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The Strategic
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the Small Powers:
THE CASE OF
THE PHILIPPINES IN
THE FACE OF THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA
DISPUTE
stratbase.com.ph
THE CASE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea surrounded by China and several small and militarily
weak Southeast Asian powers such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. For almost
three decades, these littoral states have been involved in a chronic competition as each one
seeks to extend its sovereignty and jurisdictional claims over more than a hundred islets, reefs,
and rocks and their surrounding waters. The dispute became dormant in the late 1990s and the
early 21st century after China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
signed the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
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AUGUST 2015
volume 8 issue 3
features
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12
09
on the cover
From Center of Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), a sattellite image showing
Chinese vessels building an artificial Island
at Mischief Reef in the disputed seas.
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Fostering a Strategic
Partnership with Japan
Aside from strengthening its alliance with the U.S,
the Philippines also fosters its strategic partnership
with Japan, Chinas main rival in East Asia.
10
Building Up a Credible
Defense Posture
Although determined to shift the AFPs focus from
internal security to territorial defense, the Aquino
Administration is constrained by insufficient
financial resources even with its modest
defense acquisition goals.
CONTENTS
maritime
dispute
dangerous ground or a future of conflict.3 As a future of conflict, the South China Sea becomes an arena where states with
powerful navies will jockey for strategic and diplomatic
positions with their warships in the high seas, pursue their
conflicting claims for natural resources, and strive for
supremacy in the Western Pacific.4
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frigates, and nuclear-powered attack submarines. The PLAN has also upgraded its operational capabilities across the waters surrounding Taiwan and has deployed two new
classes of ballistic and attack submarines.
Moving beyond its strategic preoccupation on
the Taiwan Straits, Chinas naval forces can
generate regional tension by challenging the
claims of its small neighboring states, and in
the long run, to change the strategic pattern
of the maritime commons of East Asia and
West Pacific from where the U.S. Navy can be
eased out. Interestingly, Chinese media commentators have repeatedly emphasized the
significance of Chinas blue water navy and
the exigency of protecting its territorial
claims in the South China Sea.
With its naval prowess, China has become
more assertive in the South China Sea. In
March 2009, Chinese naval and fishing
vessels harassed the U.S.S. Impeccable
which was openly conducting surveying
operations in the South China Sea. The following year, China warned the U.S. to
respect its extensive maritime claims. In March 2010, Chinese officials told two
visiting U.S. State Department senior officials that China would not tolerate any
American interference in the South China Sea, which is now part of the countrys core interests of sovereignty on par with Taiwan and Tibet.10 Recently,
the Chinese government increased its defense budget by 13% to boost the
PLANs capability to accomplish a range of military functions including
winning local wars under information age conditions.
Judging from its recent behavior, Chinas aggressive pursuit of its territorial
claim over the South China Sea has increased in tandem with the expansion of
its navy and maritime services.11 It conducts regular naval exercises that utilize
modern surface combatants and even submarines.12 These activities reflect
Chinas intention to unilaterally and militarily resolve the maritime issue, flaunt
its naval capabilities, and impress upon the other claimant states its
de facto ownership of the disputed territories.13 In the long run, Chinas naval
capabilities will be directed not only to expand its maritime domain but to deny
foreign naviesespecially that of the U.S.access to the East China and South
China Seas. In time, it will be capable of depriving the U.S. 7th Fleets access to
the Western Pacific inside of the so-called first island chain.14
In mid-2012, China engaged the Philippines in a tense two-month stand-off in
Scarborough Shoal using civilian government ships and fishing vessels
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supported by the PLAN. During the stalemate, China stood its ground and insisted on
its authority and control over the contested
territory and its related resources and rights.
