People vs Adorno

There is robbery with force upon things only when

the doors or windows are broken in order to enter
a building to steal or when doors or wardrobes
are broken inside a building. (People v. Adorno, 40
OG 567)
With respect to robbery through the use of force
upon things, some qualifications are called for,
since it will be robbery only if the force is as
described in Art. 299. Not every physical force
exerted by the offender is covered by Art. 299,
hence breaking storewindows to steal something
but without entry, is only theft. (People vs.
Adorno, CA, 40 O.G. 567)
REPUBLIC ACT No. 6539
AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING
CARNAPPING
Section 1. This Act shall be known and may be
cited as the "Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972."
Section 2. Definition of terms. The terms
"carnapping", "motor vehicle", "defacing or
tampering with", "repainting", "body-building",
"remodeling", "dismantling", and "overhauling",
as used in this Act, shall be understood,
respectively, to mean
"Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of
a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter's consent, or by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things.
"Motor vehicle" is any vehicle propelled by any
power other than muscular power using the
public highways, but excepting road rollers,
trolley cars, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn
mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts, amphibian
trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways,
vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks, and
tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds
used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers
having any number of wheels, when propelled or
intended to be propelled by attachment to a
motor vehicle, shall be classified as separate
motor vehicle with no power rating.
"Defacing or tampering with" a serial number is
the erasing, scratching, altering or changing of
the original factory-inscribed serial number on
the motor vehicle engine, engine block or chassis
of any motor vehicle. Whenever any motor
vehicle is found to have a serial number on its
motor engine, engine block or chassis which is

different from that which is listed in the records of

the Bureau of Customs for motor vehicles
imported into the Philippines, that motor vehicle
shall be considered to have a defaced or
tampered with serial number.
"Repainting" is changing the color of a motor
vehicle by means of painting. There is repainting
whenever the new color of a motor vehicle is
different from its color as registered in the Land
Transportation Commission.
"Body-building" is a job undertaken on a motor
vehicle in order to replace its entire body with a
new body.
"Remodeling" is the introduction of some changes
in the shape or form of the body of the motor
vehicle.
"Dismantling" is the tearing apart, piece by piece
or part by part, of a motor vehicle.
"Overhauling" is the cleaning or repairing of the
whole engine of a motor vehicle by separating
the motor engine and its parts from the body of
the motor vehicle.
Section 3. Registration of motor vehicle engine,
engine block and chassis. Within one year after
the approval of this Act, every owner or possessor
of unregistered motor vehicle or parts thereof in
knock down condition shall register with the Land
Transportation Commission the motor vehicle
engine, engine block and chassis in his name or
in the name of the real owner who shall be readily
available to answer any claim over the registered
motor vehicle engine, engine block or chassis.
Thereafter, all motor vehicle engines, engine
blocks and chassis not registered with the Land
Transportation Commission shall be considered as
untaxed importation or coming from an illegal
source or carnapped, and shall be confiscated in
favor of the Government.
All owners of motor vehicles in all cities and
municipalities are required to register their cars
with the local police without paying any charges.
Section 4. Permanent registry of motor vehicle
engines, engine blocks and chassis. The Land
Transportation
Commission
shall
keep
a
permanent registry of motor vehicle engines,
engine blocks and chassis of all motor vehicles,
specifying therein their type, make and serial
numbers and stating therein the names and
addresses of their present and previous owners.
Copies of the registry and of all entries made

thereon shall be furnished the Philippine

Constabulary and all Land Transportation
Commission regional, provincial and city branch
offices: Provided, that all Land Transportation
Commission regional, provincial and city branch
offices are likewise obliged to furnish copies of all
registration of motor vehicles to the main office
and to the Philippine Constabulary.
Section
5. Registration
of sale, transfer,
conveyance, substitution or replacement of a
motor vehicle engine, engine block or chassis.
Every sale, transfer, conveyance, substitution or
replacement of a motor vehicle engine, engine
block or chassis of a motor vehicle shall be
registered
with
the
Land
Transportation
Commission. Motor vehicles assembled and
rebuilt or repaired by replacement with motor
vehicle engines, engine blocks and chassis not
registered
with
the
Land
Transportation
Commission shall not be issued certificates of
registration and shall be considered as untaxed
imported motor vehicles or motor vehicles
carnapped or proceeding from illegal sources.
Section 6. Original Registration of motor
vehicles. Any person seeking the original
registration of a motor vehicle, whether that
motor vehicle is newly assembled or rebuilt or
acquired from a registered owner, shall within
one week after the completion of the assembly or
rebuilding job or the acquisition thereof from the
registered owner, apply to the Philippine
Constabulary for clearance of the motor vehicle
for registration with the Land Transportation
Commission. The Philippine Constabulary shall,
upon receipt of the application, verify if the motor
vehicle or its numbered parts are in the list of
carnapped motor vehicles or stolen motor vehicle
parts. If the motor vehicle or any of its numbered
parts is not in that list, the Philippine
Constabulary shall forthwith issue a certificate of
clearance. Upon presentation of the certificate of
clearance from the Philippine Constabulary and
after verification of the registration of the motor
vehicle engine, engine block and chassis in the
permanent registry of motor vehicle engines,
engine
blocks
and
chassis,
the
Land
Transportation Commission shall register the
motor vehicle in accordance with existing laws,
rules and regulations.
Section 7. Duty of Collector of Customs to report
arrival of imported motor vehicle, etc. The
Collector of Customs of a principal port of entry
where an imported motor vehicle, motor vehicle
engine, engine block chassis or body is unloaded,

shall, within seven days after the arrival of the

imported motor vehicle or any of its parts
enumerated herein, make a report of the
shipment to the Land Transportation Commission,
specifying the make, type and serial numbers, if
any, of the motor vehicle engine, engine block
and chassis or body, and stating the names and
addresses of the owner or consignee thereof. If
the motor vehicle engine, engine block, chassis or
body does not bear any serial number, the
Collector of Customs concerned shall hold the
motor vehicle engine, engine block, chassis or
body until it is numbered by the Land
Transportation Commission.
Section 8. Duty of importers, distributors and
sellers of motor vehicles to keep record of
stocks. Any person engaged in the importation,
distribution, and buying and selling of motor
vehicles, motor vehicle engines, engine blocks,
chassis or body, shall keep a permanent record of
his stocks, stating therein their type, make and
serial numbers, and the names and addresses of
the persons from whom they were acquired and
the names and addresses of the persons to whom
they were sold, and shall render an accurate
monthly report of his transactions in motor
vehicles to the Land Transportation Commission.
Section 9. Duty of manufacturers of engine
blocks, chassis or body to cause numbering of
engine blocks, chassis or body manufactured.
Any person engaged in the manufacture of
engine blocks, chassis or body shall cause the
numbering of every engine block, chassis or body
manufactured in a convenient and conspicuous
part thereof which the Land Transportation
Commission may direct for the purpose of
uniformity and identification of the factory and
shall submit to the Land Transportation
Commission a monthly report of the manufacture
and sale of engine blocks, chassis or body.
Section 10. Clearance and permit required for
assembly or rebuilding of motor vehicles. Any
person who shall undertake to assemble or
rebuild or cause the assembly or rebuilding of a
motor vehicle shall first secure a certificate of
clearance
from
the
Philippine
Constabulary: Provided, That no such permit shall
be issued unless the applicant shall present a
statement under oath containing the type, make
and serial numbers of the engine, chassis and
body, if any, and the complete list of the spare
parts of the motor vehicle to be assembled or
rebuilt together with the names and addresses of
the sources thereof.

