Professional Documents
Culture Documents
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the
importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and
the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section
11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation
introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the administration of
justice.
Here, the proximity between the offices of opposing counsel was
established; moreover, that the office of private respondents counsel was ten times
farther from the post office than the distance separating the offices of opposing
counsel. Of course, proximity would seem to make personal service most practicable,
but exceptions may nonetheless apply. For instance, where the adverse party or
opposing counsel to be served with a pleading seldom reports to office and no
employee is regularly present to receive pleadings, or where service is done on the
last day of the reglementary period and the office of the adverse party or opposing
counsel to be served is closed, for whatever reason.
Returning, however, to the merits of this case, in view of the proximity between the
offices of opposing counsel and the absence of any attendant explanation as to why
personal service of the answer was not effected, indubitably, private respondents
counsel violated Section 11 of Rule 13 and the motion to expunge was prima
facie meritorious. However, the grant or denial of said motion nevertheless
remained within the sound exercise of the trial courts discretion. Thus, as guided by
Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which ordains that the Rules
shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding, as well as by the
dictum laid down in Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 [1910], the trial court opted to
exercise its discretion in favor of admitting the Answer (with Counterclaims), instead
of expunging it from the record.
To our mind, if motions to expunge or strike out pleadings for violation of
Section 11 of Rule 13 were to be indiscriminately resolved under Section 6 of Rule 1
or Alonzo v. Villamor and other analogous cases, then Section 11 would become
meaningless and its sound purpose negated. Nevertheless, we sustain the challenged
ruling of the trial court, but for reasons other than those provided for in the
challenged order (The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on 1 July 1997,
while the questioned Answer (with Counterclaims) was filed only on 8 August 1997,
th
or on the 39 day following the effectivity of the 1997 Rules).
Lapid v. Laurea
G. R. No. 139607, October 28, 2002 | Angliongto
FACTS:
Rosario Dasig, administratrix of her son's landholdings while the latter migrated to
the United States, sold the property to respondent Sylvia Amor. This prompted
petitioners, claiming to be tenants of the landholding, to file a case for redemption
with the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Adjudicator. Petitioners
subsequently filed a complaint for annulment of sale against respondent. The
Regional Adjudicator of the DAR ruled in favor of petitioners and declared them as
tenants of the subject landholding and nullified the deed of absolute sale between
Rosario Dasig and respondent. The DARAB modified the ruling a bit, saying that they
were bona fide tenants. The Court of Appeals however reversed the DARAB. The
petitioners argued that the CA should have dismissed respondents petition for
failure to cite an explanation for the mode of service.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
W/N the Court of Appeals should not have given due course to the petition because
the respondent failed to attach thereto a written explanation why personal service
was not done
HELD:
The failure to explain why personal service was not done is not cause for
dismissal.
The service and filing of pleadings must be done personally whenever
practicable. In the present case, personal service would not be practicable.
Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where
the petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail would have entailed
considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service was not
done personally might have been superfluous.
In any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of "may," signifying
permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to
consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are necessary to
secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid application of Section
11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.
Spouses Lapid are the parents of Christopher B. Lapid, who was a Grade 1
pupil of St. Therese of the Child Jesus. He was suspended for five days effective on 6
November 1997. The Lapids filed a letter-complaint with the DECS. At the hearing,
they demanded a written retraction and a public apology from the school officials,
but the latter refused.
On May 8, 1998, the Lapids filed a complaint for damages against St.
Therese and its directress, teacher-in-charge, guidance counselor and principal
before the Malabon RTC. According to the Lapids, the schools malicious imputation
against their son tarnished their good name and reputation.
In their answer, the school officials stated that as early as June 1997, Ms.
Cruz had been sending them letters regarding Christophers mischief in school.
According to them, Christopher had committed serious infractions when he hurt not
only his classmates but also his classroom teacher, Ms. Cruz, and one school
employee. They also averred that on several occasions, the parents of students
offended by Christopher lodged complaints with the school against Christopher,
urging the administration to impose appropriate disciplinary action on him. After
most of these incidents, Ms. Cruz had called up the Lapids house to acquaint them
with these complaints. Said phone calls were received, often by Mrs. Gloria Manapat
Bautista, grandmother and guardian de facto of Christopher. All their efforts to reach
the Lapid spouses personally turned out to be futile.
On November 18, 1998, the Lapids filed a motion to declare St. Therese as
in default, which was denied by the trial court. MR was likewise denied. They filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition for
failure to indicate the material date, particularly the date of filing of motion for
reconsideration with the RTC, as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 39-98,
amending Section 3 of Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Lapids filed
an MR of the CA resolution, but still without indicating the date as to when their MR
of the RTC order was filed. CA denied the MR.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by the Lapids on the
ground of formal and procedural deficiency, i.e., their failure to state a material date
in their petition for certiorari.
