TheFederalBureaucracy:AdministeringtheGovernment

Informalterms,bureaucracyisasystemoforganizationandcontrolthatisbasedon
threeprinciple:hierarchicalauthority,jobspecialization,andformalizedrules

Hierarchicalauthorityreferstoachainofcommandwherebytheofficialsandunits
atthetopofabureaucracyhaveauthorityoverthoseinthemiddle,whointurn
controlthoseatthebottom

Jobspecializationreferstoexplicitlydefineddutiesforeachjobpositionandtoa
precisedivisionoflaborwithintheorganization

Formalizedrulesaretheestablishedproceduresandregulationsbywhicha
bureaucracyconductsitsoperations
OriginandStructureoftheFederalBureaucracy

Thefederalbureaucracywasinitiallysmall

Thefederalgovernmentsrolewasconfinedlargelytodefenseandforeignaffairs,
currencyandinterstatecommerce,andthedeliveryofmail

Inthelatterpartofthe1800s,thebureaucracybegantogrowrapidlyinsizelargely
becauseeconomicgrowthwasgeneratingnewdemandsongovernment

TypesofFederalAgencies
ThepresidentandCongressgetfarmoreattentioninthenews,butthefederal
bureaucracyhasamoredirectimpactonAmericanseverylives
Theleadingadministrativeunitsarethefifthcabinet(executive)departments

ExpectfortheDepartmentofJustice,whichhisledbytheattorney
general,theheadofeachdepartmentisitssecretary

Eachcabinetdepartmenthasresponsibilityforageneralpolicyarea

Thisresponsibilityiscarriedoutwithineachdepartmentby
semiautonomousoperatingunitsthattypicallycarrythelabelbureau,
agency,division,orservice
Independentagenciesresemblethecabinetdepartmentsbuttypicallyhavea
narrowerareaofresponsibility

CIAandNASA

Theheadsoftheseagenciesareappointedbyandreporttothepresident
butarenotmembersofthecabinet

Someindependentagenciesexistapartfromcabinetdepartments
becausetheirplacementwithinthedepartmentwouldpostsymbolicor
practicalproblems

ThelargestandalsotheoldestindependentagencyistheUSPostal
Service,withroughly700,000employees
RegulatoryagenciesarecreatedwhenCongressrecognizestheneedfor
ongoingregulationofaparticulareconomicactivity

SecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC)andEnvironmentalProtection
Agency(EPA)

Regulatoryagencieshavealegislativefunctionandajudicialfunction

Theydeveloplawlikeregulationsandthenjudgewhetherindividualsor
organizationsarecomplyingwiththem
Governmentcorporationsaresimilartoprivatecorporationsinthatthey
chargeclientsfortheirservicesandaregovernedbyabroadofdirectors

However,governmentcorporationsreceivefederalfundingtohelpdefray
operatingexpenses,andtheirdirectionsareappointedbythepresident
withSenateapproval

GovernmentcorporationsincludeFederalDepositInsuranceCorporation
(FDIC)andNationalRailroadPassengerCorporation(Amtark)
Presidentialcommissionsprovideadvicetothepresident

Someofthemarepermanentbodies,suchastheCommissiononCivilRights
andtheCommissiononFineArts
Otherpresidentialcommissionsaretemporaryanddisbandaftermaking
recommendationsonspecificissues,suchasPresidentsCommissionon
StrengthenSocialSecurity
FederalEmployment
Mostcivilservantsarehiredthroughthegovernmentsmeritsystem,whereby
theyhavetoscorehighonacompetitiveexamorhavespecializedtraining
Themeritsystemisoverseenbytwoindependentagencies

TheOfficeofPersonnelManagementsupervisesthehiringandjob
classificationoffederalemployees

TheMeritServiceProtectionBoardhearsappealsfromcareercivil
servantswhohavebeenfiredorfaceotherdisciplinaryaction

Themeritsystemisanalternativetothepatronagesystemthatgoverned
federalemploymentduringmuchofthe19th

century

Patronagewasthepostelectionpracticeoffillingadministrativeoffices
withpeoplewhohadsupportedthewinningparty

Laterpresidentsextendedpatronagetoalllevelsofadministration
withoutmuchregardforitsimpactonthequalityofadministration,
whichledtocriticstolabelitaspoilssystemadevicefortheawarding
ofgovernmentjobstofriendsandpartyhacks
Theadministrativeobjectofthemeritsystemisneutralcompetence