In the case of motor vehicle engines to be

mounted on motor boats, motor bancas and other
light water vessels, the applicant shall secure a
permit from the Philippine Coast Guard, which
office shall in turn furnish the Land Transportation
Commission the pertinent data concerning the
motor vehicle engines including their type, make
and serial numbers.
Section 11. Clearance required for shipment of
motor vehicles, motor vehicle engines, engine
blocks, chassis or body. Any person who owns or
operates inter-island shipping or any water
transportation with launches, boats, vessels or
ships shall within seven days submit a report to
the Philippine Constabulary on all motor vehicle,
motor vehicle engines, engine blocks, chassis or
bodies transported by it for the motor vehicle,
motor vehicle engine, engine block, chassis or
body to be loaded on board the launch, boat
vessel or ship.
Section 12. Defacing or tampering with serial
numbers of motor vehicle engines, engine blocks
and chassis. It shall be unlawful for any person to
deface or otherwise tamper with the original or
registered serial number of motor vehicle
engines, engine blocks and chassis.
Section 13. Penal Provisions. Any person who
violates any provisions of this Act shall be
punished with imprisonment for not less than two
years nor more than six years and a fine equal in
amount to the acquisition cost of the motor
vehicle, motor vehicle engine or any other part
involved in the violation: Provided, That if the
person violating any provision of this Act is a
juridical person, the penalty herein provided shall
be imposed on its president or secretary and/or
members of the board of directors or any of its
officers and employees who may have directly
participated in the violation.
Any government official or employee who directly
commits the unlawful acts defined in this Act or is
guilty of gross negligence of duty or connives
with or permits the commission of any of the said
unlawful act shall, in addition to the penalty
prescribed in the preceding paragraph, be
dismissed from the service with prejudice to his
reinstatement and with disqualification from
voting or being voted for in any election and from
appointment to any public office.
Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person
who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken,

be punished by imprisonment for not less than

fourteen years and eight months and not more
than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or
intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and
by imprisonment for not less than seventeen
years and four months and not more than thirty
years, when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or force upon things; and the penalty of
life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when
the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed in the commission of the
carnapping.
Section 15. Aliens. Aliens convicted under the
provisions of this Act shall be deported
immediately after service of sentence without
further proceedings by the Deportation Board.
Section 16. Reward. Any person who voluntarily
gives information leading to the recovery of
carnapped vehicles and for the conviction of the
persons charged with carnapping shall be given
as reward so much reward money as the
Philippine Constabulary may fix. The Philippine
Constabulary is authorized to include in its annual
budget the amount necessary to carry out the
purposes of this section. Any information given by
informers shall be treated as confidential matter.
Section 17. Separability clause. If any provisions
of this Act is declared invalid, the provisions
thereof not affected by such declaration shall
remain in force and effect.
Section 18. Repealing clause. All laws, executive
orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
Section 19. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect
upon its approval.
Approved: August 26, 1972
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 533 August 8,
1974
THE ANTI-CATTLE RUSTLING LAW OF 1974
WHEREAS, large cattle are indispensable to the
livelihood and economic growth of our people,
particularly the agricultural workers, because
such large cattle are the work animals of our
farmers and the source of fresh meat and dairy
products for our people, and provide raw material
for our tanning and canning industries;

WHEREAS, reports from the law-enforcement

agencies reveal that there is a resurgence of
thievery of large cattle, commonly known as
"cattle rustling", especially in the rural areas,
thereby directly prejudicing the livelihood of the
agricultural workers and adversely affecting our
food production program for self-sufficiency in
rice, corn and other staple crops, as well as in
fresh meat;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to protect
large cattle raising industry and small time large
cattle owners and raisers from the nefarious
activities of lawless elements in order to
encourage our hardworking cattle raisers and
farmers to raise more cattle and concentrate in
their agricultural works, thus increasing our
source of meat and dairy products as well as
agricultural production and allied industries which
depend on the cattle raising industry;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Republic of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution and pursuant to Proclamations No.
1081, dated September 21, 1972 and No. 1104,
dated January 17, 1973 and General Order No. 1
dated September 22, 1972, do hereby order and
decree as part of the law of the land, the
following:
Section 1. Title. This Decree shall be known as
the "Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974."
Section 2. Definition of terms. The following
terms shall mean and be understood to be as
herein defined:
a. Large cattle as herein used shall include the
cow, carabao, horse, mule, ass, or other
domesticated member of the bovine family.
b. Owner/raiser shall include the herdsman,
caretaker, employee or tenant of any firm or
entity engaged in the raising of large cattle or
other persons in lawful possession of such large
cattle.
c. Cattle rustling is the taking away by any
means, method or scheme, without the consent
of the owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or
gain, or whether committed with or without
violence against or intimidation of any person or
force upon things. It includes the killing of large
cattle, or taking its meat or hide without the
consent of the owner/raiser.

Section 3. Duty of owner/raiser to register. The

owner/raiser shall, before the large cattle
belonging to him shall attain the age of six
months, register the same with the office of the
city/municipal treasurer where such large cattle
are raised. The city/municipality concerned may
impose and collect the fees authorized by
existing laws for such registration and the
issuance of a certificate of ownership to the
owner/raiser.
Section 4. Duty of city/municipal treasurers and
other
concerned
public
officers
and
employees. All public officials and employees
concerned with the registration of large cattle are
required to observe strict adherence with
pertinent provisions of Chapter 22, Section 511 to
534, of the Revised Administrative Code, except
insofar as they may be inconsistent with the
provisions of this Decree.
Section 5. Permit to buy and sell large cattle. No
person, partnership, association, corporation or
entity shall engage in the business of buy and sell
of large cattle without first securing a permit for
the said purpose from the Provincial Commander
of the province where it shall conduct such
business and the city/municipal treasurer of the
place of residence of such person, partnership,
association, corporation or entity. The permit shall
only be valid in such province.
Section 6. Clearance for shipment of large
cattle. Any person, partnership, association,
corporation or entity desiring to ship or transport
large cattle, its hides, or meat, from one province
to another shall secure a permit for such purpose
from the Provincial Commander of the province
where the large cattle is registered. Before
issuance of the permit herein prescribed, the
Provincial
Commander
shall
require
the
submission of the certificate of ownership as
prescribed in Section 3 hereof, a certification from
the Provincial Veterinarian to the effect that such
large cattle, hides or meat are free from any
disease; and such other documents or records as
may be necessary. Shipment of large cattle, its
hides or meat from one city/municipality to
another within the same province may be done
upon securing permit from the city/municipal
treasurer of the place of origin.
Section 7. Presumption
person having in his
custody of large cattle
competent authorities,

of cattle rustling. Every

possession, control or
shall, upon demand by
exhibit the documents

prescribed in the preceding sections. Failure to

exhibit the required documents shall be prima
facie evidence that the large cattle in his
possession, control or custody are the fruits of the
crime of cattle rustling.
Section
8. Penal
provisions. Any
person
convicted of cattle rustling as herein defined
shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle
involved, be punished by prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium period if the offense is committed
without violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things. If the offense is
committed with violence against or intimidation
of persons or force upon things, the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If a person
is seriously injured or killed as a result or on the
occasion of the commission of cattle rustling, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed.
When the offender is a government official or
employee, he shall, in addition to the foregoing
penalty, be disqualified from voting or being
voted upon in any election/referendum and from
holding any public office or employment.
When the offender is an alien, he shall be
deported immediately upon the completion of the
service of his sentence without further
proceedings.
Section 9. Rules and Regulations to be
promulgated by the Chief of Constabulary. The
chief of Constabulary shall promulgate the rules
and regulations for the effective implementation
of this Decree.
Section 10. Repealing clause. The provisions of
Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise
known as the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
all laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with this
Decree are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 11. Effectivity. This Decree shall take
effect upon approval.
Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August,
in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-four.
Pil-Ey vs People
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under
Rule
45
assailing
the
November 29, 2001 Decision [2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 19810, which

affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court

(RTC), First Judicial Region, Branch 36, Bontoc,
Mountain Province.
On May 27, 1994, an Information was filed with
the RTC charging petitioner Ernesto Pil-ey and his
two co-accused, Constancio Manochon and
Waclet Anamot, with violation of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 533, or the Anti-Cattle Rustling
Law, committed as follows:
That on or before April 15, 1994, in the evening
thereof at [S]itio Ta-ed, Bontoc, Mountain
Province, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and helping one
another and with intent to gain, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and load on a Ford Fierra one (1) male cow,
and thereafter butchered the same, against and
without the consent of the owner, Rita Khayad,
resulting to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00), Philippine currency.
That the use of a motor vehicle attended and
facilitated the commission of the crime.
On arraignment, the three pleaded not guilty to
the
crime
charged.[4] Thereafter,
the
RTC
proceeded to try the case.
From the testimonies of the
witnesses, the facts are as follows.

