Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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Defendant.
Hearing:
June 2, 2016
Time:
1:30 p.m.
Courtroom: 5
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Plaintiffs,
v.
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DECLARATION OF SHANNON LISS-RIORDAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
CASE NO.: 13-3826-EMC
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I am a partner at the law firm of Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., and am lead attorney
and class counsel for the Plaintiff class in the above-captioned matter. I submit this
Litigation History
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2.
In the nearly three years this case has been pending, the parties have engaged in
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extensive discovery. Plaintiffs have propounded and Uber has responded to thirty-six
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Requests For Production and thirty-six Interrogatories, while the named Plaintiffs have
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Requests for Admission since the start of the case. To date, the parties have
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Plaintiffs have taken five depositions, including depositions of two Uber managers, two
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separate Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses, and Ubers Senior Vice President of Operations Ryan
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Graves.
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Defendants have deposed five named plaintiffs (in full-day depositions), including one
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named plaintiff who this Court dismissed from the case following the Courts Order
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limiting the class to California drivers. See Dkt. 136 at 16 (limiting class to California).
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5.
The parties have presented five joint discovery letters to Magistrate Judge Ryu and
participated in four discovery hearings, and Judge Ryu has issued three separate
substantive decisions on discovery-related issues. My firm has also been in nearconstant contact with class members in this case. More than 2,000 class members have
contacted my firm about the case and I have personally been in email contact with
drivers on a daily (and often hourly) basis. I have been assisted in these
communications by associate attorneys and a team of paralegal staff (currently
comprised of four paralegals, two of whom have been engaged primarily with
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almost daily basis) and were in the midst of preparing additional letter briefs regarding
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Counsel have met and conferred countless times regarding discovery (lately on an
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claims. There have been 23 substantive motions filed in this case (not to mention more
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than sixty administrative motions), and the Court has issued 25 substantive rulings
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(totaling more than 287 pages of legal opinions). The Court has held 18 hearings
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A trial on both liability and damages is currently scheduled to begin in this case
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approximately two months from now on June 20, 2016, and the parties have also
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When this settlement was reached, the parties were prepared to begin depositions of
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trial witnesses, and the Court had allowed each side to take up to 80 hours of
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depositions.
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The parties attempted mediation early in the case in April 2014 with mediator Jeff Ross,
Following the certification of an enlarged class and several months before trial, the
parties decided to attempt mediation again.
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The parties agreed to mediate again with mediator Mark Rudy. They met with Mr.
Rudy on March 10, 2016, and again on April 1, 2016. On April 5, 2016, the Ninth
Circuit granted Ubers Petition for Review Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). The
parties then met for an additional mediation session on April 8, 2016, and thereafter
finalized a written Memorandum of Understanding.
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experience, in light of the known monetary and non-monetary benefits of the resolution,
and weighed against the risks of continued litigation, including the following:
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The Ninth Circuit granted Ubers Petition for review of this Courts Supplemental
Class Certification Order on April 5, 2016. See Ninth Cir. Appeal No. 16-15595,
Dkt. 1.
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Plaintiffs decision to accept the terms of this agreement was based upon Counsels
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Based on the data and information I have received from Uber in this litigation, it is my
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the class size would have diminished from more than 240,000 drivers to approximately
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Moreover, by granting the Rule 23(f) petition, the Ninth Circuit agreed to review the
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Courts decision to certify Plaintiffs claim under Cal. Labor Code 2802, the driving
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force behind this case, and by far the most significant source of damages.
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Ubers Rule 23(f) appeal is currently scheduled to begin briefing in July 2016.
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Moreover, Uber has informed me that, in the absence of a Settlement, Uber would seek
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an emergency stay of the district court proceedings in OConnor so that the Ninth
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Circuit could resolve Ubers pending Rule 23(f) appeal before the start of the June 2016
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trial in this case. While not required to do so, a number of Circuit Courts have stayed
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district court proceedings following the grant of a Rule 23(f) petition. See, e.g., Arreola
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v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 2008); Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 183 (3d Cir. 2006); Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, 545
F.3d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 2008); Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp., 442 F.3d 188, 190 (4th
Cir. 2006). Thus, if the Ninth Circuit were to follow this precedent, the Ninth Circuit
would have heard and resolve Ubers Rule 23(f) petition before trial begins here.
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DECLARATION OF SHANNON LISS-RIORDAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
CASE NO.: 13-3826-EMC
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briefed and scheduled for oral argument on June 16, 2016, just days before the trial in
this case has been scheduled to begin. See Ninth Circuit Appeal Nos. 14-16078, 15-
16178. An adverse decision reversing this Courts rulings regarding the enforceability
of Ubers 2013 and 2014 arbitration clauses could destroy the certified class in this case,
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Two other appeals of this Courts rulings regarding Ubers arbitration clauses are fully
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Moreover, Uber has made clear that, should this case not resolve, and should the Ninth
Circuit panel affirm the Courts rulings regarding class certification and enforceability
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of the arbitration clauses, the company would continue to aggressively appeal these
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rulings by seeking en banc review and even certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court.
