Special Political and

Decolonisation Committee

SISMUN 2016 - Message from Chairperson

Dear delegates,
It is with immense happiness and pleasure as the vice chair of the Special Political and
Decolonisation Committee, I present to you the issues this committee has decided to
mitigate this year.
There has been a lot of political events going on in this world, some of which threaten the
existence of mankind itself. Hence, this committee found it imperative to discuss
constructive solutions to problems like establishing peacekeeping operations in Yemen and
making Non-Proliferation Treaty mandatory in countries like Democratic Republic of Korea
and Iran.
Both of these topics are extremely pertinent and major political and ethical issues of the 21st
century, so I look forward to your innovative and creative proposals for resolving this
problem at hand. In order to facilitate constructive debate and pertinent arguments and to
ensure that the members of this committee enjoy a lively debate, I recommend taking time
to research the history and position of your country in regard to these issues.
Working on the SISMUN committee has been a very enjoyable experience for me with
regards to the issues selected and as a vice chair.
I would expect passionate debate, while representing the ideology of the country from the
perspective of a young mind.
I hope this committee aids the conditioning of the newer delegates towards ameliorating
their debating skills.
Thank you,
Regards,
Yash Naik

Introduction to the committee

We will be stimulating the Special Political and Decolonisation Committee in SISMUN
2016. This committee passes resolutions with suggestions on the optimal ways for the
United Nations and member states to address the issues of colonised people.
According to its mandate, SPECPOL (which is the 4th committee of the General Assembly)
can discuss issues such as self-determination, decolonisation, and peacekeeping efforts.
While SPECPOL was derived from the Disarmament and International Security Committee,
it takes on issues that the First Committee (DISEC) of the General Assembly does not
address, as well as looking at topics with a wider scope. Unlike other UN committees,
SPECPOL shines a spotlight on issues pertaining to occupation, colonisation, and
subjugation, with the primary goal of making all countries independent and self-sufficient
from outside powers.
SPECPOL includes all 193 Member States, uniting to alleviate developing countries
dependencies on former colonizing powers. The committee derives power from its mandate
in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter, which commits to the preservation of the rights
and dignities of people living in non-self-governing territories. The committee passes
resolutions with suggestions on the optimal ways for the United Nations and member states
to address the issues of colonized people. According to its mandate, the Fourth Committee
can discuss issues such as self-determination, decolonization, and peacekeeping efforts.
While SPECPOL was derived from the Disarmament and International Security Committee,
it takes on issues that the First Committee does not address, as well as looking at topics with
a wider scope.
It should also be noted that, as this is a General Assembly committee, all resolutions are
non-binding. What this means is that operative clause language which is more indicative of
a Security Council resolution (e.g. Demands) should not be used, with non-binding
language (e.g. Urges, Recommends) being used instead. This also means that any
peacekeeping operations or punitive measures (such as economic sanctions) cannot directly
be authorised by this committee, although it is within the committees power to suggest or
recommend that the Security Council take these actions in a manner stipulated by the
committee. It is still acceptable, however, to refer to resolutions passed previously by nonGeneral Assembly committees (including the Security Council) in the perambulatory
clauses of a resolution.
The Special Political and Decolonization committee holds a very unique role in the United
Nations. While other main committees aim to resolve current global issues, SPECPOL
concerns itself with healing countries from the lasting impact of their troubling histories.
The committees foremost goal is to ensure that all countries enjoy the benefits of the
independence to which they are entitled, and only when all countries are economically,
culturally, and socially liberated can the world move
forward.

History of the Committee

The Special Political and Decolonisation Committee (SPECPOL), originally the Special
Committee on Decolonization, is the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly. It has
been integral in promoting social, economic, political and educational progress in the
Territories, to assist in developing appropriate forms of self-government and to take into
account the political aspirations and stages of development and advancement of each
Territory.
One cannot underestimate the role that SPECPOL has played: since the inception of the UN,
more than 80 former colonies have gained independence. SPECPOL, through its numerous
resolutions and debate, has promoted the self-determination of states and decolonization
efforts. Indeed, in 1960, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples stated that all people have a right to self-determination and
proclaimed that colonialism should be brought to a speedy and unconditional end.
Historically, SPECPOL has focused its attention on issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. In addition, SPECPOL frequently works in conjunction with groups such as the
High Commissioner on Refugees and also specialized groups such as the Special Committee
to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and
Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories.
Since its inception, SPECPOL has passed many resolutions addressing the quality and
framework of information technology in developing countries, paying special attention to
the development of the United Nations Department of Public Information.