Cerezo filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment which the TC refused to
grant the petition stating that Cerezo should have availed of the remedy of appeal.
Cerezo filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, which was likewise denied. The CA
ruled that the Cerezo spouses failure to file an answer was due to their own
negligence, considering that they continued to participate in the proceedings
without filing an answer. There was also nothing in the records to show that the
Cerezo spouses actually offered a reasonable settlement to Tuazon. Undaunted, the
spouses filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment, which was still denied
ISSUE:
Whether Cerezo was wrongfully declared in default.
Whether a Petion for Annulment of Judgment was the proper remedy after Cerezo
was declared in default.
HELD:
No. Records show that the petitioner previously filed with the lower court a
Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground that they were wrongfully declared
in default while waiting for an amicable settlement of the complaint for damages.
The court a quo correctly ruled that such petition is without merit. The defendant
spouses admit that during the initial hearing they appeared before the court and
even mentioned the need for an amicable settlement. Thus, the lower court
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant spouses.
Therefore, petitioner having availed of a petition for relief, the remedy of an
annulment of judgment is no longer available. The proper action for the petitioner is
to appeal the order of the lower court denying the petition for relief.
An examination of the records of the entire proceedings shows that three
lawyers filed and signed pleadings on behalf of Mrs. Cerezo, namely, Atty. Daga,
Atty. Valera, and Atty. Cerezo. Despite their number, Mrs. Cerezos counsels failed to
avail of the proper remedies.It is either by sheer ignorance or by malicious
manipulation of legal technicalities that they have managed to delay the disposition
of the present case, to the detriment of pauper litigant Tuazon.
Lina v. Court of Appeals enumerates the remedies available to a party
declared in default:
1. The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and
before judgment, file a motion under oath to set aside the order of
default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense
(Sec. 3, Rule 18 [now Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]);
If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered
the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may
file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
3. If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final
and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 [now Section
1] of Rule 38; and
4. He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to
the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of
default has been presented by him (Sec. 2, Rule 41). (Emphasis added)
Moreover, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by
default is also available if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or
even if the trial court properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion
attended such declaration.
Mrs. Cerezo admitted that she received a copy of the TCs decision on 25
June 1995. Based on this admission, Mrs. Cerezo had at least three remedies at her
disposal: an appeal, a motion for new trial, or a petition for certiorari.
Mrs. Cerezo could have appealed under Rule 4 1from the default judgment
within 15 days from notice of the judgment. She could have availed of the power of
the CA to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence, and perform all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its appellate
jurisdiction.
Mrs. Cerezo also had the option to file under Rule 37 a motion for new trial
within the period for taking an appeal.If the trial court grants a new trial, the original
judgment is vacated, and the action will stand for trial de novo.The recorded
evidence taken in the former trial, as far as the same is material and competent to
establish the issues, shall be used at the new trial without retaking the same.
Mrs. Cerezo also had the alternative of filing under Rule 65 a petition
for certiorari assailing the order of default within 60 days from notice of the
judgment.An order of default is interlocutory, and an aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. In a petition for certiorari, the
appellate court may declare void both the order of default and the judgment of
default.
Clearly, Mrs. Cerezo had every opportunity to avail of these remedies within
the reglementary periods provided under the Rules of Court. However, Mrs. Cerezo
opted to file a petition for relief from judgment, which is available only in exceptional
cases. A petition for relief from judgment should be filed within the reglementary
period of 60 days from knowledge of judgment and six months from entry of
judgment, pursuant to Rule 38 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Evidently, there was
that Garcia was operating a restaurant named Manokan sa Sugbu and they believed
he was a dummy of the respondents. The trial court denied the motion, saying that
the amendment not only requires or compels the respondents to change their
defense but also subjects them to all the acts, knowledge, admission and omissions
of Garcia. The CA affirmed, holding that the amendment is substantial and has the
effect of changing the theory of the case, and that Garcia is not an indispensable
party. MR was denied. Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the amended complaint which seeks to include the dummy of respondents
could not be admitted because petitioners theory of the case will change and that
the dummy is not an indispensable party.
HELD:
Under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, formal and
substantial amendments to a pleading may be made at anytime before a responsive
pleading has been filed. Such amendment is a matter of right. Thereafter, and during
trial, amendments may only be done with the permission of the court. Amendments
are not proper and should be denied when delay would arise, or when amendments
would result in a change of cause of action or theory of the case, or would be
inconsistent with the allegations in the original complaint.
