16. Doruelo v.

Ministry of National Defense

169 SCRA 448 (1989)
Facts: The Commandant of Philippine Coast Guard suspended
Petitioner Doruelo for two years due to a maritime collision, which
resulted in the sinking of a fishing boat. Subsequently, petitioner
appealed to the Ministry of National Defense. The said ministry
affirmed the decision of the Philippine Coast Guard and dismissed the
appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner now sought the review of the ruling
of the said administrative body.
Issue: WON the suspension of the petitioner is correct
Held: The rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if
based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing
authorities. When is evidence "substantial" has been elaborated on,
thus: Substantial evidence in more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion". We yield to the Philippine Coast Guard's factual
findings because first, it had been called upon to make such findings
and second, it was in a far better position to appraise the pieces of
evidence before it. In any case, we cannot say that it had misconstrued
the evidence, simply because it had rejected the petitioners' own. The
question is whether or not the evidence utilized to support the decision
can stand scrutiny. Under the circumstances, we find that it can.
17. Lumiqued v. Exevea
282 SCRA 125 (1997)
Facts: Lumiqued was charged for dishonesty due to questionable gas
expenses under his office. The issue was referred to the DOJ.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and
10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second
hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable
him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the
motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he
himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for
resolution. As a result, Lumiqued was eventually dismissed.
Issue: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted
by counsel during an administrative inquiry?
Held: The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which
cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of
counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial
investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or

rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an

administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of
an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and
independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not
accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation
conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145
was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively
liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to
counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or the law.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain ones side. Whatever irregularity attended the
proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqueds
appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.
18. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corp.,
et al,
G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008
Facts: The Securities of Exchange and Commission issued an order
finding that the IRC violated the Rules in connection with the then Old
Securities Act. Respondents, however, questioned the authority of the
SEC to investigate on said matter since according to PD 902-A,
jurisdiction upon the matter was conferred upon the PED (Prosecution
and Enforcement Department) of the SEC. They also contended that
their right to due process was violated when the SEC required them to
appear before the SEC to show cause why sanctions should not be
imposed upon them since such requirement shifted the burden of proof
to respondents. The CA ruled in favor of the respondents.
Issue: Whether or not their right to due process was violated when the
SEC denied the parties of their right to cross examination.
Held: There is no violation of due process in this case since the
proceedings before the PED are summary in nature. The hearing officer
may require the parties to submit their respective verified position
papers together will all supporting documents and affidavits of
witnesses. A formal hearing is not mandatory and it is within the
discretion of the hearing officer to determine whether or not there is
aneed for a formal hearing. Moreover, the law creating the PED
empowers it to
Investigate violations of the rules and regulations and to file and
prosecute such cases. It does not have adjudicatory powers. Thus, the
PED need not comply with the provisions of the Administrative Code on
adjudication.

19. Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission

10 SCRA 46 (1964)
Facts: Petitioner was charged with black market of electric meters and
that its meters were installed in bad faith to register excessive rates.
Petitioner received a communication from General Auditing Office
(GAO) that it will be audited. PSC issued subsequently a subpoena
duces tecum requiring petitioners to produce before PSC certain book
of accounts. Petitioner moved to quash such subpoena. In May 1962,
PSC issued an order, which after finding that petitioner had an excess
of revenues by 18%, lowered the present meter rates of petitioner.
Hence, this petition for certiorari is instituted.
Issue: WON notice and hearing is required
Held: Yes. Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix
rates when such are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines may partake of legislative character, such
is not the nature of the order complained of. Here, the order exclusively
applies to petitioner. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of
fact, whether the petitioner is making a profit more than 12% of its
invested capital, which is denied by the petitioner. Obviously, the latter
is entitled to cross-examine the maker of the said report, and to
introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or
complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusions drawn
therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of
fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial
character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and
hearing.
20. Securities and Exchange Commission v. GMA Network
G.R. No. 164026 December 23, 2008
Facts: Petitioner GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA, for brevity), filed an
application for collective approval of various amendments to its
Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent Securities
and Exchange Commission, (SEC). Upon such filing, the petitioner had
been assessed by the SECs Corporate and Legal Department a
separate filing fee for the application for extension of corporate term.
On March 19, 1996, the petitioner requested for an official
opinion/ruling from the SEC on the validity and propriety of the
assessment for application for extension of its corporate term.
Consequently, the respondent SEC, issued its ruling upholding the
validity of the questioned assessment.

