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his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the
foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. However, a public official
may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may
have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over
the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed
while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions
and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be
one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift,
Rice and Robling.
SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19,1997
Republic Act No. 6735 provided for the system of initiative and referendum
for local legislation and national statutes, without providing for initiative for
the amendment of the Constitution. A petition was filed to amend the
constitution regarding term limits. However, the SC held that the
constitutional provision on people's initiatives under the 1987 Constitution
(Article XVII 2) required implementing legislation to be executory. R.A. 6735
lacked the implementing rules for people's initiatives and such lack could not
be cured by Comelec providing rules. Congress also could not delegate its
legislative authority to Comelec, so Comelec could not validly promulgate
rules on the matter as it was not empowered to do so under law.
LAMBINO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006
Lambino made a petition to amend the 1987 Constitution via peoples
initiative. However, his petition did not include the full text of the proposed
amendments. The SC ruled that the initiative did not meet the requirements
of the Constitution. An amendment is directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition only if the people sign a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments. To do otherwise would be
deceptive and misleading and would render the initiative void, since there
should be both direct proposal and authorship by the person affixing their
signature to the petition.
TANADA v. ANGARA, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and
state policies. The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called
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the basic political creed of the nation by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles
in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as
guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in
its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan,
Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in
Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions,
the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They
do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II
of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which
is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus
a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.
OPOSA v. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083, February 30, 1993
Oposa, et al. filed a petition to prevent further logging licenses from being
issued. The Supreme Court, recognizing the intergenerational equity of the
petitioners as the basis of their standing, held that the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is explicitly provided in Art. II 16 of the Constitution.
While it is found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, not
Bill of Rights, but it is not any less important than any civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. It concerns nothing less than self- preservation and
self-perpetuation and is assumed to exist from the inception of mankind.
Thus, those provisions are self-executing.
ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR, A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003
Considering the American origin of the Philippine religion clauses and the
intent to adopt the historical background, nature, extent and limitations of
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when it was included in the
1935 Bill of Rights, it is not surprising that nearly all the major Philippine
cases involving the religion clauses turn to U.S. jurisprudence in explaining
the nature, extent and limitations of these clauses. However, a close scrutiny
of these cases would also reveal that while U.S. jurisprudence on religion
clauses flows into two main streams of interpretation - separation and
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Dimaporo, while serving as Representative of Lanao del Sur, filed a COC for
the post of ARMM Governor. He lost the latter election, and despite making
known his desire to continue as Representative, was not able to return to
that office. The Supreme Court did not allow him to take office as
Representative again. It differentiated a term, i.e. the period an official may
serve as provided for by law from tenure, i.e. the period that an official
actually serves. The Constitution protects the term, not the tenure. By filing
the certificate of candidacy, Dimaporo shortened his tenure. Thus, there is no
violation of the Constitution when he was prevented from re-assuming his
post. A term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or
shortened by law, but the period during which an officer actually serves
(tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of the
officer.
BAGABUYO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008
RA 9371, which provided for apportionment of lone district of City of Cagayan
de Oro was assailed on constitutional grounds, on the ground that it is not reapportionment legislation but that it involves the division and conversion of
an LGU. The Supreme Court held that RA 9371 is simply a reapportionment
legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress
under Article VI, section 5(4).
BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009
The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual
occupancy of the party-list seats depends on the number of participants in
the party-list election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list
election, then, despite the availability of 54 seats, the maximum possible
number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30 because of the threeseat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory
allocation of all the 54 available seats.
Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast
guarantees a party one seat. This 2% threshold for the first round of seat
allocation does not violate any provision of the 1987 Constitution. In the
second round allocation of additional seats, there is no minimum vote
requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the Court has struck down
the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats.
Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that
"those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in the proportion to their total number of votes" can no
longer be given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the
total membership of the House of Representatives as provided in the 1987
Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up. However, a party-list
organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the
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Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the
"sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications"
of the Members of the House of Representatives. To be considered a Member
of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of all of the
following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office. Absent any of the foregoing, the COMELEC retains
jurisdiction over the said contests.
JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966
The expression "speeches or debates herein" in Art. VI 15 (1935
Constitution) only refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as speeches (sponsorship,
interpellation, privilege uttered in Committees or to Congress in plenary
session), statements and votes cast while Congress is in session, as well as
bills introduced in Congress. It also includes other acts performed by the
same either in or out of Congressional premises while in the official discharge
of their duty when they performed the acts. It does not include acts not
connected with the discharge of their office.
Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility,
being appointed to other government posts, does not automatically forfeit
his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On
the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the
appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid
in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be
confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his
seat . . . ." The difference between the two provisions is significant in the
sense that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts only after
they have been appointed to another government office, while other
incumbent elective officials must first resign their posts before they can be
appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not
being appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that ineligibility is not
directly related with forfeiture of office. ". . . . The effect is quite different
where it is expressly provided by law that a person holding one office shall
be ineligible to another. Such a provision is held to incapacitate the
incumbent of an office from accepting or holding a second office (State ex
rel. Van Antwerp v Hogan, 283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v Neal,
130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to render his election or appointment to the
latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v Sutton, 63 Minn 147, 65 NW 262.
Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v State, 107 Okla 272, 232 p
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388, 40 ALR 941)." Where the constitution, or statutes declare that persons
holding one office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another
office, either generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has been held to
incapacitate the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so that any
attempt to hold the second is void (Ala. State ex rel. Van Antwerp v.
Hogan, 218 So 2d 258, 283 Ala 445).
AVELINO v. CUENCA, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949
As there were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including
Soto, excluding Confesor), twelve senators constitute a majority of the
Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not
mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the
House. There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the
House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring less number than
the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the
purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a
quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent
members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt about
Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same
inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one
abstained
OSMENA v. PENDATUN, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or
debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of
Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was
taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the
United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to
mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words
uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in
any other place" than Congress. Furthermore, the Rules of the House which
petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's
power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 168056, September
1, 2005
Congress did not give President the power to exercise discretion in making a
law, only the power to ascertain the facts necessary to exercise the law. The
criteria for valid delegation are that:(1) Law is complete in itself, setting forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate (2) Law fixes a standard, the limits of which are determinate and
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hour but not in inquiries in aid of legislation unless a valid claim of privilege
is made by the President or Executive Secretary.
Although some executive officials hold information covered by executive
privilege, there can be no implied claim of executive privilege thereby
exempting some officials from attending inquiries in aid of legislation.
Congress has a right to know the reasons behind the claim of executive
privilege before an official would be exempt from the investigation.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. SENAE COMMITTEE ON BANKS,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, G.R. No. 167173,
December 27, 2007
The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish
contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the
government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial
branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it.
Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative
functions per se, but to the sovereign character of the legislature as one of
the three independent and coordinate branches of government.
ABAKADA v. PURISIMA, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
Any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be
confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its
power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either
of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of
laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of
a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning
delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law
initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure
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TAGUIWALO, et. al. vs. Aquino et. al. G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such,
it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required.
Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN, et al. vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015
If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of
the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case
ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this
would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court
decisions. Herein, the Executive has violated the GAA when it stated that
savings as a concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls for
legislative, instead of judicial determination.
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states: 5) No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.
Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code provide: Section
39. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits.Except as
otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act, any savings in the
regular appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations Act for
programs and projects of any department, office or agency, may, with the
approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other item of the
regular appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new positions or
increase of salaries shall not be allowed to be funded from budgetary savings
except when specifically authorized by law: Provided, further, that whenever
authorized positions are transferred from one program or project to another
within the same department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts
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of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual
absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Furthermore, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., [w]hereas,
Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office, neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against
the conclusion that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek
public elective office have been restored. A preamble is really not an integral
part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It
cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor
restrict its operation much less prevail over its text. Hence if the pardon was
intended be conditional, it should have explicitly stated the same in the text
of the pardon itself. Since it did not make an integral part of the decree of
pardon, the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to
the pardon extended.
NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY, G.R. No. 180643,
September 4, 2008
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the
Office of the President. It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a
particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the
nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled
communication and exchange of information between the President and
his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and arriving at
decisions in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency under the
Constitution. The confidentiality of the Presidents conversations and
correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of judicial
deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all
citizens and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the
constitutionally ordained separation of governmental powers.
AKBAYAN v. AQUINO, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008
The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the
deliberative process and presidential communications privilege. It may be
readily perceived that the rationale for the confidential character of
diplomatic
negotiations,
deliberative
process,
and
presidential
communications is similar, if not identical.
MANALO v. SISTOZA, G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999
Conformably, as consistently interpreted and ruled in the leading case of
Sarmiento III vs. Mison, and in the subsequent cases of Bautista vs. Salonga,
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May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8,
the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May
14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition
is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the
difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109
days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the
outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional
duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the
framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. In
fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers neither
discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against midnight
appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its effects on the 90-day
period, or vice versa. They did not need to, because they never intended
Section 15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any
of the lower courts.
GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 203372, June 16,
2015
Paragraph (b), Section 1 of EO 2 considered as midnight appointments those
appointments to offices that will only be vacant on or after 11 March 2010
even though the appointments are made prior to 11 March 2010. EO 2
remained faithful to the intent of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution: the outgoing President is prevented from continuing to rule the
country indirectly after the end of his term.
IBP v. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000
Calling out armed forces is discretionary power solely vested in the
Presidents wisdom but the matter may be reviewed by the Court to see
whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion.
SANLAKAS v. REYES, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004
Actual invasion/rebellion and requirement of public safety are not required
for calling out the armed forces. Nothing prohibits President from declaring a
state of rebellion; it springs from powers as Chief Executive and Commanderin-Chief. Finally, calling out of the armed forces is not the same as a
declaration of martial law.
DAVID v. ARROYO, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no
power to take
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over privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist
warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has
no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest
that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority
to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS, G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
Imelda Marcos wanted to return home from Hawaii. Her return was prevented
by Pres. Aquino. She invoked her rights to travel and abode.
The SC upheld the decision to prevent her from returning to the Philippines
as an exercise of the Presidents residual powers. Whatever power inherent
in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
The President's residual power is for protecting people's general welfare,
preserving and defending the Constitution, protecting the peace, attending
to day-to-day problems. Even the Resolution proposed in the House urging
the President to allow Marcos to return shows recognition of this power.
Residual powers are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty to
safeguard and protect general welfare.
YNOT v. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not
prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to
review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law
or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in,
among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures.
This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first
instance by these lower courts.
MIRANDA v. AGUIRRE, G.R. No. 133064, September 16, 1999
A political question connotes a question of policy and referred to those
questions which under the constitution were 1) to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity or 2) in regard to which full discretionary authority
had been delegated to the legislative/executive branch of government.
Political questions are concerned with issues on the wisdom and not legality
of a particular measure. Additionally, a political question has no standards by
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presumption, they must carry the burden of showing that the PTC is a
preliminary step to selective prosecution, and that it is laden with a
discriminatory effect and a discriminatory purpose. However, petitioner has
sorely failed in discharging that burden.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION v.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC., G.R. No. L-31195, June 5,
1973
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression,
of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over
property rights has been sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet
as a coveted boon at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth
of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened
civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any
meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods
that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against
police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in
collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective
bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore
inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of
free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
BAYAN v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2005
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers
to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference
to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really
have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and
entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and
"influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they
can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress
of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot
be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of
all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
CHAVEZ v. GONZALES, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008
It is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some
form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether
the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with
the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or
manner, and under well defined standards; or (2) a content-based restraint or
censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the
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utterance or speech. The cast of the restriction determines the test by which
the challenged act is assayed with.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV.
BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY vs. COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS AND THE
ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
When petitioners, a Diocese and its Bishop posted tarpaulins in front of the
cathedral which aimed to dissuade voters from electing candidates who
supported the RH Law, and the COMELEC twice ordered the latter to
dismantle the tarpaulin for violation of its regulation which imposed a size
limit on campaign materials, the case is about COMELECs breach of the
petitioners fundamental right of expression of matters relating to election.
