Professional Documents
Culture Documents
the purchase price; however, the spouses declined to push through with the
sale. They claimed that when he requested for a discount and they refused, he
rescinded
the
agreement.
Thus,
Babasanta
filed
case
for
Specific
Performance.
On the other hand, San Lorenzo Development Corporation (SLDC) alleged
that on 3 May 1989, the two parcels of land involved, namely Lot 1764-A and
1764-B, had been sold to it in a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage. It alleged
that it was a buyer in good faith and for value and therefore it had a better
right over the property in litigation.
ISSUE:
Who between SLDC and Babasanta has a better right over the two
parcels of land?
RULING:
An analysis of the facts obtaining in this case, as well as the evidence
presented by the parties, irresistibly leads to the conclusion that the agreement
between Babasanta and the Spouses Lu is a contract to sell and not a contract
of sale.
The receipt signed by Pacita Lu merely states that she accepted the sum
of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) from Babasanta as partial payment of 3.6
hectares of farm lot. While there is no stipulation that the seller reserves the
ownership of the property until full payment of the price which is a
distinguishing feature of a contract to sell, the subsequent acts of the parties
convince us that the Spouses Lu never intended to transfer ownership to
Babasanta except upon full payment of the purchase price.
Babasantas letter dated 22 May 1989 was quite telling. He stated therein
that despite his repeated requests for the execution of the final deed of sale in
his favor so that he could effect full payment of the price, Pacita Lu allegedly
refused to do so. In effect, Babasanta himself recognized that ownership of the
property would not be transferred to him until such time as he shall have
effected full payment of the price. Doubtlessly, the receipt signed by Pacita Lu
should legally be considered as a perfected contract to sell.
FACTS:
The Alfredo spouses mortgaged their land to DBP. To pay their debt, they
sold the land to spouses Borras for P15,000. The latter also assumed to pay the
loan. Borras subsequently paid the balance of the purchase price of the land
for which Alfredo issued a receipt dated 11 March 1970 as well as the
corresponding owners duplicate copy of the lands OCT.
Borras thereafter took possession of the said land. Later, they found out that
Alfredo sold the land again to other buyers by securing duplicate copies of the
OCTs upon petition with the court. Thus, they filed for specific performance.
Alfredo spouses claimed that the sale, not being in writing, is unenforceable
under the Statute of Frauds.
ISSUE: W/N the contract of sale is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
HELD: NO.
The Statute of Frauds provides that a contract for the sale of real
property shall be unenforceable unless the contract or some note or
memorandum of the sale is in writing and subscribed by the party charged or
his agent. The existence of the receipt dated 11 March 1970, which is a
memorandum of the sale, removes the transaction from the provisions of the
Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory
contracts and not to contracts either partially or totally performed. Thus,
where one party has performed ones obligation, oral evidence will be admitted
to prove the agreement. In the instant case, the parties have consummated the
sale of the Subject Land, with both sellers and buyers performing their
respective obligations under the contract of sale. In addition, a contract that
violates the Statute of Frauds is ratified by the acceptance of benefits
under the contract. Alfredo spouses benefited from the contract because they
paid their DBP loan and secured the cancellation of their mortgage using the
money given by Borras. Alfredo also accepted payment of the balance of the
purchase price.
Alfredo spouses cannot invoke the Statute of Frauds to deny the
existence of the verbal contract of sale because they have performed their
obligations, and have accepted benefits, under the verbal contract. Borras
spouses have also performed their obligations under the verbal contract.
Clearly, both the sellers and the buyers have consummated the verbal contract
of sale of the Subject Land. The Statute of Frauds was enacted to prevent
fraud. This law cannot be used to advance the very evil the law seeks to
prevent.
spouses Sally and Yoshio Yoshizaki. On the same date, a Deed of Absolute
Sale and a Deed of Sale of Motor Vehicle were executed in favor of the spouses
Yoshizaki. The spouses Johnson were members of Joy Trainings board of
trustees at the time of sale.
On December 8, 1998, Joy Training, represented by its Acting
Chairperson Reuben V. Rubio filed an action for the Cancellation of Sales
and Damages with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the spouses Yoshizaki
and the spouses Johnson before the Regional Trial Court of Baler, Aurora
(RTC).
On January 4, 1999, Joy Training filed a Motion to Amend Complaint with the
attached Amended Complaint. The amended complaint impleaded Cecilia A.
Abordo, officer-in-charge of the Register of Deeds of Baler, Aurora, as
additional defendant. The RTC granted the motion on the same date.
