No. 15-1710 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN, Plaintiff-Appellant PAUL F. HARRIS, JR., Circuit Court Judge for Anne Arundel County, Maryland, in his individual capacity, Defendant-Appellee ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND (Civil Action No. JFM-15-1476) APPELLANT’S INFORMAL BRIEF STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN, Pro Se LitigantTABLE OF CONTENTS Page ‘TABLE OF CITATIONS ....- - - « eee iii JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 TIMELINESS OF NOTICE. . . - « Oe ee 1 ISSUE FOR REVIEW Was the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint anerroroflaw? .. 0.0 eee eee ee eee eee nl SUMMARY OF CASE... . . « eee cece 1 ARGUMENT... 0.000000 cece eee eee ee 1.2 1. Classification of the underlying case is irrelevant. There exists no sanctuary for the deprivation of constitutional rights... .... - .3 2. Judges who act in the clear absence of jurisdiction are not afforded judicial immunity. ©... 0.00. e eee eee 5 3. The district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman “inextricably intertwined” inquiry was an error... 2 es 8 CONCLUSION... 222.200 eee ete heen e cence eee t nee 1 RELIEF REQUESTED . 0.0 eee 1 PRIOR APPEALS..--..----+:- ee ee 1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .... . - ceTABLE OF CITATIONS Cases Attorney Gen. v. A.A. County School Bus, 286 Md. 324 (1979) .......-. ae Bell v, Hood, 327 US. 678 (1946)... oe eee eee veee ee ll Boyds Civic Ass'n v. Montgomery County, 526 A. 2d 598, 609 (Md. 1987)... ...-7 Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335. 351 (1872)... - ccc tence ees 6 Coburn y. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250 (1996). eee 7 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. 8. 462 (1983) . 4 Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Industries Corp., 544 US. 280 (2005)... 6. ++ Floyd v, Barker, 12 Coke 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1608)... ..-- +. .+055 4 Forrester v. White, 484 U.S, 227-229 (1988)... ee 6| Hoblock y. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005)... 9 Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994). . . 3 Kelser v. Anne Arundel County Dept. of Social Services, 679 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir.1982) . 4] Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 666-667 (1974). . . 1] Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 (1987)... ee 9) Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335, 343 (4th Cir. 1985) 2... eee ee eee 3 Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 380 A.2d 12, 297 (1977). . . « Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) . . ‘Stevenson v, Lanham, 736 A.2d 363 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999)‘Stump y. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 356-357, 360 (1978)... +--+ + wee 6 The Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U. S. 22, 25 (1913). - Verizon Ma. Inc., v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644, n. 3 (2002) . 8 Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F. 2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982). 2... 66 eee eee 3 Statutes & Rules PBUSE.§1291 cece ee ee ee te tee eee eeeee 1 DRUG CHS (G3 ee ee CREASE PSS 61332 0 ite 1,4, 1 28 U.S.C. § 1343 A) B) ove eee 2 1,5,1 AZUS.C.§ 1983... 02 ec efee eee ee eee 2,4, 5, 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (1) 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6) Annotations Allison B. Jones, “The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: What Does It Really Mean To Be Inextricably Intertwined”, DUKE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 56:643, (2006). 2. ee ee 1 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., “Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow It Up?”, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1083 (1999)... .. 6. + lJuri ional Statement The United States District Court for the District of Maryland had jurisdiction] of this Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and 28 U.S.C] § 1343 (a) (3). The District Court entered an Order on June 8, 2015 dismissing th complaint, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction and closed the case. ‘This Court has jurisdiction over appeals of final decisions of district courts of the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. ‘The Plaintiff / Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal on June 25, 2015. iew The sole issue for review is whether the district court erred by dismissing the complaint, sua sponte, based on the circumstances of the case. mma On June 2, 2015, Mr. Chamberlain filed a Complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. This action sought money damages fo} injuries sustained due to alleged violations of civil rights guaranteed by the Unite States Constitution, federal law and Maryland state law. Specifically, the complaialleged the circuit court judge acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction. The| Complaint was filed and is authorized pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed the Complaint, sua sponte, for lack o} jurisdiction. ‘Two legal reasons were provided to support this contention. First, thay the judge “enjoys absolute immunity” and, second, that “domestic