The trial court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners amended complaint. The admission thereof was clearly not a matter of
right on the part of petitioners as they sought the same only after a responsive
pleading (an answer) had already been filed by respondents. The matter was thus
within the discretion of the trial court. And, as consistently held by the Court, the
granting of leave to file amended pleadings is a matter peculiarly within the sound
discretion of the trial court and such discretion would not normally be disturbed on
appeal except when evident abuse thereof is apparent, none of which has been
shown in this case.
Remington Industrial Sales Corp. v. Court of Appeals
G. R. No. 133657, May 29, 2002 | Bautista
FACTS:
Petitioner Remington filed a complaint for sum of money and damages
arising from breach of contract against Industrial Steels, Ltd. (ISL), with Ferro Trading
GMBH and respondent British Steel as alternative defendants.
ISSUE:
Did the CA correctly order the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action, despite the fact that petitioner exercised its right to amend the defective
complaint under Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court? Or stated differently, can a
complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer has been filed,
even if there was a pending proceeding for its dismissal before the higher court?
FACTS:
HELD:
No. The complaint may still be amended as a matter of right.
Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that a
pleading may be amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is
served. This only means that prior to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the
absolute right to amend the complaint whether a new cause of action or change in
theory is introduced.
It cannot be said that the defendants rights have been violated by changes
made in the complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In such an event, the
defendant has not presented any defense that can be altered or affected by the
amendment of the complaint in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10.
The right to amend the complaint before an answer has been served is not
precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding contesting its
sufficiency. Otherwise, the right to amend a pleading under Section 2, Rule 10 will be
rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all that a defendant has to do to foreclose
this remedial right is to challenge the adequacy of the complaint before he files an
answer.
(related issue) Yes. Respondents contend that the amendment would introduce
a subsequently acquired cause of action as there was none at the time the
original complaint was filed. This is untenable. The amendment was sought after
PX had already presented evidence, specifically when it presented the testimony
of the treasury manager and the debit memo. Respondents contend that since
they had already alleged the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action as
an affirmative defense in their action, there was no need to object at the time
the evidence was presented. Respondents failure to object to the evidence at
the time it was presented is fatal to their cause inasmuch as whatever perceived
defect the complaint had was cured by the introduction of PXs evidence.
SERVICE OF PLEADINGS
HELD:
The petition which was filed by registered mail was not accompanied by a
written explanation why such service was not done personally, in contravention of
Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. That provision requires personal service of
pleadings and papers whenever practicable. If made through other modes, the party
concerned must provide a written explanation why it was not done personally. The
provision is mandatory in nature and it even gives the court the discretion to
consider a pleading or paper as not filed if no such explanation is made. Strictest
compliance is mandated, lest this provision be rendered meaningless and its sound
purpose negated.
United Pulp and Paper Co. v. United Pulp and Paper Chapter-FFW
G.R. No. 141117, March 15, 2004 | Casuela
FACTS:
Teodorico Simbulan was promoted with a corresponding salary increase.
Respondent union, on behalf of Simbulan, questioned the salary increase,
maintaining that Simbulan was entitled to a higher salary increase based on their
CBA. The case was submitted to the grievance machinery, but failed to settle. Thus,
the matter was elevated to the Voluntary Arbitrators, which rendered a decision
favourable to Simbulan.
IMPT PART: Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review, assailing the
decision of the Voluntary Arbitrators. The CA dismissed the petition outright for
being insufficient in form, stating:
1. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by
counsel for petitioner corporation rather than by a duly-authorized officer
2. The affidavit of service is inadequate, as the registry receipts evidencing mailing
of copies of the petition were not attached
3. There was no mandatory written explanation required under sec. 11, Rule 13.
Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CAs
seriously erred in dismissing the case because of mere technicalities.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in dismissing the case?
HELD:
No. Under section 5 , Rule 7, the plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading that he has not commenced
annulment of the entire proceedings. His ground is this: Summons was not duly
served upon him "as provided under Sec. 7, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court;"
accordingly, the LC "did not acquire jurisdiction over his person"; and "the trial and
decision by default" are "null and void." Court denied.
