Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. LUDIVICO D. ARCIAGA,
TAURINO SINGSON AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
No. L-29701. March 16,1987.
Facts:
On August 24, 1960, Taurino Singson filed a complaint against Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines Inc. for sustaining multiple serious physical injuries when the bus crashed against an
acacia tree. The case was set for trial on December 25, 1965 but upon the motion of both
counsel, it was transferred to February 3 and 4 1966. No pre-trial has ever been conducted, until
when April 29, 1967, only the defendant Philippine Rabbit appeared and upon motion of its
counsel, the court dismissed the case for non-appearance of plaintiff.
The order of dismissal of April 29, 1976 alluded to was sent to Atty. Constante Pimentel,
counsel for plaintiff, by registered mail on May 3, 1967 and was received on May 6, 1967. On
July 6, 1967 (61 days from receipt of dismissal), counsel for plaintiff filed a Petition for Relief
accompanied by an affidavit alleging that Taurino Singson upon attending the trial of his case
had encountered engine trouble causing him to be late. On August 16, 1967, lower court granted
plaintiffs petition for relief and denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner on November
28, 1967 on the ground that the petition for relief under Rule 38 is premised on equity. On July 9,
1968, petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with preliminary injunction in the Court of Appeals but it was denied on August 5, 1968.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied on October 1, 1968. Hence, the instant
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Is the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petition for Relief under Rule 38 is premised
on equity?
Ruling:
The court found that the petition is impressed with merits. Sec 3. of Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court provides for a petition to be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment and in this case the Petition for Relief was filed 61 days after the receipt of the notice
of the dismissal. Furthermore, the counsel for private respondents did not move for
reconsideration of the Order for dismissal, nor for new trial. Neither did he appeal, thereby
allowing the decision to become final and executory.
The private respondent could have availed of the sixty day period provided for by Rule
38 to file Petition for relief of judgment but he allowed the opportunity to lapse, thus, the rule of
equity is not applicable in this case. Moreover, the petitioner did not satisfactory showed that he
has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of the said Rule. He cannot invoke equity
as a ground for the reopening of the case. Indeed, to him is applicable, the well known maxim
that, equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. The court, thus, ruled that
the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside and said Civil Case is declared
terminated.
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ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. AND
RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.
Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and
established residence in the Philippines afterwards. The parties were divorced in Nevada, United
States in 1982. Petitioner re-married also in Nevada with Theodore Van Dorn. Dated June 8,
1983, private respondents filed suit against petitioner claiming that the latters properties in
Manila were conjugal and that private respondent had a rightful claim to its management.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the suit claiming that the private respondent acknowledged that he
and petitioner had no community property in the divorce proceedings. The Regional Trial
Court denied the dismissal on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines
so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this
certiorari proceeding.
Issues:
a. When is a certiorari proceeding justifiable?
b. Can the Philippines recognize divorce?
Ruling:
a.
The petition was granted, and respondent judge was hereby ordered to dismiss the
complaint filed where respondent judge denied her motion to dismiss said case, and her motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal order. When the lower court acts in a manner equivalent to a
lack of jurisdiction then it devolves upon the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding to
exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed.
b.
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippines nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces. Aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. A divorce decree granted by a U.S. Court between a Filipina and her
American husband is binding on the American husband. Since the couple had obtained a
divorced in Nevada, the husband is estopped from asserting his rights over supposed conjugal
property. The American husband in this instance who was granted absolute divorce with his
Filipina wife is cut off from marital and successional rights with the latter.
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Issues:
Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration valid?
Whether or not William Gatchalian a Filipino citizen?
Held:
It was held that the warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of immigration should
be for investigation purposes only. Thus, the warrant of arrest that was issued is null and void for
being unconstitutional. Based on the Immigration Act, it is clear that the Commissioner of
Immigration may issue warrant of arrest only after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In
other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of immigration, to be valid, must be
for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation.
As to the citizenship of William Gatchalian, it was held that William Gatchalian follows
the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in
turn, is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who is admittedly a
Filipino citizen whose Filipino citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an
order dated July 12, 1960. Thus, William gatchalian belongs to the Filipino class of citizens as
contemplated under Sec. 1 Article IV of the Constitution, which provides: Section 1. the
following are citizens of the Philippines; (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution.
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CAR COOL PHILIPPINES, INC., represented in this act by its President and General
Manager VIRGILIO DELA ROSA, petitioner, vs. USHIO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent
G.R. No. 138088. January 23, 2006
Facts:
On December 19, 1995, Ushio Realty and Development Corporations (Ushio Realty)
filed an ejectment case against Car Cool Philippines, Inc. (CAR COOL) to recover possession of
a parcel of land (property) located at No. 72 (137) Quezon Avenue corner of Victory Avenue,
Quezon City.
USHIO Realty alleges that the former owners of the property, spouses Hector and Gloria
Hizon Lopez (Spouses Lopez), leased the property to CAR COOL since 1972. In 1990, the
Spouses Lopez and CAR COOL executed a written lease agreement over the property for two
years. On the expiration of the agreement, the Spouses Lopez allowed CAR COOL to continue
renting the property. Thus, the agreement went on by a verbal month-month agreement. Hector
Lopez wrote CAR COOL to inform of his intention to sell the property and te former gave the
latter the option to buy the property before offering it to other prospective buyers. CAR COOL
failed to respond to the offer. Thus, the property was bought by USHIO.
USHIO gave CAR COOL a specific time to which to vacate the property. But after three
notice and failing, however, to comply te demands of USHIO, filed a complaint for ejectment on
December 19, 1995. The Metropolitan Trial Court decided in favor of USHIO REALTY. CAR
COOL filed an appeal to the Regional Trial Court, but still the latter affirm the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages by way of rentals and
attorneys fees in favor of USHIO.
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
CAR COOL asserts that to award damages to USHIO Realty would constitute unjust
enrichment at the expense of CAR COOL. CAR COOL claims that it never benefited from its
occupation of the property after USHIO Realtys agents enetered the property on October 1,
1995 and unlawfully destroyed CAR COOLs office, equipment and spare parts. Because of the
destruction of the equipment and spare parts needed to operate its business, CAR COOL asserts
that it was no longer possible to continue its business operations. The Supreme Court, however,
was not convinced basing from the Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically under
Sections 17 and 19.
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ARIEL NON ET.AL., petitioners. vs. HON. SANCHO DAMES II, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the 5th Regional Trail Court, Br. 38, and
MABINI COLLEGES, INC., respondents
G.R. No. 89317. May 20, 1990
Facts:
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges Inc., in Daet were not allowed
to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student
mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. Petitioners filed a petition in the court
seeking their re-admission to the school, but the trail court dismissed the petition using the ruling
in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA as the basis. Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari.
The case was assigned to the 3rd division of the court, which then transferred it to the Court en
banc on Aug. 21, 1989 considering that the issues raised are jurisdictional.
Respondent school justified their action of non-readmission due to the fact that the
petitioners incurred academic deficiency. Petitioners used the following as defense: that 3 of
them were graduating; that their academic deficiencies do not warrant re-admission; that their
breach of discipline was not serious; that the improper conduct attributed to them was during the
exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly; that there was no due
investigation; that respondent school is their choice institution near their places of residence
which they can afford to pay for tertiary education, of which they have already lost one-and-ahalf school-years-in itself punishment enough.
Issue:
Whether or not the ruling in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA be binding in this case?
Ruling:
The court in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the termination of contract theory. But it
must be repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an
ordinary contract. Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Par. 137 of the
manual of Regulations for Private Schools. On the other hand, the manual recognizes the right of
the student to be enrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it.
It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities were the student mass
actions conducted in Feb. 1988 and which led and/or participated by the petitioners. Certainly,
excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them
undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also
constitutes a violation of the basis tenets of fair play.
Petitioners, who have been refused readmission and who have been effectively excluded
from respondent school for 4 semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for
any breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass
actions that, according to respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them
to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the
strained relations between petitioners and the officials of the respondent school.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The orders of respondent judge are herby annulled.
Respondent Mabini College is ordered to re-admit and to allow the re-enrollment of petitioners.
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ARMANDO JOSE y PAZ and MANILA CENTRAL BUS LINES (MCL), represented by
its General Manager MR. DANILO T. DE DIOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ROMMEL ABRAHAM, represented by his father FELIXBERTO ABRAHAM, JOSE
MACARUBO and MERCEDES MACARUBO, respondents.
G. R. Nos. 118441-42. January 18, 2000.
Facts:
On February 22, 1985, at around six oclock in the morning, Bus 203, being operated and
leased by petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL), collided with a red Ford
Escort. The bus is driven by Armando Jose while the Ford Escort by John Macarubo. As a result
of the collision, the left side of the Ford Escorts hood was severely damaged while its driver,
John Macarubo, and its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel Abraham, were seriously
injured. The driver and conductress of Bus 203 rushed Macarubo and Abraham to the nearby
hospital but after 5 days, Macarubo eventually died. Abraham survived but he became blind and
he also suffered multiple lacerations on the face and a fracture on the forehead.
Rommel Abraham, represented by his father, Felixberto, instituted a civil case against
MCL and Armando Jose while spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the deceased,
filed their own suit for damages against MCL alone. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party
case complaint against Juanita Macarubo, registered owner of the Ford Escort. The latter, in turn,
filed a counterclaim for damages against MCL for the damage in her car.
The trial court dismissed the two civil cases against MCL and ruling favorably on its
third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court, ordering petitioners to pay damages for injuries to persons and damage to property
as a result of a vehicular accident, thus, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue/s:
(a) Whether it was the driver of Bus 203 who was at fault for the collision of the two
vehicles under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
(b) Whether private respondent Juanita Macarubo, the registered owner of the Ford
Escort, is liable to petitioners based on John Macarubos negligence.
Ruling:
(a) No. Private respondents failed to prove their allegation of negligence against the
driver of Bus 203, neither are the allegations of negligence against employer-employee relations,
so the two civil cases against Manila Central Bus Lines and driver Armando Jose, are hereby
dismissed. Article 2176 provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this chapter.
(b) No. The third-party complaint filed against Juanita Macarubo was also dismissed on
the ground that MCL only alleged that John Macarubo is the authorized driver which is not
equivalent to an allegation that he was an employee of Juanita Macarubo. Nor did MCL present
any evidence to prove that Juanita Macarubo was the employer of John Macarubo.
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ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO,
respondents.
No. L-16439. July 20, 1961
Facts:
Nita Villanueva came to know Antonio Geluz for the first time in 1948 through her aunt
Paula Yambot. In 1950, Nita became pregnant by her present husband before they legally
married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt,
she had herself aborted by the again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted
again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant.
On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister and the latters daughter, she again repaired to
the defendants clinic. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the
sum of P50.00. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his
election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. It is
the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiffs basis in filing this action and award of
damages. The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages upon the
provision of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not fixing a minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case
of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that both the lower court and Court of Appeals erred in giving
minimum award of damages to the respondent. The two said courts have not found any basis for
an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellees indifference to the previous
abortion of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. Despite the suspicious
repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate and secure the
punishment of the practitioner. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from
the doctor a large money payment. It is unquestionable that the appellants act in provoking the
abortion of appellees wife, without medical necessary to warrant it, was a criminal and morally
reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of woman or that of
her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an
award of damage that under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
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conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Article 147 and 148
of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
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LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY and
KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
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Facts:
Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy were married on November 15, 1973 at the church of Our
Lady of Lourdes, Quezon City. Both were 22 years old. the union was blessed with two children,
Frederick and Farrah Sheryl. They first resided at Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga,
and later I Sto. Tomas, Pampanga were they operated their business, lumber and hardware.