relations cases may not be heard” by the district court. Argument It was an error of law for the district court to dismiss the Complaint su sponte. The complaint alleges violations of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, is a federal question, seeks redress pursuant to federal law, and i: distinct and separate from any issue which had been litigated in the state court The complaint clearly and cogently alleges the judge is not immune from sui under the circumstances of this case as the alleged actions fall within an exception to the general rule of absolute judicial immunity. Lastly, the district court’ application of the Rooker-Feldman “inextricably intertwined” inquiry was an erroi For these reasons, and because the Complaint provides legally plausibl allegations sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence prio} to a sua sponte dismissal, the dismissal was an error of law. The district court has jurisdiction to hear this case.1. Classification of the underlying case is irrelevant. There exists no| sanctuary for the deprivation of constitutional rights. Initially, it is important to note what this case is and is not about. The| complaint filed was a complaint between Stephen D. Chamberlain, a citizen off Colorado, and Paul F. Harris, a Circuit Court Judge (acting in his individual] capacity) who is a resident of Maryland. The complaint specifically alleged tha Judge Harris acted under the color of law, in the clear absence of jurisdiction, and, deprived Mr. Chamberlain of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution Mr. Chamberlain seeks monetary damages for these actions. This case cannot be classified as a “domestic relations” case. The district court’s assertion that “domestic relations cases may not be hear in this court” is wholly irrelevant to the matter. Neither Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2 335, 343 (4th Cir. 1985) nor Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F. 2d 832 (4th Cir} 1982) cited by the district court have any applicability to the instant case, Whil the Raftery court did opine that states have a more direct interest in domesti relations cases, this is not a domestic relations case and unlike Raftery, there ar‘ clearly no interfamilial relationships present. Also, unlike Wasserman, this cas does not involve using diversity jurisdiction to “. . . grant divorces, determin alimony or support obligations or decide child custody rights.” The Wasserma Court stated:“A decision by a federal court not requiring the adjustment of family status| or establishing familial duties or determining the existence of a breach 0 such duties, does not contravene the domestic relations exception to federal] diversity jurisdiction.” (Quoting Kelser v. Anne Arundel County Dept. of Social Services, 679 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir.1982)).. This is a case which singularly seeks the enforcement of rights secured by| the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is inarguable tha federal questions and the vindication of federal rights can be brought before federal tribunal. The district court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint on the basis of 4 lack of jurisdiction is clear error. Subject matter jurisdiction is provided by 2! USC. § 1331: Federal question - The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Additionally, subject matter jurisdiction is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (a) (3) : Civil rights and elective franchise - (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by an person: (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute| ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunit secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congres providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdictior of the United States. The district court’s re-classification of this action brought pursuant to 4: U.S.C. § 1983 as a domestic relations matter should be rejected. Nothing in th complaint is “intertwined”, either “inextricably” or even tangentially to the merits of the underlying action. (See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldma a460 U. S. 462 (1983)). The complaint is not about a domestic issue, nor does it} seek review of the merits of any decision in the state court. This is a federal} question, brought forward as a result of alleged constitutional violations by a state actor acting under the color of law. Neither 28 U.S.C. § 1331 nor 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (a) (3) can be read to have carved out a sanctuary in specific types of underlying litigation to eliminate the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as 4 mechanism for seeking redress for alleged violations of a litigant’s constitutional and federal statutory rights. Jurisdiction is the authority conferred by Congress to adjudicate a given typd of case. (The Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U. S. 22, 25 (1913)). Here, §§ 1331 and 1343 (3) unquestionably authorize federal courts to adjudicate all civil action arising under the constitution, and to redress the deprivation, under color of stat law, of constitutional rights. It is also plain that the complaint formally an explicitly alleged such a deprivation. The district court’s dismissal for lack o} jurisdiction was an error. 