In the complaint, Joy Training alleged that the spouses Johnson sold its
properties without the requisite authority from the board of directors. It
assailed the validity of a board resolution dated September 1, 199811 which
purportedly granted the spouses Johnson the authority to sell its real
properties. It averred that only a minority of the board, composed of the
spouses Johnson and Alexander Abadayan, authorized the sale through the
resolution. It highlighted that the Articles of Incorporation provides that the
board of trustees consists of seven members, namely: the spouses Johnson,
Reuben, Carmencita Isip, Dominador Isip, Miraflor Bolante, and Abelardo
Aquino.12
Cecilia and the spouses Johnson were declared in default for their failure to file
an Answer within the reglementary period.13 On the other hand, the spouses
Yoshizaki filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims on June 23, 1999.
They claimed that Joy Training authorized the spouses Johnson to sell the
parcel of land. They asserted that a majority of the board of trustees
approved the resolution. They maintained that the actual members of the
On December 15, 1987, petitioner returned the bracelet to Vicky Suarez, but
failed to return the diamond ring or to turn over the proceeds thereof if
sold. As a result, private complainant, aside from making verbal demands,
wrote a demand letter to petitioner asking for the return of said ring or the
proceeds of the sale thereof. In response, petitioner, thru counsel, wrote a letter
to private respondents counsel alleging that Rosa Lim had returned both ring
and bracelet to Vicky Suarez sometime in September, 1987, for which reason,
petitioner had no longer any liability to Mrs. Suarez insofar as the pieces of
jewelry were concerned. Irked, Vicky Suarez filed a complaint for estafa under
Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code for which the petitioner herein
stands convicted.
ISSUE:
What was the real transaction between Rosa Lim and Vicky Suarez - a contract
of agency to sell on commission basis as set out in the receipt or a sale on
credit?
RULING:
Rosa Lims signature indeed appears on the upper portion of the receipt
immediately below the description of the items taken. We find that this fact
does not have the effect of altering the terms of the transaction from a
contract of agency to sell on commission basis to a contract of sale.
Neither does it indicate absence or vitiation of consent thereto on the part of
Rosa Lim which would make the contract void or voidable. The moment she
affixed her signature thereon, petitioner became bound by all the terms
stipulated in the receipt. She, thus, opened herself to all the legal obligations
that may arise from their breach. This is clear from Article 1356 of the New
Civil Code which provides:
Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may
have been entered into, provided all the essential
requisites for their validity are present. x x x.
However, there are some provisions of the law which require certain formalities
for particular contracts. The first is when the form is required for the validity
of the contract; the second is when it is required to make the contract
effective as against third parties such as those mentioned in Articles 1357
and 1358; and the third is when the form is required for the purpose of
proving the existence of the contract, such as those provided in the Statute
of Frauds in Article 1403. A contract of agency to sell on commission basis
does not belong to any of these three categories, hence it is valid and
enforceable in whatever form it may be entered into.
Furthermore, there is only one type of legal instrument where the law strictly
prescribes the location of the signature of the parties thereto. This is in the
case of notarial wills found in Article 805 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at
the end thereof by the testator himself x x x.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every
page thereof, except the last, on the left margin x x x.
the United States. Per the tickets, Spouses Viloria were scheduled to leave for
Newark on August 13, 1997 and return to San Diego on August 21, 1997.
Subsequently, Fernando requested Mager to reschedule their flight to Newark to
an earlier date or August 6, 1997. Mager informed him that flights to Newark
via Continental Airlines were already fully booked and offered the alternative of
a round trip flight via Frontier Air. Since flying with Frontier Air called for a
higher fare of US$526.00 per passenger and would mean traveling by night,
Fernando opted to request for a refund. Mager, however, denied his request as
the subject tickets are non-refundable and the only option that Continental
Airlines can offer is the re-issuance of new tickets within one (1) year from
the date the subject tickets were issued. Fernando decided to reserve two
(2) seats with Frontier Air.
As he was having second thoughts on traveling via Frontier Air, Fernando went
to the Greyhound Station where he saw an Amtrak station nearby. Fernando
made inquiries and was told that there are seats available and he can
travel on Amtrak anytime and any day he pleased. Fernando then
purchased two (2) tickets for Washington, D.C.
From Amtrak, Fernando went to Holiday Travel and confronted Mager with the
Amtrak tickets, telling her that she had misled them into buying the
Continental Airlines tickets by misrepresenting that Amtrak was already
fully booked. Fernando reiterated his demand for a refund but Mager was
firm in her position that the subject tickets are non-refundable.
Upon returning to the Philippines, Fernando sent a letter to CAI on February
11, 1998, demanding a refund and alleging that Mager had deluded them
into purchasing the subject tickets. On June 17, 1999, Fernando went to
Continentals ticketing office at Ayala Avenue, Makati City to have the subject
tickets replaced by a single round trip ticket to Los Angeles, California under
his name. Therein, Fernando was informed that Lourdes ticket was nontransferable, thus, cannot be used for the purchase of a ticket in his favor.