Later, Fernando left their Conjugal dwelling. Their two children were under the custody
of Filipina. But later, Frederick transferred to his father in Tondo.
As a result, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation in Regional Trial Court San
Fernando, Pampanga. The case later upgraded to separation of property on the ground that her
husband left her without cause for more than one year. Moreover, they have entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement. The trial court granted the petition. She also sued her husband for
attempted parricide. One afternoon, she went to a dental clinic owned by her husband and
operated by her mistress. She went there to fetch her son Frederick and to take him to San
Fernando, Pampanga. But the boy ignored her and continued playing the family computer. So
she spanked her, unfortunately Fernando pulled her and started beating her like hell.
Unfortunately, the Regional Trial Court of Manila held Fernando liable only for slight physical
injuries and sentenced to 20 days of imprisonment.
She filed another legal separation on that ground and the Regional trial Court of
Pampanga granted the petition and giving Sheryll in her custody, Frederick to the respondent.
She filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage to Fernando. But the
Regional Trial Court denied for lack of merit. She appealed to the Court of Appeals but denied
the same. It fell short of quantum of evidence. Thus, the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void ab initio because of the absence of marriage license
at the time of the celebration of marriage
Held:
The findings of the Supreme Court were:
a. The marriage was celebrated on November 15, 1973, but the marriage license was issued
on September 17, 1974. Almost one year after the celebration of the marriage (120 days
from the date of issue).
b. The marriage license was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet neither the wife nor the husband
ever resided the place.
Thus, the petition was granted.
Facts:
Quita and Padlan were married in the Philippines, but Quita filed for divorce in
California which was granted. She remarried twice after the divorce. Upon Padlans death, Quita
made claims upon his estate as the surviving spouse and heir of Padlan, alleging that since
Padlan was a Filipino citizen, he remained married to her in spite of the divorce decree.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that
she had secured a divorced in the USA and in fact had twice remarried
Held:
Quitas right to inherit from Padlan depends on her citizenship at the time the divorce was
decreed. If she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, the divorce would be
valid as to her and will be recognized in the Philippines, and she would lose her right to inherit.
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may, be reorganized in the Philippines,
provided tahy are valid according to their national law; once proved that a wife was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from her husband, then she could very well lose her
right to inherit from the latter.
Facts:
On May 24, 1981 Crpriano Orbecido III married Lady Milagros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. The marriage was blessed
with two children, Kristoffer Simbortiz V, Orbecido and Lady Kimberly B. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cprianos wife left for the United States bringing his son, Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano was informed by his son that his wife had been naturalized as Amrican citizen and
that she married certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court (Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga
Del Sur, Branch 73) a petition to marry because of the situation. It was granted. However, the
Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration
but it was denied. Thus, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code
Held:
The Supreme Court is unanimous in holding that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried,
also to remarry. However before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. In the case, it was not submitted as evidence.
Thus, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines was granted.
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Facts:
Jaime O. Sevilla, herein petitioner, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Carmelita N. Cardenas, herein respondent, for their marriage was vitiated by
machination, duress, and intimidation employed by the respondents Carmelita and her father. He
was forced to sign a marriage contract with Carmelita Cardenas before a minister of the Gospel,
Rev. Cirilo D Gonzales. Moreover, he alleged that there was no marriage license presented
before the solemnizing officer as certified by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Manila. Actually, it was certified 3 times on the following dates: March 11, September 20, 1994
and July 25, 2000 that marriage license no. 2770792 was nowhere to be found.
On the other hand, the respondent, Carmelita N. Cardenas refuted these allegations of
Jaime and claims that they were first civilly married on May 19, 1969 and thereafter married at a
church on May 31, 1969 at Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both were alleged to be
recorded in Local Civil Registrar and NSO. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage
license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City declared the nullity of marriage of the parties
based on the petitioners allegations that no marriage license was presented before a solemnizing
officer. And that without the said marriage license, being one of the formal requisites of
marriage, the marriage is void from the beginning. This was based on the 3 certifications issued
by the Local Civil Registrar Manila that marriage license number 220792 was fictitious.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of
the trail court in favor of the marriage, because the Local Civil Registrar failed to locate the said
license with due effort as testified by certain Perlita Mercader because the former Local Civil
registrar had already retired. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the Court of Appeals. thus, this case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the certification made by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan that
Marriage License No. 2770792, as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties, sufficient to
declare the marriage void from the beginning
Held:
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The absence of logbook is not conclusive proof of nonissuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to
search for the said logbook, we can not easily accept that absence of the same also means nonexistence or falsity of entries therein.
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for
several years producing two offsprings, now adult themselves. Thus, the instant petition was
denied.
Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On
May 18, 1989, decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. he then married the petitioner on
January 12, 1992.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in
the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at
the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner
his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;
thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it
stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The
court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. The trial court held the marriage
dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines.
Issue:
a. Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven
b. Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner
Held:
a. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
b. The Supreme Court cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. The Supreme
Court agree to the petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce
decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the
very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Thus, the case was remanded.
Facts:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that he and respondent celebrated their marriage twice without securing the
required marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing
on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never
went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14
October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted
ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued
declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding
marriage contract and its entry on file.
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity
of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She had actually gave
birth to two children, one as stated by the petitioner and the other was Rachel Ann Alcantara on
October 27, 1992. Moreover, petitioner filed the said case in order to evade prosecution for
concubinage for he had a mistress with whom he had three children. The case for concubinage
was actually filed and that petitioner prays that the annulment case be dismissed for lack of
merit.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The
Court of Appeals dismissed also the petitioners appeal. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on
record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the
marriage
Held:
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite
enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the
marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in
case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of
its lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage
license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the
validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
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Facts:
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. The respondent avers
that Fely hot-tempered, nagger, and extravagant, she abandoned him for 13 years, and Felys
acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and
continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in
relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
On the other hand, Fely counterclaims that respondent was an American citizen, thus, she
is not subject to Philippine laws. She avers she left that respondent because of the latters
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the
maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly
had enough money for basic needs. Moreover, she avers that respondent misused the amount of
P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On
the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent
Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she
advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and
litigation expenses.
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage
of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initioon the gound of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner Republic believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and
evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision,
dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error
therein. Hence the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not applying Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code
Held:
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the
couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case
of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was
still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her
Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after
she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In
the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine
laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
Thus, the Petition was granted and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, was reversed and set aside.
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Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17,
1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
with whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of
their marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement
of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper
venue and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two
motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and
a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and,
hence, the case before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration
Held:
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners.
If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove
that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Morover, the Supreme Court found that respondents legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo
or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its
October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It
was also REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
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The petition was granted and the assailed Decision and Resolution were seversed and set
aside. The trial court's decision dated July 4, 1989 was reinstated.
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of the Deceased ALFREDO E.
JACOB, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
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ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. AND
RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.
Facts:
Alice Reyes Van-Dorn, petitioner, was a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton,
respondent, was a U.S. citizen. The two got married in Hong Kong in 1972. They lived in the
Philippines and begot two children. They obtained divorce in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn.
The private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating the business of the latter in
Ermita, Manila is their conjugal property. Thus, he claimed that he has the right to manage such
conjugal property.
Petitioner then filed a Motion to Dismiss since it was already agreed upon in the divorce
judgment that there is no community property between her and the respondent.
The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved is
located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
Issue:
Is the effect of the foreign divorce binding in the Philippines on the matter of conjugal
property?
Ruling:
The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. Aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided that they are valid
according to their national law. Likewise, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorce. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of
petitioner. Furthermore, he cannot be entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
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ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, v.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioners successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issues:
(a)
Whether or not Pepito and Norma living together as husband and wife for at least
five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code
of the Philippines.
(b)
Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for
the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is
already dead
Ruling:
(a)
On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on
the basis of cohabitation as husband and wife where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period should
be the years immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivitymeaning no third party was involved at any time within the five
years, and continuitythat is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who
lived faithfully with their spouse.
(b)
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
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LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO- DIY AND
KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
No. L-53703. August 19, 1986.
Facts:
Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of nullity of his marriage, celebrated on July
1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church in Makati, with Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the
ground that she had a previous existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion solemnized on June 25,
1972, at Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.
Lilia admitted she had prior subsisting marriage but it was null and void that she and
Eduardo have been allegedly forced to enter said marital union and that he, at the time of the
marriage in 1972, was already married to someone else.
The trial court ruled against Lilia because the existence of force exerted in both parties of
the first marriage had already been agreed upon
Issue:
Was said prior marriage void or merely voidable?
Ruling:
The prior marriage was voidable. A marriage vitiated by force on both parties is not void
but merely voidable and therefore valid until annulled. Since there is no annulment yet, it is clear
that when she married respondent, she was validly married to her first husband, consequently,
her marriage to respondent is void.
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6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."
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Ruling:
a.
b.
The OSG submits that Normas comments are irrelevant and not responsive to the arguments in the
petition. Nonetheless, the OSG reiterates that Normas evidence fell short of the requirements of the
law since no competent evidence was presented during the trial to prove that Eulogios inability to look
for a job, his resulting drunkenness, jealousy and other disagreeable behavior are manifestations of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Section 6 of Rule 18 of the 1985 Rules of Court,[23] the rule then applicable, provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. - If the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not acollusion between the parties exists, and if there is
no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court.
In this case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution of the case at the trial level.
Other than the Public Prosecutors Manifestation that no collusion existed between the contending parties
and the brief cross-examination which had barely scratched the surface, no pleading, motion, or position
paper was filed by the Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State should have been given the opportunity to
present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.
The decision of RTC and CA is reversed and set aside.
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VIRGINIA A. LEONOR, petitioner, vs. BELDIA, JR. and LEONOR, JR., respondent
G.R. No. 112597. April 2, 1996
Facts:
Virginia A. Leonor, herein petitioner, was married to the private respondent, Mauricio D.
Leonor, Jr., in San Carlos City. They had been separated for a substantial part of their married
life for, while Mauricio resided in Switzerland studying and working, Virginia stayed in the
Philippines working as a nurse in Laguna. Mauricio became unfaithful and lived with a certain
Lynda Pond abroad. This induced petitioner to institute a civil action in Geneva, Switzerland for
separation and alimony. Private respondent counter-sued for divorce. Cantonal Civil Court of
Switzerland pronounced the divorce of the spouses Leonor but reserved the liquidation of the
matrimonial partnership. The said Swiss Court denied alimony to petitioner. On appeal to the
higher Cantonal Civil Court, Mauricio asked for the cancellation of his marriage in the
Philippines. In 1992, the higher Cantonal Civil Court granted petitioner alimony, prompting
Mauricio to elevate the matter on appeal to the Federal Court of Switzerland. In its decision, the
Federal Court affirmed the decision of the higher Cantonal Civil Court. Mauricio, represented by
his brother Teodoro Leonor, filed a petition for the cancellation of the late registration of
marriage in the civil registry; given as grounds for the cancellation were the tardiness of the
registration and the nullity of his marriage with Virginia due to the non-observance of the legal
requirements for a valid marriage. After several hearings, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring said marriage null and void for being sham and fictitious.