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The uncertainty created by these appeals was a major factor I took into account in
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A second major risk that I took into account was the risk of trying the all-important
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This Court has stated that numerous [Borello] factors point in opposing directions on
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the issue of employment classification, such that the employment misclassification test
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does not yield an unambiguous result. Dkt. 251 at 2627; see also Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.,
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point in the other, and some are ambiguous . . . .). Thus, there is serious risk that a
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unanimous jury would not find that all drivers in the certified class are Ubers
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In addition, I have adamantly maintained that the employment status question is a legal
question for the Court to decide. The multi-factor Borello test is complicated, and a
decision by a jury risks that the jurors would rely on their own lay understanding of
what constitutes an employee or an independent contractor. I am concerned that a jury
would give undue weight to the fact that drivers value their flexibility (something that
Uber has made clear it intended to impress upon the jury even though I contend it is not
relevant) and would likewise give undue weight to the fact that the parties contract
states that drivers are independent contractors. Even with proper jury instructions,
there can be no avoiding the risk of jurors imposing their own beliefs and
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a major risk, as it would make it very difficult for Plaintiffs to have appealed an adverse
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I believe this settlement falls within the range of possible approval, and the Court
should grant the settlement preliminary approval.
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I also view the Courts decision to deny Plaintiffs request for a special verdict form as
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Likewise, the parties have aggressively litigated the issue of Ubers independent
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contractor defense in summary judgment and have studied this issue in depth in
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preparation for trial. The parties have also litigated the issue of class certification
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supplemental briefing and hearings. See Dkt. 276, 298, 312, 359, 365, 370-1, 380, 381,
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387, 388.
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This information was discussed in depth over the course of three mediation sessions
with Mediator Mark Rudy as well as in additional negotiations between the parties.
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DECLARATION OF SHANNON LISS-RIORDAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
CASE NO.: 13-3826-EMC
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Failure to Reimburse for Necessary Work-Related Expenses (Cal. Lab. Code 2802)
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If Plaintiffs were to prevail on the misclassification issue at trial, I believe a jury would
likely find that drivers expenditures for mileage and cellular phone data plans were
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Cal. Lab. Code 2802 requires an employer to indemnify its employees for all
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However, Uber has informed me that it intended to defend the Cal. Labor Code 2802
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claim on the merits at trial by asserting, among other arguments, that Uber has, in fact,
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satisfied Section 2802 by structuring the fare to be an all-inclusive fare that takes into
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account things like expenses, see Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc., 42 Cal. 4th
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554, 55859 (2007) ([A]n employer may satisfy its statutory reimbursement obligation
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increases in commission rates . . . .). Although I disagree with this argument, because
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Uber did not expressly indicate that it was reimbursing for expenses, it is conceivable
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that this argument may gain traction with a jury,, thus precluding recovery under
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2802.
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drove in California while transporting riders during the class period, and applying the
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IRS fixed reimbursement rates that have been in effect each year during this period, I
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Based on data that Uber produced showing the number of miles that class members
approximately $
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However, Uber has vigorously contested this calculation and made clear that it intended
to argue at trial that Plaintiffs use of the fixed IRS reimbursement rate did not provide
a proper or accurate estimate of drivers expenses and that instead the IRS variable
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cents per mile during the applicable timeframe, whereas the fixed and variable rate for
mileage reimbursement (favored by Plaintiffs) varied from 50 to 56.6 cents per mile
during the applicable timeframe. Thus, using Plaintiffs figures, we calculated the
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The variable rate for mileage reimbursement (favored by Uber) varied from 16.5 to 24
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approximately $
approximately $
Although these damage calculations account for the certified class period, this
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settlement would release claims through the date of preliminary settlement approval.
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Based upon data that Uber provided that is current through April 8, 2016, less than two
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weeks ago, Plaintiffs estimate of mileage reimbursement for certified OConnor class
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The costs of owning and operating a vehicle fall into two categories: fixed and variable.
Fixed expenses are those that do not vary over time from month to month, including
depreciation and insurance, whereas variable expenses are costs that fluctuate month to month,
such as the costs of gas, maintenance, and tires. Plaintiffs use of the IRS fixed rates (which
are actually called the IRS Fixed and Variable Rates, but I refer to them here as the fixed
rates for convenience) would compensate drivers for both types of costs, but Uber intended to
argue at trial (had Plaintiffs succeeded on liability) that only variable costs attributable to
driving for Uber should be used because Uber drivers would have incurred the fixed expenses
even if they did not use their cars for Uber. In other words, a driver using his own car would
have had to pay for insurance and depreciation whether or not he drove for Uber, whereas
variable costs like gas and wear and tear are more directly attributable to driving for Uber.
Plaintiffs would have disputed Ubers reasoning because Uber drivers cannot perform
their job without a car, and Uber requires them to have cars of a certain make and model and to
have insurance, meaning that they cannot do the job without having to pay these fixed
expenses. Furthermore, many drivers do upgrade their cars or even buy a brand new car in
order to meet Ubers standards, so Plaintiffs do not agree that all drivers were paying these
fixed costs regardless. However, although Plaintiffs would have vigorously disputed Ubers
argument, they recognize that there was a serious risk that Ubers argument could gain traction
with the jury, and that if the variable rate were applied, the expense reimbursement claim
would be worth far less than Plaintiffs had estimated.
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DECLARATION OF SHANNON LISS-RIORDAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
CASE NO.: 13-3826-EMC
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calculation using the IRS variable rate (as Uber had preferred) would place this number
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at approximately $
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In addition, the settlement includes drivers who were excluded from the OConnor class
and drivers who used other platforms not at issue in OConnor (e.g., UberTAXI).