In a letter dated June 21, 1999, Fernando demanded for the refund of the
subject tickets as he no longer wished to have them replaced. In addition to the
dubious circumstances under which the subject tickets were issued, Fernando
claimed that CAIs act of charging him with US$1,867.40 for a round trip ticket
to Los Angeles, which other airlines priced at US$856.00, and refusal to allow
him to use Lourdes ticket, breached its undertaking under its March 24, 1998
letter.
On September 8, 2000, Spouses Viloria filed a complaint against CAI, praying
that CAI be ordered to refund the money they used in the purchase of the
subject tickets with legal interest from July 21, 1997 and to pay P1, 000,000.00
as moral damages, P500, 000.00 as exemplary damages and P250,000.00 as
attorneys fees.
Following a full-blown trial, the RTC rendered its April 3, 2006 Decision,
holding that Spouses Viloria are entitled to a refund in view of Magers
misrepresentation in obtaining their consent in the purchase of the subject
tickets. Furthermore, the RTC ruled that CAI acted in bad faith in reneging on
its undertaking to replace the subject tickets within two (2) years from their
date of issue when it charged Fernando with the amount of US$1,867.40 for a
round trip ticket to Los Angeles and when it refused to allow Fernando to use
Lourdes ticket.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTCs April 3, 2006 Decision, holding that CAI
cannot be held liable for Magers act in the absence of any proof that a
principal-agent relationship existed between CAI and Holiday Travel. According
to the CA, Spouses Viloria, who have the burden of proof to establish the fact of
agency, failed to present evidence demonstrating that Holiday Travel is CAIs
agent. Furthermore, contrary to Spouses Vilorias claim, the contractual
relationship between Holiday Travel and CAI is not an agency but that of a sale.
private
respondent
requested
for
reconsideration
or
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ateneo de Manila University has Contracts for the Sale of its
Services of its Institute of Philippine Culture and thus is taxable within the
purview of then Section 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
RULING:
After reviewing the records of this case, we find no evidence that Ateneos
Institute of Philippine Culture ever sold its services for a fee to anyone or
was ever engaged in a business apart from and independently of the
academic purposes of the university.
Stressing that it is not the Ateneo de Manila University per se which is being
taxed, Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue contends that the tax is
due on its activity of conducting researches for a fee. The tax is due on the
gross receipts made in favor of IPC pursuant to the contracts the latter entered
to conduct researches for the benefit primarily of its clients. The tax is imposed
on the exercise of a taxable activity. x x x [T]he sale of services of private
respondent is made under a contract and the various contracts entered into
between private respondent and its clients are almost of the same terms,
showing, among others, the compensation and terms of payment.
In theory, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may be correct. However, the
records do not show that Ateneos IPC in fact contracted to sell its research
services for a fee. Clearly then, as found by the Court of Appeals and the Court
of Tax Appeals, petitioners theory is inapplicable to the established factual
milieu obtaining in the instant case.
In the first place, the petitioner has presented no evidence to prove its bare
contention that, indeed, contracts for sale of services were ever entered into by
the private respondent.
Moreover, the Court of Tax Appeals accurately and correctly declared that the
funds received by the Ateneo de Manila University are technically not a fee.
They may however fall as gifts or donations which are tax-exempt as
shown by private respondents compliance with the requirement of Section
123 of the National Internal Revenue Code providing for the exemption of such
gifts to an educational institution.
It is also well to stress that the questioned transactions of Ateneos Institute of
Philippine Culture cannot be deemed either as a contract of sale or a contract
for a piece of work. By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties
obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate
thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its
equivalent. By its very nature, a contract of sale requires a transfer of
ownership.
In the case at bench, it is clear from the evidence on record that there was no
sale either of objects or services because, as adverted to earlier, there was no
transfer of ownership over the research data obtained or the results of
research projects undertaken by the Institute of Philippine Culture.
Furthermore, it is clear that the research activity of the Institute of Philippine
Culture is done in pursuance of maintaining Ateneos university status and not
in the course of an independent business of selling such research with profit in
mind. This is clear from a reading of the regulations governing universities:
31. In addition to the legal requisites an institution must meet,
among others, the following requirements before an application
for university status shall be considered:
xxxxxxxxx
(e) The institution must undertake research and operate with a
competent qualified staff at least three graduate departments in
accordance with the rules and standards for graduate education.
One of the departments shall be science and technology. The
competence of the staff shall be judged by their effective
teaching, scholarly publications and research activities published
in its school journal as well as their leadership activities in the
profession.
