PEOPLE OF THE PHILS VS.

BOCBOSILA
FACTS:
On 29 November 1999, appellant was charged in an
Information with Murder allegedly committed murder
(with AC of treachery and evident premeditation) upon
the person of one MICHAEL ANGELO BALBER Y
CASTILLON, a minor, 17 years of age, by then and
there stabbing him on the trunk with the use of a
bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon him serious
and grave wound which was the direct and immediate
cause of his untimely death

2.

According to the testimonies, when the deceased

Castillon was walking through a grocery store,
appellant and his 2 companions suddenly approached
and surrounded Michael. Appellant positioned himself
at the back of Michael while his two companions
stood in front of Michael. Suddenly, they grabbed the
shoulders of Michael and overpowered the latter. One
of appellants companions drew out a knife and
repeatedly stabbed Michael at the stomach.
Afterwards, the appellants other companion, took the
knife from the companion with long hair, and also
stabbed Michael at the stomach. Later, appellant went
in front of Michael, took the knife from the companion
and likewise stabbed Michael at the stomach.
Appellant also kicked Michael when the latter was
already lying on the ground.

HELD:

When arraigned appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to the

charge therein. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued
On 12 November 2001, the RTC rendered its
Decision convicting appellant of murder. It sustained
the "clear, direct and positive" testimony of the
prosecution witnesses who all declared that they saw
appellant stab Michael. It found no ill-motive on the
part of the prosecution witnesses in testifying against
appellant. It also ruled that there was treachery in the
killing of Michael since the latter was unarmed,
unsuspecting and very young at the time of the
attack.
It held that accused Bocbosila is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Bocbosila filed Notice of Appeal to CA- affirmed the
RTC decision. Hence this petition.

3.

OF MURDER DESPITE THE PALPABLE

DISCREPANCIES AND INCONSISTENCIES
IN
THE
TESTIMONIES
OF
THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
WON RTC ERRED IN NOT GIVING
EXCULPATORY
WEIGHT
TO
THE
EVIDENCE
PRESENTED
BY
THE
DEFENSE.
Crim pro: WON the constitutional rights to
produce evidence on his behalf and to due
process were violated when the trial court
denied the motion of his counsel to present
substitute witnesses.

Petition bereft of merit

1.

A witness testifying about the same nervewracking incident can hardly be expected to
be correct in every detail and consistent with
other witnesses in every respect, considering
the inevitability of differences in perception,
recollection, viewpoint, or impressions, as
well as in their physical, mental, emotional,
and psychological states at the time of the
reception
and
recall
of
such
impressions.22 Thus, we have followed the
rule in accord with human nature and
experience that honest inconsistencies on
minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen,
rather than destroy the credibility of a
witness, especially of witnesses to crimes
shocking to conscience and numbing to
senses.23

The inconsistencies cited by appellant refer to minor

and unimportant details which do not adversely affect
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Although
the testimony of Ronald and Edgardo as to the
number of knives used in the stabbing incident differs
with that of Inspector Malaza, all of them declared
under oath during the trial that appellant stabbed
Michael.
Thus, as stated by the Court of Appeals, such
inconsistency should not be considered as a "fatal
error," since what is important and decisive is that
they had seen appellant stab Michael and that they
testified on the fact during the trial.

ISSUES:
1.

WON RTC ERRED IN FINDING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE [DOUBT] OF THE CRIME

Besides, their testimonies on material and relevant

points are substantially consistent with each other.
They testified that three persons, among whom was

the appellant, had stabbed Michael. Their descriptions

of the faces, physical attributes, and respective
positions of appellant and his two companions during
the attack are compatible. They also stated that
appellant was the last person who stabbed Michael.
2.

Apropos the second issue, appellant denied

any liability and invoked alibi. He argued that
he was inside his store when the stabbing
incident occurred, and, that it was Lemuel
who stabbed Michael. He also presented
Antonio to corroborate his testimony.

For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to

prove that he was somewhere else when the crime
was committed. He must likewise prove that it is
physically impossible for him to be present at the
crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.26 If appellant was, as he claimed, inside
his store at the time of the incident, then it was not
physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene
or in its immediate vicinity. His store is located just
beside Mactan Street,27 and that he witnessed the
incident at a distance of merely five arms length from
his store.28 Therefore, his defense of alibi must fail.
3.

given due course, it will amount to an unreasonable

disregard of solemn agreements submitted to and
approved by the court of justice and would make a
mockery of the judicial process.