Thus, the COMELEC had no legal basis to issue said order as the tarpaulins
were not paid for by any candidate or political party and the candidates
therein were not consulted regarding its posting. It was part of the
petitioners advocacy against the RH Law. Jurisprudence which sets the limit
to free speech of candidates during elections but do not limit the rights of
broadcasters to comment on the candidates do not apply to the petitioners,
as the petitioners are private individuals who have lost their right to give
commentary on the candidates when the COMELEC ordered the tarpaulin
removed. Second, the tarpaulin is protected speech. The size of the
tarpaulins is fundamentally part of protected speech, as it is important to
convey the advocacy of the petitioners, who are also part of the electorate.
More importantly, every citizens expression with political consequences
enjoys a high degree of protection. While the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted in return for consideration by any candidate, political party or partylist group. The COMELEC, therefore, has no jurisdiction to issue its order as it
lacks the requisites of a valid content-based regulation of speech. Third, the
tarpaulins and their messages are not religious speech, as they do not
convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic Church. With all due respect to
the Catholic faithful, the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not
binding upon this court.
The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by
one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.
IN RE: JURADO, A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC April 6, 1995
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determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2)
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in
said applications.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MARK JASON CHAVEZ Y BITANCOR
ALIAS NOY, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014
The Miranda rights is a right guaranteed by the Constitution to the accused
during custodial investigation. Republic Act No. 7438 even expanded its
definition to include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any
violation of law. This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered
before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. For one, the
same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez is also
being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an
additional pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother
who accompanied him to the police station.
MARIETA DE CASTRO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015
The right to remain silent and to counsel can be invoked only in the context
in which the Miranda doctrine applies when the official proceeding is
conducted under the coercive atmosphere of a custodial interrogation. There
are no cases extending them to a non-coercive setting. The rights are
invocable only when the accused is under custodial investigation. A person
undergoing a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation
and, hence, the audit examiner may not be considered the law enforcement
officer contemplated by the rule. By a fair analogy, Marieta may not be said
to be under custodial investigation. She was not even being investigated by
any police or law enforcement officer. She was under administrative
investigation by her superiors in a private firm and in purely voluntary
manner. She was not restrained of her freedom in any manner. She was free
to stay or go. There was no evidence that she was forced or pressured to say
anything.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA
G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014
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officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion
initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person
suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this
would be an infringement upon ones basic right to security of ones person
and effects. Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded
by this exception, unless there is compliance with the genuine reason
requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public.
MAPALO v. LIM, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006
The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives
evidence, whether voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil,
criminal or administrative proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be
a witness against himself.
GOVT. OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it
should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases,
there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,
both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the
person detained is not in issue.
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, Jr., ET AL v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET
AL., G.R. No. 203335. February 18, 2014
Charging offenders of violation of RA 10175 and the RPC both with regard to
libel; likewise with RA 9775 on Child pornography constitutes double
jeopardy. The acts defined in the Cybercrime Law involve essentially the
same elements and are in fact one and the same with the RPC and RA 9775.
RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
David argued that the Court has disregarded the undisputed fact that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status under
R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction deemed not to have lost it at the time
of his naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was said to
have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship in his Miscellaneous Lease
Application. However, while Section 2 declares the general policy that
Filipinos who have become citizens of another country shall be deemed not
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When there has been no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest
number of votes should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.
EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO vs. HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EDGAR "EGAY" S. SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 212398,
November 25, 2014
San Luis filed a disqualification case against co-gubernatorial candidate
Ejercito. The COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En banc granted the
disqualification petition. In the said petition, San Luis alleges that Ejercito
was distributing an Orange Card with the intent to entice voters to vote for
him and that Ejercito exceeded the allowable amount for campaign funds.