Topic 1 - Establishing
peacekeeping operations in Yemen
Introduction to peacekeeping
Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the UN to assist
host countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace.
Peacekeeping has unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to
deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian
peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandates.
UN Peacekeepers provide security and the political and peacebuilding support to help
countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to peace.
UN Peacekeeping was born at a time when Cold War rivalries frequently paralysed the
Security Council.
Peacekeeping was primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on
the ground, providing crucial support for political efforts to resolve conflict by peaceful
means. Those missions consisted of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops
with primarily monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles.
In 1988, UN peacekeepers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. At that time, the Nobel
Committee cited the Peacekeeping Forces through their efforts have made important
contributions towards the realization of one of the fundamental tenets of the United Nations.
Thus, the world organization has come to play a more central part in world affairs and has
been invested with increasing trust.
UN Peacekeeping is guided by three basic principles:
a) Consent of the parties
UN peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties to the
conflict. This requires a commitment by the parties to a political process. Their acceptance
of a peacekeeping operation provides the UN with the necessary freedom of action, both
political and physical, to carry out its mandated tasks.
In the absence of such consent, a peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the
conflict; and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its fundamental role
of keeping the peace.
The fact that the main parties have given their consent to the deployment of a United
Nations peacekeeping operation does not necessarily imply or guarantee that there will also
be consent at the local level, particularly if the main parties are internally divided or have
weak command and control systems. Universality of consent becomes even less probable in
volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed groups not under the control of any
of the parties, or by the presence of other spoilers.

b) Impartiality
Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but
should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity. United Nations peacekeepers should be
impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of
their mandate.
Just as a good referee is impartial, but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation
should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process
or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation
upholds.
Notwithstanding the need to establish and maintain good relations with the parties, a
peacekeeping operation must scrupulously avoid activities that might compromise its image
of impartiality. A mission should not shy away from a rigorous application of the principle
of impartiality for fear of misinterpretation or retaliation.
Failure to do so may undermine the peacekeeping operations credibility and legitimacy,
and may lead to a withdrawal of consent for its presence by one or more of the parties.
c) Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate
UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. However, they may use force at
the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defence and
defence of the mandate.
In certain volatile situations, the Security Council has given UN peacekeeping operations
robust mandates authorizing them to use all necessary means to deter forceful attempts
to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack,
and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order.
Although on the ground they may sometimes appear similar, robust peacekeeping should
not be confused with peace enforcement, as envisaged under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter.

Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the
authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main
parties to the conflict.

By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and
may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is
normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless
authorized by the Security Council.
A UN peacekeeping operation should only use force as a measure of last resort. It should
always be calibrated in a precise, proportional and appropriate manner, within the principle
of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for
the mission and its mandate. The use of force by a UN peacekeeping operation always has
political implications and can often give rise to unforeseen circumstances.
Judgments concerning its use need to be made at the appropriate level within a mission,
based on a combination of factors including mission capability; public perceptions;
humanitarian impact; force protection; safety and security of personnel; and, most
importantly, the effect that such action will have on national and local consent for the
mission.
Depending on their mandate, peacekeeping operations may be required to:

a) Deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across borders;
b) Stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire, to create an environment for the parties to
reach a lasting peace agreement;
c) Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements;
d) Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic
principles, good governance and economic development.
Success is never guaranteed, because UN Peacekeeping almost by definition goes to the
most physically and politically difficult environments. However, UN Peacekeepers have
built up a demonstrable record of success their 60 years of existence, including winning the
Nobel Peace Prize.
UN peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of mandates from the United Nations
Security Council. Their tasks differ from situation to situation, depending on the nature of
the conflict and the specific challenges it presents.
The Charter gives the UN Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Council may adopt a
range of measures, including the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation.
Depending on the specific set of challenges, UN peacekeepers are often mandated to play a
catalytic role in the following essentially peacebuilding activities:
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants;
Mine action;
Security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities;
Protection and promotion of human rights;
Electoral assistance;
Support for the restoration and extension of State authority;
Promotion of social and economic recovery and development.
The Crisis in Yemen
Yemen is in the grip of its most severe crisis in years, as competing forces fight for control
of the country. Impoverished but strategically important, the tussle for power in Yemen has

