Cesar Bengzon vs Franklin

Drilon
208 SCRA 133 Political Law Veto Power of the President
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
repealed during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided
certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional
commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement
benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill
(House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to
certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court
asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never
repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which
were subject of the case of Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to
non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then
readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill
(GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices.
Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item
entitled: General Fund Adjustment; included therein are allotments to unavoidable
obligations in different brances of the government; among such obligations is the allotment
for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of
the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is
already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then
Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due
to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has
no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the
president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors
much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the
authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It
appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the

others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not
at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the
president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed
the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items
covering obligations to the other departments of the government.

TANADA v. ANGARA
October 26, 2012 Leave a comment

272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said
agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its
exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost
and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as
reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic
sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives
foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally
binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a
regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it
consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a
valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of

judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows
withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation
of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for
the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction.
Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

BIRAOGO VS PTC
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
x -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON
A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by thirdlevel public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has
all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less
order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from
such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the

PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of
the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested
the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and
argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the
inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds
because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already
appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasijudicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters
jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause
because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E.
O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping
the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices,
agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a
body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress
are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers
a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they
are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of
E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest
rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does
so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled
to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or
taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos
assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues
in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers
under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad
hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the
President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in
the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of
existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to
specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount
that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules
and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement
those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the
filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the
DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining
facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No.

1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause
enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class
are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and
find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at
least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which
all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to
the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

Maria Carolina Araullo vs

Benigno Aquino III
July 16, 2014
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Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund Realignment

Constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish
growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan.
Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead
of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a
certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the
funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are
declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other
priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth
was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the
Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by
Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he,
and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor
of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the
money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded;

to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the
MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for
certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan,
and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings
and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the
President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to
suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited
in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from
the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds,
which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an
unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the
Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should
only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because
funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative
and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to
an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no
funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be

legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by
the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other
instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was
not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings
should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already
being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue
targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to
it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The
DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to
return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However,
the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and
proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

Ulpiano Sarmiento III vs

Salvador Mison
October 31, 2011
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156 SCRA 549 Political Law Appointment of Head of Bureaus Officers

Requiring Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments

This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was
appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon
Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and
professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears
that Misons appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for
approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the
confirmation of the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the
Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the
unconstitutionality of Misons appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of heads of bureaus needed confirmation by the
Commission on Appointment.
HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed heads of bureaus as one of
those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987
Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These
four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require
confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by
the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to
the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA.

uz Farms vs Sec of DAR

FACTS:

Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly stands to be
adversely affected by the enforcement of some provisions of CARP.

Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to
it:
(a)

Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural,

Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.

(b)

Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial,

livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."

(c)

Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d)

Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily

determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law
(e)

Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13

". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed
within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in
such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive xxx

ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No.
6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage

HELD:

Said provisions are unconstitutional.

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of
the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to
include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform
program of the Government.

Commissioner Tadeo: Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang
agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay
namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers.

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private
agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of
"commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be
covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and
poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

GUTIERREZ VS HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE
ON JUSTICE 415 SCRA 44
BY MAROON 5 PARTNERS AND ASSOCIATES JUNE 1, 2012 ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS FILING
AND REFERRAL IMPEACHMENT MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZOMBUDSMAN ONE-YEAR BAR

Certiorari and prohibition

Date of Promulgation: February 15, 2011
Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
QuickGuide: Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House Resolutions of
Sept. 1 and 7, 2010 finding two impeachment complaints against the
petitioner, simultaneously referred to the House Committee on Justice,
sufficient in form and substance on grounds that she was denied due
process and that the said resolutions violated the one-year bar rule on
initiating impeachment proceedings for impeachable officers. Court
dismissed the petition.
Facts:

22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first

session, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and
spouses Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint
against Gutierrez upon endorsement of Party-List Representatives Walden
Bello and Arlene Bag-ao


27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House
Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the Committee on
Rules to include it in the Order of Business

3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary

John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James
Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed an impeachment complaint againsta
herein petitioner endorsed by Representatives Colmenares, Casio,
Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus

HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on

Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen
transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on
August 9, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business

11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints to

the House Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found

both complaints sufficient in form

2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings

of the 15th Congress was published

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found

the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution
and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance

Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging

Resolutions of September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due
process and that these violated the one-year bar rule on initiating
impeachment proceedings

Issue/s:
1.

Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy

2.

Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of

Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress denied due process to
the Petitioner

3.

Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints violated the

Constitution

Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.

Ratio:

1.

1.

NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION

Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a power but a duty of
the judiciary
the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives
the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for
several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section
3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.
-the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the
sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined
limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, judicially discoverable
standards for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion,
through the power of judicial review
1.