prosecution

On April 16, 1994, private complainant Rita

Khayad of Bontoc, Mt. Province discovered that
her 3-year-old white and black-spotted cow,
[5]
which was grazing at SitioTaed with her 4 other
bovines, was missing.[6] She and her children
searched for it but to no avail. She was later
informed by her grandson, Ronnie Faluyan, that in
the afternoon of April 15, 1994, while the latter
was with his friends at the 156 Store at the back
of the market, he saw a cow similar to that of his
grandmothers[7] loaded in a blue Ford Fiera driven
along the national highway by accused
Manochon.[8] With Manochon in the Fiera was his
helper, petitioner Pil-ey.[9] Manochon was a
butcher and meat vendor. [10]
After having ascertained from people in the
market that the cow was already slaughtered,
[11]
Rita reported the matter to the police.
[12]
Tagged as the primary suspects were
petitioner Pil-ey, his co-accused, Manochon and
Anamot. The 3 accused were invited by the
authorities to the Bontoc Municipal Police Station
for questioning.[13] On April 17, 1994, Rita, Annie

and Ronnie went to the station to file their

respective affidavits.[14] During the confrontation
between the parties, petitioner Pil-ey admitted
that they were the ones who took the cow. Since
they were relatives, Pil-ey asked for a settlement
of the case.[15] Rita, however, rebuffed the
request.[16] On separate occasions, Anamot and
Manochon went to the house of Rita,[17] to offer a
compromise, but again, Rita refused. [18]
Traversing the prosecution evidence, accused
Manochon and Pil-ey testified that on April 12,
1994, Anamot went to Manochons house and
offered
his
cow
for
sale
and
butchering[19] for P7,000.00. Manochon agreed
and gave him P1,000.00 as advance payment;
the balance of P6,000.00 shall be paid after the
cows meat had been sold.[20] At7:00 a.m. of April
15, 1994, Anamot went to the market and
requested Pil-ey to ask Manochon, who was then
busy chopping meat for sale, if his cow could be
scheduled for butchering on the following day.
[21]
Manochon consented so Anamot described the
white and black-spotted cow and instructed Pil-ey
to get the same above the road at SitioTaed.[22]
Hence, at 2:00 p.m. on that day, while Manochon
was in Sagada buying pigs, [23] Pil-ey went
to Sitio Taed, found the subject cow, tied it to a
tree within the area, and then went home to wait
for Manochon.[24] When the latter came back from
Sagada, they proceeded back to Sitio Taed at
around 4:00 p.m. to load the cow in the blue Ford
Fiera.[25]Passing along the national road, [26] they
then went back to Manochons house in Caluttit.
[27]
At 11:00 p.m., they butchered the cow at
Manochons house and readied it for sale.[28]
In the afternoon of April 16, 1994, they were
surprised when they were invited by the Bontoc
Police for investigation in view of the complaint of
Rita Khayad who claimed to be the owner of the
cow.[29] Manochon further stated that only Pil-ey
and Anamot answered the questions of the police
officers and the private complainant, and that he
was not able to explain his side as they were
forced and sent immediately to jail. [30] He denied
offering a settlement and explained that he went
to Rita Khayads house to deliver theP6,000.00.
[31]
Petitioner Pil-ey denied asking forgiveness
from private complainant and insisted that the
cow they took was Anamots.[32]
For his part, Anamot denied having conspired
with his co-accused in taking the subject cow.
[33]
He testified that in 1993, he and Rita coowned a white female cow, which was hacked

and sold for butchering to Manochon. [34] On April

12, 1994, he went to see Manochon at his house
in order to collect his share of the payment. [35] He
further claimed that, aside from the cow he coowned with Rita, he had three other cows grazing
near the road going to Guina-ang but he had
nothing at Sitio Taed;[36] hence, he denied seeing
and talking to Manochon and Pil-ey on April 15,
1994 and instructing them to get a cow
at Sitio Taed. He stated that after the meeting
on April 12, 1994, he saw his co-accused again
when they were already behind bars. [37] He
further alleged that he went to Ritas place not to
ask for a settlement but only to ask from the
latter why he was included in her complaint. [38]
On March 22, 1996, the RTC rendered its
Decision[39] finding the three accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating P.D. No.
533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling
Law of 1974. The fallo of the RTCs decision reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the
process, sentencing each of the above-named
accused to indeterminate imprisonment of ten
(10) years, and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months,
and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal
as maximum the statute violated being a special
law; ordering the said accused to pay jointly and
severally the sum of P10,000.00 to the offended
party; and to pay the costs.
Individual notices of appeal[41] were, then, filed by
the accused. On November 29, 2001, the
appellate court affirmed the ruling of the RTC and
disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the
judgment of conviction dated March 22, 1996,
rendered by Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court,
First Judicial Region, Bontoc, Mountain Province,
in Criminal Case No. 1025 entitled People of the
Philippines versus Constancio Manochon, Waclet
Anamot and Ernesto Pil-ey, the same is
AFFIRMED in toto.
With costs against accused-appellants.
The separate motions for reconsideration [43] were
denied; thus, the three accused interposed their
respective but separate appeals before this Court.
On November 11, 2002, Constancio Manochons
petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R.
No. 155234 was denied by the Court for failure to

submit a certified true copy of the assailed

decision; and for raising factual issues.
[44]
Likewise, on December 16, 2002, the Court
denied Waclet Anamots petition for review
on certiorari (UDK-13174) for failure to pay the
docket fees.[45]
Thus, only the instant petition for review
on certiorari[46] filed by Ernesto Pil-ey is left for
resolution.
In this petition, Pil-ey reiterates his and
Manochons narration of the incident,[47] and raises
the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE OFFER
OF COMPROMISE ON THE
PART
OF
THE
PETITIONER IS AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF GUILT
[IN SPITE] OF THE FACT THAT IT WAS MADE
DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION WHERE THE
PETITIONERS [RIGHTS] WERE NOT OBSERVED,
HENCE, THE SAME IS INADMISSIBLE.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING IN THIS CASE THE
LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF GUILT UNDER SECTION 7
IN RELATION TO SECTION 5 OF PD NO. 533, THE
ANTI-CATTLE RUSTLING LAW OF 1974.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT [IN SPITE] OF THE FACT
THAT EVIDENCE ON RECORD COULD NOT
SUPPORT A CONVICTION.[48]
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not,
based on the evidence on record, petitioner is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the
provisions of P.D. No. 533 or the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974.
We rule in the affirmative.
Cattle-rustling is the taking away by any means,
method or scheme, without the consent of the
owner or raiser, of any cow, carabao, horse,
mule, ass or other domesticated member of the
bovine family, whether or not for profit or gain, or
whether committed with or without violence
against or intimidation of any person or force
upon things; and it includes the killing of large
cattle, or taking its meat or hide without the
consent of the owner or raiser.[49]
Conviction for cattle-rustling necessitates
the concurrence of the following elements:

(1) large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another;