serious implications for the region and the security of the West.
Here are some key questions explained Who is fighting whom?
In recent months Yemen has descended into conflicts between several different groups,
pushing the country "to the edge of civil war", according to the UN's special adviser. The
main fight is between forces loyal to the beleaguered President, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi,
and those allied to Zaidi Shia rebels known as Houthis, who forced Mr Hadi to flee the
capital Sanaa in February.
Who's in charge in Yemen?
Yemen's security forces have split loyalties, with some units backing Mr Hadi, and others
the Houthis and Mr Hadi's predecessor Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has remained politically
influential. Mr Hadi is also supported in the predominantly Sunni south of the country by
militia known as Popular Resistance Committees and local tribesmen. Both President Hadi
and the Houthis are opposed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which has
staged numerous deadly attacks from its strongholds in the south and south-east. The picture
is further complicated by the emergence in late 2014 of a Yemen affiliate of the jihadist
group Islamic State, which seeks to eclipse AQAP and claims it carried out a series of
suicide bombings in Sanaa in March 2015. After rebel forces closed in on the president's
southern stronghold of Aden in late March, a coalition led by Saudi Arabia responded to a
request by Mr Hadi to intervene and launched air strikes on Houthi targets. The coalition
comprises five Gulf Arab states and Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Sudan.
Why does it matter for the rest of the world?
What happens in Yemen can greatly exacerbate regional tensions. It also worries the West
because of the threat of attacks emanating from the country as it becomes more unstable.
Western intelligence agencies consider AQAP the most dangerous branch of al-Qaeda
because of its technical expertise and global reach. The US has been carrying out
operations, including drone strikes, against AQAP in Yemen with President Hadi's cooperation, but the Houthis' advance has meant the US campaign has been scaled back. The
conflict between the Houthis and the elected government is also seen as part of a regional
power struggle between Shia-ruled Iran and Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia, which shares a long
border with Yemen.
Gulf Arab states have accused Iran of backing the Houthis financially and militarily, though
Iran has denied this, and they are themselves backers of President Hadi.
Yemen is strategically important because it sits on the Bab al-Mandab strait, a narrow
waterway linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, through which much of the world's oil
shipments pass. Egypt and Saudi Arabia fear a Houthi takeover would threaten free passage
through the strait.
How did it all get out of control and what are the origins of the issue?
After months of tightening their hold, the Houthis have formally seized power. In January,
the group said it would dissolve parliament and announced plans for a new interim assembly
and five-member presidential council, which would rule for up to two years. The move
filled a political vacuum which had existed since President Hadi, the prime minister and

cabinet resigned earlier that month after the Houthis placed President Hadi under house
arrest and detained other leading figures.
But the Houthis are minority Shia from the north, and their declaration has not been
recognised by Sunni tribesmen and southern leaders, threatening Yemen with a further
descent into chaos. President Hadi, who is recognised as Yemen's legitimate leader by the
international community, managed to escape to Aden, which he declared the de facto
capital.
Who are the Houthis?
The Houthis are members of a rebel group, also known as Ansar Allah (Partisans of God),
who adhere to a branch of Shia Islam known as Zaidism. Zaidis make up one-third of the
population and ruled North Yemen under a system known as the imamate for almost 1,000
years until 1962.
The Houthis take their name from Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi. He led the group's first
uprising in 2004 in an effort to win greater autonomy for their heartland of Saada province,
and also to protect Zaidi religious and cultural traditions from perceived encroachment by
Sunni Islamists.
After Badr al-Din al-Houthi was killed by the Yemeni military in late 2004, his family took
charge and led another five rebellions before a ceasefire was signed with the government in
2010. In 2011, the Houthis joined the protests against then President Saleh and took
advantage of the power vacuum to expand their territorial control in Saada and
neighbouring Amran province. They subsequently participated in a National Dialogue
Conference (NDC), which led to President Hadi announcing plans in February 2014 for
Yemen to become a federation of six regions. The Houthis however opposed the plan,
which they said would leave them weakened.
Why is Yemen so unstable?
In recent years Yemen has seen violent conflicts largely caused by underlying problems of
unequal access to power and resources.
There have been six rounds of fighting between the state and the Houthis in the north;
separatist unrest in the south; frequent attacks by AQAP; and power struggles between tribal
and military factions. For much of the 20th Century, Yemen existed as two separate
countries - the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. In 1990, the countries chose to unify and create
the Republic of Yemen. However, southerners soon began complaining of political and
economic marginalisation by the government in Sanaa, and fought a civil war in 1994 in a
failed attempt to reverse the unification.
Instability and large-scale displacement, as well as weak governance, corruption, resource
depletion and poor infrastructure, have hindered development in the poorest country in the
Middle East.
Unemployment, high food prices and limited social services mean more than 10 million
Yemenis are believed to be food insecure.