Ejercito alleges that a preliminary investigation should have been conducted
prior to the decision of the COMELEC. In this regard, the Supreme Court ruled
that, As contemplated in paragraph 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, a
complaint for disqualification filed before the election which must be inquired
into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether the acts
complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry results in a
finding before the election, the COMELEC shall order the candidate's
disqualification. In case the complaint was not resolved before the election,
the COMELEC may motu propio or on motion of any of the parties, refer the
said complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary
investigation.
PENERA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 131613, November 25, 2009
Penera was disqualified as a mayoralty candidate for engaging in election
campaigning before the campaign period. The Court ruled in her favor. A
candidate is any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who
has filed a certificate of candidacy. Any person who files a certificate of
candidacy within the period for filing shall only be considered as a candidate
at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Accordingly, a candidate is only liable for an election offense for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. Any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period, when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a
candidate. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan
political acts are lawful.
MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
MUSTAPHA J. OMAR, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally
construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers
may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Settled is the rule that
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Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code, the same is not the operative
act that gives rules valid force and effect since the bulletin of codified rules
by the ONAR is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all
appellate courts, the National Library, and other public officers or agencies
specified by Congress. Publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of
general circulation is required before laws can take effect.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GSIS v. MOLINA, G.R. No. 170463, February
2, 2011
The assailed resolutions pertain only to internal rules to regulate GSIS
personnel, thus, there was no need to comply with the publication or filing
requirements. According to the UP Law Centers guidelines, interpretative
regulations, and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public need not be filed
with the center.
PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE v. SM PRIME HOLDINGS INC., G.R. No.
170599, SEPTEMBER 22, 2010
the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the
Laguna Lake region. In expounding on this issue, the Court held that the
adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special law, such as the LLDA
Charter, provides for another forum. The Court further ruled that although
the PAB assumed the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control
Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases, this does not
preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its
area of responsibility and to impose fines as penalty.
OPLE v. TORRES, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of
national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by
government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice
Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of
thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic
rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power
of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be
covered by law.
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KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. BAYAN MUNA, G.R. No. 167798, April 16,
2006
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in
either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can
enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the
government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant
to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual
agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in
substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is
purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of
legislative power.
Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co. (1933)
Public Service Commission granted the Phil. Railway Co. the power to fix its
own rates in order to compete with the rates of road trucks and auto buses.
Such grant is invalid. The Legislature delegated to the PSC the power of
fixing rates of public services but it was not authorized by law to delegate to
Phil. Railway Co. the power to alter its freight rates whenever it should find it
necessary to do so, because the PSC cannot determine whether such new
rates will be just and reasonable.
Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA (2000)
Parcels of land owned by petitioner were taken by the DAR for distribution
pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It was dissatisfied with
the valuation of the land so it filed a petition for a determination of just
compensation for its property with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the petition
on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for
filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB.
Pursuant to Rule XIII, Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the decision
of the Adjudicator on the land valuation and preliminary determination and
payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall
be brought to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court within 15 days
from receipt of the notice thereof. Since Veterans petition in the RTC was
filed beyond the 15-day period, the RTC correctly dismissed the case.
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, IN HIS CAPACITY
OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; HON.
SINGSON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
HIGHWAYS SECRETARY vs. JOSEFINO N. RIGOR, G.R.
December 10, 2014
AS ACTING
ROGELIO L.
WORKS AND
No. 206661,
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of the Constitution
to be entitled to a
the Constitutional
determinant of the
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Section 9, Article III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws; and d) A
valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. There
was no offer because the letter Pasig sent the Cuangcos and the invitation to
the engineers office only proved its intent to acquire the property for a right
of way and did not amount to a valid and definite offer.
ONGSUCO v. MALONES, G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009
The rentals and goodwill fees imposed by the municipal ordinance are
charges, making the municipal ordinance void and unenforceable as there
was no valid public hearing conducted as mandated by Sec. 186 of the Local
Government Code, which expressly provides that ordinances levying taxes,
fees or charges cannot be enacted without any public hearing.