Based on updated data that Uber has provided about these drivers, the mileage expense
approximately
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, while a
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Of course, these drivers faced much greater challenges in being able to prevail on their
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claims, given that the Court had excluded many of these drivers from the class and
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determined that their misclassification claim could not proceed on a class basis. In
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addition, many of the excluded class members likely did not have as strong a claim for
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expense reimbursement in the first place because some of the limo companies they
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drove for provide partial reimbursement (such as for gas) and most provide a vehicle
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for the drivers.2 Given these additional hurdles these drivers would have faced, the
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settlement allocation formula gives these drivers one-half the credit for their miles as
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The settlement also includes drivers in Massachusetts who were putative class members
in the Yucesoy case and other Massachusetts drivers. Based on updated data that Uber
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has provided, the mileage expense reimbursement figures for these Massachusetts
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DECLARATION OF SHANNON LISS-RIORDAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
CASE NO.: 13-3826-EMC
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(using Plaintiffs
However, the Massachusetts drivers face much more significant risks in this litigation
than the drivers in California, given that there is not yet a certified class in the Yucesoy
case, and the case has not advanced nearly as far as OConnor. Further, because there
Labor Code 2802, Plaintiffs recovery for expenses in Massachusetts is much less
certain. See Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 2014 WL 496882, *3 (D.
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Mass. Feb. 7, 2014) (in Massachusetts, the question of whether business expenses and
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deductions borne by employees are recoverable under the Wage Act is unsettled under
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state law.) (certifying this question to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court).4
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With respect to expense reimbursement for telephones, I received data from Uber
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showing that California drivers who leased their phones from Uber were charged a total
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of $13.8 million for the phones. Extrapolating half of this rate to all California
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settlement class members (based on the assumption that drivers who used their own
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phones to drive for Uber would not have to pay the full amount that drivers who leased
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their phones would pay, and would also be able to use the phones for their own
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purposes) brings the total estimate for phone expenses in California to approximately
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This figure includes all Massachusetts drivers, including drivers that drove through
third-party companies and under corporate or fictitious names, because Plaintiffs do not believe
that the distinction that the Court drew in the California case would have been relevant under
Massachusetts law. It also includes drivers who used Uber platforms not specifically at issue
in Yucesoy (e.g., UberTAXI). In total, the settlement covers approximately 385,000 California
and Massachusetts drivers.
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Thus, in allocating the settlement funds between California drivers and Massachusetts
drivers, I calculated the relative value of the claims of the two groups, ascribing one-half credit
for the expense reimbursement claim.
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DECLARATION OF SHANNON LISS-RIORDAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
CASE NO.: 13-3826-EMC
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Unlawful Taking of Gratuities (Cal. Lab. Code 351; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200)
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employees. Section 351 does not provide for a private cause of action; however, a
violation thereof can be brought as a claim under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, et
seq.
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Cal. Lab. Code 351 prohibits employers from taking any part of a gratuity given to its
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Plaintiffs have argued that, if they were to prevail on the misclassification issue, and
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prevailed on the claim that Uber has charged passengers a gratuity but without passing
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it on in full to the drivers, then the jury would be asked to determine what amount of
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the fare constituted a gratuity. I made calculations based on a conclusion that the jury
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may have found that Uber included a 20% tip in the fare (a figure which Uber stated on
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some occasions in communications with customers, see Dkt. 485-3 at 9, 20, 52). In
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other words, under this theory, if a driver had a $10 fare, Uber should have set aside
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20% of the fare ($2) to be remitted exclusively to the driver as a tip. Uber should then
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have taken its commission (of, for example, 20%) out of the remaining $8. Uber would
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then receive a commission of $1.60. Instead, Uber took its commission out of the
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entire $10 fare and thus received $2. Thus, Uber would owe the driver the 40 cent
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California for certified class members), I calculated the total potential value of this
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claim to be approximately
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potential value of the claim for drivers who are not currently in the OConnor certified
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Based on this theory and data produced by Uber (showing the total amount of fares in
class to be approximately
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Using the same logic, based on data produced by Uber providing the total amount of
fares in Massachusetts, the total value of the analogous claim in for Massachusetts
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Plaintiffs recognize the risks in proving this claim, including the risk that the jury could
find that Ubers communications that tip is included in Ubers fare were too variable
or not widespread enough to warrant a finding that a tip was actually included. In
addition, in order to succeed on this claim, Plaintiffs would have to prove employee
status for the drivers. And, even if Plaintiffs succeeded on the claim, the jury could
conclude that a lesser amount of tip than 20% was included (such as 15% or 18%). For
example, Uber was prepared to argue that, even if Plaintiffs succeeded on this claim, its
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research demonstrates that 16% is a more usual tip left for taxicab drivers and, if
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The claims described above are the statutory claims that Plaintiffs pursued in this
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against Uber in California and Massachusetts, in order to effectuate the final resolution
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the date of preliminary approval. However, for the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs
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did not value these claims as posing significant risk to Uber and thus contributing any
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appreciable increase in likely damages that drivers may have been able to obtain.
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Failure to Pay Wages When Due (Cal. Lab. Code 201-203, 204, 210)
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(immediately). Cal. Lab. Code 203 provides for waiting time penalties assessed
only when such failure to pay wages when due is willful, and a finding of willfulness
the Labor Code provisions at all, i.e. when there is a good faith dispute as to whether a
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Cal. Lab. Code 201 and 202 require employers to page wages earned and unpaid
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that it would be difficult for Plaintiffs to overcome Ubers good faith defense to
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Cal. Labor Code 221 and 224 provide that an employer may only lawfully withhold
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or federal law; (2) when a deduction is expressly authorized in writing by the employee
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bargaining agreement. Here, Defendants conduct as alleged herein has violated Cal.