Timeline of events in Yemen

2008 March-April - Series of bomb attacks on police, official, diplomatic, foreign business
and tourism targets. US embassy evacuates all non-essential personnel.
2008 November - Police fire warning shots at Common Forum opposition rally in Sanaa.
Demonstrators demand electoral reform and fresh polls. At least five protesters and two
police officers injured.
2009 August - The Yemeni army launches a fresh offensive against Shia rebels in the
northern Saada province. Tens of thousands of people are displaced by the fighting.
2009 November - Saudi Arabia says it has regained control of territory seized by Yemeni
rebels in a cross-border incursion.
2010 February - Government signs ceasefire with Houthi northern rebels, which breaks
down in December.
2010 September - Thousands flee government offensive against separatists in southern
Shabwa province.
2011 January - Tunisian street protests encourage similar demonstrations in other countries,
including Yemen. President Saleh pledges not to extend his presidency in 2013 or to hand
over to his son.
2011 November - President Saleh agrees to hand over power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh
Mansour Hadi. Unity government including prime minister from opposition formed.
2012 February - Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi inaugurated as president after uncontested
elections.
2014 January - National Dialogue Conference winds up after ten months of deliberation,
agreeing a document on which the new constitution will be based.
2014 February - Presidential panel gives approval for Yemen to become a federation of six
regions as part of its political transition.

2014 August - President Hadi sacks his cabinet and overturns a controversial fuel price rise
following two weeks of anti-government protests in which Houthi rebels are heavily
involved.
2014 September - Houthi rebels take control of the most of capital Sanaa.
2015 January - Houthis reject draft constitution proposed by government.
2015 February - Houthis appoint presidential council to replace President Hadi, who flees to
Aden southern stronghold.
2015 March - Islamic State carries out its first major attacks in Yemen - two suicide
bombings targeting Shia mosques in Sanaa in which 137 people are killed.
Houthi rebels start to advance towards southern Yemen. President Hadi flees Aden.
Saudi-led coalition of Gulf Arab states launches air strikes against Houthi targets and
imposes naval blockade.
2015 September - President Hadi returns to Aden after Saudi-backed government forces
recapture the port city from Houthi forces and launch advance on Aden.

Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements on Yemen Conflict

S/RES/2216 - This resolution established an arms embargo on the Houthis and forces
loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh.
S/RES/2201 - This was a resolution that strongly deplored the Houthis actions to dissolve
parliament on 6 February and take over government institutions and urged the
acceleration of negotiations to reach a consensus solution regarding the political impasse.
S/RES/2140 - This resolution expressed the Councils strong support for the next steps of
the political transition and established sanctions against those threatening the peace,
security or stability of Yemen.
S/PRST/2015/8 - This was a presidential statement condemning the Houthis unilateral
actions and reaffirming the Councils readiness to take further measures.
S/PRST/2014/18 - This presidential statement expressed grave concern about the
deterioration the security situation in Yemen in light of the actions taken by the Houthis.
However, many of these resolutions have been deplored by the Houthis, who have called for
a mass protest against, since they propose the establishment of arms embargoes against the
Houthis and call on them to quit Sanaa and other areas they have seized.