A few days after Chinese and Filipino civilian
vessels withdrew from the contested shoal,
thus ending the impasse, China deployed its
growing military and paramilitary forces in the
South China Sea. It took certain measures
to advance its right to exploit marine and oil
resources rights; strengthened its administrative control over the disputed land features;
and ignored the harsh criticism of the U.S.,
Japan and other states.15
In July 2012, China created a new administrative unit for the 1,100 Chinese citizens
living in the island groups of the Spratlys, the
Paracels, and the Macclesfield Bank. In addition, the Central Military Commission, Chinas
most powerful military body, approved the
stationing of PLA personnel to guard these
islands. These actions were designed to reinforce Chinas territorial claim over the South
China Sea. No less than the president of the
National Institute of South China Sea Studies based in Hainan Island admitted that the
goal of the strategic move is to allow Beijing
to exercise sovereignty over all land features
inside the South China Sea including more
than 40 islands now illegally occupied by
Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia.16
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Balancing Chinas
Maritime Expansion
Historically, the Philippines had
primarily focused its strategic attention
and efforts on containing domestic
3RD QUARTER 2015
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Building Up a Credible
Defense Posture
Although determined to shift the AFPs
focus from internal security to territorial
defense, the Aquino Administration is constrained by insufficient financial resources
even with its modest defense acquisition
goals. The current territorial defense buildup is a very expensive undertaking because, in many cases, the AFP has to start
from scratch. For example, the Philippine
air defense capability is nil because the PAF
is practically a helicopter air force without
any fighter planes. It has only one operational radar with a very limited coverage area.43
The PAF needs to develop or acquire radars,
hangars, forward operating bases,
maintenance capabilities, as well as command and control facilities. The PN plans
to acquire two state-of-the-art frigates which
require communications and weapons
systems and mission-essential devices such
as day/night electronic navigational gadgets, communication suites, safety-of-life-atsea equipment, propulsion and seamanship
and ship-handling gears, and corresponding
logistic support packages.
fighters which only had five serviceable years. A sound alternative, he said,
was to buy cheaper new fighter aircraft from the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, or South Korea.
In 2012, the Philippine government started negotiations for the procurement
of 12 Korean F/A-50 Golden Eagles from Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI).
The F/A-50s design was largely patterned after the U.S Lockheed Martin F-16
Fighting Falcons. Both fighter planes have similar features: a single engine
and the same speed, size, cost, and range of possible weapons system. These
12 F/A 50 interceptors could secure the Philippines air-space and
simultaneously serve as trainer planes to develop the PAF pilots air command
maneuvering (ACM)skills.46 During his two-day state visit in South Korea on
17-18 October 2013, President Aquino announced that both governments were
finalizing the deal worth Php18.9 billion (estimated US$450 million).
On March 2014, after nearly two years of difficult and tedious negotiations, the
Philippines finally signed a contract with KAI for the purchase of fighter planes
for the PAF. Guaranteed by the state-owned Korea Trade-Investment
Promotion Agency (KOTRA), the contracts commit KAI to deliver the fighter
planes to the PAF in the next 38 months. With air-to-air mid-distance attack
and night-fighting capabilities, the 12 F/A-50 Fighting Eagles would act as
interim jet fighters while the PAF waits for more funding and the proper training
needed for the purchase of fourth-generation multi-role combat interceptors.47
This was the PAFs first such acquisition since the Philippines bought 25 F-8
Crusader fighter-bombers from the U.S. in 1979 to supplement its squadrons of
pre-Vietnam War F-5 fighter planes. It was an important milestone for the PAF,
which had no operational fighter planes since the retirement of its two aging
squadrons of Northrop F-5s in 2005. This was also the AFPs first major
acquisition since its planned force modernization in the early 1990s.
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Fostering a Strategic
Partnership with Japan
Aside from strengthening its alliance with the U.S, the
Philippines also fosters its strategic partnership with Japan,
Chinas main rival in East Asia. On July 2012, then Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto and his Filipino
counterpart, Secretary Gazmin, inked a bilateral agreement
on maritime security.59 This agreement features high-level
dialogues between defense officials and reciprocal visits
by the MSDF chief-of-staff and the PN flag commander. A
few days later, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert
Del Rosario announced that Tokyo was likely to provide the
PCG with ten 40-meter boats as part of Japans ODA to the
Philippines by the end of the year.60 Newspapers also reported a grant of two additional bigger vessels considered
for transfer to the Philippine government.