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Labor Code 221-224 insofar as Defendant has deducted the costs of equipment (i.e.
telephones). However, because the telephone expenses are part of Plaintiffs Cal.
Labor Code 2802 claim, Plaintiffs do not think that this claim adds any value. Thus,
although Plaintiffs added this claim for settlement purposes in an effort to give Uber
global peace, Plaintiffs do not believe that this claim has any additional value.
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DECLARATION OF SHANNON LISS-RIORDAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
CASE NO.: 13-3826-EMC
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Failure to Pay Minimum Wages (Cal. Lab. Code 1182.12, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, 1197.1)
and FLSA (29 U.S.C. 201, et seq.)
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Cal. Lab. Code 1194 permits an employee receiving less than the legal minimum
wages (currently $10.00 per hour under California law) to recover the unpaid balance
of minimum wage in a civil action. Section 1194.2 further provides for an award of
liquidated damages in a minimum wage action unless an employer can show that the
violation was in good faith and that it had reasonable grounds for believing it was not
subject to minimum wage requirements. Likewise, the federal Fair Labor Standards
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Act requires that employers pay at least the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour
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Massachusetts law in the Yucesoy case, see Yucesoy, Civ. A. No. 3:15-00262-EMC,
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Dkt. 194 at 9-10 (after several attempts to amend), and dismissed similar minimum
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wage claims under the FLSA in the Del Rio case, see Del Rio, Civ. A. No. 3:15-cv-
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hurdle in resolving this claim on a class-wide basis, as discovery has not revealed that
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Uber has had a uniform policy or practice that would support a finding of liability (or
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no liability) on this claim for all drivers and may well have required individualized
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analysis.
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Failure to Pay Overtime Wages (Cal. Lab. Code 510, 1198, 1194) and Fair Labor
Standards Act (29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1))
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Cal. Lab. Code 1198 and Wage Order 9 require employers to pay their employees at
their overtime rate of pay for hours worked in excess of eight per day and/or 40 per
week. Cal. Lab. Code 1194 permits an employee receiving less than his or her
overtime wages to recover the unpaid balance of such wages in a civil action.
Likewise, the Fair Labor Standards Act requires that an employer pay time-and-a-half
an employees regular rate of pay for all hours worked beyond forty in a workweek.
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claim under Massachusetts law in the Yucesoy case, see Yucesoy, Civ. A. No. 3:15-
00262-EMC, Dkt. 194 at 9-10 (again, after several attempts at amendment), and
dismissed similar overtime claims under the FLSA in the DelRio case, see DelRio, Civ.
would certify a claim for those drivers who worked these hours.
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As with the minimum wage claim, the Court already dismissed Plaintiffs overtime
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However, if the Court did certify this claim, and if Plaintiffs were to prevail on the
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misclassification issue, I believe a jury would determine that certain drivers worked in
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excess of eight hours per day or 40 hours per week without being compensated at their
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applicable overtime rates of pay. Based on data provided by Uber, I estimate that if this
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claim were to succeed, its value would be approximately $2 million for California
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However, given the Courts skepticism of this claim in the Yucesoy case, and the
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hurdles to its certification, I believe it would have been very difficult to achieve
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Failure to Provide Meal Periods and Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Periods (Cal.
Lab. Code 226.7, 512, Wage Order 9
59.
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all employees with one 30-minute duty-free meal period if such employee works more
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than five hours in a day. Additionally, 226.7 and Wage Order 9 generally require
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employers to provide all employees with one 10-minute duty-free rest period for every
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Cal. Lab. Code 226.7, 512 and Wage Order 9 generally require employers to provide
If Plaintiffs were to prevail on the misclassification issue, I believe a jury would likely
determine that Uber has met its obligation to provide meal and rest periods. While
drivers might feel pressure to accept ride requests and therefore skip meal and rest
periods, given the way that I understand Ubers application works, I believe that Uber
will be able to argue that drivers can take breaks whenever they wish, including by not
accepting a ride request or by logging out of the Uber App and going off-line
whenever the driver wishes to take break. For example, when drivers are not logged in
to Driver Mode, they do not receive ride requests, and, therefore, cannot be punished by
Uber for declining ride requests or be pressured into missing or cutting short their
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breaks. I believe that such facts would likely preclude liability for meal and rest period
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violations.
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61.
Cal. Lab. Code 1174 requires employers to maintain payroll records pertaining to its
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employees, and Cal. Lab. Code 1174.5 provides for penalties for willful failures to
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maintain such records. A finding that an employers failure to comply with 1174 was
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in good faith precludes liability for the violation. Dalton, 2011 WL 1045107, *6
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(granting summary judgment on 1174 claim because of a good faith dispute that
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difficult for Plaintiffs to show that Uber does not maintain all information required by
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1174, and, even if it does not, it would be difficult for Plaintiffs to overcome Ubers
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I believe that Uber would likely argue that their weekly driver summary emails
constitute pay statements that show all information required by 226(a), except for the
information required by 226(a)(7) (drivers last four digits of their social security
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226(a)(7).
65.