Issue:
Is the judgment rendered by the regional trial court voiding a marriage under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court valid and proper?
Ruling:
No. The summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Art. 412 of the
Civil Code, cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginias civil status from married to
single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. Neither does the trial court,
under said Rule, have any jurisdiction to declare their marriage null and void and as a result
thereof, to order the local civil registrar to cancel the marriage entry in the civil registry. The only
errors that can be cancelled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not
material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. Where the effect of a
correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her children from
legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial proceeding
Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under.
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the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner
that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we
are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion
between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
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them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The
reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity
amounting to adultery. Although he believed that her wife committed adultery, he still persuaded
her wife.
It is important to note that a divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the parties
continue to live together after it was known, or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge of
adultery, or sleeping together for a single night, and many others. The resumption of marital
cohabitation as a basis of condonation will generally be inferred, nothing appearing to the
contrary, from the fact of the living together as husband and wife, especially as against the
husband.
Because of this, the Supreme Court agreed with the RTC and CAs findings that there was
indeed condonation on the part of Benjamin Bugayong, therefore, the foregoing case is hereby
dismissed.
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essence of the cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable
social institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of
its status.
In the instant action, the Court has to find that plaintiff became cognizant of defendant's
infidelity in September, 1962. Plaintiff made successive attempts to induce the husband to amend
his erring ways but failed. Her desire to bring defendant back to the connubial fold and to
preserve family solidarity deterred her from taking timely legal action.
The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in Article
102 of the Civil Code should be counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September
1962 or from December 1963. Computing the period of one year from the former date, it is clear
that plaintiff's complaint filed on December 14, 1963 came a little too late.
The period of "five years from after the date when such cause occurred" is not here
involved.
Upon the undisputed facts it seems clear that, in the month of September 1962, whatever
knowledge appellant had acquired regarding the infidelity of her husband, that is, of the fact that
he was then living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala, was only through the information given to
her by the driver of their family car. Much as such hearsay information had pained and anguished
her, she apparently thought it best, and no reasonable person may justifiably blame her for it, not
to go deeper into the matter herself because in all probability even up to that time,
notwithstanding her husband's obvious neglect of his entire family, appellant still cherished the
hope, however forlorn, of his coming back home to them. Indeed, when her husband returned to
the conjugal home the following October, she purposely refrained from bringing up the matter of
his marital infidelity "in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant away." True, appellant
likewise heard in April 1963 rumors that her husband was seen with a woman on the family way
on Dasmarias Street, but failed again to either bring up the matter with her husband or make
attempts to verify the truth of said rumors, but this was due, because "she was so happy that
defendant again returned to the family home in May 1963 that she once more desisted from
discussing the matter with him because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him
away." As a matter of fact, notwithstanding all these painful information which would not have
been legally sufficient to make a case for legal separation, appellant still made brave, desperate
attempts to persuade her husband to come back home. In the words of the lower court, she
"entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him to
return to his family" and also "requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs.
Enriqueta Majul" for the same purpose, but all that was of no avail. Her husband remained
stubborn.
After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the
only time when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the
early part of December 1963 when plaintiff, accompanied by their two children went to talk to
defendant where she pleaded but however was refused by the defendant.
From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the
preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no
longer leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be
under obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then
that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is set aside and another is hereby rendered
holding that appellant is entitled to legal separation.
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ELOISA GOITIA Y DELA CAMARA, plaintiff vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant
No. 11263. November 2, 1916
Facts:
This is an action by the wife against the husband for support outside of the conjugal
domicile. Eloitia Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married on January 7, 1915 and
established residence at San Marcelino where they lived together for one month because the wife
returned to the home of her parents due to the following reasons: that the husband demand wife
to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that whenever wife rejected
husbands indecorous demands, husband would maltreat wife by words and inflict injuries on
wifes lips, face and different parts of her body; and that because wife was unable to desist
husbands repugnant desires and maltreatment, she was obliged to leave the conjugal home. The
wife also seeks for support from his husband even if she lives separately. The husband on the
other hand, seeks the relief of the courts in compelling his wife to return back to their conjugal
home.
Issue:
Whether or not the wife is compelled to return to the marital dwelling?
Ruling:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties
and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law
which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the legal existence is
merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the government
upon principles of public policy for the benefit of the society as well as the parties.
Marriage is an institution and its maintenance is in its purity which the public is deeply
interested. In the case at bar, when the continuance of the marriage becomes intolerable to one or
both parties and gives no possible good to the community, relief from the court should be
attainable. The Supreme Court made the observation that implied approval by the court of a
wifes separate residence from her husband doe not necessarily violate the sacredness and
inviolability of the marriage. Since separation de-facto is allowed in this case, it is only due to
the fact that public peace and wifes purity must be preserved.
Lastly, the husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to
support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful, illegal and unbearable
conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take the advantage of her
departure to abrogate his duty to still support his wife. In law, the wife is legally still within the
conjugal domicile, even if living separately, thus he is entitled to support and maintenance by the
husband.
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Facts:
Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were the owners of a parcel of land
identified as Lot 13. After they died, their surviving children, Modesto Aranas and Federico
Aranas, adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition executed on
May 2, 1952. The southern portion, described as Lot 13-C, was thereby assigned to Modesto; the
northern, to Federico.
On March 21, 1953, Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name. He died on
April 20, 1973 while his wife, Victoria Comorro, predeceased him dying on July 16, 1971. They
had no children but Modesto was survived by two (2) illegitimate children named Dorothea
Aranas Ado and Teodoro C. Aranas. These two borrowed P18,000.00 from Jesus Bernas. As
security therefor they mortgaged to Bernas their father's property, Lot 13-C.
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas caused the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage over Lot 13-C on June 29, 1977 and acquired the land.
On November 24, 1978, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint
against Jesus Bernas and his spouse, Remedios Bernas. They alleged that they be declared as coowners of the land as stated in the will they have discovered that was executed by Victoria
Comorro.
The trial court declared the defendants spouses Jesus Bernas and Remedios O. Bernas as
legal owners of Lot No. 13-C and including all the improvements thereon;
The plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, where they succeeded only in
having the award of actual and moral damages deleted, the judgment of the trial court having
been otherwise affirmed in toto.
From this judgment of the Appellate Court, Consolacion Villanueva appealed to the
Supreme Court. Her co-plaintiff, Raymundo Aranas, did not.
Issue:
Whether or not Lot 13-C is a conjugal property of spouses Modesto Aranas and Victoria
Comorro which gives Consolacion Villanueva all of said Victoria's interests, rights and
properties, real and personal as her net share from the conjugal partnership property with her
husband, Modesto Aranas.
Ruling:
No.
Lot 13-C was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria Comorro and her husband,
Modesto Aranas. It was the latter's exclusive, private property, which he had inherited from his
parents Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa as provided in Article 148 of the Civil Code that to
be considered as the exclusive property of each spouse is inter alia, that which is brought to the
marriage as his or her own, or that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.
Thus, even if it be assumed that Modesto's acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C took place
during his marriage to Victoria Comorro, the lot would nonetheless be his exclusive property
because acquired by him, during the marriage, by lucrative title.
Moreover, Victoria Comorro died on July 16, 1971, about two years ahead of her
husband, Modesto Aranas, exclusive owner of Lot 13-C, who passed away on April 20, 1973.
Victoria never therefore inherited any part of Lot 13-C and hence, had nothing of Lot 13-C to
bequeath by will or otherwise to Consolacion Villanueva.
ALFONSO TAN and ETERIA TEVES TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES CELESTINO U. TAN and ROSARIO DY KUSHIN and SPOUSES MAXIMO
U. TAN and TERESITA SY TAN, respondents.
G. R. No. 120594. June 10, 1997.
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Facts:
Eteria Teves Tan was married to Alfonso U. Tan but they were now living separately by
virtue of a decree of legal separation rendered by the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
on August 31, 1977.
On April 17, 1989, a case for partition and accounting was instituted by the spouses
Alfonso and Eteria Tan against herein private respondents who are Alfonso's brothers, Celestino
and Maximo, and their respective wives, Rosario and Teresita. It was alleged in the complaint
that the parties are co-owners of a 906-square meter residential lot with improvements thereon
situated at Banaue, Cebu City acquired sometime in 1970. Pursuant to the provisions of Article
494 of the New Civil Code, the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan, being co-owners to the extent of
one-third (1/3) portion of the aforesaid lot, sought partition of the same.
On January 16, 1990, Alfonso U. Tan filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss
contending that the case was filed only at the instance of his estranged wife, Eteria, and that he
had no claim whatsoever against his brothers insofar as the family business is concerned.
On July 12, 1991, a decision was rendered after trial finding that the 906-square meter lot
with improvements was acquired by the three (3) brothers by sale through installments and so it
should be partitioned equally among them and their respective wives. Consequently, since the lot
was acquired during the marriage of petitioner and Alfonso, the former could not be deprived of
her share of the one-third portion which is the conjugal property of the spouses.
Spouses Celestino and Rosario Tan and the spouses Maximo and Teresita Tan, interposed
an appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, reversed and set aside the said judgment.
Respondent court ruled that although the subject property was acquired during the marriage of
the spouses Eteria and Alfonso, it was established by the Tan brothers that the same was inherited
from their mother, hence, their exclusive property.
Issue:
Whether or not the property in dispute was inherited by Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo
from their late mother, Trinidad Uy Tan, making one-third of the said portion an exclusive
property of Alfonso.
Ruling:
Yes.
Conclusive evidence points to the fact that the undivided one-third (1/3) of the parcel of
land in question is not the conjugal partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan and Eteria
Teves Tan. It is the former's exclusive property which he had inherited from his mother, Trinidad
Uy, the original owner of the property.
Although acquired during Alfonso's marriage to Eteria, the said property should be
regarded as Alfonso's own exclusively, as a matter of law pursuant to Article 148 of the Civil
Code which provides that: Article 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each
spouse: xxx that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is then affirmed.
MANOTOK REALTY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
FELIPE MADLANGAWA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-45038. April 30, 1987.
Facts:
231
Private respondent Felipe Madlangawa claims that he has been occupying a parcel of
land in the Clara de Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being
obtained from Andres Ladores, then an overseer of the subdivision.
On April 2, 1950, the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate,
including her paraphernal properties which covered the lot occupied by the private respondent
were placed under custodia legis.
On April 22, 1950, the private respondent made a deposit for the said lot in the sum of
P1,500.00 which was received by Vicente Legarda, husband of the late owner, which was
appointed as a special administrator of the estate on April 28, 1950.