ISSUE:
W/N summons in a suit in personam against a resident of the Philippines temporarily
absent therefrom may be validly effected by substituted service under Section 8,
Rule 14, (formerly Section 8, Rule 7) of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
SUMMONS
Maximo v. Montalban
22 SCRA 1077 | Chavez
FACTS:
Montalban commenced suit against Fr. Maximo who was residing at the
parish church in Rizal. Plaintiffs' cause of action sprang from a car accident which
occurred at Padre Faura St., Manila. Paul Montalban, son of plaintiffs, suffered
injuries. On the same day that the complaint was filed, summons was served on
defendant Fr. Maximo at the church in Rizal, through Fr. Bautista a priest in the
same church.
Fr. Bautista sent a letter to the Clerk of Court of the CFI of Manila, informing
st
him that Fr. Maximo left for Europe, and will be back on the 1 week of November.
nd
Actually, Fr. Maximo returned about the 2 week of October, 1958. The LC
declared defendant in default and rendered judgment sentencing defendant to pay
Montalban damages. Plaintiffs wrote Fr. Maximo, at the Church, requesting prompt
compliance. Defendant answered the letter expressing regret that he could not
comply with plaintiffs' request, because he was not aware of the civil case, and that,
in the criminal action arising out of the same incident, he was acquitted. Sheriff of
Rizal notified defendant and demanded payment. The Sheriff's return shows that in
response to such demand, defendant alleged that he was then "financially hard up"
and that the Sheriff found no property that could be subject to execution. The
Deputy Sheriff attached and levied on a residential house located in Caloocan City
and purportedly belonging to defendant.
2 years and 2 months after defendant admittedly learned of the LCs
decision, defendant filed a verified motion in the same case praying for the
Yes. Plaintiffs argue that if the ordinary method prescribed by the rules that
is, personal service under Section 7, Rule 14, is not feasible, then the substituted
service in Section 8 aforesaid comes into play. Defendant advances the theory that
where defendant was temporarily abroad, the sole and exclusive method of service
of summons in a case in personam is that set forth in Section 18, Rule 14 of the Rules
(formerly Section 18, Rule 7).
Substituted service such as one contemplated in Section 8 upon a
temporarily absent resident, it has been held, is wholly adequate to meet the
requirements of due process. The constitutional requirement of due process exacts
that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give the notice desired.
Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the
requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied;
due process is served.
In American jurisprudence, whether a defendant be in another state under
the federal system or is abroad in Europe, substituted service is still considered to be
valid. Milliken vs. Meyer states: "Its adequacy so far as due process is concerned is
dependent on whether or not the form of substituted service provided for such cases
and employed is reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings
and an opportunity to be heard.
When the framers of our Rules adapted Section 8, it is to be implied that
they intended to give the provision the same meaning. Section 8 is to be viewed in
the same context it is understood in the American legal system. The word
"defendant" in that provision is to be construed as including any resident of this
country. By comparative construction, Section 8 is to be applied to all resident
defendants without distinction as to whether he is physically present in this
country or not.
the expense of Abelardo. Consequently, the trial court declared the marriage
between Abelardo and Margarita null and void. In this petition, Margarita attacked
the validity of the service of summons on her and the judgment dissolving the
conjugal partnership of gains.
ISSUE:
Was Summons validly served on Margarita Romualdez Licaros?
HELD:
Actions in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that
actions in personam are directed against specific persons and seek personal
judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or quasi in rem are directed against
the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto
as against the whole world.
At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991,
Margarita was residing in the United States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together
with her two children. The trial court considered Margarita a non-resident defendant
who is not found in the Philippines. Since the petition affects the personal status of
the plaintiff, the trial court authorized extraterritorial service of summons under
Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The term "personal status" includes family
relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife.
Under Section 15 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, a defendant who is a nonresident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by
extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the action affects the personal
status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected
under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of
court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court
by registered mail to the defendant's last known address, also with leave of court; or
(3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient. Applying the foregoing
rule, the trial court required extraterritorial service of summons to be effected on
Margarita. The trial court's prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does not fall
ISSUE:
W/N there is a valid service of summons Invalid
W/N the CA erred in dismissing the petition of the petitioner Yes
HELD:
An original action in the CA under Rule 47 to annul a judgment or final order
or resolution in civil actions of the RTC may be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic
fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction. The SC ruled that the CA erred in dismissing the
petition because it failed to take note from the material allegations of the petition,
that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the summons and the copy of
the complaint were not served on her.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon, it was said that jurisdiction is
acquired by a trial court over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary
appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons.
The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a
case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He is, thus,
put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such
service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and
void. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant
even if he knows of the case against him unless he is validly served with summons.
Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing
a copy thereof to him in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to her. However, if there is impossibility of prompt service of the
summons personally on the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of
the summons may be effected by substituted service as provided in Section 7, Rule
14.