Past action in Yemen

In 1963, an organisation called United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) was
formed by the Security Council of the United Nations. UNYOM was established on 11 June
1963 by Security Council resolution 179 (1963), to observe and certify the implementation
of the disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. The
mandate of UNYOM stemmed from the disengagement agreement entered into by the three
Governments concerned, namely, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic and the Arab
Republic of Yemen, set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 29 April 1963. The
function and authority of UNYOM as defined in the agreement were considerably more
limited than in the case of other United Nations observation missions. Its establishment was
not based on any ceasefire agreement and there was no ceasefire to supervise. The tasks of
UNYOM were limited strictly to observing, certifying and reporting in connection with the
intention of Saudi Arabia to end activities in support of the royalists in Yemen and the
intention of Egypt to withdraw its troops from that country. The mandate of UNYOM ended
on 4 September 1964 and its personnel and equipment were withdrawn.
Analysis and Expectations
The crisis in Yemen has become a threat to international security and a major concern in the
international community. The civil war and uprising not only threatens the livelihoods of the
local people, but also dramatically surges up the crime rates and decreases the accessibility
of basic services like medical care, education and housing (in short, the quality of life
decreases). As the intensity of the rebellion increases, trading and commercial activities
within the region will decrease and major sources of income for the country such as import
and export of goods will be heavily affected. However, the real stakes are not just economic
- though billions of dollars every year could be lost due to war, but also humanitarian. The
real cost is human toll - trauma, torture and even death.
The committee now is tasked with several objectives like recommending the Security
Council to establish peacekeeping operations in Yemen, considering the impact the
peacekeeping missions could have in Yemen, defining a legal framework in which those
convicted of war crimes may be punished and reinstating the mandate upon which the
peacekeeping missions will act. It is also important for UN Peacekeepers to maintain
general law and order within the country and ensure that the lives of the local people living
there are not adversely affected due to civil war.
Peacekeepers are only allowed to act upon self defence and not otherwise, and hence,
should a new framework be implemented for peacekeepers to respond to violence whether it
affects their personal safety or not? If so, would it be redundant and create new levels of
bureaucracy? Also, what can be done to defend ingenuous civilians residing in the area?
Should an external body be formed for heavier patrolling of these areas? If so, then where
will the funding come from when military budgets are going down as the violence in these
regions increase? These are some of the questions which the committee will need to answer
during the course of this MUN Conference for effective and constructive debate.

It is also imperative that all parties in Yemen, whether foreign aid, peacekeeping agencies or
privatised military remain consistent with international humanitarian law and ensure the
safety of civilians and United Nations and its associated personnel.
The peacekeepers also have to ensure that all humanitarian actors reach people in need of
humanitarian assistance unhindered and safe.

Topic B - To make NPT

mandatory for DPRK and Iran
Introduction
The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and
complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral
treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in
1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended
indefinitely. A total of 190 parties have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclearweapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and
disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty's significance.
The provisions of the Treaty, particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a review of the
operation of the Treaty every five years, a provision which was reaffirmed by the States
parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.
To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between
States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance
with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes
cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology
for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons
use. The NPT is the most widely accepted arms control agreement; only Israel, India, and
Pakistan have never been signatories of the Treaty, and North Korea withdrew from the
Treaty in 2003.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was an agreement signed in 1968 by several of the
major nuclear and non-nuclear powers that pledged their cooperation in stemming the
spread of nuclear technology. Although the NPT did not ultimately prevent nuclear
proliferation, in the context of the Cold War arms race and mounting international concern
about the consequences of nuclear war, the treaty was a major success for advocates of arms
control because it set a precedent for international cooperation between nuclear and nonnuclear states to prevent proliferation.

By the beginning of the 1960s, nuclear weapons technology had the potential to become
widespread. The science of exploding and fusing atoms had entered into public literature via
academic journals, and nuclear technology was no longer pursued only by governments, but
by private companies as well. Plutonium, the core of nuclear weapons, was becoming easier
to obtain and cheaper to process. As a result of these changes, by 1964 there were five
nuclear powers in the world: in addition to the United States, the Soviet Union, and the
United Kingdom, all of which obtained nuclear capability during or shortly after the Second
World War, France exploded its first nuclear bomb in 1960, and the Peoples Republic of
China was not far behind in 1964. There were many other countries that had not yet tested
weapons, but which were technologically advanced enough that should they decide to build
them, it was likely that they could do so before long.
The spread of nuclear weapons technology meant several things for international
lawmakers. While the only countries that were capable of nuclear strike were the United
States, its close ally Britain, and the Soviet Union, the doctrine of deterrence could be
reasonably maintained. Because both sides of the Cold War had vast stocks of weapons and
the capability of striking back after being attacked, any strike would likely have led to
mutually assured destruction, and thus there remained a strong incentive for any power to
avoid starting a nuclear war. However, if more nations, particularly developing nations that
lay on the periphery of the balance of power between the two Cold War superpowers,
achieved nuclear capability, this balance risked being disrupted and the system of deterrence
would be threatened.
Moreover, if countries with volatile border disputes became capable of attacking with
nuclear weapons, then the odds of a nuclear war with truly global repercussions increased.
This also caused the nuclear states to hesitate in sharing nuclear technology with developing
nations, even technology that could be used for peaceful applications. All of these concerns
led to international interest in a nuclear non-proliferation treaty that would help prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons.
Although the benefits to be derived from such a treaty were clear, its development was not
without controversy.
A ban on the distribution of nuclear technology was first proposed by Ireland in a meeting
of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1961. Although the members approved
the resolution, it took until 1965 for negotiations to begin in earnest at the Geneva
disarmament conference. At that time, U.S. negotiators worked to strike a delicate balance
between the interest in preventing further transfer of the technology that it shared with the
Soviet Union and the desire to strengthen its NATO allies by giving several Western
European nations some measure of control over nuclear weapons. The plan for a nuclear
NATO threatened to scuttle the talks altogether, and the United States eventually abandoned
it in favor of reaching a workable treaty.
A more difficult problem involved the question of bringing non-nuclear nations into line
with the planned treaty. Nations that had not yet developed nuclear weapons technology
were essentially being asked to give up all intentions to ever develop the weapons. Without
this agreement on the part of the non-nuclear powers, having the nuclear powers vow never
to transfer the technology would likely not result in any real limitation on the number of
worldwide nuclear powers. After two years of negotiations, the nuclear powers managed to
make enough concessions to induce many non-nuclear powers to sign.