Subsequently, petitioner Manotok Realty Inc., became the successful bidder and vendee
of the Tambunting-Legarda Subdivision consisting of 44 parcels of land pursuant to the deeds of
sale executed in its favor by the Philippine Trust Company on March 13 and 20, 1959, as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda. The lot in dispute was one of
those covered by the sale and private respondent was one of the many occupants who refused to
vacate the lots they were occupying, so that on April 26, 1968, the petitioner filed an action to
recover the said lot.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the only right remaining to the petitioner is to enforce the
collection of the balance of payment from private respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the property sold by Vicente Legarda to private respondent is conjugal
making the sale valid, binding, and enforceable against the petitioner.
Ruling:
No.
Article 136 of the Civil Code provides that The wife retains the ownership of the
paraphernal property while Article 137 states that The wife shall have the administration of the
paraphernal property, unless she delivers the same to the husband by means of a public
instrument empowering him to administer it.
It is not proved that Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal properties
of Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have
validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of the paraphernal properties
of Clara Tambunting. It is also undisputed that the probate court appointed Vicente Legarda as
administrator of the estate only on August 28, 1950, more than three months after the questioned
sale had taken place.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. Private
respondent is ordered to surrender the material and physical possession of the lot to the petitioner
because the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab initio, the
former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property.
232
Teodora B. Ong conducted her own logging business in Camarines Sur. In furtherance of
her business operation, on August 18, 1955, she secured from Francisco Boix a loan in the
amount of P2,827.83. Unfortunately, because of mismanagement, Teodora defaulted in her
obligation. This prompted Boix to file a complaint against Teodora and Ramon Ong, the latter
being joined as husband of the former. Defendant-spouses were declared in default and judgment
was rendered, in favor of Boix. After the decision became final and executory, Boix moved to
execute the judgment. The motion was granted and a corresponding writ of execution was issued.
Accordingly, the Sheriff of Camarines Norte levied and attached a parcel of land in the
sole name of Teodora B. Ong. In a notice of levy or Execution and notice of Public Auction sale,
auction sales was held on October 10, 1958 with defendant Boix having adjudged as highest
bidder.
On November 16, 1961, Ramon C. Ong filed a complaint against defendants Arsenio
Camino as Deputy Sheriff of Camarines Norte and Francisco Boix, to annul the auction sale of a
parcel of land, allegedly owned conjugally by plaintiff and his former wife Teodora B. Ong,
awarded in favor of Boix, as highest bidder, in an auction sale conducted by Deputy Sheriff
Camino.
Petitioner contends that the auction sale of the property in dispute is null and void; that
the subject property is really conjugal which the wife in the case at bar could not legally bind,
and considering that the indebtedness was contracted by the wife only, the levy of the subject
property not owned exclusively by the wife but owned jointly with the husband is improper.
The subject property is paraphernal property, in view of the fact that it was declared,
under Tax No. 05378, in the name of Teodora B. Ong while the house erected thereon was
declared under Tax No. 06022 in the name of Ramon C. Ong and Teodora B. Ong is petitioner's
claim that the subject property is conjugal. Petitioner stresses heavily on the fact that since the
surname "Ong" (which is the surname of the husband Ramon C. Ong) was carried by Teodora in
the tax declaration, that indicates that the subject property was acquired during the marriage. By
reason thereof, the property in dispute is presumed to be owned jointly by both spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not the property in dispute was a conjugal ownership of spouses Ramon and
Teodora Ong.
Ruling:
No.
The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property
is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore
conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wife's name, but the
house built thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. Under such circumstances, coupled
with a careful scrutiny of the records of the present case, the Supreme Court held that the lot in
question is paraphernal, and is therefore, liable for the personal debts of the wife.
ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 124642. February 23, 2004.
Facts:
233
On September 26, 1978, the Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI)
obtained a loan of P9,000,000.00 from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this
loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory
note for the said amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978 at an interest rate of 14% per
annum. As added security for the said loan, on September 28, 1978, Alfredo Ching, together with
Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding
themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing
the ABC to the extent of P38,000,000.00. The loan was subsequently renewed on various dates,
the last renewal having been made on December 4, 1980.
Earlier, on December 28, 1979, the ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the
amount of P13,000,000.00 payable in eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. As in the
previous loan, the PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note to evidence the
loan maturing on June 29, 1981. This was renewed once for a period of one month.
The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, on August 21, 1981, the
ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against
the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank
charges.
In the meantime, on July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on
attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching.
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching,
filed a Motion to set aside the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares
of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out
of conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines. Furthermore, the indebtedness
covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by petitioner
Alfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
Issue:
Whether or not the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name of
petitioner-husband should be set aside for the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature;
hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the PBMCI.
Ruling:
Yes.
Article 161 (1) of the New Civil Code now Article 121 (2 and 3) of the Family Code of
the Philippines provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership.
The Supreme Court held in this case that the private respondent failed to prove that the
conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husbands act of executing
a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of
PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the
benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitionerhusband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal
partnership would thereby be benefited.
234
Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought two parcels of land during their coverture.
The first is located in Paraaque, Metro Manila and the second is located in Paco, Manila.
Concordia died on April 30, 1978. They had two children: Romeo and Alexander.
While at Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Moises agreed that the Paraaque and Paco
properties would be given to Romeo and Alexander. However, when Moises returned in 1984, he
renegotiated the agreement with Romeo and Alexander. He wanted the Paraaque property for
himself but would leave the Paco property to his two sons. They agreed.
It appears that Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property on installment basis on
May 17, 1977. However, it was only on December 14, 1984 that Moises was able to pay its
balance. He secured the title over the property in his name as a widower. According to Romeo,
Moises violated the agreement that their (Romeos and Alexanders) names would be registered
in the title once the balance was paid.
Romeo and Alexander lived on the Paco property but in April 1988, Alexander agreed to
sell to Romeo his share in the Paco property.
In February 1988, Romeo learned that Rosalina Castro, mother of petitioner Virgilio
Castro, had given Moises P30, 000.00 as down payment for the sale by Moises of the Paco
property to her son. Romeo was informed that the Paco property had been sold to Castro by
Moises by virtue of a deed of sale dated December 5, 1988 for P95, 000.00. Alexander testified
that after the sale, his father got one-third of the proceeds while he received two-thirds. Romeo
did not get a single centavo.
Romeo then filed an action to nullify the sale between Moises and the Castro spouses and
to compel Moises and Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance of the Paco property to him
upon payment of the balance of its agreed price.
The petitioners contend that the Paco property is the capital property of Moises. They
allege that the spouses Moises and Concordia purchased the property on installment basis in
1977 but stress that it was Moises who paid the balance of P12, 000.00 pesos in 1984. At that
time, Concordia had long been dead.
Issue:
Whether or not the Paco property is the capital property of Moises.
Ruling:
No.
The Paco property is a conjugal property of Moises and Concordia. Since Moises and
Concordia were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, the provisions of the New
Civil Code apply. Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code provides that The following are
conjugal partnership property: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of
the spouses; x x x. Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their marriage
Moises did not bring it into their marriage, hence it has to be considered as conjugal.
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Petitioners-spouses Castro were not buyers in good faith. A purchaser in good faith must
be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. It was proven that Romeo told
Virgilio in a meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco property by virtue of an oral partition
and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he knew Romeo was in possession of the title and
Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the property. Petitioners-spouses therefore have no
right in the property.
TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS; and
CONCHITA EVANGELISTA and Her Husband SIMEON EVANGELISTA; ARACELI F.
MARILLA and Her Husband FREDDY MARILLA; ANTONIO V. FRANCISCO; and
EUSEBIO FRANCISCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 102330. November 25, 1998.
235
Facts:
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco by his second
marriage. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco
are children of Eusebio by his first marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have
acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment house
and; (2) a house and lot located at Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that these properties
were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease
and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them. Petitioner also claims that private
respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney which
authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with the apartments
situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said general
power of attorney. Petitioner also sought to be declared as the administratrix of the properties in
dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents. It held
that the petitioner failed to adduce proof that said properties were acquired during the existence
of the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject properties are conjugal properties of the spouses.
Ruling:
No.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife". However, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition
sine qua non for the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership but petitioner failed to
adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were
acquired during her marriage with Eusebio.
Property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the marriage, is
considered his or her separate property. As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store,
petitioner relied on the building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the
applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked the business license for the sari-sari
store issued in her name alone. It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no
way prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. And the fact that
one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property
is conjugal or not.
Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents assert that
their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In contrast, petitioner claims
ownership over said property inasmuch as the title thereto is registered in the name of "Eusebio
Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco." It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon
which petitioner anchors her claim is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the
name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco", is no proof that the property was
acquired during the spouses coverture.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
236
The late Teodulo Diaz, who died intestate before the last World War, was the registered
owner of a tract of land located in Ilagan, Isabela. He was survived by his wife Maria Espejo
(now also deceased) and five children, one of whom is the herein petitioner Conceso Diaz.
On June 9, 1947, the widow, Maria Espejo sold a portion of the land to herein private
respondent Tomas de Guzman. The transaction was evidenced by a Deed of Sale.
Tomas de Guzman declared the land he purchased for taxation purposes, and he has been
paying the taxes thereon. In a letter dated September 22, 1971 private respondent requested the
Register of Deeds of Isabela to issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title of the land
conveyed. The Register of Deeds in turn wrote a letter to petitioner Conceso Diaz to surrender
the owner's duplicate certificate of title in order that the deed of sale could be properly annotated.
Due to the refusal of petitioner to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, de Guzman
had to file on April 5, 1972, in the Court of First Instance of Isabela, a petition for the surrender
of the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title in the name of the late Teodulo Diaz.
Among his contention, Diaz argued that the property sold is part of the intestate estate of
his late father, thus, Maria Espejo did not have any judicial authority to sell the portion of the lot
in question.
Issue:
Whether or not the property of Teodulo Diaz and Maria Espejo is conjugal giving her the
authority to sell the lot in question to Tomas De Guzman.
Ruling:
Yes.
Upon a consideration of the established facts, it was shown that the property was
acquired during the existence of the conjugal partnership. It is a settled rule that adjudication of
real property to one of the spouses only, does not necessarily mean that it is his or her exclusive
property, if said land was acquired during the marriage.
Upon the death of Teodulo Diaz, the land was divided into two, one-half became the
conjugal share of Maria Espejo and the other half became the hereditary share of the heirs of
Teodulo Diaz by operation of law.
When Maria Espejo Vda. de Diaz sold the lot to respondent in 1947, she did not sell the
same as an administratrix; she sold it as owner of the other half. There was, therefore, no need
for any judicial authority for her to sell her own property or share in the conjugal partnership.
237
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50, 300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the credit line
extended to PBM, respondents Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executes
security agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with BMs indebtedness to
AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the Court of First Instance (CFI).
The CFI rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P 50,300,000 with interests.
Pending appeal of judgment in the civil case, upon motion of AIDC, the lower court
issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Upon AIDCs putting up of an P8,000,000 bond, a
writ of execution was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr. appointed sheriff in
the civil case caused the issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of a sheriff
sale on three of their conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of
the properties levied.
Upon application of private respondents, the lower court issued a temporary restraining
order to prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of
execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction.
However, after filing of a petition for certiorari by AIDC, the CA issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the lower court from enforcing its order, thus paving the way for the
scheduled auction sale of respondents-spouses conjugal properties.
