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Problem Area in Legal Ethics

Case Digests (Feb. 2, 2016)

Jimenez vs Francisco (2014)


Facts:
Mario Crespo (aka Mark Jimenez) filed a complaint for estafa against Caroline
Castaneda Jimenez (complainant in the disbarment case) and several others with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City. Jimenez claimed to be the true and beneficial
owner of the shares of stock in Clarion realty and Development Corporation (Clarion)
which was incorporated for the purpose of purchasing a residential house located in
Forbes Park. The Forbes house was purchased for P117,000,000 but it was undervalued
to make it appear that it was sold for only P78,000,000. Later on, Jimenez was informed
by his lawyer, Atty. Edgar Francisco, that Caroline fraudulently sold the Forbes property
to Philmetro Southwest Enterprise for P118 million. This sale was again undervalued at
P78 million. Thereafter, Jimenez, with the assistance of Atty. Francisco, sued them for
estafa.
Caroline was shocked and felt betrayed especially by Atty. Francisco as he was the one
who assisted her with the transactions. Atty. Francisco also happened to be the legal
counsel of Clarion. Hence, she filed a complaint against him with the IBP-CBD, seeking
his disbarment, on the basis of the affidavit executed by Atty. Francisco in the estafa
case.
On his part, Atty. Francisco argued that he did not violate the rule on disclosures of
privileged communication nor the proscription against representing conflicting interests,
on the ground that he was the personal counsel of Jimenez and not of Caroline.
The IBP-CBD found that Atty. Francisco violated the rules on privileged communication
and conflict of interest, and that he participated in unlawful transactions. It was
recommended that he be suspended for one year from the practice of law. The IBP-BOG
affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rules on privileged communication and
conflict of interest.
Held: No. Those rules presuppose a lawyer-client relationship. Also, the rule on lawyerclient privilege requires the following factors: (1) Attorney-client relationship; (2) The
client made the communication in confidence; and (3) The legal advice must be sought
from the attorney in his professional capacity.
In this case, Caroline failed to establish the professional relationship between her and
Atty. Francisco.
Nevertheless, Atty. Francisco was suspended from the practice for six months for
having participated in the unlawful transactions concerning the purchase of the Forbes
property in violation of Canons 1 and 10 and Rule 1.0 of the CPR.

Problem Area in Legal Ethics


Case Digests (Feb. 2, 2016)

Foster vs Agtang (2014)


Facts:
MANILA Erlinda Foster had a legal problem concerning a deed of absolute sale, which
Atty. Jaime Agtang notarized, she entered into with Tierra Realty. Foster then agreed to
engage Atty. Agtangs legal service for the filing of the appropriate case in court. Atty.
Agtang received P20,000 as acceptance fee and P5,000 for incidental expenses. In the
course of the attorney-client relationship, Atty. Agtang committed the following acts: (1)
He asked a loan from Foster in the amount of P100,000 for the repair of his car; (2)
Asking for an unnecessarily high filing fee of P150,000. He justified the amount, citing
the high value of the land involved and the sheriffs travel expenses and
accommodations in Manila. (3) He again asked for P70,000 or P50,000 for a supposed
emergency but received only P22,000; (4) He asked P50,000 to bribe a judge in
connection with the reformation case; (5) Failing to notify Foster that the case was
already dismissed; and (6) He did not disclose to Foster that he was acquainted with
Tierra Realty.
With respect to the loan, Atty. Agtang claimed that it was Fosters husband who
insisted on the loan to reward his patience of visiting their home. He denied the other
accusations.
The IBP recommended Atty. Agtangs suspension for one year, which was shortened to
three months.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Agtang violated the CPR.
Held: Yes. He violated the following provisions of the CPR:

Rule 1.0 For overpricing the amount of the filing fee. He asked for P150,000 when
it should have only been P22,410.

Rule 16.04 For borrowing considerable amounts of money from Foster.

Rule 15.03 For representing conflicting interest. He failed to disclose to Foster


that he represented Tiera Realty in the past.

For these, Atty. Agtang was disbarred.