In Miranda v. CA, it was held that the modes of service should be strictly
followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be served personally within a
reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating the efforts made to
find him and personally serve on him the summons and complaint and the fact that
such effort failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service to be
accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is necessary because substituted
service is a derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that
substituted service of summons is a method extraordinary in character; hence, may
be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances categorized by statutes.
Under Section 5, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, alias summons may be issued when
the original summons is returned without being served on any or all of the
defendants. Petitioners, however, did not do so, and they should now bear the
consequences of their lack of diligence.
The fact that Atty. Expedito Bugarin represented all the respondents
without any exception does not transform the ineffective service of summons into a
valid one. It does not constitute a valid waiver or even a voluntary submission to the
trial courts jurisdiction. There was not even the slightest proof showing that
respondents authorized Atty. Bugarins appearance for and in their behalf. The
records show that in all the pleadings which required verification, only Caridad
Trocino signed the same. There was never a single instance where defendant heirs
signed the pleading. The fact that a pleading is signed by one defendant does not
necessarily mean that it is binding on a co-defendant.
Since the defendant heirs are co-defendants, the trial court should have
verified the extent of Atty. Bugarins authority when petitioners failed to appear as
early as the pre-trial stage, where the parties are required to appear. The absence of
the defendant heirs should have prompted the trial court to inquire from the lawyer
whether he was also representing the other petitioners. As co-defendant and coheirs over the disputed properties, the defendant heirs had every right to be present
during the trial. Only Caridad Trocino appeared and testified on her own behalf. All
the defenses raised were her own, not the defendant heirs.
Consequently, the judgment sought to be executed against respondents
were rendered without jurisdiction as there was neither a proper service of
summons nor was there any waiver or voluntary submission to the trial courts
jurisdiction. Hence, the same is void, with regard to private respondents except
Caridad Trocino. It must be pointed out that while it was the spouses Jesus and
Caridad Trocino who sold the properties to petitioners, their right to proceed against
Jesus Trocino when he died was passed on to his heirs, which includes respondents
and Caridad Trocino. When the process server personally served the summons on
Caridad Trocino, the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction over her person alone.
Hence, the trial courts decision is valid and binding with regard to her, but only in
proportion to Caridad Trocinos share.
MOTIONS
National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia v. Court of Appeals
G. R. No. 124267, January 31, 2003 | Enriquez
the FLADC shall earn interest at 10% per annum to be computed from the date of the
FLADC Board Resolution which is 19 June 1996; and that the Tius shall be credited
with 49,800 shares in FLADC for their property contribution, specifically, the 151 sq.
m. parcel of land. The Court affirmed the fact that both the Ongs and the Tius
violated their respective obligations under the Pre-Subscription Agreement.
The Tius filed to the SC Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution on the
grounds that: (a) the SEC order had become executory as early as September 11,
1998 pursuant to Sections 1 and 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court; (b) any further
delay would be injurious to the rights of the Tius since the case had been pending for
more than six years; and (c) the SEC no longer had quasi-judicial jurisdiction under
RA 8799 (Securities Regulation Code).
The Ongs filed their opposition, contending that the SEC order was not yet
final and executory; that no good reason existed to issue a warrant of execution; and
that, pursuant to Section 5.2 of RA 8799, the SEC retained jurisdiction over pending
cases involving intra-corporate disputes already submitted for final resolution upon
the effectivity of the said law. Also, the Ongs filed their own Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, raising two main points: (a) that specific performance and not
rescission was the proper remedy under the premises; and (b) that, assuming
rescission to be proper, the subject decision of this Court should be modified to
entitle movants to their proportionate share in the mall.
The Tius, in their opposition to the Ongs MR, counter that the arguments
therein are a mere re-hash of the contentions in the Ongs petition for review and
previous MR of the CAs decision, and is therefore pro-forma and did not prevent the
Decision of the SC from attaining finality.
ISSUE:
W/N the Ongs MR should be granted.
HELD:
Yes. After a thorough re-examination of the case, the Court found that its
Decision of February 1, 2002 overlooked certain aspects which, if not corrected, will
cause extreme and irreparable damage and prejudice to the Ongs, FLADC and its
creditors.
The procedural rule on pro-forma motions pointed out by the Tius should
not be blindly applied to meritorious motions for reconsideration. As long as the
same adequately raises a valid ground (i.e., the decision or final order is contrary to
law), the SC has to evaluate the merits of the arguments to prevent an unjust
decision from attaining finality. In Security Bank and Trust Company vs. Cuenca, the
private respondent Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and support
her with P20,000.00 every month to be paid on or before the 15th of each month
starting 15 April 2000. Likewise petitioner was also ordered to pay the accumulated
arrears from the day she was born, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,
plus P20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every month from 15 May 2000 as
alimony pendente lite should he desire to pursue further remedies against private
respondent.
