estate is
valid
RULING:
We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of
Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is valid albeit
executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires
partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order
to be valid. The requirement in sec. 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised
Rules
of
court
that
a
partition
be put in a public document and registeredhas for its purpose th
e protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy
claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice to others. it follows then that the intrinsic validity of
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not
undermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditors
to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an
estate to enter into agreement for distribution thereof in
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the
rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that
a writing and be registered in order to be valid. The partition of
inherited property need not be embodied in a public document
so as to be effective as regards the heirs that participated
therein. The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Padas estate
being legal and effective as among his heirs, Juanita and maria
pada validly transferred their ownership rights over the lot to
engr. Paderes and private respondent.
MCMICKING VS. SY CONBIENG

dela Cruz, Kyzeth
Margarita Jose, a native of the Philippines, died

sometime on February 1902 in Amoy, China. Engracio
Palanca was appointed as administrator of the estate left
by Jose, which estate was partly located in Hong Kong and
partly in the Philippines. Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco
and Dy Cunyao executed bonds as sureties of Palanca
who thereafter took possession of all the properties of
Jose. Upon the death of Mariano Ocampo in 1904, Palanca
was required to furnish a new bond, which new bond was
subsequently filed through new sureties.
Mariano Ocampo (Palancas former surety) left an estate
and Doroteo Velasco was appointed as its administrator
with sureties Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia
Barretto. Mariano Ocampo was also survived by his
heirs; a daughter to whom he left 2/3 of his estate and 3
sons in China to whom he left the remaining 1/3 of his
estate. Doroteo, Mariano Ocampos estate administrator
filed a complete report and inventory of the latters
properties, together with a statement of all his debts and
liabilities. As a part of said report, Doroteo filed an
instrument signed by all of the persons interested in the
estate of Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the partitition of
the estate among themselves without proceedings in
court, at the same time assuming the payment of all
obligations against the estate. Such partition agreed to
was affirmed and approved by an order of the court and
Doroteo, in pursuance of such order and after having
settled all liabilities of the estate delivered all of the
properties to the respective devisees and legatees leaving
no property of the estate in his hands.
FACTS:
Page 60
Sometime in 1908, Engracio Palanca was removed from

office as the administrator of Margarita Joses estate by
reason of the fact that Palanca failed and refused to
render an account of the property and funds of the said
estate and even failed and refused to deliver such
property and funds to his successor Jose McMicking who
was appointed as administrator of Margarita Joses estate
in Palancas stead. Palanca retained possession of said
property and funds, absconded with the same, and never
returned to the Philippines. Due to these circumstances
McMicking instituted a claim against the estate of Mariano
Ocampo who was a surety of Palanca. The court approved
such claim and directed that Doroteo Velasco, the
administrator of Mariano Ocampos estate, pay it if he had
sufficient funds. No payment was made to Margarita
Joses estate.
McMicking then instituted a claim against the estate of
Pio de la Guardia Barretto who died in 1905. Pio was
one of the sureties of Doroteo Velasco when he was
appointed as administrator of Mariano Ocampos estate.
Pio left an estate to which the defendant Benito Sy
Conbieng was appointed as administrator. The
committee appointed by the court to appraise and hear
claims against Pios estate disallowed McMickings claim
and such finding of the committee was affirmed by said
lower court.
HELD:
Judgment of the lower court disallowing the claim against
Pio de la Guardia Barrettos estate affirmed.
Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio was surety,
would not have been liable himselfhad this action been
commenced against him. If the principal is not liable upon
the obligation, the surety cannot be. The basis of the
liability of a surety on administrator's bond is the fault or
failure of the principal. If the latter incurs no liability, the
former incurs none. The administrator who complies with
the law incurs no liability to any person.
The estate of Mariano Ocampo against which McMickings
original claim was made and to which Doroteo Velasco
was appointed as administrator was already partitioned at
the time the claim was made.
A partition of the property of a deceased person may be
made under the provisions of sections 596 and 597 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding that an
administrator with the will annexed has been appointed
and the administration of the estate under said
appointment is in progress. Such provisions are applicable
no matter what stage the administration has reached.
"SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without
Page 60
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benito Sy Conbieng as administrator of Pio

de la Guardia Barrettos estate is liable for the claim made
by Jose McMicking in favor of Margarita Joses estate.
"SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts.

But if it shall appear, at any time within two years
after such settlement and distribution of the estate,
that there are debts outstanding against the estate
which have not been paid, any creditor may compel
the settlement of the estate in the courts in the
manner hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall
be paid, with interest; and the administrator
appointed by the court may recover the assets of
the estate from those who have received them, for
the purpose of paying the debts; and the real estate
belonging to the deceased shall remain charged with
the liability to creditors for the full period of two
years after such distribution, notwithstanding any
transfers thereof that may have been made."
These sections provide for the voluntary division of the

whole property of the decedent without proceedings in
court.
Where, after the appointment of an administrator with the
will annexed of a deceased person and the due making of
the inventory of the property and the taking possession
thereof by such administrator, an agreement is made
between the owners thereof under the will already
probated partitioning the same between them under said

sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, the delivery of the
property to such partitioning owners by such
administrator, under proper proceedings and order of
court and after compliance with the provisions of such
sections, is, in effect, a discharge of such administrator as
to all future obligations and responsibilities in relation to
said property. In other words, if he turns such property
over to the owners thereof after a partition among them
was made in complete accordance with said sections, and
he performs his full duty as such administrator, neither he
nor his bondsmen are liable to any person for such act. An
administrator cannot be held to accountability for
property over which he has no power or control or
jurisdiction and in which he has no legal interest. The
thing on which he was appointed to operate having been
withdrawn wholly beyond his ken by the very power (the
law, secs. 596 and 597) which appointed him, there is a
complete revocation of the original appointment dating
from the day of the removal from his hands of the
property which he was appointed to administer.
The administrator has no power or control or jurisdiction
and no legal interest in the property anymore because by
such partition, the estate passes out of existence. The
whole property is taken from the administrator and
passed on to the owners. They become the absolute
owners thereof, subject only to the liability of divestiture
on the happening of certain events; but even such
divestiture may be avoided by paying the debt, which is
the moving cause thereof.
Page 60
legalproceedings, in certain cases.Whenever all

the heirs of a deceased person are of lawful age and
legal capacity, and there are no debts due from the
intestate estate, or all the debts have been paid by
the heirs, the heirs may, by a family council as
known under Spanish law, or by agreement between
themselves, duly executed in writing, apportion and
divide the estate among themselves, as they may
see fit, without proceedings in court."
In effect, Section 597 creates a statute of limitations,

which deprives all debtsnot discovered within the
prescribed time, of the power of requiring an
administration
of
the
estate
remaining.
Such
administration, after partition, depends upon the
discovery of the debt "at any time within two years after
the settlement and distribution of the estate." These
sections do not operate unless that discovery is made
within the time prescribed.

The partition provided for in these sections is binding and
valid even though not all of the debts actually outstanding
were paid before the partition was made. The discovery of
an unpaid obligation after partition does not destroy the
partition. It simply furnishes ground for the application of
the creditor for the appointment of an administrator. The
discovery of a debt after partition does not permit the
whole property in possession of the partitioning parties to
be thrown into administration. Only so much of the
property is subject to such administration as is sufficient
to pay the claim discovered, leaving the partitioning
persons in undisturbed possession of the remainder.Even
after the discovery of a debt subsequent to partition, the
partitioning persons may prevent any administration
whatever by paying the debt discovered, thereby
preserving the partition intact in all its parts.
GERONA V. DE GUZMAN
dela Cruz, Kyzeth
FACTS:
Petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion,
Francisco and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that
they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and
Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9,
1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman
and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; thatafter the death
of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila
Ramos, who begot him several children, namely,
respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica,
Page 60
While at any time within two years after such partition the
property, or a portion thereof, then in possession of the
partitioning
parties,
may
be
placed
again
in
administration in the event of the discovery of unpaid
debts "within two years after such settlement and
distribution of the estate," it would not be the same
estate represented by the prior administrator, and he
would not be the administrator of the new estate by virtue
of his appointment in the old. It would be necessary to
appoint, upon proper application and notice, another
administrator for the purposes set forth in said sections.
Before this, it is necessary that the requisite conditions
are present; the unpaid debt must be discovered and the
creditor must make his application. In the case at bar,
neither of the above conditions being present, there could
be no administration after partition. No new administrator
was or could be appointed. There was no administration.
The appointment of commissioners to hear plaintiff's
claim was without authority. It was an appointment in
respect to an estate that did not legally exist and in
relation to an administration that had never been
inaugurated. The acts of such commissioners were
without legal effect.
Petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying

said deed of extrajudicial settlement, insofar as it
deprives them of their participation of 1/8th of the
properties in litigation. On the other hand, respondents
maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased Placida
de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate of
Marcelo de Guzman, shebeing merely a spurious child of
the latter, and that petitioners' action is barred by the
statute of limitations.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the action
has prescribed, which decision was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of the petitioners to annul the
extrajudicial settlement executed by the respondents has
prescribed.
HELD:
The SC affirmed the decision of the CA affirming the RTCs
dismissal of the case on the ground that the action has
prescribed.
Upon appeal, petitioners contended that since they and
the respondents were co-heirs of Marcelo, the action for
partition does not prescribe.
The SC held that although, as a general rule, an action for
partition among coheirs does not prescribe, this is true
only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in
question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations
operates, as in other cases; from the moment the
possessor of the property asserts such adverse title.
When respondents executed the deed of extrajudicial
settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of
the deceased, and secured new transfer certificates of
title in their own name, they thereby excluded the
petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and
consequently, set up a title adverse to them.
Page 60
Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that

Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945; that
subsequently, or on May 6, 1948 respondents executed a
deed of "extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased
Marcelo
de
Guzman",
fraudulently
misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving
heirs of the deceased although they well knew that
petitioners were, also, his forced heirs. Thatrespondents
had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the
transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land,
issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and
new transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own
name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for
each; that such fraud was discovered by the petitioners
only the year before the institution of the case; that
petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their
share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th Interest
thereon.
The action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement

upon the ground of fraud may be filed within four years
from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed
to have taken place when said instrument was filed with
the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were
issued in the name of the respondents exclusively.
toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the

defendants, but the same failed. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the complaint. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUES:
PEDROSA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

De guzman , Jabrielle
(1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of

Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition had already prescribed (2)
whether or not said deed is valid
FACTS:
HELD:
Spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated

proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption
of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. CFI granted
the petition. Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and
Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguels
estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion
the estate of Miguel. Private respondents filed an action to
annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City.
CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption.
Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision to
the Court of Appeals. While said appeal was pending, the
Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with
respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and
of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of
the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his
brothers and sisters. Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but
upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner. Thereafter,
petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share
of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused
saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they
were not their blood relatives. Petitioner, then, filed a complaint
to annul the 1983 partition. Said complaint was later amended
on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation that earnest efforts
Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period

(1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice
of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the
provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied
with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have
taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians. Petitioner, as the records
confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition.
Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable
in her case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4)
years. Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed
on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the
questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was
executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on
the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule
on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states: The fact of
the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published
in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in
the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement
shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof. Under said provision, without
Page 60
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the
deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the
ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed
without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of
and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena
is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother,
Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the
collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate,
following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code. The
private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not
aware of Maria Elenas adoption since they even filed an action
to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that
their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was
still being questioned at the time they executed the deed of
partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed
only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently
a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting
from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid
and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private
respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with
intent to defraud Maria Elena.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the
partition in question which was null and void as far as the
plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions.
The partition in the present case was invalid because it
excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares
in the partitioned property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial

settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof. As the partition
was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was
not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge
the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution
in 1941. To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in
the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child,
was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only
represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena.
Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate
automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares.
Respondent Rodriguezes interests did not include Miguels
estate but only Pilars estate.
Petition is GRANTED.
ESTATE OF FRANCISCO VS. CARREON
De guzman , Jabrielle
FACTS:
Rosa Aldana Francisco petitioned the Court of First Instance of
Rizal summarily to settle the estate of her husband Jose M.
Francisco. Alleging that they had three minor children who were
his legal heirs, and that the deceased left a parcel of land with
house thereon, and no creditors, she asked for declaration that
the persons entitled to share in his estate are the said three
minor children, with herself as usufructuary. She requested for
appointment as guardian ad item of her three minor children,
and her request was granted in due course. Petition was
approved and was registered.
Rosa Aldana Francisco mortgaged her share of the realty to the
sisters Fausta Carreon and Catalina Carreon and was duly
registered. Afterwards, she conveyed by absolute deed of sale,
Page 60
the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the

extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The
rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued
before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon,
i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the
said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after,
which was when publication was done in the instant case.
However, in a motion, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda.de Francisco,

mother of the deceased Jose M. Francisco, allegedly in
representation of the minor Jose Francisco y Palumpon, averred
that this minor was a recognized natural son of the deceased,
with legal right to participate in his estate, that the previous
proceedings were void because Rosa Aldana Francisco had
concealed such fact, and because she had interests in conflict
with those of her three sons, the truth being that the land was
private property of Jose M. Francisco of which she could not
have been awarded a portion in fee simple.
When the motion to annul or reopen was called for hearing,
Macaria Palumpon requested in open court the dismissal,
without prejudice, of Jose Francisco y Palumpon's demand for
recognition. Her request was granted.
Both Rosa Aldana and the Carreons moved for reconsideration,
contending that, inasmuch as Jose Francisco y Palumpon had
withdrawn, there was no authority to continue, for the matter
became a closed incident. Thereafter, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de
Francisco, as guardian ad item of the three legitimate,
submitted an "amended motion" wherein she made practically
the same allegations of her previous motion and prayed for
identical remedies except those touching the recognition of
Jose Francisco y Palumpon. Overruling objections, the court
admitted the amended motion, heard it granting the interested
parties opportunity to present their evidence and arguments,
and rendered judgment holding the realty was private property
of the deceased Jose Francisco, who had acquired it four years
before his marriage to Rosa Aldana. Wherefore it held that the
whole property passed to the ownership of the three legitimate
children of the deceased, subject to usufructuary rights of the

widow; it annulled the mortgage and the sale executed by Rosa
Aldana in favor of the Carreon sisters, and then issued other
appropriate instructions to the Register of Deeds.
ISSUES:
WON the court erred: (1) in continuing to hear the motion for
reopening, even after the natural child had withdrawn from the
litigation and (2) in taking cognizance of the annulment of the
mortgage and sale, which it could validly consider as a probate
court.
HELD:
Supposing the original motion did not afford legal standing to
the three legitimate children, and that it could not be
"amended", as contended by appellants, we perceive no reason
to prevent the court below from considering such amended
motion as a new and independent petition in the expediente,
filed expressly on behalf of the three minor children. The matter
of time might conceivably be material in regard in considering
the "amended" motion as "original" motion; but in this case it
happens to be immaterial, because under section 5 of Rule 74
such motion may be lodged with the court within one year after
the minors have reached majority; and they are still minors
now. Incidentally this section 5 fully answers appellants'
contention that Tiburcia's moves should have been initiated
within two years after November 8, 1947.
Appellants may not justly complain that they thought such
petition for readjustment or reopening could take place only
within two years as prescribed by section 4 of Rule 74 and as
annotated in the certificate of title; because they are
conclusively presumed to know the existence and provisions of
section 5, Rule 74. As the trial judge correctly observed:
Page 60
to the aforesaid creditors, her interest and participation in the

land. This sale was likewise inscribed in the office of the
Register of Deeds.
Contrary to appellants' claim, relief for the minors cannot be

directed against the bond which, according to appellants,
should have been demanded under section 3, Rule 74, because
that section applies where personal property is distributed not
where, as here, realty is the subject of partition.
Several decisions hold that "If during the summary proceeding
some of the heirs claim, by title adverse to that of the
decedent, some parcels of land, the probate court has no
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue which must be decided in a
separate suit". But here there is no question that the realty
belonged to the decedent; and a separate suit was
unnecessary, specially remembering that in these summary
settlements the judge is expected to "proceed summarily" and
"without delay""to determine who are the persons legally
entitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion and divide
it among them."
The resolution under review apportions property admittedly

belonging to the decedent among his legal heirs. It is no
objection that it affects the herein appellants. They knew or
ought to know the rule permitting such to reapportionment
even after two years, and they have been given every chance
to be heard, having been by their own petition, regarded as
parties to the entire proceedings. And section 4, Rule 74 (which
must be deemed extensible to situations covered by section 5,
Rule 74) expressly authorizes the court to give to every heir his
lawful participation in the real estate "notwithstanding any
transfers of such real estate" and to "issue execution" thereon.
All this implies that, when within the amendatory period the
realty has been alienated, the court in re-dividing it among the
heirs has authority to direct cancellation of such alienation in
the same estate proceedings, whenever it becomes necessary
to do so. To require the institution of a separate action for such
annulment would run counter to the letter of the above rule and
the spirit of these summary settlements.
From the foregoing, the conclusion follows that no prejudicial
error was committed by the lower court, whose order is,
consequently, affirmed with costs.
SAMPILO ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Dimaliwat, Dianne
FACTS:
Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. Teodoro
left four parcels of land in Pangasinan. He left as heirs his
widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces.
Without any judicial proceedings, Leoncia (his widow) executed
an affidavit (Exhibit A) stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete
left no children or respondent neither ascendants or
acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews
Page 60
But the whole trouble is that they accepted the mortgage with
the encumbrance annotated; and while it referred to Rule 74,
Section 4, and did not specifically mention section 5, the fact
that section 4, Rule 74 was therein noted should have been
sufficient warning to them that the title was subject to the
interest of persons unduly prejudiced hereby. We take judicial
notice of the fact that in the adjudication in summary
settlements more often that not, the order merely says that the
sale shall be subject to the provisions of section 4, Rule 74. This
is the case because the Court can not foresee whether the
movant would be affected; but section 5 being an imposition of
the law, and being a mere sequence to the provisions of Section
4; we hold that where the title on its face shows that it was
subject to the provisions of Rule 74, section 4, a third person
who accepts it must take notice that he is running the risk of
interferring with the rights of minors as provided under section
5, Rule 74.
or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife of

the deceased, the one and only person to inherit the above
properties. Leoncia then executed a deed of sale (Exhibit B) of
all the above parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo. Benny
then sold (Exhibit C) the parcels of land to Honorato Salacup.
These three documents were registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
Felisa
Sinopera
instituted
proceedings
for
the
administration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete. The complaint
alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute
the affidavit of adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired
no rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had Benny
Sampilo acquired any right to the said properties
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of
action to recover her and her co-heirs' participation to the lands
in question had not prescribed at the time the action to recover
was filed.
had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the

extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of
such effect is made, either directly or by implication.
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the
case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the opinion and so
hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring
distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition
after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial
partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated
or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in
addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have
been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of
the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or
are represented by themselves or through guardians.
The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements
because not all the heirs interested have participated in the
extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that
the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces
living at the time of his death.
RULING:
The procedure outlined in Section

extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit,
proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic
such settlement or distribution would affect
1 of Rule 74 of
is an ex parte
be contended that
third persons who
RULE
75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary

US VS. CHIU GUIMCO
Dimaliwat, Dianne
FACTS:
Joaquin Cruz, a chinese merchant living for many years
in the municipality of Gingoog, Province of Misamis, died while
Page 60
It is argued that as the action was instituted almost four

years after the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", was
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan,
the right of action of the administratrix has prescribed and
lapsed because the same was not brought within the period of
two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court.
visiting China. Before his departure from the Philippines he had

executed a will before Anastacio Servillon, a notary public, in
which Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden were named as executors. Chiu
Guimco is Joaquin Cruzs brother.
Guimco, as attorney in fact and manager of the estate of
his deceased brother, entered into an agreement with his
brothers Filipina wife, whereby she relinquished her claims to
the estate for a consideration. He also entered into an
agreement with Uy Cuan, his brothers Chinese wife, for the
distribution of the estate and for the payment of rentals on her
interest in the real estate. No payments have, however, been
made by Guimco.
Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan, wrote a letter to
Guimco urging him to produce the will of the decedent for the
institution of lawful proceedings in accordance therewith.
Guimco replied that the will in question had never been in his
possession and that he had never seen it.
A complaint was filed under section 628 of the Code of
Civil Procedure charging Guimco with the failure to produce the
will within the time required by law. The court found the
accused guilty and imposed upon him a fine of P1800.
Subsequently, the court, believing that the will was in his
possession, ordered him to produce it but Guimco still failed to
do so. The court ordered the confinement of Guimco in the
provincial jail.
The remedy provided in section 629 of the Code of Procedure is

clearly a totally different remedy, having no relation with that
provided in section 628 (now section 4 of Rule 75). It is not
permissible in a prosecution under Sec. 628 to superimpose
upon the penalty of fine therein prescribed the additional
penalty of imprisonment prescribed under Sec. 629.
To enforce the production of the will by the accused at a trial
under Sec. 628 would virtually compel him to convict himself,
since the mere production of the will by him would be
conclusive that he had possession of it as charged in the
criminal complaint. This would constitute an infringement of the
provision of law which says that in a criminal action the
defendant shall be exempt from testifying against himself.
GUEVARRA VS. GUEVARRA

Dimaampao, Mahadodin
ISSUE:
Whether the judge was acting within his power when he
ordered the commitment of Guimco to the provincial jail?
PALACIOS VS. CATIMBANG-PALACIOS

Dumapias, Gay
FACTS:
Page 60
RULING:
No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now

section 5 of Rule 75), which allows imprisonment of a person
who neglects to deliver a will after the death of the testator
without reasonable cause, can only be applied when a court is
acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration
of the estates of deceased persons. Where administration
proceedings are not already pending, the court, before taking
action under this section, should require that there be before it
some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to
make action by the court under this section appropriate.
entirely un-affected, and may be raised even after the will has
been authenticated."
On the other hand, "after a will has been probated during the
lifetime of a testator, it does not necessarily mean that he
cannot alter or revoke the same before he has had a chance to
present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after
the testator's death would be in order".The reason for this is
that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, new Civil
Code.).
Trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling
the portion of the will which allegedly impairs the legitime of
the oppositor on the ground that, as it has found, she is an
extraneous matter which should be treshed out in a separate
action.
FERNANDEZ VS. DIMAGIBA
Dumapias, Gay
FACTS:
The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes
have petitioned for a review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
in a Special Proceeding, admitting to probate the alleged last
will and testament of the deceased, and overruling the
opposition to the probate.
On January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent),
submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the
probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes,
executed on October 22, 1930. The will instituted the petitioner
as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was
set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio
Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar,
Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be
heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate
asked. Grounds: forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix,
estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will
by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate
made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and
Page 60
June 25, 1946 - Juan Palacios executed his last will and
testament. Availing himself of the provisions of the new Civil
Code, he filed on May 23, 1956 before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas a petition for its approval. In said will, he
instituted as his sole heirs his natural children Antonio C.
Palacios and Andrea C. Palacios.
June 21, 1956 - an opposition was filed by Maria Catimbang to
the probate of the will. Ground: she is the acknowledged natural
daughter of petitioner but that she was completely ignored in
said will thus impairing here legitime. She objects to its intrinsic
validity or to the legality of the provisions of the will.
July 6, 1956 court issued an order ADMITTING the will to
probate. After proper hearing concerning the intrinsic validity of
the will, the court issued another order declaring oppositor to
be the natural child of petitioner and annulling the will insofar
as it impairs her legitime, with costs against petitioner.
Petitioner appealed in order to secure the probate of his will
availing himself of the provisions of Article 838 (2) NCC, which
permit a testator to petition the proper court during his lifetime
for the allowance of his will.
ISSUE:
WON the opposition can be entertained/heard.
RULING:
NO. Its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has
been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law,
much less if the purpose of the opposition is to show that the
oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly has
been ignored in the will for issue cannot be raised here but in a
separate action. This is especially so when the testator, as in
the present case, is still alive and has merely filed a petition for
the allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof after his
death.
In Montaano vs. Suesa, court said: "The authentication of the
will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the
validity of a will. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; that may be
impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The questions relating to these points remain
ISSUES:
(a) whether or not the decree of the CFI allowing the will to
probate had become final for lack of appeal.
(b) whether or not the order of the Court of origin overruling the
estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become
final.
(c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had
been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of
conveyance in favor of the proponent.
RULING:
(a) It is elementary that a probate decree finally and
definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the
testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will
and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid
and enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final

and appealable; Section 1 of Rule 109 specifically prescribes
that "any interested person may appeal in special proceedings
from an order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment:
(a) allows or disallows a will."
Appellants argue: they were entitled to await the trial
Court's resolution on the other grounds of their opposition
before taking an appeal, as otherwise there would be a
multiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts. This contention is
without weight.
The probate decree of the Court was not appealed on time, the
same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate
courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the
evidence upon which it is made to rest.
The revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an
express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the
testatrix allegedly evidencing an abandonment of the original
intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As
such, the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely
the particular devise or legacy. Only the total and absolute
revocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament
(Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).
(b) The presentation and probate of a will are
requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to
protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to
respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and
right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty
imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the
Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation
(Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public
policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel.
(c) Article 957(2) of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of
the Code of 1889), which recites:
Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the
thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that
in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect
only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the
alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if
it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise
Page 60
1944, but conveyances were finally set aside by this Supreme

Court.
CFI: will was genuine and properly executed; but
deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation
"until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of
the properties is opportunely presented."
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for
reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of
estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved.
Court overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask
for the probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the
right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune
time."
1960, the CFI appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the
sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this
was done on February 9, 1960.
On the question of whether the execution by the
testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in
favor of the testamentary heir, subsequent to the execution of
her 1930 testament, had revoked the latter, the trial Court
resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the late
Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the
deeds of sale." Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals.
PASCUAL VS COURT OF APPEALS

Dorado, Czaybeeh
FACTS:
However, after the will had been probated, her daughter

from first marriage, EbbaIngeborg, moved for the annulment of
the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate
administration, thus preparing the way for the establishment of
the claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of her
father. She contended, among others, that the order admitting
the will to probate was made without notice to her. In the
argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at the time
the court made the order of publication, it was apprised of the
fact that the petitioner lived in the United States and that as
daughter and heir she was necessarily interested in the probate
of the will. It is, therefore, insisted that the court should have
appointed a date for the probate of the will sufficiently far in the
future to permit the petitioner to be present either in person or
by representation; and it is said that the failure of the court thus
to postpone the probate of the will constitutes an infringement
of that provision of the Philippine Bill which declared that
property shall not be taken without due process of law.
IN RE JOHNSON
Espino, Carla
Emil Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized

citizen of the United States. He died in the city of Manila leaving
a will. The will is an holographic instrument, being written in the
testator's own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two
witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A petition, however, was
presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for
the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the
time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States
of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with
the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated
here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and three
weeks publication of notice was ordered in the "Manila Daily
Bulletin." Due publication was made pursuant to this order of
the court.
Page 60
shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have

been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of
repurchase.
As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such
change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix,
expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the
circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944
were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee
Dimagiba. As found by the Court of Appeals in its decision
annulling these conveyances, "no consideration whatever was
paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers,
thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying
the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to
comply in advance with what she had ordained in her
testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom.
Revocation being an exception, we believe, that in the
circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.
If the annulment was due to undue influence, then the
transferor was not expressing her own free will and intent in
making the conveyances. Hence, it cannot be concluded, either,
that such conveyances established a decision on her part to
abandon the original legacy.
The recovery of the alienated property "even if it be by reason
of the nullity of the contract" does not revive the legacy. An
alienation through undue influence in no way differs from one
made through violence or intimidation. In either case, the
transferor is not expressing his real intent, and it cannot be held
that there was in fact an alienation that could produce a
revocation of the anterior bequest.
Appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
Whether or not the order admitting the will to probate

was beyond the jurisdiction of the court and void because it was
made without notice to the petitioner; and
RULING:
The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular
and that the publication was sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to
be probated.
In the case of In re Davis, the Court ruled that "the
proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem,
and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide
latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice
to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute
possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a
court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his
property without due process of law, the proceeding being
strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground
that the constructive notice prescribed by the statute was
unreasonably short."
Further, section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides that Upon such terms as may be just the court may
relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment,
order or other proceeding taken against him through his
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; Provided,
That application therefor be made within a reasonable time, but
in no case exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or
proceeding was taken. The use of the word "judgment, order or
other proceeding" in this section indicates an intention on the
part of the Legislature to give wide latitude to the remedy here
provided, and is not to be restricted to judgments or orders
entered in ordinary contentious litigation. In other words the

utility of the provision is not limited to actions proper but
extends to all sorts of judicial proceedings. The word "party,"
used in this section, means any person having an interest in the
subject matter of the proceeding who is in a position to be
concluded by the judgment, order, to other proceeding taken.
Therefore, also in conformity with the doctrine
announced in the Davis case, the petitionerin this case could
have applied at any time within six months for March 16, 1916,
and upon showing that she had been precluded from appearing
in the probate proceedings by conditions over which she had no
control and that the order admitting the will to probate had
been erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or upon a
supposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the court would
have been authorized to set the probate aside and grant a
rehearing. It is no doubt true that six months was, under the
circumstances, a very short period of time within which to
expect the petitioner to appear and be prepared to contest the
probate with the proof which she might have desired to collect
from remote countries. Nevertheless, although the time allowed
for the making of such application was inconveniently short, the
remedy existed; and the possibility of its use is proved in this
case by the circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in fact
here appeared in court by her attorneys and excepted to the
order admitting the will to probate.It follows that the order of
March 16, 1916, admitting the will of Emil H. Johnson to probate
cannot be declared null and void merely because the petitioner
was unavoidably prevented from appearing at the original
hearing upon the matter of the probate of the will in question.
MANAHAN VS. MANAHAN
Espino, Carla
FACTS:
Page 60
ISSUE:
The petitioner, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special

proceedings No. 4162, for the probate of the will of the
deceased Donata Manahan. The court set the date for the
hearing and the necessary notice required by law was
accordingly published. It, later on, entered the decree admitting
the will to probate as prayed for. The will was probated on
September 22, 1930 and appointed the herein petitioner as the
executrix. On May 11, 1932, the appellant herein, Engracia
Manahan, filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial,
praying that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated
and the authenticated will declared null and void ab initio. She
claimed that she was an interested party in the testamentary
proceedings and, as such, was entitled to and should have been
notified of the probate of the will.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner was entitled to and should
have been notified of the probate of the will: and
(2) Whether or not the will is null and void ab initio on the
ground that the external formalities prescribed by the
Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in
the execution thereof.
appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a

forced heir, she did not acquire any successional right.
(2) No. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect
to the due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any
of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any
separate or independent action or proceedings. Also, inasmuch
as the proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem,
the trial court's decree admitting the will to probate was
effective and conclusive against her, in accordance with the
provisions of section 306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure
which reads as follows:
SEC. 306.EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. . . . .
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in
respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the
estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person the
judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the
will or administration, or the condition or relation of the person:
Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of
administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death
of the testator or intestate; . . . .
RULING:
ALABAN VS COURT OF APPEALS
Hipolito, Nina Anthonette
FACTS
Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate
of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido
Elevencionado a. ALLEGATION: he was the heir of the decedent
and the executor of her will. b. RTCs RULING: allowed the
probate of the will and directed the issuance of letters
testamentary to respondent
Page 60
(1) The appellant's contention is obviously unfounded

and untenable. She was not entitled to notification of the
probate of the will and neither had she the right to expect it,
inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed
an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof. Her
allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the
deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be notified
on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the
will could not have been probated because: a) the

signature of the decedent was forged; b) the will was not
executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to
sign below the attestation clause; c) the decedent lacked
testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; d) the will
was executed by force and under duress and improper pressure;
e) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of
affixing of her signature; and f)she did not know the properties
to be disposed of, having included in the will properties which
no longer belonged to her. b. RTCs Ruling: denied motion 1)
petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by publication
and that the deficiencyin the payment of docket fees is not a
ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. 2) RTCs
Decision was already final and executory even before
petitioners filing of the motion to reopen 3. Petitioners filed a
petition to annule RTCs decision a.CLAIM: there was a
compromise agreement between petitioners and respondents
and they learnt the probate proceeding only in July 2001 b.CAs
RULING: petition dismissed 1) no showing that petitioners failed
to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of newtrial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies
through no fault of their own.
ISSUE:
W/N the allowance of the will to probate should be
annulled for failure to mention the petitioners asparties
RULING:
No 1. Probate of a will is considered action in rem a.
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee
named in a will, or any other personinterested in the estate
may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the
court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the
time and place for proving the will must bepublished for three
(3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in

the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator b.
Petitioners became parties due to the publication of the notice
of hearing 2.The filing of motion to reopen is similar to a motion
for new triala.The ruling became final and executor because the
motion was filed out of time. Given that they knew of the
decision 4 months after they could have filed a petition for relief
from judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen. 3.
Petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to
comply with the substantive requisites, a. An action for
annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the
case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
PURPOSE: to have the final and executory judgment set aside
so that there will be a renewal of litigation. 4. Notice is required
to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator a. the will states that the respondent was instituted
as the sole heir of the decedent thus he has no legal obligation
to mention petitioners in the petition for probate or personally
notify them.
RULE
76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will