Ameritbasedbureaucracyiscompetentinthesensethatemployees
arehiredandretainedonthebasisoftheirskills,anditsisneutralinthe
sensethatemployeesarenotpartisanappointeesandareexpectedtobe
ofservicetoeveryone,notjustthosewhosupporttheincumbent
president
Ithasitsownbiasesandinefficiencies
Careerbureaucratstendtoplacetheiragenciesinterestaheadofthoseofother
agenciesandtypicallyopposeeffortstotrimtheiragenciesprograms
ThelargemajorityoffederalemployeeshaveaGS(GradedService)job
ranking
Federalemployeessalariesincreasewithrankandlengthofservice

Althoughfederalemployeesareunderpaidincomparisonwiththeir
counterpartsintheprivatesector,theyreceivebetterfringe
benefitsincludingfullhealthinsurance,secureretirementplans,and
substantialvacationtimeandsickleavethendomostprivatesector
employees
Federalemployeescanformlaborunions,buttheirunionbylawhavelimited
scope;thegovernmenthasfullcontrolofjobassignments,compensation,and
promotion
TheBudgetaryProcess

Ofspecialimportancetoexecutiveagenciesisthebudgetaryprocesstheprocess
throughwhichannualfederalspendingandrevenuedecisionsaremade

TheConstitutionassignsCongressthepowertotaxandspend,butthepresident,as
chiefexecutive,alsohasamajorroleindeterminingthebudget

ThebudgetaryprocessinvolvesgiveandtakebetweenCongressandthepresident
aseachtriestoinfluencehowfederalfundingwillbedistributedamongvarious
agenciesandprograms

ThePresidentandAgencyBudgets
Thebudgetaryprocessbeingsintheexecutivebranchwhenthepresident,in
constitutionwiththeOfficeofManagementandBudget(OMB),establishes
generalbudgetguidelines
Eachagencyisassignedabudgetceilingthatitcannotexceedindevelopingits
budgetproposal
Theagenciesreceivetheirguidelinesinthespringandthenworkthroughthe
summertocreateadetailedagencybudget,takingintoaccounttheirexisting
programsandnewproposals
TheythenaresubmittedtoOMBinSeptemberforafullreviewthatinvariably
includesfurtherconsultationwitheachagencyandtheWhiteHouse
OMBthenfinalizestheagencybudgetsandcombinesthemintothepresidents
budgetproposal
Thepresidentdoesnothaveanyrealsayovermostofthebudget,about2/3of
whichinvolvesmandatoryspending
Thespendingisrequiredbylaw,whichincludesspendingondefense,foreign
aid,education,nationalparks,spaceexploration,andhighways
Thepresident,then,worksonthemarginsofthebudget
Inmostpolicyareas,thepresidentwillproposeamodestspendingincreaseor
decreaseoverthepreviousyear

CongressandtheAgencyBudgets
Congresshasconstitutionalauthorityovergovernmentspendingandits
prioritiesareneverexactlythesameasthepresidentsevenwhenthe
congressionalmajorityisofthesamepoliticalparty
UponreachingCongress,thepresidentsbudgetproposalgoestotheHouse
andSenatebudgetcommittees
OnceapprovedbythefullHouseandSenate,thelevelsareaconstraintonthe
restofCongresssworkonthebudget
Aswiththeexecutivebranch,thesecommitteesfocusondiscretionary
spendingprograms,whicharebasically,theonlybudgetitemssubjectto
change
TheHouseAppropriationsCommitteethroughits13th

subcommitteereviews
thebudget
TheSenateisasmallerbody,anditsreviewofagencyrequestsislessexacting
thanthatoftheHouse

TheSenateAppropriationsCommitteeservesasacourtoflastresortfor
agenciesthathavehadtheirfundingrequestscutbyOMBorbytheHouse
AppropriationsCommittee
MembersoftheHouseandSenaterelyonCongressionalBudgetOffice
IftheCongressionalBudgetOfficebelievesthatOMBoranagencyhas
miscalculatedtheamountofmoneyneededtocarryoutitsmandates
programs,itwillalertCongresstothediscrepancy
Theysubmittheirrecommendationstothefullchambersforavote
IfapprovedbyamajorityintheHouseandintheSenate,differencesinthe
SenateandHouseversionsarethenreconciledinconferencecommittee
ThereconciledversionofthebudgetisthenvoteduponintheHouseand
Senateand,ifapproved,issenttothepresidenttosignorveto
PolicyandPowerinTheBureaucracy