The auction sale took place, AIDC being the only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale
by petitioner Magsajo which was registered.
Eventually, the trial court promulgated its decision declaring the sale on execution null
and void. The CA promulgated the assailed decision, affirming the decision of the RTC which
held that the loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement and
benefit of the PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioner-appellees.
Issue:
Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by respondent husband alone in this
case are considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership which is chargeable against the
conjugal partnership.
Ruling:
No.
Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e. he directly
received money and services to be used in and for his own business or his own profession, that
contract falls within the term obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Here, no
actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit of the family in apparent at the time
of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family
stands to benefit from the loan or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband.
238
Alipio Yabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180. Title thereto devolved
upon his nine children, namely, Victoriano, Procopio, Lope, Jose, Pelagia, Baseliza, Francisca,
Maria, and Gaudencia, upon his death sometime before or during the second world war.
On April 28, 1976, Pastor Makibalo, husband of Maria Yabo, child of Alipio filed with
the Court of First Instance a complaint against the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo. In such
complaint, Pastor alleged that he owned a total of 8 shares of the said lots having purchased the
share of seven of Alipios children and inherited the share of his wife Maria, and that except for
the portion corresponding to Gaudencias share which he did not buy, he occupied, cultivated and
possessed continuously, openly, peacefully and exclusively the two parcels of land. He therefore
prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of 8/9 of the lots questioned.
The trial court rendered judgment, finding Pastor, now Eugelio Salvador and Remedios
Salvador owners of eight shares on Lot No.6080 and some shares on Lot No.6180.
On October 8, 1976, the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the late Alipio Yabo
lodged within the same court a complaint for partition and quieting of title with damages against
Pastor, Enecia, Cristal, and the spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador. They alleged that the
aforesaid lots are common properties of the heirs of Alipio and that the defendants after Alipios
death became the de facto administrators of the lots and to their surprise discovered that the
Salvadors have been harvesting coconuts from the lots.
The plaintiffs prayed that they and the defendant be declared as the owners of the lots and
that the Salvador spouses be declared as having no rights thereto. The two cases thereby were
consolidated and jointly heard. The trial court however ruled against the plaintiffs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Maria did not sell her share to Alberto and
Elpia Yabo; that prescription and laches have not ran against the private respondents with respect
to the 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and to her conjugal share in the portions
acquired from her brother and sisters and Procopio never sold his share in Lot. No. 6080 to
Pastor Makibalo.
Issue:
Whether or not, the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza, Procopio and Francisca in
Lot No.6180 and in Lot No. 6080 which had been purchased by Pastor during his marriage with
Maria belong to their conjugal partnership.
Ruling:
Yes.
The Court ruled that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to either of them. In the instant case,
the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza, Procopio and Francisca in Lot No.6180 and in Lot
No. 6080 had been purchased by Pastor during his marriage with Maria. Such shares would have
been the exclusive property of Pastor had there been proof that the properties were acquired or
purchased by him with his exclusive money. Thus, absent such proof the same was deemed by
the Court to belong to the conjugal partnership of Pastor and Maria.
Spouses DANILO and ALBERTA DOMINGO, and EDUARDO QUITEVES, Petitioners, vs.
GUILLERMO REED, Respondent.
G.R. No. 157701. December 9, 2005.
Facts:
239
Respondent Guillermo Reed was an overseas contract worker from 1978 to 1986 and
came home only for short vacations. He purchased from the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) on installment basis a 166 square meter property. Because he was working
abroad, it was his wife, Lolita Reed, who paid the consideration to the GSIS. The title covering
said property was issued by the Registry of Deeds in the name of Lolita Reed, married to
Guillermo Reed.
Guillermo had allowed his brother, Dominador, and the latters wife, Luz, to stay in the
house constructed on his property.
In December, 1991, Dominador and Luz Reed were summoned to the barangay in
connection with the complaint for ejectment filed against them by Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta
Domingo, who claimed to be the owners of the lot where their house stands. Guillermo denied
having sold his property.
On March 8, 1994, Guillermo filed a complaint for reconveyance of property against
Lolita, spouses Ardaniel and Natividad Villanera, spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo, and
Eduardo Quiteves, alleging that his wife, Lolita Reed, from whom he had been estranged,
conspiring with the other petitioners, caused the preparation of a special power of attorney
wherein it was made to appear that he authorized his wife to sell the subject property; that he did
not sign the special power of attorney nor appear before the notary public because he was
working abroad.
The trial court rendered judgment against Guillermo. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not Lolita is justified in effecting a sale of the subject property without her
husbands consent for the maintenance and support of the family.
Ruling:
No.
Lolitas rights over the property were merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. There was also absolutely no proof to her allegations that she used the
proceeds of the sale to purchase necessities for the maintenance and support of the family.
Having failed to establish any of these circumstances, she may not unilaterally bind the conjugal
assets.
240
Facts:
Lucia Embrado was married to Oreste Torregiani in 1943. Prior to the marriage, there
was a sale of Lot 564, a 366-square meter lot to Lucia when she was still single. However, only
on 2 July 1946 when a Venta Definitiva, a notarized document written entirely in Spanish, was
executed by the Carpitanos to Lucia.
The couples, after the marriage made their conjugal abode on the lot and in 1958
constructed a residential commercial building thereon.
On May 1, 1971 an absolute deed of sale was executed by Lucia Embrado Torregiani of
the said lot described as her own paraphernal property to her adopted daughter, Eda Jimenez, for
the sum of P 1,000.00.
On March 6, 1972, Eda Jimenez sold 65 square meters of the said lot to Marcos
Salimbagat for P 6,500.00. On August 1972, the Torregianis spouses instituted an action for
declaration of nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance and damages against the
spouses Santiago and Eda Jimenez alleging that the sail of said lot to Eda Jimenez was void not
only for lack of consideration but also because the husband of Lucia did not consent to the sale,
which consent is necessary because the lot was a conjugal property.
The trial court held in favor of Lucia. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
courts decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the lot in question is paraphernal property of Lucia.
Ruling:
No.
While the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the property in question
was originally a paraphernal property of Lucia, the Supreme Court cannot adopt its conclusion
that because Lucia and the original owners agreed for its purchase and sale, ownership was
already acquired by Lucia at that moment. Under Art. 1496 of the Civil Code, "ownership of the
thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways
specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the
possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee," and under Art. 1498, "when the sale is
made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the
thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot
clearly be inferred."
The Venta Definitiva over the lot in favor of Lucia Embrado was executed by the
Carpitanoses on 2 July 1946 when her marriage to petitioner Oreste Torregiani was already
subsisting.
Another thing more, the second paragraph of Art. 158 of the Civil Code (now Article 120,
Family Code) provides that "buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the
marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value
of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same." Under this article, the land
becomes conjugal upon the construction of the building without awaiting reimbursement before
or at the liquidation of the partnership upon the concurrence of two conditions, to wit: (a) the
construction of the building at the expense of the partnership; and, (b) the ownership of the land
by one of the spouses. 18 The conditions have been fully met in the case at bench. Thus, even if
Lot 564 was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia as evident from the "Venta Definitiva",
the same became conjugal upon the construction of the residential/commercial building in 1958.
Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for the
purchase of a house and lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street, Executive Heights Village,
Paranaque, Metro Manila. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life
independently and on their own, petitioner, in October 31, 1989, issued a check in the name of a
certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged receipt thereof.
When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of the amount he
loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a
position to make a definite settlement of the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent
resistance to petitioners inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats
against petitioner.
On August 24, 1994, petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of
US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation. Thus, petitioner filed a
complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the loan by the husband and wife is the liability of the conjugal property.
Ruling:
Yes.
The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family
Code. Notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent husband, he shall be solidarily
liable for such loan together with his wife.
The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was used to
purchase the subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal
home, thus benefiting the family. On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan made by
the defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of
the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the
payment of the loan.
representative of the A & L Industries. Respondent Yulo presented an alleged special power of
attorney executed by his wife, respondent Lily Yulo, who manages A & L Industries and under
whose name the said business is registered, purportedly authorizing Augusto to procure the loan
and sign the promissory note. About two months prior to the loan, however, Augusto had already
left Lily and their children and had abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became
due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same.
Private respondent Lily filed her answer with counterclaim, alleging that although
Augusto and she are husband and wife, the former had abandoned her and their children five
months before the filing of the complaint; that they were already separated when the promissory
note was executed; that her signature in the special power of attorney was forged because she
had never authorized Augusto in any capacity to transact any business for and in behalf of A & L
Industries, which is owned by her as a single proprietor, that she never got a single centavo from
the proceeds of the loan mentioned in the promissory note; and that as a result of the illegal
attachment of her properties, which constituted the assets of the A & L Industries, the latter
closed its business and was taken over by the new owner.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitioner's complaint against the private
respondent Lily Yulo and A & L Industries. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the loan incurred by respondent Augusto is a liability of the conjugal
partnership.
Ruling:
No.
There is no dispute that A & L Industries was established during the marriage of Augusto
and Lily Yulo and therefore the same is presumed conjugal and the fact that it was registered in
the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. However, for the said
property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. In the present case, the obligation which the petitioner is
seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by the private respondent Lily was
undoubtedly contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he incurred the
obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he
made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L Industries, to procure
such loan from the petitioner.
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.), INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ALEJO M. VINLUAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 102692. September 23, 1996.
Facts:
Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Incorporated is engaged in the manufacturing and selling of
various cosmetics, health, and body care products, as well as medical drugs. On several
occasions in the year 1982, the defendant, Delilah Vinluan, purchased products of the said
243
corporation, as she was also engaged in the business of retailing Johnson products. The
defendants, under the name and style of "Vinluan Enterprises," thus incurred an obligation of
Two Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Pesos and Eighty-Nine (P235,880.89)
Centavos, for which she issued seven (7) Philippine Banking Corporation checks of varying
amounts and due dates. When presented on their respective due dates, however, the checks given
in payment of the obligation bounced and were dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds.
Several demands thereafter for payment were to no avail, despite the several extensions
given to the defendant spouses to settle the obligation. It was only on January 5, 1983 that the
defendants made a partial payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, thereby reducing their
principal obligation to P230,880.89. When no further payments were made to settle the
obligation despite repeated demands, Johnson & Johnson was constrained to file a complaint on
June 8, 1983 against defendant spouses Vinluan, for collection of the principal obligation plus
interest, with damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Alejo Vinluan, as well as their conjugal property, can be held liable for his
wifes obligation to plaintiff corporation.
Ruling:
No.
The Supreme Court ruled that the decision of the trial court is final and executory. Thus,
it affirmed the lower courts decision when it charged defendant Delilah Vinluan alone to pay the
plaintiff corporation, having already declared that the defendant-husband cannot be held legally
liable for his wifes obligation. Perhaps, when it was later discovered that the defendant Delilah
Vinluan did not have sufficient property of her own to settle their obligation, the conjugal
properties of the defendant spouses became the object of levy. But in order to bind the conjugal
partnership and its properties, the New Civil Code provides that the debts and obligations
contracted by the husband or the wife must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and that
the husband must consent to his wifes engaging in business. However, in this case, the husband
did not give his consent neither did the obligation redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence,
the conjugal partnership as well as the defendant cannot be held liable.