Issue: WON the Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 which is

the basis of the issued assessment is valid
Held: No. Rate-fixing is a legislative function, which concededly has
been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws.
The due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine
whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the
bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it
arbitrarily infringes on a persons right to property.
21. Emerson B. Bagonghasa v. Johanna L. Romualdez
G.R. No. 179844, March 23, 2011
Facts: Complainants Romualdez, et al. are absolute and lawful owners
of separate parcels of lands situated in Laguna. Sometime in 1994 and
1995, the then Secretary of Agrarian Reform declared the property to
be part of the public domain, awarded the same to the Defendants and
forthwith issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the
respective defendants. Petitioners now question the validity of the
CARP coverage of the subject properties and the issuance of the
assailed CLOAs.
Issue: WON the court may resolve the controversy in this case
Held: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from
resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction was initially lodged with
an administrative body of special competence. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not allow a court to arrogate unto itself authority to
resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with
an administrative body of special competence. The Office of the DAR
Secretary is in a better position to resolve the particular issue of nonissuance of a notice of coverage an ALI case being primarily the
agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power
to determine such issue lies with the DAR, not with this Court.
22. Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Uniwide Sales Inc.
G.R. No. 174674, October 20, 2010
Facts: Respondents filed with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation the
same being approved. The newly appointed Interim Receivership
Committee filed a rehab plan in the SEC. An amended rehabilitation
plan (ARP) was soon filed with the SEC which was later approved. On
Oct. 11, 2001, the Interim Receivership Committee filed a
Second Amended Rehab Plan (SARP). The same was approved by the
SEC. Petitioners, as unsecured creditors of respondents, appealed with
the SEC praying the SARP be set aside and a new one be issued

directing the Interim Receivership Committee to improve the terms and

conditions of SARP in consultation with all unsecured creditors. SEC
denied the appeal. CA affirmed the SEC.
Issue: Should the SARP be revoked and the rehabilitation proceedings
terminated?
Held: The SECs decision on the matter, herein pending, will have to be
anticipated since the same requires the technical expertise, knowledge
and skills of the SEC.
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not
determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In other words, if a
case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized
training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the court is
had even if the matter may well be within the latter's proper
jurisdiction. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to
guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising
its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined
some question or some aspect of some question arising in the
proceeding before the court.
23. GSIS v. COA
G.R. No. 138381, November 10, 2004
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
24. Gregorio Vigilar v. Arnulfo D. Aquino
G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011
Facts: Petitioner sent an Invitation to bid to respondent for the
construction of a dike. The project was awarded to respondent and a
"Contract Agreement" has been executed. When the project was
comlpeted, a certain amount was due to respondent which the
petitioners refused to pay. As a result, he filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money before the RTC. Petitioner contends that
respondent should have first filed a claim before the Commission on
Audit (COA) before going to the courts.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE OF RESPONDENT TO
EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
Held: No. It has been established that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are
not ironclad rules. In Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap, this Court
enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely: (a)
where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay
or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d)
where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely
legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f)
where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the
doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the
controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j)
where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where
strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.
In the present case, conditions (c) and (e) are present.
The government project contracted out to respondent was completed
almost two decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the
case to the relevant government office or agency will definitely
prejudice respondent. More importantly, the issues in the present case
involve the validity and the enforceability of the "Contract of
Agreement" entered into by the parties. These are questions purely of
law and clearly beyond the expertise of the Commission on Audit or
the DPWH.
25. Geraldine Gaw Guy v. The Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Immigration G.R. No. 167824, July 2, 2010
Facts: Respondent Atty. Agustin Ignacio filed a Complaintfor blacklisting
and deportation against petitioners before the Bureau of Immigration
(BI) on the basis that the latter two are Canadian citizens who are
illegally working in the Philippines. Petitioners avers that the CA
gravely abused its discretion in holding that the lower court has no
jurisdiction over their case and that the instant case is an exception to
the rule of primary jurisdiction and warrants petitioners immediate
resort to judicial intervention.
Issue: WON the Court may intervene