SANTOS VS. CASTILLO
FACTS:
Petitioner Emerita Santos, in her behalf and as guardian
of the minor acknowledge natural children of the deceased,
filed a petition for probate of the will of Nicolas Azores. She also
filed a motion for the appointment of a special administrator. At
the hearing, respondents Jose, Sinfrosa and Antonio Azores,
legitimate children of the deceased filed their opposition, on the
ground that the court had not acquired jurisdiction on the case.
Petitioner's allegations being insufficient to confer jurisdiction
because she did not allege that she had the custody of the will,
and therefore, was not entitled to present it for probate and
Page 60
Petitioners after 4 months filed a motion for the reopening of

the probate proceedings a. CLAIMs: 1) they are the intestate
heirs of the decedent. 2) RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees,
defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs.
ISSUE:
Who is entitled to apply for probate? WON the court
acquired jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
no will shall pass either real or personal estate, unless it is
proved and allowed. For this purpose, section 626 provides that
the person who has the custody of he will shall, within 4 days
after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to
the court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the
will. Sections 628 and 629 proscribed coercive means to compel
a person having the custody of a will to deliver it to the court
which has jrisdiction. Petitioner alleged that the deceased
designated nobody as custodian of his will but that he directed
his nephew Manuel Azores to deliver a copy thereof to her, to
keep one in his possession, and to turn over the other two
copies to his son Jose Azores, with instructions to the effect that
if petitioner or his son failed to present said will for probate,
Manuel should take charge of presenting it to the court. +aking
everything into account therefore, it is of the court's vieww that
Jose Azores, the son of the deceased, had the custody of the will
because the original thereof was turned over to him. For the
sake of argument, however, admitting that the testator had
designated nobody as custodian of the will, it cannot be denied

that his act of subsequentl$ making a codicil and entrusting the
custody thereof to his legitimate children, clearly modified his
last will. In this sense, the custody of both is entrusted to his
legitimate children and not to Manuel Azores or to petitioner.
Hence, as the legitimate children of the deceased had custody
of the originals of the will and of the codicil, they alone could,
had the right and where bound by law to apply for the probate
of their father' last will. In order that the court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and for the
administration of the properties left by a deceased person, the
application must allege, in addition to the residence of the
deceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances, that
the applicant is the executor in the will or is the person who had
custody of the will to be probated. The original of said
document must be presented or sufficient reasons given to
justify the nonrepresentation of said original and the
acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof. Inasmuch as these
requisites had not been complied with in the application filed by
the petitioner, the respondent judge did not exceed in
jurisdiction in dismissing the application in question.
PEREZ VS. PEREZ
Katigbak , Paula Margareth
FACTS:
On May 25, 1973, the plaintiffs-appellants executed a
deed of real estate mortgage in favor of the Development Bank
of the Philippines over the property located in Bataan as
security for an agricultural loan of P6,500.00. The mortgage
contract was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Bataan. The
plaintiffs failed to pay their obligation which prompted DBP in
extrajudicially foreclosing the property. the application was filed
And the necessary notice of Sheriffs sale was issued and posted
by the deputy sheriff at three (3) public places in Morong,
Bataan, where the mortgaged property is located and duly
published for three (3) consecutive weeks in the Olongapo
News. On December 19, 1978, the public auction sale was
conducted at the municipal building in Morong, Bataan, wherein
Page 60
furtherance because the will that should be probated is the

original and not a copy thereof, as the one presented by the
petitioner. Petitioner filed an amended petition prayingthat
respondents be required to present the copies of the will and
the codicil in their possession. Court issued an order denying
the petition for the appointment of a special administrator by
petitioner and ordered Jose Azores, who has custody of the last
will and testament and all other documents in relation thereto,
to deliver said papers to the court within the date from notice.
Consequently, petitioner filed a motion praying that her
amended petition be admitted. However, before this motion
was decided, respondents, after their father's death, presented
the original of the will and codicil, and petitioned that they be
admitted for probate. The court issued an order dismissing the
petition filed by the petitioner.
ISSUE/s:
WHETHER THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS ON POSTINGS. WHETHER THERE WAS NO
PUBLICATION IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION
WHERE THE REAL PROPERTY IS SITUATED.
RULING:
No. The requirement on the posting of notices is found in
Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, viz:
Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for
not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the
municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such
property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice
shall also be published once a week for at least three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
municipality or city. Their position that the puericulture center
and the municipal building should be considered one and the
same place because they were located in one place is pure
fallacy and totally unacceptable for being contrary to the actual
state of things. The petitioners further contend that even after
the sheriff had posted the notice, he may not have posted it
anymore for the remaining nineteen (19) days, as required by
Act No. 3135. It could also be, according to petitioners, that
after the notice was posted, the same may have been removed
from where it was posted either by an act of man or by an act of
nature. But such contention was not supported with evidence.
As correctly held by the trial court and the appellate court, the
deputy sheriff has in his favor the presumption that his official
duty was regularly performed. The petitioners herein were
unable to topple this presumption in the trial court, the Court of
Appeals, and now in this Court. -No. To be a newspaper of
general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the
dissemination of local news and general information; that it has
a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; and that it is
published at regular intervals. The newspaper must not also be
devoted to the interests or published for the entertainment of a
particular class, profession, trade, calling, race or religious
denomination. The newspaper need not have the largest
circulation so long as it is of general circulation. Based from the
testimonies of the witnesses, it was proven that Olongapo News
was indeed a newspaper of general circulation. That although in
1978, it was not published in Morong, Bataan, under P.D. No.
1079, it is categorical that in the event there is no newspaper or
periodical published in the locality, the same may be published
in the newspaper or periodical published, edited and circulated
in the nearest city or province. Since no newspaper of general
circulation was being published in Morong, Bataan, in the year
1978, then the respondents were right in availing themselves of
the services of the Olongapo News, which, as found by the trial
court, was the nearest publication in Bataan.
DE ARANZ VS. GALING
Katigbak , Paula Margareth
FACTS:
On 3 March 1986, private respondent Joaquin R-Infante
filed RTC Pasig a petition for the probate and allowance of the
last will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola.
The petition specified the names and addresses of herein
Page 60
Democrito Perez emerged as the winning bidder for P11,000.00.

Certificate of sale in favor of Democrito Perez was issued and
registered in the Registry of Deeds. Since plaintiffs-appellants
failed to exercise their right to redeem the foreclosed property,
original defendant Democrito Perez executed an affidavit of
consolidation which resulted in the issuance of a new TCT. On
1985, a civil case for Annulment of Public Auction Sale with
Damages coupled with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for
Restraining Order was filed by herein petitioners against the
respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Balanga,
Bataan. The case was dismissed. Petitioners filed an appeal
alleging that the RTC erred in holding that the public auction
sale of the subject mortgaged property was valid despite the
lack of notice to them, thus, depriving them of their right to
property without due process of law. They further alleged that
the notice of public auction sale was not validly published in a
newspaper of general circulation, as required by law. But CA
affirmed RTC's decision. Motion for reconsideration was filed but
the same was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the requirement of

notice on heirs, legatees, and devisees is merely a procedural
convenience to satisfy the requirements of due process?
RULING:
Yes. Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads: SEC. 4.
Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail
or personally. The court shall also cause copies of the notice of
the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to
the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of
residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage
thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if
such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in
like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he
be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor
not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal
service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the
day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing. It is clear from the
aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing
for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated
or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the
Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of

residence be known. There is no question that the residences of
herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the
probate court. But despite such knowledge, the probate court
did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The
requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not
satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three
(3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
BASA VS. MERCADO
Lee, Mariline
MANINANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Lee, Mariline
ACAIN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Lectura, Erika
GAN VS. YAP
Lectura, Erika
RODELAS VS ARANZA
Lim, Justin
RULE
76
Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the

Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder
LEON & GHEZZIE VS.MANUFACTURERS LIFE INS.
Lim, Justin
SUNTAY VS. SUNTAY
Lubay, Angela
VDA. DE PEREZ VS. TOLETE
Lubay, Angela
FACTS:
Page 60
petitioners as legatees and devisees. The probate court issued

an order setting the petition for hearing. Said order was
published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general circulation
in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks.
On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. The hearing
was then reset and private respondent presented his evidence
ex-parte and placed Arturo Arceo one of the testamentary
witnesses, on the witness stand. During the proceedings,
private respondent was appointed executor. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration alleging that, as named legatees, no
notices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period of
ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the probate
of the will. This was denied by the Court. Petition for certiorari
was filed and referred to CA which was also dismissed. Hence,
present petition.
ISSUE:
WON it was necessary to prove the foreign law.
RULINGS:
NO.The evidence necessary for the reprobate or
allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the
Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in
accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his
domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3)
the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the
fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws
of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except
for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all
the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon
which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by
the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them
.Petitioner must have perceived the omission of the fifth
requirement above as in fact she moved for more time to
submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws
but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the
probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should
relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best

evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported
will is probated or denied probate
Respondent Judge was ordered to give the petitioner a
reasonable time within which to submit evidence.
ANCHETA VS GUERSAY-DALAYGON
Mercado, Trish
ANCHETA v. GUERSEY-DALAYGON
GR NO. 139868; June 8, 2006
TOPIC: Rule 77 Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the
Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder
Facts: Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard
Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have
resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an
adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in
1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire
estate to Richard consisting of Audreys conjugal share in
real estate improvements at Forbes Park, current account
with cash balance and shares of stock in A/G Interiors. Two
years after her death, Richard married Candelaria
Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died
and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to
respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he left to
his adopted daughter.
Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where
Audreys will was admitted to probate, filed a motion to
declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project
Page 60
Subject of this case is the probate of the will of Spouses

Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became
American citizens and practicing doctors in New York, U.S.A. The
spouses executed separate wills for the benefit of each other.
The spouses and their family perished when they were trapped
by fire that gutted their home.
Thereafter, their wills were admitted to probate with the
Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. Then,
petitioner who is the mother of Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan filed
for the reprobate of the will with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Malolos, Bulacan. The will was denied probate for the reason
that the documents did not establish the law of New York on the
procedure and allowance of wills. The petitioners motion for
reconsideration to be given sufficient time to prove New York
law was denied. On appeal, petitioner contend that the
evidence submitted to the RTC were already sufficient to allow
probate of will.
Issue: Whether or not the decree of distribution may still

be annulled under the circumstances.
Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased
person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a
timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is
like any other judgment in rem.
However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of
distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the
Court ruled that a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he
is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control
or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence.
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution
of Audreys estate according to the terms of her will and

as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic
fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be
upheld.
RULE
78
Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When

and to Whom issued
NGO THE HUA VS. CHUNG KIAT HUA
Mercado, Trish
NGO THE HUA v. CHUNG KITA HUA
GR NO. L-17091; Sept. 30, 1963
Facts:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administrator of the estate
of the deceased Chung Liu.
Ngo The Hua, claiming to be the spouse of the deceased, filed a
petition to be appointed administratix of the estate of the
aforementioned deceased. The petition was opposed by the
children of the deceased claiming that Ngo Hua is morally and
physically unfit to execute the duties of the trust as
administratix, and that the she and the deceased procured an
absolute divorce in Taiwan. The lower court found that Ngo Hua
and the deceased were validly divorced in Taipei. The court
issued an order appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administrator
instead.
Page 60
of partition of Audreys estate. The motion and project of

partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary
administrator with regards to Richards will also filed a
project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richards undivided
interest in the Forbes property was allocated to
respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to
their three children. Respondent opposed on the ground
that under the law of the State of Maryland, where
Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee
the entire interest of the testator in the property subject
to the legacy.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in passing upon the
validity of the divorce obtained by Ngo Hua and the deceased
and upon the filiation of the oppositors?
Held:
No. It is well settled that the declaration of heirs shall only take
place after all the debts, expenses and taxes have been paid. A
cursory reading of the pertinent section discloses that what the
court is enjoined from doing is the assignment or distribution of
the residue of the deceaseds estate before the abovementioned obligations chargeable to the estate are first paid.
Nowhere from the said section may it be inferred that the court
cannot make a declaration of heirs prior to the satisfaction of
these obligations. It is to be noted, however, that the court in
making the appointment of the administrator did not purport to
make a declaration of heirs.
MEDINA ET. AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Mansul, Nabral
MALOLES II VS. PHILLIPS
Mansul, Nabral
REPUBLIC VS. MARCOS
Pangilinan, Legis
TORRES VS. JAVIER
Pangilinan, Legis
DE GUZMAN VS. LIMCOLIOC
Rabanal, Michelle
Proceso de Guzman died on January 1, 1937, without leaving a

will. The deceased was first married to Agatona Santos, with
whom he had four children, named Nicolasa, Apolinario, Ana
and Tomasa. After Agatona's death, the deceased contracted a
second marriage with Angela Limcolioc, with whom he did not
have any child.
On the 7th of the same month of January, 1937, the Court of

First Instance of Rizal appointed Nicolasa de Guzman judicial
administratrix of the properties of the deceased Proceso de
Guzman. On the 8th of the same month of January, 1937,
Angela Limcolioc, widow of the deceased, asked that this
appointment be set aside and that she had named
administratrix instead, on that ground of her preference as the
widow. The court denied this petition and sustained the
appointment of Nicolasa. From these resolutions, Angela
appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in not appointing her

administratrix of the estate of the deceased Proceso de Guzman
and in appointing Nicolasa de Guzman as such administratrix
without first setting the case for hearing.
RULING:
FACTS:
Page 60
If the properties left by the deceased Proceso de Guzman were

acquired during his marriage with Agatona Santos, his children,
among them Nicolasa, have more interest therein than his now
widow, Angela Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way of
usufruct, to a portion equal to that corresponding to one of the
children who has received no betterment.
TORRES VS. SICAT

Rabanal, Michelle
FACTS:
On August 25, 1950, Luis Morales, married to
Hermenegilda Sicat, died in the municipality of Tarlac, Tarlac
Seven days later, Jose Torres alleging to be a creditor of the
conjugal partnership commenced this special proceeding in the
Twelve days afterwards the widow voiced her opposition, and

claimed preference to be appointed as administratrix. She said
the only close relatives and forced heirs were her six legitimate
minor children, besides herself.
RTC:
The petitioner presented evidence. The oppositor submitted
none. Then the trial judge, disregarding the preference
established by law for the surviving widow, entered on August
16, 1951 an order appointing Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus as
administrator.
Under section 6, rule 79 of the Rules of Court, when a person
dies intestate, administration should be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be
(b) if such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, . . . it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
The trial judge was cognizant of this statutory preference. But
he expressly stated his reason for disregarding it, saying in
effect: "Apparently the amount of credits exceeds the value of
the conjugal assets; therefore the interest of the creditors
deserves paramount consideration. Now inasmuch as the widow
has shown hostility to the creditors by openly disputing their
credits, she is therefore unsuitable, for having adverse
interests."
A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential
rights of the surviving spouse to the
Page 60
The application filed by Nicolasa de Guzman for her

appointment alleges that during the marital life of the deceased
with his first wife Agatona Santos, both, through their mutual
labor, acquired all the properties left by the deceased, not
having acquired any property during his second marriage with
Angela Limcolioc. The court bore these allegations in mind. It is
true that the case was not heard for the purpose of establishing
these allegations, but when Angela asked for the
reconsideration of the appointment of Nicolasa, she did not
deny these allegations and merely stated that they do not
justify her appointment as administratrix. For failure of Angela
to deny these allegations, thus taking them for granted, the
court was justified in considering them when it denied the
reconsideration of its resolution and when it sustained the
appointment of Nicolasa.
Tarlac court petitioning for the issuance of letter of

administration in favor of Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus, for the
purpose of settling the estate of the deceased.
administration of the estate of a deceased person; but if the

person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable the court
may appoint another person.
acknowledged indebtedness to every one coming forward with

a claim, regardless of its merit, she would be useless, even
harmful, both to the heirs and the actual creditors.
Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in

adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately
interested in the estate of such an extent as to render the
appointment inadvisable.
Under the rules (Rule 87) creditors; claims may be filed, and
considered, only after the regular administrator has been
appointed. Hence, in selecting the administrator, the court
could not yet normally accord priority treatment to the interests
of those whose credits were in dispute. And counsel for herein
appellant did well in opposing the presentation of evidence of
the objected credits at the hearing, arguing in part,
ISSUE:
Whether RTCs appointment should be upheld, ignoring
the surviving widows preferential right.
RULING:
In our opinion it is a sound juridical principle that the
administrator should not adopt attitudes nor take steps inimical
to the interests of the creditors. The administration of the
intestate is undertaken for the benefit of both the heirs and the
creditors. but by creditors we mean those declared to be so in
appropriate proceedings. Before their credits are fully
established they are not "creditors" within the purview of the
above principle. So it is not improper it is even proper for
the administrator or whoever is proposed for appointment as
such, to oppose, or to require competent proof of, claims
advanced against the estate. "The propriety of contesting
particular claims must frequently be left largely to his discretion
and no presumption of bad faith or misconduct will be made
against him." (34 C. J. S., p. 259.)
At the hearing of the petition for the appointment of
administrator, this widow practically did nothing more than to
inform the alleged creditors, "prove your credit before I honor
it." That is not necessarily dishonest nor contrary to real
creditors. And then, not having opposed all creditors, because
she did not deny the estate's liability to the People's Bank, she
could not strictly be considered hostile to the creditors. Had she
. . . the time has not yet arrived when this court can even
entertain the presentation of those exhibits because the stage
of presenting claims has not yet arrived. Consequently, this
court can not even receive as evidence the said documents as
evidence of indebtedness, because if those evidence will be
accepted then we will be in a position to rebut them and to
enter into actual trial to show that they are not really evidence
of indebtedness, and in that case we will not terminate because
then we will be contending as to whether those were really
executed or really contracted. ...
On the other hand, the appealed order conceding that the
evidence "showed clearly that the surviving widow is fully
competent in a high degree to administer the intestate of her
deceased husband", plainly indicates that except for her
supposed hostility to creditors she was suitable for the trust.
Consequently, having found that her attitude did not per se
constitute antagonism to the creditors, we must necessarily
declare and enforce her superior right to appointment as
administratrix under Rule 79.
Wherefore, the questioned order appointing Atty. Pedro B. De
Jesus is annulled, and one will be entered requiring the issuance
by the court a quo of letters of administration to the widow
appellant subject to such terms and conditions as are
appropriate under the Rules. Costs against the appellee.
Page 60
"The surviving widow" the trial judge stated, "has always

consistently refused to recognize the credits" and manifested
her determination to "resist the claims of creditors."
FACTS:
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina married to Dr.
Federico died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Suntay
(Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time
of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico,
and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio
Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot
three children, namely: respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and
Emilio II. Emilio Is first marriage was subsequently annulled.
Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III
and Nenita Suntay, by two different women. Respondent and
her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived separately from their
father and paternal grandparents. After her spouses death,
Federico adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and
Nenita. On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor. Federico filed
his opposition. Being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is
capable of administering her estate and he should be the one
appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass
of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded
legal preference in the administration. After a failed attempt by
the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a
Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted
son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedents estate on his
behalf. The trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to Intervene
considering his interest in the outcome of the case. In the
course of the proceedings, Federico died. The trial court
rendered a decision appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as
administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate. Aggrieved,
respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of
Administration issued to Emilio III. The CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs
status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from
representing his deceased father in the estate of the latters
legitimate mother, the decedent.
ISSUE :
Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to
act as administrator of the decedents estate.
HELD:
The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate
succession is to give preference to the wishes and presumed
will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will. The basis
for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain
bar rule, is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining
herein for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina,
on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal
relationship of legitimate relatives. Emilio III was reared from
infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico,
who both acknowledged him as their grandchild. Emilio III is a
legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the
distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree
from Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimate
father, Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred
in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedents
estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the
estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the
interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even
declared that under the law, Federico, being the surviving
spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of the
exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in
the conjugal partnership.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of
administration granted. If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond,
or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
Page 60
SUNTAY III VS. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY

Rivera, Hiezll Wynn
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case

may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate

descendants of a deceased.
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case

may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person,
it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
RULE
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it

depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each
case. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. In
the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case
necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both
respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas
estate.
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately
reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends,
for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her
legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her
husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of
Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate
child. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly
pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal
presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist
79
Opposing Issuance of Letters Testamentary,

Petition and Contest for Letters of Administration
GUTIEREZ VS VILLEGAS
Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine
FACTS:
In 1954, Irene Santos died intestate, leaving as her only
heirs her surviving spouse Jose Villegas and two nieces
daughters of a deceased brother, Rizalina and Adela Gutierrez.
Thereafter, the surviving spouse filed with the Rizal CFI- Pasay,
a petition for Letters of Administration , and was appointed
administrator of the estate. In the petition, he named as
intestate heirs, besides himself, the 2 nieces of his deceased
wife. Under the unverified manifestation signed by Adela
Gutierrez, accompanied by a public instrument entitled
"Kasulatan ng Bilihan at Salinan", renounced all her rights ,
interests and participation in the estate of Irene in favor of her
sister.
However, Adela averred that the deed of assignment of
her rights, participation and interest in the estate of Irene
Santos and the first manifestation were obtained thru fraud
practiced by the administrator upon her and were vitiated by
mistake or undue influence. Therein, she narrated that due to
stringent financial conditions, she (Adela) requested the
administrator for an advance of P2,000.00 from the estate. The
administrator refused on the ground that it is against the law,
but suggested that she might obtain a loan from her sister
Rizalina, offering to help. Thereafter, the administrator informed
Adela that he was able to secure the conformity of Rizalina to
Page 60
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and

willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
The petition is GRANTED.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Adela Santos Gutierrez has a right to
intervene in the probate proceeding.
DURAN VS. DURAN

FACTS:
Pio Duran died intestate. Among his alleged heirs are
Josefina, as surviving spouse; several brothers and sisters;
nephews and nieces.
Subsequent to his death, Cipriano, one of the surviving
brothers, executed a public instrument assigning and
renouncing his hereditary rights to decedents estate in favor of
Josefina for consideration. However, a year later, Cipriano filed
in CFI-Albay a petition for intestate proceedings to settle Pios
estate and an ex parte motion to be appointed as Special
Administrator. Josefina opposed and moved for the dismissal
RULING:
YES. It cannot be successfully denied that Adela Santos

Gutierrez is an indispensable party to the proceedings in
question. Her interest in the estate is not inchoate, it was
established at the time of death of Irene Santos. While it is true
that she executed a deed of assignment, it is also a fact that
she asked the same to be annulled, which action is now pending
before the CFI-Pasig Although Adela had filed a manifestation
dropping herself from the proceedings and presenting therewith
the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record, nevertheless
fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the probate
Court. Every act intended to put an end to in division among coheirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. No serious argument can
be offered to deny the co-heirship of appellee in the estate
under probate. It appearing (if We assume the due execution of
the Deed of Assignment), that the transaction is in the nature of
extrajudicial partition, court approval is imperative, and the
heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the
estate and over their persons, by the mere act of assignment
and desistance. Even if the partition had been judicially
approved on the basis of the alleged deed of assignment, an
aggrieved heir does not lose her standing in the probate court.
Adela was not a third person; she was an original party
therein.
Page 60
give her a loan of P10,000.00 instead of only P2,000.00. Adela

was then brought by Villegas and Rizalina to the office of their
lawyer, where she was made to sign a document she could not
read. The lawyer asked Adela to sign another document, which
he said was to be presented in Court and explained the
contents of the document signed the day before. It was only
then that Adela came to know that said document was a deed
of sale. When Adela protested, Villegas told her that the matter
could be discussed better in his house. During the discussion,
Villegas informed Adela that the amount of P50,000.00 which
Rizalina was paying for her share in the inheritance, was
probably more than what she would get in the estate, because
the estate is not valuable and had plenty of debts. Although
Adela did not want to accept the money, Villegas refused to
take them back. When she was made to sign the deed of
assignment, Adela did not know the true value of the estate.
The administrator Villegas and Rizalina denied the
allegations of fraud, undue influence and the like.
Adela presented with the Probate Court, a motion
praying that the administrator and/or his attorneys be required
to furnish her all copies of pleadings filed or to be filed in the
intestate proceedings, it appearing that the administrator
presented pleadings in Court without serving her copies thereof.
An opposition was interposed by the administrator, who
alleged that the movant, although originally a party to the
probate proceeding, has voluntarily and expressly desisted from
being so, and that having assigned by sale, all her rights,
interests and participations in the estate, she has no longer any
legal standing in the case.
CFI: Favored Adelina and ordered the administrator to
furnish the former copies of pleadings.
Rizalina and the Administrator appealed.
TAYAG VS. TAYAG-GALLOR

Salayog, Benny Rico
FACTS:
Respondent, Tayag-Gallor or TG, filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration over the estate of
Ismael Tayad. She claims that she is 1 of 3 illegitimate
children of Ismael. Ismael was married to petitioner but
they didn't have any children of their own.
Ismael died intestate, leaving behind 2 lots and one
motor vehicle, both in possession of petitioner. Petitioner
promised respondent and her brothers 100K each as their
share in the proceeds of the sale of the motor vehicle.
Petitioner only gave half.
Respondent alleged that petitioner intends to
dispose of the properties of Ismael to the respondents
prejudice, Petitioner opposed this petition of TG asserting
that the properties were purchased by her using her own
money, she even denied all of petitioners allegations.
Petitioner filed for dismissal for failure to state a
cause of action. Petitioner reiterated that she is the sole
owner of the properties by presenting TCTs. She also
averred that it was necessary for respondent to show
proof that she was acknowledged and recognized by
Ismael Tayag. There being no such allegation, the action
becomes one to compel recognition. DENIED. CA also
denied petitioners motion and directed the trial court to
proceed with the dispatch. CA ruled that the allegation of
respondent that she is an illegitimate child suffices for a
cause of action, without the need to state that she had
been recognized or acknowledged.
Page 60
upon the ground that the petitioner is not an interested person

in the estate, in view of the deed of transfer and renunciation,
in the alternarive, she asked to be appointed administratrix.
Whereas Cipriano alleged that Josefina was not the decedents
wife and that the deed of assignement was procured through
fraud, with gross inadequacy of consideration and vitiated by
lesion.
Meanwhile, Miguel, another brother of decedent, filed a
petition to be joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano. Josefina moved
to strike out said petition as an improper attempt to intervene
in the case.
CFI: dismissed the petition of Cipriano for lack of interest
in the estate premised on the deed of assignment signed by
Cipriano.
Cipriano and Miguel appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Cipriano can be considered as an
interested person in the estate
RULING:
No.Petitioner Cipriano is not an interested person in the
estate of the decedent. In the present case, there was really no
settlement proceedings. The remedy of the petitioner is to
rescind or to annul the deed of assignment or the extrajudicial
partition. The assignment took place without pending
settlement proceeding. The properties subject matter of the
assignment were not under the jurisdiction of the settlement
court. Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition
between the assignor and assignee, the same does not need
court approval to be effective between parties. An extrajudicial
partition is valid as between participants even if the requisites
of Sec. 1 Rule 74 are not followed, since such requisites are for
purposes of binding creditors and non-participating heirs only.
Under the Rules of Court, a petition for administration
and settlement of an estate must be filed by an interested
person. And in the meanwhile, the assigning heir cannot
initiate a settlement proceedings, for until the deed of
assignment is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid and
effective against him, so that he is left without that interest
in the estate required to petition for settlement proceedings.
Petitioner came to the SC and asserts that

respondent should not be allowed to prove her filiation in
the settlement of Ismael's estate. Because the claim of
filiation should not be allowed to be proved in an action
for settlement of an estate.
recognition or whether she has a material and direct

interest to maintain the suit. So, the allegation that
respondent is an illegitimate child suffices even without
stating that she has been recognized or acknowledged.
This petition by petitioner is DENIED.
RULING: YES.
Petition for issuance of letters of administration must be
filed by an interested person. An interested party is one
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct.
The petition for the issuance is a suit for the settlement of
the intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of
respondent to maintain such a suit is dependent on
whether she is entitled to successional rights as an
illegitimate child which may be established through
voluntary or compulsory recognition.
Petitioners ground is essentially based on her contention
that by Ismael's death, respondent can no longer
establish her filiation. However, petitioner overlooked the
fact that respondent's successional rights may be
established not just by judicial action to compel
recognition but also by proof that she had been
voluntarily acknowledged.
Respondent was yet to show her proof of filiation because
of petitioner's opposition. So, there is no way yet to
determine if her petition is actually one to compel
RULE
80
Special Administrator
FULE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Salayog, Benny Rico
FACTS:
- Amado Garcia died - left property in Calamba, Laguna.
- Virginia Garcia Fule (illeg sis) pet for letters of admin & ex
parte appointment as special administratix in CFI Laguna
- Motion was granted.
- Preciosa Garcia (wife) and in behalf of their child - opposed
- failure to satisfy jurisdictional requirement & improper
venue (avers no domicile/residence of deceased as
required by Rule 79 Sec. 21) - death certs presented by
Fule show QC as deceaseds last residence
- Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere
illegitimate sister of the deceased is not entitled to succeeding
from him2
1Rule 79 Sec 2 - petition should show the existence of jurisdiction to make the
appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts such as death, name, last
residence, existence, situs of assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks administration as
next of kin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed
2NCC Art. 992.
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestado from the legitimate

children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in
the same manner from the illegitimate child.
Page 60
ISSUE: Whether respondent's petition for the issuance of

letters of administration sufficiently states a cause of
action considering that she merely alleged she is an
illegitimate child?
- CFI - denied opposition

- CA reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule
- Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30k.
3RULE 73 Sec.1. if the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at

the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled at the CFI in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death. And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI
of any province in which he had estate.The court 1 st taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
Venue and Processes
Contained in a law of procedure - merely a matter of

method & convenience to parties
o Rule 4 Sec 4 - Venue is subject to waiver

but Preciosa did not waive it, merely requested for
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
spouse
b) What does the word residesin Rule 73 Sec 1 mean
Resides actual residence

- Requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place
In
statutes
fixing
venue
residence&domicilesynonymous even when statue
uses domicile, it is still construed as residence & not
domicile in its technical sense
- Elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed.
- Popular sense the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode
- No particular length of time required but must be more
than temporary
legal residence or domicile requires bodily presence and an
intention to make it ones domicile.
DISPOSITION: Fules petition DENIED.