244
On March 3, 1988, Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife,
Berlinda, thru a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed on November 18, 1987 by
Berlinda in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land
covered by TCT No. B-37189 in favor of spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista.
As a consequence, TCT No. B-37189 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. V-2765
of the Registry of Deeds for the Valenzuela Branch was issued in the names of spouses Claro
Bautista and Nida Bautista on March 4, 1988.
Evidence shows that the signature appearing on the Special Power of Attorney as that of
Berlinda is a forgery, and that consequently, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in
favor of spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlinda.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale made by Pedro is null and void.
Ruling:
Yes.
The sale of conjugal property by the husband without marital consent of the wife affects
the entire property, not just the share of the wife and it is considered a nullity.
Petitioners are not buyers of good faith since they were dealing with a seller (Pedro) who
had title to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that marital
consent of respondent is required before he could convey the property.
245
The registered owners of the Subject Land, which is the subject of controversy in this
case, were petitioner spouses, Godofredo and Carmen Alfredo. The Subject Land is covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 284 issued to Godofredo and Carmen.
On 7 March 1994, the private respondents, spouses Armando Borras and Adelia Lobaton
Borras, filed a complaint for specific performance against Godofredo and Carmen before the trial
court. Armando and Adelia alleged in their complaint that Godofredo and Carmen mortgaged the
Subject Land for P7,000.00 with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). To pay the
debt, Carmen and Godofredo sold the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia for P15,000.00, the
buyers to pay the DBP loan and its accumulated interest, and the balance to be paid in cash to the
sellers.
Armando and Adelia gave Godofredo and Carmen the money to pay the loan to DBP.
Godofredo and Carmen introduced Armando and Adelia, as the new owners of the Subject Land,
to the old tenants of the same. Armando and Adelia then took possession of the Subject Land.
Armando and Adelia discovered that Godofredo and Carmen had re-sold portions of the
Subject Land to several persons. Thus, Armando and Adelia filed a complaint for specific
performance.
The trial court ruled in favor of Armando and Adelia. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the contract of sale made by Carmen is void because she did not obtain
the consent and authority of her husband, Godofredo.
Ruling:
No.
The Supreme Court ruled that the contract of sale was voidable subject to annulment by
the husband. Following petitioners argument that Carmen sold the land to Armando and Adelia
without the consent of Carmens husband, the sale would only be voidable and not void.
The Family Code provides that any alienation or encumbrance made by the husband of
the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is void. However, when the
sale is made before the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the disposition of conjugal property without the
wifes consent is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 reads: The wife may, during the
marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment
of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required,
or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the
conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after
the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.
Godofredo can no longer question the sale either. Voidable contracts are susceptible of
ratification. Godofredo ratified the sale when he introduced Armando and Adelia to his tenants as
the new owners of the Subject Land. If the sale was truly unauthorized, then Godofredo should
have filed an action to annul the sale. He did not. The prescriptive period to annul the sale has
long lapsed. Godofredos conduct belies his claim that his wife sold the Subject Land without
his consent.
Moreover, Godofredo and Carmen used most of the proceeds of the sale to pay their debt
with the DBP. This shows that the sale redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Hence, even if Carmen sold the land without the consent of her husband, the sale still binds the
conjugal partnership.
TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, petitioner, vs. GILDA L. JARDELEZA, ERNESTO L.
JARDELEZA, JR., MELECIO GIL L. JARDELEZA, and GLENDA L. JARDELEZA,
respondents.
G.R. No. 112014. December 5, 2000.
Facts:
246
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza were married long before 03 August
1988, when the Family Code took effect. The union produced five children, namely: petitioner,
Ernesto, Jr., Melecio, Glenda and Rolando.
On 25 March 1991, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. then 73 years old, suffered a stroke and
lapsed into comatose condition.
On 3 July 1991, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of letters of
guardianship to him, rather than to his mother, on the ground that she considered the property
acquired by Dr. Jardeleza as her own and did not want to be appointed guardian.
On 09 August 1991, respondents filed with the trial court an opposition to the petition for
guardianship and the motion for issuance of letters of guardianship to petitioner.
On 20 August 1993, the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition for
guardianship. The trial court concluded, without explanation, that the petition is superfluous and
would only serve to duplicate the powers of the wife under the explicit provisions of Article 124,
second paragraph, of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 124 of the Family Code renders superfluous the appointment of a
judicial guardian over the person and estate of an incompetent married person.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Article 124 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
situation of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and that the proper procedure was an application for
appointment of judicial guardian under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
The Supreme Court remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with this decision.
On February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located
from Manuel Callejo. Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple sold one-half portion of the said
lot to Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda, Judie pushed through the sale of the remaining
one-half portion of their lot on March 1, 1990 to Luzviminda Guiang.
On May 28, 1990, Gilda filed an Amended Complaint against her husband Judie and
petitioners-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint sought the declaration
of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her
husband, null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the remaining one-half portion of the conjugal lot made by the
husband is valid without the consent of his wife.
Ruling:
No.
The Supreme Court held that any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988
when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without
the consent of the wife is null and void.
The said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code,
which states: "Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
October 19, 1951 in the name of Madlangsakay. At the time of the purchase, petitioners were
occupying Lot No. 8 as tenants.
Negotiations begun for the sale of Lot No. 8 to petitioner tenants and in an affidavit dated
August 26, 1958, Madlangsakay promised to subdivide the land among them at P0.70 per square
meter. Nothing came out of the negotiations.
Soon thereafter, the relationship between the new owner and the occupants soured and
quickly deteriorated into a series of legal squabbles which culminated in the present controversy.
On April 26, 1961, petitioners filed an amended complaint against Madlangsakay to quiet
title over Lot. No. 8.
In his answer, Madlangsakay averred that the deeds of sale and the affidavits which he
purportedly executed were all forgeries and that the land in question, being conjugal property and
mortgaged with the Philippine National Bank, could not be alienated without his wife's consent.
The trial court upheld Madlangsakay. It dismissed the complaint, nullified the deeds of
sale and the affidavits.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property made by Madlangsakay is valid.
Ruling:
No.
The land is a conjugal property and, as such, it could not be alienated without the
conformity of his wife. Moreover, it was heavily mortgaged with the Philippine National Bank,
Malolos branch, and could not be transferred without the bank's consent. As a matter of fact, the
transfer certificate of title was then in the possession of said bank.
25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto, Sr.
is the father of herein Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda
Jardeleza.
On June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda herself filed a petition regarding the declaration of
incapacity of Ernesto, Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties,
and authorization to sell the same.
The trial court rendered its decision finding that it was convinced that Ernesto, Sr. was
truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, and that the sale
of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon was necessary to defray the mounting expenses
for treatment and hospitalization.
On June 24, 1991, Teodoro filed his Opposition to the proceedings being unaware and not
knowing that a decision has already been rendered on the case by public respondent.
On July 3, 1991, Teodoro filed a motion for reconsideration. He propounded the
argument that the petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of
administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was essentially a petition for
guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto, Sr. As such, it cannot be prosecuted in
accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family
Code. It should follow the rules governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court
which require procedural due process, particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits
Issue:
Whether or not Gilda, as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a
parcel of land with its improvements, with the approval of the court in a summary proceedings,
to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of eight million pesos.
Ruling:
No.
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code
govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one
where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld
or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is
incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject
spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke,
cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of
the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
250
assigned to different countries during his successive tours of duties as a member of the
diplomatic service.
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his
wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a
building and lot in Greenhills belonging to the conjugal partnership.
In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim
for legal separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their
six children and that they were depending for their support on the rentals from another conjugal
property in Forbes Park. She also informed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he
had not returned to his legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate residence in
Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng and their three children.
Remedios also asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the
liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of
his adultery.
The trial court found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage with
Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon his retirement at a separate residence. The
court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share
in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his
respondent wife.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent should be the sole administrator of the conjugal
properties.
Ruling:
Yes.
The Supreme Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for
almost nineteen years, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not
alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal
partnership.
Thus, it was held that pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole mass
of conjugal assets, private respondent is allowed to continue with her administration; and
petitioner should be enjoined from interfering with his wife's administration pending resolution
of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties
as provided in Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61 states that after a petition for
legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement
between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such
designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the
conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation
was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the
preliminary injunction.
the latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive
control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole
gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that
defendant Lopez, after abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited
with herein petitioner since 1976.
It was further alleged that Alberto and petitioner Relucio, during their period of
cohabitation since 1976, have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopezowned or controlled corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments
and buildings, cars and other motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry. These properties,
which are in the names of Alberto and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly or their dummies and
proxies, have been acquired principally if not solely through the actual contribution of money,
property and industry of Alberto with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from petitioner
Relucio.
Issue/s:
(a) Whether respondents petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal
property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto established a cause of action against
petitioner.
(b) Whether or not there is a basis in law to forfeit Albertos share in property co-owned
by him with petitioner, and a dissolution of the conjugal partnership with private respondent.
Ruling:
(a) No. The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as
administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her
marriage to Alberto. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. There is no rightduty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action.
(b) Yes. The Supreme Court upheld that the trial court can issue a judgment ordering
Alberto to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to
respondent and their children, and dissolve Albertos conjugal partnership with respondent, and
forfeit Albertos share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be
perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.
Company of New York. He executed as a mortgage a conjugal property and a real estate, a house
and a camarin situated in Dagupan, Pangasinan measuring about 7,091 square meters.
On 24 October 1910, the Standard Oil Company of New York through its lawyers presented
its complaint to Mariano Nable Jose. Said action was known as No. 833 of the Court of First
Instance of Dagupan, Pangasinan. The purpose of the action was to recover from Mariano the
sum of 633,191.244 pesos and the foreclosure of the said mortgages given by Mariano to the
plaintiff upon certain property particularly described in the complaint to secure the payment if
the said sum of money.
Issue:
Whether or not Mariano Nable-Jose after the death of Paz Borja has the power to sell or
mortgage the community property acquired during their coverture.
Ruling:
The husband has the exclusive right as the surviving spouse to take the possession of the
common property, and to administer it, until the same is liquidated and he is entrusted to make
the liquidation upon the death of the wife. The interest of the wife in the community property is
an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, and after her death, her interest constitutes neither a
legal nor equitable estate, and only ripens into title when upon liquidation and settlement there
appear to be assets in the community partnership.
The contract executed by a person, who, according to the registry has a right thereto,
cannot be invalidated with regard to third persons after it has been recorded. The mortgage is
perfectly valid and binding upon all parties.
253
his wife, Arturo executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement (RMOA) in favor of
respondent, binding himself to sell to respondent the subject property.
Subsequently, Arturos wife, Esther, executed a Special Power of Attorney dated October
25, 1989, appointing her sister, Bernadette Ramos, to act for and in her behalf relative to the
transfer of the property to respondent. Ostensibly, a marital squabble was brewing between
Arturo and Esther at the time and to protect his interest, respondent caused the annotation of his
adverse claim on the title of the spouses to the property on November 14, 1989.