The final treaty

The final treaty involved a number of provisions all aimed at limiting the spread of nuclear
weapons technology. First, the nuclear signatories agreed not to transfer either nuclear
weapons or nuclear weapons technology to any other state. Second, the non-nuclear states
agreed that they would not receive, develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. All of
the signatories agreed to submit to the safeguards against proliferation established by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Parties to the treaty also agreed to cooperate
in the development of peaceful nuclear technology and to continue negotiations to help end
the nuclear arms race and limit the spread of the technology. The treaty was given a 25-year
time limit, with the agreement that it would be reviewed every 5 years.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was, and continues to be, heralded as an important
step in the ongoing efforts to reduce or prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Still, it had
one major drawback in that two nuclear powers, France and the Peoples Republic of China,
did not sign the agreement, nor did a number of non-nuclear states.
The Treaty is based on four pillars:
Pillar One Non-Proliferation: Article 1 of the NPT states that nuclear weapon state
countries (N5) should not transfer any weapon-related technology to others.
Pillar Two Ban on possession of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states: Article 2
states the other side of the coin, namely that non-nuclear states should not acquire any form
of nuclear weapons technology from the countries that possess it or acquire it
independently.
Pillar Three Peaceful use of nuclear energy: Article 4 not only allows the use of nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes, but even stresses that it is the inalienable right of every
country to do research, development and production, and to use nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, without discrimination, as long as Articles 1 and 2 are satisfied.
It further states that all parties can exchange equipment, material, and science and
technology for peaceful purposes. It calls on the nuclear states to assist the non-nuclear
states in the use of peaceful nuclear technology.
Pillar Four Nuclear disarmament: Article 6 makes it obligatory for nuclear states to get
rid of their nuclear weapons. The Treaty states that all countries should pursue negotiations
on measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear
disarmament.

North Korea - Is it an active participant in the arms race?

North Korea's nuclear programme remains a source of deep concern for the international
community. In 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2016, North Korea announced that it had conducted
successful nuclear tests - they came after the North was sanctioned by the UN for launching
rockets.

Analysts believe the first two tests used plutonium as the fissile material. The North is
believed to possess enough weapons-grade plutonium for at least six bombs.
Whether it used plutonium or uranium as the starting material for the 2013 test is unclear.
While these were atomic bomb tests, North Korea said its test in January 2016 was of a
hydrogen bomb. Again, the starting material is unclear.
H-bombs use fusion - the merging of atoms - to unleash massive amounts of energy,
whereas atomic bombs use nuclear fission, or the splitting of atoms.
However, some experts cast doubt on the H-bomb claim, given the size of the explosion
registered.
Multiple rounds of negotiations have taken place between the North, the US, Russia, China,
Japan and South Korea aimed at persuading Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions.
But none of this has ultimately deterred North Korea.
In September 2005, after more than two years of on-off talks, North Korea agreed a
landmark deal to give up its nuclear ambitions in return for economic aid and political
concessions.
Implementing the deal proved extremely difficult and the talks stalled in April 2009.
Contacts in July 2011 did not get far before long-time leader Kim Jong-il died and was
succeeded by his son, Kim Jong-un.
Another step forward in early 2012, when North Korea suddenly announced it would
suspend nuclear activities and place a moratorium on missile tests in exchange for US food
aid, came to nothing when Pyongyang tried to launch a rocket in April that year.
North Korea also made certain claims about its capabilities in the wake of its tests.
Firstly, it claimed it had "miniaturised" a device, that is, made a device small enough to fit a
nuclear warhead onto a missile.
In April 2015, it repeated this claim, but US officials were quoted as casting doubt on this
claim and experts say it is difficult to assess the progress North Korea has made on
miniaturisation.
Pyongyang also said the 2013 test had a much greater yield than the plutonium devices it
detonated in 2006 and 2009.
Some analysts have suggested that warnings of a "high-level" test could have been code for
the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) rather than plutonium.
Although both represent roughly the same level of threat, a uranium bomb would signify a
huge technological achievement because the process of distilling natural uranium ore to the
stuff suitable for bombs is profoundly difficult.
The 2013 test was indeed larger in force than previous ones but monitors failed to detect
radioactive isotopes. Finding certain isotopes would help experts determine whether a
plutonium or uranium-based device was used.
But a well-contained test could yield no radioactive isotopes, experts say. So uncertainty
remains.
North Korea also claims it carried out an underground test of a hydrogen bomb in January
2016 but these were met with plenty of scepticism.
Initial estimates put the blast in the 10 to 15 kiloton range, whereas a full thermonuclear
blast would be closer to 100 kilotons.