On January 2013, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida
announced Japans technical assistance to the PCG
through the provision of essential communications equipment for maritime safety.61 On 27 June 2013, Japanese
Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera and Secretary Gazmin
confirmed the continuous exchanges of information aimed
at strengthening Philippine-Japan defense relations and on
working together to make U.S. strategic rebalancing a reality in Asia.62 Secretary Gazmin also raised the possibility
of allowing the Japanese MSDF access to the former
American military bases in the Philippines if Tokyo is
interested in negotiating and signing an
access agreement with Manila.63
The Philippines and Japan have conducted high-level meetings and consultations to solidify their security cooperation
in the face of Chinas military assertiveness. On December
2013, President Aquino discussed with Prime Minister
Shintaro Abe in Tokyo Chinas establishment of an Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea.64
President Aquino was worried that China might extend the
zone into the South China Sea, adversely affecting Philippine security. Prime Minister Abe assured President Aquino
that Japan would not tolerate Chinas attempt to change
the status quo in the region by force and that it intended to
cooperate with the Philippines to ensure that the freedom
of flight and navigation is respected.65 To help build up the
PCGs capability, Prime Minister Abe approved a yen-based
soft loan to finance the Philippines acquisition of ten
40-meter long multi-purpose patrol boats from Japan.
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technology to the Philippines.69 In a press briefing, President Aquino announced the forthcoming negotiation on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that would allow SDF access
to Philippine military bases. He disclosed that a Philippine-Japan SOFA is possible since
both countries have boosted their security relationship significantly over the past few years.
The SDFs use of Philippine bases, on a limited and rotational basis, will be useful to Japan
as it actively pursues a policy of Pro-Active Contribution to Peace in East Asia. With
refueling and basing facilities in the Philippines, units of the ASDF and MSDF can
conduct joint patrols with their American counterparts for a longer period of
time and over a larger area of the South China Sea.
Conclusion
Since 2009, China has taken an aggressive approach in pursuing its expansive maritime
claim in the South China Sea. Initially, it used a delaying tactic in the resolution of the
dispute while it consolidated its claims over disputed maritime territories and deterred
small claimant states from strengthening their own claims. Eventually, the U.S. and Japan
displayed their interests in the dispute and have since projected their naval prowess in East
Asia. These two naval powers have also extended military assistance to the small claimant
states in the South China Sea dispute-the Philippines and Vietnam. This, in turn, has raised
the possibility of a major naval confrontation between an emergent power and two major
naval powers in the South China Sea. These developments have created a potentially
volatile balance of power situation in the South China Sea. So far, this balance of
power has prevented an armed conflict among the claimant states.
The Philippines is taking advantage of this strategic impasse to build up a credible defense
capability to back its defiant act of standing up to Chinas maritime expansion in the South
China Sea. It has also strengthened its security ties with the U.S. and Japan to maintain
the balance of power situation for the time being. However, given the slow pace and the
limited funding for its arms modernization program, the Philippines foresees that this strategic stand-off among the major powers will continue way into the third decade of the 21st
century. Nevertheless, such a view may overlook the possibility that this strategic stand-off
might be the proverbial calm before the storm. If this storm suddenly breaks out on the
countrys maritime horizon, the Philippines might find itself in the same situation as it was
in the late 1941militarily ill-equipped, utterly defenseless, and totally
unprepared for the tempests destructive onslaught.
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endnotes
This article is a shorter version of a paper
that was presented in the panel on Military Balance
and Regional Order Fifth Annual CSIS South China
Sea Conference, Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), 21 July 2015, Washington, D.C.
1
2
National Institute for Defense Studies,
NIDS China Security Report 2014 (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2015). p. 3.