2. Judges who act in the clear absence of jurisdiction are not afforded judicial immunity. While the district court specifically stated it dismissed the complaint for lac! of jurisdiction, it clearly indicated dismissal was also required because the judgs “enjoys absolute immunity.”A cursory review of the doctrine of judicial immunity reveals there are two] well settled exceptions to the general rule affording judges absolute judiciall immunity. The immunity of a judge for acts within his jurisdiction has roots extending to the earliest days of common law. (See Floyd v. Barker, 12 Coke 23, 77 Eng Rep. 1305 (1608)). The Supreme Court accepted the rule of judicial immunity in Bradley y. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872), however this case and others make cleay that immunity can be overcome by two sets of circumstances. First, a judge is no immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i. e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. (Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 227-229 (1988); Stump v, Sparkman, 435 U.S. 360 (1978). Second, a judge is not immune for actions. though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. (Stumy v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 356-357 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 351 (1872). The Bradley Court provided a clear distinction between acting in “excess o jurisdiction” and acting in “the clear absence of jurisdiction:” “A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Where there i clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want o} jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible.” The instant complaint clearly outlined facts which showed the only issu before the circuit court was moot, the judge was aware of these facts, and yel proceeded to act “in the clear absence of jurisdiction.” (Circuit courts in Marylandhave no jurisdiction to hear moot cases. (See Stevenson v. Lanham, 736 A.2d 363 (Ma. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250 (1996); Boyds| Civie Ass'n v. Montgomery County, 526, A.2d 598, 609 (Md. 1987); ; Attorney General v, Anne Arundel County Sch. Bus Contractors Ass'n, 286, Md. 324 (1979)4 Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 380 A.2d 12, 297 (1977). The, district court apparently overlooked Paragraph 23 of Mr. Chamberlain’s complain which left no room to suggest the general rule concerning judicial immunity wa: applicable to this case: Judicial immunity, under the circumstances of this case as will be proven at trial, is not applicable. Judicial acts taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction are not protected acts. While the district court directly stated the complaint was being dismissed fo a lack of jurisdiction, presumably in accordance with Rule 12 (b) (1), the Court’ demonstrative statement concerning judicial immunity infers the dismissal wa: also made in accordance with Rule 12 (b) (6): failure to state a claim upon whicl relief can be granted. The district court’s conclusion that the judge “enjoys absolut immunity” is in direct contravention to settled law and erroneous. Nevertheless, i the district court questioned whether the complaint stated a cause of action fot which relief could be granted, that question of law must be decided after, and no} before, the Court assumes jurisdiction. Jt_is_only after the Court assume ‘urisdiction, and after evidence and facts are before it, that a just determination cambe made as to whether the complaint stated a claim for which relief could be} granted. a The district court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman “inextricabl intertwined” inquiry was an error. The district court reasoned that dismissal was proper because the “merits o| the decisions made regarding the Chamberlains’ divorce proceedings are, inextricably intertwined in every claim asserted in the complaint; such review b this court is not permitted.” This reasoning does not comport with the Rooker: Feldman doctrine, and cannot be used as a basis for denial of jurisdiction over the complaint. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercis appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments . . .” (Verizon Ma. Inc., v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Ma., 535 U.S. 635, 644, n. 3 (2002) “Rooker-Feldman bars losing party in state court ‘from seeking what in substance would be appellat review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losin; party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” (Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005| quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994) (underline added)In other words, the doctrine is based on the principle of federalism,| particularly the statutory rule that lower federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to review state court judgments. Notably, the Supreme Court has only applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrin twice: first in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and sixty years later in Feldman. (Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280. 