(3) the taking is done without the consent of the
owner or raiser; (4) the taking is done by any
means, method or scheme; (5) the taking is done
with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking
is accomplished with or without violence or
intimidation against persons or force upon things.
[50]
Considering that the gravamen of the crime is
the taking or killing of large cattle or taking its
meat or hide without the consent of the owner or
raiser,[51] conviction for the same need only be
supported by the fact of taking without the cattle
owners consent.
In the instant case, the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt that Rita Khayads white
and black-spotted cow was taken from Sitio Taed
where it was grazing; that its taking was without
Ritas consent; and that the said cattle was later
seen in the possession of the petitioner and his
co-accused. Thus, the foregoing elements of the
crime of cattle-rustling are present.
Its takers have not offered a satisfactory
explanation for their possession of the missing
bovine. It is the rule that when stolen property is
found in the possession of one, not the owner,
and without a satisfactory explanation of his
possession, he is presumed to be the thief. [52] This
is in consonance with the disputable presumption
that a person found in possession of a thing taken
in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker
and the doer of the whole act.[53]
Indeed, petitioners defense of mistake of
fact, i.e., he and his employer Manochon were of
the erroneous belief that the cow was owned or
raised by Anamot, is unacceptable. This defense
crumbles in the light of Anamots testimony that
his purpose in going to Manochons house on April
12, 1994 was to exact payment of a white female
cow sold for butchering in 1993, and not to sell
the white and black-spotted cow subject of this
case. He further stated that he did not have cows
grazing at Sitio Taed.
Petitioners admission in the course of the
trial that he and his co-accused took the cow is
buttressed by the testimony of prosecution
witness Ronnie Faluyan that he saw Manochon
and Pil-ey with the subject cow in a blue Ford
Fiera. This judicial admission, which binds the
declarant and which does not need any further
presentation of evidence,[54] reinforces petitioners
conviction.
Thus, petitioners argument that his alleged offer
of settlement during the informal confrontation at

the police station is inadmissible in evidence

because it was made without the presence of
counsel, is no longer material. After all, the crime
of cattle-rustling and the fact that petitioners and
his co-accused are the perpetrators thereof had
been established by ample evidence other than
the alleged inadmissible extrajudicial confession.
The same holds true even if we do not apply the
presumption of guilt under Section 7[55] of P.D. No.
533.
All told, we hold that the evidence on record
sufficiently prove the unanimous findings of the
RTC and the CA that the petitioner and his coaccused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating the provisions of P.D. No. 533. There is
no cogent reason to reverse the said rulings.
Be that as it may, we, however, find that the
penalty imposed by the trial court is erroneous.
While it correctly imposed reclusion temporal in
its minimum period as the maximum penalty, it
erred in imposing prision mayor in its maximum
period as the minimum penalty. As in Canta v.
People,[56] the RTC in this case considered P.D. No.
533 as a special law and applied the latter portion
of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
[57]
However, as we have declared in Canta, the
computation of the penalty should be in
accordance with our discussion in People v.
Macatanda,[58] which
we
quote
herein
for
emphasis, thus:
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that
P.D. No. 533 is a special law, entirely distinct from
and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From
the nature of the penalty imposed which is in
terms of the classification and duration of
penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal
Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily
imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear
that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment
of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the
offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310), or
otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions
thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal
Code on civil liability of the offender, a provision
which is not found in the decree, but which could
not have been intended to be discarded or
eliminated by the decree. Article 64 of the same
Code should, likewise, be applicable
Hence, in the instant case, considering that
neither
aggravating[60] nor
mitigating
circumstance attended the commission of the
crime, the penalty to be imposed should be
within the range of prision correccional in its

maximum period to prision mayor in its medium

period, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, as maximum. We, thus, modify
the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court
to be four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional.
Furthermore, we note that the separate appeals
interposed by Manochon and Anamot were
denied by this Court on November 11
and December 16, 2002, respectively. As their
convictions were affirmed earlier, they were
already made to suffer the erroneous penalty
imposed by the trial court. Nevertheless, they
shall benefit from the favorable modification of
the minimum penalty made herein. Section 11,
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that an appeal taken by one
or more of several accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.[61]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
disquisition, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED, with the modification
that
petitioner Ernesto Pil-ey and his co-accused
Constancio Manochon and Waclet Anamot are
hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison term of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional in its maximum period, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months
and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, as maximum
PEOPLE vs. BERNARD G. MIRTO
The Facts
Seven Informations for Qualified Theft were filed
against the accused, docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 9034, 9115, 9117, 9120, 9123, 9126, and
9130. The Informations similarly show how the
offenses were allegedly committed, differing only
as to the dates of the commission, the number of
bags of cement involved, the particulars of the
checks paid by the cement purchasers, the
amounts involved, and the depositary accounts
used by accused. The Information for Criminal
Case No. 9034 indicted accused, thus:
The undersigned City Prosecutor of Tuguegarao
City accuses BERNARD G. MIRTO of the crime of
QUALIFIED THEFT, defined and penalized under
Article 310, in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of
the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on June 21, 2001, in the City of Tuguegarao,
Province of Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of

this Honorable Court, said accused BERNARD G.

MIRTO, being the Branch Manager of UCC-Isabela
(Tuguegarao Area), with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor
force upon things, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of
confidence and without the consent and
knowledge of complainant, UNION CEMENT
CORPORATION, a duly organized Corporation
operating under existing laws, represented by
REYNALDO S. SANTOS, Assistant Vice President
Marketing/North Luzon, whose business address
is located at 5th Floor Kalayaan Building, 164
Salcedo Street, Makati, Metro Manila, take, steal
and deposit into his personal Security Bank &
Trust Co. (Tuguegarao Branch) Account No.
0301261982001, the proceeds of 4,600 bags of
Portland cement, owned by herein complainantCorporation, paid to him by the Philippine Lumber
located at Bonifacio Street, this City, in the form
of Checks, namely: METROBANK CHECK NOS.
103214898 and 1032214896, for P67,000.00 &
P241,200.00, respectively, in the total amount of
P308,200.00, which accused is obligated to
convey to the complainant-Union Cement
Corporation represented by its Vice-PresidentMarketing, REYNALDO S. SANTOS, to its loss,
damage and prejudice, in the aforesaid amount of
THREE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED
PESOS,
(P308,200.00)
Philippine
Currency.
Contrary to law.[3]
To summarize, the seven Informations showed
the following details:
Per records,[4] the accused was branch manager
of Union Cement Corporation (UCC) for
the Tuguegarao City area. At the UCC office in
Isabela, he shared an office room with Restituto P.
Renolo, Branch Manager for the province. On June
29, 2001, at about noon, the accused confided to
Renolo that he had misappropriated company
funds.Renolo advised him to explain his misdeeds
in writing to Assistant Vice-President and Head of
UCC-North Luzon Reynaldo S. Santos (AVP
Santos).
Later that day, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused
told
Renolo
that
he
would
be
going
to Tuguegarao City. Just before Renolo left the
office, he saw on the accuseds table a piece of
partly-folded paper, which turned out to be a
handwritten letter of the accused to AVP Santos,
in which he admitted taking company funds and
enumerated the particular accounts and amounts
involved. Renolo took the letter home, read it

over the phone to AVP Santos at about 7:00 p.m.,

and faxed it to AVP Santos the following day.
AVP Santos, in turn, sent a copy of the letter to
the top management of UCC, which then
instructed the Group Internal Audit of the Phinma
Group of Companies to conduct a special audit of
the UCC-Tuguegarao City Branch. Antonio M.
Dumalian, AVP and Head of the Group Internal
Audit, organized the audit team composed of
Onisimo Prado, as head, with Emmanuel R.
Reamico, Adeodato M. Logronio, and Glenn
Agustin, as members.
The audit team conducted the special audit of the
UCC-Tuguegarao City Branch from July 3 to July
25, 2001. They interviewed several cement
buyers/dealers, among them Wilma Invierno of
Rommeleens Enterprises, Arthur Alonzo of Alonzo
Trucking, Robert Cokee of Philippine Lumber, and
Russel Morales of Mapalo Trucking. All four
executed affidavits attesting that UCC cement
bags were sold directly to them instead of to
dealers with credit lines and that, as payment,
they issued Pay to Cash checks pursuant to the
instruction of the accused.
AVP Santos and Dr. Francis Felizardo, Senior VicePresident (SVP) and Head of the Marketing Group
of UCC, met with the accused at the UCC Sales
Office in Poro Point, San Fernando City, La
Union. In that meeting, the accused admitted
misusing company money, but pleaded to them
not to terminate him as he was willing to pay
back
the
amount
from
his
salary
on
installment. He also asked them not to file
charges against him.
In a Report dated August 8, 2001, the Group
Internal Audit confirmed the veracity of the June
29, 2001 handwritten admission letter of the
accused and his July 20, 2001 Certification
enumerating the names of the specific bank
accounts, specific bank holders, and the banks
wherein he had deposited the funds of UCCTuguegarao City Branch. It appeared that the
total unremitted collections of the accused
from May 25, 2001 to June 23, 2001 amounted to
PhP 6,572,750.
UCC found that the accused gravely abused the
trust and confidence reposed on him as Branch
Manager and violated company policies, rules,
and regulations. Specifically, he used the credit
line of accredited dealers in favor of persons who
either had no credit lines or had exhausted their
credit lines. He diverted cement bags from the
companys Norzagaray Plant or La Union Plant to
truckers who would buy cement for profit. In
these transactions, he instructed the customers