Administrativeagenciesmaintaskispolicyimplementationthatis,thecarrying
outofdecisionsmadebyCongress,thepresident,andthecourts

Someofwhatthebureaucracydoesisfairlystraightforward,asinthecaseof
deliveringthemail,processinggovernmentloanapplications,andimprisoning
thoseconvictedofcrime

Yetthebureaucracyoftenhasbroaddiscretionwhenimplementingpolicy

Administrativeagenciesmakepolicyintheprocessofdetermininghowto
implementcongressional,presidential,andjudicialdecisions

Suchrulemakingdetermininghowalawwillworkinpracticeisthechiefway
administrativeagenciesexercisecontroloverpolicy

Inthecourseoftheirwork,administratorsalsodeveloppoliciesideasthatthey
thenproposetotheWhiteHouseorCongress

Insum,administratorsinitiatepolicy,developit,evaluateit,applyit,anddecide
whetherothersarecomplyingwithit

Thebureaucracydoesnotsimplyadministerpolicy,italsomakespolicy

TheAgencyPointofView
Akeyissueaboutbureaucraticpolicymakingistheperspectivethat
bureaucratsbringtotheirdecisions
Dotheyoperatefromtheperspectiveofthepresidentordotheyoperatefrom
theperspectiveofCongress?
Althoughbureaucratsareresponsivetobothofthem,theyareevenmore
responsivetotheneedsoftheagencyinwhichtheywork,aperspectivealso
calledtheagencypointofview
Thisoutlookcomesnaturallytomosthighrankingcivilservants
Morethan90%oftopbureaucratsreachtheirhighlevelpositionsbyrising
throughtheranksofthesameagency
Professionalismalsocementsagencyloyalties

Highleveladministrativepositionshaveincreasinglybeenfilledby
scientist,engineers,lawyers,educators,physicians,andother
professionals
Althoughtheagencypointofviewdistortsgovernmentpriorities,bureaucrats
havelittlechoicebuttolookoutfortheiragencysinterests
ThepresidentandmembersofCongressdifferintheirconstituenciesandthus
intheagenciestowhichtheyaremostresponsive
RepublicanandDemocratsofficialsalsodifferintheirpriorities,arealitythat
isnevermoreapparentthanwhenpartycontrolofthepresidencyorCongress
changes
Insum,ifanagencyistooperatesuccessfullyinAmericaspartisansystemof

dividedpower,itmustseeksupportwhereveritcanfindit
SourcesofBureaucraticPower
Inprogrammingtheiragencysinterests,bureaucratsreplyontheir
specializationknowledge,thesupportofintereststhatbenefitfromtheir
programs,andthebackingofthepresidentandCongress
ThePowerofExpertise

Mostofthepolicyproblemsconfrontingthefederalgovernmentare
extraordinarilycomplex

Muchofthisexpertiseisprovidedbybureaucrats

Theyspendtheircareersworkinginaparticularpolicyarea,and
manyofthemhavehadscientific,technical,orotherspecialized
training

Electedofficials,ontheotherhand,aregeneralists,nonemoreso
thatthepresident,whomustdealwithdozensofinterests

MembersofCongressacquiresomeexpertisethroughtheir
committeework,butmostofthemlackthetime,training,or
inclinationtobecomedeeplyknowledgeableoftheissuesthey
handle

Allagenciesacquiresomeinfluenceoverpolicythroughtheircareerists
expertise
ThePowertoClienteleGroups

Mostfederalagencieswerecreatedforthepurposeofpromoting,
protecting,orregulatingaparticularinterest

Nearlyeverymajor
interestin
societycommerce,
labor,agriculture,
banking,andsoonhasa
correspondingfederal
agency

Inmostcases,there
interestsareclientele
groupsinthesensethat
theybenefitdirectlyfrom
theagencysprograms

Clientelegroupscanbe
countedonthelobby
Congressandthepresidentonbehalfoftheagencywhenitsprograms
andfundingarebeingreviewed