(f) The institution must show evidence of adequate and stable
financial resources and support, a reasonable portion of which
should be devoted to institutional development and research.
(underscoring supplied)
xxxxxxxxx
32. University status may be withdrawn, after due notice and
hearing, for failure to maintain satisfactorily the standards and
requirements therefor.
FACTS:
On September 18, 1988, herein petitioner Del Monte Philippines Inc. (DMPI)
entered into an Agreement with MEGA-WAFF, represented by Managing
Principal Edilberto Garcia (Garcia), whereby the latter undertook the supply
and installation of modular pavement at DMPIs condiments warehouse at
Cagayan de Oro City within 60 calendar days from signing of the agreement.
To source its supply of concrete blocks to be installed on the pavement of the
DMPI warehouse, MEGA-WAFF, as CONTRACTOR represented by Garcia,
entered into a Supply Agreement with Dynablock Enterprises, represented by
herein respondent Aragones, as SUPPLIER
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supply Agreement entered into was in the nature of a
contract for a piece of work.
RULING:
The petition fails.
The authorities petitioner cited in fact show that the nature of the Supply
Agreement between Aragones and MEGA-WAFF was one for a piece of work.
Contrary to petitioners claim that save for the shape, there was no
consideration of any special needs or requirements of DMPI taken into account
in the design or manufacture of the concrete paving blocks, the Supply
Agreement is replete with specifications, terms or conditions showing
that it was one for a piece of work.
At this juncture it is well to note that the Supply Agreement was in the
nature of a contract for a piece of work. The distinction between a contract of
sale and one for work, labor and materials is tested by inquiry whether the
thing transferred is one not in existence and which never would have existed
but for the order of the party desiring to acquire it, or a thing which would have
existed but has been the subject of sale to some other persons even if the order
had not been given. If the article ordered by the purchaser is exactly such as
the seller makes and keeps on hand for sale to anyone, and no change or
modification of it is made at purchasers request, it is a contract of sale even
though it may be entirely made after, and in consequence of the purchasers
order for it.
provision is to protect the laborers and the materialmen from being taken
advantage of by unscrupulous contractors and from possible connivance
between owners and contractors. Thus, a constructive vinculum or contractual
privity is created by this provision, by way of exception to the principle
underlying Article 1311 between the owner, on the one hand, and those who
furnish labor and/or materials, on the other. [Velasco vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-47544, January 28, 1980]
As a matter of fact, insofar as the laborers are concerned, by a special law, Act
no. 3959, otherwise known as An Act making it obligatory for any person,
company, firm or corporation owning any work of any kind executed by
contract to require the contractor to furnish a bond guaranteeing the payment
of the laborers. they are given added protection by requiring contractors to file
bonds guaranteeing payment to them.
In this connection, while, indeed, Article 1729 refers to the laborers and
materialmen themselves, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it is
but fair and just that plaintiff-appellee be deemed as suing for the
reimbursement of what they have already paid the laborers and materialmen,
as otherwise he would be unduly prejudiced while either defendant-appellant
DMPI or defendant Garcia would enrich themselves at plaintiff-appellees
expense.
paid
the
agreed
price.
Subsequently,
petitioners
returned
to
respondent 29,772 pieces of frogs and moose heads for failing to comply
with the approved sample. The return was made on different dates: the initial
one on December 12, 1988 consisting of 1,720 pieces, the second on January
11, 1989, and the last on January 17, 1989.
Petitioners then demanded from the respondent a refund of the purchase
price of the returned goods in the amount of P208, 404.00. As respondent
Sio refused to pay, petitioners filed on July 24, 1989 an action for collection of
a sum of money in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38 where it
ruled in favor of the petitioners.
Respondent Sio sought recourse in the Court of Appeals. In its April 30, 1993
decision, the appellate court affirmed the trial court decision. Respondent then
filed
Motion
for
Reconsideration
and
Supplemental
Motion
for
contract is one for a piece of work, not a sale. On the other hand, if the thing
subject of the contract would have existed and been the subject of a sale to
some other person even if the order had not been given then the contract is one
of sale. The contract between the petitioners and respondent stipulated that
respondent would manufacture upon order of the petitioners 20,000 pieces
of vinyl frogs and 20,000 pieces of vinyl moose heads according to the
samples specified and approved by the petitioners.