that payments be made in the form of Pay to

Cash checks, for which he did not issue any
receipts. He did not remit the checks but these
were either encashed or deposited to his personal
bank account at Security Bank & Trust Co. (SBTC)Tuguegarao City Branch with Account No. 0301261982-001 or to the accounts of a certain
Magno Lim at MetroBank and Equitable PCIBank,
both in Tuguegarao City. Conchito Dayrit,
Customer Service Officer and Representative of
SBTC-Tuguegarao City, confirmed the findings of
the UCC internal auditors through the accuseds
Statement of Account showing the various checks
deposited to his account, and which subsequently
cleared.
Upon arraignment on August 6, 2002, the
accused entered a plea of not guilty to the seven
separate charges of qualified theft.[5] Trial on the
merits ensued.
The Ruling of the RTC
On March 24, 2008, the RTC rendered its
Decision, acquitting the accused in Criminal Case
Nos. 9120, 9123, and 9126, but finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing Qualified
Theft in Criminal Case Nos. 9034, 9115, 9117,
and 9130. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
renders judgment thus:
1.
In Criminal Case No. 9034: finding the
accused GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
the crime of qualified theft;
2.
In Criminal Case No. 9115: finding the
accused GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
the crime of qualified theft;
3.
In Criminal Case No. 9117: finding the
accused GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
the crime of qualified theft;
4.
In Criminal Case No. 9120: finding the
accused NOT GUILTY, as there is no showing how
he profited from deposits he made to the account
of Mr. Magno Lim;
5.
In Criminal Case No. 9123: finding the
accused NOT GUILTY by reason of insufficiency of
evidence;
6.
In Criminal Case No. 9126: finding the
accused NOT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime of qualified theft;
7.
In Criminal Case No. 9130: finding the
accused GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
the crime of qualified theft.
In view of the foregoing, in the imposition of the
penalties upon the accused, this Court is guided

by the following doctrinal pronouncement of the

Supreme Court in People v. [Mercado], G.R. No.
143676, February 12, 2003:
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in
applying the proper penalty. As reasoned by
appellant, the penalty for Qualified Theft under
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code is prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
raised by two degrees. Hence, the penalty high
by two degrees should be reclusion temporal in
its medium and maximum periods and not
reclusion perpetua as imposed by the trial
court. Being
a
divisible
penalty,
the
Indeterminate Sentence Law could then be
applied.
On the other hand, [appellee] cites the cases of
People v. Reynaldo Bago and People v. Cresencia
C. Reyes to show that the trial court properly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
We agree with the appellee that the trial court
imposed the proper penalty.
In accordance with the doctrine laid down in
People v. Mercado, the accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. Accused is ordered to restitute the
private complainant the total amount of TWO
MILLION
TWO
HUNDRED
SEVENTY
NINE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (Php
2,279,350.00) covering the amount represented
by the checks involved in these cases.
Set the promulgation of this Decision on 15 April
2008, at 8:30 oclock in the morning.
In convicting the accused, the RTC relied on his
admission when he testified on February 15, 2007
and his Memorandum of the fact of his having
deposited the checks payments from UCC cement
sales in his personal account with SBTC,
Tuguegarao
City
Branch. Contrary
to
the
accuseds argument, the RTC found that he did
not hold his collections in trust for UCC, since he
was never authorized by UCC to retain and
deposit checks, as testified to by AVP
Santos. Moreover, the RTC found fatal to
accuseds defense his handwritten letter, dated
June 29, 2001, addressed to AVP Santos, which
reads in part, Sir, I regret to say that a total
amount of PhP 6,380,650.00 was misused by me
for various reasons,[7] which the accused admitted
to in open court during his testimony on February
15, 2007.

Aggrieved, accused
before the CA.

appealed

his

conviction

The Ruling of the CA

On August 24, 2009, the appellate court rendered
the appealed decision, affirming the findings of
the RTC and the conviction of accusedappellant. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
of
the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan, Branch 5, in Criminal Case Nos. 9034,
9115, 9117 and 9130, dated March 24, 2008 and
promulgated on April 15, 2008, finding accusedappellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Qualified Theft is hereby AFFIRMED and
UPHELD.

arguments accused-appellant earlier raised in his

Brief for the Accused-Appellant before the CA.
Accused-appellant
raises
the
same
sole
assignment of error already passed upon and
resolved by the CA, in that THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT, BASED ON THE
EVIDENCE, THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF
QUALIFIED THEFT.[12]
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution
failed:
(a) To establish that he had material possession
of the funds in question;

With costs against the accused-appellant.

(b) To refute the authority given to him by UCC;

Accused-appellant
argued
that, first,
the
Informations indicting him for Qualified Theft did
not adequately inform him of the nature of the
offense charged against him; andsecond, he had
juridical possession of the subject checks, not
merely material possession; hence, the qualifying
circumstance of grave abuse of confidence
cannot be appreciated against him.

(c) To establish the element of taking under Art.

308 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC);

The CA, however, found that accused-appellant

only had material possession of the checks and
not juridical possession[9] as these checks
payments were made to UCC by its customers
and accused-appellant had no right or title to
possess or retain them as against UCC. The fact
that accused-appellant was obliged, as per
company policy, to immediately turn over to UCC
the payments he received from UCC customers
was attested to by the prosecution witness, UCC
Branch Manager Renolo. Thus, the CA concluded
that there was neither a principal-agent
relationship between UCC and accused-appellant
nor was accused-appellant allowed to open a
personal account where UCC funds would be
deposited and held in trust for UCC.

(f) To establish, in sum, the ultimate facts

constitutive of the crime of Qualified Theft under
Art. 310, in relation to Art. 308, of the RPC.

(d) To establish that the funds were taken without

the consent and knowledge of UCC;
(e) To establish the element of personal property
under Art. 308 of the RPC; and

For being closely related, We will discuss together

the arguments thus raised.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
which defines Theft, provides:
ART. 308. Who are liable for theft.Theft is
committed by any person who, with intent to gain
but without violence, against, or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latters consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:

Hence, We have this appeal.