Problem Area in Legal Ethics


Case Digests (Feb. 2, 2016)

Navarro vs Solidum (2014)


Facts:
Atty. Ivan Solidum was retained as Hilda Presbiteros counsel for the purpose of
following up the release of the payment for the latters 2.7-hectare property in Bacolod
which was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). DAR was supposed to pay P700,000 for the property but it was mortgaged
by Hilda to PNB for P1,200,000. Hilda claimed that PNBs claim had already prescribed,
so she engaged the services of Atty. Solidum to represent her in this matter. He proposed
the filing of a case for quieting of title against PNB. He received P50,000 from Hilda for
the expenses of the case, but nothing came out of it.
Hildas daughter, Ma. Theresa Yulo, also engaged Atty. Solidums services to handle
the registration of her 18.85 hectare lot in Negros. Theresa convinced her sister,
Natividad Navarro, to finance the expenses. Atty. Solidum thus received P200,000 from
Natividad. Natividad later on that the property was already in the name of Teodoro Yulo
and said that she would not have spent so much if Atty. Solidum only apprised her of the
real situation of the property.
To finance his sugar trading business, Atty. Solidum obtained two loans from Natividad,
both in the amount of P1 million. He promised a 10% monthly interest.

Problem Area in Legal Ethics


Case Digests (Feb. 2, 2016)

He also obtained a loan from Hilda in the amount of P1 million covered by a real estate
mortgage over a 263-square-meter property in Bacolod. Atty. Solidum sent Hilda
postdated checks drawn against an account in Metrobank. Hilda was dissatisfied with the
mortgaged land, so Solidum promised a bigger land, but did not deliver on such promise.
Solidum was able to pay Nati and Hilda a total of P900,000. Later on, Nati and Hilda
could no longer encash the checks Solidum was giving, because the accounts were
already closed. When the two tried to foreclose the mortgages, Solidum countered that
the 10% monthly interests were illegal.
Nati and Hilda filed a complaint against Solidum with the IBP-CBD which found Solidum
guilty of violation of several provisions of the CPR and recommended his disbarment.
But the IBP-BOG reduced the penalty to a two-year suspension.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Solidum violated the provisions of the CPR.
Held: Yes. He violated the following provisions:

Rule 1.01 With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent
agreed to pay a high interest rate on the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the
MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA
he drafted on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also
established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero
for P1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only P150,000, showing that he
deceived his client as to the real value of the mortgaged property. Respondents
allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that
he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property. Respondent failed
to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged
to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only
claimed that complainants knew that he could no longer open a current bank
account, and that they even suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for
him. However, we are inclined to agree with the IBP-CBDs finding that he made
complainants believe that the account belonged to him. In fact, respondent signed
in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to Navarro.
Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of
checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants believed that the
checks belonged to accounts in respondents name.

Rule 16.01 Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulos 18.85-hectare lot,
claimed that respondent received P265,000 from her. Respondent countered that
P105,000 was paid for real estate taxes but he could not present any receipt to
prove his claim. Respondent also claimed that he paid P70,000 to the surveyor but
the receipt was only forP15,000. Respondent claimed that he paid P50,000 for
filing fee, publication fee, and other expenses but again, he could not substantiate
his claims with any receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent had been

Problem Area in Legal Ethics


Case Digests (Feb. 2, 2016)

less than diligent in accounting for the funds he received from Navarro for the
registration of Yulos property.

Rule 16.04 While respondents loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA,
postdated checks and real estate mortgage, it turned out that respondent
misrepresented the value of the property he mortgaged and that the checks he
issued were not drawn from his account but from that of his son. Respondent
eventually questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on the
ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the
checks issued by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts
were already closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case,
was not fully protected. Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyers
ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.6 In his
dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his knowledge of
the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.

Atty. Solidum was disbarred.