Tests for regional radioactivity will again be carried out, but there is no certainty they will
offer a definitive conclusion.
As in 2013, North Korea claimed this was a successful test of a miniaturised device. Again
it has not been verified.

Suspected test
sites of nuclear
weapons in North
Korea

North Korea nuclear reactor not fully operational: U.S. think tank
Recent satellite images suggest the nuclear reactor seen as North Koreas main source of
weapons-grade plutonium is still not operating at full capacity, a U.S. think tank said
Thursday.
North Korea mothballed the Yongbyon reactor in 2007 under an aid-for-disarmament
accord, but began renovating it after its third nuclear test in 2013.
When fully operational, the reactor is capable of producing around 6 kilos (13 pounds) of
plutonium a year enough for one nuclear bomb, experts say.

Analyzing satellite imagery from late 2014 to the end of 2015, the Washington-based
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) concluded the reactor has been
operating intermittently or at low power throughout the period.
Using tell-tale operational markers, including steam emissions and hot water discharges, the
ISIS experts discerned a pattern of limited operations for a few weeks, followed by an
apparent shutdown.
The reasons for this type of operation are unknown, the institute said.
Its findings contradict a North Korean statement in September last year that all facilities at
the Yongbyon nuclear complex were working normally.
The ISIS experts did detect signs that a gas centrifuge plant for enriching uranium was
operational, given snow melt on the roofs of the plants main buildings.
Activity at Yongbyon is closely monitored for any sign of reprocessing activity.
At some point North Korea is expected to shut down the reactor, discharge the spent fuel,
and chemically process it in a nearby radiochemical laboratory to extract weapons-grade
plutonium.
North Korea has carried out four nuclear tests since 2006, the most recent being last week
when it announced it had detonated its first hydrogen bomb.
Experts have disputed the hydrogen-bomb claim, saying the yield from the test was far too
low for a full-fledged thermonuclear device.
As the U.N. Security Council grappled with a response to the underground blast, North
Koreas U.N. mission claimed Wednesday that its test showed that it could now wipe out
the United States.
North Korea said the test scientifically proved the power of the smaller H-bomb.
A Security Council diplomat said Wednesday that the U.N.s most powerful body is
working on a resolution that imposes tougher sanctions on North Korea to reflect the claim
that it tested a hydrogen bomb, which is a step change from its three previous atomic
tests.
The diplomat said all 15 council members agree that North Korea should be denuclearized,
and this will be reflected in a new resolution.
U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed over the phone
Wednesday that the international community should get tough on North Korea in the wake
of the nuclear test.
Obama and Putin agreed on the importance of a strong and united international response
in defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions that demanded Pyongyang suspend any
activities related to nuclear programs, according to the White House.