Private respondent moved for execution of the judgment of support, which
the trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution, citing as reason Francheska's
immediate need for schooling. Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff levied upon a motor
vehicle, a Honda City, registered in the name of "A.B. Leasing & Fin. Corp., Leased to:
G & G Trading," and found within the premises of petitioner's warehouse in Caloocan
City.
Petitioner appealed to the CA but his petition was denied with the
ratiocination that judgements for support are immediately executory and cannot be
stayed by an appeal.
ISSUE:
Was there GADLEJ on the part of the trial court in its issuance of the writ of
execution?
FACTS:
Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to school her three
3-year old daughter Francheska Joy S. Pondevida, Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote
petitioner Augustus Caezar R. Gan demanding support for their "love child."
Petitioner, in his reply, denied paternity of the child. An exasperated Bernadette
thereafter instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint against petitioner for
support with prayer for support pendente lite.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action. He argued that since Francheska's certificate of birth indicated her
father as "UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual basis for the claim of support.
His motion was denied. Despite denial of his motion, petitioner failed to file his
answer within the reglementary period. On 19 January 2000 private respondent
moved that petitioner be declared in default, which motion was granted. In
its Order declaring petitioner in default the trial court noted that petitioner's Motion
to Admit Answer was filed more than ninety (90) days after the expiration of the
reglementary period.
After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved,
the trial court rendered its Decision on 12 May 2000 ordering petitioner to recognize
HELD:
No. Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless
ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately
executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule
which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and
that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor.
The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments
for support and makes no distinction between those which are the subject of an
appeal and those which are not. To consider then petitioner's argument that there
should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the
clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution.
The court also found the petitioners attempts to delay the execution. As
the records show, in partial fulfilment of the writ of execution, petitioner
surrendered a sedan which was not his and was later ordered to be released to a
third party who laid claim over the vehicle.
Moreover, the Court finds no useful purpose to dwell on petitioners
arguments concerning the validity of the judgment by default and the paternity
4.
Mutilan v. Andiong
Adm. Matter No. RTJ-00-1581, July 2, 2002 | Garcia-Morera
5.
Gochan v. Gochan
G. R. No. 143089, February 27, 2003 | Grapilon
FACTS:
Allegations and perceptions of bias from the mere tenor and language of a
judge is insufficient to show prejudgment. Allowing inhibition for these reasons
would open the floodgates to abuse. Unless there is concrete proof that a judge has
a personal interest in the proceedings, and that his bias stems from an extra-judicial
source, this Court shall always commence from the presumption that a magistrate
shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals (CA) granting that Judge Dicdican should inhibit himself from
the civil case (Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages) based on bias and
partiality.
Basically, Judge Dicdican denied the several motions of the respondents
and since they believe that the Judge was biased and partial, the Judge ruled
against them.
On Appeal, The CA opined that the apprehensions of respondents about the
bias or partiality of Judge Dicdican in favor of petitioners were well-founded.
The CA based its ruling on the following circumstances pointed out by
respondents:
1. Judge Dicdican denied the Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses filed by
respondents, but in the same Order ruled on its merits without giving them an
opportunity to be heard.
2. The above Order of the judge was too well-prepared to be extemporaneous,
leading respondents to suspect that he was bent on deciding the case in favor of
petitioners.
3. Without indicating for the record respondents objections, Judge Dicdican
admitted all exhibits of petitioners and even allowed their witnesses to answer
all questions, even if he had not yet resolved the applicability of the Statute of
Frauds.
6.
ISSUE:
1. Whether respondents are guilty of forum shopping.
2. Whether Judge Dicdican should have inhibited himself.
HELD:
1. NO.
2. The Petition is meritorious insofar as the second issue is concerned. Judge
Dicdican need not inhibit himself. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other
than those mentioned above.
The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary.
The instances mentioned in the first paragraph of the cited Rule conclusively
presume that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in a case. The second
paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the discretion of the
judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only
their conscience as guide.
The Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be considered valid
reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and
convincing evidence
Denial of Respondents Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses
The fact that respondents Motion for Hearing was denied does not by itself
show bias and partiality. Clearly, Judge Dicdican based his denial on the Rules of
Court, according to which a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses is indeed
discretionary on the part of a judge. Thus, Judge Dicdican cannot be charged with
Moreover, respondents cannot claim that all their requests were turned
down by Judge Dicdican. This Court takes notice of the fact that respondents asked
for an extension of time to file their answer and later asked for two postponements
of the pretrial. In fact, when the pretrial was finally set for August 11, 1998, they
then filed their Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses. And when the judge denied it,
they again asked for a postponement of the pretrial, a request that was readily
granted by the trial court.