The RTC was correct in denying the defense

counsels motion for substitution of witnesses
since Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates that
the matters agreed upon in the pre-trial
conference and as stated in the pre-trial
order shall bind the parties, to wit:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. After the pre-trial

conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the
actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence
marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the
trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course
of the action during the trial, unless modified by the
court to prevent manifest injustice (Italics supplied).
The pre-trial order of the RTC dated 29 February
2000 clearly shows that the defense named only four
witnesses. The parties were also informed therein that
witnesses who were not mentioned in the pre-trial
order will not be entertained during the trial on the
merits. Thus, pursuant to the afore-stated provision
and its purpose of preventing undue delay in the
disposition of criminal cases and ensuring fair trial,
the denial of the defense counsels motion for
substitution of witnesses is justified. Moreover, if
appellants motion for substitution of witnesses is

TRIAL (LACKING CASES)

NILO MACAYAN, JR. Y MALANA, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS
Macayan was charged with robbery upon the person
of Annie Uy Hao.
Annie Uy Jao (Jao) is the owner of Lanero Garments
Ext (Lanero). In 1995, she hired Macayan as a
sample cutter and to undertake materials purchasing
for her garments business. In 2000, when her
business was fdoing poorly, she allowed her
employees to engage on other engagements to
extend their income; provided that the Lanero would
still be their main priority. Upon learning that Macayan
and his wife is working on a rival company, she
confronted the latter and despite demands, Macayan
took for granted his work at Lanero. Later on,
Macayan voluntarily stopped reporting to work. He
latter on filed an illegal dismissal case against Jao.
During the pendency of the illegal dismissal case,
Macayan allegedly threatened Jao that her family
would be harmed and/or kidnapped if she did not give
him P200,000.00. The following day, Macayan
allegedly called Jao to reiterate his threat and to
specify the time and place February 16, 2001,
sometime between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. at McDonald's
Banawe Branch in which the P200,000.00 should
be handed to him. Jao claimed that she was sure it
was Macayan speaking to her, as the person on the
phone addressed her as "Madam," which was how he
customarily called her.
Jao sought the help of NBI for entrapment operation.
The latter asked her to prepare P4,000 to be marked
and used at the operation. Upon handling of the
marked money by Macayan, the NBI immediately
proceeded the arrest.

According to Macayans testimony, he was boxed on

the right side of Macayan's face and told him,
"Tatanga-tanga ka. Pupunta ka rito ng walang
kasama, ikaw ngayon ang me [sic] kaso."He was also
physically abused by an NBI operative.
The Information charging him with robbery dated
February 20, 2001 was then prepared, and the
criminal case was filed and raffled to Branch 101 of
the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City
RTC convicted him of robbery.
Macayan then appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the
People of the Philippines at the appellate stage, did
not file an appellee's brief. Instead, it filed a
Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Appellee's
Brief25recommending that Macayan be acquitted. It
asserted that his guilt was not established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Court of Appeals Tenth Division AFFIRMED
Macayan's conviction and increasing the duration of
the penalty imposed. It reasoned that Jao's sole,
uncorroborated testimony was nevertheless positive
and credible. As regards Jao's having been
threatened after the postponement of the February
12, 2001 conference in the illegal dismissal case, the
Court of Appeals reasoned that constancias are "not
the best evidence of attendance"28 and that, in any
case, Jao was threatened after and not during the
conference
Macayan filed for Motion
DENIED. Hence this petition.

of

Reconsideration-

ISSUE: WON the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of

Macayan was established
HELD: Macayan is acquitted. Decision of CA is
reversed.
Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence specifies the requisite quantum of
evidence in criminal cases: (RECITE WITH
ANALOGY TO PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCERIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED)