Respondent Sio did not ordinarily manufacture these products, but only upon
order of the petitioners and at the price agreed upon. Clearly, the contract
executed by and between the petitioners and the respondent was a
contract for a piece of work. At any rate, whether the agreement between the
parties was one of a contract of sale or a piece of work, the provisions on
warranty of title against hidden defects in a contract of sale apply to the case at
bar, viz:
"Art. 1714. If the contractor agrees to produce the work from
material furnished by him, he shall deliver the thing produced to
the employer and transfer dominion over the thing. This
contract shall be governed by the following articles as well as by
the pertinent provisions on warranty of title and against hidden
defects and the payment of price in a contract of sale."
"Art. 1561. The vendor shall be responsible for warranty
against the hidden defects which the thing sold may
have, should they render it unfit for the use for which it is
intended, or should they diminish its fitness for such use to such
an extent that, had the vendee been aware thereof, he would
not have acquired it or would have given a lower price for it; but
said vendor shall not be answerable for patent defects or those
which may be visible, or for those which are not visible if the
vendee is an expert who, by reason of his trade or profession,
should have known them."
"Art. 1571. Actions arising from the provisions of the preceding
ten articles shall be barred after six months from the
delivery of the thing sold." (Emphasis supplied)
There is no dispute that respondent made the last delivery of the vinyl products
to petitioners on September 28, 1988. It is also settled that the action to
recover the purchase price of the goods petitioners returned to the respondent
was filed on July 24, 1989, more than nine months from the date of last
delivery. Petitioners having filed the action three months after the six-month
period for filing actions for breach of warranty against hidden defects stated in
Art. 1571, the appellate court dismissed the action.
ALI AKANG vs. MUNICIPALITY OF ISULAN, SULTAN KUDARAT PROVINCE
G.R. No. 186014 June 26, 2013
FACTS:
Ali Akang (petitioner) is a member of the national and cultural community
belonging to the Maguindanaon tribe of Isulan, Province of Sultan Kudarat
and the registered owner of Lot 5-B-2-B-14-F (LRC) Psd 1100183 located at
Kalawag III, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-3653,5 with an area of 20,030 square meters.
Sometime in 1962, a two-hectare portion of the property was sold by the
petitioner
to
the
Municipality
of
Isulan,
Province
of
Sultan
Kudarat
(respondent) through then Isulan Mayor Datu Ampatuan under a Deed of Sale
executed on July 18, 1962.
The respondent immediately took possession of the property and began
construction of the municipal building. Thirty-nine (39) years later or on
October 26, 2001, the petitioner, together with his wife, Patao Talipasan, filed a
civil action for Recovery of Possession of Subject Property and/or Quieting of
Title thereon and Damages against the respondent, represented by its
Municipal Mayor, et al. In his complaint, the petitioner alleged, among others,
that the agreement was one to sell, which was not consummated as the
purchase price was not paid.
Nicomedes then
declared the subject property in his name in 1965 under Tax Declaration No.
2050.
On 23 June 1965, Nicomedes executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over the
subject property in favor of Emma Ver Reyes (Emma), which stated that the
Vendor [Nicomedes] is the true and lawful owner of a parcel of land situated at
Tungtong, Las Pinas, Rizal. Emma was only able to pay the first installment
of the total purchase price agreed upon by the parties. Furthermore, as
will be discussed later on, Nicomedes did not succeed in his attempt to have
any title to the subject property issued in his name.
On 14 June 1968, Nicomedes entered into another contract involving the
subject property with Rosario D. Bondoc (Rosario).Designated as an Agreement
of Purchase and Sale.
On 7 March 1969, Nicomedes and Rosario executed a Joint Affidavit,[14]
whereby they confirmed the sale of the subject property by Nicomedes to
Rosario through the Agreement of Purchase and Sale dated 14 June 1968.
They likewise agreed to have the said Agreement registered with the Registry of
ISSUE:
Which party acquired valid and registrable title to the same.
RULING:
After a conscientious review of the arguments and evidence presented by the
parties, the Court finds that the Deed of Conditional Sale between Nicomedes
and Emma and the Agreement of Purchase and Sale between Nicomedes and
Rosario were both mere contracts to sell and did not transfer ownership or title
to either of the buyers in light of their failure to fully pay for the purchase price
of the subject property.
A Contract to Sell may not be considered as a Contract of Sale because the first
essential element is lacking.
explicitly reserves the transfer of title to the prospective buyer, meaning, the
prospective seller does not as yet agree or consent to transfer ownership of the
property subject of the contract to sell until the happening of an event, which
for present purposes we shall take as the full payment of the purchase price.
What the seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to fulfill his promise to sell the
subject property when the entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to
him.
Two years later, on March 31, 1969, Mayfair entered into a second Contract of
Lease with Carmelo for the lease of another portion of the latters property -namely, a part of the second floor of the two-storey building, with a floor area of
about 1,064 square meters; and two store spaces on the ground floor and the
mezzanine, with a combined floor area of about 300 square meters. In that
space, Mayfair put up another movie house known as Miramar Theater. The
Contract of Lease was likewise for a period of 20 years.