4
See Robert Kaplan, The South China Sea is
the Future of Conflict, Foreign Policy 188 (September/
October 2011): 76-88. http://search.proquest.com/do
cview/888030576?accountid=28547
5
17
Mark Landler, How Obama Switched to
Tougher Line with China, International Herald Tribune
(21 September 2012). pp. 1-1.
1 9
Jane Perlez, U.S. Gives Explanation for
its Pivot to Asia, International Herald Tribune (4
June 2012). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/doc/
view/1018261286/13818EF8BE5C...
7
Aaron L. Friedberg, Buckling Beijing: An
Alternative U.S. China Policy, Foreign Policy (September/October 2012). 91, 5. P. 53.
8
Ibid. p. 53.
10
Edward Wong, China Asserts Role as a
Naval Power, International Herald Tribune (23 April
2010). pp. 1and 4.
1 2
For details on Chinas Training Exercises in
its surrounding waters see National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2011) . pp. 14-21.
13
See The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011: The Annual As-
16
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20
David S. Cloud, Panetta Out to Reassure
Allies Defense Chief Says U.S. Commitment, Asian
Pivot Real, South Florida-Sun-Sentinel (2 June 2012).
p. 1 http://search.proquest.com/docview/101814753
5/13818EF8BE5C...
21
Sheldon W. Simon, Conflict and Diplomacy in the South China Sea: The View from Washington, Asian Survey 52, 6 (November/December 2012).
p. 1012.
22
.X. Hammes and D. Hooker, Americas Ultimate Strategy in a Clash with China, National Interests
(June 10, 2014). p.1. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-ultimate-strategy-clash-china-10633
23
Sheldon W. Simon, Conflict and Diplomacy in the South China Sea: The View from Washington, Asian Survey 52, 6 (November/December 2012).
p. 1012.
24
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., How to Deter
China: The Case of Archipelagic Defense, Foreign Affairs 94, 2. (March/April 2015). pp. 78-86.
25
National Institute of Defense Studies, NIDS
China Report 2011 (Tokyo: National Institute of Defense Studies, 2011). p. 17.
26
China Sea Plate: Tokyo is Confronting Beijing and Increasing Defense Ties with ASEAN Members to Protect Maritime Trade, Wall Street Journal (09 July 2012).
p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview.102413288
4/131979D7E21C...
For an interesting discussion on the dismal state of the PAF see Galileo Gerard R. Kintanar,
Developing an Air Power Culturethe Missing Dimension, Digest: Strategic and Special Studies (3rd
Quarter 2012). pp. 35-48.
27
Yoichi Kato, Chinas Naval Expansion in the
Western Pacific, Global Asia (Winter 2010) 5, 4. p. 19.
44
Jon Grevatt, Philippines to Hasten Recreation of Dedicated Combat Wing with Ex-USAF F-16
Purchase, Jane Defense Industry 29, 1 (January 1,
2012). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/91
0358069/1367C416F31C55.
28
cit. p. 26.
29
The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 2012: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence
Economics (London: The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2012).p. 212.
30
31
32
33
34
The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 2012: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence
Economics (London: The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2012). p. 213.
35
Charles Glaser, Will Chinas Rise Lead to
War? Why Realism Does not Mean Pessimism, Foreign
Affairs 90, 2 (March/April 2011). p. 91.
36
Noel M. Morada and Christopher Collier,
The Philippines: State versus Society, in Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Ed)
Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001).p. 550.
37
Ronnie Gil L. Gavan, Organized National
Engagement (ONE) at Sea: Optimizing the States Option for Maritime Security, Digest 19, 1 (First Quarter
2012).p. 10.
38
China Wants Philippines to Seek Permission before Spratlys Oil Search, BBC Monitoring AsiaPacific (10 June 2011). p. 1. http://proquest.umi.com/
pqdweb?index=281&did=2370661661&Sr...
National Security Council, National Security Policy 2011-2016 (Quezon City: National Security
Council, April 2011). p. 39.