However, to recover under 226, an employee must also show injury. Injury exists
under 226 when an employee is not provided with a pay statement at all, 226(e)(2),
or when there is a deficient wage statement and an employee cannot promptly and
easily determine from the statement alone the information required by 226(a)(2) (total
hours worked), (a)(3) (piece rate units earned, if applicable), (a)(4) (all deductions),
(a)(6) (inclusive dates of the pay period), and (a)(9) (all applicable hourly rates in effect
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during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly
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rate by the employee). Courts have determined that this injury requirement generally
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requires that the employee be unable to quickly verify earnings when looking at the
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wage statements. Holak v. K Mart Corp., 2014 WL 4930762, *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30,
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2014); see also Price v. Starbucks Corp., 192 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1143, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d
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174 (2011) (recognizing that an injury exits where inaccurate or incomplete wage
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computations to reconstruct time records and determine if they were correctly paid).
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I believe it would have been difficult for Plaintiffs to show injury here, including
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because Uber would likely argue that its pay statements set forth the information
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drivers are not paid on a piecework basis), (a)(4) (Uber did not make any deductions),
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(a)(6) (statements show dates of the pay period), and (a)(9) (inapplicable because there
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have not been hourly rates in effect for drivers). Additionally, Uber would likely
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argue that the weekly statements clearly set forth earnings during each pay period,
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hours worked and substantial additional information, which allow drivers to quickly
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Moreover, even assuming that Plaintiffs can show injury arising from a violation of
226, such a violation of 226 is actionable only if it is knowing and intentional, and
therefore courts have permitted employers to assert a good faith defense to the claim at
or after trial. Dalton, 2011 WL 1045107, *5 (finding that good faith dispute as to
whether plaintiffs were independent contractors exempt from Section 226 precludes a
finding that defendant acted with the requisite scienter of knowing and intentional);
Hurst v. Buczek Enterprises, LLC, 870 F.Supp.2d 810, 829 (N.D.Cal.2012) (when a
party makes a good faith claim that a worker [has been properly classified as exempt],
its failure to provide accurate wage statements is not knowing and intentional.)
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defenses to this claim, including that it had a good faith belief that drivers were
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68.
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One in Seven Days Rest (Cal. Labor Code 551, 552, and 558)
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69.
Cal. Lab. Code 551 provides that every person in every occupation is entitled to one
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days rest in seven, and Cal. Lab. Code 552 prohibits employers from requiring an
17
employee to work more than six days out of seven. Here, some Uber drivers worked
18
seven days per week (although based on data from Uber it appears that this was true
19
only for a minority of drivers). In any case, Plaintiffs believe they would face difficult
20
hurdles in proving this claim on a class-wide basis given that many drivers drove only
21
occasionally, and given that it is undisputed that drivers are able to sign on and off the
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Application whenever they wish and can drive as much or as little as they wish.
70.
Cal. Lab. Code 432.5 makes it unlawful for an employer to require an employee or
applicant to agree, in writing, to a term or condition that the employer knows to be
prohibited by law. Here, there is an argument Uber required drivers to accept its
that they would face a challenge in overcoming Ubers defenses to this claim, including
3
4
5
6
7
that it had a good faith belief that the provisions of its agreements were lawful.
72.
Cal. Labor Code 246 provides that an employer must provide any employee who, on
or after July 1, 2015, works in California for the same employer for 30 days or more
within a year from the start of employment, with paid sick days. If Plaintiffs succeed in
9
10
proving employee status, then drivers who drove more than 30 days in a calendar year
11
arguably accrued a certain number of paid sick days and were entitled to use these
12
accrued paid sick days for purposes enumerated in Labor Code section 246.5(a)(l)-(2).
13
74.
However, Plaintiffs likely would face serious challenges in proving liability under
14
section 246 because they must first prove the employees hourly rate of pay, a figure
15
that the Court might find to be incalculable in the case of drivers who use Uber. See
16
Cal. Labor Code 246(k). Even if calculable, a Court may conclude that individual
17
18
must be employed for at least 90 days before being able to use paid sick leave, a Court
19
may conclude that many of the drivers who use Uber infrequently may not be entitled
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Failure to Pay Wages Due Upon Termination (Cal. Labor Code 201-04, 206.5, 208,
210)
75.
Cal. Labor Code 204 requires that an employer pay all wages due upon the
termination of any employee. Plaintiffs ascribe little value to this claim because they
have not seen evidence that Uber delays final payment to drivers who have been
deactivated.
28
DECLARATION OF SHANNON LISS-RIORDAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
CASE NO.: 13-3826-EMC
19
1
2
3
4
Failure to Pay Workers Compensation Insurance (Cal. Labor Code 3700.5, 3712,
3715 Brought Pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200)
76.
These sections of the Labor Code require employers to provide workers compensation
insurance to employees injured on the job. Cal. Lab. Code 3700.5 provides that the
failure to secure the payment of compensation as required by this article by one who
9
10
challenges. First, I believe that it is highly questionable whether drivers could bring
11
such a claim in a private lawsuit as I believe that Uber would argue the claim is
12
preempted by the exclusivity of the Workers Compensation Act, Cal. Labor Code
13
3600, 3602, and that a UCL claim cannot be utilized as a backdoor way to avoid this
14
exclusivity. See Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 24 Cal. 4th
15
800, 828 (2001); Hughes v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 88 Cal. App. 4th 517, 522 (2001)
16
17
unfair competition law (UCL) where the underlying challenged conduct was a
18
violation of the Workers Compensation Act because the WCAB had exclusive
19
jurisdiction); Koszdin v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 186 Cal. App. 4th 480, 495 (2010).