2.
DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish as a mode of
promulgation the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment
Proceedings?

(P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form and substance of

the impeachment complaints is tainted with bias as the Chairman of the
HCOJs, Rep. Tupas, father has a pending case with her at the
Sandiganbayan

Presumption of regularity

The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of the

express grant of rule-making power in the HOR

the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the

constitutional requirements and providing that there must be
a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance
requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
committee

The Constitution itself did not provide for a specific method of

promulgating the Rules.

impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body

politic, and not for the punishment of the offender

1.

3.

THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE

(P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before
the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within
one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be
accepted and referred to public respondent.

INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with

Congress taking initial action of said complaint (referral of the complaint to
the Committee on Justice)

IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate

Rationale of the one-year bar: that the purpose of the one-year

bar is two-fold: 1)to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to
allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation,
that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such
that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer
rekindle the candle. (Gutierrez vs. HOR, 2011)
JAGB

Wilson Gamboa vs Secretary

Margarito Teves
February 15, 2014
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Mercantile Law Corporation Code Capital What Capital means

In 1928, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) was granted a franchise
to engage in the business of telecommunications. Telecommunications is a nationalized
area of activity where a corporation engaged therein must have 60% of its capital be owned

by Filipinos as provided for by Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of
the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a
public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens; xxx
In 1999, First Pacific, a foreign corporation, acquired 37% of PLDT common shares. Wilson
Gamboa opposed said acquisition because at that time, 44.47% of PLDT common shares
already belong to various other foreign corporations. Hence, if First Pacifics share is added,
foreign shares will amount to 81.47% or more than the 40% threshold prescribed by the
Constitution.
Margarito Teves, as Secretary of Finance, and the other respondents argued that this is
okay because in totality, most of the capital stocks of PLDT is Filipino owned. It was
explained that all PLDT subscribers, pursuant to a law passed by Marcos, are considered
shareholders (they hold serial preferred shares). Broken down, preferred shares consist of
77.85% while common shares consist of 22.15%.
Gamboa argued that the term capital should only pertain to the common shares because
that is the share which is entitled to vote and thus have effective control over the
corporation.
ISSUE: What does the term capital pertain to? Does the term capital in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution refer to common shares or to the total outstanding capital
stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares)?
HELD: Gamboa is correct. Capital only pertains to common shares. It will be absurd for
capital to pertain as inclusive of non-voting shares. This is because a corporation consisting
of 1,000,000 capital stocks, 100 of which are common shares which are foreign owned and
the rest (999,900 shares) are preferred shares which are non-voting shares and are Filipino
owned, would seem compliant to the constitutional requirement here 99.999% is Filipino
owned. But if scrutinized, the controlling stock the voting stock or that miniscule .001%
is foreign owned. That is absurd.
In this case, it is true that at least 77.85% of the capital is owned by Filipinos (the PLDT
subscribers). But these subscribers, who hold non-voting preferred shares, have no control
over the corporation. Hence, capital should only pertain to common shares.
Thus, to be compliant with the constitution, 60% of the common shares of PLDT should be
Filipino owned. That is not so in this case as it appears that 81.47% of the common shares
are already foreign owned (split between First Pacific (37%) and a Japanese corporation).
When may preferred shares be considered part of the capital share?
If the preferred shares are allowed to vote like common shares.

Read full texts: 2011 Decision | 2012 Decision on MFR (affirmed 2011 Decision)
Related News: Son continues fathers fight vs. giant firm (July 30, 2013, The Manila Times)

FUNA VS. VILLAR

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO

A. VILLAR
G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo
A. Villar as Chairman of the COA.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the
fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting
Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on
April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA.
Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as
expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his
hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman
accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in
fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7
years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that
position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February
22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention
to step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his
word, Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III
named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This
development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein
moot and academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan
and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the
requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least
four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo
namely:
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount
public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the

following requisites for the exercise of judicial review of an executive act

obtain in this petition, viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and
must be the very litis mota of the case
ISSUES:
a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court
b. WON Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and
after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA
commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under, and the
circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
HELD:
Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance,
since it obviously has far-reaching implications, and there is a need to
promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future
analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to
institute the instant petition.
In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm
before the so-called non-traditional suitors may be extended standing to sue,
thusly:
a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds
or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question
c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are
of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
On the substantive issue:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of
seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman
shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the
other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the

predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a

temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987
Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the
point being that a second appointment, be it for the same position
(commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position
(commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab
initio.
The Court finds petitioners position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding
the word reappointment as, in context, embracing any and all species of
appointment. The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be
appointed by the President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the
full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or extended another
appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term
of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred from being
reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served
the full term of seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either
the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers
is to prevent the president from dominating the Commission by allowing him
to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has
not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence
of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In addition, such
promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the
rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such
that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the
term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not
exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the
commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly
precludes a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman,
provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.