Held: Yes. Judicial intervention should be granted in cases where the

claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the claim is correct in deportation proceeding.
26. New SunValley Homeowners Association v. Sanguniang Barangay
ng Sun Valley G.R. NO. 156686, July 27, 2011
Facts: The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the BSV
Sangguniang Barangay) issued BSV Resolution No. 98-096. NSVHAI
contested the BSV Resolution and filed a Petition for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for issuance of
TRO with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case and that
petitioners recourse in questioning BSV Resolution No. 98-096 should
have been with the Mayor of Paraaque City, as clearly stated in
Section 32 of the Local Government Code.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies.
Held: Yes. It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang
Barangays actions to see if it acted within the scope of its prescribed
powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be resolved
within the local government.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone
of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser
expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies.
Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from
a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed.

27. Arlin Obiasca v. Jeane Basallote

G.R. No. 176707, February 17, 2010
Facts: Respondent Basallote was appointed to the position of
Administrative Officer II and assumed the office June 19, 2003.
However, due to some supervening events, he was advised to go back
to her former position, which she complied with. When respondent
learned that petitioner was appointed to the same position of

Administrative Officer II, she filed a complaint with the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman who ruled in her favor. In its November 29, 2005
resolution, the CSC granted the appeal, approved respondents
appointment and recalled the approval of petitioners appointment.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA denied the petition.
Issue: WON the decision of the CSC may be reversed
Held: No. The decision of the CSC is final and executory if no petition
for reconsideration is filed within fifteen days from receipt thereof. In
this case, petitioner did not file a petition for reconsideration of the
CSC resolution before filing a petition for review in the CA. Such fatal
procedural lapse on petitioners part allowed the CSC resolution to
become final and executory. Hence, for all intents and purposes, the
CSC resolution has become immutable and can no longer be amended
or modified. A final and definitive judgment can no longer be changed,
revised, amended or reversed
28. Republic v. Carlito Lacap
G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007
Facts: Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, and
thereafter undertook the works and purchased materials and labor in
connection with the project. When the project was finally completed,
DPWH withheld payment on the ground that COA disapproved the final
release of funds due to Lacaps expired contractor license. When the
respondent filed a complaint for specific performance and damages,
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds,
among others, that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the
action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of the
District Auditor to disapprove the claim.
Issue: WON there is a failure to exhaust administrative remedies
Held: No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound
public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules.
There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice
the complainant; and (e) where the question involved is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice.
Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal Department
rendered in 1993 and 1994 that payment to a contractor with an
expired contractors license is proper, respondent remained unpaid for
the completed work despite repeated demands. Clearly, there was

unreasonable delay and official inaction to the great prejudice of

respondent.
Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired license at the time
of the execution of its contract is entitled to be paid for completed
projects, clearly is a pure question of law. It does not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth
or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said question at best could be
resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final
decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of
justice.
29. Khristine Rea Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and
Technology, et al. G.R. No. 156109, November 18, 2004
Facts: Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent
Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). In February
2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign. When Regino failed to buy
the required ticket for the said campaign, she was not allowed to take
her final exam in statistics and logic. As a result thereof, petitioner filed
a complaint for damages against PCST. Respondents filed a Motion to
Dismis on the ground failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
According to respondents, the question raised involved the
determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of the PCST;
hence, the case should have been initiated before the proper
administrative body, the Commission of Higher Education (CHED).
Issue: WON there is a failure to exhaust administrative remedies
Held: No. The exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when
there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon
the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they
are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial
tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to award
damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case
before the Commission.