Both leases contained a provision granting Mayfair a right of first refusal
to purchase the subject properties. However, on July 30, 1978 - within the
20-year-lease term -- the subject properties were sold by Carmelo to
Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. (Equatorial) for the total sum of
P11,300,000, without their first being offered to Mayfair.
As a result of the sale of the subject properties to Equatorial, Mayfair filed a
Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 7) for (a) the
annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial, (b)
specific performance, and (c) damages.
From the peculiar facts of this case, it is clear that petitioner never took
actual control and possession of the property sold, in view of respondents
timely objection to the sale and the continued actual possession of the
property. The objection took the form of a court action impugning the sale
which, as we know, was rescinded by a judgment rendered by this Court. It
has been held that the execution of a contract of sale as a form of
constructive delivery is a legal fiction. It holds true only when there is no
impediment that may prevent the passing of the property from the hands of the
vendor into those of the vendee. When there is such impediment, fiction yields
to reality - the delivery has not been effected.
Hence, respondents opposition to the transfer of the property by way of sale to
Equatorial was a legally sufficient impediment that effectively prevented the
passing of the property into the latters hands.
ESTELITA VILLAMAR vs. BALBINO MANGAOIL
G.R. No. 188661 April 11, 2012
FACTS:
Villamar is the registered owner of a 3.6080 hectares parcel of land [hereinafter
referred as the subject property] in San Francisco, Manuel, Isabela covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-92958-A. On March 30, 1998, she
entered into an Agreement with Mangaoil for the purchase and sale of said
parcel of land.
On April 1, 1998, the parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale whereby
Villamar (then Estelita Bernabe) transferred the subject parcel of land to
Mangaoil for and in consideration of [P]150,000.00.
In a letter dated September 18, 1998, Mangaoil informed Villamar that
he was backing out from the sale agreed upon giving as one of the reasons
therefor:
3. That the area is not yet fully cleared by encumbrances as there are
tenants who are not willing to vacate the land without giving them back the
amount that they mortgaged the land.
Mangaoil demanded refund of his P 185,000.00 down payment. Reiterating said
demand in another letter dated April 29, 1999, the same, however, was
unheeded.
On January 28, 2002, the respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for
rescission of contract against the petitioner. In the said complaint, the
respondent sought the return of P185, 000.00 which he paid to the petitioner,
payment of interests thereon to be computed from March 27, 1998 until the
suit's termination, and the award of damages, costs and P20,000.00 attorney's
fees
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of the petitioner to deliver to the respondent both the
physical possession of the subject property and the certificate of title covering
the same amount to a substantial breach of the former's obligations to the
latter constituting a valid cause to rescind the agreement and deed of sale
entered into by the parties.
RULING:
We rule in the affirmative.
The RTC and the CA both found that the petitioner failed to comply with
her obligations to deliver to the respondent both the possession of the subject
property and the certificate of title covering the same.
Article 1458 of the NCC obliges the seller to transfer the ownership of and to
deliver a determinate thing to the buyer, who shall in turn pay therefor a price
certain in money or its equivalent. In addition thereto, Article 1495 of the NCC
binds the seller to warrant the thing which is the object of the sale. On the
other hand, Article 1498 of the same code provides that when the sale is made
RECEIVED from MR. TOMAS K. CHUA PBCom Check No. 206011 in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (P100,000.00) as
EARNEST MONEY for the sale of the property located at 40 Tampingco cor.
Hidalgo, San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila (Area : 718 sq. meters).
The balance of TEN MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND (P10,700,000.00)
is payable on or before 15 July 1989. Capital Gains Tax for the account of the
seller. Failure to pay balance on or before 15 July 1989 forfeits the earnest
money. This provided that all papers are in proper order.[6]
CONFORME: ENCARNACION VALDES Seller
TOMAS K. CHUA Buyer
ISSUE:
Whether there is a perfected contract of sale of immovable property
RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.
There is no dispute that Valdes-Choy is the absolute owner of the Property
which is registered in her name under TCT No.162955, free from all liens and
encumbrances. She was ready, able and willing to deliver to Chua the owners
duplicate copy of the TCT, the signed Deeds of Sale, the tax declarations, and
the latest realty tax receipt. There is also no dispute that on 13 July 1989,
Valdes-Choy received PBCom Check No. 206011 for P100,000.00 as earnest
money from Chua. Likewise, there is no controversy that the Receipt for the
P100,000.00 earnest money embodied the terms of the binding contract
between Valdes-Choy and Chua.