What further militates against respondents counsel is his excuse that he
was informed by a court personnel that his Motion to Reset had been granted.
Supposedly because of this information, the counsel was under the impression that
there would be no hearing on the last scheduled date. His assumption that his
motion to reset would be granted was bad enough. What was worse was that, in
following up the proceedings of the case, he relied on the unauthorized
communication of an unidentified court personnel. He could have easily verified if
there was a hearing, and what transpired if it indeed there was one. This is the duty
imposed upon lawyers.
Declaration of the Absence of the Possibility of a Compromise
From the time the original Complaint was filed up to the date of the pretrial,
the parties had more than seven months to enter into a compromise agreement.
This was more than sufficient time. It escapes this Court why, exactly on the day of
the pretrial, respondents suddenly informed the court that it was exploring the
possibility of a settlement. Besides, their absence during the pretrial negated the
sincerity of their desire to enter into a settlement.
East Asia Traders, Inc. v. Republic
G.R. No.152947, July 7, 2004 | Gregorio
Petilla v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 150792, March 3, 2004 | Gregorio
Alvarez v. Diaz
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1283, March 3, 2004 | Jalipa
September 1994, the next working day, following the last day for filing which fell on
a Sunday.
Leonardo v. S.T. Best, Inc.
G.R. No. 142066, February 6, 2004 | Nieves
United Coconut Planters Bank v. Magpayo
G.R.No. 149908, May 27, 2004 | Ong
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA, which
overturned the order of dismissal of the RTC of Paraaque.
Respondent filed a case for reimbursement of a sum of money and
consequent damages. After petitioners answer was filed, pre-trial was set on
September 26, 1997 at 1:30 p.m. When the case was called, only the respondents
counsel was present. Asked if he had a special power of attorney, counsel replied
that he had, but he left it in the office. Hence, the petitioner moved to declare the
respondent non-suited, pursuant to Rule 18, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, the trial court issued an Order of Dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Respondent thus filed an Omnibus Motion stating therein that he arrived at
the court at around 2:00 p.m. and that he did not intend to be late for the pre-trial,
but the traffic at the South Superhighway was heavy due to construction work. He
attached copies of two powers of attorney which were dated May 20, 1997 and
6
September 24, 1997 respectively as proof that there indeed was a special power of
attorney executed but that respondents counsel forgot to bring it to the pre-trial.
Respondent prayed that the dismissal order be reversed and the trial court inhibit
itself from hearing the case.
RTC found the motion unmeritorious and affirmed the dismissal of the case.
On appeal, the CA reversed, stating that the Rules of Court is not cast in stone, and
that this case did not show either an evident scheme to delay the disposition of the
case, nor a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirements of the rules. The
CA also gave credence to the manifestation of respondents counsel that he had a
special power of attorney from his client, which was attached to the appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the CAs reversal of the RTCs dismissal was in accord the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence.
INTERVENTION
Nordic Asia Limited v. Court of Appeals
G. R. No. 1111159, June 10, 2003 | Padilla
DISCOVERY
Santos v. Philippine National Bank
G. R. No. 148218, April 29, 2002 | Posadas
FACTS:
The facts are not in dispute. Santos et.al. are the children of the deceased
Angel C. Santos. A few years after his death, petitioners discovered that the
decedent had a time deposit in PNB which was later converted to a Premium Savings
Account amounting to almost 2M. However, when Santos tried to withdraw from
the deposit, the bank, its branch manager, disallowed the withdrawal on the ground
that a certain Bernardito Manimbo had claimed the deposit and had in fact
withdrawn considerable amounts a few years before. PNB claimed that Manimbo
had presented (1) an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication allegedly executed by Reyme L.
Santos, one of the petitioners in this case, in which it was made to appear that he
was the sole heir of Angel C. Santos; and (2) a Special Power of Attorney also
allegedly executed by petitioner Reyme L. Santos appointing Angel P. Santos and
Bernardito Manimbo his attorneys-in-fact.
Claiming that these documents were falsified, Santos et.al. brought suit
against PNB for recovery of the deposit in the RTC. PNB filed their answer to the
complaint, attaching mere photocopies the Affidavit and SPA.