Tabang vs Gacott (2004)


Facts:

Problem Area in Legal Ethics


Case Digests (Feb. 2, 2016)

Lilia Tabang sought legal advice from a judge named Estaquio Gacott (father of
respondent herein) regarding her desire to buy a 30-hectare agricultural land in Palawan.
The judge told her that she is prohibited from acquiring vast tracks of land, because she
already owns other parcels of land, so he advised her to put the title of the lands in the
names of fictitious persons and to keep the titles with her for easy disposition. Lilia
eventually succeeded in acquiring the lands. But, later on she had to sell the same. She
then asked the assistance of Atty. Glenn Gacott (respondent). On the pretext that he is
going to help them sell the subject property to prospective buyers, respondent borrowed
the seven land titles from complainants. However, despite the lapse of one year from the
time he borrowed the titles, respondent still failed to negotiate the sale of the property.
He informed herein complainants that he lost all the seven land titles and advised them
to file a petition for the reissuance of title. However, in the course of the proceedings,
the public prosecutor noticed that the signatures of the alleged owners in the seven
individual Special Power of Attorney executed in favor of Lilia Tabang appear to have
been signed by the same person because of the similarities in their strokes. The public
prosecutor informed the trial court of this fact prompting the latter to summon the
alleged principals. To avoid embarrassment and possible sanctions from the court
because the alleged principals are in fact fictitious, Lilia withdrew the case without
prejudice to the re-filing of the same. Subsequently, Lilia filed a new set of cases for reissuance of title, changing the signatures of the fictitious owners. Upon knowledge that a
new set of cases was filed, respondent executed or caused to be executed several
documents, among which were Revocation of Special Power of Attorney and Affidavits of
Recovery purportedly signed by the principals of Lilia Tabang. Respondent caused the
annotation of these documents in the land titles covering the subject properties.
Thereafter, respondent caused the publication of a notice representing himself as the
owner of the subject parcels of land and indicating therein his desire to sell the said
properties. Eventually, respondent was able to sell the seven parcels of land to seven
individuals. However, only three of these buyers were legitimate, while the remaining
four are dummies of respondent. As a result of selling the three parcels of land,
respondent was able to receive P3,773,675.00. None of the proceeds of the sale was
remitted to complainants.
The complainants thus filed a complaint against respondent with the IBP, claiming that
in executing the various Revocation of Special Power of Attorney and Affidavit of
Recovery, affixing thereon the signatures of the fictitious registered owners of the
disputed parcels of land, and in arrogating the ownership over the said lands upon
himself, respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty and deceit.
Respondent denied that complainant Lilia Tabang is the real owner and that she
merely acted as a broker who was trying to promote the sale of the properties; that when
she came to know that the properties were sold by their registered owners, she called up
the law office of respondent and demanded that she be given her share or balato in the
sale of the properties equivalent to 20% of the gross sales because of her alleged efforts
exerted in promoting the sale of the subject parcels of land; that when respondent
turned her down, Lilia threatened to put him in bad light and seek his disbarment.

Problem Area in Legal Ethics


Case Digests (Feb. 2, 2016)

Respondent further denies complainants allegation that he sold real properties of some
of his clients to third persons claiming that in all these cases his role was merely to
notarize the documents of sale executed voluntarily by his clients and the buyers of their
properties.
The Investigating Commissioner conducted a mandatory conference and thereafter
required the parties to submit position papers. And then she recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months. The IBP-BOG modified
the penalty to disbarment.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Gacott should be disbarred.
Held: No. The case should be remanded for further proceedings, because the procedure
observed was not proper. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. In
complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may
not be dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons. Sec. 8 of Rule 139-B
provides: Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the
Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He
shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be
given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard
by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to
appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte. The Investigator shall terminate the
investigation within three (3) months from the date of its commencement, unless
extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application. Willful failure
or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall
be dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed
by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require the alleged
contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors
may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set
forth in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as
practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter,
the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution
setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted to
the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty.
In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner initiated the formal investigation
by conducting a mandatory conference between the complainants and the respondent
after both parties have filed their complaint and answer, respectively. The mandatory
conference was supposedly held for the purpose of defining the issues and enabling the
parties to stipulate facts. However, no definitive result was reached during the
conference as respondent continued to deny all the allegations of the complainants. After
the mandatory conference was held, no further hearings were conducted. Instead, the
Investigating Commissioner merely required the parties to submit their respective
position papers, including all the necessary documents and duly verified affidavits of
witnesses, if any. On the sole basis of the pleadings filed by both parties and of the

Problem Area in Legal Ethics


Case Digests (Feb. 2, 2016)

documents attached thereto, the Investigating Commissioner submitted her Report and
Recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.