On November 16, 1989, respondent sent a letter to Arturo and Esther informing them of
his readiness and willingness to pay the full amount of the purchase price. The letter contained a
demand upon the spouses to comply with their obligation to turn over possession of the property
to him. Arturo and Esther failed to deliver the property which prompted respondent to file a
complaint for specific performance with damages against petitioners.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for specific performance. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property executed by Arturo and Esther on
separate documents is valid before the dissolution of their marriage.
Ruling:
No.
Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family Code.
There being no indication that they have adopted a different property regime, their property
relations would automatically be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The
subject land which had been admittedly acquired during the marriage of the spouses forms part
of their conjugal partnership.
The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator of the conjugal
partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
without the wifes consent. Similarly, the wife cannot dispose of any property belonging to the
conjugal partnership without the conformity of the husband.
More significantly, it has been held that prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which
constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that
there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of
each spouse is limited to the net remainder or remanente liquido (haber ganancial) resulting
from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the
husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally
determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be
divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.
The sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the wife when there is no showing that the latter is incapacitated is void ab initio
because it is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Article 166 of the Civil Code.
Since Article 166 of the Civil Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that acts or
transactions executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law itself
authorizes their validity.
As an exception, the husband may dispose of conjugal property without the wifes
consent if such sale is necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities mentioned in Articles 161 and
162 of the Civil Code This is one instance where the wifes consent is not required and,
impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary.
Inescapably, herein petitioners action for specific performance must fail. Even on the
supposition that the parties only disposed of their respective shares in the property, the sale,
assuming that it exists, is still void for the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the
conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non
habet. No one can give what he has not.
254
duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he
later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. In her
counterclaim, Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their
marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private
respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy,
which ended in their son being born prematurely.
Issue:
Whether the marriage be annulled on the ground that they did not cohabit during their
marriage.
Ruling:
Appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of
cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a
marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who
can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes
relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the
marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x
x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.
still subsisting. According to Florence, her consent was gained by the respondent with deception
and that he adroitly convinced her family his marriage with the first wife was void. While
Florence and Atty. Maccarubos marriage was still subsisting, the latter abandoned their family
and cohabited with Josephine Constantino whom he married.
Respondent assailed the claims of Florence denying that he employed deception and that
he was the one whose consent was vitiated because of the former and her familys threat, force
and intimidation. He said that it was a sham wedding and that he was forced to marry Florence to
save the familys reputation because Florence was at that time three-months pregnant. He
submitted pieces of evidence to the Investigating Commission that indicated final and executory
decision of declaring his marriage with Florence void ab initio; a certification that their marriage
license was not filed in the records of NSO; certification showing he was a civic-spirited person;
judicial decree of annulment to complainant which was res judicata upon present administrative
case. He further claimed that his first marriage was also declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity by his wife, Helen.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Maccarubo is guilty of gross misconduct in his private affairs which
warrant disciplinary action.
Ruling:
Upon the evidence on record, respondent is indeed guilty of gross misconduct in his
private affairs which warrant disciplinary action. The incontrovertible facts show that while
respondent had a subsisting marriage with Helen Esparza with whom he had two children, he
entered into a second marriage with complainant. While the marriage between complainant and
respondent has been annulled by final judgment, he and complainant started living as husband
and wife in 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting, rendering him liable for
concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is required for the
continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and
is a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage. Even assuming arguendo that
respondent was coerced by complainant to marry her, the duress, by his own admission as the
following transcript of his testimony reflects, ceased after their wedding day, respondent having
freely cohabited with her and even begot a second child by her.
The decision, rendered in default of complainant, cannot serve as res judicata on the final
resolution of the present case. A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor
purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. In sum,
respondent has breached the following precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Rule 1.01, CANON 7, and Rule 7.03. Respondent was found guilty of gross immorality and
therefore disbarred.
Felicita to his uncles house that brought in a protestant minister who solemnized a marriage
between the two. After the ceremony, Santiago gave the girl a few pesos and sent her home. The
father of Felicita, having known of what transpired, filed a criminal case of rape against the
appellant, resulting to his conviction. The latter now forwarded the defense of his marriage to
Felicita.
Issue:
Is the appellants defense tenable?
Ruling:
No. the ceremony cannot be considered binding on her because of duress. It is therefore
void for lack of essential consent, and it posed no impediment to the wrongdoers prosecution.
The marriage ceremony was a mere ruse to escape from the consequences of his act. The manner
in which appellant dealt with the girl before and after the marriage shows that he had no bona
fide intention of making her his wife.
demanding the return of her share in the lot. Failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, she
filed a complaint for annulment of sale against respondent spouses. Respondent spouses claimed
that they are purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid because it was duly approved by
the court.
On February 15, 1990, the trial court declared the sale of the lot void with respect to the
share of Ignacia. On May 31, 1990, the trial court modified its decision by declaring the sale void
in its entirety and ordering Vicente Reyes to reimburse respondent spouses the purchase price of
P110,000.
Both Ignacia and respondent spouses appealed in the Court of Appeals. Pending the
appeal, Ignacia died and she was substituted by her compulsory heirs.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale should be annulled in its entirety or only with respect to the share
of Ignacia
Ruling:
The husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the
consent, express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. In the case, the
contract is void and not merely voidable. The trial court correctly annulled the sale of the lot in
its entirety. In Bucoy v. Paulino, a case involving the annulment of sale with assumption of
mortgages executed by the husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the
alienation or encumbrance must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the
wife in the conjugal property is concerned.
to his two sons. In February 1988, Romeo learned that the mother of petitioner, Virgilio, have
Moises P30,000.00 as down payment for the sale by Moises of the Paco property.
Ceferino Miat, brother of Moises, testified that even before the death of Concordia, there
was already an agreement that the Paco property would go to Romeo and Alexander. This was
reiterated at the deathbed of Concordia as well as to the extended Miat family members.
Romeo filed an action to nullify the sale between Moises and the Castro spouses, to
compel Moises and Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance or assignment of the Paco
property to him upon payment of the balance of its agreed price, and to make them pay damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the Paco property is conjugal or capital
Ruling:
The property is conjugal. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is to be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does not require proof that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the
manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.
260
resident alien in February 1992. After 6 miscarriages and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally
gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only
Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five week vacation and
they all had roundtrip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick
mother and promised to follow her with their baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to stay
permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and
continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding her affairs.
When Nerissa arrived home a few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was no
longer in good terms. The petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws. She only wanted to be
with her only child but he was being kept away from her by his husband. On the other hand, Ray
wanted to stay here in the Philippines and maintained that it would not be very difficult to live
here since they have their own home and car. Nerissa was forced to move to her parents.
On July 26, 1993, Nerissa filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent Ray to
surrender the custody of their child to her.
On August 27, 1993, the court issued an order awarding custody of the one-year old child
to his mother. Upon appeal by Ray, the Court of Appeals, on September 27,1993, reversed the
decision of the court and awarded the custody of the child to his father.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the child should be given to his father.
Ruling:
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his
mother finds its raison d'etre in the basic need of a child for his mother's loving care. Only the
most compelling of reasons shall justify the court's awarding the custody of such a child to
someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the
past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of
custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a
communicable disease.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. The custody of the child
belongs to the mother, Nerissa Perez.
During the pre-trial of the case, the spouses entered into a compromise agreement. The
said agreement was given judicial imprimatur. However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for
the repudiation of the compromise agreement and the reconsideration of the same on the grounds
that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential
effects of the compromise agreement. Such was denied by the RTC.
On August 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition holding that the conviction of the
respondent of the crime of adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the
conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the partial voluntary separation of property by the spouses pending the
petition of nullity of marriage is valid
Ruling:
Yes. The compromise agreement partially divided the properties of the conjugal
partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal
separation. Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected
voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned compromise
agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under
the law. This holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still
pending.
262
pertains to the voluntary dissolution of their conjugal partnership and the establishment between
them of the regime of separation of property grounded on Article 191 of the civil code.
The trial court denied the petition upon the ground that, under Article 191 of the Civil
Code, a conjugal partnership shall only be dissolved once a legal separation has been ordered.
Issue:
Whether or not a conjugal partnership may be dissolved upon agreement of the spouses
Ruling:
Yes. The fourth paragraph of Article 191 of the Civil Code provides that the husband and
wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to
judicial approval. However, in the case, the liquidation cannot be effected without a liquidation
of the conjugal partnership between Jose Bermas, Sr. and his first wife, in which the children by
first marriage have an interest. The decision appealed from is set aside and the case was
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in conformity with this decision.
ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner vs. CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents
No. L-23482. August 30, 1968
Facts:
On February 14, 1953, Alfonso Lacson and Carmen San Jose-Lacson were married. To
them were born four children.
263
On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal home in Santa Clara
Subdivision, Bacolod City, and commenced to reside in Manila. She filed on March 12, 1963 a
complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) of Manila for custody of all
their children as well as support for them and herself.
However, the spouses, thru the assistance of their respective attorneys, succeeded in
reaching an amicable settlement respecting custody of the children, support, and separation of
property. On April 27, 1963 they filed a joint petition dated April 21, 1963, to which the CFI
rendered judgment approving and incorporating in toto their compromise agreement
On May 7, 1963 the respondent spouse filed in the JDRC a motion wherein she alleged
that she "entered into and signed the Joint Petition as the only means by which she could have
immediate custody of the minor children who are all below the age of 7," and thereafter prayed
that she "be considered relieved of the agreement pertaining to the custody and visitation of her
minor children and that since all the children are now in her custody, the said custody in her
favor be confirmed pendente lite." On May 24, 1963 the petitioner spouse opposed the said
motion and moved to dismiss the complaint. The JDRC, on May 28, 1963, sustained the
petitioner spouse's plea of bar by prior judgment and lis pendens, and dismissed the case. After
the denial of her motion for reconsideration, the respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals wherein she raised, among others, the issue of validity or legality of the
compromise agreement in connection only with the custody of their minor children. On October
14, 1964 the Court of Appeals certified the said appeal to the Supreme Court, since "no hearing
on the facts was ever held in the court below no evidence, testimonial or documentary,
presented-only a question of law pending resolution in the appeal."
Issue:
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and the judgment
of CFI grounded on the said agreement, are conformable to law
Ruling:
It is valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership. It is not however, within the province of the court to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit, andrender conjugal rights to the other.
The order dated April 27, 1963 of the CFI, in so far as it awarded custody of the two
older children who were 6 and 5 years old, respectively, to the father, in effect sought to separate
them from their mother. To that extent therefore, it was null and void because it is clearly
violative of article 363 of the Civil Code.
264
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales were united together in a marriage performed in a
military fashion in 1903. During their cohabitation, they had six children. The disputed property
involving a parcel of land was acquired in 1911 before the church wedding in 1919.
Regina Morales died sometime after their marriage in 1919. The husband remarried Julia
Pamatluan who sold the properties using a power of attorney to spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C.
Macarya.
Plaintiffs instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, before the Court of First
Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the documents of sale covering the subject
parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the herein defendant
spouses, alleging that the realties were common properties of their parents, having been acquired
during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital; and that the sales of the said lands
in favor of the defendant spouses in 1953, after the death of their mother, Regina Morales, was
executed by their father, Melbourne Maxey, without their knowledge and consent; and that they
came to know of the above-mentioned sales only in 1961.