39
40
Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Armed
Forces of the Philippines: Strategic Intent (Quezon
City: Camp Aguinaldo, 2011). p. 27.
43
45
Aurea Calica, Aquino: Government Can
Now Afford to Buy New Fighter Jets, The Philippine
Star (17 May 2012). p. 2.
46
Asia News Monitor, Philippines: F/A-50s
to Boost Countrys Capability to Defend Territory,
Asia News Monitor (21 October 2013) p.1. http://
search.proquest.com/docview/1443037151?accoun
tid=28547
BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, South Korea, Philippines Sign Agreement on Export of Fighter
Aircraft, BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific (28 March 2014).
p. 1 http://search.proquest.com/docview/15107033
22?accountid=28547
47
48
Asia News Monitor, Philippines: DND
Eyes Acquisition of Two Brand New Frigates, Asia
News Monitor (15 August 2013). p. 1. http://search.
proquest.com/docview/1420301565?account
id=28547
49
Asia News Monitor, Only Best, Affordable Naval Ships will be Acquired for the Philippines,
Asia News Monitor (09 January 2013). p. 1. http://
search/proquest.com/docview/1267135710?accoun
tid=28547
Ibid. p. 4.
56
Jim Garamone, U.S.-Philippine Pact Expands Defense Cooperation, Targeted News Service
(28 April 2014). P. 1 http://search.proquest.com/docvi
ew/1519453450/17CC0F621D4441CBPQ/55?account
id=...
57
For details regarding this new forms access arrangements see Robert Harkavy, Thinking
about Basing, Naval War College Review 58. 3 (Summer 2005). pp. 12-42.
58
Ibid. p. 1
59
Janes Country Risk Daily Report, Japan
and Philippines Sign Defense Pact, Janes Country Risk
Daily Report (4 July 2012) 19, 134. p. 1. http://search.
proquest.com/docview/102349/13A38763AF488...
60
Jerry E. Esplanada, Philippines, Japan to
Enhance Maritime Security Ties, Philippine Daily Inquirer (9 July 2012). p. 1 http://globalnation.inquirer.
net/43508/philippines-japan-to-enhance...
61
Asia News Monitor, Philippine/Japan:
Philippines, Japan Agree to Enhance Cooperation in
Maritime Security, Asia News Monitor (14 January
2013). p. 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/126
9104724?accountid=28547
62
BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, Philippines, Japan Agree to Strengthen Defense Ties, BBC
Monitoring Asia-Pacific (27 June 2013). p. 2. http://
search.proquest.com/docview/137173115?account
id=28547
63
Ibid. p. 2.
Jiji Press English News Service, Japan, Philippines to Cooperate on Chinas Air Defense Zone, Jiji
Press English News Service (13 December 2013). p. 1.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1467745056?
51
GMA News Philippine Navy to Acquire
Largest Ship in Inventory, GMA News (23 January
2011). p. 1. http://www.gmanews.tv/print/211298
66
Gulf News, Aquino and Abe Discuss Maritime Disputes, Gulf News (25 June 2014).p. 1. http://
search.proquest.com/docview/1539577105?account
id=28547
50
52
See Sheena Chestnuts Greitens, The U.S.
Alliance with the Philippines: Challenges and Opportunities, U.S. Alliances and Partnership at the Center
of Global Power (Eds) Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M.
Denmark, and Greg Chaffin (Seattle and Washington,
D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2014). p.
144.
53
Ibid. p. 128.
54
Ibid. p. 128.
41
42
64
65
Ibid. p. 1.
67
Ibid.p. 1.
68
Ibid. p. 1.
69
Japan-Philippines Joint Declaration: A
Strengthen Partnership for Advancing the Shared
Principles and Goals of Peace, Security, and Growth
in the Region and Beyond (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 4 June 2015).
55
Philippine News Agency, New Defense
Agreement Enhances Philippine, U.S. Alliance on Security ChallengesDND Chief, The Philippines News
SPARK
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The key link to idea and action is the on-line
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