De Jesus vs Sanchez-Malit
Facts:
Mercedita De Jesus filed a disbarment case against lawyer and notary public Atty. Juvy
Mell Sanchez-Malit (respondent) for allegedly committing the following acts: (1) Drafting
and notarizing a real estate mortgage over a public market stall which falsely named
Mercedita as its absolute and registered owner for which Mercedita was sued for perjury;
(2) Notarizing a lease agreement without the signature of the lessees; (3) Notarizing a
sale agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) without advising Mercedita that the property was still covered by the period
within which it could not be alienated; and (4) Notarizing SPAs without the signature of
the principals.
With regard to the mortgage, respondent claimed that the deed was prepared in
haste, hence she failed to delete the phrase absolute and registered owner. With
regard to the lease, respondent countered that respondent countered that the document
attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was actually new. She gave the courts copy of the
agreement to complainant to accommodate the latters request for an extra copy. Thus,
respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainants assurance that
the lessees would sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the
court. Complainant, however, reneged on her promise. As regards the purchase
agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that complainant was
an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions of
that transaction. Actually, when the purchase agreement was notarized, complainant did

Problem Area in Legal Ethics


Case Digests (Feb. 2, 2016)

not present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing about it. Rather, the
agreement expressly stated that the property was the subject of a case pending before
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); complainant was thus
notified of the status of the subject property. Finally, respondent maintained that the
SPAs submitted by complainant as additional evidence wereproperly notarized. It can be
easily gleaned from the documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before
respondent; hence,the notarization was limited to the formers participation in the
execution ofthe document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly stated that the
document must be notarized in the principals place of residence.
An exchange of pleadings ensuedafter respondent submitted her Comment. After her
rejoinder, complainant filed an Urgent Ex-ParteMotion for Submission of Additional
Evidence. Attached thereto were copies of documents notarized by respondent, including
the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs naming
Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the
principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete signatures of the
parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a lease contract that lacked the
signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form
(Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter toa potential investor
in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10) an unsigned Consent to Adoption.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that she be disqualified as notary
public for two years and suspension from the practice of law for six months. This was
affirmed by the IBP-BOG.
In her motion for reconsideration, respondent argued that the additional evidence
should have been expunged for being inadmissible, because the procedural requisites
under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice was not observed.
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be penalized.
Held: Yes. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the
inadmissibility of documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly
considered in evidence the other notarized documents submitted by complainant as
additional evidence.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one
invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document into
a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence
in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.

Problem Area in Legal Ethics


Case Digests (Feb. 2, 2016)

Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the
notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly
as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of
the notarization process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial
documents diminished. In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not the
owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of
the real estate mortgage contractdoes not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it
only heightens the latters liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondents
conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Supreme Court did not believe respondents explanation for her lapses.

Problem Area in Legal Ethics


Case Digests (Feb. 2, 2016)

Ecraela vs Pangalangan (2015)


FACTS
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the
University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer
group or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar examinations
and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the
IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has
three (3) children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a
series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women between the
years 1990 to 2007.
These alleged illicit relations involved:
a. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992,
which complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;
b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite
being already married to Jardiolin;
c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved with
DDD;
d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to
Jardiolin and while still being romantically .involved with CCC; '
e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004 until
the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC.
Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse, deceived CCC
and DDD by representing himself to be a bachelor, thereby convincing the two women to
start a love affair with him, when in. truth, he was then still married to Jardiolin.
Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during the period of
1998 to 2000, respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC), represented the interest of Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
in cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development Corporation
(KOC). However, despite being a public officer and a government counsel, respondent

Problem Area in Legal Ethics


Case Digests (Feb. 2, 2016)

conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and assisted KDC in its case,
thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and, m effect, that of the Philippine Government.
Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe then Solicitor
Rolando Martin of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for the latter's
cooperation in the dismissal of the cancellation proceedings in favor of KDC. In return for
his "earnest efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was allegedly rewarded with
a Toyota Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo. The vehicle was seen
several times by respondent's classmates and officemates being driven and parked by
respondent in his own home and in the OGCC premises itself.
Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an educator in
Manuel L. Quezon University, San Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde, and
Maryknoll College, where respondent induced his male students to engage in "nocturnal
preoccupations" and entertained the romantic gestures of his female students in
exchange for passing grades.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent committed gross immoral conduct, which would warrant
his disbarment?
RULING
After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board of
Governors' resolution finding that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was fully
supported by the evidences offered.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life. behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess
the legal qualifications for the profession. Good moral character is not only required for
admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain one's good standing
in this exclusive and honored fraternity.
We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
proceedings against a member of the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently held that
clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative
penalties on a member of the Bar.