Further, there is no controversy that as embodied in the Receipt, Valdes-Choy
and Chua agreed on the following terms: (1) the balance of P10,215,000.00 is
payable on or before 15 July 1989; (2) the capital gains tax is for the account of
Valdes-Choy; and (3) if Chua fails to pay the balance of P10,215,000.00 on or
before 15 July 1989, Valdes-Choy has the right to forfeit the earnest money,
provided that all papers are in proper order. On 13 July 1989, Chua gave
Valdes-Choy the PBCom managers check for P485,000.00 to pay the capital
gains tax.
Both the trial and appellate courts found that the balance of P10,215,000.00
was not actually paid to Valdes-Choy on the agreed date. On 13 July 1989,
Chua did show to Valdes-Choy the PBCom managers check for
P10,215,000.00, with Valdes-Choy as payee. However, Chua refused to give this
check to Valdes-Choy until a new TCT covering the Property is registered in
Chuas name. Or, as the trial court put it, until there is proof of payment of the
capital gains tax which is a pre-requisite to the issuance of a new certificate of
title.
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC vs. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC
G.R. No. 162267 July 4, 2008
FACTS:
On October 19, 1990 at about 10:30 p.m., a Mitsubishi Lancer car with Plate
Number PHD-206 owned by United Coconut Planters Bank was traversing the
Laurel Highway, Barangay Balintawak, Lipa City. The car was insured with
plaintiff-appellee [UCPB General Insurance Inc.], then driven by Flaviano
Isaac with Conrado Geronimo, the Asst. Manager of said bank, was hit and
bumped by an 18-wheeler Fuso Tanker Truck with Plate No. PJE-737 and
Trailer Plate No. NVM-133, owned by defendants-appellants PCI Leasing &
Finance, Inc. allegedly leased to and operated by defendant-appellant Superior
Gas & Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO) and driven by its employee, defendant
appellant Renato Gonzaga.
The impact caused heavy damage to the Mitsubishi Lancer car
resulting in an explosion of the rear part of the car. The driver and passenger
suffered physical injuries. However, the driver defendant-appellant Gonzaga
continued on its [sic] way to its [sic] destination and did not bother to bring his
victims to the hospital.
Plaintiff-appellee paid the assured UCPB the amount of P244, 500.00
representing the insurance coverage of the damaged car.
RULING:
Section 12. Liability of lessors. Financing companies shall not be liable for
loss, damage or injury caused by a motor vehicle, aircraft, vessel, equipment,
machinery or other property leased to a third person or entity except when the
motor vehicle, aircraft, vessel, equipment or other property is operated by the
financing company, its employees or agents at the time of the loss, damage or
injury.
Petitioners argument that the enactment of R.A. No. 8556, especially
its addition of the new Sec. 12 to the old law, is deemed to have absolved
petitioner from liability, fails to convince the Court.
These developments, indeed, point to a seeming emancipation of financing
companies from the obligation to compensate claimants for losses suffered from
Whether or not petitioner did breach the implied warranty against hidden
encumbrances regarding the sale of the motor vehicle resulting in the nonregistration thereof.
RULING:
In the present case, petitioner did not breach the implied warranty against
hidden encumbrances. The subject vehicle that had earlier been stolen by a
third party was subsequently recovered by the authorities and restored to
petitioner, its rightful owner. Whether Sy had knowledge of the loss and
subsequent recovery, the fact remained that the vehicle continued to be owned
by petitioner, free from any charge or encumbrance whatsoever.
(Granting without admitting) Gratia argumenti that there was a breach of the
implied warranty against hidden encumbrances, notice of the breach was not
given to petitioner within a reasonable time. Article 1586 of the Civil Code
requires that notice be given after the breach, of which Sy ought to have
known. In his Third-Party Complaint against petitioner, there was no allegation
at all that respondent had given petitioner the requisite notice.
More important, an action for damages for a breach of implied warranties must
be brought within six months from the delivery of the thing sold. [35 Art. 1571
of the Civil Code] The vehicle was understood to have been delivered to Sy when
it was placed in his control or possession. Upon execution of the Deed of Sale
on September 12, 1996, control and possession of the vehicle was transferred
to respondent. That the vehicle had been delivered is bolstered by the fact that
no contrary allegation was raised in the Third-Party Complaint. Whether the
period should be reckoned from the actual or from the constructive delivery
through a public instrument, more than six months had lapsed before the
filing of the Third-Party Complaint.
FACTS:
The spouses Bate and Julie Nabus were the owners of parcels of land
with a total area of 1,665 square meters, situated in Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet,
duly registered in their names. The property was mortgaged by the Spouses
Nabus to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), La Trinidad Branch, to secure a
loan in the amount of P30,000.00.