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing
the People of the Philippines, submitted a
Manifestation and Motion,[10] opting not to file any
supplemental brief, there being no new issues
raised nor supervening events transpired.
Accused-appellant manifested also not to file a
supplemental brief.[11] Thus, in resolving the
instant appeal, We consider the sole issue and

1. Any person who, having found lost property,

shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously
damaged the property of another, shall remove or
make use of the fruits or objects of the damage
caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate

or a field where trespass is forbidden or which
belongs to another and without the consent of its
owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall
gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm
products.
Thus, the elements of the crime of Theft are: (1)
there was a taking of personal property; (2) the
property belongs to another; (3) the taking was
without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking
was done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking
was
accomplished
without
violence
or
intimidation against the person or force upon
things.[13]
Theft is qualified under Art. 310 of the RPC, when
it is, among others, committed with grave abuse
of confidence, thus:
ART. 310. Qualified Theft.The crime of theft shall
be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding article, if committed by a
domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor
vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation,
fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property
is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
The elements of Qualified Theft committed
with grave abuse of confidence are as
follows:
1. Taking of personal property;

paymentsall issued payable to cashare personal

properties belonging to UCC. These funds through
checks were paid by UCC clients for the deliveries
of cement from UCC. One with the courts a quo,
We will not belabor this point in the fifth
argument raised by accused-appellant.
Second. The third element is likewise abundantly
clear. The collected amounts subject of the
instant case belonged to UCC and not to accusedappellant. When
accused-appellant
received
them in the form of Pay to Cash checks from UCC
customers, he was obliged to turn them over to
UCC for he had no right to retain them. That he
kept the checks and deposited them in his
account and in the accounts of Magno Lim
knowing all the while that these checks and their
proceeds were not his only proves the presence
of unlawful taking.
As the trial court aptly pointed out, accusedappellants theory that he only kept the funds in
trust for UCC with the elaborate explanation that
once the checks cleared in his account then he
remits them to UCC is completely incredulous. For
one, accused-appellant has not adduced evidence
that he indeed remitted the funds once the
corresponding checks were cleared. For another,
accused-appellant could not explain why he
deposited some of the checks he collected in the
accounts of Magno Lim in MetroBank (MBTC
Account No. 124-5) and Equitable PCIBank (EPCIB
Account
No.
71820-8). Moreover,
accusedappellants
contention
of
such
alleged
[15]
management practice
is unsupported by any
evidence showing that prior to the events in mid2001 there was indeed such a practice of
depositing check collections and remitting the
proceeds once the checks cleared.

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to
gain;
4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of
confidence.[14]
All of the foregoing elements for Qualified Theft
are present in this case.
First. The presence of the first and second
elements is abundantly clear. There can be no
quibble that the fund collections through checks

Third. The element of intent to gain is amply

established through the affidavit [16] of Wilma
Invierno of Rommeleens Enterprises, one of UCCs
customers, who confirmed that she had been sold
cement bags instead of to dealers with credit
lines and she was required by accused-appellant
to issue pay to cash checks as payment. The
affidavits of Arthur Alonzo[17] of Alonzo Trucking,
Robert Cokee[18] of Philippine Lumber, and Russel
Morales[19] of Mapalo Trucking similarly attested to
the
same
type
of
sale
and
payment
arrangement. In so doing, accused-appellant
facilitated the collection of pay to cash checks
which he deposited in his bank account and in the
bank accounts of Magno Lim. Thus, the fourth
element of intent to gain is duly proved.

Fourth. Equally clear and undisputed is the

presence of the fifth element. Accused-appellant
admitted having received these checks and
depositing them in his personal account and in
the accounts of Magno Lim. Thus, the element of
taking was accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things.
Fifth. That UCC never consented to accusedappellants depositing the checks he collected in
his or other accounts is demonstrated by the
immediate action UCC took upon being apprised
of the misappropriation and accused-appellants
confession letter. UCC lost no time in forming a
special audit group from the Group Internal Audit
of Phinma Group of Companies. The special audit
group conducted an internal audit from July 3 to
25, 2001 and submitted a Special Audit
Report[20] dated August 8, 2001, showing that the
total unremitted collections of accused-appellant
from the period covering May 25, 2001 through
June 23, 2001 amounted to PhP 6,572,750.
AVP Santos and UCC SVP and Head of Marketing
Group Dr. Felizardo met with accused-appellant
who
admitted
misappropriating
company
funds. AVP Santos testified[21] in open court on
what transpired in that meeting and accusedappellants verbal admission/confession. And with
the findings of the auditors that not only did
accused-appellant unlawfully take UCC funds but
he also committed the offense of violating
company policies, rules, and regulations, UCC
was compelled to file seven criminal complaints
against accused-appellant. This swift and prompt
action undertaken by UCC argues against the
notion that it consented to accused-appellants
act of depositing of check proceeds from
company sales of cement products in his account
or in the accounts of Magno Lim.
Sixth. That accused-appellant committed the
crime with grave abuse of confidence is clear. As
gathered from the nature of his position, accusedappellant was a credit and collection officer of
UCC in the Cagayan-Isabela area. His position
entailed a high degree of confidence, having
access to funds collected from UCC clients.
In People v. Sison,[22] involving a Branch Operation
Officer of Philippine Commercial International
Bank (PCIB), the Court upheld the appellants
conviction of Qualified Theft, holding that the
management of the PCIB reposed its trust and
confidence in the appellant as its Luneta Branch
Operation Officer, and it was this trust and
confidence which he exploited to enrich himself

to the damage and prejudice of PCIB x x x.

[23]
In People v. Mercado,[24] involving a manager
of a jewelry store, the Court likewise affirmed the
appellants conviction of Qualified Theft through
grave abuse of confidence.
In the instant case, it is clear how accusedappellant, as Branch Manager of UCC who was
authorized to receive payments from UCC
customers, gravely abused the trust and
confidence
reposed
upon
him
by
the
management of UCC. Precisely, by using that
trust and confidence, accused-appellant was able
to perpetrate the theft of UCC funds to the grave
prejudice of the latter. To repeat, the resulting
report of UCCs internal audit showed that
accused-appellant unlawfully took PhP 6,572,750
of UCCs funds.
The courts a quos finding that accused-appellant
admitted misappropriating UCCs funds through
the appropriation of the subject checks is
buttressed by the testimonies of Renolo and
Santos,[25] who heard and understood accusedappellants extrajudicial confession. True enough,
they were competent to testify as to the
substance of what they heard from accusedappellanthis declaration expressly acknowledging
his guilt to the offensethat may be given in
evidence against him.[26]
That he deposited most of the subject checks in
his account was proved by accused-appellants
statement of account with SBTC (Account No.
0301-261982-001) through the testimony of
Conchito Dayrit, the Customer Service Officer and
representative of SBTC-Tuguegarao City Branch.
[27]

Moreover, accused-appellant issued a written

certification[28] dated July 20, 2001, attesting to
the fact of the ownership of the bank accounts
where he deposited the checks he collected from
UCC clients,
Further, as can be amply gleaned from accusedappellants handwritten admission and duly borne
out by the internal audit teams findings, he
deliberately used a scheme to perpetrate the
theft. This was aptly pointed out by the CA, which
We reproduce for clarity:
UCC found that accused-appellant gravely abused
the trust and confidence reposed on him as
Branch Manager and violated company policies,
rules and regulations. He did not remit
collections from customers who paid Pay to
Cash checks. He used the credit line of

accredited dealers in favor of persons who

did not have credit lines or other dealers
who had exhausted their credit line. He
diverted cement bags from Norzagaray
Plant or La Union Plant to truckers who
would buy cement for profit. In these
transactions, he instructed dealers that check
be made in the form of pay to cash. He did
not issue them receipts. The checks were
either encashed or deposited to accusedappellants personal account No. 0301261982-001 at Security Bank & Trust Co.
(SBTC) Tuguegarao Branch or deposited to
the accounts of a certain Mr. Magno Lim
maintained
at
MetroBank
and
EquitablePCIBank,
both
located
at Tuguegarao City.
It is, thus, clear that accused-appellant
committed Qualified Theft. And as duly pointed
out above, even considering the absence of the
handwritten extrajudicial admission of accusedappellant, there is more than sufficient evidence
adduced by the prosecution to uphold his
conviction. As aptly pointed out by the trial court,
the prosecution has established the following:
1.
That checks of various customers of UCC
were written out as bearer instruments. Payments
in cash were also made.
2.
These were received by the accused Mirto
who deposited them in his personal account as
well as in the account of Mr. Magno Lim.
3.
The monies represented by the checks and
the case payments were consideration for bags of
cement
purchased
from
the
UCC,
the
complainant-corporation.
4.
The accused Mirto was never authorized nor
was it part of his duties as branch manager to
deposit these proceeds in his account or in the
account of Mr. Magno Lim.[30]
Defense of Agency Unavailing
As his main defense, accused-appellant cites the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Restituto
Renolo and Reynaldo Santos to impress upon the
Court that he is an agent of UCC. And as an
agent, so he claims, an implied trust is
constituted by his juridical possession of UCC
funds from the proceeds of cement sales:
To accused-appellant, he had authority to collect
and accept payments from customers, and was
constituted an agent of UCC. As collection agent