DE GUZMAN VS. GUADIZ
Sumaway, Dylan
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, docketed as Special
Page 60
ISSUES/HELD
a) Venue v. Jurisdiction
JURISDICTION power/authority of court over subject matter
o Jurisdiction over all probate cases is w/ CFIs
independently from the place of residence of the
deceased (Judiciary act 1948)
o Not changed by procedure
o There are cases though that if such power is not
exercised conformably w/ procedure, court loses power
to exercise it legally. However, this doesnt amount to
loss of jurisdiction over subject matter but only over the
person or that judgment may be rendered defective for
lack of something essential to sustain it.
VENUE place where each case shall be brought
o Because there are many CFIs, ROC fixed the venue (of
settlement of estates, probate of will & issuance of
letters of admin) - place of residence of deceased /
province
Death Certificate deceased resided in QC at the
time of his death, therefore the venue of Laguna was
improper (death cert admissible to prove residence
of deaceased at time of his death)
o Rule 73 Sec 13 - really a matter of venue
Clause so far.
Caption Settlement of estate of Deceased Person.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules

is broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in
granting letters testamentary or of administration as where a
contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in
another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the
proceeding on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in
cases where the parties cannot agree among themselves.
Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot
be immediately granted, a special administrator may be
appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased.
The facts justifying the appointment of a special administrator
are:
(1) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate of the
win.
(2) The basis of the private respondents' claim to the estate of
Catalina Bajacan and opposition to the probate of the will is a
deed of donation dated June 19, 1972 allegedly executed by the
deceased Catalina Bajacan and her late sister Arcadia Bajacan
in their favor.
There is an immediate need to file an action for the annulment
of such deed of donation in behalf of the estate. Precisely, the
petitioner filed Civil Case No. 1080 in the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija Branch V, against the herein private
respondents.
Upon the filing of this petition, the respondent judge, on motion
of the private respondents, postponed the hearing of the
probate of the will which was then scheduled on August 23,
1978 to September 20, 1978.
The reasons for the appointment of a special administrator are:
The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator
rests in the fact that estates of decedents frequently become
involved in protracted litigation, thereby being exposed to great
waste and losses if there is no authorized agent to collect the
debts and preserve the assets in the interim. The occasion for
such an appointment usually arises where, for some cause,
such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will,
regular administration is .delayed. No temporary administration
can be granted where there is an executor in being capable of
acting, however.
Page 60
Proceeding No. 865 for the probate of a will alleged to have

been executed by one Catalina Bajacan instituting the herein
petitioner as sole and universal heir and naming him as
executor.
The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss and/or
opposition contending, among others, that all the real
properties of Catalina Bajacan are now owned by them by virtue
of a Deed of Donation Intervivos executed on June 19, 1972 by
Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina Bajacan in their favor; that on
September 30, 1977, the respondent judge resolved to defer
resolution on the said motion to dismiss until the parties shall
have presented their evidence; that a motion for the
appointment of a special administrator was filed by the
petitioner on September 23, 1977 alleging that the unresolved
motion to dismiss would necessarily delay the probate of the
will and the appointment of an executor.
The respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for
appointment of a special administrator.
ISSUE: whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the order d denying petitioner's motion for the
appointment of a special administrator
RULING: Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Section 1 Appointment of Special Administrator When there
is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by
any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the
deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators appointed.
Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special
administrator should there be a delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause
including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will.
Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special
administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. This discretion,
however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or Contrary to
reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
RELUCIO VS SAN JOSE

Sumaway, Dylan
FACTS: Petitioner, Julita Relucio, was appointed administratrix
of the testate estate of Felipe Relucio, Sr., Upon petition filed on
June 27, 1950 by Lorenzo, Rolando and Leticia Relucio, to which
the petitioner filed an opposition, the Court of First Instance of
Manila issued an order on January 15, 1951, appointing Rolando
Relucio as administrator in substitution of the petitioner.
Before the appeal could be perfected, Rolando Relucio moved
for the immediate execution of the order appointing him as
administrator.
The court merely made reference to the letters of
administration issued in favor of Rolando Relucio and did not
pass on the motion for immediate execution.
Rolando Relucio filed a motion praying that the petitioner be
declared in contempt of court for failing to deliver to him, after
demand, all papers, documents, titles and properties of the
estate under her administration. In the order dated April 10,
1951, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied this motion
for contempt and appointed the Equitable Banking Corporation
as special administrator pending the appeal of the petitioner
from the order of January 15, 1951.
RULING: From the very position taken by the respondent Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, it is plain that the
motion for immediate execution of the order of January 15,
1951, was in effect denied, with the result that the petitioner
must be deemed as having the right to continue as
administratrix until her appeal is finally disposed of. It is
noteworthy that the petitioner was named in the will of Felipe
Relucio, Sr., (already duly probated) not only as administratrix
but as executrix, and her substitution by Rolando Relucio in
virtue of the appealed order of January 15, 1951 is not for any
cause, but is based solely on the circumstance that Rolando
Relucio is an heir
The cases in which a special administrator may be appointed
are specified in section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court which
provides as follows: "When there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from
the allowance or disallowance of a will, or from any other cause,
the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and
take charge of the estate of the deceased and executors or
administrators thereupon appointed." A special administrator
may also be appointed in a case covered by section 8 of Rule 87
which provides as follows: "If the executor or administrator has
a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice
thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a
special administrator who shall, in the adjustment of such claim,
have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the
general administrator or executor in the settlement of other
claims. The court may order the executor or administrator to
pay to the special administrator necessary funds to defend such
claim."
There is no pretense that the case at bar is one falling under
either section 1 of Rule 81 or section 8 of Rule 87. In any view of
the case, there is a regular administrator. Pending her appeal
from the order of January 15, 1951, the petitioner had the right
to act as administratrix.
DE GUZMAN VS ANGELES
Tomarong, Marian
FACTS:
On May 5, 1987 Private Respondent Elaine de Guzman filed a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de
Page 60
Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to

preserve estate until it can pass into hands of person fully
authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs.
It appears that the estate the properties registered under the
Torrens system in the name of the deceased Catalina Bajacan
consisting of eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural land.
It is claimed that these 80 hectares produce P50,000.00 worth
of palay each harvest twice a year. Obviously there is an
immediate need for a special administrator to protect the
interests of the estate as regards the products.
All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special
administrator in accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court are present in the case at bar.
On May 28, 1987, PR filed her ex-parte motion to appoint

petitioner as Special Administratix of the estate of Manolito de
Guzman. Hearing was set on June 5, 1987, however, no notice
was given to petitioner. In the order dated June 5, 1987, the RTC
granted the PRs motion to be appointed as special
administratix. The RTC issued another order dated June 8, 1987,
granting the Urgent ex-parte Motion for assistance filed by PR
for appointment of two deputy sheriffs with some
military/policemen to assist her in preserving the estate of her
late husband. Petitioner resisted on taking the subject vehicles
on the ground that they were his personal properties.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition to annul the RTCs orders
dated June 5 and June 8, 1987. He alleges that the appointment
of a special administrator constitutes an abuse of discretion for
having been made without giving petitioner an opportunity to
oppose said appointment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court may appoint a special
administratix and issue a writ of possession of alleged
properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate of
the said deceased person even before the probate court causes
notice be served upon all interested parties
A special administrator has been defined as the "representative

of decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and
preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is
appointed." The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar
interest in the preservation of the estate as the private
respondent who happens to be the widow of deceased Manolito
de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as mandated by the
Rules of Court. It is not clear from the records exactly what
emergency would have ensued if the appointment of an
administrator was deferred at least until the most interested
parties were given notice of the proposed action. No
unavoidable delay in the appointment of a regular administrator
is apparent from the records.
HEIRS OF CASTILLO VS. GABRIEL
Tomarong, Marian
On January 25, 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo
Almoradie, died in Malabon City leaving behind a sizable
HELD:
No. In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent

court acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the filing
of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by the
private respondent. Verily, notice through publication of the
petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person is
jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders
affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void and
subject to annulment. In the instant case, no notice as
mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
was caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on
the motions of the private respondent to be appointed as
special administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged
properties of the deceased person in the widow's favor, and to
grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of
Manolito de Guzman.
Page 60
Guzman before RTC of Makati City. The petition alleges among

others that petitioner as the surviving spouse of the decedent is
most qualified and entitled to the grant of letters of
administration. On May 22, 1987, PR filed a motion for writ of
possession over 5 vehicles registered under the name of the
said deceased person, alleges to be conjugal properties of the
de Guzmans and in order to preserve the assets of her late
husband, but which are at present in the possession of PRs
father-in-law, herein Petitioner Pedro de Guzman.
On October 16, 1989, Belinda Dahlia Castillo filed a motion for

intervention, claiming that she is the only legitimate child of
Lorenzo and Crisanta but on June 2, 1990 Belinda Castillo died.
On November 3, 1989, Roberto Y. Gabriel filed before RTC a
petition for probate of an alleged will and for the issuance of
letters testamentary in his favour. He alleged that he discovered
his mothers will on Oct. 25, 1989 in which he was instituted
as the sole heir and designated as alternate executor for the
named executor therein, Francisco Yanga, brother of Crisanta,
who had predeceased the latter. The RTC of Malabon City
dismissed the intestate proceedings of Spec. Proc. No. 192-MN.
The probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as special
administrator of his mothers estate. However, on April 16,
2001, Roberto died. His widow Dolores filed a Manifestation and
Motion where she informed the probate court about her
husbands death and prayed that she be admitted as substitute
in place of her late husband and be appointed as administratix
as well. Heirs of Belinda opposed to it contended that she was
not Crisantas next of kin. RTC appointed Dolores as special
administratix. The Heirs of Belinda moved to reconsider but it
was denied by the probate court. CA affirmed the decision of
the lower court.
HELD:
Yes. The Court has repeatedly held that the appointment of a
special administrator lies in the sound discretion of the probate
court. A special administrator is a representative of a decedent,
appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his
estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed.
When appointed, a special administrator is regarded not as a
representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the
appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate,
and, in fact, as an officer of the court. As such officer, he is
subject to the supervision and control of the probate court and
is expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate,
especially its smooth administration and earliest settlement.
The principal object of appointment of temporary administrator
is to preserve the estate until it can pass into hands of person
fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and
heirs. In many instances, the appointment of administrators for
the estates of decedents frequently become involved in
protracted litigations, thereby exposing such estates to great
waste and losses unless an authorized agent to collect the
debts and preserve the assets in the interim is appointed. The
occasion for such an appointment, likewise, arises where, for
some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof
of the will, regular administration is delayed. The new Rules
have broadened the basis for the appointment of an
administrator, and such appointment is allowed when there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any
cause, e.g. , parties cannot agree among themselves. It needs
to be emphasized that in the appointment of a special
administrator (which is but temporary and subsists only until a
regular administrator is appointed), the probate court does not
determine the shares in the decedents estate, but merely
appoints who is entitled to administer the estate. The issue of
heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution,
and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in
the administration as to be the basis of distribution. Thus, the
ISSUE:
Whether the appointment of Dolores as special administratix by

probate court is proper
Page 60
inheritance consisting mostly of real estate and shares of stock.

A month after her death, Crisantas mother commenced an
intestate proceedings before RTC of Malabon City docketed as
Spc. Proc. No. 192-MN. She prayed among others that the
letters of administration be issued to her son, Mariano Yanga,
brother of Crisanta. RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator.
However, the marriage between Lorenzo and Crisanta was
declared void for being bigamous. Then, RTC removed Lorenzo
as administrator and appointed Mariano.
CORONA VS COURT OF APPEALS

Tresvalles, Kris
FACTS:
On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New
York, U.S.A., leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated
October 3, 1980, which excluded her husband, respondent
Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her heirs, and the other, a formal
Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three weeks
thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico
"for reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting to
concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation under
Philippine Law"; bequeathed her properties in equal shares to
her sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and Gloria
L. Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way;
and appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner, as her
Executrix. On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a petition for
the probate of the Wills before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal and for the appointment of Nenita Alonte as Administrator

because she (Rowena) is presently employed in the United
Nations in New York City. The probate Court appointed Alonte as
Special Administratix. On On December 12, 1980, the surviving
husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion" and
prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied and prayed for
his appointment as Special Administrator because the Special
Administratix appointed is not related to the heirs and has no
interest to be protected. On December 18, 1980, Nenita P.
Alonte posted her Php100,000 bond and took her oath of office
before a Notary Public. On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court
set aside its Order of December 2, 1980 appointingNenita as
Special Administratrix, and appointed instead the surviving
husband, Romarico as Special Administrator for the reasons that
under Section 6, Rule 78, of the Rules of Court, the surviving
spouse is first in the order of preference for appointment as
Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that the
disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the grounds
of disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the
next of kin is appointed only where the surviving spouse is not
competent or is unwilling to serve besides the fact that the
Executrix appointed, is not the next of kin but merely a niece,
and that the decedent's estate is nothing more than half of the
unliquidated conjugal partnership property.
ISSUE:
Whether the Appellate Court erred in upholding the
appointment of the surviving husband as special administrator
HELD:
This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition taking
into account the allegations, arguments and issues raised by
the parties, is of the considered opinion that petitioner's
nominee, Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special
Page 60
preference of respondent is sound, that is, not whimsical, or

contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. The
petitioners strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court is misplaced. The rule refers to the appointment
of regular administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on the
other hand, applies to the appointment of a special
administrator. It has long been settled that the appointment of
special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding
the appointment of regular administrators
En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators

that while they may have respective interests to protect, they
are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control
of the Probate Court and are expected to work for the best
interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its
earliest settlement.
MATIAS VS GONZALES
Tresvalles, Kris
FACTS:
On May 15, 1952, Aurea Matias initiated said special
proceedings with a petition for the probate of a document
purporting to be the last will and testament of her aunt, Gabina
Raquel, who died single on May 8, 1952, at the age of 92 years.
The heir to the entire estate of the deceased except the
properties bequeathed to her other niece and nephews, namely,
Victorina Salud, Santiago Salud, Policarpio Salud, Santos Matias
and Rafael Matias is, pursuant to said instrument, Aurea
Matias, likewise, appointed therein as executrix thereof, without
bond. Basilia Salud, a first cousin of the deceased, opposed the
probate of her alleged will, and, after appropriate proceedings,
the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued an order,
sustaining said opposition and denying the petition for probate.

Subsequently, Aurea Matias brought the matter on appeal.
Meanwhile, or on February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud moved for
the dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, as special administrator of
the estate of the deceased, and the appointment, in his stead of
Ramon Plata. The motion was set for hearing on Feb 23, 1956
but was postponed to Feb 27, 1956. Although notified of this
order, Rodriguez did not appear on the date last mentioned.
Instead, he filed an urgent motion praying for additional time
within which to answer the charges preferred against him by
Basilia Salud and for another postponement of said hearing.
This motion was not granted, and Basilia Salud introduced
evidence in support of said charges, whereupon respondent
Judge by an order, dated February 27, 1956, found Rodriguez
guilty of abuse of authority and gross negligence, and,
accordingly, relieved him as special administrator of the estate
of the deceased and appointed Basilia Salud as special
administratrix thereof, to "be assisted and advised by her niece,
Miss Victorina Salud," who "shall always act as aide, interpreter
and adviser of Basilia Salud." Said order, likewise, provided that
"Basilia Salud shall be helped by Mr. Ramon Plata . . . who is
hereby appointed as co-administrator."
Aurea asked that said order be set aside and that she be
appointed special co-administratix with Horacio on the ground
that Basilia is over 80 years of age, totally blind and physically
incapacitated to perform the duties of said office and the said
movant is the universal heiress of the deceased and the person
appointed by the latter as executrix of her alleged will. This
motion was denied and maintained the appointment of the
three. However, on March 17, 1956, Basilia Salud tendered her
resignation as special administratix by reason of physical
Page 60
Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special Administrator,

considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of
discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will, is entitled to the
highest consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment on
grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed
by the fact that justice and equity demand that the side of the
deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be
represented in the management of the decedent's estate.
Shortly afterwards, or on June 18, 1956, respondents Ramon

Plata and Victorina Salud requested authority to collect the
rents due, or which may be due, to the estate of the deceased
and to collect all the produce of her lands, which was granted
on June 23, 1956. On June 27, 1956, said respondents filed
another motion praying for permission to sell the palay of the
deceased then deposited in different rice mills in the province of
Cavite, which respondent judge granted on June 10, 1956. Later
on, or on July 10, 1956, petitioner instituted the present action
against Judge Gonzales, and Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata,
for the purpose of annulling the above mentioned orders of
respondent Judge, upon the ground that the same had been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner argued that she should have preference in the choice
of special administratix of the estate of the decedent being the
universal heiress to said estate and the executrix appointed in
the alleged will of the deceased, that until its final disallowance
which has not, as yet, taken place she has a special interest
in said estate, which must be protected by giving
representation thereto in the management of said estate; that,
apart from denying her any such representation, the
management was given to persons partial to her main
opponent. That the Rules of Court do not permit the
appointment of more than one special administrator and that
Ramon and Victorina were authorized to collect the rents and
sell the palay without previous notice to petitioner.
Respondents maintain that respondent Judge acted with the
scope of his jurisdiction and without any abuse of discretion;
that petitioner can not validly claim any special interest in the
estate of the deceased, because the probate of the alleged will

and testament of the latter upon which petitioner relies has
been denied; that Horacio Rodriguez was duly notified of the
proceedings for his removal; and that Victorina Salud and
Ramon Plata have not done anything that would warrant their
removal.
ISSUE: whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion
for not appointing the named executrix and the propriety of
appointing more than one administratix
HELD:
Although Horacio Rodriguez had notice of the hearing of the
motion for his removal, dated February 17, 1956, the record
shows that petitioner herein received copy of said motion of
February 24, 1956, or the date after that set for the hearing
thereof. Again, notice of the order of respondent Judge, dated
February 23, 1956, postponing said hearing to February 27,
1956, was not served on petitioner herein.
In her motion of February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud prayed for the
dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, and the appointment of Ramon
Plata, as special administrator of said estate. Petitioner had,
therefore, no notice that her main opponent, Basilia Salud, and
the latter's principal witness, Victorina Salud, would be
considered for the management of said. As a consequence, said
petitioner had no opportunity to object to the appointment of
Basilia Salud as special administratrix, and of Victorina Salud, as
her assistant and adviser, and the order of February 27, 1956,
to this effect, denied due process to said petitioner.
The rule, laid down in Roxas vs. Pecson to the
one special administrator may be appointed
temporarily" the estate of the deceased, must
the light of the facts obtaining in said case.
Page 60
disability, due to old age and recommended the appointment of

victorina Salud.
effect that "only

to administrator
be considered in
The lower court
ROXAS VS. PECSON

Tuason, Jannelle
FACTS:
Pablo M. Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan. The
petitioner, widow of the deceased, filed a petition for the
probate of an alleged will of her deceased husband and for her
appointment as executrix of his estate designated in said will.
Petitioner was appointed as special administratrix and qualified
as such over the objection of the respondents who sought the
appointment of Maria, sister of the deceased. Upon petition by
the respondents, the respondent judge rendered his resolution
appointing the petitioner as special administratrix only of all the
conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria Roxas as special
administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively
to the deceased Pablo M. Roxas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge acted in excess of the court's
jurisdiction in appointing two special co-administratices of the
estate of the deceased.
RULING:
Yes. There is absolutely no reason for appointing two separate
administrators. As under the law, only one general
administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and

distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows
that only one special administrator may be appointed to
administer temporarily said estate, because a special
administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed
to act in lieu of the general administrator. "When there is delay
in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned
by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of will, or from
any other cause, the court may appoint a special administrator
to collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased until
the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or
administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81).
Although his powers and duties are limited to "collect and take
charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the executor or
administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may
commence and maintain suits as administrator, and may sell
such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A
special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the
deceased." (Section 2, Rule 81.)
DE GALA VS. GONZALES
Tuason, Janelle
FACTS:
Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a
niece of Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died
leaving no heirs by force of law, and Serapia, through her
counsel, presented the will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a
nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the
ground that it had not been executed in conformity with the
provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Serapia
de Gala was appointed special administratrix of the estate of
the deceased.
On the other hand,Sinforoso, husband of the deceased, filed a
motion asking the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special
administratrix be cancelled and that he, be appointed in her
stead. The motion was opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales
and by Serapia de Gala, but it was nevertheless granted.Serapia
Page 60
appointed therein one special administrator for some properties

forming part of said estate, and a special administratrix for
other properties thereof. Thus, there were two (2) separate and
independent special administrators. In the case at bar there is
only one (1) special administration, the powers of which shall be
exercised jointly by two special co-administrators. Moreover,
there are authorities in support of the power of courts to
appoint several special co-administrators.
was removed, and Sinforoso was appointed special

administrator in her place, principally on the ground that he had
possession of the property in question and that his appointment
would simplify the proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be removed as a special
administratix of the estate of the deceased
RULING:
administratrix of the estate before the RTC. The action also

prayed for the appointment of a receiver.
Gliceria filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that she may
not be sued as special administratrix. She also filed an
opposition to the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
receivership on the ground that the property subject of the
foreclosure proceedings is in custodia legis, since administration
proceedings had already been instituted for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased.
ISSUES:
LIWANAG, vs. REYES

Umbalin, Norissa
FACTS:
On July 14, 1960, the late Liwanag executed in favor of the
mortgagee Rotegaan Financing, Inc., a real estate mortgage on
a parcel of residential land to secure the payment of a loan. It
was stipulated in the mortgage contract that the total amount
of mortgage debt shall be fully paid on or before July 14, 1961.
Before the one year period expired, Liwanag died intestate.
As the mortgage obligation of the deceased was not fully
paid, the mortgagee, instituted a complaint for foreclosure
against the Estate of Pio D. Liwanag and Gliceria Liwanag as
1. WON Gliceria
administratix.
Liwanag
can
be
sued
as
special
2. WON there was abuse of discretion on the part of the

lower court in the issuance of its order for the
appointment of a receiver.
HELD:
1. YES.
Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making
the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against
the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse
effects of the statute of limitations running against them
in cases where the appointment of a regular
administrator is delayed. So if the court is to deny the
present action on this technical ground alone, and the
appointment of a regular administrator will be delayed,
the very purpose for which the mortgage was
constituted will be defeated.
2. NO.
It is to be noted that the contract of mortgage
between the deceased and the Rotegaan Financing,
Page 60
Yes. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in

the sound discretion of the court; the function of such an
administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the
deceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be sued
by a creditor and cannot pay any debts of the deceased. The
fact that no appeal can be taken from the appointment of a
special administrator indicates that both his appointment and
his removal are purely discretionary, SC cannot find that the
court below abused its discretion in the present case. In
removing Serapia de Gala and appointing the present possessor
of the property pending the final determination of the validity of
the will, the court probably prevented useless litigation.
states the in case of judicial foreclosure, the Mortgagor

hereby consents to the appointment of the president of
the mortgagee corporation or any of its officers as
receiver, without any bond, to take charge of the
mortgaged property at once, and to hold possession of
the same, and the rents and profits derived from the
mortgaged property, before the sale, x x x. Hence, the
will of the deceased himself allowed that, in case of
foreclosure, the property be put into the hands of a
receiver, and this provision should be respected by the
administratrix of the estate. The cases cited by
petitioner in favor of the theory that property in custodia
legis can not be given to a receiver is not applicable,
considering that this is an action to enforce a superior
lien on certain property of the estate and the
appointment of a receiver, which is a very convenient
and feasible means of preserving and administering the
property, has been agreed upon by the contracting
parties.
About two years later, special administrator Alfonso

submitted a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to
some charitable or educational institution/s, some personal
effects (clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc.)
which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value.
The court required a specification of the properties sought to be
sold. Instead, the special administrator submitted a copy of the
inventory of the personal properties belonging to the estate
with the items sought to be sold marked with a check in red
pencil.
Idonah filed an opposition to the proposed sale. But, the
lower court approved the proposed sale. Idonah moved to
reconsider on the following grounds:
1. The order in effect authorized the special
administrator to sell the entire personal estate of the
deceased;
2. There was no showing that the goods sought to be
sold were perishable;
3. The goods sought to be sold represented her
lifetime savings and collections;
ANDERSON VS. PERKINS

Umbali, Norissa
4. There were unauthorized withdrawals from the

properties of the estate, and the sale of the
inventoried lot would prevent identification and
recovery of the articles removed; and
FACTS :
ISSUES:
1. Is the special administrators power to sell limited to
perishable property.
2. WON the lower court erred in authorizing the special
administrator to sell certain personal properties of the
estate. YES. It was premature. RATIO
HELD:
Page 60
Special proceedings were commenced by Dora Perkins