Evenarelativelyweakorlooselyorganizedclientelegroupcanbeofhelp
toanagencyifitsprogramsandtherefore,thegroupsbenefitsare
threatenedwithcutsorelimination

Therelationshipbetweenanagencyanditsclientelegroupisareciprocal
one

Justasaclientelegroupcanbeexpectedtoprotectitsagency,theagency
willworktoprotectthegroup
ThePowerofFriendsinHighPlaces

AlthoughthegoalsofthepresidentorCongresscanconflictwiththoseof
thebureaucracy,theyneeditasmuchasitneedsthem

Anagencysresourcesitsprograms,expertise,andgroupsupportcan
helpelectedofficialsachievetheirpolicygoals

AgenciesalsohavealliesinCongress

Agencieswithprogramsthatbenefitimportantkeyvotingblocsare
particularlylikelytohavecongressionalsupport
DemocracyandBureaucraticAccountability

StudieshavefoundthattheUSfederalbureaucracycomparesfavorablyto
governmentbureaucracieselsewhere

Nevertheless,thefederalbureaucracyspolicyinfluenceisatoddswithdemocratic
principles

Thebureaucraticformofgoverningistheantithesisofthedemocraticform

Bureaucracyentailshierarchy,command,permanenceofoffice,appointmentto
office,andfixedrules,whereasselfgovernmentinvolvesequality,consent,rotation
ofoffice,electiontooffice,andopendecisionmaking

ThepresidentandmembersofCongressareaccountabletothepeoplethrough
elections

Bureaucratsarenotelectedandyetexerciseasignificantdegreeofindependent
power

Theirinfluenceraisesthequestionofbureaucraticaccountabilitythedegreeto
whichbureaucratsareheldaccountableforthepowertheyexercise

Toasmalldegree,theyareaccountabledirectlytothepublic

Forthemostpart,however,bureaucraticaccountabilityoccurslargelythroughthe
president,Congress,andthecourts

AccountabilitythroughthePresidency
Periodically,presidentshavelaunchedbroadinitiativesaimedatmakingthe
bureaucracymoreresponsive
Presidentscanalsointervenemoredirectlythroughexecutiveorderstoforce
agenciestopursueparticularadministrativeactions
Nevertheless,presidentsdonothavethetimeorknowledgetoexercise
personaloversightofthefederalbureaucracy
Itisfartoobiganddiverse
Reorganization

Thebureaucracyssizeitshundredofseparateagenciesmakesit
difficultforpresidentstocoordinateitsactivities

Agenciespursueindependentandevenconflictingpaths

Presidentshavesoughttostreamlinethebureaucracyinanattemptto
makeitmoreaccountable

Suchreorganizationeffortsusuallyimprovethebureaucracys
performance,butnotdramaticallyso

Presidentshavehadmoresuccessincontrollingthebureaucracyby
movingactivitiesoutoftheagenciesandintotheExecutiveOfficeof
Presidency(EOP)

EOPisdirectlyunderWhiteHousecontrolandfunctionstoadegreeas
thepresidentspersonalbureaucracy

TheEOPnowmakessomepolicydecisionsthatatanearliertimewould
havebeenmadeintheagencies
PresidentialAppointments

Fordaytodayoversightofthebureaucracy,presidentsrelyontheir
politicalappointees

Thepresidenthasabout3000partisanappointees

Someappointeesfillparttimepositionsandsomemustsatisfyspecified
areas,

Evenso,presidentsappointalargenumberofhandpickedexecutive

officials

Thetoppositionsineveryagencyareheldbypresidentialappointees

Theirinfluenceisgreatestinagenciesthathavesubstantialdiscretionary
authority

Someagenciesoperatewithinguidelinesthatlimitwhatagencyheadscan
do

AspartypolarizationhasincreasedinWashington,thepresidential
appointmentprocesshasbecomemorecontentious

Presidentshaveincreasinglysoughttoappointindividualswhocan
betrustedtoadvancetheWhiteHousesagendawhilesenatorsof
theopposingpartyhaveincreasinglysoughttoblockthosethatthey
thinkareoverlypartisan

Althoughpresidentsusuallyprevailintheseshowdowns,thereare
limitstowhattheycanaccomplishthroughtheirappointees

Presidentialappointeesnumberinthe100s,andmanyofthemlack
detailedknowledgeoftheagenciestheyhead,makingthem
dependentonagencycareerists