On February 19, 1977, the Spouses Nabus executed a Deed of
Conditional Sale [4] covering 1,000 square meters of the 1,665 square meters of
land in favor of respondents Spouses Pacson for a consideration of
P170,000.00, which was duly notarized on February 21, 1977.
The
ISSUES:
1)
contract of lease;
2)
contract of sale.
RULING:
As regards the first issue, the Deed of Conditional Sale entered into by
the Spouses Pacson and the Spouses Nabus was not converted into a
contract of lease. The 364 receipts issued to the Spouses Pacson contained
either the phrase as partial payment of lot located in Km. 4 or cash vale or
cash vale (partial payment of lot located in Km. 4), evidencing sale under the
contract and not the lease of the property. Further, as found by the trial court,
Joaquin Pacsons non-signing of the second page of a carbon copy of the Deed
of Conditional Sale was
the original
contract[34] and the other copies of the contract were all signed by Joaquin
Pacson and the other parties to the contract.
On the second issue, petitioners contend that the contract executed by the
respondents and the Spouses Nabus was a contract to sell, not a contract of
sale. They allege that the contract was subject to the suspensive condition of
full payment of the consideration agreed upon before ownership of the subject
property could be transferred to the vendees. Since respondents failed to pay
the full amount of the consideration, having an unpaid balance of P57,544.84,
the obligation of the vendors to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
respondents did not arise. Thus, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale
executed in favor of Betty Tolero, covering the same parcel of land was valid,
even if Tolero was aware of the previous deed of conditional sale.
Ramos v. Heruela differentiates a contract of absolute sale and a contract of
conditional sale as follows:
Article 1458 of the Civil Code provides that a contract of sale may be absolute
or conditional. A contract of sale is absolute when title to the property
passes to the vendee upon delivery of the thing sold. A deed of sale is
absolute when there is no stipulation in the contract that title to the
property remains with the seller until full payment of the purchase price.
The sale is also absolute if there is no stipulation giving the vendor the
right to cancel unilaterally the contract the moment the vendee fails to
pay within a fixed period. In a conditional sale, as in a contract to sell,
ownership remains with the vendor and does not pass to the vendee until full
payment of the purchase price. The full payment of the purchase price
partakes of a suspensive condition, and non-fulfillment of the condition
prevents the obligation to sell from arising.[36]
Respondent Sea Foods Corp is the registered owner of Lot No. 300 which was
occupied by squatters who belongs to the United Muslim Christian Urban Poor
Association, Inc.
Sometimes in 1991, UMCUPAI thru its President expressed its intention to buy
the lot and initiated negotiations with SFC. It would use the proceeds of its
pending loan application with NHMFC.
Thereafter the parties executed a Letter of Intent to Sell by SFC and a Letter of
Intent to Purchase by UMCUPAI , which provides:
WHEREAS, [SFC] is the registered owner of a parcel [of] land designated
as Lot No. 300 situated in Lower Calarian, Zamboanga City, consisting of 61,736 square meters,
and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 576 of the Registry of Deeds of
Zamboanga City;
WHEREAS, UMCUPAI, an association duly registered with the SEC (Registration No.
403410) and duly accredited with the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor, has
approached [SFC] and negotiated for the ACQUISITION of the above-described property of
[SFC];
WHEREAS, in pursuance to the negotiations between [SFC] and UMCUPAI, the latter
has taken steps with the proper government authorities particularly the Mayor of Zamboanga City
and its City Housing Board which will act as Originator in the acquisition of said property
which will enable UMCUPAI to avail of its Community Mortgage Program;
WHEREAS, it appears that UMCUPAI will ultimately apply with the Home Mortgage
and Finance Corporation for a loan to pay the acquisition price of said land;
WHEREAS, as one of the steps required by the government authorities to initiate
proceedings is to receive a formal manifestation of Intent to Sell from [SFC];
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties
hereto agree as follows:
1.
[SFC] expressly declares its intention to sell Lot No. 300 with an area of 61,736
square meters situated in Lower Calarian, Zamboanga City and covered by TCT No. 576 of the
Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga City to UMCUPAI at the price of P105.00 per square meter, free
from all liens, charges and encumbrances;
2.
That UMCUPAI hereby expressly declares its intention to buy the aforesaid
property and shall endeavor to raise the necessary funds to acquire same at the
abovementioned price of P105.00 per square meter;
3.
That the Absolute Deed of Sale shall be executed, signed and delivered together
with the title and all other pertinent documents upon full payment of the purchase price;
4.
That [SFC] shall pay the capital gains tax and documentary stamps,
Registration, transfer tax and other expenses shall be paid by the UMCUPAI. [3]