Anderson seeking the probate of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins
will. Dora also filed an urgent petition for the appointment of
Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate. On
the same day, Alfonso was appointed upon his posting of a
P50,000 bond. Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of
Eugene, entered an opposition to the probate of the will. Later,
the special administrator Alfonso submitted an inventory of all
the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to
Eugene at the time of his death.
5. There is evidence showing Idonahs separate

rights to a substantial part of the personal estate.
Section 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, provides

that the special administrator "may sell such perishable
and other property as the court orders sold", which
shows that the special administrator's power to sell is
not limited to "perishable" property only. The function of
a special administrator is only to collect and preserve
the property of the deceased until a regular
administrator is appointed. But it is not alone the specific
property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its
value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the
sale by a special administrator of perishable property. It
is in line with this general power to preserve not only the
property of the estate but also its value, that Section 2,
Rule 81 also empowers such administrator to sell "other
property as the court ordered sold".
2. YES. It was premature.
The records show that up to the time the
proposed sale was asked for and judicially approved, no
proceeding had been taken to segregate the alleged
exclusive property of Idonah from the mass of the estate
supposedly left by Eugene or to liquidate the conjugal
partnership property of the spouses. Until the issue of
the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is
heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership
liquidated or at least an agreement be reached with
Idonah as to which properties of the conjugal partnership
she would not mind being sold to preserve their value,
the proposed sale is premature. Also, there are no
reasons of extreme urgency to justify the proposed sale
over the strong opposition and objection of Idonah who
may later be adjudged owner of a substantial portion of
the personalities in question. After all, most of the items
sought to be sold can easily be preserved in either or
both of two residential houses (Manila and Baguio City).
Re: special administrator Alfonsos claim that
Idonah should have indicated the alleged "fine furniture"
which she did not want sold and that her refusal to do so
is an indication of her unmeritorious claim Idonah was

not given a reasonable opportunity to point out which
items she did not want sold. Her opposition and motion
for reconsideration were overruled by the lower court
without reasons. The records do not even show that an
inquiry was made as to the validity of the grounds of her
opposition.
CO VS. ROSARIO
Uy, Charles
FACTS:
Upon the death of the father of herein parties, Co Bun
Chun, the RTC of Makati City appointed petitioner Luis Co as coadministrator together with a Vicente Yu. Subsequently,
petitioner nominated his son, Alvin Co, as special coadministrator, which motion was granted by the trial court.
About four years later, numerous criminal charges have been
filed against Alvin Co, and at the basis of the same, the other
heirs asked that he be removed as special co-administrator.
Said motion was granted by the trial court. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but upon the
denial of the same, he brought the matter to the CA under Rule
65. The CA affirmed the decision, hence, this appeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is proper for the trial court to dismiss
the services of Alvin Co on the basis of the criminal charges
filed against him even if he had not yet been convicted
RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. As a special coadministrator, Alvin Co may be removed by the trial court even
if the grounds for his removal are not enumerated under the
rules. This is because he is a special administrator, not a regular
administrator, and special administrators are not covered by
Page 60
1. NO.
ALCASID VS SAMSON
Uy, Charles
FACTS:
An application for the issuance of letters of
administration was filed by herein respondents in favor of one
of their numbers, herein respondent Jesus V. Samson, in the CFI
of Albay. Such application was granted and on the same day,
Jesus Samson was appointed special administrator for the
estate. Said appointment was opposed by herein petitioner
Josefina Samson, the widow of Jose Samson, the deceased,
together with her three minor children. They asked that
Josefina, and not Jesus be appointed administrator. After two
years of hearing, the trial court appointed Antonia Codia, city
treasurer, petitioner, as regular administrator. The court also
ordered Jesus to turn over to Codia all papers regarding the
administration of the estate in the March 12, 1956 order. Upon
motion of the widow, the April 3, 1956 Order was issued,
ordering Jesus to turn over all documents to Codia within three
days. It would appear, however, that respondents opposed the
appointment of Codia but their motion was denied, hence, they
went up to the CA who decided in favor of herein respondents
on the basis of Cotia v Pecson where it was ruled that the
appeal stayed the appointment of Codia. Aggrieved, petitioners
filed this petition before the Court
ISSUE:
Whether or not Codia qualifies as administrator of the
The Court ruled in the affirmative. At the outset, it must

be noted that the appointment of Jesus Samson was as special
administrator, while that of Codia was of a regular
administrator. The appointment of a special administrator is
discretionary upon the court, hence, the court may also remove
the said special administrator, including when a regular
administrator is appointed. Section 3, Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court provides that the authority of the special administrator
ends when a regular administrator is appointed. Even assuming
that Cotia v Pecson applies which it does not because that is
the removal of a regular administrator still, the authority of
Jesus Samson has ended because the April 3 Order is a special
order as was required by Section 2, Rule 39. It boils down to the
fact that the appointment of special administrators is up to the
discretion of the court.
JUNQUERA VS. BORROMEO
Viernes , Wayne
RULE
81
Bonds of Executors and Administrators

COSME DE MENDOZA V. PACHECO, 64 PHIL 134 (1937)
FACTS:
Manuel Soriano was former administrator of the estate
of Cosme. As such administrator, he filed a bond for
P5,000 with Januario Pacheco and Raymundo Cordero as
sureties. When an account was made, Soriano was
indebted to the estate. Thus, the lower court ordered
the execution of his bond.
Some time later, Soriano and the new administratrix
entered into a settlement whereby Soriano ceded
estate
RULING:
Page 60
the rules covering regular administrators. The appointment of

special administrators are left to the sound discretion of the
courts, and thus, the removal of special administrators are also
left to the sound discretion of the courts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a probate court has the power to order
the execution of an administrator's bond?
HELD:
To begin with, it lies within discretion of the court to
select an administrator of the estate of a deceased
person. Before an administrator, or an executor, enters
upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary
or of administration are issued, the person to whom they
are issued is required to give a bond in such reasonable
sum as the court directs, with one or more sufficient
sureties, conditioned upon the faithful performance of
his trust. The administrator is accountable on his bond
along with the sureties for the performance of certain
legal obligations.
It is clear that the Court of First Instance, exercising
probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing
of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof,
and to hold it accountable for any breach of the
administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an allembracing power over the administrator's bond and over
administration proceedings, a Court of First Instance in
a probate proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authority
to execute and make that bond answerable for the very
purpose for which it was filed. It is true that the law
does not say expressly or in so many words tat such
court has power to execute the bond of an administrator,
but by necessary and logical implication, the power is
there as eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocal
term.
WARNER, BARNES & CO. VS. LUZON SURETY CO, INC.
Vizcarra, William
FACTS:
Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd.(WBC), filed a complaint
against Luzon Surety Co., Inc.(LSC), of the recovery of the sum
of P6,000. The basis of the complaint was a bond in the sum of
P6,000 filed by Agueda Gonzaga as administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of Agueda Gonzaga in Special Proceedings No.
452, the condition being that said bond would be void if the
administratrix "faithfully prepares and presents to the Court a
correct inventory of all the property of the deceased which may
have come into his possession or into the possession of any
other person representing him according to law, if he
administers all the property of the deceased which at any time
comes into his possession or into the possession of any other
person representing him; faithfully pays all debts, legacies, and
bequests which encumber said estate, pays whatever dividends
which the Court may decide should be paid, and renders a just
and true account of his administrations to the Court within a
year or at any other date that he may required so to do, and
faithfully executes all orders and decrees of said court."
It was alleged in the complaint that WBC had a duly approved
claim against the Estate of Aguedo Gonzaga in the sum of
P6,485.02, plus 2 per cent annual interest; that the
administratrix violated the conditions of her bond "(a) by failing
to file an inventory of the assets and funds of the estate that
had come into her hands; (b) by failing to pay or discharge the
approved claim of the plaintiff; (c) by failing to render a true
and just account of her administration in general, and of the
said war damage payments in particular."; that the defendant,
as surety in the bond, failed to pay to the plaintiff,
notwithstanding the latter's demand.
The LSC filed an answer setting up the special defenses that the
complaint did not state a cause of action.
On January 6, 1953, the WBC filed a motion for summary
judgment, alleging that "the special defenses relied upon by the
LSC in her Answer raise only questions of law, and the WBC
Page 60
certain real properties to the estate, thereby reducing

his indebtedness to P5,000. The sureties now question
the jurisdiction of the court to execute the bond.
believes that LSC cannot produce counter-affidavits that would

raise any 'genuine issues as to any material facts.'
The CFI rendered a summary judgment sentencing LSC to pay
WBC the sum of P6,000. From this judgment the defendant
appealed.
Though nominally payable to the Republic of the Philippines, the

bond is expressly for the benefit of the heirs, legatees and
creditors of the Estate of the deceased Aguedo Gonzaga. There
is no valid reason why a creditor may not directly in his name
enforce said bond in so far as he is concerned.
RULING:
Under the first assignment of error, LSC contends that
the lower court had no jurisdiction to pass upon its liability
under the bond in question, because it is only the probate court
that can hold a surety accountable for any breach by the
administratrix of her duty, citing the case of Mendoza vs.
Pacheco, 64 Phil., 134. It is, however, noteworthy that while the
citation is to the effect that the probate court has jurisdiction
over the forefeiture or enforcement of an administrator's bond,
it was not held therein that the same matter may not be
litigated in an ordinary civil action brought before the court of
first instance.
Under the fifth assignment of error, it is alleged that the WBC

should have first filed a claim against the Estate of the
deceased administratrix Agueda Gonzaga, in conformity with
section 6 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court providing that "Where
the obligation of the decedent is joint and several with another
debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he
were the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the
estate to recover contribution from the other debtor." Apart
from the fact that his defense was not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer and was therefore waived
(section 10, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court), it appears that even
as late as September 17, 1952, when the present complaint was
filed, (more than two years after the death of Agueda Gonzaga),
there were no proceedings for the administration of her estate,
with the result that section 6 of Rule 87 loses its applicability.
Moreover, it is to be noted that the LSC had also chosen to file a
third-party complaint in the present case against Romualdo
Araneta, joint and several counter-guarantor of the deceased
administratrix, instead of presenting a claim against the latter's
estate.
Under the third and fourth assignments of error, it is insisted for

LSC that the bond in question was executed in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines and that the proper procedure would
seem to be that it might be enforced in the administration
proceedings were it was filed. This view is likewise not tenable.
Wherefore, it being understood that the defendant-appellant is

sentenced to pay to the plaintiff-appellee only the sum of
P6,000, plus the cost, the same is hereby affirmed.
LUZON SURETY CO., INC. VS. QUEBAR
Vizcarra, William
FACTS
Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in behalf of
defendant Quebrar as administrator of 2 estates (Chinsuy and
Lipa). The plaintiff and both Quebrar and Kilayko bound
themselves solidarily after executing an indemnity agreement
where both the defendants agreed to pay the premiums every
Page 60
Under the second assignment of error, LSC claims that there are
genuine controversies between the parties litigant, and that,
contrary to the allegations of the complaint, the administratrix
made a return to the court of the war damage payments she
received; the administratrix cannot be charged with having
failed to pay plaintiff's claim because there is no showing that
she was ever authorized to pay approved claims; the
administratrix may be presumed to have rendered an
accounting of her administration, likely in 1948, in accordance
with section 8 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. In answer, it is
sufficient to state that the allegations that the administratrix
failed to file an inventory, to pay the plaintiff's claim, and to
render a true and just account of her administration, are factual
and remained uncontroverted by counter-affidavits which the
appellant could have easily filed.
ISSUE:
Are the bonds still in force and effect from 1955 to 1962
RULING
YES. Under Rule 81 (Sec.1) of the Rules of Court, the
administrator is required to put up a bond for the purpose of
indemnifying creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is
conditioned upon the faithful performance of the administrator's
trust. Hence, the surety is then liable under the administrator's
bond.
Even after the approved project of partition, Quebrar as
administrator still had something to do. The administration is for
the purpose of liquidation of the estate and the distribution of
the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means
the determination of all the assets of the estate and the
payment of all debts and expenses. It appears that there are
still debts and expenses to be paid after 1957.
Moreover, the bond stipulation did not provide that it will
terminate at the end of the 1st year if the premium remains
unpaid. Hence, it does not necessarily extinguish or terminate
the effectivity of the counter bond in the absence of an express
stipulation to this effect. As such, as long as the defendant
remains the administrator of the estate, the bond will be held
liable and the plaintiff's liabilities subsist being the co-extensive

with the administrator.
RULE
82
Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation

and Removal of Administrator or Executor
BORROMEO VS BORROMEO
Yatco, Nathaniel
FACTS:
Dr. MaximoBorromeo died testate designating Borromeo
Brothers Estate, Inc. as sole heir. His brother CanutoBorromeo
acted as executor of the said will. The said corporation is owned
by the testator and his brothers and sisters. Proceedings have
been instituted. The widow, Johanna Hofer Borromeo filed an
Urgent Motion to remove the executordue to negligence in the
performance of duties and unfitness to continue as executor.
While the action was still pending, CanutoBorromeo withdrew
his joint bank account with the decedent and deposited it on his
and his other brother Exequiels joint account without authority
from the Court. In time the petition was heard and the judge
relieved Canuto as executor for some reasons including that of
the unauthorized withdrawal of the decedents joint account
with the executor.Canuto appealed. Canuto claims that they
were joint owners of such account and either of them (decedent
or Canuto) has right over it.
ISSUE: WON a conflict of interest arose in such withdrawal
made by Canuto which is a ground for removal as executor of
the estate.
RULING:
Yes.It was found by the SC that the money taken from
the joint account in the Bank was done by Canuto with
representation as executor of the estate of deceased
Dr.Maximo. There was bad faith in the concealment of property
belonging to the decedents estate. Canuto should have
deposited the P23, 930.39 on the estate andnot at his disposal.
It then constituted as hiding such property from the widow and
he, as executor of the estate, bypassed judicial adjudication of
Page 60
year. In the years 1954-55, the defendants paid the premiums

and the documentary stamps. In 1957, the Court approved the
project of partition, while in 1962, Luzon Surety demanded
payments of premiums from 1955 onwards. It was also in the
same year when the court granted the motion of the defendants
to have both bonds cancelled. Hence, plaintiff files a case in the
CFI. The court (CFI) allowed the plaintiff to recover since the
bonds were in force and effect from the filing until 1962. The
Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court on
questions of law.
the said property.Conflict between the interest of the executor

and the interest of the deceased is ground for removal or
resignation of the former, who has thereby become unsuitable
to discharge the trust. According to Rule 82, sec 2, if an
executor neglects to settle his account and settle the estate
according to law, the court may remove him or, in its discretion
permit him to resign.
OCAMPO VS OCAMPO
Yatco, Nathaniel
FACTS:
Renato and Erlinda (Respondents herein) appealed to the CA

and CA ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
in appointing Melinda (daughter of Dalisay) as a regular
administrator.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion on
the revocation of the respondents as special administrators and
appointment of Merlinda (daughter of Dalisay) as regular
administratrix.
RULING
The court finds no abuse of discretion on the revocation
but finds it improper for Merlinda to be a regular
administratrix. The probate court may at its discretion appoint
or
remove
special
administrators
toher
than
the
groundsenumerated in the Rules. The respondents were not
able to comply with the payment of the bond which is required
in Rule 81 and also, there was evident bad faith on the part of
the respondents as administrators when an alleged sale of the
property included in the estate was done thru a conditional
deed of sale. As a result of such transaction, it deprived the
estate of profits accruing from the said real property (monthly
rentals.)
Such reason of the probate court being grounded
on equity, justice and legal principles. As to the appointment of
Merlinda, it must be as a special administrator and not a
regular administrator. Rule 78 determines the persons to be
appointed as regular administrators. She is neither an heir or a
creditor to the estate. However, the SC held her as a special
administratrix due to her competency in filing the bond and true
inventory of the estate as soon as the RTC appointed her of
such responsibility. Such acts clearly manifested her intention to
serve
willingly.
Pending
the
proceeding
for
regular
administration, Merlinda is designated as special administratrix
of the estate.
RULE
83
Page 60
Vicente and Maxima Ocampo died intestate leaving 3

children namely Leonardo, Renato and Erlinda. The 3 siblings
divided the profits of the decedents estate among themselves.
Subsequently, Leonardo died leaving his surviving spouse
Dalisay and 3 children namely Vince, Merlinda and Leonardo, Jr.
When Leonardo died, Renato and Erlinda took over to the
exclusion of the widowed wife Dalisay.Dalisay and her 3 children
filed a petition for intestate proceedings of the estate of
Vicente, Maxima and her deceased husband Leonardo. It seeks
to settle the estate and appoint an administrator to divide such
as they were not receiving any profit anymore. Respondents
Renato and Erlinda countered assailing the petition defective as
it sought two estates in one proceeding (Estate of Vicente and
Maxima; and Leonardos estate.)There was a motion to appoint
Renato and Erlinda as administrators but was countered by
Dalisay as it would cause further injustice and nominated Binan
Rural Bank as administrator. Trial Court accepted that
respondent Renato and petitioner Dalisay be appointed as joint
administrators. Petitioner Dalisay was revoked of her
appointment as her nomination of Binan Rural bank constituted
a waiver and the court found that she is unfit to such
office.Renato and Erlinda, as special administrators, was
ordered by the court to produce a true inventory of the estate.
RTC later on revoked the appointment of Renato and Erlinda for
failure to comply with the order and failure to pay the bond as
prescribed by the rules and that there was an alleged sale made
by them involving a real property belonging to the estate.
SEBIAL VS. SEBIAL

GARCIA VS. GARCIA
Arcilla, Jay
CUIZON VS. RAMOLETE
Azarcon, Pia Lea
FACTS:
As early as 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the
registration of several parcels of land in Mandaue City docketed
as L.R. Case No. N-179. In 1970, he distributed his property
between his two daughters, Rufina and Irene, to whom the salt
beds subject of the controversy was given. In 1971, Irene
executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving
the said salt beds in favor of petitioners Franciso et al. Although
the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in
1972, the decree of registration and the corresponding O.C.T.
was issued only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that
same year, T.C.T No. 10477 covering the property in question
was issued to Irene. The latter died in 1978. During the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate, Rufina, the mother of
Francisco et al., adjudicated to herself all the property of Irene
including the salt beds in question. She then executed a deed of
Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified the
1971 deed of sale and renounced and waived whatever rights
and interests and participation she may have in the property in
question in favor of the petitioners. The deed was annotated in
T.C.T. No. 10477. Subsequently, T.C.T. No. 12665 was issued in
favor of the petitioners. In 1978, Domingo Antigua, who
allegedly was chosen by the heirs of Irene to act as
administrator, was appointed administrator by the CFI of Cebu.

Antigua included the salt bed in the inventory of Irenes estate
and asked the Cebu CFI to order petitioners to deliver the salt to
him. The Cebu CFI granted the same.
ISSUE:
Whether a court handling the intestate proceedings has
jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a TCT issued
in favor owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings
if the said parcels of have been?
RULING:
No. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in
charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part
of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside
parties. All said court could do is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory of properties
to be administered by the administrator. If there is dispute, then
the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims
of title because the probate court cannot do so. In the instant
case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside
parties but it was sold seven years before the death of the
decedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who are
not party to the proceedings. In Bolisay vs. Alcid, the Court held
that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the
presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due
weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner
of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action. Having been
apprised of the fact that the property in question was covered
by a TCT issued in the name of third parties, the respondent
Page 60
Inventory and Appraisal . Provision for Support of

Family
court should have denied the motion of the respondent

administrator and excluded the property in question from the
inventory of the property of the estate.
GUINGUING VS. ABUTON

FACTS:
Ignacio Abuton died, testamentary, leaving two sets of
children by two different wives. First from DionisiaOlarte whom
he had 12 children and 3 already died. Second from, Teodora
Guinguing whom he had 4 children, all still living. Upon
allowance of the will, Gabriel Binaoro was appointed as
administrator. Binaoro submitted the inventory to the court but
he included only the lands which the testator had devised to the
children of the second marriage, omitting other lands possessed
by him at the time of his death and which were claimed by the
children of the first marriage as having been derived from their
mother.
as an advancement. The purpose of the motion was to force the

first set of children to bring into collation the properties that had
been received by them, in conformity with article 1035 of the
Civil Code; and the motion was based partly on the supposition
that Ignacio Abuton had never in fact effected a liquidation of
the conjugal property pertaining to himself and DionisiaOlarte.
This motion was formally opposed by two of the children

of the first marriage, namely, Agapito and CalixtoAbuton y
Olarte.
The trial judge found that after the death of the first wife
the testator had acquired no property after the first marriage
and the testator liquidated the ganacial estate and had divided
among the first set of children all of the property that pertained
to the first wife in the division, with the exception of the homeplace in the poblacion, in which the testator had continued to
reside till death. The share pertaining to the testator in said
division was, so the court found, retained in his own hands; and
this property constituted the proper subject matter of the
present administration proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisional inventory should include
all property pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the
deceased.
RULING:
Page 60
This prompted Teodora Guinguing to file a motion, asking

that the administrator be required to amend his inventory and
to include therein all property pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of Ignacio Abuton and DionisiaOlarte, including
property actually in the hands of his children by her which (the
motion alleged) had been delivered to her four minor children
Among the properties remaining in possession of Ignacio

Abuton at the time of his death was a piece of land covered by
a composition title No. 11658, issued in 1894 in the name of
DionisiaOlarte. At the same time that this title was issued,
AgapitoAbuton procured two other titles, Nos. 11651 and
11654, covering adjacent properties to be issued in his own
name. From the circumstance that title No. 11658 was issued in
the name of DionisiaOlarte the opponents, theAbutons , appear
to believe that this land was her particular property and should
now vest exclusively in her heirs. This conclusion is erroneous.
There is nothing to show that the land covered by title No.
11658 was not acquired by the spouses during their marriage,
and the circumstance that the title was taken in the name of
the wife does not defeat its presumed character as ganacial
property. Therefore, in liquidating the ganacial property of the
first marriage it was within the power of the surviving husband
to assign other property to the first set of children as their
participation in the estate of their mother and to retain in his
own hands the property for which a composition title had been
issued in the name of the wife.
RULE
84
General Powers and Duties of Executors and

Administrators
WILSON VS REAR
Borja,Catherine
FACTS:
July 14, 1925, Charles C. Rear was murdered by some
Moros on his plantation. The whole plantation consisted of
public lands. J.J. Wilson qualified as special administrator of the
estate on November 17, 1925.
Later, the property of the estate was appraised at
P20,800, of which the commissioners filed an inventory and
report, which was also signed by Wilson. January 4, 1927, the
commissioners made and filed a report of claims against the
estate, but by reason of the fact that it was claimed and alleged
that the administrator did not have any funds to pay, on March
30, 1927, the court ordered the administrator to sell a portion of
the property.
After due notice, the public sale took place, and the property
was sold to Wm. Mannion for P7,600. April 26, 1927,
March 23, 1928, Wilson filed his final account which later was
amended on June 10, 1928, to which the heirs made numerous
and specific objections, including that Wilson, as special
administrator and as administrator, was neglectful and
imprudent and he committed waste. He is, therefore, liable.
ISSUE:
Page 60
Yes.The making of the inventory is necessarily of a

preliminary and provisional nature, and the improper inclusion
of property therein or the improper omission of property
therefrom is not absolutely decisive of the rights of persons in
interest. In addition, the inclusion of a property in the inventory
does not deprive the occupant of possession; and if it is finally
determined that the property has been properly included in the
estate, the occupant heir is liable for the fruits and interest only
from the date when the succession was opened (art. 1049, Civ.
Code). The provisions of the Civil Code with reference to
collation clearly contemplate that disputes between heirs with
respect to the obligation to collate may be determined in the
course of the administration proceedings.
RULING:
The law does not impose upon an administrator a high degree
of care in the administration of an estate, but it does impose
upon him ordinary and usual care, for want of which he is
personally liable. In the instant case there were no
complications of any kind and in the usual and ordinary course
of business, the administrator should have wound up and
settled the estate within eight months from the date of his
appointment.
When he was appointed and qualified as administrator, the law
imposed upon him legal duties and obligations, among which
was to handle the estate in a business-like manner, marshal its
assets, and close the estate without any unreasonable or
unnecessary delay. He was not appointed to act for or on behalf
of the creditors, or to represent the interests of the heirs only.
He should have administered the affairs of the estate for the
use and benefit alike of all interested persons, as any prudent
business man would handle his own personal business. When
appointed, it is the legal duty of the administrator to administer,
settle, and close the administration in the ordinary course of
business, without any unnecessary delay. Neither does an
administrator, in particular, without a specific showing or an
order of the court, have any legal right to continue the
operation of the business in which the deceased was engaged,
or to eat up and absorb the assets of the estate in the payment
of operating expenses. Yet, in the instant case, the
administrator on his own volition and without any authority or
process of court continued the operation of the plantation, and
in the end, as shown by his own report, the estate, which was
appraised at P20,800, with actual debts of the deceased of only
P1,655.54, was all wiped out and lost, and left with a deficit of
P1,809.69.
SAN DIEGO VS. NOMBRE

Borlagdatan, April
FACTS:
-AdeloNombre as duly constituted judicial administrator
leased a fishpond to Pedro Escanlar (respondent)
-Terms of the lease : 3yrs
-It is executed without previous authority or approval of the
Court where the proceedings was pending
-Nombre was removed as administrator by Order of the court
and one SofronioCampillanos was appointed in his stead
-Campillanos filed a motion asking for authority to execute a
lease contract of the same fishpond in favor of petitioner for 5
years from 1961
- Nombre opposed this alleging that to grant such motion by the
new administrator would nullify the contract of lease validly
executed
RULING OF TRIAL COURT:
-It held that the contract with Escanlar was null and void, for
want of judicial authority and that unless he would offer the
same as or better conditions than the prospective lessee - San
Diego
Page 60
Is Wilson, as special administrator, liable?
-No good reason why the motion for authority to lease the
property to San Diego should not be granted
-A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not

only the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and
creditors of the estate.
RULING OF CA:
-It reversed the trial court's decision explaining that even in the
absence of such special powers, a contract or lease for more
than 6 years is not entirely invalid
-No such limitation on the power of a judicial administrator to
grant a lease of property placed under his custody is provided
for in the present law
-In accordance with Article 1647, CC it is only when the lease is
to be recorded in the Registry of Property that it cannot be
instituted without special authority
-However under Rule
authorizes a judicial
administer the estate
which includes leasing
-A judicial administrator before entering into his duties, is

required to file a bond.
-This is not applicable in case of agency wherein agent is only
answerable to his principal. The protection which the law gives
the principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent,
stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be
thru agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial administrator
are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the
appointing court.
85, Section 3, of the Rules of Court it

administrator, among other things, to
of the deceased not disposed of by will
the property
ISSUE: WON a judicial administrator can validly lease property

of the estate without prior judicial authority and approval
JARODA VS. CUSI

Bueno, Jirene
FACTS:
RULING:
-While it may be admitted that the duties of a judicial

administrator and an agent (petitioner alleges that both act in
representative capacity), are in some respects, identical, the
provisions on agency this should not apply to a judicial
administrator
Antonio Tan filed for a Special Proceeding before the respondent

court stating that the deceased Carlos Villa Abrille died
intestate leaving estates consisting of his conjugal share in real
and personal properties and some of them are shares in the coownership in Juna Subdivision and cash on bank.
Page 60
-The court denied the petition & affirmed CA's ruling.
Tan executed, together with the other co-owners of the Juna

Subdivision a power of attorney appointing himself as attorneyin-fact to sell (or) dispose the lots in the 99.546-hectare
subdivision. Tan filed before the court for the approval of the
power of attorney executed authorizing himself to sell the lots,
which the court also granted.
Petitioner Natividad V. A. Jaroda moved to nullify the order that
allowed the withdrawal of the bank deposits, as well as the
order which approved the power of attorney which was granted
by the respondent court. Jaroda appealed but it was also
dismissed. Petitioner Jaroda filed the present petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction alleging, among other
things, that appeal would not be speedy and adequate as
respondent Tan has sold and continues to sell the subdivision
lots on the strength of the respondent court's order, to her
irreparable prejudice and that of the other heirs which the Court
gave due and issued an order restraining the respondent from
selling the share of the intestate estate.
ISSUE: Whether Respondent Judge gravely abused his

discretion when it granted the withdrawal of the bank deposits,
as well as the order which approved the power of attorney of
Special Administrator Tan to sell or dispose the lots co-owned by
the deceased in Juna Subdivision.
RULING:
Yes. We agree with petitioner that the order allowing the special
administrator to withdraw the bank deposits standing in the
name of the decedent is in abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. In the first place, said withdrawal is foreign
to the powers and duties of a special administrator, which, as
Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides, are to take
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and
estate of the decease and preserve the same for the executor
or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose
may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may
sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders
sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts
of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.
In the second place, the order was issued without notice to, and
hearing of, the heirs of the deceased. The withdrawal of the
bank deposits may be viewed as a taking of possession and
charge of the credits of the estate, and apparently within the
powers and duties of a special administrator; but actually, said
withdrawal is a waiver by the special administrator of a prima
facie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the bank deposits
in favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, who were
Page 60
The heirs of the deceased are his surviving spouse, nine (9)
children (among them the herein petitioner, Natividad V. A.
Jaroda), and four (4) grandsons, among them the herein
respondent, Antonio V. A. Tan. After Respondent Tan was
appointed special administrator he petitioned for the withdrawal
of sums of P109,886.42 and P72,644.66 from the Philippine
National Bank, which sums were not listed in his petition for
administration as among the properties left by the deceased
instead actually belong to and were held in trust for the coowners of the Juna Subdivision. Powers of attorney purportedly
signed by the co-owners authorizing the late Carlos Villa Abrille
to sell the lots in the Juna Subdivision and to deposit the
proceeds thereof with the Philippine National Bank were
exhibited. The court granted the petition.
The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased; they,

therefore, belong prima facie to his estate after his death. And
until the contrary is shown by proper evidence at the proper
stage, when money claims may be filed in the intestate
proceedings, the special administrator is without power to make
the waiver or to hand over part of the estate, or what appears
to be a prima facie part of the estate, to other persons on the
ground that the estate is not the owner thereof. If even to sell
for valuable consideration property of the estate requires prior
written notice of the application to the heirs, legatees, or
devisees under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, such notice is
equally, if not more, indispensable for disposing gratuitously of
assets of the decedent in favor of strangers. Admittedly, no
such notice was given, and without it the court's authority is
invalid and improper.
b) The order approving the power of attorney executed by

administrator Tan and appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to
sell the subdivision lots for a price at his discretion is, likewise,
void for want of notice and for approving an improper contract
or transaction.
As provided under Section 4 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court ,

power of attorney for the sale of the pro-indiviso share of the
estate requires "written notice to the heirs, devisees, and
legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold" and
admittedly, administrator Tan did not furnish such notice.
It is well settled that an executrix holds the property of her

testator's estate as a trustee and that an executrix will not be
permitted to deal with herself as an individual in any
transaction concerning the trust property.
The opinion of some commentators that, as a general rule,

auto-contracts are permissible if not expressly prohibited and
that there is no express provision of law prohibiting an
administrator from appointing himself as his own agent, even if
correct, cannot and should not apply to administrator of
decedent's estates, in view of the fiduciary relationship that
they occupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased and their
responsibilities toward the probate court. A contrary ruling
would open the door to fraud and maladministration, and once
the harm is done, it might be too late to correct it.
A concrete example would be for administrator Tan to authorize

agent Tan to sell a lot for P50, with the condition that if he can
sell it for more he could keep the difference; agent Tan sells the
lot for P150.00; he retains P100.00 and deposits in the bank
P50.00 "in the name of Antonio V. A. Tan, in trust for Juna
Subdivision" (as worded in the power of attorney. Annex "F-1");
thus, administrator Tan's accounting to the estate for the sale of
the lot for P50 would be in order, but the estate would have
been actually cheated of the sum of P100, which went to agent
Tan in his individual capacity.
Page 60
allegedly claiming the same as alleged by the administrator in

his motion.
The court below also failed to notice that, as alleged in the

administrator's petition after the death of Carlos Villa Abrille the
administrator Tan, in his personal capacity, had replaced said
deceased as manager of the Juna Subdivision by authority of
the other co-owners. By the court's questioned order
empowering him to represent the interest of the deceased in
the management of the subdivision, the administrator Tan came
to be the agent or attorney-in-fact of two different principals:
the court and the heirs of the deceased on the one hand, and
the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other, in
managing and disposing of the lots of the subdivision. This dual
agency of the respondent Tan rendered him incapable of
independent defense of the estate's interests against those of
the majority co-owners. It is highly undesirable, if not improper,
that a court officer and administrator, in dealing with property
under his administration, should have to look to the wishes of
strangers as well as to those of the court that appointed him. A
judicial administrator should be at all times subject to the
orders of the appointing Tribunal and of no one else.
Jaroda's interest in the estate demands that she be heard by

the court in all matters affecting the disposal of her share, and
that the administrator should primarily protect the interest of
the estate in which she is a participant rather than those of the
decedent's co-owner. The partial partition approved by the
court has no effect, one way or the other, upon the orders
contested in the present case because it is not definite whether
the lots described in the 57 pages of the partition agreement
correspond to those of the Juna Subdivision as described in the
power of attorney.
Cadavis , Lloyd
FACTS:
A verified complaint for disbarment case filed by Mauro