Bythetimetheycometounderstandtheagencysprograms,manyof
themleave
OMB:Budgets,Regulations,andLegislativeProposals

Ofthemanagementtoolsavailabletothepresident,fewaremoredirect
thantheOfficeofManagementandBudget

Fundingandpolicyarethemainstaysofeveryagency

OMBsroleinoverseeingthepreparationofagencybudgets,itactsasa
reviewboardforagencyregulationsandpolicyproposals

NoagencycanissueamajorregulationwithoutOMBsverificationthat
thebenefitsoftheregulationoutweighitscosts,andnoagencycan
proposelegislationtoCongresswithoutOMBsapproval

OMBoperatesfromapresidentialperspective

Aproposedregulationorbillthatconflictswiththepresidentspoliciesis
unlikelytobeapproved
AccountabilitythroughCongress
Acommonmisperceptionisthatthepresidenthassoleauthorityover
executiveagencies
Congressalsoclaimsownershipbecauseitisthesourceofeachagencys
programsandfunding
Themostsubstantial
controlthatCongress
exertsoverthe
bureaucracyisthroughits
powerofthepurse.
Congresshas
constitutionalauthority
overspending;itdecides
howmuchmoneywillbe
appropriatedforagency
programs
Congresscanalsoexert
controlbytaking
authorityawayfromthe
bureaucracy

Congressalsohascontrolthroughitsoversightfunction,whichinvolves
monitoringthebureaucracysworktoensureitscompliancewithlegislative
intent
Ifanyagencystepsoutofline,Congresscancallhearingstoasktough
questionsand,ifnecessary,takelegislativeactiontocorrecttheproblem
BureaucratsarerequiredbylawtoappearbeforeCongresswhenaskedtodo
so,andthemerepossibilityofbeinggrilledbyacongressionalpanelcanlead
administratorstostayinline
Theeffectisnotaltogetherpositive
Bureaucratsaresometimesreluctanttotryinnovativeapproachesoutofafear
thatparticularmembersofCongresswilldisapprove
CongresshasdelegatedmuchofitsoversightresponsibilitytotheGovernment
AccountabilityOffice(GAO)
AccountabilitythroughtheCourts
Thebureaucracyisalsooverseenbythejudiciary
Legally,thebureaucracyderivesitsauthorityfromactsofCongress,andan
injuredpartycanbringsuitagainstanagencyonthegroundsthatithasfailed
tocarryoutalawproperly
Ifthecourtagrees,theagencymustchangeitspolicy
Nevertheless,thecourtstendtosupporttheadministratorsiftheiractionsare
atleastsomewhatconsistentwiththelawtheyareadministering
TheySupremeCourthasheldthatagenciescanapplyanyreasonable
interpretationsofstatutesinsomeinstanceshavediscretionindeciding
whethertoenforcestatutes
Theserulingsreflectthejudiciarysrecognitionthatadministratorsmusthave
flexibilityifheyaretooperateeffectively
Theybureaucracyanditsjudiciarywouldbothgrindtothecrunchinghaltif
administratorswereconstantlyincourtdefendingtheiragencysdecision
AccountabilitywithintheBureaucracyitself
SeniorExecutiveService

Recognizingthatthebureaucracysemploymentsystemencouragesan
agencypointofview,Congressin1978establishedtheSeniorExecutive
Service(SES)

Representsacompromisebetweenapresidentledbureaucracyand
anexpertone

Consistofroughly7000toplevelcareercivilservantswhoquality
throughacompetitiveprocesstoreceiveahighersalarythantheir
peersbut,inreturn,canbeassignedbythepresidenttoanyposition
withinthebureaucracy

Intendedtobetheintermediariesbetweentheregularpresidential
appointeesatthetopoffederalagenciesandtheregularcivil
servantswhoworkintheseagencies
AdministrativeLawJudges

Occasionally,anindividualwillbelievetatheorshewasunfairly
disadvantagedbyabureaucratsdecisionandwillcontestit

Suchdisputesareusuallyhandledbyanadministrativelawjudge
Whistleblowing

Onewaytostoptheseprohibitedpracticesiswhistleblowingtheactof
reportinginstancesofofficialmismanagement
DemographicRepresentativeness

Moreequallyrepresentativeoftheentirepopulation