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Wage Order 9, 5, requires that for each workday that a California employee is
required to report for work and does report, but is either not put to work or is furnished
less than half of that employees usual or scheduled days work, each such employee
must be paid an amount equal to half of his or her usual or scheduled days pay, or in
any event must be paid an amount equal to 2 hours at the employees regular rate of
pay. Here, the claim would presumably apply where drivers signed onto the App but
received no ride requests and gave no rides. I believe there is a substantial risk of no
recovery on this claim because drivers can indisputably work as often as they like and
are not required to report or sign onto the App at any particular time. Thus, because
Uber drivers are arguably never required to report for work, I do not ascribe any
6
7
8
9
Cal. Lab. Code 226.8 defines willful misclassification as avoiding employee status
10
11
12
13
Ubers defenses to this claim, including that it had a good faith belief that its drivers
14
should be classified as independent contractors rather than employees, and that it did
15
not knowingly misclassify drivers as a way of avoiding the law. Accordingly, I believe
16
there would be a substantial risk of no recovery on this claim because of the willfulness
17
requirement.
18
19
79.
PAGA, Cal. Lab. Code 2698, et seq., generally provides for penalties arising from
20
violations of the California Labor Code. Penalties are assessed per employee and per
21
22
80.
23
has yet to rule, so there remained a risk that these claims would not go forward in this
24
case. However, assuming that Plaintiffs were successful in having these claims added
25
26
27
28
Here, Plaintiffs have moved to have PAGA claims added to their case, but the Court
to this case, Plaintiffs have made the following assessment of this claim.
81.
Given that much of the work that Uber drivers have performed has been spread out over
time, there have been a considerable number of weeks in which Labor Code violations
may be at issue.5 In light of this fact, if Plaintiffs were successful in establishing Labor
Code violations for all of these drivers during all of these workweeks, potential PAGA
penalties would be astronomical and far beyond the potential damages at issue in this
4
5
6
case.
82.
For example, assuming that the Court or jury were to find that Uber is subject to PAGA
penalties for their failure to reimburse Drivers for work related expenses (e.g., mileage),
Uber would be subject to a PAGA penalty of $100 per driver for the first pay period in
which there was a violation, and $200 per driver for each subsequent pay period in
9
10
which there was a violation. Cal. Lab. Code 2699(f). Thus, for only the penalties
11
associated with the California Labor Code violations in this case, 2802 and 351, the
12
penalties could exceed one billion dollars.6 This is to say nothing of other potential
13
PAGA penalties arising from the numerous other Labor Code violations set forth herein.
14
See supra, n. 4.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
The Labor Code provisions that have been alleged in various litigation against Uber are
sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 206.5, 207, 208, 210-14, 221-224, 226, 226.7, 226.8, 227, 245-49,
351, 353, 432.5, 450, 510, 512, 550, 551, 552, 558, 1174.5, 1182.12, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198,
2753, 2802, 3700, 3700.5, 3712, and 3715, although Plaintiffs recognize that it would be
difficult to prove underlying liability on a number of these statutory provisions for the reasons
discussed above. Additionally, it is not entirely clear under California law whether it is
permissible to stack PAGA penalties on top of underlying violations, as the California
Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the issue. Thus, it is possible that Plaintiffs would not
have been able to obtain more than a single PAGA penalty per pay period, even if there had
been multiple violations in that pay period.
6
Plaintiffs estimated the total number of pay periods for the California class by assuming
that every class member drove every month between their first month and their last month with
Uber for a total of approximately 1,253,954 months. Because Uber pays drivers weekly, that
would equate to 5,392,002 pay periods. When each pay period is multiplied by $100 for every
violation of Cal. Labor Code 2802, the total is $530 million. Likewise, when each pay period
is multiplied by $100 for every violation of Cal. Labor Code 351, that yields an additional
$530 million. Thus, for violations of just Cal. Labor Code 2802 and 351 alone, the PAGA
penalties could top $1 billion. However, this estimate is likely a large overestimate because all
drivers certainly did not drive every week starting with their first week and ending with their
last week.
28
DECLARATION OF SHANNON LISS-RIORDAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
CASE NO.: 13-3826-EMC
22
1
2
83.
dramatically reduce the award pursuant to Cal. Lab. Code 2699(e)(2), which permits
the court to reduce awarded PAGA penalties if, based on the facts and circumstances of
the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and
oppressive, or confiscatory, and to comport with due process. See York v. Starbucks
Corp., 2012 WL 10890355, *10 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2012) (PAGA's section 2699(e) (2)
provides the Court with the ability to fashion an appropriate penalty in this case that
9
10
will not offend notions of due process.); see also Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 163
11
Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1214 (2008) (holding that a PAGA penalty in the amount of one-
12
13
84.
Uber would no doubt argue that these penalties should be dramatically reduced
14
pursuant to 2699(e)(2) and to comport with due process. Given that PAGA penalties
15
would arise purely from Ubers alleged misclassification of drivers, and given that Uber
16
may well establish that it had a good faith belief that its drivers were properly classified,
17
I believe there is a good chance that the Court would reduce PAGA penalties (as
18
19
damages, if that much. See Harris v. Radioshack Corp., 2010 3155645, at *3-4 (N.D.