At the same time, Putin advocated all relevant sides exercising maximum restraint and not
taking action that could incite military escalation in Northeast Asia, a Russian statement
said.
North Koreas U.N. mission circulated a report from the countrys news agency saying the
Jan. 6 test wasnt to threaten or provoke anyone but was indispensable to build a
nuclear force to cope with the U.S. ever-more undisguised hostile policy toward the
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, the countrys official name.
It said North Korean scientists and technicians are in high spirit to detonate H-bombs
capable of wiping out the whole territory of the U.S. all at once as it persistently moves to
stifle the DPRK.
Iran and the Non Proliferation Treaty
Irans nuclear programme has been the target of a great deal of misinformation, downright
lies and above all myths. As a result, it is often difficult to unpick truth from falsehood.
Iran is a party to the NPT but was found in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards
agreement and the status of its nuclear program remains in dispute. In November 2003
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported that Iran had repeatedly and over an
extended period failed to meet its safeguards obligations, including by failing to declare its
uranium enrichment program. After about two years of EU3-led diplomatic efforts and Iran
temporarily suspending its enrichment program, the IAEA Board of Governors, acting
under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, found in a rare non-consensus decision with 12
abstentions that these failures constituted non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards
agreement. This was reported to the UN Security Council in 2006, after which the Security
Council passed a resolution demanding that Iran suspend its enrichment. Instead, Iran
resumed its enrichment program.
The United States also concluded that Iran violated its Article III NPT safeguards
obligations, and further argued based on circumstantial evidence that Iran's enrichment
program was for weapons purposes and therefore violated Iran's Article II nonproliferation
obligations. The November 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate later concluded that
Iran had halted an active nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003 and that it had
remained halted as of mid-2007. The NIE's "Key Judgments," however, also made clear that
what Iran had actually stopped in 2003 was only "nuclear weapon design and weaponisation
work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work"namely, those aspects of Iran's nuclear weapons effort that had not by that point already
been leaked to the press and become the subject of IAEA investigations.
The UN Security Council has passed multiple resolutions demanding that Iran halt its
enrichment activities. Negotiations to resolve the nuclear issue between Iran and the United
States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, China, and Germany (P5+1 also known as
E3+3) failed during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but have progressed further
under President Hassan Rouhani. Several rounds of talks in Geneva in October and

November 2013 culminated in a 6-month Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), and negotiations
along a parallel track led to the Framework for Cooperation (FFC) between the IAEA and
Iran.
Following the Iran-Iraq war, Iran committed itself to the development of one of the most
sophisticated ballistic missile programs in the Middle East. Iran has pursued a dual track
strategy, developing both liquid and solid-fueled systems.
In addition to its missile program, Iran is actively developing a space launch capability. Iran
successfully launched three satellites into space in February 2009, June 2011, and February
2012 aboard the Safir space launch vehicle (SLV).Some analysts fear that the Safir
represents the technical basis for Tehran to develop long-range ballistic missiles. Expert
debate concerning Iran's technological capacity to develop even more advanced weapons in
the near future is significant and ongoing.
Iran currently has some 15,700 pounds of 3.5 to 5 percent nuclear fuel, and 432 pounds of
20 percent enriched fuel. International Atomic Energy Agency investigators have never
turned up any weapons grade fuel in Iran and have certified that Teheran is not diverting
fuel to build nuclear weapons. Intelligence agencies, including Israels, are in general
agreement that Teheran has not enriched above 20 percent. A nuclear weapon requires about
110 pounds of uranium fuel enriched to between 90 and 95 percent.
Iran insists it is not building a weapon, and its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,
issued a fatwa, or religious ruling, against the production of nuclear weapons as being
contrary to Islamic beliefs.
Analysis and Expectations
Both Iran and North Korea have the potential to contribute immensely to the development
of the global arms race and hence, it is up to the world committee to strongly discourage
stockpiling of Weapons of Mass Destruction by making the Non Proliferation mandatory for
DPRK and Iran. How could this be done?
Nuclear states like the P5 could place trade embargoes or economic sanctions on DPRK if it
is under reasonable suspicion of stockpiling weapons above a certain scale or promoting
scientific research of nuclear weapons, but this could be redundant and an act of hypocrisy
by the P5 because of their nature of stockpiling weapons.
An effort by individual, nuclear armed states to disarm could be made, but there would be
no guarantee of the other states obliging to do the same, thus putting the state defenceless.
Lastly, some UN-sponsored incentives such as economic benefits and increased diplomatic
ties could be considered for both the countries by all willing nations if both these nations are
willing to disarm and do their part to curb the global arms race, but a lot of consideration,
planning, and thought would have to be given to this idea by the SPECPOL committee for
this proposal to become an innovative solution.
While condemning the rate of armament of the countries in the world, it is up to the
committee to find a long-term solution which will truly enable DPRK and Iran to stop the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

This background guide is by no means exhaustive. It is merely a mode of guidance for

delegates. Further research carried out by delegates is utmost significant. Please note that
content from the guide cannot be quoted as evidence. Factual statements may be questioned
by other delegates or by the dais, because of which appropriate evidence is a must.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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