721 SCRA 146

Imbong v. Ochoa
Petitioners: JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in
behalf of their minor children, et al.
Respondents: HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, et al.
Ponente: J. Mendoza
FACTS:
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the
sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact
that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen
(14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the ground that the RH Law violates the right to religious
freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee
respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives.
For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their
beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom. It is also argued that
the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be
allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute,
they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the
"compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion
and the right to free speech.
Issue:
Whether or not the RH Law violates Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
Held:

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among
religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of
public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability
of the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited
from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the
use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health
measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to
one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice,
doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is
an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be
respected.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the
religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against
his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to
perform an act against his beliefs.
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that
Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with
their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck
down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)
(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding

programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious
freedom of health care service providers should be respected.