20
Cal. Aug. 9, 2010) (Chen, J.) (granting motion for final settlement approval and finding
21
that although Plaintiffs could arguably get more . . . because they [were] entitled to
22
penalties under the PAGA, it [was] not clear that they could get a significant amount
23
24
25
26
27
28
Moreover, most settlements provide only modest allocations for PAGA claims and
have not analyzed actual potential recoveries. Indeed, there is no requirement that a
PAGA allocation be proportional to the value of a PAGA claim, as many courts have
approved settlement agreements that provide for less than the one percent allocation to
PAGA penalties made here (75 percent of which goes to the LWDA), notwithstanding
the potential value of the PAGA claim. Hopson v. Hanesbrands Inc., 2009 WL 928133,
*9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) (approving total PAGA allocation that was .49% of
Cal. Aug. 4, 2015) (approving total PAGA allocation that was .5% of $10,000,000
gross settlement); Lusby v. Gamestop Inc., 297 F.R.D. 400, 407 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(approving total PAGA allocation that was .67% of $750,000 gross settlement), final
approval granted, Lusby v. GameStop Inc., 2015 WL 1501095, *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31,
9
10
2015). In fact, this Court conditionally granted final settlement approval under such
11
circumstances just last week. See Alexander v. Fedex Ground Package Sys., 2016 WL
12
1427358, *2 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2016) (conditionally approving PAGA allocation
13
14
86.
These exposure numbers assume that Uber would not be successful in proving that
15
drivers are properly classified as independent contractors at trial and would not be
16
successful in any of its numerous appeals before the Ninth Circuit on the arbitration
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Indeed, a significant number of courts have approved PAGA allocations that are
simply $10,000 or less, regardless of the settlement value of the case and regardless of the
valuation (if any) of the PAGA claim. Chu v. Wells Fargo Investments, LLC, 2011 WL
672645, *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2011) (approving PAGA settlement payment of $7,500 to the
LWDA out of $6.9 million common-fund settlement); Franco v. Ruiz Food Products, Inc.,
2012 WL 5941801, *13 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2012) (approving PAGA settlement payment of
$7,500 to the LWDA out of $2.5 million common-fund settlement); Schiller v. David's Bridal,
Inc., 2012 WL 2117001, *14 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2012) (approving PAGA settlement payment
of $7,500 to the LWDA out of $518,245 common-fund settlement). If Plaintiffs were to
consider the actual penalties that could be awarded under PAGA, this case would not be
capable of being settled at all. It could not have been the intention of the California legislature
for PAGA to be a weapon that makes settlements of highly contested litigation impossible.
28
DECLARATION OF SHANNON LISS-RIORDAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
CASE NO.: 13-3826-EMC
24
1
2
3
The allocation formula distributes the settlement funds among drivers on a proportional
basis based on number of miles while On Trip, transporting a passenger in the car.
Drivers who are members of the certified class in OConnor will receive double weight
for their mileage (relative to those drivers who were excluded from the class and
reimbursement claim, as well as the much greater likelihood of these claims being
pursued, given that they had been included in a certified class. The formula also
9
10
awards double weight for the mileage of drivers who timely opted out of Ubers 2013
11
and 2014 arbitration clause (in either California or Massachusetts) relative to those
12
drivers who did not opt out, reflecting their greater chance of remaining in the class in
13
this case, should the Courts rulings holding Ubers arbitration clauses invalid be
14
overturned on appeal.
15
88.
16
expected net settlement distributions (after the subtraction of fees and expenses) for the
17
18
89.
As shown in this exhibit, drivers who drove a substantial amount of miles will receive
19
significant payments. For example, class members in California who drove in the
20
highest category of miles (more than 25,000) may recover on average close to $2,000,
21
which would double to $4,000 if they opted out of the arbitration clause, and could
22
double again to $8,000 (assuming a 50% claim rate for the settlement). In contrast, the
23
settlement class members who drove a minimal number of miles will receive more
24
25
26
27
28
nominal payments.
90.
Further, I believe the non-monetary relief in the settlement provides significant and
meaningful benefit to drivers. First, Ubers agreement that it will make deactivation
decisions only for sufficient cause is both legally and practically significant. Under the
settlement, this provision will preclude Uber from deactivating drivers for any reason at
all and will specifically eliminate deactivation for failing to accept a sufficient number
of ride requests while using the app. Additionally, Uber will now provide drivers with
notice and the right to cure many deactivations prior to permanent deactivation, will
provide greater transparency regarding the reasons for deactivations, and will create an
appeals process for many deactivations (not related to safety, fraud, customer ratings or
8
9
91.
Legally, these modifications address one of Plaintiffs core arguments in this case that
10
it is a companys right to terminate at will, and not the actual exercise of that control,
11
12
because [t]he power of the principal to terminate the services of the agent gives him
13
the means of controlling the agent's activities. Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers,
14
Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 522, 531 (2014); see also O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 2015 WL
15
5138097, at *19-21 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (noting that the majority of Ubers
16
contracts contain express language that provides Uber with a right to terminate any
17
and all drivers without cause and that a putative employer's right to discharge a hiree
18
at will, without cause, is perhaps the strongest evidence of the right to control)
19
(emphasis in original).
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
92.
Moreover, on a practical level, I believe these changes in the deactivation policy will be
meaningful for drivers who must confront these issues on a regular basis. Indeed,
scores of drivers have contacted my firm on a regular basis stating they are concerned
about being deactivated for numerous and wide-ranging reasons or without any
explanation at all. These changes will help alleviate this widespread problem in several
ways by providing drivers with: (1) at least two warnings and an opportunity to cure
many types of deficiencies prior to deactivation; (2) a written explanation of the reasons
for their deactivation; and (3) an appeals process for many types of deactivations,
overseen by fellow drivers for those who believe they have been unjustly deactivated.