Mananquil against Atty. Villegas w/ gross misconduct or
malpractice committed while acting as counsel of record
of one Felix Leong in the latters capacity as
administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Felomina
Zerna. The complainant was appointed special
administrator after Felix Leong died.
March 21, 1961, respondent was retained as counsel of

record for Felix Leong, one of the heirs of the late
Felomina Zerna, who was appointed as administrator of
the Testate Estate of the Felomina Zerna.
A lease contract was executed between Felix and the

Heirs of Jose Villegas represented by respondents
brother in law Marcelo involving, among others, sugar
lands of the Estate.
Felix Leong was designated as administrator and owner,

by testamentary disposition, of 5/6 of all said parcels of
land.
The lease contract was for 4 sugar crop years, w/ 10%

yearly rental of the value of the sugar produced from the
leased land.
April 20, 1965,the formal partnership of Hijos De Jose

Villegas was formed among the heirs of Jose Villegas, of
which respondent was a member.
Another lease contract was executed bet. Felix and the

partnership, containing basically the same terms and
Page 60
MANANQUIL VS. VILLEGAS
After the demise of Marcelo, respondent was appointed

manager of Hijos De Jose Villegas by the majority of
partners.
Renewals of the lease contract were executed bet. Felix

and Hijos De Jose Villegas and respondent signing
therein as representative of the lessee.
In 1980, respondent was replaced by his nephew

Geronimo Villegas as the manager of the family
partnership.
Villegas was both counsel of Felix Leong and a partner in

the partnership of Hijos De Jose Villegas.
When Felix died, this disbarment case was filed by

Mananquil. He alleged that the lease contracts were
made iniquitous terms and conditions. He also alleged
that Villegas should have notified and secured the
approval of the probate court in Zernas estate before
contracts were renewed, Villegas being counsel of that
estates administrator.
ISSUES: 1. WON Villegas should have first secured the probate
courts approval regarding the lease?
estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the

payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He
may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special
authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. For
instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the
power to enter into the lease contracts involving the properties
of the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval.
Thus, considering that administrator Felix was not
required under the law and prevailing jurisprudence to seek
prior authority from the probate court in order to validly lease
real properties of the estate, Villegas, as counsel of Felix,
cannot be taken to task for failing to notify the probate court of
the various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its
judicial approval thereto.
2. NO. there is no evidence to warrant disbarment, although
Villegas should be suspended from the practice of law because
he participated in the renewals of the lease contracts involving
the properties of Zernas estate in favor of the partnership of
Hijos De Jose Villegas. Under Art. 1646 of the Civil Code,
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be
the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue
of their profession are prohibited from leasing, either in person
or through the mediation of another, the properties or things
mentioned. Such act constituted gross misconduct, hence,
suspension for 4 months.
2. WON Villegas should be disbarred?
RULE
RULING:
1. NO. Pursuant to sec.3 of the Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of
Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the right to the
possession and management of the real as well as the personal
85
Accountability and Compensation of Executors and

Administrators
JOSON VS. JOSON
Castillo, Shain Ann
Page 60
conditions as the 1stcontract , w/ Marcelo signing again

as representative of the lessee.
Upon his death, his will was presented to the RTC of Nueva Ecija
by his son Felicisimo Joson for probate. In August, said will
having been duly probated, Felicisimo Joson was appointed
administrator of the estate and, accordingly, he filed an
inventory of the properties left by the deceased.
The administrator filed his first account and second account for
the year 1945-1946 and 1946-1947 respectively. This was
ordered by the court to be examined by the clerk of court but
the same has never been approved.On, 1948, the administrator
filed another account for the year 1947-1948 and, upon motion
of the heirs, he was ordered to file an accounting covering the
properties under his administration.
Eduardo Joson, one of the heirs, filed an opposition to all the
accounts filed by theadministrator where he alleged that the
administrator diminished the shares of the heirs and had
padded his expenses of administration.
The heirs were able to compromise their differences and
entered into an extrajudicial settlement and partition of the
entire estate under the provisions of the Rules of Court which
provides for the settlement of the estate without court
intervention. This settlement was contained in two documents
executed on the same date wherein they manifested that they
are entering into it because of their desire to put an end to the
judicial proceeding and administration.
Without said accounts having been heard or approved,
the administrator filed a motion to declare the proceedings
closed and terminated and to relieve him of his duties as such.
Heir Eduardo Joson filed an opposition to said motion but, after

hearing, the court issued an order declaring the proceedings
terminated and relieving the administrator not only of his duties
as such but also of his accounts notwithstanding the heirs'
opposition to said accounts.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the duty of an administrator to make an accounting of his
administration a mere incident which can be avoided once the
estate has been settled?
(2) Are the proceedings deemed terminated by the mere
execution of an extrajudicial partition of the estate without the
necessity of having the accounts of the administrator heard and
approved by the court?
(3) Is the administrator ipso facto relieved of his duty of
proving his account from the moment said partition has been
executed?
RULING:
(1) No.The duty of an administrator to render an account is not
a mere incident of an administration proceeding which can be
waived or disregarded when the same is terminated, but that it
is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the
court before the administration is finally ordered closed and
terminated.
The trial court erred in acceding to the motion for in doing so it
disregarded the express provisions of our rules relative to the
settlement of accounts of a judicial administrator specifically
Section 1, Section 8,9 and 10.
(2) No. The proceedings is not deemed terminated by the mere
execution of an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The fact
that all the heirs of the estate have entered into an extrajudicial
settlement and partition in order to put an end to their
differences cannot in any way be interpreted as a waiver of the
Page 60
FACTS:
Tomas Joson died on July 5, 1945 in Nueva Ecija leaving
behind heirs and properties. He married three times and was
survived by nine (9) heirs: two (2) children and grandchildren by
his first wife Eufemia de la Cruz; two (2) daughters by his
second wife Pomposa Miguel and his third wife and surviving
widow Dominga M. Joson.
(3) No.The administrator is not yet relieved of his duty of

proving his account.While the attitude of the heirs in concluding
said extrajudicial settlement is plausible and hascontributed to
the early settlement of the estate, the same cannot however be
considered as release of the obligation of the administrator to
prove his accounts.This is more so when, according to the
oppositors, the administrator has committed in his accounts a
shortage in the amount of P132,600.00 which certainly cannot
just be brushed aside by a mere technicality.
TUMANG VS. LAGUIO
FACTS:
In Special Proceeding No. 1953 involving the estate of
the late Dominador Tumang and pending before the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, the widow of the deceased, namely
Magdalena A. Tumang, administratrix and executrix of the will,
filed a petition to declare the testate proceedings definitely
terminated and closed with respect to herself and two of her
children Melba Tumang Ticzon and Nestor A. Tumang. The
petition was premised on the fact that the aforesaid heirs had
already acknowledged receipt of the properties adjudicated to
them, and in order for such properties to be transferred in their
names, there was need for an order of the court declaring the
proceedings closed with respect to the aforesaid heirs. The
petition was opposed by appenee's daughter, Guia T. Laguio
and her children on the ground that appellee, as administratrix
and executrix, had not yet delivered all properties adjudicated
to them. Moreover, the oppositors contended that there could
be no partial termination of the proceedings. Thereafter, the
administratrix withdrew the aforementioned petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court should have required the
executrix to render an accounting of the cash and stock
dividends received after the approval of her final accounts.
RULING:
Yes. Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the "executor or
administrator shall render an account of his administration
within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters
testamentary or of administration ..., and he shall render such
further accounts as the court may requite until the estate is
wholly settled." In the instant case, further accounts by the
executrix appear to be in order, in view of the fact that the
dividends sought to be accounted for are not included in the
final accounts rendered by the executrix. It appears that the
interests of all the parties will be better served and the conflict
between petitioners and respondent will be resolved if such
additional accounting is made. Further, "it has been held that an
executor or administrator who receives assets of the estate
after he has filed an account should file a supplementary
account thereof, and may be compelled to do so, but that it is
only with respect to matters occuring after the settlement of
final account that representatives will be compelled to file
supplementary account." It is only in a case where the petition
to compel an executor to account after he has accounted and
has been discharged fails to allege that any further sums came
into the hands of the executor, and the executor specifically
denies the receipt of any further sums that the accounting
should be denied.
RODRIGUEZ VS. SILVA
Dela Cruz, Kyzeth
PHIL. TRUST CO., VS. LUZON SURETY
Deguzman, Jabrielle
FACTS:
Court of First Instance of Manila appointed Francis R.
Picard, Sr. as Administrator the Intestate Estate of the deceased
Page 60
objections of the heirs to the accounts submitted by the

administrator not only because to so hold would be a
derogation of the pertinent provisions of our rules but also
because there is nothing provided in said partition that the
aforesaid accounts shall be deemed waived or condoned.
After the denial of appellant's lotion for reconsideration, it took

the present appeal.
ISSUES: WON (1) the Court cannot order the confiscation of the
administrator's bond, on prejudice or injury to creditors,
legatees or heirs of the estate of James R. Burt having been
shown, and (2) a probate court cannot, ex proprio motu,
prosecute the probate bond.
RULING:
Appellant's contention that the probate court, ex proprio
motu, cannot order the confiscation or forfeiture of an
administrator's bond, is clearly without merit. Whatever may be
the rule prevailing in other jurisdictions, in ours probate court is
possessed with an all-embracing power not only in requiring but
also in fixing the amount, and executing or forfeiting an
administrator's bond. The execution or forfeiture of an
administrator's bond, is deemed be a necessary part and
incident of the administration proceedings as much as its filing
and the fixing of its amount. The rule, therefore, is that the
probate court may have said bond executed in the same
probate proceeding. Moreover, the condition of the
administrator's bond in question is that Francis L. Picard shall
faithfully execute the orders and decrees of the court; that if he
did so, the obligation shall become void, otherwise it shall
remain in full force and effect. In having been established that
Picard disbursed funds of the estate without authority, the
conclusion follows that he had and his surety became bound
upon the terms of their bond. Appellant also contends that it
was not proper for the lower court to order the confiscation of
its bond because no prejudice or injury to any creditor, heir or
other interested person has been proved. This is also without
merits. According to the record, the claims against the estate
filed by Antonio Gardiner and Jose Teruel for the sum of P200.00
and P3,205.00, respectively, were approved by the probate
court but the same have remained unpaid because of lack of
funds. Finally, appellant claims that it had been released from
liability as surety because it received no notice of the
proceedings for the determination of the accountability of the
administrator. This contention we also find to be untenable.
Page 60
James R. Burt upon a bond. Thereafter he submitted and the

Court approved his bond in the required amount, with appellant
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. as his surety. Court dismissed Picard, as
administrator and appointed the Philippine Trust Co. in his
place. The latter submitted an inventory-report showing that the
only asset of the Intestate Estate of Burt that had come into its
possession was the sum of P57.75 representing the balance of
the checking account of said deceased with the Philippine
National Bank. A review, however, of the record of the case
reveals that former Administrator Francis Picard, filed an
inventory of the estate of the deceased, from which it appears
that the sole property he found was the amount of P8,873.73 in
current account with the Philippine National Bank. This amount
was reduced to P7,986.53 after deducting therefrom his
expenses in the amount of P887.22; and as reported by him in
his petition , the further expenses in the amount of P865.20
were deducted, thereby leaving the balance of P7,121.33. Court
hereby orders said Francis Picard, to deliver within 48 hours
from the receipt of a copy of the order the difference of
P7,063.58 to the present Administrator, Philippine Trust
Company. Picard, submitted an itemized statement of
disbursements made by him as administrator of the estate,
showing that the estate funds amounted to P7,986.53; that he
reported to the Court additional expenses incurred amounting
to P865.20, thus leaving a balance of P7,121.33; that thereafter
he disbursed the sum of P250.00 to defray the burial expenses
of the deceased, thus leaving a balance of P6,871.33; that on
several occasions he had delivered to Feliciano Burt adoptive
son of the deceased James R. Burt different sums of money
totalling P5,825.00, thus leaving a balance of P972.33. After
considering this statement, the Court, issued an order finding
Picard, guilty of having disbursed funds of the estate amounting
to about P8,000.00, without authority. Picard was prosecuted for
estafa. Having pleaded guilty to the charge, judgment of
conviction was accordingly rendered, and he was, besides, held
civilly liable. Court issued an order requiring appellant Luzon
Surety Co., Inc. to show cause why the administrator's bond
filed by it on behalf of Picard would not be confiscated.
Appellant filed a motion to set aside said order. Court denied
appellant's motion and ordered the confiscation of its bond.
From the nature of the obligation entered into by the surety on

an administrator's bond which makes him privy to the
proceedings against his principal he is bound and concluded,
in the absence of fraud and collusion, by a judgment against his
principal, even though said surety was not a party to the
proceeding. In the case of the De Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil.
135, the sureties on the administrator's bond were held liable
thereon altho they were not parties to the proceeding against
the administrator, nor were they notified in connection
therewith prior to the issuance of the court order for the
confiscation of the bond. Lastly, according to Section 11, Rule
86 of the Rules of Court, upon the settlement of the account of
an executor or administrator, his sureties "may upon
application, be admitted as a party to such accounting." The
import of this provision is that the sureties are not entitled to
notice but may be allowed to intervene in the settlement of the
accounts of the executor or administrator if they ask for leave
to do so in due time. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
is hereby affirmed, with costs.
their litigation expenses but the RTC denied the said

motion in May 1955.
QUASHA-PENA VS. LCN CONS.

Dimaliwat, Dianne
Eventually, the RTC granted the second Motion for

Payment; however, it reduced the sums to be paid. LCN, then
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by
the RTC. Recourse was then resorted to the Court of Appeals.
On May 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision
essentially ruling in favor of LCN. While the Court of Appeals
conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, as the
administrators of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere, were
entitled toadministrator's fees and litigation expenses, they
could not claim the same from the funds of the estate.
Raymond Triviere passed away on December 14, 1987.

On January 13, 1988, proceedings for the settlement of his
intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo
Triviere, before the RTc of Makati City Atty. Enrique P. Syquia and
Atty. William H. Quasha of the Quasha Law Office, representing
the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere,
respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the
deceased in April 1988. As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty.
Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes,
security services, and the preservation and administration of
the estate, as well as litigation expenses.
In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed
before the RTC a Motion for Payment of
On the other hand, LCN, the only remaining claimant

against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere filed
its Comment on/Opposition to the Motion on 2. LCN countered
that the RTC had already resolved the issue of payment of
litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment
filed by Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the
administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and
expenses of the estate as required by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Quasha Law Office is entitled to payment
of the expenses incurred as executor or administrator of the
estate of Triviere.
HELD:
No. Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which reads: Section 7. What expenses and fees allowed
executor or administrator. Not to charge for services as
Page 60
FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor

Zapata also of the Quasha Law Office,
took over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and
continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate.
On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed
another Motion for Payment, for their own behalf and for their
respective clients.
The afore-quoted provision is clear and unequivocal and

needs no statutory construction. Here, in attempting to exempt
itself from the coverage of said rule, the Quasha Law Office
presents conflicting arguments to justify its claim for attorney's
fees against the estate. At one point, it alleges that the award
of attorney's fees was payment for its administration of the
estate of the late Raymond Triviere; yet, it would later renounce
that it was an administrator.
SISON VS. TEODORO
Mahadodin Dimaampao
UY TIOCO VS. IMPERIAL
Dorado, Czaybeeh
RULE
86
Claims against Estate

AFAN VS DE GUZMAN
Espino, Carla
FACTS:
On July 12 1957, De Guzman filed a claim in the special
proceeding for the settlement of intestate estate of
ArsenioAfan. The claim was allegedly due from Afan, with
interest thereon, within 30 days from August 16, 1949, as set
forth in a promissory note then issued by Afan. On July 22,
1957, theadministratix objected to the consideration of the
claim upon the ground, among others, that it had been filed
long after the expiration of the period for the presentation of
claim against said estate. The lower court issued the order
refusing to entertain the aforementioned claim. De Guzman
invokes, in support of his appeal, section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court. He maintains that his claim was filed prior to the
distribution of the estate of the deceased. Further, he now
alleges, for the first time, a "cause" why the lower court should
allegedly have considered his claim. He says, in his brief that he
had no actual knowledge of the fact that the estate of the
deceased was then already in the process of settlement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim of De Guzman should be granted
RULING:
No. First, as provided in Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Time within which claims shall be filed.In the
notice provided in the preceding section, the
court shall state the time for the filing of claims
against the estate, which shall not be more than
twelve nor less than six months after the date of
the first publication of the notice. However, at
any time before an order of distribution is
entered, on application of a creditor who has
failed to file his claim within the time previously
limited, the court may, for cause shown and on
such terms as are equitable, allow such claims to
be filed within a time not exceeding one month.
The second sentence thereof clothes the court with authority to
permit the filing of a claim after the lapse of the period stated in
the first sentence, but prior to and distribution, subject to the
following conditions, namely (1) there must be tin application
therefor; (2) a cause must be shown why the permission should
Page 60
attorney. Compensation provided by will controls unless

renounced. When the executor or administrator is an attorney,
he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for
legal services rendered by him.
Second, on his contention that he had no actual knowledge of

the fact that the estate of the deceased was then already in the
process of settlement, the Court found otherwise. He had actual
knowledge of the present proceeding long before the filing of
his claim therein on July 27, 1957. It appears that, during the
lifetime of Afan, or on May 24, 1950, De Guzman instituted,
against him, a civil case to recover the amount of the
promissory note. The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of
the trial court in favor of De Guzman and ordered a trial de
novo. Sometime after the records had been remanded to the
lower court, Afan died. On August 15, 1955, that court issued an
order requiring counsel for his heirs to submit to the court the
number of the intestate estate proceedings of the deceased
Arsenio R. Afan. This order was complied with on August 30,
1955 and a copy of "notification" containing the required
information was served upon counsel for De Guzman, as
plaintiff therein. On January 18, 1956, his counsel filed in said
case a motion for the appointment of a legal representative of
the deceased Afan, to substitute him as defendant therein. On
January 24, 1956 De Guzman filed, therefore, a statement,
entitled "compliance", setting forth the names, ages and
addresses of the heirs of the deceased, "as shown by the
records in Special Proceedings No. 26858, entitled 'Instance
estate of Arsenio R. Afan' before the Court of First Instance of
Manila," with the prayer that said "heirs be substituted as party
defendants" in Case No. 1148, "in place of the deceased Arsenio
R. Afan." Yet, De Guzman choose not to file his claim in such
proceeding until July 27, 1957, one year and a half after the
filing of his aforementioned "compliance."Instead of furnishing a

"cause" for the extension of the reglementary period for the
filing of his claim, this omission on the part of De Guzman fully
justifies the denial of such extension and the order appealed
from. In one case, the Court have already held that failure to file
a claim within the time provided therefor upon the sole ground
that the claimant was negotiating with one of the heirs for
payment, is not sufficient to justify extension. Lastly, the Court
also ruled in another case that where a claimant knew of the
death of the decedent and for four or five months thereafter he
did nothing to present his claim, this can hardly be considered
as a good excuse for such neglect.
Therefore, De Guzmans claim should not be granted on the
ground that it was filed out of time.
HEIRS OF PIZARRO vs. CONSOLACION
FACTS:
Petitioners are the oppositors in the special proceeding
case filed by private respondent Luis Tan for the settlement of
the estate of the late Dominga Garcia. In 1977, Luis Tan,
allegedly the only surviving son of Dominga Garcia who died
sometime in 1930 in Canton, China, filed for the issuance of the
letters of administration in favor of Alfonso Atilano. Garcia left a
parcel of land located in Davao City which is under the
possession of the heirs of Ramon Pizarro. Respondent court set
the petition for hearing and the said order and petition were
duly published. After the private respondent Tan had begun
presentation of evidence, the parties entered into a compromise
and the petitioners withdrew their opposition to the intestate
proceedings. Meanwhile in 1979, Tan and the City of Davao filed
a joint motion asking the respondent court to take notice of the
agreement which in substance seeks to proceed with the
determination of the heirs of Dominga Garcia which shall be
determinative of their respective claims against the estate.
Page 60
be granted; and (3) the extension of time granted for the filing
of the claim shall not exceed one (1) month.In this case, De
Guzman has not sought permission to file the claim. Moreover,
the same does not allege any reason why he should be excused
for his failure to file the claim in this proceeding within the
period stated in the Rules of Court.
RULING:
Yes. The range of period specified in the Rules is
intended to give the probate court the discretion to fix period
for the filing of claims. The probate court is permitted by the
rule to set the period provided it is not less than 6 months nor
more than 12 months from the date of the first publication of
notice. Since the notice issued and the period set by the court
was not in accordance with the requirements of Sec 2, Rule 86,
what should apply then is the period as provided for by the
rules which is not less than 6 months nor more than 12 months
from the date of first publication. The first publication of notice
in the Mindanao Times was on March 30? 1978. Thus, the two
claims of the petitioners against the estate which were filed on
March 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979 respectivelu were filed on
time.
GUTIERREZ VS. DATU
Katigbak, Paula
FACTS:
In 1940, Maria Gerardo Vda. De Barretto, owner of
fishpond lands in Pampanga, leased to Ricardo Gutierrez for a
term to expire on May 1, 1947. On November 1, 1941, it was
found that the dikes were opened, resulting in their destruction
and in the loss great quantities of fish inside, to the damage
and prejudice of the lessee.
Gutierrez, while the testate proceeding was opened, filed

a complaint for 2 items: first, for the sum of P32,000.00
representing advance rentals he had to the decedent and
second, the sum of P60,000.00 as damages in the concept of
earned profits, that is, profits which the claimant failed to
realize because of the breach of the lease contract.
On June 7, 1957, appellant commenced an ordinary civil
action against the executrix of the testate for the recovery of
the same amount of P60,000 referred to as the second item. In
July 1957 appellant amended his claim in the testate
proceeding by withdrawing therefrom the item of P60,000.00,
leaving only the one for refund of advance rentals in the sum of
P32,000.00.
After the issues were joined in the present, the court
dismissed the action for abandonment by both parties.
Appellant moved to reconsider; the court denied the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the claim should have been
prosecuted in the testate proceeding and not by ordinary civil
action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gutierrezs claim for damages based on
unrealized profits is a money claim against the estate of the
deceased Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barretto?
RULING:
Yes. The word "claims" as used in statutes requiring the
presentation of claims against a decedent's estate is generally
construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature
which could have been enforced against the deceased in his
lifetime and could have been reduced to simple money
judgments; and among these are those founded upon contract.
The claim in this case is based on contract specifically, on a
breach thereof. It falls squarely under section 5 of Rule 87
"Upon all contracts by the decedent broken during his lifetime,
even though they were personal to the decedent in liability, the
personal representative is answerable for the breach out of the
assets." A claim for breach of a covenant in a deed of the
Page 60
Petitioners filed their opposition and the respondent court

issued an order taking note of the agreement. Private
respondent Tan filed a motion to drop and exclude the
petitioners on the ground that they do not even claim to be
heirs of the deceased Garcia. Respondent court dismissed both
claims of the petitioners on the ground that they are barred for
having been filed out of time.
ISSUE:
WON the order of the respondent court which directed
that the filing of claims against the estate be filed within 6
months after the first publication of the notice is null and void
and violative of Sec 2, Rule 86 of Revised Rules of Court.
decedent must be presented under a statute requiring such

presentment of all claims grounded on contract.
The only actions that may be instituted against the
executor or administrator are those to recover real or personal
property from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property,
real or personal. The instant suit is not one of them.
AGUAS VS. LLEMOS
Lee, Mariline
BPI VS. CONCEPCION AND HIJOS
Lectura, Erika
IMPERIAL INS., VS. DAVID
Lim, Justin
STRONGHOLD VS. REPUBLIC
Lubay, Angela
FACTS:
Republic Asahi Glass contracts with JDS for
the construction of roadways and drainage systems in RAG's
compound. JDS does so andfiles the required compliance bond
with Stronghold Insurance acting as surety. The contract is 5.3M
the bond is 795k. JDS falls woefully behind schedule, prompting
RAG to rescind the contract and demand the compliance
bond. The owner of JDS dies and JDS disappears. Shire fuses to
pay the bond claiming that the death of JDS owner extinguishes
the obligation.
RULING::
As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the
debtor does not extinguish the obligation.Obligations are
transmissible to theheirs, except when the transmission is
prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the
nature of the obligation.Only obligations that are personal or are
identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by
death.Furthermore, the liability of petitioner is contractual in
nature, because it executed a performance bond, as a surety,
petitioner is solidarilyliable with Santos in accordance with the
Civil Code.
Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the
prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the
estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not
actually extinguished.What is extinguished is only the obligees
action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as
a probate court.
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations
Santos had under his contracts with respondent were not
intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of
law. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of
those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his
estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up
to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond.
Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to
escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.
ISSUE:
MBTC VS. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORP

Mercado, Trish
Page 60
WON petitioners liability under the performance bond

was automatically extinguished by the death of Santos, the
principal.
FACTS:
On October 5, 2000, Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc.

(SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of money against Absolute
Management Corporation (AMC). The complaint was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-00-42105 and was assigned to
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80. SHCI alleged in its complaint
that it made advance payments to AMC for the purchase of
27,000 pieces of plywood and 16,500 plyboards in the sum of
P12,277,500.00, covered by Metrobank Check Nos.
1407668502, 140768507, 140768530, 140768531, 140768532,
140768533 and 140768534. These checks were all crossed, and
were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMCs
General Manager, in 1998. Chua died in 1999, and a special
proceeding for the settlement of his estate was commenced
before the RTC of Pasay City. This proceeding was pending at
the time AMC
filed its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint.
SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chuas death, for allegedly
undelivered items worth P8,331,700.00. According to AMC,
these transactions could not be found in its records. Upon
investigation, AMC discovered that in 1998, Chua received from
SHCI 18 Metrobank checks worth P31,807,500.00. These were
all payable to AMC and were crossed or for payees account
only
ISSUE:
Whether Metrobanks fourth-party complaint against
Chuas estate should be allowed.
HELD:
YES.
RATIO:
The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules

of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section
11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of

deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should
be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special
proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary
claims,including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely
apply suppletorily.
SANTOS VS. MANARANG
Mansul, Nabral
ESTATE OF OLAVE VS. REYES
Pangilinan , Legis
SALONGA-HERNANDEZ VS. PASCUAL
Rabanal Michelle
RULE
87
Actions by and Against Executors and Administrators

HEIRS OF GREGOIRE VS. BAKER
Rivera, Hiezll Wynn
FACTS: J. H. Ankrom died, and thereafter, A. L. Baker, qualified
as his administrator. The administrator filed his inventory of the
assets pertaining to the estate of his decedent, in which
inventory was included a tract of land covered by Torrens
certificate of title and containing an area of more than 930
hectares. The heirs of Rafael Gregoire filed a claim against the
estate of Ankrom for the sum of $35,438.78, U. S. currency, or
P70, 877.56, based upon a judgment rendered in the Supreme
Court of the Republic of Panama. It appears that the total
recognized claims against the estate amounted originally to
P76,645.13, but four of the creditors, having claims in the
amount of P1,639.82, have been paid in full, leaving a balance
owing by the estate of P75,005.31, the greater part of which is
Page 60
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. ABSOLUTE

MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013
HELD: When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an

executor or administrator to pay debts and expenses, and when
the deceased person made in his life-time such fraudulent
conveyance of such real or personal estate or of a right or
interest therein, as is stated in the preceding section, any
creditor of the estate may, by license of the court, if the
executor or administrator has not commenced such action,
commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the
executor or administrator, an action for the recovery of the
same and may recover for the benefit of the creditors, such real
or personal estate, or interest therein so conveyed. But such
action shall not be commenced until the creditor files in court a
bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge,
conditioned to indemnify the executor or administrator against
the costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon
the judgment by him so recovered for the costs incurred and
such other expenses as the court deems equitable. The remedy

of the heirs of Gregoire is, therefore, to indemnify the
administrator against costs and, by leave of court, to institute
an action in the name of the administrator to set aside the
assignment or other conveyance believed to have been made in
fraud of creditors.
SINFOROSO PASCUAL VS. PONCIANO PASCUAL

FACTS:
The plaintiff and defendants are legitimate children of
the testratix, Eduarda de los Santos.In 1940, while the
proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased Eduarda
de los Santos were pending in CFI-Rizal plaintiff, Sinforoso
Pascual, instituted in the CFI-Pampanga against Ponciano S.
Pascual and others, an action for the annulment of a contract of
sale of a fishpond situated in Pampanga, supposedly executed
without consideration by said deceased in her lifetime in favor
of the defendants.
Defendants filed of a motion to dismiss, alleging want of
cause of action, limitation of action, wrong venue and pendency
of another action. RTC: granted the motion on the ground that
the action should have been brought by the executor or
administrator of the estate left by the deceased, and directed
the plaintiff to amend his complaint. Plaintiff filed an amended
complaint. However, RTC declared that such amendment did not
cure the insufficiency of the complaint, dismissed the action.
ISSUE: Whether the action should have been filed by the
executor and not by the plaintiff-heir?
HELD: No.
Under Rule 86, section 1, of the new Rules of Court,
actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of
the deceased for causes which survive may be prosecuted or
defended by his executor or administrator. Upon the
Page 60
comprised of the claim of the appellants. As the affairs of the

estate stood upon the original inventory, there appeared to be
sufficient assets to pay all claimants; but while these intestate
proceedings were being conducted, the administrator
discovered that a year and a half before his death, Ankrom had
executed a mortgage on the property here in question in favor
of the Philippine Trust Company. Two days after this mortgage
had been executed, Ankrom appears to have made an
assignment of all his interest in the mortgaged property to one
J. G. Jung, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for a purported consideration of
the sum of P1 and other good and valuable considerations. In
view of these conveyances by his intestate, the administrator
presented an amended inventory, omitting therefrom the tract
of 930 hectares with its improvements thereon, the same being
the land covered by the transfers above mentioned. The court
made an order, approving of the omission by the administrator
of said property from the inventory; and its is from this order
that the present appeal is here being prosecuted.
commencement of the testate or intestate proceedings the

heirs have no standing in court in actions of the above
character, except when the executor or administrator is
unwilling or fails or refuses to act, in which event to heirs may
act in his place.
Here, the fictitious sale is alleged to have been made to
the defendants, one of them, Miguel S. Pascual, being the
executor appointed by the probate court. Such executor
naturally would not bring an action against himself for recovery
of the fishpond. His refusal to act may, therefore, be implied.
And this brings the case under the exception. It should be noted
that in the complaint the prayer is that the fishpond be
delivered not to the plaintiff but to the executor, thus indicating
that the action is brought in behalf of the estate of the
deceased.
VELASQUEZ VS. GEORGE
Salayog, Benny Rico
intestate supposed to be in Cerilios possession. Thereafter, writ

of execution was issued. By virtue of it, the provincial sheriff
issued notice of attachment against the real property described
in COT of the Register of Deeds and under the tax assessment
in the name of Cerilio. Cerilio filed an urgent motion to set aside
the writ of execution and for writ of preliminary injunction which
was opposed by Jesus. The public auction was set and Jesus
Modesto named as the highest and only bidder. Then,
Certificate of final sale in favour of Jesus was issued by the
Provincial Sheriff. Cerilio filed motion for reconsideration,
however, it was denied by the CFI. In pursuance to the writ of
possession filed by Jesus, the Provincial Sheriff issued a
notification to Cerilio placing Jesus in possession of the real
property sold to him. Cerilio filed petition for certiorari to annul
the proceedings had before the CFI of Leyte.
ISSUE:
RIOFERIO ET. AL. VS COURT OF APPEALS

Sumaway, Dylan
Whether the CFI had the authority to decide whether the

properties, real or personal belong to the estate or to the
persons examined
MODESTO VS. MODESTO

Tomarong, Marian
HELD:
No.
Bruno Modesto died leaving several heirs, among them,

Cerilio Modesto and Jesus Modesto. In the course of the
intestate proceeding, Jesus, acting as administrator of the
estate of Bruno, filed in the CFI of Tacloban, Leyte, motion to
cite and examine under oath several persons, especially Cerilio
regarding the properties concealed, embezzled or fraudulently
conveyed which was granted by the lower court.
Joint
commissioners were appointed by CFI. Thereafter, submitted
their report. Jesus filed a motion in court to require Cerilio to
turn over to him the personal properties belonging to the
If an executor or administrator or any interested individuals in

the estate of the deceased, complains to the court having
jurisdiction of the estate that a person/s are suspected of
having possessed or having knowledge of the properties left by
a deceased person, or of having concealed, embezzled or
conveyed any of the said properties of the deceased, the court
may cite such person/s to appear before it and may examine
him or them on oath on the matter of such complaint. In such
proceedings the trial court has no authority to decide whether
or not said properties, real or personal, belong to the estate or
Page 60
FACTS:
VALERA VS. INSERTO

Tresvalles, Kris
FACTS: In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and Consolacion
Sarrosa in which Eumelia Cabado and Pompiro Valera had
been appointed administrators the heirs of a deceased
daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a motion asking
that the Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt for her
failure to render an accounting of her administration. Cabado
replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose
Garin, Teresa's husband and the movant heirs' father, delivered
to the administrator an 18-hectare fishpond in Baras, Barotoc
Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the estate and she in turn moved for
the return thereof to the estate, so that it might be partitioned
among the decedents' heirs. Jose Garin opposed the plea for the
fishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the property was
owned by his children and this was why it had never been
included in any inventory of the estate.
The Court viewed the Garin Heir's motion for contempt, as well
as Carbado's prayer for the fishpond's return within the purview
of Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. The incident was set
for hearing and thereafter, the court issued an order
commanding the heir of Teresa Garin to reconvey immediately
the fishpond to the estate of the spouses.
There seems little doubt, however, that the Court's
pronouncement regarding the estate's title to the fishpond was
merely provisional in character, made solely to determine

whether or not the fishpond should be included in the inventory
of estate assets. So it was evidently understood by the
administrators who have more than once asserted that "the
probate court has jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the
fishpond for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the
properties. So it was made clear by the Probate Court itself
which, at the outset, stated that the hearing on the matter was
meant "merely to determine whether or not the fishpond should
be included as part of the estate and whether or not the person
holding it should be made to deliver and/or return ** (it) to the
estate. And so it was emphasized in another Order, denying
reconsideration of the Order of September 17, 1980. Judge Adil
afterwards granted the administrators' motion for execution of
the order pending appeal, and directed the sheriff to enforce
the direction for the Garin Heirs to reconvey the fishpond to the
estate. The corresponding writ was served on Manuel Fabiana,
the supposed caretaker. Voicing no objection to the writ, and
declaring to the sheriff that he was a mere lessee, Fabiana
voluntarily relinquished possession of the fishpond to the
sheriff. The latter, in turn, delivered it to the administrators.
Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with
the Probate Court seeking vindication of his right to the
possession of the fishpond, based on a contract of lease
between himself, as lessee, and Jose Garin, as lessor. 16 But
Judge Adil dismissed his complaint.
In the meantime, Jose Garin having filed a motion for
reconsideration of the above mentioned order of Judge Adil
(declaring the estate to be the owner of the fishpond), in which
he asserted that the Probate Court, being of limited jurisdiction,
had no competence to decide the ownership of the fishpond, 22
which motion had been denied 23-filed a notice of appeal from
said Order. 24 But he quickly abandoned the appeal when, as
Page 60
to the persons examined. If, after such examination there is

good reason to believe that said person or persons examined
are keeping properties belonging to the estate, then the next
step to be taken should be for the administrator to file an
ordinary action in court to recover the same.
ISSUE: whether the probate court had jurisdiction to take

cognizance of and decide the issue of title covering a fishpond
being claimed by an heir adversely to the decedent spouses
HELD:
Jurisdiction of Probate Court
Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court), acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited
jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of and
determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third
person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all
the Other parties having legal interest in the property consent,
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the
Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons
are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being
that the question of whether or not a particular matter should
be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g.,
probate, land registration, etc., is in reality not a jurisdictional
but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice
which may be waived.
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the
application of the exception to the rule. As already earlier
stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the
parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of
title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the
issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the

question being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary
civil action," but merely to determine whether it should or
should not be included in the inventory. This function of
resolving whether or not property should be included in the
estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate
Court's competence, although the Court's determination is only
provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the
parties. 32
The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section
6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, expressly invoked by the
Probate Court in justification of its holding a hearing on the
issue arising from the parties' conflicting claims over the
fishpond. 33 The examination provided in the cited section is
intended merely to elicit evidence relevant to property of the
decedent from persons suspected of having possession or
knowledge thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or
conveyed away the same. Of course, if the latter lays no claim
to the property and manifests willingness to tum it over to the
estate, no difficulty arises; the Probate Court simply issues the
appropriate direction for the delivery of the property to the
estate. On the other hand, if the third person asserts a right to
the property contrary to the decedent's, the Probate Court
would have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate action
must be instituted by the administrator to recover the property.
34
Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the
Probate Court could have admitted and taken cognizance of
Fabiana's complaint in intervention after obtaining the consent
of all interested parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the
question of title to the fishpond, or ascertaining the absence of
Page 60
aforestated 25 Judge Adil authorized execution of the order

pending appeal, instead, he initiated a special action for
certiorari prohibition and mandamus )with prayer for
preliminary injunction) in the Court of Appeals
objection thereto. But it did not. It dismissed the complaint in

intervention instead. And all this is now water under the bridge.
Possession of Fishpond Pending
Determination of Title Thereto
Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of
title to the fishpond was merely provisional, not binding on the
property with any character of authority, definiteness or
permanence, having been made only for purposes of in.
conclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at the
hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be subject of
execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in
himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose
right to possess has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an
appropriate action. These considerations assume greater
cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not
in the decedents' names but in others, a situation on which this
Court has already had occasion to rule.
In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that
if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the
presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due
weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be consider as the owner of
the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified
in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the
case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons
named in the title
FACTS:
Petitioners executed separate complaint-affidavits charging
private respondents of several violation of penal laws when they
went to the premises of ABS CBN and informed the employees
thereof regarding the forced closure of the premises of the
station and stoppage of its operation due to the LOI No. 1 issued
by then Pres. Marcos during Martial Law.
Benedicto, PH ambassador to Japan and the principal
stockholder of RPN 9, the only station allowed to broadcast
during martial law, rented the studios owned by ABSCBN and
occupied the same during negotiation about the monthly
rentals. Due to failure to reach the desired monthly rental rate,
the counsel for petitioner demanded RPN 9 to vacate the
studios and pay rentals but respondents refused to do so. At the
end of Marcos regime, ABS CBN was returned to the Lopez and
allowed operation. Unfortunately, the complaints previously
filed were dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of probable
cause. Hence, the present petition. Noteworthy is the fact that
Benedicto died during the pendency of the case and was
dropped as party herein.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil liability of Benedicto subsists even after
his death, which extinguished his criminal liability.
RULING:
No. The rules on whether the civil liability of an accused, upon
death, is extinguished together with his criminal liability, has
long been clarified and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas:
1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
Page 60
ABS-CBN VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Tuason, Jannelle
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives

notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x xx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure15 as amended. The separate civil
action
may
be
enforced
either
against
the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the
civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the
civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency
of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid
any apprehension on a possible [de]privation of right by

prescription.
Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBN's insistence that the case
at bench survives because the civil liability of the respondents
subsists is stripped of merit.
RULE
88
Payment of the debts of the Estate
ALDAMIZ VS. JUDGE OF CFI-MINDORO

Umbalin, Norissa
BUAN VS. LAYA
Uy, Charles
FACTS:
A contingent claim for P50,000 was filed by Sylvia Laya against
the intestate estate of the deceased Florenica and Rizalina
Buan. The contingent claim was based on the fact that a
Philippine Rabbit Bus, owned and operated by the spouses
Buan, collided with a private car resulting to the death of Juan
Laya, the father of Sylvia Laya. The driver of the bus was
charged with homicide and serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence and was sentenced therefor. The heirs of
Juan Laya had reserved the right to file a separate civil action,
and they did so. Administrators of the estate opposed the
contingent claim, arguing that the same could not be allowed
because it has not been filed before the death of the spouses.
The CFI of Tarlac admitted the claim, but denied that a portion
of the estate be set aside to answer for the claim. Counsel for
administrator then moved to set aside the order, but before
they could do so, the civil action instituted in Manila was
declared premature because the criminal conviction is not yet
final, and ordered plaintiffs therein to file an amended
Page 60
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice

Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in sensostrictiore."
ISSUE
DINGLASA VS. ANG CHIA

Viernes, Wayne
RULE
Whether or not the contingent claim may be admitted

RULING
The Court ruled in the affirmative. A contingent claim is one
that, by its nature, is dependent upon the happening of an
uncertain event. it may or may not develop into a valid claim,
depending upon that uncertain event. Whether or not the heirs
of the deceased, Juan C. Laya, would succeed in the action
brought in Manila against the administrators of the estate of the
deceased spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, is the
uncertain event or contingency upon which the validity of the
claim presented in the administration proceedings depends.
While the contingent event had not yet happened, Sylvia has no
claim upon the intestate estate, for such claim would only arise
after the event happened. As such, the contingent claim may
not be dismissed. Contingent claims follow the result of the
action, and as such, the fact that the case is temporarily
dismissed may not terminate the claim, as only the final results
of the action could do that. The rules provide that a contingent
claim is to be presented in the administration proceedings in
the same manner as any ordinary claim, and that when the
contingency arises which converts the contingent claim into a
valid claim, the court should then be informed that the claim
had already matured.
89
Sales, Mortgages, and other Encumbrances of Property

of decedent
GODOY VS. ORELLANO
Vizcarra, William
FACTS :
In consideration of P1,000 received by Felisa Pagilinan,
a document was executed by her giving Eusebio A. Godoy, an
option to buy a dredge for the sum of P10,000. It appears
from that document that the dredge is the common property of
the vendor and of the brothers Demetrio, Jose, Guillermo,
Alfredo, and Paz, all surnamed Orellano; that the condition was
that Godoy was to pay the whole price of the dredge within
twenty days; and that said option was granted in accordance
with the power of attorney executed by her coowners who
reserved the right to ratify whatever sale might be made, or
option granted by Pagilinan, their attorney-in-fact. The latter's
co-owners did not ratify the option contract. Before the
expiration of twenty days, the Godoy was ready to make
complete payment of the price, but Pagilinan failed to deliver
the dredge. Then the Godoy brought suit in the CFI against
Feliza Pagilinan, Paz Orellano, Jose Orellano, Demetrio
Orellano, Guillermo Orellano, and Alfredo Orellano, praying that
they be ordered to deliver the dredge, upon payment by him of
the sum of P9,000; to pay him the sum of P10,000 as damages,
Page 60
complaint, which they did so. The CFI of Tarlac then dismissed
the contingent claim on the ground that the reason for the
same had ceased to exist. Assuming that an amended
complaint had been filed, still, the same had not yet been acted
upon.
and to return to the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 should the

carrying out of the sale become impossible.
from the plaintiff and that she has tendered it several times, but
that the Godoy refused to accept it.
The defendants Orellano set up in their answer a general

denial of the facts alleged in the complaint and, as a special
defense, alleged that the dredge in question was the property
of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, pending in the CFI, and
under the administration of Felisa Pangilinan; that Godoy
perfectly knows that said dredge is under judicial control and
could not be disposed of without judicial authority, and that the
court has never authorized the sale mentioned in the complaint
filed herein; and that the defendants Jose, Guillermo, and
Alfredo surnamed Orellano are at present under age, and the
defendant Paz Orellano is a married woman who had not
obtained the consent of her husband before executing the
power of attorney in favor of the Pagilinan.
The judge a quo rendered judgment, ordering Pagilinan

to pay Godoy the sum of P2,000 with legal interest.
Whether or not the option contract between Pagilinan

and Godoy is void because of absence of authority of the court.
RULING:
Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize
the sale of properties like the one under consideration and the
power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of
Pagilinan, without authority of court, has no legal effect, and
this is the more so, since two of the said heirs are under age,
and the others did not ratify the option contract, as provided in
the aforesaid power of attorney.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that

the Pagilinan was not, in her capacity as judicial administratrix
of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, legally authorized to
sell, or contract to sell, any property belonging to said estate
without the authority of the court, and the contract entered into
by her with the plaintiff, without this authority, is null and void.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint
against the appellant Felisa Pagilinan is hereby dismissed.
CFI OF RIZAL VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Yatco, Nathaniel
Page 60
The defendant Felisa Pagilinan filed a separate answer,

and alleges: that Godoy, as well as the defendants, and the
notary who prepared the aforesaid option sale, were all aware
of these facts, and they led her to believe that she had the
authority to dispose of the dredge in her name and by
themselves; that believing herself to be under obligation to
comply with the aforesaid option deed, she applied to the court
of probate for permission to sell the dredge in the sum of
P10,000; that on the day of the hearing of the motion, her codefendants who had themselves authorized her by means of a
power of attorney on the ground that there were higher bidders
and the best thing to do was to sell it at public auction; that in
view of this opposition, Pagilinan asked the court that it be sold
at public auction, and the court authorized said defendant to
sell it at public auction; that the Pagilinan did not at any time
refuse to make delivery of the dredge to the Godoy, but that it
was the court that would not give her the authority to do so;
and that she is all times ready to return the P1,000 received
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Facts:
Elena OngEscutin, executrix of testate estate of late

PoncianoOngLacson asked for authority from probate court to
sell a real property to pay taxes and claims against the estate.
It was granted and thus was sold to GanHeng for P400K. The
sale was perfected and taxes were paid for the estate. Felix Ong
filed an opposition on the approval by the court of such sale and
offered P450K for such real property and prayed for the
acceptance of such offer. Probate court dismissed Felix Ongs
petition, and so did the CA. However upon MR of Felix Ong, the
CA found that the probate court committed grave abuse of
discretion as such offer by Felix Ong was at a higher price and
thus more beneficial for the estate.
The Special Proceeding was commenced by Antonio Tan

(Tan) allegingin the petition that Carlos Villa Abrille died
intestate and that his heirsare his surviving spouse, 9 children
(among them is petitioner NatividadJaroda) and 4 grandsons,
among them respondent Tan.
WON the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on

the probate courts approvale of the sale to GanHeng.
RULING:
Yes. The sale to be annulled was a private sale and not
thru public auction. Felix Ong had no legal personality to
impugn such sale of real property to GanHeng. Felix was neither
a creditor nor an heir to the estate. Also, he did not comply with
the bond requirement of Rule 89, sec 3 of the Rules. Persons
interested on such property of the estate may be prevented by
posting a bond which is fixed by the court. Furthermore, the
subsequent motion filed by the executrix to withdraw the sale
as the property in question is now worth P1M is denied.
GanHeng was a purchaser in good faith and the estate had
already benefitted from the payment made by GanHeng. The
SC affirmed the private sale made by the executrix and
GanHeng.
JARODA VS. CUSI
Tan filed a petition for the withdrawal of sums from PNB

alleging thatthese sums were registered in the name of the
deceased but they wereactually held in trust for co-owners of
Juna Subdivision. CFI grantedthis motion.
CFI issued to Tan letters of administration. Tan filed a
petition allegingthat the deceased was a manager and co-owner
of Juna Subdivision andpraying for approval by the court of the
power of attorney executed by him, on behalf of the intestate
estate, appointing himself to sell share of
the estate in the subdivision lots. CFI granted the petition.
Jaroda moved to nullify the 2 CFI orders. CFI denied the
motion for lack of merit. Jaroda elevated the case to the SC.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the CFI Order allowing the withdrawal of
bank deposits was in abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction? .
(2) Whether or not the CFI Order approving the power of
attorney is valid.
Page 60
ISSUE:
Tan was appointed special administrator.
On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the

affirmative. Said withdrawal is foreign to the powers
and duties of a specialadministrator. (Rule 80.2)
The CFI order was issued without notice to, and hearing
of, the heirs of
the deceased. The withdrawal of the bank deposits may be
viewed aswithin the powers and duties of a special
administrator; but actually, it isa waiver by the special
administrator of a prima facie exclusive right ofthe intestate
estate to the bank deposits in favor of the co-owners of theJuna
Subdivision. The bank deposits were in the name of the
deceasedso they belong prima facie to his estate after his death.
And until thecontrary, the special administrator is without power
to make the waiveror to hand over part of the estate to other
persons on the ground that theestate is not the owner thereof.
On the second issue, the High Tribunal ruled in the
negative. The CFI order is void for want of notice and for
approving animproper contract or transaction.
An administrator is not permitted to deal with himself as
an
individual in any transaction concerning trust property.
This isbecause of the n view of the fiduciary relationship that
theyoccupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased and
theirresponsibilities toward the probate court.
By the CFIs order, administrator Tan came to be the
agent of
two different principals: the court and the heirs of
the deceasedon the one hand, and the majority co-owners of the
subdivisionon the other, in managing and disposing of the lots of

thesubdivision. This dual agency of Tan rendered him incapable
ofindependent defense of the estate's interests against those of
themajority co-owners.
PAHAMOTANG VS. PNB

Arcilla, Jay
RULE
90
Distribution and Partition of the Estate
GATMAITAN VS. MEDINA

Azarcon, Pia Lea
FACTS:
On March 10, 1956, Felicisimo Gatmaitan filed a petition,
seeking his appointment as administrator of the property of his
wife, Veronica Medina, who died intestate. Gorgonio Medina and
Dominica Medina, as heirs of the deceased (she being their fullblooded sister), filed an opposition, praying that Gorgonio
Medina, or a neutral third party, or Felicisimo Gatmaitan and
Gorgonio Medina, jointly, be appointed as administrator or
administrators of the estate. The court appointed Felicisimo
Gatmaitan as administrator of the estate with a bond and
Gorgonio Medina as co-administrator without compensation and
bond. On March 14, 1957, administrator Gatmaitan filed an
amended inventory of the estate but was opposed on the
ground that the same did not represent the true and faithful list
of the properties left by the deceased. In view of the opposition,
the hearing and consideration of the amended inventory was
postponed until further assignment. On April 2, 1957, the heirs
of the deceased, through counsel, filed a "Motion for Partial
Partition and Distribution," The court heard counsel for
Page 60
Ruling:
ISSUE:
WON the lower court gravely abused its discretion in
directing a partial distribution of the intestate estate of the
deceased Veronica Medina in favor of appellees, without
requiring the distributees to file the proper bonds pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 91, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
RULING:
The lower court, erred in rendering the order appealed
from. A partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the
final termination of the testate or intestate proceedings should
as much as possible be discouraged by the courts and, unless in
extreme cases, such form of advances of inheritance should not
be countenanced. The reason for this strict rule is obvious

courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of
the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be
adequately protected and all the rightful heirs assured of their
shares in the inheritance. Why the appealed order is
unwarranted is evident on three counts. Firstly, the partial
distribution was prematurely ordered by the lower court. It
appears that at the time the questioned order was rendered,
the amended inventory and appraisal filed by the administratorappellant was not yet even accepted, and it was still under
consideration by the court, in view of an opposition to the
admission thereof by some of the heirs. Moreover, it seems that
notices for the presentation of claims by possible creditors of
the estate had not yet been published, so that the period for
the presentation of claims had not as yet elapsed.
Consequently, it cannot be safely said that the court had a
sufficient basis upon which to order a partial distribution of the
properties, having in mind the adverse effects that it might
have on the rights of the creditors and the heirs alike. Second,
and more important, no bond was fixed by the court as a
condition precedent to the partial distribution ordered by it, a
bond which, because of the reasons already adduced, becomes
all the more imperative. Rule 91, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
specifically provides as follows: When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowances to the
widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall
assign the residue of the estate to the person entitled to the
same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which is
entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any
other person having the same in his possession. . . . No
distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
Page 60
administrator Gatmaitan and for the heirs or oppositors, but

without receiving any evidence whatsoever. The administrator,
Gatmaitan, filed a motion for reconsideration, calling attention
to the fact that, contrary to what the order states, "he has not
agreed to the partial distribution of the estate in the manner
contained in the order", and urging that "the sums ordered to
be partially distributed are not warranted by the circumstances
obtaining" in the case and that, moreover, "the manner of
distribution will work difficulties to the estate and to the heirs
themselves". Motion was denied for lack of merit. Gatmaitan
filed a notice of appeal from the foregoing orders. Appellant
filed a record on appeal and notified counsel for the oppositors
of the date he would move for the approval thereof by the
court. The court approved the record on appeal presented by
appellant for failure to file written opposition thereto as required
in the order of the court notwithstanding the length of time that
had already elapsed. In his brief, appellant only made one
assignment of error, and it reads thus: The lower court gravely
abused its discretion in directing a partial distribution of the
intestate estate of the deceased Veronica Medina in favor of
appellees, without requiring the distributees to file the proper
bonds pursuant to the provisions of Rule 91, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
order of this Court dated June 12, 1957, notwithstanding the

length of time that has already elapsed and the absence of
proof that the bond offered was ever filed and approved by the
Court, fortify that conclusion. Anyway, since the purpose of the
bond required by section 1, paragraph 2, of Rule 91 is to protect
not only the appellant but also the creditors and subsequent
claimants to the estate, in order that they may not be
prejudiced by the partial distribution, the amount of the bond
could not be fixed without hearing such interested parties, and
there is no showing that they were consulted. Hence, the bond
offered could not affect the merits of this appeal, although the
Court below is not precluded for approving a new bond.
Wherefore, the order of partial distribution appealed from is set
aside, without prejudice to the issue of another order after strict
compliance with the Rules of Court. The records are ordered
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
QUASHA-PENA VS. LCN CONSTRUCTION*

FACTS:
In December 1987, Raymond Triviere died intestate and
the proceedings for the settlement of his estate were instituted
by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere. Atty. Enrique P. Syquia
(Syquia) and Atty.William H. Quasha (Quasha) of the Quasha
Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late
Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed administrators
of the estate of the deceased. As administrators, Atty. Syquia
and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real
estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and
administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses. Atty.
Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for
Payment of their litigation expenses.
Page 60
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the

distributees or any of them, give a bond, in the sum to be fixed
by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the courts directs. Appellees contend that
the order of partial distribution having been issued pursuant to
an agreement of the parties, the same could not now be
assailed by the appellant. While the wording of the appealed
order seem to indicate that it was rendered with the conformity
of the heirs, there is reason to believe that it was just a
mistaken impression on the part of the court. Soon after the
order was rendered, the administrator-appellant filed a motion
for reconsideration, among other things, calling the attention of
the court that he never agreed to the partial distribution of the
estate in the manner ordained in the appealed order. Although
said motion was denied for lack of merit, the court did not deny
categorically appellant's imputation, which could have been
easily averred to by it; nor did the appellees at any time prior to
this appeal controvert the aforesaid allegation of the
administrator. There is plausibility in appellant's statement that
the agreement referred to in the order was actually one
between the appellees among themselves. It should be noted,
furthermore, that the bond required by the Rules is not solely
for the protection of the heirs then appearing, but also for the
benefit of creditors and subsequent claimants who have not
agreed to the advances. Lastly, appellees urged that this appeal
was prematurely taken in that appellant has not as yet formally
objected to the proffered bond as mentioned in an alleged order
of the court, dated May 16, 1957. The tenor of the order of May
16, 1957, as well as the fact that neither said order nor the
"constancia" of appellees are included in the Record on Appeal,
indicates that the belated offer to file a bond amounted to no
more than an attempt of appellees to settle the particular issue
between the parties that was rejected by the appellant. That
the record on appeal was approved much later, on July 15,
1957, and yet without the written opposition . . . required in the
RTC denied their motion citing their failure to submit an

accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under
administration in May 1995.
as they have over a decade now spent so much time, labor and
skill to accomplish the task assigned to them; and the last time
the administrators obtained their fees was in 1992.
In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata

(Zapata), also of the Quasha Law Office, took over as the
counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty.
Syquia in the settlement of the estate. On 6 September 2002,
Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment,
for their own behalf and for their respective clients, claiming for
the payment of attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
LCN sought recourse from CA maintaining, among others, that

the awards violate Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as
there still exists its (LCN's) unpaid claim in the sum
of P6,016,570.65.
Among others, LCN argued that its claims are still outstanding
and chargeable against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere;
thus, no distribution should be allowed until they have been
paid; especially considering that as of 25 August 2002, the
claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere
amounted to P6,016,570.65 as against the remaining assets of
the estate totaling P4,738,558.63, rendering the latter
insolvent.
RTC issued its Order, taking note that the widow and the heirs of
the deceased Triviere, after all the years, have not received
their respective shares in the Estate, declaring that there was
no more need for accounting of the assets and liabilities of the
estate considering that the estate has no more assets except
the money deposited with the Union Bank of the Philippines and
that both the Co-Administrator and counsel for the deceased
are entitled to the payment for the services they have rendered
and accomplished for the estate and the heirs of the deceased
The appellate court likewise revoked the P450,000.00 share

and P150,000.00 share awarded by the RTC to the children and
widow of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, on the basis
that Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court proscribes
the distribution of the residue of the estate until all its
obligations have been paid.
Petitioners, maintain that the RTC Order should not be
construed as a final order of distribution, but a mere
interlocutory order that does not end the estate proceedings.
Only an order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue
of the estate to the proper distributees brings the intestate
proceedings to a close and, consequently, puts an end to the
administration and relieves the administrator of his duties. That
the said Order grants the payment of certain amounts from the
funds of the estate to the petitioner children and widow of the
late Raymond Triviere considering that they have not received
their respective shares therefrom for more than a decade. Out
Page 60
LCN Construction Corp., as the only remaining claimantagainst

the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere in Special
Proceedings, filed its Comment on/Opposition to the aforequoted Motion on 2 October 2002. LCN countered that the RTC
had already resolved the issue of payment of litigation
expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment filed by
Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha for failure of the administrators to
submit an accounting of the assets and expenses of the estate
as required by the court.
CA conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, as

the administrators of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere,
were entitled to administrator's fees and litigation expenses,
they could not claim the same from the funds of the estate
reasoning that the award of expenses and fees in favor of
executors and administrators is subject to the qualification that
where the executor or administrator is a lawyer, he shall not
charge against the estate any professional fees for legal
services rendered by him. Instead, the Court of Appeals held
that the attorney's fees due Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law
Offices should be borne by their clients, the widow and children
of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the awards of the RTC in favor of the petitioner,
children and widow constitute a partial distribution of the estate
and is proscribed by Rule 90 Section 1.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners, insist that the awards in favor of the petitioner
children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere is not a
distribution of the residue of the estate, thus, rendering Section
1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court inapplicable.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When
the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable
to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court,
on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a
person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice,
shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to
the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which
each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover
their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or
any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the

obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.
While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow
made in the RTC Order dated 12 June 2003 was not yet a
distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there was
still a pending claim against the estate, still, they did constitute
a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the
petitioner children and widow were already being awarded
shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been
paid or provided for.
Section 2, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly
recognizes advance distribution of the estate, thus:
Section 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. Notwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in
proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may,
in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper
and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be
affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the
heirs or legatees,upon compliance with the conditions set forth
in Rule 90 of these rules. (Emphases supplied.)
The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised
Rules of Court allows the distribution of the estate prior to the
payment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided that
"the distributees, or any of them, gives a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs."
In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or
not to permit the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise
of such discretion should be qualified by the following:
[1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending
controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance
distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and
Page 60
of the reportedP4,738,558.63 value of the estate, the petitioner

children and widow were being awarded by the RTC, their
shares in the collective amount of P600,000.00. Evidently, the
remaining portion of the estate still needs to be settled. The
intestate proceedings were not yet concluded, and the RTC still
had to hear and rule on the pending claim of LCN against the
estate of the late Raymond Triviere and only thereafter can it
distribute the residue of the estate, if any, to his heirs.
There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner

children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the
settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two
requirements or, at the very least, took the same into
consideration. Its Order is completely silent on these matters. It
justified its grant of the award in a single sentence which stated
that petitioner children and widow had not yet received their
respective shares from the estate after all these years. Taking
into account that the claim of LCN against the estate of the late
Raymond Triviere allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65, already
in excess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the
estate, the RTC should have been more prudent in approving
the advance distribution of the same.
Petitioners invoked Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court,where
the Court sustained an Order granting partial distribution of an
estate.
However, in Dael is the estate has sufficient assets to ensure
equitable distribution of the inheritance in accordance with law
and the final judgment in the proceedings and it does not
appear there are unpaid obligations, as contemplated in Rule
90, for which provisions should have been made or a bond
required, such partial distribution may be allowed.
No similar determination on sufficiency of assets or absence of
any outstanding obligations of the estate of the late Raymond
Triviere was made by the RTC in this case. In fact, there is a
pending claim by LCN against the estate, and the amount
thereof exceeds the value of the entire estate.
Furthermore, in Dael, the Court actually cautioned that partial
distribution of the decedent's estate pending final termination
of the testate or intestate proceeding should as much as
possible be discouraged by the courts, and, except in extreme
cases, such form of advances of inheritance should not be
countenanced. The reason for this rule is that courts should

guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the decedent
to the end that the creditors thereof be adequately protected
and all the rightful heirs be assured of their shares in the
inheritance.
TORRES VS. ENCARNACION
Borja, Catherine
FACTS:
The petitioners contest the jurisdiction of the respondent
Judge to issue the order herein sought to be reviewed directing
them to deliver to the administrator of the intestate estate of
Marcelo de Borja, a certain parcel of land which is in petitioners
possession and to which they assert exclusive ownership. They
contend that the administrators remedy to recover that
property is an action at law and not by motion in the intestate
proceeding.
It appears that in the above-entitled intestate estate, the
commissioners appointed by the court submitted on February 8,
1944, a project of partition, in which the land in question, which
is and was then in the possession of the herein petitioners, was
included as property of the estate and assigned to one Miguel
B. Dayco, one of Marcelo de Borjas heirs. Although the
administratrix of Quintin de Borjas estate was the party named
in the partition in behalf of that estate, the present petitioners
took active part in the proceeding for the reason that they had
been declared their fathers sole heirs in the settlement of their
fathers estate. Moreover, one of these children was herself the
duly appointed administratrix of the last named intestate
estate.
ISSUE:
Page 60
[2] thedistributees must post a bond, fixed by the court,

conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the
estate (second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90).
Can the remedy to recovery the property be done by

motion in the same intestate proceeding?
RULING:
Pertinent to the question posed by the petitioners is
section 1 of Rule 91 which provides as follows:
"When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of

administration, the allowances to the widow, and inheritance
tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law,
have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to
the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the
proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such
persons may demand and recover their respective shares from
the executor or administrator, or any other person having the
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or
as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled
under the law, the testimony as to such controversy shall be
taken in writing by the judge, under oath.
said proceeding being the most convenient one in which this

power and function of the court can be exercised and performed
without the necessity of requiring the parties to undergo the
inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commence and
litigate an entirely different action.
IMPERIAL VS. MONOZ

Borlagdatan, April
FACTS:
-On 1957, Luis Santos surviving spouse of the deceased
Fermina Bello Santos, who died intestate filed Special
Proceeding No. 1049, entitled "Intestate Estate of Fermina Bello
Santos", in CFI Bulacan
-Luis was appointed regular Administrator on 1958, as
there was no opposition filed by the only other heir, herein
petitioner Purificacion Santos Imperial
-Later on petitioner Purificacion Santos Imperial entered
her appearance in the abovementioned intestate proceedings
as Oppositor, and filed a motion to require the regular
administrator to render an accounting
"No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the

obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs."cralairtua1aw
library
-This resulted in the approval by the Court a quo on 1967

of the project of partition with the following awards:
Applying this Rule, the probate court, having the custody

and control of the entire estate, is the most logical authority to
effectuate this provision within the same estate proceeding,
2. To Purificacion Santos-Imperial, citizen of the Philippines, of

age, married to Eloy Imperial and resident of Malolos, Bulacan,
is hereby awarded and adjudicated an undivided THREEEIGHTH(3/8) share in each of the properties described above;
1. To Dr. Luis U. Santos, citizen of the Philippines, of age,

married to Socorro Manankil and resident of Malolos, Bulacan, is
hereby awarded and adjudicated an undivided FIVE-EIGHTH(5/8)
share in each of the above-described properties; and
Page 60
Santos filed a Motion for Correction of both the

Amended Project of Partition of 1966, approved by the Court on
June 6, 1967, and the Final Partial Project of Partition of March
22, 1968, likewise approved by the same court on April 26,
1968, claiming that the partition submitted to the Court was
erroneous, as the same did not conform with the ruling laid
down in the case of Santillon vs. Miranda
-Luis contended that he should get the properties
partitioned while oppositor-petitioner Purificacion Santos
Imperial, the only child (adopted), should get only the remaining
of the estate.
-This Court citing the case of Santillon held that in deciding the
issue as to whether the order of the lower court is final and
appealable, went on to say:
It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and,
therefore, appealable to this Court.
Under Rule 109, section 1, a person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order of the Court of First Instance where
such order "determines ... the distributive share of the estate to
which such person is entitled."
The two (2) questioned orders, being final in character, should
have been appealed by the party adversely affected within the
30-day reglementary period provided for appeal. This was not
done.
ISSUES:
WON:
(1) An order of a probate court in testate or intestate
proceedings approving a project of partition which clearly fixed
the distributive share to which each heir is entitled is merely
interlocutory in nature so that the probate court can correct and
set aside the same anytime; or is final and, therefore,
appealable within the 30 day period for appeal; and
(2) A court can order the correction of an erroneous final
decision after it had become final and executory.
RULING:
(1)
-The contention of petitioner to the effect that the orders of the
court a quo dated 1967 as well as that of 1968, are final as the
same have determined the distributive shares of the known
forced heirs, finds support in the very same case cited by the
respondents as their authority.
(2)
-The contention of petitioner that an order which has already
become final and therefore executory is not subject to
correction, finds support in Chereau vs. Fuentebella, where it
was held that an erroneous decree or judgment although
granted without legal authority and contrary to the express
provision of the statute, is not void. Here, as no appeal was
taken, the decree must be conceded to have full force and
effect. An erroneous decree is not a void decree.
-The questioned orders having become final and, therefore,
executory because of the failure of the herein respondent Luis
U. Santos to appeal on time by allowing the period for appeal to
lapse before filing his motion for correction on June 18, 1968, he
has to suffer the misfortune brought about by his own
negligence and fatal inadvertence
LOPEZ VS. LOPEZ
Bueno, Jirene
FACTS:
Page 60
Concepcion Lopez filed a petition in the intestate proceedings of

the deceased Emeterio Lopez, claiming to be an acknowledged
natural daughter of the deceased and praying that she be
declared his universal heiress entitled to a summary award of
his estate, same being valued at less than six thousand pesos
(P6,000). The oppositors-appellants filed an opposition, denying
petitioners claim and praying that, as they are nephews and
nieces of the deceased, they be adjudged entitled to the
property.
Concepcion Lopez filed later an amended petition, alleging
that, according to a new assessment, the estate was worth nine
thousand pesos (P9,000) and that, therefore, its distribution
could not be made summarily but thru regular administration
proceedings. Accordingly, an administrator was appointed who,
but appellants filed a motion that they be declared heirs of the
deceased. The court issued an order declaring the petitioner an
acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased entitled to the
rights accorded her by law. The oppositors appealed.
ISSUE: Whether Concepcion Lopez is an acknowledged natural
daughter of Emeterio Lopez who died intestate, leaving no
legitimate
descendants,
ascendants
or
widow.
no prayer therein that she be declared an acknowledged natural

child, but only that she be adjudged universal heiress, of the
deceased. In the body of the petition there is an allegation that
she is a natural child of the based and has been in an
uninterrupted possession of such status.
The court ruled that inasmuch as the recognition of her status is
a prerequisite to her right to heirship, her prayer that she be
declared universal heiress implies a like prayer that she
be recognized as an acknowledged natural child.
Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule of pleadings,
applicable to motions or petitions, that the prayer for
relief, though part of the pleading, is no part of the
cause of action or defense alleged therein, and the
pleader is entitled to as much relief as the facts duly
pleaded may warrant. In previous cases, similar facts
were held to be sufficient to entitle a natural child to
recognition.
Appellants claim that they had no notice either of the petition
for the declaration of heirs or of the date set for the hearing
thereof.
We find in the record no evidence affirmatively
showing that they had no such notice; therefore, the
presumption of regularity of proceedings should stand.
Contrary to appellants contention it is a well-settled rule that a

person claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of
a deceased need not maintain a separate action for
recognition but may simply intervene in the intestate
proceedings, by alleging and proving therein his or her
status as such, and claiming accordingly the right to
share in the inheritance.
In the motion for reconsideration filed by them, the lack of

notice is alleged; but the motion is not even verified. Besides,
according to the record Attorney Simplicio B. Pea was the
counsel for both the administrator and the oppositorsappellants. The petition for declaration of heirs, although signed
by Attorney Simplicio B. Pea as "abogado del administrador",
was, in fact, a petition filed in behalf of the oppositorsappellants as their right to succession is therein asserted and
prayed for. Under these circumstances, there exists sufficient
ground for holding, as we do hold, that the oppositorsappellants had notice of the petition as well as of the hearing
where
the
said
attorney
was
present.
The petition filed by Concepcion Lopez in the intestate

proceedings is alleged to be insufficient. It is said that there is
GUY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Yes. Concepcion Lopez is an acknowledged daughter of the

deceased and is the only heiress.
Page 60
RULING:
Petitioner
FACTS:
Private respondents-minors Karen and Kamille Oanes

Wei, represented by their mother Remedios filed a
petition for letters of administration.
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly

acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who
died intestate leaving an estate valued at P10m
consisting of real and personal properties. His known
heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children
Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael.
Private Respondents prayed for the appointment of a

regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima
Wei Estate. Prayed by Petitioner Michael, son of the
decedent, be appointed as special administrator of the
estate.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He

asserted that his father left no debts and that his estate
can be settled without securing letters of administration
pursuant to sec.1, rule 74. He argued that private
respondents should have established their status as
illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima wei
pursuant to Art.175 of the family code.
The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss on the

ground that the certification against forum shopping has
been signed by the private respondents and not their
counsel. They contended that Remedios should have
executed the certification on behalf of her minor
daughters.
and his co-heirs alleged that private

respondents claim have been paid, waived, abandoned
or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios
Release and waiver of claim stating that in exchange for
the financial and educational assistance received from
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge
the estate of SimaWei from any and all liabilities.
RTC-denied the motion to dismiss as well as the

supplemental motion to dismiss. It ruled that while the
Release and waiver of claim was signed by Remedios, it
had not been established that she was the duly
constituted guardian of her minor daughters. No
renunciation of right occurred. Trial court also rejected
petitioners objections on the certification against forum
shopping.
Petitioner mover for reconsideration but was denied. He

filed a petition for certiorari before CA which affirmed
the RTC orders. CA denied the MFR. Hence this petition.
Petitioner argues that the CA disregarded existing rules

on certification against forum shopping; that the release
and waiver of claim executed by Remedios released and
discharged the Guy family and estate of Sima Wei from
any claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do
not have the legal personality to institute the petition for
letters of administration as they failed to prove their
filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei.
Private respondents contended that their counsels

certification can be considered substantial compliance
with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping.
Page 60
Cadavis, Lloyd
2. whether the release and waiver of claim precludes

private respondents from claiming their successional rights?
3. whether private respondents
prescription from proving their filiation?
are
barred
by
RULING:
1. Rule 7, sec.5 of the ROC provides that the certification on
non-forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the
principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be
cause for dismissal of the case. However, liberal application of
the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be
served. In Sy Chin vs CA, we ruled that while a petition may
have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping
was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this
procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of
substantial justice. So it is in the present controversy where the
merits of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the
rules with impunity should be considered as compelling reasons
to temper the strict application of the rules.
2. As regards Remedios release and waiver of claim, the same
does not bar private respondents from claiming successional
rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in
clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally
pertains to him. In this case, we find that there was no waiver of
hereditary rights. The release and waiver of claim does not
state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states
that remedies received 300k and an educational plan for her
minor daughters by way of financial assistance and in full
settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind

against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim. Considering
that the document did not specifically mention private
respondents hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it
cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights
of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latters
claim. Under article 1044 of CC, parents and guardians may not
therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without
judicial approval. Not having been judicially authorized, the
Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will
not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs
of the deceased.
In the present case, private respondents could not have
possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet
to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of
the deceased.
3. Anent the issue on private respondents filiation, we agree
with the CA that a ruling on the same would be premature
considering that private respondents have yet to present
evidence. Before the family code took effect, the governing law
on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was article 285
of the Civil code, to wit:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may
be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the ff.cases:
1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the
child, in which case the latter may file the action before
the expiration of 4 years from the attainment of his
majority;
Page 60
ISSUES: 1. Whether private respondents should be dismissed

for failure to comply w/ the rules on certification of non-forum
shopping?
Xxxx
In this case, the action must be commenced within 4 years from
the finding of the document.
We ruled in Bernabe vs Alejo, that illegitimate children who
were still minors at the time of the Family code took effect and
whose putative parent died during their minority are given the
right to seek recognition for a period of up to 4 years from
attaining majority age.
Under the family code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is
established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or
a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by
the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is
based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or
special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of
prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by
private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would
be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has
been no reception of evidence yet. This court is not a trier of
facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the RTC.
RULE
91
Escheats
INRE ESTATE OF LAO SAYCO

Castillo, Shainn
FACTS:
This is an appeal by the Chinaman Lao Chiama,
administrator of the estate of the decedent Bernardo Rafanan
Lao Sayco, aliasSaya, and guardian of the minor Lay Chuyting
from the judgment rendered in a special proceeding.
The municipal council of Mambajao appeared in the said
proceedings and prayed that, since Bernardo Rafanan died in
that pueblo without leaving any known legitimate successor,the
real and personal property left by the said decedent within the
district of the property left by the said decedent within the
district of the aforementioned municipality be awarded to the
latter. The administrator also prayede that his administration be
closed, and, as the guardian of the Chiaman Lay Chuyting,
requested that the property referred to be delivered to the
latter as the son and sole heir of the decedent Rafanan.
The municipal council of Mambajao,which believed that
it was entitled to the said property, opposed the delivery of the
property to the alleged heir.
The lower court, rendered judgment ordering that the
property left by the decedent, Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, be
assigned to the municipality of Mambajao, Province of Misamis,
to be administered by its municipal council and placed at the
disposal of the school in the same manner as other property
intended for the same use.
ISSUE:
Whether the municipality of Mambajao is entitled to the
property left by the decedent.
Page 60
In the present case, counsel for the municipality of

Mambajao merely prayed for an order of reversion and for the
adjudication in behalf of the municipality of the property
aforementioned; he did not comply with the provisions of the
law by furnishing the required proofs in regard to the matters
hereinabove indicated, which must be the subject of an
investigation.
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985)

private respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around
personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow
and a French national. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most
especially during the waning years of her life, respondent
Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion
since no close relative was available to tend to her needs. In
recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms.
Hankins executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donation
involving two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and
7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private respondent alleged that

she misplaced the deeds of donation and were nowhere to be
found. While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic
filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. During the
proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by Romeo
Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio
Regosa, but on 24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial
court for the reason that "they miserably failed to show valid
claim or right to the properties in question." Since it was
established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled
to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court
escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction to
declare the same escheated in favor of the state.
RULING: (A)We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding,
unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by
virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal
property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the
absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to
forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers."
Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state
may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the
time within which a claim to such property may be made. The
procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered
is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed
within which such action must be brought. (b) In this
jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his
claim "within five (5) years from the date of such judgment,
such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if
Page 60
RULING:
No. Rule 91 of the Civil Procedure provides the rules for
filing a petition for escheat. In the present case,it does not
appear that there was made, at the request of counsel for the
president and the municipal council of Mambajao, the
inquisition provided by law, for the record is not accompanied
by any certified copy of the investigatory of the real and
personal property that belonged to the said decedent, with a
statement of the places where the realty is located.Moreover,
the notice summoning the persons who believed they were
entitled to his property should have been published for at least
six consecutive weeks, and not for three.Furthermore, the
person who lays claim to the property left by the decedent at
death, as the latter's successor or heir, must prove his identity
and rights.
109
Appeals in Special Proceedings
REPUBLIC VS. NISHINA

De guzman, Jabrielle
FACTS:
Nisaida Sumera Nishina (respondent), represented by

her mother Zenaida Sumera Watanabe, filed before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth
record and change of surname. In her petition, respondent
alleged the following: She was born on October 31, 1987 in
Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mother Zenaida and Japanese
father Koichi Nishina who were married. Her father later died.
Her mother married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada. As
they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil
registry, respondents mother caused the late registration of her
birth under the surname of her mothers second husband,
Hakamada. Her mother and Hakamada eventually divorced. Her
mother married another Japanese, Takayuki Watanabe, who
later adopted her by a decree issued by the Tokyo Family Court.
It was filed and recorded in the civil registry of Manila. It
surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the
Malolos Civil Registry under the name Nisaida Sumera
Nishina,hence, her filing before the RTC of her petition praying
that her second birth certificate bearing the surname
Hakamada, issued through late registration be cancelled; and
that in light of the decree of adoption, her surname Nishina in
the original birth certificate be changed to Watanabe. After
hearing the petition, RTC, granted respondents petition and
directed the Local Civil Registry of Malolos to cancel the second
birth record of Nisaida Sumera Hakamada and to change it from
NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA to NISAIDA SUMERA WATANABE.
Before the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal, alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong
mode of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as
required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 (appeal from the RTCs)
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court
dismissed petitioners appeal, holding that since respondents
RULE
TESTATE ESTATE OF VDA.DE BIASCAN VS. BIASCAN

Dela Cruz, Kyzeth
Page 60
sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the

proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall
be barred forever." The 5-year period is not a device
capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on
the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be
claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise
they may lose them forever in a final judgment. (c) In a special
proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the
petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any
person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property
sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and may
appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case,
the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young appeared
alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de San
Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the exclusive
owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims to be
the lessee thereof under a contract legally entered with the
former (underscoring supplied). (d) A judgment in escheat
proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive
notice, but not against those who are not parties or privies
thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown,"a judgment of escheat
was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to
all persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners of
any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in
any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper
notice having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year
period therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost her
right to claim and the supposed "discovery of the deeds of
donation" is not enough justification to nullify the escheat
judgment which has long attained finality.
petition before the RTC is classified as a special proceeding,

petitioner should have filed both notice of appeal and a record
on appeal within 30 days from receipt of the October 8, 2007
Order granting respondents petition, and by not filing a record
on appeal, petitioner never perfected its appeal
determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order

granting respondents petition for cancellation of birth record
and change of surname in the civil registry. WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED.
RULES 99-100
Adoption and Custody of Minors
WON the CA erred in dismissing the appeal.

RULING:
SECTION 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
specifies the orders or judgments in special proceedings which
may be the subject of an appeal, viz: SECTION 1. Orders or
judgments from which appeals may be taken. An interested
person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or
judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment: (a)
Allows or disallows a will; (b) Determines who are the lawful
heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the
estate to which such person is entitled; (c) Allows or disallows,
in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset
to a claim against it; (d) Settles the account of an executor,
administrator, trustee or guardian; (e) Constitutes, in
proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian,
a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the
appointment of a special administrator; and (f) Is the final order
or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial
rights of the person appealing unless it be an order granting or
denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration. The
above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the
pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal in addition
to the notice of appeal is thus required to be filed as the original
records of the case should remain with the trial court to enable
the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and
distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final. In
the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not
necessary since no other matter remained to be heard and
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BOBILES

Dorado, Czaybeeh
REPUBLIC VS. TOLEDANO AND SPOUSES CLOUSE
Espino, Carla
FACTS:
On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US
Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a former Filipino who became a
naturalized US citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala,
a minor who is Evelyn's youngest brother. The trial court
granted the petition. Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General appealed contending that the lower court erred in
granting the petition for the spouses are not qualified to adopt
under Philippine Law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt
RULING:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of The Family Code of the
Philippines, private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly
barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) expressly enumerates the persons
who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
Page 60
ISSUE:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by

consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her
Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the
latter.
Aliens, not included in the foregoing exceptions, may adopt
Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country
adoption as may be provided by law.
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A.
Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under
any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the
first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born
citizen of the United States of America. In the second place,
Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity
nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when
private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to
adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen.
She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a
citizen of the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may
appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184. She
was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger
brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be
granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which
mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a
condition that must be read along together with Article 184.
Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As
the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.
The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
REPUBLIC VS. MILLER

FACTS:
On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American

citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to
adopt Michael Magno Madayag, a Filipino child, under the
provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows
aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits giving
their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD
recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its
evaluation. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision
granting the petition for adoption. On August 3, 1998, the
Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a
Filipino child by aliens. The Solicitor General appealed to the
granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.
Page 60
(3) An alien, except:
Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino

child when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.
RULING:
Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing
of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be
affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law
disqualifying him. The enactment of the Family Code, effective
August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are
aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become
vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall
be governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one
whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon
events foreign to the will of the holder. Vested rights include not
only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but
also an exemption from new obligations created after the right
has vested. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in
form and substance in accordance with the law in governance
at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and
retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction
of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches
cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events,
although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction
from attaching in the first instance. Therefore, an alien who filed
a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code,
although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code,
may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before
the Family Code. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental
care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children
and give them the protection of society and family in the person
of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to
experience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a child
in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be

sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.
IN RE MICHELLE LIM
Katigbak, Paola Margareth
FACTS:
Monina Lim (petitioner) is an optometrist by profession.
On 1974, she married Primo Lim. Being childless, they
registered the minor children entrusted to them by certain
Ayuban as their own----named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude
P. Lim.
When Primo died, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an
American citizen. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by
availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to those
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April
2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael. At the time of the filing of the petitions for
adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
RTC dismissed the petitions on the ground that since the
petitioner had remarried, she should have filed the petition
jointly with her new husband. Motion for reconsideration was
filed but was denied. Mere consent of the husbend was
insufficient because the law gives additional requirements, such
as residency and certification of his qualification, which the
husbandmust comply. As to the argument that the adoptees are
already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint
exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that even an
emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and
assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Page 60
ISSUE:
RULE:
Denied. Under Section 7 of RA 8552, the use of the
word shall means that joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is mandatory. Petitioner, having remarried at
the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by
petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario,
the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for
adoption on this ground.
Even if Olario gave his consent, there are requirements that
must be complied, as set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as:
(1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with
the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in
the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the
filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such
residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is
allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted
child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved
during the trial. These requirements on residency and
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise
be waived pursuant to Section 7.
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore
necessary since the children have been emancipated having
reached the age of majority. This is untenable. It is true that
when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when
he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person and property of
the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts
of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the
effects of legal adoption. Other effects were enumerated in
Article V of RA 8552.
Petitioner further insist that joint adoption was possible since
Olario already filed a case for dissolution of marriage, the court
ruled that until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the
marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is required.
CANG VS. CLAVANO
Lectura, Erika
DSWD VS. BELEN
Lim, Justin
REPUBLIC VS HERNANDEZ
Lubay, Angela
FACTS:
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl
Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer
therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to
Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade
which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name
in the same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the
petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in
a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be
conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for
change of name are two special proceedings which, in
substance and purpose, are different from and are not related
to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of
law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law
allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter
of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural
Page 60
Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly

adopt?
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the

petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name
predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive
joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits
and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and
vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in
the Rules against the joinderof adoption and change of name
being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a
single petition.
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the
change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition
for adoption.
RULING:
No.
Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal
effect of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be
a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire
the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation,

to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the
decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to
follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary
consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be
contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed
for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it
was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an
adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a
license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first
name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the
adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of
adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an
adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot
properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the
civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in ones
name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly
complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for
a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or
grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly
determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict
compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable
in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It
is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by
itself, governed by its own set of rules. Afortiori, it cannot be
granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a
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consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is

the change of the registered given or proper name, and since
this would involve a substantial change of ones legal name, a
petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly
be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites
therefor being conformably satisfied.
IN RE STEPHANIE GARCIA
Mercado, Trish
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA GARCIA, HONORATO B. CATINDIG
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein
petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among
others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her
mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been
using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is
now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He
prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to
Garcia her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia
be changed to Catindig his surname.
ISSUE:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural
father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle
name?
HELD:
YES.
RATIO:
An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by
law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by
law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother.
Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by
her natural father to use, as middle name her mothers
surname, the Court finds no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.
BRIONES VS. MIGUEL

Dumapias, Gay*
SY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Rivera, Hiezll Wynn
FACTS:
On 19 January 1994, Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition
for habeas corpus against Wilson Sy before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 48, docketed as Special Proceeding No.
94-69002. Mercedes prayed that said writ be issued ordering
Wilson to produce their minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah
before the court and that after hearing, their care and custody
be awarded to her as their mother.
In his answer, Wilson prayed that the custody of the
minors be awarded to him instead. Petitioner maintained that
Mercedes was unfit to take custody of the minors. He adduced
the following reasons: firstly, respondent abandoned her family
in 1992; secondly, she is mentally unstable; and thirdly, she
cannot provide proper care to the children.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the custody of the minor children be
given to the mother.
2. Whether or not the father is obligated to provide
financial support to the minor children not in his
custody.
Page 60
mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding

would be to denigrate its role and significance as the
appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
2. Yes.
Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation
to give support is demandable from the time the person who
has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it
shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand.
The Court likewise affirms the award of P50,000.00 as support
for the minor children. As found by both courts, petitioners
representations regarding his familys wealth and his capability
to provide for his family more than provided a fair indication of
his financial standing even though he proved to be less than
forthright on the matter. In any event, this award of support is
merely provisional as the amount may be modified or altered in
accordance with the increased or decreased needs of the needy
party and with the means of the giver.
RULE 103
Change of Name
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS (May 21, 1992)
FACTS:
Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of
Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina. When he was but 2 and a
half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his
sister Margaret Alcala, was then 9 years old, they were, with the
consent of their natural parents and by order of the court,
adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong,
both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now deceased, was an
insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school
teacher. They decided to adopt the children as they remained
childless after 15 years of marriage. Upon reaching the age of
22, private respondent, by then married and a junior
Engineering student, filed a petition to change his name to
Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname
Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and
friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth
and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever
of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a
Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life;
and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to
revert to his former surname.
RTC: resolved in favor of private respondent, decreeing that,
the jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied with.
Republic through the Solicitor General appealed. The Solicitor
General contends that private respondent's allegations of
ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were
Page 60
RULING:
1. Yes. Section 213 of the Family Code states that:
In case of separation of the parents, parental authority
shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The
Court shall take into account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise.
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the
sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational,
social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into
account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parents.
However, the law favors the mother if she is a fit and
proper person to have custody of her children so that they may
not only receive her attention, care, supervision but also have
the advantage and benefit of a mothers love and devotion for
which there is no substitute. Generally, the love, solicitude and
devotion of a mother cannot be replaced by another and are
worth more to a child of tender years than all other things
combined.
ISSUE:
Whether the reasons given by private respondent in his
petition for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to
warrant the granting of said petition.
RULING: YES. The assertion of the Solicitor General was
unacceptable. The testimony of private respondent in the lower
court bears out the existence of valid cause in his bid for
change of name: that he observed that Wong as a surname
embarrassed him to his friends and when he goes with Chinese
friends he cannot talk Chinese; that private respondent was
living in Campo Muslim, a Muslim community but no one can
believe that he is a Muslim; that he has a little business of
Furniture but has little customer because no one believes that
he is Muslim. Hence, the SC upheldthe decision of respondent
appellate court. The purpose of the law an allowing of change of
name as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his
personality and to provide his best interest.In granting or
denying the petition for change of name, the question of proper
and reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court. The
evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and
not all the best evidence available is required.In the present
case, the court had exercised its discretion judiciously when it
granted the petition.
Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to

improve his social standing as long as in doing so, he does not
cause prejudice or injury to the interest of the State or other
persons .Nothing whatsoever is shown in the record of this case
that such prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of
other persons would result in the change of petitioner's name.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must
show not only some proper or compelling reason therefor but
also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. Among the grounds for change of name which have
been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)
When the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d)
Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
(f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the
question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound
discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be
satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available.
Summarizing, in special proceedings for change of name, what
is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of
the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and
propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof,
mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and
with the sole prerogative for making such determination being
lodged in the courts.
While it is true that under Article 365 of the Civil Code is
to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change
Page 60
unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition for change of

name. He claims that for private respondent to cast aside the
name of his adoptive father is crass ingratitude to the memory
of the latter and to his adoptive mother who is still alive,
despite her consent to the petition for change of name. Further,
the Solicitor General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong
to his old name violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code,
which requires an adopted child to use the surname of the
adopter.
CA: Affirmed.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC

Salayog, Benny Rico
PEOPLE VS. CAGANDAHAN
Sumaway, Dylan
REPUBLIC VS. AQUINO
Tomarong, Marian
REPUBLIC VS. MARCOS
Tresvalles, Kris
FACTS: On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by
private respondent Pang Cha Quen alleging that she is a citizen
of Nationalist China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino
citizen; that she had resided in Baguio City since her birth on
January 29, 1930; that by a previous marriage to Sia Bian alias
Huang Tzeh Lik, a citizen of Nationalist China, she gave birth to
a daughter, May Sia alias Manman Huang on January 28, 1958
in the City of Manila; that on January 12, 1959, she caused her
daughter to be registered as an alien under the name of Mary
Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the child's
father had abandoned them; that her daughter has always used
the name Mary Pang at home and in the Baguio Chinese
Patriotic School where she studies; that on August 16, 1966,
petitioner Pang Cha Quen married Alfredo De la Cruz; that as
her daughter has grown to love and recognize her stepfather,
Alfredo De la Cruz, as her own father, she desires to adopt and
use his surname "De la Cruz" in addition to her name "Mary
Pang" so that her full name shall be Mary Pang De la Cruz; that
Alfredo De la Cruz gave his conformity to the petition by signing
at the bottom of the pleading; that the petition was not made
for the purpose of concealing a crime as her ten-year old
daughter has not committed any, nor to evade the execution of
a judgment as she has never been sued in court, and the
petition is not intended to cause damage or prejudice to any
third person. She prayed that her daughter be allowed to
change her name from May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to Mary
Pang De la Cruz.
On April 4, 1968, respondent Judge issued an order setting the
hearing of the petition on September 16, 1968 at 9:00 o'clock in
the morning and inviting all interested persons to appear and
show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The
order also directed that it be published at the expense of the
petitioner in the Baguio and Midland Courier, a newspaper of
general circulation in Baguio City and Mountain Province, once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks, the first publication to be
made as soon as possible. The order also commanded that the
Solicitor General and the City Attorney of Baguio be furnished
copies of the order and petition.
On September 16, 1968, when the petition was called for
hearing, nobody opposed it. Upon motion of petitioner's
counsel, respondent Judge authorized the Clerk of Court or his
deputy to receive the evidence of the petitioner, Pang Cha
Quen.
Page 60
of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather

than the object of adoption proceedings.0 The act of adoption
fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More technically, it
is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are
recognized as legally existing between persons not so related
by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of
the child of another as son or daughter and heir and conferring
on it a title to the rights and privileges of such. The purpose of
an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status of
relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the
change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being
more an incident than the object of the proceeding. 31 The
welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the
determination of an application for adoption.
Then, respondent Judge issued an order on February 12, 1969

authorizing the name of the minor, May Sia alias Manman
Huang, also known as Mary Pang, to be changed to Mary Pang
De la Cruz.
The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the
Supreme Court on the ground that the court's order is contrary
to law
ISSUE: whether respondent Judge erred in granting the petition
although private respondent Pang Cha Quen failed to adduce
proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of the
minor "May Sia" alias Manman Huang."
HELD: The Government's contention is well-taken.
1. We accordingly hold that for a publication of a petition for a
change of name to be valid, the title thereof should include,
first, his real name, and second, his aliases, if any. this Court
explained the reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the
name sought to be adopted and the other names or aliases of
the applicant in the title of the petition, or in the caption of the
published order. It is that the ordinary reader only glances
fleetingly at the caption of the published order or the title of the
petition in a special proceeding for a change of name. Only if
the caption or the title strikes him because one or all of the
names mentioned are familiar to him, does he proceed to read
the contents of the order. The probability is great that he will
not notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if they are
mentioned only in the body of the order or petition.
In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified petition dated
March 30,1968, and the published order of the trial court dated
April 4, 1968 read, thus:
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR MAY SIA

ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA CRUZ, PANG CHA
QUEN, Petitioner. (P. 15, Rollo.)
The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions
of the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of
the publication. In view of that defect, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings, i.e., the
various names and aliases of the petitioner which she wished to
change to "Mary Pang De la Cruz."
2. The following have been considered valid grounds for a

change of name:
(1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation;
(3) when the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs.
Republic, L-21194, April 29,1966; Chill Hap Chin vs. Republic, L20018, April 30, 1966; Republic vs. Tanada, et al., L-31563,
November 29, 1971; Alfon vs. Republic, I,51201, May 29, 1980);
(4) having continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage (Josefina Ang
Chay vs. Republic, L-28507, July 31, 1980); or
(5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody
(Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, November 29, 1965).
As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the
reasons offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter
Page 60
are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with, and learned to love
and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father. (2) to afford
her daughter a feeling of security and (3) that "Alfredo de la
Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity at
the foot of this pleading"
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City to

parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not
yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got
married, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so
that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The
general rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if
it will give a false impression of family relationship to another
where none actually exists. we specifically held that our laws do
not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a
person not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname
of their mother's husband, who is not their father, can result in
confusion of their paternity.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in

Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there
together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born
in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden
surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they
anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated
against because of his current registered name which carries a
middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether
they are brother and sister since they have different surnames.
Hence, they filed a petition for change of name and/or
correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and
have his registered name changedto Julian Lin Wang.RTC denied
the petition because the reasons for the change of name were
not within the grounds recognized by law. Appeal made thereon
was subsequently denied.
Clearly, the petition for change of name must be filed by the

person desiring to change his/her name, even if it may be
signed and verified by some other person in his behalf. In this
case, however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by
May Sia.Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias
Mary Pang, when she shall have reached the age of majority,
may file the petition to change her name. The decision to
change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of
a new name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It must
be her personal decision.
IN RE: PETITION OF JULIAN WANG

Tuason, Jannelle
Whether or not the denial to grant the change of name was

proper.
RULING:
Yes. The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that
there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is
sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must
show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but
also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been
held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously
used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and
was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Page 60
Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name

is that it was not filed by the proper party.
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith

and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest.16
The present petition seeks to drop the middle name altogether.
Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change
of name usually deal with requests for change of surname.
There are only a handful of cases involving requests for change
of the given name and none on requests for changing or
dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop
the middle name from his registered name? We have to answer
in the negative because middle names serve as to identify the
maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further
distinguish him from others who may have the same given
name and surname as he has.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for
the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how
such change of name would make his integration into
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his middle name would
cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
REPUBLIC VS. CAPOTE
Umbalin, Norissa
RA 9048 & 10172
surnames were taken from then name and alias of their father,
Ang Kiu Chuy, alias Sioma Luy. Petitioner and Sioma Luy were
never married, and Sioma Luy is married to another woman.
Petitioner filed the petition to remove the name of the father so
that the son would be Jorge Batbatan and the daughter would
be Delia Batbatab. The petition was denied by the trial court on
the grounds that the records show that it was the petitioner who
supplied the information in the birth certificate of her son, and
that entries in the records of birth are correctable only if the
effect would not change status, citizenship, or any substantial
alterations. Such changes must be decided in the appropriate
proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the name change could be allowed
RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The changes sought
by petitioner would not affect the status of the children because
they are illegitimate in the first place. The law requires that
illegitimate children should carry the surname of their mothers
and that is precisely what the petitioner was trying to achieve
here. A clerical error implies mistakes by the clerk in copying or
writing, the making of wrong entries in the public records
contrary to existing facts. It is not a clerical error if it would
bring about a substantial change.
Clerical Error Law

BATBATAN VS. OFFICE OF LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
Uy, Alexander
FACTS:
LEE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 118387, 367 SCRA 110
Page 60
Petitioner Eligia Batbatan is the mother of two minor

children, Jorge Batbatan Ang and Delia Batbatan Luy. The
OCTOBER 11, 2001

Meiki , Merlin
mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan

gave birth to petitioners.
FACTS:
The private respondents are the children of Lee Tek
Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng.
The
petitioners are children of Lee Tek Sheng and his
concubine, Tiu Chuan.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents,

every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the
petitioners, their father, falsified the entries in the
records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that
petitioners mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
Private RespondentsRita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek

Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia
K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee,
Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel
and Thomas K. Lee, filed two (2) separate petitions for
the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the
records of birth of the petitionersMarcelo Lee, Albina
Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino
K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee.
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who took

care of the petitioners.
They all lived in the same
compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents
were residing in. All was well, therefore, before private
respondents discovery of the dishonesty and fraud
perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false

and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of
petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the
name of Keh Shiok Cheng as their mother, and by
substituting the same with the name Tiu Chuan, who
is allegedly the petitioners true birth mother.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions that
they are the legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek
Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in
China.
Tiu Chuan was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family
as their new housemaid but immediately became his
The private respondents requested the NBI to conduct

an investigation. After investigation, the NBI prepared a
report that the false entries in the records of birth of
petitioners made it appear that the latter were
legitimate children of Kek Shiok Cheng.
It was this report that prompted private respondents to
file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of
entries in petitioners records of birth with the lower
courts.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions
on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper
where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy
and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is
essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed
prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already
prescribed.
Page 60
A case was filed against all petitioners, except Emma

Lee, before RTC Manila assigned to respondent Judge
Lorenzo B. Veneracion. A similar petition against Emma
Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan and assigned
to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy.
When Keh Shiok Cheng died, Lee Tek Sheng insisted that
the names of all his children, including those of
petitioners, be included in the obituary notice of the
formers death that was to be published in the
newspapers.
On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an

Order stating that the petitioners have complied with
the jurisdictional requirements for the Court to take
cognizance of this case.
Petitioners attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the
above-mentioned orders failed and they appealed to the
CA. The CA, however, found no merit in their arguments
and dismissed their petition.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not resort to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court is proper
2.
Whether or not the private respondents suits
amounted to a collateral attack against petitioners
legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding
HELD:
The proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a
particular fact, status and/or right. The thrust of said
proceedings was to establish the factual truth regarding
the occurrence of certain events which created or
affected the status of persons and/or otherwise
deprived said persons of rights.
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court establishes the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The
petitions filed by private respondents for the correction
of entries in the petitioners records of birth were
intended to establish that for physical and/or biological
reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have
conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in
their birth records.
Contrary to petitioners contention that the petitions

before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn
legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that
petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng,
but to establish that the former are not the latters
children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no
blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and
petitioners.
In Republic vs. Valencia, this Court, held that even
substantial errors in a civil register may be corrected
and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. A proceeding for
correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil
register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature
and takes on the characteristics of an appropriate
adversary
proceeding
when
all
the
procedural
requirements under Rule 108 are complied with.
Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered, the suit or proceeding is appropriate.
The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4.Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
Page 60
Respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to

dismiss for failure of the petitioners to appear at the
hearing of the said motion.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person

having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a
proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register are - (1) the civil registrar,
and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby.
Upon the filing of the
petition, it becomes the duty of the court to - (1) issue
an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the
petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The following are likewise entitled to oppose the
petition: - (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been
followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no
longer be described as summary. There can be no
doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed
either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or
claiming any interest in the entries sought to be
cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively
prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary
proceedings. (Underscoring supplied.)
According to the Court of Appeals, the proceedings
taken in both petitions for cancellation and/or correction
of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in the

lower courts are appropriate adversary proceedings.
We agree.
Appeals:
As correctly observed by the Court of
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or

correction of entries of birth was filed by private
respondents and pursuant to the order of the RTCManila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order
setting the case for hearing was ordered published once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines. In the RTCKalookan, there was an actual publication of the order
setting the case for hearing in Media Update once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In both cases
notices of the orders were ordered served upon the
Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of Manila and
Kalookan and upon the petitioners herein. Both orders
set the case for hearing and directed the Civil Registrars
and the other respondents in the case below to file their
oppositions to the said petitions. A motion to dismiss
was consequently filed by herein petitioners Marcelo,
Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio, all
surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila,
and an opposition was filed by Emma Lee in the RTCKalookan.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed
by the private respondents in the courts below by way
of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the civil registers with the
requisite parties, notices and publications could very
well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate
action. (Underscoring supplied.)
The petitioners assert, however, that making the
proceedings adversarial does not give trial courts the
license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is
limited to those corrections contemplated by Article 412
Page 60
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be

published once in a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited

case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic, the reason we
declared null and void the portion of the lower courts
order directing the change of Labayo-Rowes civil status
and the filiation of one of her children as appearing in
the latters record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was
inappropriate to effect such changes, but because
Labayo-Rowes petition before the lower court failed to
implead all indispensable parties to the case.
Far from petitioners theory, this Courts ruling in
Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic[ does not exclude recourse to
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect
substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil
register. The only requisite is that the proceedings
under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding
as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding.
Thus:
If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the civil register] is merely to
correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or
obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a
summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of
a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes
which may affect the civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and

controversial alterations which can only be allowed after
appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the
nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the
civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in
character and should be threshed out in a proper action
depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy,
and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the
entries are notified or represented and evidence is
submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and
proof to the contrary admitted. x x x. (Underscoring
supplied.)
It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings
and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy
granted upon mere application or motion. But this is
not always the case, as when the statute expressly
provides. Hence, a special proceeding is not always
summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure
outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated
therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108
requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e.,
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4).
The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all persons
who claim any interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar
and any person in interest are also required to file their
opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the
court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is
after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).
Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in
Republic vs. Valencia, that Rule 108, when all the
procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the
appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic
Page 60
of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a

harmless or innocuous nature. The petitioners point to
the case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic, which is of a later
date
than
Republic
vs.
Valencia,
where
this
Courtreverted to the doctrine laid down in earlier cases,
starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic, prohibiting the
extension of the application of Rule 108 beyond
innocuous
or
harmless
changes
or
corrections.
Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil
Registrar, allowing substantial changes under Rule 108
would render the said rule unconstitutional as the same
would have the effect of increasing or modifying
substantive rights.
In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108

cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive
rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:
On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the
cancellation of any entry regarding marriages in the
civil registry for any reason by the mere filing of a
verified petition for the purpose. However, it is not as
simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can
be canceled or corrected under this Rule are
typographical or clerical errors, not material or
substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage.
A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding; error made by a clerk or a
transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing (Black vs.
Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless and
innocuous change such as a correction of name that is
clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L10226, Feb. 14, 1958).
Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will
change the civil status of petitioner and her children
from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be
granted except only in an adversarial x x x.
Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure
under Rule 108, and for that matter under Article 412 of
the Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to change his
and Virginias civil status from married to single and of

their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. x x x
Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a
civil registry will change the status of a person from
legitimate to illegitimate, as in Sarah Zitas case,
the same cannot be granted in summary proceedings.
It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the
confusion sown by pronouncements seemingly in
conflict with each other, and perhaps, in the process,
stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same
substantial issue.
The basis for the pronouncement that extending the
scope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections is
unconstitutional is embodied in the early case of Ty
Kong Tin vs. Republic[40] that first delineated the
extent or scope of the matters that may be changed or
corrected pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.
The Supreme Court ruled in this case that:
x x x. After a mature deliberation, the opinion was
reached that what was contemplated therein are mere
corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and
not those that may affect the civil status or the
nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the
purpose of the petition is merely a clerical error then
the court may issue an order in order that the error or
mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a substantial
change, which affects the status or citizenship of a
party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper
action depending upon the nature of the issue involved.
Such action can be found at random in our substantive
and remedial laws the implementation of which will
naturally depend upon the factors and circumstances
that might arise affecting the interested parties. This
opinion is predicated upon the theory that the
procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary in
nature which cannot cover cases involving controversial
issues.
Page 60
vs. Valenciathere continues to be a seesawing of opinion

on the issue of whether or not substantial corrections in
entries of the civil register may be effected by means of
Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code.
The more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of
Appealsand Republic vs. Labradordo seem to signal a
reversion to the Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the
scope of application of Article 412 to clerical or
typographical errors in entries of the civil register.
From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August
30, 1950 until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of
Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of
court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial
authorization
to
effect
the
desired
innocuous
rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant
to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a
procedure which should be limited solely to the
implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on
the matter of correcting entries in the civil register.
Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of
Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant
to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIII
of the Constitution, which directs that such rules of
court shall not diminish or increase or modify
substantive rights. If Rule 108 were to be extended
beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of
errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and
controversial
alterations
concerning
citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become
unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying
substantive rights, which changes are not authorized
under Article 412 of the New Civil Code.[43]
(Underscoring supplied).
We venture to say now that the above pronouncements
proceed from a wrong premise, that
is, the
interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clerical
errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively
excluding from its domain, and the scope of its
implementing rule, substantial changes that may affect
nationality, status, filiation and the like.
Why the
limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin
does not satisfactorily answer this question except to
opine that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is

summary in nature and cannot, therefore, cover cases
involving controversial issues. Subsequent cases have
merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine without,
however, shedding light on the matter.
The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412
contemplates a summary procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides
as follows:
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without a judicial order.
It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be
followed except to say that the corrections or changes
must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be
gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for
obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses
both the terms corrected and changed. In its
ordinary sense, to correct means to make or set
right;to remove the faults or errors from while to
change means to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute. The provision neither qualifies as to the
kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it
distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction
or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude
that all entries in the civil register may be changed or
corrected under Article 412. What are the entries in the
civil register? We need not go further than Articles 407
and 408 of the same title to find the answer.
Thirdly, Republic Act No. 9048 which was passed by
Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended
Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
SECTION
1.
Authority
to
Correct
Clerical
or
Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname.- No entry in a civil register shall be changed
Page 60
This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of

Chua Wee, et al. vs. Republicwhere the Court said that:
or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical

or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
its implementing rules and regulations.
It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is

Congress response to the confusion wrought by the
failure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-called
summary procedure for changes or corrections of a
harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that
appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or
corrections of a substantial kind. For we must admit
that though we have constantly referred to an
appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to
categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic
Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary procedure
while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding.
Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot be decided on
the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective
application.
Hence, the necessity for the preceding
treatise.
REPUBLIC VS. KHO

GR. NO. 170340
JUNE 29, 2007
Meiki , Merlin
FACTS:
On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael,
Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of
Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries
in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in
their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the
court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to
order the correction of some entries in their birth
certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his
birth certificate of the citizenship of his mother to
"Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well as the deletion of
the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of
marriage of parents" because his parents, Juan Kho and
Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally
married. The same request to delete the "married"
status of their parents from their respective birth
certificates was made by Carlitos siblings Michael,
Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira. With respect to the birth
certificates of Carlitos children, he prayed that the date
of his and his wifes marriage be corrected from April
27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in
their marriage certificate.
Page 60
The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical

errors in entries of the civil register are now to be
corrected and changed without need of a judicial order
and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit
of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in
entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the
scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes
and corrections in entries of the civil register. This is
precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other
cases of its genre had said, perhaps another indication
that it was not sound doctrine after all.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended

Petition3 in which it was additionally prayed that
Carlitos second name of "John" be deleted from his
record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of
Carlitos father in his (Carlitos) marriage certificate be
corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to
"Chinese," respectively.
the petition for correction of entries in the subject

documents despite the failure of respondents to implead
the minors mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party
and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the
corrections with regard to the questioned "married"
status of Carlito and his siblings parents, and the
latters citizenship.
On September 14, 2001,7 the OSG entered its

appearance with an authorization to the city prosecutor
of Butuan City to appear in the case and render
assistance to it (the OSG).
CA Ruling;
On
January
31,
2002,
respondents
presented
documentary evidence showing compliance with the
jurisdictional
requirements
of
the
petition
and
testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of
Carlito and his mother, Epifania. During the same
hearing, an additional correction in the birth certificates
of Carlitos children was requested to the effect that the
first name of their mother be rectified from "Maribel" to
"Marivel."
By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA

denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlitos
parents rendered the trial short of the required
adversary proceeding and the trial courts judgment
void. NO
RTC Ruling:
HELD:
The trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan

City to correct the entries in the record of birth of
Carlito, as follows: (1) change the citizenship of his
mother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John"
from his name; and (3) delete the word "married"
opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last
correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the
birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona,
and Heddy Moira. As well as the prayer for the
correction in the birth certificates of Carlitos minor
children are granted. Further, the trial court granted the
correction prayed for in Carlitos marriage certificate.
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of

Appeals. That case stemmed from a petition for
correction of entries in the birth certificate of a minor,
June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real
father (Armando Gustilo) and to correspondingly change
her surname. The petition was granted by the trial
court.
Page 60
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC

Decision to the CA, faulting the trial court in granting
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered

also by Gustilo, however, sought to annul the trial
courts decision, claiming that she should have been
made a party to the petition for correction. Failure to
implead her deprived the RTC of jurisdiction, she
contended.
The essential requisite for allowing substantial

corrections of entries in the civil registry is that the true
facts be established in an appropriate adversarial
proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
xxxx
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in
Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the
petition for correction, as any judicial determination
that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her
wards share in the estate of her father. x x x.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the
petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that
the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule
108, which requires notice by publication x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind
the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the
petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even
parties who should have been impleaded under Section
3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x
xxxx
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an
action against a thing and not against a person. The
decision on the petition binds not only the parties
thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. Publication is

notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its
object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to
make an objection of any sort against the right sought
to be established. It is the publication of such notice
that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and
vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule
on whether Marivel or respondents parents should have
been impleaded as parties to the proceeding. It may not
be amiss to mention, however, that during the hearing
on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who was acting
as representative of the OSG did not raise any objection
to the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlitos parents as
parties to the proceeding.
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel
was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in
her childrens birth certificates, especially since the
notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all
sent to the residence she shared with Carlito and the
children.
It is also well to remember that the role of the court in
hearing a petition to correct certain entries in the civil
registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts
recorded therein.
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and
Marivel, their certificate of marriage25 shows that
indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not on
April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that
the date "April 27, 1989" was supplied by his helper,
adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time
his sons were born because his previous marriage was
annulled only in 1999.Given the evidence presented by
respondents, the CA observed that the minors were
illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring
about no change at all in the nature of their filiation.
Page 60
In dismissing Barcos petition, this Court held that the

publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of
Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable
party.
The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from

Carlitos and his siblings birth certificates of the entry
"Married" opposite the date of marriage of their
parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued on
November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish
priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and
Epifania had been living together as common law couple
since 1935 but have never contracted marriage legally.
A certification from the office of the city registrar, which
was appended to respondents Amended Petition,
likewise stated that it has no record of marriage
between
Juan
Kho
and
Epifania.
Under
the
circumstances, the deletion of the word "Married"
opposite the "date of marriage of parents" is warranted.
With respect to the correction in Carlitos birth
certificate of his name from "Carlito John" to "Carlito,"
the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the
cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of
name falls under letter "o" of the following provision of
Section 2 of Rule 108:
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in
the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a)
births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation;
(e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of
a minor; and (o)changes

underscoring supplied)
of
name. (Emphasis
and
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103

(which governs petitions for change of name) were not
complied with, observance of the provisions of Rule 108
suffices to effect the correction sought for.
More importantly, Carlitos official transcript of record
from the Urious College in Butuan City, certificate of
eligibility from the Civil Service Commission, and voter
registration record satisfactorily show that he has been
known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likely
to arise from the dropping of the second name.
The correction of the mothers citizenship from Chinese
to Filipino as appearing in Carlitos birth record was also
proper. Of note is the fact that during the cross
examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did
not deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to
oppose the correction prayed for, which certainly was
not respondents fault, does not in any way change the
adversarial nature of the proceedings.
Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of
Carlitos siblings uniformly stated the citizenship of
Epifania as "Filipino." To disallow the correction in
Carlitos birth record of his mothers citizenship would
perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal circumstances
of the siblings who are unquestionably born of the same
mother and father.
Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course,
is the correction of the name of Carlitos wife from
"Maribel" to "Marivel." The mistake is clearly clerical or
typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but
is also obvious to the understanding considering that
the name reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlito
and his wife is "Marivel."
Page 60
With respect to Carlitos mother, it bears noting that she

declared at the witness stand that she was not married
to Juan Kho who died in 1959. Again, that testimony was
not challenged by the city prosecutor.
Apropos is Yu v. Republic which held that changing the

appellants Christian name of "Sincio" to "Sencio"
amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error. The
change of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to
Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere innocuous
alteration, which can be granted through a summary
proceeding. The same ruling holds true with respect to
the correction in Carlitos marriage certificate of his
fathers name from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho." Except in
said marriage certificate, the name "Juan Kho" was
uniformly entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and
of his siblings.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
KILOSBAYAN VS. ONG

G.R. NO. 177721
JULY 3, 2007
Meiki , Merlin
abeyance" by Malacaang in view of the question

relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong.
There is no indication whatever that the appointment
has been cancelled by the Office of the President.
On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported
that respondent Executive Secretary stated that the
appointment is "still there except that the validation of
the issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC)."
Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to
respondent
Ong
through
respondent
Executive
Secretary
is
patently
unconstitutional,
arbitrary,
whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese
citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that
his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese
citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth
certificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The birth
certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of
respondent Ongs birth on May 25, 1953, his father was
Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.
Petitioners invoke the Constitution:
On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in

representation of the Office of the President, announced
an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong
as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the
vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment
was reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by the
major daily publications.
On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported
that the appointment was "recalled" or "held in
Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution

provides that "No person shall be appointed Member of
the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines ."Sec. 2 of
Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
Citizenship."
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that
eleven years after respondent Ongs birth his father was
finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization,
Page 60
FACTS:
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be

issued annulling the appointment issued to respondent
Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.
Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an
Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), praying that a TRO be issued,
in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and
restrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasing
the appointment of respondent Ong, and to prevent and
restrain respondent Ong from assuming the office and
discharging the functions of Associate Justice of this
Court.
Executive Secretarys Comment:
Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his
Comment, essentially stating that the appointment of
respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court on
May 16, 2007 was made by the President pursuant to
the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the
Constitution, thus:
SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges
of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from
a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments
need no confirmation.
Respondent Executive Secretary added that the
President appointed respondent Ong from among the
list of nominees who were duly screened by and bore
the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII,
Section 8 of the Constitution. Said respondent further
stated: "The appointment, however, was not released,
but instead, referred to the JBC for validation of
respondent Ongs citizenship."
Ongs Comment:
Respondent
Ong
submitted
his
Comment
with
Opposition, maintaining that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen; that petitioners have no standing to file
the present suit; and that the issue raised ought to be
addressed to the JBC as the Constitutional body
mandated to review the qualifications of those it
recommends to judicial posts. Furthermore, the
petitioners in his view failed to include the President
who is an indispensable party as the one who extended
the appointment.
As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his
ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan,
born on November 25, 1881, who was allegedly a
Filipino citizen5 who married Chan Kin, a Chinese
citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in
1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of which Maria
Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that
time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby
also became a Filipino citizen;6 that respondent Ongs
mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses
Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who
were married in 1927; that, therefore, respondents
mother was a Filipino citizen at birth; that Dy Guiok
Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han
Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when
respondent Ong was eleven years old his father, Eugenio
Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and as a result he, his
brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in
the naturalization.
Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau
of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an
identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen
under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution,
since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was
born.
Page 60
that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a

natural-born Filipino citizen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
respondent Ong is a natural-born
Filipino citizen. NO
HELD:
He is still required to submit evidentiary documents.
In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar,
docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14,
1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date, respondent
Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the
Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino
citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was
naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a
minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became
a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of
his petition, be submitted his birth certificate and the
naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate

states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his
mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese
citizen.
It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and
the submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court
allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court,
respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The
alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born
status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot
amend the final decision of the trial court stating that
respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along
with his father.
Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no
substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil
register can be made without a judicial order, and, under
the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial
change.
Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a
summary administrative proceeding to correct clerical or
typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply
to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to the
nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil
registry should, therefore, be effected through a
petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The series of events and long string of alleged changes
in the nationalities of respondent Ongs ancestors, by
various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual
assertions that need to be threshed out in proper
judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records
on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would
have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ongs
Page 60
Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which

they asserted their standing to file this suit on the
strength of previous decisions of this Court, e.g.,
Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona8 and Kilosbayan,
Incorporated v. Morato,9 on the ground that the case is
one of transcendental importance. They claim that the
Presidents appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme
Court Justice violates the Constitution and is, therefore,
attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that
respondent Ongs birth certificate, unless corrected by
judicial order in non-summary proceedings for the
purpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence of
what it states, namely, that respondent Ong is a Chinese
citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he
was a minor would not make him a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still

appears in the records of this Court. Respondent Ong
has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral
tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of
three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong
cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that
would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason,
he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.
Page 60

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72

Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules

CA dismissed; MR was denied. Hence, this petition for

The MR of the petitioners was denied; hence, they filed a

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

DISPOSITION:Petition is denied for lack of merit

PATRICIA NATCHER VS. HON. COURT OFAPPEALS

of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired the 2nd

prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

ISSUE: whether or not Judge Ruiz is correct in dismissing the

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

TABUADA VS. RUIZ

Special proceeding # 5198 (settlement of intestate

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City

should they fail to submit the compromise within the given

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

time and place of examining and allowing the account of the

affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City

In the whole, the Court found that Andres was, at the

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Don Andres

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in which

Rule 79 Section 2, demands that the petition should

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI

Resides ex vi termini actual residence-Elastic and

The CA ruled in the following manner:

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

Finally, venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the

up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death of

such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist

abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay

discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

PACIOLES VS. CHUATOCO-CHING

CAMAYA VS. PATULANDON

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

the propriety of oppositors (respondents) claim. According to

Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition,

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

In her Supplemental she attached Certification issued be

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

A Special Proceeding was instituted for the settlement of estate

Whether the ownership of the 12 hectare land should be

possessed property namely Lot 1927 with an area of 3.97

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR.,

WON petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to

the 12 hectare land in question stating the ultimate facts in

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal.

CALMA VS. TANEDO

Doctrine: Debts chargeable against the conjugal property

2) An ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of the

Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016