QUEZON CITY v. BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, G.R. No. 162015,
March 6, 2006
Bayantel is exempt from realty taxes on its properties that are actually,
directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. Congress may
grant a tax exemption previously withdrawn by the LGC. Despite the fact
that Sec. 5, Article X of the Constitution gives local legislative bodies the
power to tax, their exercise of this power may be subject to guidelines and
limitations as Congress may provide. Thus, the power to tax is still primarily
vested in Congress. Through Sec. 232 of the Local Government Code which
provides that a province or city or municipality within the Metropolitan
Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property...not
hereinafter specifically exempted, the Congress highlighted its power to
thereafter exempt certain realties from the taxing power of local government
units. The use, in turn, of the same phrase exclusive of this franchise in
Republic Act 7633, which was the basis for Bayantes exemption from realty
taxes prior to the LGC, shows the intention on the part of Congress to once
again remove from the LGCs delegated taxing power all of the franchisees
properties actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its
franchise.
MIAA v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006
MIAA, not being a government-owned and controlled corporation, is exempt
from real estate tax because it is a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers. An instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government not integrated within the department framework, vested with
special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. Sec. 133 of the LGC states that the
taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays shall not
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extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities. This constitutes a limitation
imposed by Congress on the local governments exercise of the power to tax.
Furthermore, the power of local governments to tax national government
instrumentalities is construed strictly against local governments and the rule
is that a tax is never presumed and that there must be clear language in the
law imposing the tax.
QUEZON CITY v. ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008
While Congress has the inherent power to tax and grant tax exemptions, Sec.
5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution confers on municipal corporations a
general power to levy taxes and otherwise create sources of revenue and
they no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of these powers. In
interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be
resolved in favor of municipal corporations. In this case, the in lieu of other
taxes provision does not expressly provide in clear and unambiguous
language what kind of taxes ABS-CBN is exempted from, and as a claim of
tax exemption is not favored nor presumed in law but must be clearly shown,
ABS-CBN is liable for Quezon Citys franchise tax.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS v. CITY OF DAVAO, G.R. No. September 16,
2008
Smart is liable to pay Davaos franchise tax because its legislative franchise
did not expressly provide the specific taxes from which it was exempt. The
in lieu of all taxes clause in Smarts legislative franchise did not expressly
and categorically state that the exemption applies to both local and national
taxes and thus, the phrase in question must be applied only to national
internal revenue taxes. Tax exemptions are never presumed and are
construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority.
SANGALANG v. IAC, G.R. No. 71169, December 22, 1988
The Mayors act is valid because in this case, the city has the power to open
a city street for public use. Despite loss of privacy among Bel-Air residents,
more important than this is the duty of a local executive to take care of the
needs of the majority at the expense of the minority.
CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO, G.R. No. L-23053, January 29, 1968
The applicable provision is that of Art. 2189 of the Civil Code as it governs
liability due to defective streets, which Teotico alleged to be the cause of
his injuries. Sec. 4 of the City Charter is not decisive on the issue as it refers
merely to liability arising from negligence in general, regardless of the object
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Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code provides that an elective local official
cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms, and that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity
of service. For an official to be disqualified from running because of the
three-term limit, the official must have been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post, and he must have fully served
three consecutive terms. In this case, there was an interruption in
Potenciosos second term as municipal councilor as he succeeded the retired
Vice Mayor Mendoza. Such succession in local government offices is by
operation of law and does not constitute voluntary renunciation of office.
Thus, since the succession did not amount to a voluntary renunciation of
office (which does not interrupt the continuity of service), Potencioso could
not be said to have fully served his second term and as such, he is entitled to
run for another term as municipal councilor.
MENDOZA v. LAXINA, G.R. No. 146875, July 14, 2003
The re-taking of an oath of office by a duly-proclaimed but subsequently
unseated local elective official is not a condition sine qua non to the validity
of his re-assumption into his office. Once Laxina was proclaimed and duly
sworn into office the first time, he became entitled to assume office and
exercise its functions. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient
basis to stop him from assuming office or discharging his functions. When
the COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending appeal issued by the
MTC in favor of Fermo, the MTCs decision proclaiming Fermo as winner of the
election was stayed and the status quo or when Laxina was occupying the
office of Barangay Captain was restored. As such, the re-taking of his oath
was a mere formality, because through the stay of the MTCs decision, it was
as if the writ of execution was not issued and he was not ousted from office.