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The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by


which respondent has been found committing gross immorality in the conduct of his
personal affairs.
In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous
and illicit relations with both married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to
2007, including complainant's own wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of
email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented,
complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with DOD and CCC by
preponderant evidence.
Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that the same were
not sufficiently established. In his answer, respondent simply argued that complainant's
petition contains self-serving averments not supported by evidence. Respondent did not
specifically deny complainant's allegations and, instead, questioned the admissibility of
the/ suppoting documents. Due to respondent's own failure to attend the hearings and
even submit his own position paper, the existence of respondent's illicit relations with
DDD and CCC remain uncontroverted.
The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated Article XV,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws,
which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically
Article XV, Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner Villadolid' s
findings that respondent violated Canon 1 0 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.
In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a Senate
Inquiry and had a pending case for graft and corruption against him with the
Sandiganbayan.

Problem Area in Legal Ethics


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Perez vs Catindig (2015)


Facts:
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since
the mid-1960s when they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but
they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and
Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez
(Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in
Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of
Lourdes in Quezon City. Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez
because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out
of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his
scholarship in the Harvard Law School.
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign
country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once
the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and
Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that
Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that
there was no longer any impediment to their marriage.
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the
United States of America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named
Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since
the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and
Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it,
the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also
promised to legally adopt their son.
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union
by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would
still have to get the consent of Gomez to the said petition.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter 9 in the mail
informing her of Atty. Catindigs scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime
later, she came upon a love letter written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo
dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo,
promising to marry her once his impediment is removed. Apparently, five months into
their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until
such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001,
Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.

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On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an
upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently
seen.
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He
claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she
was incapable of complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy
problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children, their relationship
simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They
then consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the
agreement to separate and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that
the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of property. She likewise
advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever
value it may have and comfort it may provide them.
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of
Attorney addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican
Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty.
Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the
Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a
Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the
divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the
Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and
Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty.
Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his
previous marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez
because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely
desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship.
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left
their home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his
relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty.
Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that while he was attracted to
her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that
Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed
that Atty. Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however
rejected Atty. Catindigs romantic overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate
his feelings since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said that despite
being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she
resigned from his law firm.
ISSUE

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Whether or not the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their
disbarment?
RULING
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the
circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of
the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit, the Court held:
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the
general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character
is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also
remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such
character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all.
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or
deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Immoral conduct
involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference
to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency. The Court makes
these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires
grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a
grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty.
Catindigs own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral;
it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice a wedding in the Central Methodist
Church in 1968, which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig
started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his

Problem Area in Legal Ethics


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first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was
then already falling apart due to Gomez serious intimacy problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez,
dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in
the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty.
Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and earth
just so he could marry her right away a marriage that has at least a semblance of
legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from
the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and
Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married
to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared
a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still
married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindigs sense of
social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on
marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in
the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid,
the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added
security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage
outside Philippine jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindigs claim is true, it matters not that Dr.
Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to
various legal strategies in order to render a faade of validity to his otherwise invalid
marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is
reprehensible to the highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions
he resorted to in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her
and their son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity
of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with the much
younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty.
Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of
the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood,
the Courts finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindigs desertion of
Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his
previous marriage to Gomez.
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as
such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage. In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is
warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship
with another woman who has borne him a child.

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Atty. Catindigs subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one
definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty.
Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal
skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of
him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where
a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the
offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most
appropriate penalty.
Atty. Catindigs claim that Dr. Perezs allegations against him are not credible since they
are uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted
in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage
with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for the
Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of
evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is,
the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an
anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and
the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against
lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in
suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.
The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that
the latter indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the
respondents; it does not prove the veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly, the
supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter
professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship
with Atty. Catindig.

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