of UCC, he asserts he can hold the collections in

trust and in favor of UCC; and that he is a trustee
of UCC and, therefore, has juridical possession
over the collected funds. Consequently, accusedappellant maintains there was no unlawful taking,
for such taking was with the knowledge and
consent of UCC, thereby negating the elements of
taking personal property and without the owners
consent necessary in the crime of Qualified Theft.
This contention fails.
The duty to collect payments is imposed on
accused-appellant because of his position as
Branch Manager. Because of this employeremployee relationship, he cannot be considered
an agent of UCC and is not covered by the Civil
Code provisions on agency. Money received by an
employee in behalf of his or her employer is
considered to be only in the material possession
of the employee.[33]
The fact that accused-appellant had authority to
accept payments from customers does not give
him the license to take the payments and deposit
them to his own account since juridical
possession is not transferred to him. On the
contrary, the testimony he cites only bolsters the
fact that accused-appellant is an official of UCC
and had the trust and the confidence of the latter
and, therefore, could readily receive payments
from customers for and in behalf of said company.
Proper Penalty
The trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court,
sentenced accused-appellant to restitute UCC the
aggregate amount of PhP 2,279,350, representing
the amount of the checks involved here. The trial
court also imposed the single penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Apparently, the RTC erred in imposing
said single penalty, and the CA erred in affirming
it, considering that accused-appellant had been
convicted on four (4) counts of qualified theft
under Criminal Case Nos. 9034, 9115, 9117 and
9130. Consequently, accused-appellant should
have
been
accordingly
sentenced
to
imprisonment on four counts of qualified theft
with the appropriate penalties for each
count. Criminal Case No. 9034 is for PhP 308,200,
Criminal Case No. 9115 is for PhP 688,750,
Criminal Case No. 9117 is for PhP 1,213,900, and
Criminal Case No. 9130 is for 68,500 for the
aggregate amount of PhP 2,279,350.
Now to get the proper penalty for each count, We
refer
to People
v.
Mercado,[34] where
We
established that the appropriate penalty for
Qualified Theft is reclusion perpetua based on

Art. 310 of the RPC, which provides that [t]he

crime of [qualified] theft shall be punished
by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in
[Art. 309] x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying the computation made in People v.
Mercado to the present case to arrive at the
correct penalties, We get the value of the
property stolen as determined by the trial court,
which are PhP 308,200, PhP 688,750, PhP
1,213,900 and PhP 68,500. Based on Art.
309[35] of the RPC, since the value of the items
exceeds P22,000.00, the basic penalty isprision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be
imposed in the maximum period, which is 8
years, 8 months and 1 day to 10 years of prision
mayor.[36]
And in order to determine the additional years of
imprisonment, following People v. Mercado, We
deduct PhP 22,000 from each amount and each
difference should then be divided by PhP 10,000,
disregarding any amount less than PhP
10,000. We now have 28 years, 66 years, 119
years and 4 years, respectively, that should be
added to the basic penalty. But the imposable
penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total
of 20 years. Therefore, had accused-appellant
committed simple theft, the penalty for each of
Criminal Case Nos. 9034, 9115 and 9117 would
be 20 years of reclusion temporal; while Criminal
Case No. 9130 would be from 8 years, 8 months
and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, before
the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. However, as the penalty for Qualified Theft
is two degrees higher, the correct imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua for each count.
In fine, considering that accused-appellant is
convicted of four (4) counts of Qualified Theft
with corresponding four penalties of reclusion
perpetua, Art. 70 of the RPC onsuccessive
service of sentences shall apply. Art. 70
pertinently provides that the maximum duration
of the convicts sentence shall not be more than
threefold the length of time corresponding to the
most severe of the penalties imposed upon
him. No other penalty to which he may be liable
shall be inflicted after the sum total of those
imposed
equals
the
said
maximum
period. Such maximum period shall in no case
exceed forty years. Applying said rule, despite
the four penalties of reclusion perpetua for four
counts of Qualified Theft, accused-appellant shall

suffer imprisonment for a period not exceeding

40 years.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The
appealed CA Decision dated August 24, 2009 in
CA-G.R.
CR-H.C.
No.
03444
is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION in
that
accused-appellant Bernard G. Mirto is convicted
of four (4) counts of Qualified Theft and
accordingly sentenced to serve four (4) penalties
of reclusion perpetua. But with the application of
Art. 70 of the RPC, accused-appellant shall suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for a period not
exceeding 40 years.
Costs against accused-appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. FERNANDO SULTAN y LATO,
accused-appellant.
FERNANDO SULTAN y LATO appeals from the
Decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with rape,
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to return to his victim one (1) wrist
watch, one (1) ring, one (1) pair of earrings, and
one (1) necklace valued at P1,600.00, P850.00,
P500.00, and P2,100.00, respectively, and cash of
P130.00; otherwise, to pay P5,180.00 if
restitution be no longer feasible. He was further
ordered to pay P50,000.00 for moral damages.
The evidence for the prosecution was based
principally on the testimony of complaining
witness Juditha M. Bautista. According to her, on
2 June 1997 at 9:00 oclock in the evening she
was on her way home from a visit to her cousin
Cristina Mansilongan in Novaliches, Quezon City;
when she passed the dark alley in her cousin's
compound she was accosted by someone, later
identified as accused-appellant Fernando L.
Sultan, who pointed a sharp instrument at her
neck and announcing it was a "hold-up." He
grabbed her and brought her to a house along
the alley which turned out to be his. Once inside
the house, he made her sit down. He offered her
a drink; she refused it. Then he started divesting
her of her watch, ring, earrings, and necklace the
values of which are now reflected in the Decision
of the court a quo, and her cash of P130.00. After
taking her valuables, he started kissing her on
the lips and cheeks. As if to discourage him from
making further sexual advances, she told him
that she was married with two (2) children but
accused-appellant was not dissuaded from
pursuing his intentions. While pointing an ice pick
at her he ordered her to undress. She acceded for

fear that he would kill her as she was under

constant threat. After she had completely
undressed, accused-appellant ordered her to lie
down on the floor. He then kissed her again from
head down. Still she could not resist him because
of fear. He went on top of her, held her two (2)
hands on the level of her head, spread her thighs
and inserted his penis into her vagina. The coital
encounter lasted for ten (10) to fifteen (15)
minutes.
After satisfying his lust, he ordered her to put on
her bra and panty, tied her hands and went out of
the room to smoke. After ten (10) to fifteen (15)
minutes, he came back, untied her, and once
again with threat and intimidation sexually
abused her. Thereafter, he tied her hands to a
protruding piece of wood in the room and held
her in his arms. She cried. He told her that he
loved her and that he would answer for what he
had done to her. They talked until noon the
following day without sleeping.[3]
In her effort to release herself from his clutches
she "agreed" to elope with him. Perhaps
convinced that she was going to run away with
him, he allowed her to go home at noon to get
her things. She was then staying with her cousin
Nita del Rosario, at No. 9 Sta. Eleuteria Street,
Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon City. He even
accompanied her to the highway to get a ride
home.
When Juditha arrived home she saw her sister
Antonette in the house. She was not actually
residing there but went there only that day.
Juditha lost no time in narrating her harrowing
experience to her sister. Immediately Antonette
called her brother SPO1 Fernando M. Bautista
who resides in Bulacan.[5] SPO1 Bautista arrived
at around 3:00 or 4:00 oclock in the afternoon
and was told about what happened.[6] He then
advised Juditha to go back to the house of
accused-appellant for the "planned elopement"
so that he and his two (2) companions[7] could
stage an arrest.[8]
On their way to the house of accused-appellant,
Juditha rode in a passenger jeep with her sister
Antonette and cousin Nita while her brother and
his two (2) companions followed them on board
an XLT Van. Juditha alighted near the house of
accused-appellant while her companions waited
for her and accused-appellant along the highway.
When she arrived at accused-appellants place, he
was already waiting for her outside the store
nearby. They went inside his house and came out