283 (2005). Recently, in Exxon Mobile, the Supreme Court provided clarifying guidance to the doctrine, restricting Rooker-Feldman to the narrow ground of th Rooker and Feldman cases, both of which involved federal plaintiffs calling upor district courts to “overturn an injurious state-court judgment.” The unanimous Court specified four requirements for invocation of the doctrine: 1) the case mus be brought by a state court loser; 2) the injury alleged must be caused by the stat court judgment; 3) the judgment must have been rendered before the district cour} proceedings commenced; and 4) the case must invite the district court review and rejection of that judgment. (Allison B. Jones, “The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine What Does It Really Mean To Be Inextricably Intertwined”, DUKE LA\ JOURNAL, Vol. 56:643, (2006) referencing Exxon Mobile and Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005) ‘The “inextricably interwined” inquiry was borne from a footnote in th Feldman case. In Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 (1987), Justict Marshall expanded on the point by stating:“a federal claim is inextricably intertwined . . . if the federal claim succeeds} only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” The “inextricably intertwined” inquiry, employed to determine Rooker-| Feldman doctrine applicability, has regularly, and wrongly, been used by the lower courts to deny federal jurisdiction. (See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow It Up?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1083 (1999)). The complaint dismissed by the district court in this case did not assert injuries caused by the state court judgment. The alleged injuries were sustained by the judge acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction by hearing a case which wa facially devoid of a controversy and for which he had no authority to preside over} Secondly, the complaint cannot be read, nor can it be inferred, to “invite the distric court review and rejection” of the state-court judgment. As two of the fou requirements for invoking “Rooker-Feldman’” are not met in this case, the distric} court’s application of the doctrine and use of the “inextricably intertwined’ inquiry was an error, Seeking a remedy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fo violations of constitutional rights, for which the district court has jurisdiction, is wholly separate from an attempt to seek review of a state-court judgment, whic has not been requested of the district court in this complaint. Legal reasoning th the claims in this complaint are “inextricably intertwined” with the merits of the state court decisions is flawed. 10Conclusion It cannot be said that the complaint before the district court was "st insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of [the Supreme] Court o1 otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy withi the jurisdiction of the District Court, whatever may be the ultimate resolution o1 the federal issues on the merits." Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666-667 (1974). (Citations omitted.) District court jurisdiction, as clearly laid out in the complaint, is provided by three statutes:, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, § 1332, and § 1343 (a) (3). The complaint is civil action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States} The parties are citizens of different states and the matter in controversy exceeds thi sum of $75,000.00. And the complaint was filed to “redress the deprivation, unde color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right] privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by an ‘Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within th jurisdiction of the United States.” The district court has jurisdiction over this matter. Dismissal, sua sponte, foy lack of jurisdiction was clear error. With regard to judicial immunity, the admonition found in Bell v. Hood, 32’ USS. 678 (1946) is instructive: ""Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actualh recover. For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want o jurisdiction.” The averments in this case fall squarely within one of the settled exception: to judicial immunity. ‘The facts laid out in the complaint are sufficient to warran| the opportunity to present the merits of the case before a fair tribunal fo adjudication. Relief Requested The Appellant hereby respectfully requests this Court vacate the United, States District Court for the District of Maryland’s Order of June 8, 201 dismissing the Appellant's complaint, remand the case to that Court for furthgr proceedings, and for the recovery of the docketing fee and cost of printing and reproducing the brief pursuant to Local Rule 39 (c). Pris eals No other cases have been file in this Court. VT Bao Stephen D. Chamberlain Pro Se LitigantCertificate of Compliance I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type volume limitation imposed by Fed. R. App. P. 32 (a) (7) (B). The brief contains 2,777 words of proportionally spaced text. The type face is Times New Roman, 14-point font. Se7o64_— Stephen D. Chamberlain Certificate of Service I certify that on 14 July, 2015, I served a copy of this Informal Brief b; Certified Mail, postage prepaid, to The Honorable Paul F. Harris, Jr, Anne Arundel County Circuit Court, 8 Church Circle, Annapolis, MD 21404 Defendant / Appellee. Sara nn Stephen D. Chamberlain