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a

criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such
a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is

required, or that degree of proof which produces

conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of
establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the
strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the
weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in
the due process clause35 of the Constitution, but
similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. "Undoubtedly, it
is the constitutional presumption of innocence that
lays such burden upon the prosecution." Should the
prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a
matter of course, that an accused must be acquitted.
As explained in Basilio v. People of the Philippines:
The determination of the guilt of an accused hinges
on how a court appreciates evidentiary matters in
relation to the requisites of an offense. Determination
of guilt is, thus, a fundamentally factual issue.
This court, however, is not a trier of facts. Consistent
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, "[a]s a rule, only
questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45."40 More specifically, "in a criminal case, factual
findings of the trial court are generally accorded great
weight and respect on appeal, especially when such
findings are supported by substantial evidence on
record."41
Nevertheless, there are exceptions allowing this
court to overturn the factual findings with which it
is confronted. Speaking specifically of criminal
cases, this court stated in People of the Philippines v.
Esteban that "in exceptional circumstances, such as
when the trial court overlooked material and relevant
matters . . . this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate
the factual findings of the [lower courts]." 43 Below are
the recognized exceptions to the general rule binding
this court to the factual findings of lower courts:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

(7)
(8)

When the conclusion is a finding grounded

entirely on speculation, surmises, and
conjectures;
When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
When the findings of fact are conflicting;
When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee;
When the findings are contrary to those of the
trial court;
When the findings of fact are conclusions

(9)
(10)

without citation of specific evidence on which

they are based;
When the facts set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; and
When the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.44 (Emphasis supplied)

The position taken by the Office of the Solicitor

General has resulted in the peculiar situation where it
is not the prosecution but, effectively, the trial court
and the Court of Appeals arguing for Macayan's guilt
beyond
reasonable
doubt.
With the backdrop of these assertions, we deem it
proper to reevaluate the factual findings and the
conclusions reached by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals.

REVIEW OF ELEMENTS OF ROBBERY

Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code provides for
who
are
guilty
of
robbery:

ARTICLE 293. Who are Guilty of Robbery. Any

person who, with intent to gain, shall take any
personal property belonging to another, by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or
using force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery.
ELEMENTS
1) there is a taking of personal property [i.e., unlawful
taking]; 2) the personal property belongs to another;
3) the taking is with animus lucrandi [i.e., intent to
gain]; and 4) the taking is with violence against or
intimidation of persons or with force upon things.46
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General,
the "bone of contention" centers on the elements of
unlawful taking and of violence against or intimidation
of persons. This is precisely Macayan's contention:
that he neither intimidated nor threatened Jao, and
that he could not have unlawfully taken money from
her on account of any act of intimidation and/or
threats made by him.

As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor

General, the resolution of this case hinges on whether
Jao was indeed threatened and/or intimidated by
Macayan into giving him money, that is, whether he
extorted money from Jao. Per Jao's own testimony,
there were two (2) instances in which she was
threatened and/or intimidated: first, immediately
after the postponement of the February 12, 2001
conference in the illegal dismissal case; and second,
when Macayan called her on February 13, 2001 and
set a rendezvous for handing over the extorted
money.
Contrary to the conclusions of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, we find Jao's testimony
regarding these occasions (and ultimately, the
presence of the requisite of violence against or
intimidation of a person) dubious and unreliable.
Jurisprudence has established the standard for
appreciating the credibility of a witness' claim:

[F]or evidence to be believed, however, it must not

only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but
must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve
under the circumstances. The test to determine the
value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is
in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the
experience of mankind. Whatever is repugnant to
these standards becomes incredible and lies outside
of judicial cognizance.61
Jao's inconsistent conduct, coupled with flimsy
justifications for acting as she did, betrays the
absurdity and unreliability of her claims and ultimately,
of her as a witness.
CRIM PRO DOCTRINE:

IV. RATIONALE FOR ACQUITTAL

In sum, the prosecution failed to establish the

elements of unlawful taking and of violence against or
intimidation of a person. Reasonable doubt persists.
As is settled in jurisprudence, where the basis of
conviction is flawed, this court must acquit an
accused:

Consistent with the rule on burden of proof, the

requisite quantum of evidence in criminal cases, and
in light of the points highlighted by both Macayan and
the Office of the Solicitor General, we find that the
prosecution failed to establish Macayan's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, a reversal of the rulings of
the trial court and Court of Appeals is in order.
Macayan
must
be
acquitted.

In criminal cases, the prosecution has the onus

probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused. Ei
incumbit probatio non qui negat. He who asserts
not he who denies must prove. The burden must
be discharged by the prosecution on the strength of
its own evidence, not on the weakness of that for the
defense. Hence, circumstantial evidence that has not
been
adequately
established,
much
less

corroborated, cannot be the basis of conviction.

Suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum
of evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Indeed, "the sea of suspicion has no shore, and the
court that embarks upon it is without rudder or
compass."
It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system,
the overriding consideration is not whether the court
doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it
entertains a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Where
there is no moral certainty as to their guilt, they must
be acquitted even though their innocence may be
questionable. The constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.66 (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted)
With the prosecution having failed to discharge its
burden of establishing Macayan's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, this court is constrained, as is its
bounden duty when reasonable doubt persists, to
acquit him.
Ricardo Atienza and Alfredo Castro vs People of
the Philippines
Gr No. 188694
February 12, 2014

Facts:
Petition for review on certiorari assailing the
decision of the CA, affirming the decision of RTC
Manila which found Petitioners Atienza and Castro
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Robbery and Falsification of Public Document.
Petitioners are CA employees: budget officer
and utility worker, respectively. On March 20, 1995,
Juanito Atibula (Atibula), a custodian of the CA
Original Decisions, was invited by Castro to Atienzas
birthday party where he was introduced to a certain
Dario who asked for his help in locating a CA decision
in a particular case. (FERNANDO CASE)
They found said case in Vol 260 of the CA
Original Decisions. Dario perused said
document
and also scanned Vol. 265. In the following days,
Dario approached Atibula and requested the latter to
insert a decision dated Sep 26 1968 in one of the
Volumes but Atibula refused. Atienza thereafter
offered him P50,000 in exchange for Vol 260 but he
also refused.
Atibula subsequently discovered that Vol.
266 was missing which he reported to his superiors
immediately. Several days later, a certain Nelson de
Castro, also a CA employee, handed Atibula a giftwrapped package which turned out to be the missing

Vol. 266. De Castro claimed that it was Castro who

asked him to do so.
The contents of the returned Vol. 266 were
reviewed by Atibula and it was found that there were
new documents inserted therein: CA decisions and
resolutions supposedly for the FERNANDO CASE.
Upon Atibulas comparison, it was found that the
duplicate original decisions did not bear such
promulgations. Upon the NBI investigation that
ensued, it was found that Vol. 266 has indeed been
altered and the signatures of the CA Justices therein
have been forged.
Ultimately, a complaint was filed by the NBI
to the Office of the Ombudsman implicating Atienza,
Castro and Dario of the Crimes of Falsification of
Public Document and Robbery under the RPC.
Thereafter, corresponding informations were filed
before the RTC and the petitioners pleaded not guilty
while Dario remained at large.
Atienza denied having anything to do with
the crimes and he averred that he was away from the
office during the months in question due to workrelated duties as budget and liason officer. Castro on
the other hand, did not make any efforts to refute the
charges against him.
RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
there is conspiracy. The previous events that
conspired between the petitioners and Atibula prove
their guilt. CA: affirmed RTCs decision. Although
there was no direct evidence, Atibulas and the NBIs
testimonies along with other circumstances are
sufficient for a conviction. CA: Atienzas defense is
self-serving and cannot outweigh the circumstantial
evidence.
Issue:
Are the circumstantial evidence sufficient to
warrant a conviction
Held:
NO.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of
collateral facts and circumstances from which the
main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason
and common experience. It is sufficient for conviction
if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that
the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute
an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the

exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. Stated

differently, the test to determine whether or not the
circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to
convict the accused is that the series of
circumstances duly proven must be consistent with
each other and that each and every circumstance
must be consistent with the accuseds guilt and
inconsistent with his innocence.
Firstly, the Court found no evidence to link
Castro to the crimes charged. Affidavits, although
acknowledged before a notary public, are considered
hearsay evidence of the affiant was not presented in
court to testify thereon and to give the adverse party a
chance to cross-examine him. Nelson de Castro, who
averred in his sworn statement that it was Castro who
asked him to deliver the gift-wrapped package to
Atibula was not presented in court during trial.
Secodly, Atienzas
guilt
is
likewise
questionable. Atibulas testimony states that the
former attempted to bribe him to take out Vol. 260 but
then the controversy arose from a different document:

Vol 266. This discrepancy on the very subject matter

of the crimes dilutes the strength of the evidence
required for a conviction. According to the court, the
attempted bribery constituted proof of motive which is
not sufficitent to support a conviction, no matter how
strong.
Criminal conviction rests on the strength of
the evidence of the prosecution and not on the
weakness or even absence of defense. If the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction. Accordingly, there being no
circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a
conviction, the Court hereby acquits petitioners,
without prejudice, however, to any subsequent finding
on their administrative liability in connection with the
incidents in this case.