Cruz v.

Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (2000)

Petitioners: Isagani Cruz
Respondents: Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
Topic: Territory, People, and Government - Territory
SUMMARY: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) or RA 8371 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR). However, due to a tie vote (7-7) after due deliberation and re-deliberation, the petition
was dismissed. (Thus, the separate opinions are more important in this case).
FACTS: See issues.
ISSUE/S:

Most important issue: WoN Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, 8, and 57, and 58 of RA
8371/IPRA and its IRR are unconstitutional for unlawfully depriving the State of its
ownership over lands of the public domain, minerals, and other natural resources
therein, violating the regalian doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution
o Justice Kapunan: NO.
Said provisions affirming the ownership by indigenous peoples of their
ancestral lands and domains by virtue of native title (definition: lands held
in private ownership since time immemorial) do not diminish the States
ownership of lands within the public domain, because said ancestral
lands and domains are considered as private land, and never to have
been part of the public domain, following the doctrine laid down in Cario
v. Insular Government.
Section 3(a) does not confer or recognize any right of ownership over the
natural resources to the ICCs/IPs. Its purpose is definitional and not
declarative of a right or title.
Section 57 only grants priority rights to ICCs/IPs in the utilization of
natural resources and not absolute ownership thereof. The State retains
full control over the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the
utilization of natural resources under existing laws, such as the SmallScale Mining Act of 1991 and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Neither
does the grant of said rights exclude non-indigenous peoples from
undertaking the same activities within the ancestral domains upon
authority granted by the proper governmental agency.
o Justice Puno: NO.
Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. The
classification of lands in the public domain under Section 3, Article XII of
the Constitution does not include ancestral lands nor ancestral domains.

The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may
be acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and
domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only. Both modes
presume or recognize the land as private and not public.
The right of ownership to ancestral domain under Section 7(a) involves
lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs,
sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains, not
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. Ownership therefore of natural resources remain with the
State.
Small-scale utilization of resources in Section 7(b) is also allowed under
paragraph 3, section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Finally, the large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of RA
8371/IPRA is allowed under paragraphs 1 and 4, section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution since only priority rights (which does not necessarily
mean ownership rights) are given to ICCs/IPs.
However, by including natural resources, Section 1, Part II, Rule III of
the Implementing Rules goes beyond Section 7(a) and therefore
unconstitutional.
Justice Panganiban: YES.
Section 3(a) [whose definition of ancestral domain encompasses natural
resources found therein], and 3(b) [defines ancestral lands as those
possessed by ICCs/IPs since time immemorial] contravene Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution, which declares that the State owns all lands
of the public domain, minerals, and natural resources none of which,
except agricultural lands, can be alienated. In addition, mere possession
or utilization of land, however long, does not automatically convert them
into private properties.
IPRA/RA 8371 does not specify limits to ancestral lands and domains.
IPRA/RA 8371 relinquishes the States power under Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution of full control of natural resources in ancestral lands
and ancestral domains in favor of ICCs/IPs, who may exercise these
rights without any time limit. In addition, they are also given the right to
negotiate directly the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural
resources under Section 7(b), a right vested by the Constitution only to
the State.
Justice Vitug: YES. Sections 7 and 57 go beyond the context of the
fundamental law and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an
unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a significant area of the country
and its patrimony

WoN Sections 51 to 53, 59, 52(i), 63, 65, and 66 of RA 8371/IPRA, defining the powers
and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands, violate the due process clause
of the Constitution
o Justice Kapunan: NO. The fact the NCIP is composed wholly of indigenous
peoples does not mean that it is incapable of being impartial. Moreover, the use
of customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the
Constitution.
o Justice Puno: Not discussed.
o Justice Panganiban: Not discussed. It is best to await specific cases filed by
those whose rights may have been injured by these provisions.
o Justice Vitug: YES, but only on making customary law applicable to the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The
second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress
to provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains. I do not
see this statement as saying that Congress may enact a law that would simply
express that customary laws shall govern and end it there. No discussion on the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP.
WoN Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998,
which provides that the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of
policy and program coordination, infringes upon the Presidents power of control over
executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
o Justice Kapunan: NO, since said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA
expressly places the NCIP under the Office of the President, and therefore under
the Presidents control and supervision with respect to its administrative
functions. However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial powers are concerned, the same are reviewable by the Court of
Appeals, like those of the NLRC and the SEC.
o Justice Puno: Not discussed.
o Justice Panganiban: Not discussed. It is best to await specific cases filed by
those whose rights may have been injured by these provisions.
o Justice Vitug: Not discussed.

NOTES:

Seven Justices voted to dismiss the petitions

o Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged
provisions of R.A. 8371.
o Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of
the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA,
and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing

with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in

conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
o Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does
not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven Justices voted to grant the petition
o Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3
(a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of
the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose
rights may have been violated by the IPRA.
o Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a),
7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justice Vitug also mentioned that the
petitioners have standing to raise the issue, as it is of transcendental importance.
o Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate
opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.