The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that his promotional
appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year term
from February 2008 to February 2015given his four (4)-year tenure as COA
commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court.
While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word
reappointment, there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can
one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both
positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view would
allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be
constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational
system of succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any
circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year
appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of
the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term
as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule
would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively
breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so
appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office
of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who
serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as
chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of
the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term
is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more
than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the
Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional
commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set
of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an
appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing
authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the
expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system
prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,
resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion
of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the

unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down
under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were
appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are
barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the
first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by
the prohibition against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than
seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the
unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is
not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period
of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term
of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that
the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation,
disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that reappointment
found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office
(Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other
hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office
(Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence,
not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
APRIL 11, 2014 BY EMIR MENDOZA

CASE DIGEST: Imbong v Ochoa, et al.

(G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957,
205003, 205138, 204988, 205043, 205478,
205491, 205720, 206355, 207111,
207172, 207563)
Click here for the full text of the Decision.
Read the RH Law (RA 10354) here.
Read the IRR of the RH Law here.
Read enforcement mechanisms of the RH Law with the unconstitutional provisions stricken out here.
*SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating
the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health

3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech

a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the Statesponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical health
practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other
institutions despite their conscientious objections
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as
a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to determine WON a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
* HELD AND RATIO:
A.
1. NO. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this
matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization.
Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of
fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not
intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized
ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and
female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive,
and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret
this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using
the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices
that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that
the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would
pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason,
the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily,
must be struck down.

2. NO. Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, nonabortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and
in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the
RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that the
status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and distribution of
contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court
believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made
available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in
mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed
drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory only
after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the
FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective.
3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of
modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to
ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
a.) NO. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the
policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would
violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the
State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State
can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
b.) YES. Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to
immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible
healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise
Clause, whose basis is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group and health care service providers to refer patients to other providers
and penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to
disseminate information and perform RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and
(a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion. While penalties may
be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail
over the effective implementation of the law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also
violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public health officers
and their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and
the protection of this freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free
exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of an
individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not
pertain to life-threatening cases.
The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means to
achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken other secular steps to ensure
that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the
Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).
c.) NO. Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law does not
even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar. Those who attend
the seminar are free to accept or reject information they receive and they retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4. YES. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent
of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial
privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the
basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to
defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and
the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH
Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and
the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of
minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising
parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures is invalid as it
denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In
addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
5. NO. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education.
Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the
Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of parents in upbringing
their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement
(rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups
in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line
with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6. NO. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the
RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The private health care institution cited
under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health care service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of information and
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from
rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH
Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the
terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
7. NO. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is not
a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick
elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to
paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH
Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to
have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have
and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks
to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under
Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education.
8. NO. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care
service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary
servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest

that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH
service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is
imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not
allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)
B. NO. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or
product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but
also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods (under RA 3720 as
amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).
C. NO. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph (c) of
Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities,
programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these services are not
mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely delineates the
powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an
abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare.

S VS. BULL
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

THE UNITED STATES vs. BULL

G.R. No. L-5270, January 15, 1910
Facts: The information alleged the following: That on and for many months to
December 2, 1908, H. N. Bull was the master of a steam sailing known as the
steamship Standard, the said vessel is engaged in carrying and transporting
cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign port and city of Manila,
Philippines. That the accused Bull while being the master of the said vessel
on or about the 2nd day of December 1908, wilfully, and wrongfully carry,
transport and bring into the port and city of Manila 677 head of cattle and
carabaos from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable
means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to the said animals. In this, to wit, the accused as the
master of the vessel, did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals
so in transit and suitable means for trying and securing said animals in a
proper manner, and did then and there cause some of said animals to be tied
by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to
be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being
tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the
aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for
securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals
were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the
decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
Commission.

Issue:
1. The complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court.
2. That under the evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and
determine the case.
Ruling:
1. Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of
First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which
such animals are disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent therewith in
Act No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of the courts of the
Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the
courts over certain offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the
jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the Philippine Islands
on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1
Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First
Instance in any province into which such ship or water upon which the offense
or crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this
offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could
have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly
conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well recognized and established
public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that
it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws
thereof. We have then the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an
offense of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master
thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense
continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the
United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an
offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of
any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the
headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial
waters, and a new set of principles became applicable.
The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial
sovereign subject through the proper political agency. This offense was
committed within territorial waters. From the line which determines these
waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to
anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued,
and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the
same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The
offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a

continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during

the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was
done within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court, but the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether
that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every
state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According
to strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly
power without permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a
prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public ship of all friendly
powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within
such waters was not established until within comparatively recent times.
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go
freely. Local official exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses
committed by their crew are justiciable by their own officers acting under the
laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general
principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and
convenience, and finds its justification in the fact that experience shows that
such vessels are generally careful to respect local laws and regulation which
are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity and
convenience does not require the extension of the same degree of exemption
to merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to extent of the
immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to the French theory and
practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern
the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by
the court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts
therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French
merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against another.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the
merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose
of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so
long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise
provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over
offenses committed on board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew
against another which amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquility of the
country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the language requires us to

hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or tranquility of the
country. The offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing to so
with any difference between the captain and the crew. It was a violation by the
master of the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus
find that neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the
commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle
of public law, are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction
over the offense charged in the information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not
allege that the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation
which it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port.
To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be to construe the language
of the complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of
the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and
a reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction
upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are
then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their
disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be
different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional
element in the offense, but it does not.
The evidence shows not only that the defendants acts were knowingly done,
but his defense rests upon the assertion that according to his experience, the
system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable
and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals. It was conclusively
proven that what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.
2. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning
of the Act cannot be left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a
question which must be determined by the court from the evidence. On
December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the
port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng,
Formosa, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in
transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said animals,
contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1
of Act No. 275. The trial court found the abovementioned facts true and all of
which are fully sustained by the evidence.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred
and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs. The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.

Notes:
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that

The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or

transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the
Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such
animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable
sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel
in passage from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall
cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage and fresh water at
least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the animals are
embarked to the time of their final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by
adding to section 1 thereof the following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or
transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the
Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such animals
while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or
other animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported, without
cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or unload
cattle upon or from vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes
or chains attached to the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly
and willfully fails to comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every
such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of not less that one hundred dollars nor
more that five hundred dollars, United States money, for each offense.
Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court of First Instance or
any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are
disembarked.
FROM ATTY. DOBLADA^^
Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of
First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused
to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated
and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower
courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the
defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained
valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control invalidated all
judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could continue hearing
the cases pending before them.
Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and
valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may
be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror.
Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the
bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid,
then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any other government
and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese
military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid
and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs
intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains.
Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such
construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of
the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international
law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the
phrase processes of any other governments.
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they
become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being
continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until changed by some
competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the
new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of
the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon
them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction
over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws
creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take
cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation
unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because
such a construction would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force
or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in
the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)

through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
insurrection against the parent state)

abanag vs. Vito Case Digest (Consti-1)

Mabanag vs. Vito
[GR L-1123, 5 March 1947]
En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in separate opinion, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 1 filed
separate opinion
Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the
Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on
23 April 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first
session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight
representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in
the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A
resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution
had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for prohibition was filed. As a
consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the
congressional resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto," nor was their membership
reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an
amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in
favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either
branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition sought to prevent the enforcement of said congressional
resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The members of the Commission on Elections,
the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made
defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the
Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution proposing
an amendment to the Constitution.
Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities that political questions are not
within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on
the principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation
of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of political question.
The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full
harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the
political departments of the government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect
to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill
rule" born of that respect. If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to
ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to
achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article
XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is
no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to
amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative
capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in
dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of
the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity
of a proposal then into that of ratification.

Planas v. COMELEC
7/17/2014
0 Comments

Constitutional Law. Political Law. Plebiscite Cases.

PLANAS VS. COMELEC

49 SCRA 105; January 22, 1973
Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.
FACTS:
While the 1971 Constitution Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the president issued
Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under martial law. On November 29, 1972 the Convention
approved its proposed constitution. The next day the president issued PD No. 73 submitting to the people
for ratification or rejection the proposed constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a petition to enjoin respondents from implemented PD No. 73
because the calling of the plebiscite among others are lodged exclusively in the Congress. On December
17, 1972, the president issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of PD 1081 for the purpose of
free and open debate on the proposed constitution. On December 23, the president announced the
postponement of the plebiscite, as such, the Court refrained from deciding the cases. On January 12, the
petitioners filed for an urgent motion praying that the case be decided as soon as possible.
ISSUES:
1. Is validity of PD 73 justiciable?
2. Is PD 73 valid?
3. Does the 1971 Constitutional Convention have the authority to pass the proposed constitution?
HELD:
The Court may pass upon constitutionality of PD 73 not only because of a long list of cases decided by
the Court but also of subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution which expressly
provides for the authority of the Court to review cases revolving such issue. The validity of the decree
itself was declared moot and academic by the Court. The convention is free to postulate any amendment
as long as it is not inconsistent to what is known as Jus Cogens.