twenty (20) minutes later. They boarded a

passenger bus while SPO1 Bautista and his
companions trailed them. When the bus reached
the corner of Forest Hill Subdivision, Gulod,
Novaliches, it slowed down because of the traffic
thus making it easier for SPO1 Bautista and his
companions to board the bus. Upon seeing her
brother and his companions, Juditha motioned to
them. They immediately approached accusedappellant and boxed him before they could arrest
him. The other passengers of the bus joined in
hitting
accused-appellant.
This
caused
a
commotion in the bus. Some policemen who were
in the barangay hall across the street saw the
disturbance. They boarded the bus to find out
what happened. Then they assisted in facilitating
the arrest of accused-appellant and brought him
to the barangay hall. He was later on transferred
to
the
police
headquarters
for
further
interrogation.
At the police station the authorities investigated
Juditha who readily identified accused-appellant
as her robber and rapist. The police then
requested for physical examination to find signs
of sexual abuse. Medico-Legal Inspector Dr.
Dennis G. Bellin found no external signs of
violence although there was a deep fresh
laceration at 5 oclock position in Judithas hymen.
He also discovered other lacerations, deep
healed, at 3, 7 and 9 oclock positions. Dr. Bellin
also observed that Judithas external vaginal
orifice offered moderate resistance to his
examining index finger and virgin-sized vaginal
speculum. She was no longer a virgin when the
alleged rape transpired.[9]
On 5 June 1997 an Information[10] for the special
complex crime of robbery with rape was filed
against accused-appellant Fernando Sultan y
Lato, docketed as Crim. Case No. Q-97-71353.
But accused-appellant brushed aside the charge
and claimed that it was simply a sexual congress
of consenting adults.
Finding the complaining witness version more
credible, the trial court, on 5 June 1998, found
accused-appellant
guilty
as
charged
and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. He was
ordered to return to Juditha Bautista one (1) wrist
watch valued at P1,600.00, one (1) ring worth
P850.00, one (1) pair of earrings worth P500.00,
one (1) necklace worth P2,100.00 and cash in the
amount of P130.00, or the payment of P5,180.00
if return was not possible. Accused-appellant was
further directed to pay his victim P50,000.00 for
moral damages.[11]

In this appeal, accused-appellant submits that

there is no convincing proof that he is guilty of
the crime charged.
As to the robbery, he contends that the testimony
of complainant that she was robbed of her
personal valuables should not be given weight
and credence as (a) no evidence was presented
in court to prove her claim and that (b) if he had
really robbed her, why did she not ask him for
restitution of her valuables after the alleged
threat had ceased, i.e., when there was already
an agreement between them to elope?
These arguments fail to persuade us. The
testimony of complainant as to the taking of her
cash and valuables is evidence enough to sustain
a conviction for robbery considering that we find
no fault in the pronouncement of the trial court
that her testimony is credible. The persuasive
value of the declaration of credibility is bolstered
by our own scrutiny of the testimony of
complainant showing her answers to the incisive
questions propounded to her to be firm and
straightforward.
While there may have been no effort on the part
of complainant to retrieve her personal
belongings from accused-appellant even after all
threats had ceased, her failure to do so does not
under the circumstances necessarily dispute the
commission of robbery. Article 293 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that "[a]ny person who, with
intent to gain, shall take any personal property
belonging to another, by means of violence
against or intimidation of person, or using force
upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery." When
accused-appellant divested complaining witness
of her personal belongings he committed the
crime of robbery. All the elements necessary for
its execution and accomplishment were present,
i.e., (a) personal property belonging to another,
(b) unlawful taking, (c) intent to gain, and (d)
violence or intimidation. It is therefore immaterial
that she failed to ask for the return of her
personal things. Moreover, her actuation could
only be fairly interpreted to mean that she did not
want accused-appellant to be suspicious of her
moves.
As for the charge of rape, accused-appellant
maintains that the requisite force or intimidation
was not proved by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt; that there was some form of
consent to the sexual intercourse as complainant
did not put up tenacious resistance despite lack

of threat on her life during the alleged rape; and,

that complainant on cross-examination was not
certain whether accused-appellant was armed at
the commencement of the rape.
We likewise find these contentions of accusedappellant unconvincing. The prosecution for rape
in the instant case is based solely on the
testimony of complaining witness. Thus, the basic
issue that must be addressed is her credibility.
Doctrinally, the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is accorded the highest
respect and weight by the appellate courts. It is
normally sustained unless material facts and
circumstances
have
been
overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied.[12] There is no
such showing in this case.
Accused-appellant might not have employed
force in committing the rape but he definitely
used intimidation which was sufficient to make
complainant submit herself to him against her will
for fear of life and personal safety. Accusedappellant grabbed her and dragged her to his
house. He was armed with an ice pick and
threatened to kill her with it if she did not follow
his wishes. She was naturally intimidated and her
intimidation started from that moment on, and
subsisted in her mind when the rape was started
until its consummation. Intimidation is subjective
so it must be viewed in the light of the victims
perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime, and not by any hard
and fast rule. It is enough that it produces fear, as
in the present case, fear that if the complainant
does not yield to the bestial demands of accusedappellant something would happen to her at that
moment or even thereafter. Thus, it is irrelevant
that she was not certain when cross-examined
that accused-appellant was armed with an ice
pick when the rape commenced; it was enough
that he was holding something that looked like an
ice pick which engendered fear in her. With fear
instilled in her mind, it is understandable that she
did not offer any resistance since any attempt to
do so would only be futile. Such failure on her
part should not be taken to mean consent so as
to make her a willing participant in the sexual
confrontation.
The Information charges accused-appellant with
the special complex crime of robbery with rape.
The record shows that the prosecution has
established that he committed both robbery and
rape with the intent to take personal property of
another preceding the rape. Under Art. 294, par.
(1), of the Revised Penal Code, "x x x [a]ny

person guilty of robbery with the use of violence

against or intimidation of persons shall suffer: 1.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, x x x
when the robbery shall have been accompanied
by rape x x x x" Complaining witness Juditha
Bautista was raped twice on the occasion of the
robbery. In this regard, this Court had declared in
some cases that the additional rapes committed
on the same occasion of robbery would not
increase the penalty.[13] There were also cases,
however, where this Court ruled that the
multiplicity of rapes committed could be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.[14]
Finally, in the recent case of People v. Regala,[15]
the Court held that the additional rapes
committed should not be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance despite a resultant
"anomalous situation" wherein robbery with rape
would be on the same level as robbery with
multiple rapes in terms of gravity.[16] The Court
realized that there was no law providing for the
additional rape/s or homicide/s for that matter to
be considered as aggravating circumstance. It
further observed that the enumeration of
aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the
Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13
of the same Code which enumerates the
mitigating
circumstances
where
analogous
circumstances may be considered, hence, the
remedy lies with the legislature. Consequently,
unless and until a law is passed providing that the
additional rape/s or homicide/s may be
considered aggravating, the Court must construe
the penal law in favor of the offender as no
person may be brought within its terms if he is
not clearly made so by the statute. Under this
view, the additional rape committed by accusedappellant is not considered an aggravating
circumstance. Applying Art. 63, par. (2), of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "(i)n all
cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof x x x x 2. (w)hen there are
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances
in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty
shall be applied," the lower penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed on accusedappellant.
As to the award of damages to the complaining
witness, an additional amount of P50,000.00 may
be given as damages ex delicto in line with recent
jurisprudence.[17]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo
finding accused-appellant FERNANDO SULTAN Y

LATO GUILTY of the special complex crime of

robbery with rape and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua, to pay Juditha M. Bautista
P50,000.00 for moral damages, P5,180.00 for
actual damages representing the value of the
personal properties plus the cash amount of
P130.00 taken from her is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of P50,000.00 be
added as civil indemnity in conformity with
prevailing jurisprudence. Costs against accusedappellant.