Creating more transparency while also restricting the reasons that Uber can deactivate
3
4
5
In addition, the creation of the Drivers Association will allow drivers to continue to
work towards additional non-monetary programmatic relief for drivers in California
and Massachusetts by polling their fellow drivers to create an agenda for further change
and meeting regularly with Uber management to engage in good faith discussions to
9
10
counsel their desire to have more of a voice in the way Uber operates and have
11
expressed frustration at feeling the company is unaware of their needs. I believe the
12
Drivers Association could go a long way towards addressing these issues as well.
13
94.
The drivers will also have the benefit of challenging some of these issues in arbitration
14
at the companys expense. As this Court has already held, Ubers current agreements
15
require an even split of arbitration-related costs (except where required by law). See
16
Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 109 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1209 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Thus,
17
even in a misclassification case where drivers allege they are employees and should be
18
subject to the Employment Rules, Uber can (and has) readily argue that the
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
95.
The Commercial Rules require claimants to pay substantial initial and final fees (a
minimum of $1,550 depending on the value of the case) and requires the parties to split
all other costs of arbitration, including arbitrator fees. In other cases I have litigated in
which workers have challenged their misclassification as independent contractors, but
in which the workers have been compelled to pursue individual arbitration under the
AAA Commercial Rules, the arbitration service has made an initial determination that
the claimants would be required to split the arbitration fees. For example, in McKean
v. Caviar, Inc., JAMS No. 1100082951, the claimant brought a misclassification claim
in arbitration, since a plaintiff in a related case against this company was compelled to
individual arbitration under the AAA Commercial Rules. In this case, the office of the
arbitrator indicated that the Employment Rules (under which the respondent would pay
the bulk of the fees) did not apply because of the independent contractor relationship.
See Exhibit 2, attached hereto. While I protested this determination, and the respondent
agreed in that case to pay the arbitration fees, it is not certain that the claimant would
not have been required to pay the fees if the respondent had not agreed to pay them.
Similarly, in Ribeiro v. System4, LLC, AAA No. 01 15 0003 8637 (another case in
9
10
which a plaintiff in a related case against the same company had been compelled to
11
individual arbitration under the AAA Commercial Rules), the AAA made an
12
administrative determination that, because the AAA Commercial Rules applied, the
13
arbitration fees would need to be split between the parties. See Exhibits 3 and 4,
14
attached hereto. I protested this determination and persuaded the arbitrator to make a
15
threshold ruling on who would pay the fees (or whether they would be split). Id.
16
However, because the agreement stated that the AAA Commercial Rules would apply,
17
my client was still billed for his share of the $7,500 cost of even obtaining this
18
19
briefing on this issue for me to obtain a ruling from the arbitrator that my client would
20
not have to split arbitration fees. However, this result was not assured and could well
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
96.
In short, it has been my experience that, even when a claimant is challenging what he or
she alleges to be misclassification as an independent contractor, when an arbitration
provision provides that the AAA Commercial Rules will apply, there is a real risk that
the claimant may be required to split arbitration fees. As a practical matter, this
deterrent would essentially eliminate the possibility of recovery for all but the most
28
DECLARATION OF SHANNON LISS-RIORDAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
CASE NO.: 13-3826-EMC
28
motivated Drivers. Ubers agreeing to pay for drivers arbitration costs in cases based
2
3
4
Finally, I believe the portion of the settlement regarding Ubers tipping policy will have
a substantial and real effect on drivers livelihoods. Under the agreement, Uber has
agreed to make good faith efforts to clarify its messaging regarding tipping, clarifying
on its website and in communications with drivers and riders that tips are not included
on Uber's platforms (with the exception of UberTAXI) and that tipping is neither
expected nor required. Moreover, Uber has confirmed that its policies do not prohibit a
9
10
driver from putting up signs or requesting a tip. And under this agreement, Uber will
11
not have the ability to deactivate drivers at will in California and Massachusetts. Thus,
12
there would be no prohibition on drivers posting in their cars a small sign stating that
13
tips are not included, they are not expected, but they would be appreciated.8
14
believe that, with this information, many riders will begin tipping their drivers, which
15
16
98.
In light of the risks posed by this case, as well as the anticipated delay in payment even
17
18
any adverse rulings), and considering as well the significant non-monetary components
19
of this settlement, I believe this settlement is a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution
20
21
99.
22
Attached hereto as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of the parties Settlement
Agreement.
23
24
25
26
27
If some passengers are unhappy with the signs (or their interactions with drivers
regarding tips) and that leads to poor ratings, then given that low ratings are still a basis for
deactivation, drivers may still suffer potential repercussions for having such signs in their cars.
But, under this agreement, there would be nothing directly prohibiting drivers from having
such signs.
28
DECLARATION OF SHANNON LISS-RIORDAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
CASE NO.: 13-3826-EMC
29
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
100.
Attached hereto as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of the parties Short Form
Notice to be sent to the Settlement Class.
101.
Attached hereto as Exhibit 8 is a true and correct copy of the parties Long Form
Notice to be sent to the Settlement Class.
102.
Attached hereto as Exhibit 9 is a true and correct copy of the draft Claim form (both
online and in paper form).
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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28
DECLARATION OF SHANNON LISS-RIORDAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
CASE NO.: 13-3826-EMC
30