Santos et.al. filed a motion for the production of the originals of the
documents offered in evidence by PNB and the examination of the documents by the
NBI, but their motion was denied by the trial court which directed them to seek the
assistance of the NBI without issuing an order to the NBI. For this reason, they wrote
the NBI requesting the examination of the documents but the NBI denied the
request, reiterating that the NBI could not examine the documents without
submission of the originals of the documents in question and a court order for the
examination of the same. They therefore brought a special civil action for certiorari
in the CA, but their action was likewise dismissed. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying
reconsideration.
It has been held that where the requisite circumstances exist, a party may
be entitled to the production of records for inspection, copying, and photocopying as
a matter of right. The trial court was in error in ruling that the genuineness and due
execution of the questioned documents had been admitted by petitioners, thereby
foreclosing the possibility of having the signatures subjected to inspection and
handwriting analysis and preventing petitioners from contradicting respondents'
assertion that a valid withdrawal of the decedent's deposit had been made, when no
such admission had been made by them. PNB is thus ordered produce the originals
and the Court to direct the NBI to examine the same.
Duque v. Court of Appeals
G. R. No. 125383, July 2, 2002 | Reyes
FACTS:
Petitioner Duque filed a complaint with the RTC of Valenzuela against the
Spouses Bonifacio (SB). According to Duque, SB negotiated certain checks in
exchange for cash in the total amount of P270,000. Duque said that the SB told her
that they are holders in due course and that the checks are fully funded. However,
upon presentation of the checks they were dishonored. Duque repeatedly
demanded the SB to pay her but they refused to honor the checks.
Petitioner Valenzuela alleged that the SB did the same thing to her and they
owe her P432,000.
The Spouses Bonifacio denied all of the allegations of the petitioners. They
also claim that upon learning that they checks were returned to the petitioners they
made arrangements for settlement but only for the checks duly issued by them.
They also claim that "they do not owe that much" to either of the petitioners.
Several months after the Pre-trial the petitioners filed a Request for Admission and
they furnished the counsel of the Spouses Bonifacion. They requested that the
spouses admit that:
1. they negotiated with plaintiffs for valuable consideration the checks annexed to
the respective complaints;
2. defendant Edna M. Bonifacio signed separate promissory notes dated November
23, 1987, acknowledging that she is indebted to plaintiff Duque in the sum of
Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P270,000.00) and to plaintiff Valenzuela
Four Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Pesos (P432,000.00), respectively; and
3. the plaintiffs in the two cases sent letters of demand to the defendants both
dated November 28, 1987 which the latter received on December 5, 1987.
No. Records show that only the counsel of the respondents, Atty. H.G. Domingo,
Jr. was furnished copies of the requests. This is not sufficient compliance with
the Rules. According to the rules the request for admission must served to the
respondents and not to their counsel.
FACTS:
The Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) declared a strike on account of alleged
unfair labor practices committed by Nestle Philippines, Inc. (Nestle) and put up a
imposed upon a party who fails to comply with the modes of discovery rests on the
same sound judicial discretion. It is the duty of the courts to examine thoroughly the
circumstances of each case and to determine the applicability of the modes of
discovery, bearing always in mind the aim to attain an expeditious administration of
justice.
Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. v. Mangudadatu
G.R. No. 1550110, August 16, 2004 | Saranillo
Manzano v. Despabiladares
G.R.No. 148786, December 16, 2004 | Sia
FACTS:
In 1989, respondent Luz Despabiladeras obtained on credit from petitioner
Roger Manzano various construction materials which she used in her construction
project at the Camarines Sur Polytechnic Colleges (CSPC). Petitioner claims that the
materials costs around P307K of which only P130K was paid by respondent despite
payment by CSPC for the project. Petitioner filed a sum of money claim with
damages in the RTC of Iriga City, in her answer with counterclaim respondent alleged
that petitioner substantially altered the cost of materials and that she made
additional payments via two checks (+P57K). In his reply, petitioner alleges that the
checks represented payment for other obligations.
The issues were joined and in the pre-trial, both parties agreed that
petitioner shall make an offer to stipulate to respondent to determine the cost of
the materials in dispute and the latter will state her comment or objections. Instead
of making an offer to stipulate, petitioner filed a request for admission asking
respondent to admit within 15 days that (1. That respondent received the materials
from petitioner and 2. Of the P307K, only P130K was paid by respondent).
Respondent did not answer. RTC ordered the requested facts be admitted confirmed
and later on ruled in favor of petitioner. CA set aside the decision of the RTC
ISSUE:
What is the legal consequence when a request for admission of material and
relevant facts pursuant to Rule 26 is not answered under oath within the period
stated in the Rules by a party litigant served therefore?