VALLES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000
Lopez is not disqualified. Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code uses the
term dual citizenship as a disqualification, meaning dual allegiance. For
candidates like Lopez with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. As such, if in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that
he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, such a declaration, under oath,
operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. In this case,
Lopez should not be disqualified as the Philippine law on citizenship adheres
to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or
citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth. Lopez, is a
Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. Also, the fact that Lopez
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was born in Australia did not amount to her losing her Philippine citizenship.
Furthermore, the fact that Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and
had an alien certificate of registration did not mean that she was renouncing
her Filipino citizenship since a renunciation must be express to result in the
loss of citizenship.
MERCADO v. MANZANO, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999
Manzano should not be disqualified because the dual citizenship meant in
Sec. 40 (d) of the Local Government Code as a ground for disqualification,
refers to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states, while dual
allegiance, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. For candidates with dual
citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing
of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship. Manzanos oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received
his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, shows his election of Philippine citizenship.
MONDANO v. SILVOSA, G.R. No. L-7708, May 30, 1955
The investigation and suspension were illegal because, although provincial
supervision over municipal officials belongs to the Provincial Governor and he
may submit written charges before the Provincial Board and suspend the
official, the charges in this case are not malfeasances contemplated under
Sec. 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. The charges may be
considered as involving moral turpitude, but before the Provincial
Board/Governor may formally charge and suspend the petitioner, there must
first be a conviction which was lacking in this case.
TALAGA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012
Talaga deliberately made misrepresentations in his COC, therefore the same
was null and void. The false representation here must be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. To prevent a candidate from running in an electoral
race, one may resort to either a petition for disqualification under Sec. 40 of
the Local Government Code (the effect of which will be the prohibition of the
person from continuing as a candidate) or to a petition to deny due course
to, or cancel, a certificate of candidacy grounded on a statement of a
material representation in the said certificate that is false (the effect of which
is the cancellation or denial of due course of the persons certificate, with the
said person not treated as a candidate at all as if she never filed a COC). A
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person whose COC was cancelled does not give rise to a valid candidacy and
therefore cannot be substituted by another person.
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 187167, August 6, 2011
Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States
parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within
which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of
sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone
(Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
VINUYA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
The Latin phrase, erga omnes, has since become one of the rallying cries of
those sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-based international public
order. However, as is so often the case, the reality is neither so clear nor so
bright. Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept,
its full potential remains to be realized in practice.
The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus
cogens. In international law, the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling
law") refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding
conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory
in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.
As a general principle and particularly here, where such an extraordinary
length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our
consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the
foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the
standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic,
and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps
are appropriate or necessary.
ANG LADLAD v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta
Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are
declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not
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reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in
any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken
any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of
international law to ascertain their true status.
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION v. DUQUE, G.R.
No. 173034, October 9, 2007
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into
a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant
to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty
or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or
conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the
Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to
domestic conflicts.
PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is
regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the
countrys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of
foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal
with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,
maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the
business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has
the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and
enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by
requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the
validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that "no treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate."
Prosecutor v. Galic (Trial Judgment, ICTY, 2003)
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Galic was convicted of crimes against humanity for acts during the Siege of
Sarajevo in the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His many acts included
intentionally launching attacks to spread terror among the civilian
population, which he defended as an act of military necessity. The Court
convicted him, explaining that if excessive casualties are expected to result,
the attack should not be pursued. The test for proportionality is whether a
reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual
perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him or
her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the
attack.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (American Case, 1980)
This was a wrongful death action brought under the American Alien Torts
Statute charging Pena-Irala, then the Inspector-General of the police in
Paraguay, of torturing to death a teenage Paraguayan. The Court held that
deliberate torture under the color of official authority violated customary
international law, regardless of the nationality of the parties.