On the other hand, defendant-spouses deny the material allegations of the complaint and
assert by way of affirmative defenses that they are the true and lawful owners and possessors of
the properties in question having purchased the same in good faith and that since then, they have
been in possession thereof openly, exclusively and continuously in concept of owners.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties in question are the exclusive properties of the late
Melbourne Maxey, to the exclusion of his wife Regina Morales.
Ruling:
No. Where a man and woman lived as common-law partners in 1903, got married in
1919, and after the death of the woman in 1919, the surviving spouse sold a parcel of land
acquired before they got legally married, article 144 of the new civil code applies and their
children entitled to recover from the vendee.
The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of
his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the petitioners should
return one-half of the P1, 300.00 purchase price of the land while the private respondents should
pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable considerations,
however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of P650.00 on the other
for annulment of their marriage on the ground that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his marital obligations. Moreover, she prays for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
On February 12, 1997, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent. The petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided. He
did not contest the decision declaring his marriage to respondent void ab initio.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the properties should be divided equally
between the parties
Ruling:
No. their property relations shall be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which
creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties under a void
marriage, have been acquired through their joint efforts; work or industry shall be owned by
them in equal shares. It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by
the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition if
the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
266
Facts:
After the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., Narcisa subsequently married Bonifacio
Calapatura. In order to support her minor children with her first husband, Narcisa and her
brother-in-law, Tomas Calapatura, Sr., excuted on April 26, 1968 an Agreement of Purchase and
Sale whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter the northern half portion of the property.
Narcisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Tomas over the said property. In 1976,
Tomas daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, built a two-storey duplex on the northern part half
portion of the property. Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, son of Tomas cousin, built a small house
on the northern portion of theproperty.
On April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and
delivery of possession of the northern half portion of the subject property.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property conjugal or paraphernal
Ruling:
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was entered into,
provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In the case, while
Narcisa testified that she bought the property with her own funds, she, however, admitted in the
contract that the property was her conjugal share with her first husband. A verbal assertion that
she bought the land with her own funds is inadmissible to qualify the terms of a written
agreement under the parole evidence rule.
267
The marriage between petitioner and respondent was declared null and void ab initio by
the trial court under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of property.
On October 5, 2000, the trial court held that since the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was declared void ab initio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the liquidation
and partition of the properties they own in common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioners motion was dismissed for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code applies in the dissolution of their
properties
Ruling:
Yes. All the elements required in Article 147 are present in the case at bar. Considering,
however, the merits of the case, the Court believes that a blind adherence to the general rule will
result in miscarriage of justice as it will divest the petitioner of her just share in their common
property, and thus, deprive her of a significant source of income to support their children whom
the court had entrusted to her care. The Court held that where a rigid application of the rule that
certiorari cannot be substitute for appeal will result in a manifest failure of justice, the provisions
of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the
first was with petitioner Susan Nicdao Carino and the second was with respondent Susan Yee
Cario.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated
by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits
and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner
Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 while respondent Susan Yee received a
total of P21,000.00. On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be
ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos
(P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits which the petitioner received.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she
met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage
license.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Susan Yee Carino should be entitled to one half of the benefits received
by Susan Nicdao Carino
HELD:
Since the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Article
147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage. In this
property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution
shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her
exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children, and household, ar
excluded in this regime.
One-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her
share in the property regime, and the other half to the deceased legal heirs, his children with
Susan Nicdao.
ANTONIO VALDES, petitioner, vs. RTC, BR. 102 Q.C. AND CONSUELO GOMEZVALDES, respondents
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996
Facts:
269
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971. Begotten during
their marriage were five children. In a petition dated June 22, 1992, Valdes sought the declaration
of nullity of the marriage pursuant to article 36 of the Family Code. After hearing the parties
following the joinder of issues, the marriage of Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez is declared
null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, on the ground of their mutual Psychological
Incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations. The three older children shall
choose which parent they would want to stay with, the younger children shall be placed in the
custody of their mother. The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification on that portion directing compliance with Art. 50,
51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. Parenthetically,
during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to
remain with their father Antonio Valdes.
Issue:
Whether the trial court failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition
of a family dwelling in a situation wherein a marriage is declared null and null and void because
of Psychological Incapacity on the part of either or both parties to the contract.
Ruling:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of cause thereof,
the property relation of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Art. 137 or 148.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have obtained through
their joint efforts.
The rules set up to govern liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and viodable marriages are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exist between common-law spouses.
270
Facts:
Petitioner, Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo were both married
and with children but are separated from their respective spouses, they cohabited while their
respective marriages still subsisted. Petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal
properties which were registered solely in respondents name. But due to irreconcilable
differences the couple separated. Petitioner the demanded his share in the subject properties but
respondent refused.
Issue:
Whether or not the parties be considered as co-owners of the properties considering the
present status of the parties as both married and incapable of marrying each other even assuming
that they lived together as husband and wife.
Ruling:
The Family Code Provides that a co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who
live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that if the
parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their contributions which, in the absence of proof to contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is
thus co-ownership even if the parties are incapacitated to marry.
NENG MALANG, petitioner, vs. HON. COROCOY MOSON et. al., respondents
G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000
272
Facts:
The applicability of the regular rules of procedure and case law in this jurisdiction. to
civil cases before the District Shari'a Courts is the issue in this petition.
On November 14, 1988, petitioner-spouses filed a complaint against private respondents
for "Quieting of Title to Property, Annulment of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-122 and P138, and Damages, With Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" with the Shari'a District
Court, 6th Shari's District at Cotabato City, Public respondent Register of Deeds of the same city
was impleaded as a nominal party. Private respondents filed their answer dated December 1,
1988.
The case was set for trial on the merits on May 22, 1989 but it was postponed at the
instance of private respondents. Other settings were postponed for one reason or another.
However, on July 4, 1989, private respondents filed a pleading designated as "Amplification of
Affirmative or Special Defenses with Prayer for Dismissal of Complaint on the Ground of Lack
of Jurisdiction." On the basis thereof, the trial court issued an order on November 7, 1989
dismissing the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Code shall govern the property relations of Muslim Marriages
celebrated before the Muslim Code
Ruling:
Yes. Since it is the Civil Code which determines the validity of the marriages contracted
before P.D. 1083, it is the same code that determines and governs the property relations of the
marriages, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question, the Civil
Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses,
whether Muslim or non-Muslim.
Facts:
On August 31, 1984, the Imus Rural Bank, Inc. executed a deed of absolute sale in favor
of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential
land with a house thereon. On February 15, 1985, the Register of Deeds made a record entry of
an Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he waived whatever claims he had over the
property. On June 11, 1990, Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works and
Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay for the same. On November 27, 1990,
MIWCC filed a complaint against him and was rule by the trial court in favor of the respondent.
Sheriff Roberto Alejo included the parcels of land mentioned earlier at a public auction for the
recovery of the balance of the amount due.
On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcels
of land in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her husband had
no propriety right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver.
The trial court ruled in favor of Josefina. However, the CA reversed the decision of the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and
Eduardo Francisco
Ruling:
No. The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds
before the cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The
petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money, property, or
industry in the acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of the property.
Petiitioner admitted that when she and Eduardo cohabited, the latter was incapacitated to marry
her. Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Eduardo
and Carmelita, the same should be presumed to be the conjugal property of Eduardo and
Carmelita.
Facts:
Seventeen-year old Gina Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband,
when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid sometime in July 1987. After a brief courtship, they
decided to cohabit as husband and wife. When her relationship with Jacintos relatives turned
sour, she decided to work as an entertainer in Japan. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and
end their 9-year cohabitation.
On January 9, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for partition and recovery of personal
property with receivership against petitioner, alleging that she was able to contribute P70,000.00
in the completion of their unfinished house from her salary as entertainer in Japan. Also, she was
able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture, and household effects. She prayed
that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of
P70,000.00 be reimbursed to her.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 148 of the Family Code applies although the adulterous
cohabitation commenced prior to the effectivity of the same code
Ruling:
Yes. In the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by parties to a bigamous
marriage and adulterous relationship, a proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties
commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on 1988,
Article 148 applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code. Respondent Gina Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto in the
controverted house and personal properties. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the required
amount as determined by the Court.
TSHIATE UY and RAMON UY, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIVIDAD
CALAUNAN-UY, and THE ESTATE OF MENILO UY, respondents
G.R. No. 102726. May 27, 1994
276
Facts:
Respondent Natividad was the common-law wife of the late Menilo Uy, Sr. for about
thirty-six years. Their union bore four children. After the death of Menilo, Sr., petitioners
initiated a special proceeding entitled, In the Matter of the Petition for Letters of Administration
of the Estate of Menilo Uy, Sr. Respondent filed a civil case for Partition of Properties Under
Co-ownership, against the estate of Menilo, Sr.
The parties, upon the suggestion of the RTC, submittes a Compromise Agreement. On
April 24, 1991, a judgment was rendered based on such compromise. Petitioner Tshiate filed an
omnibus motion alleging that by virtue of Hong Kong marriage, she was the surviving legal
spouse of Menilo, Sr. Petitioners contended that the compromise was a patent nullity.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for partition of property on alleged co-ownership in the case at
bar be governed by Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code
Ruling:
Yes. The action for partition is predicated on an alleged co-ownership between private
respondent Natividad and deceased Menilo, Sr. of property evidently acquired during the period
of their common-law relationship. The governing provisions, applicable to their case, are now
found in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, considering that Menilo, Sr. died on
September 27, 1990, well after the effectivity of Executive Order No. 209 or the Family Code of
the Philippines on August 3, 1988.
277
Facts:
Alayo D. Busing married Juliana Oday on 27 July 1927, with whom he had three
children, namely, Flora, Teresita, and Gaido. In 1946, he left the conjugal home, and he forthwith
started to live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot one child, named Josephine
Bosing, now Josephine Belcodero.
On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the
Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the deed, he indicated his civil status as "married to Josefa R. Bosing,"
the common-law wife. In a letter, dated 06 Dctober 1959, which he addressed to Magdalena
Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the lot in the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing."
The final deed of sale was executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., on 24 October 1959. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 48790 was issued in the name of "Josefa R. Rosing, married to Alayo
Bosing, On 6 June 1958, Alayo married Josefa even while his prior marriage with Juliana was
still subsisting. Alayo died on 11 March 1967. About three years later, or on 17 September 1970,
Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot in
question, which was there described as "conjugal property" of Josefa and the deceased Alayo.
The notice of extrajudicial partition was published on 04, 05 and 06 November 1970 in the
Evening Post; the inheritance and estate taxes were paid; and a new Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 198840 was issued on 06 June 1974 in the name of Josephine.
On 30 October 1980, Juliana and her three legitimate children filed with the court a quo
an action for reconveyance of the property. On the basis of the above facts, the trial court ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs, and it ordered that Josephine Bosing execute a deed of reconveyance of
the property in question to the legal heirs of the deceased Alayo D. Bosing, and that both
defendants pay, jointly and severally, actual damages by way of attorney's fees and expenses in
litigation.
Issue:
Whether the property in question was acquired by Alayo in 1949 when an agreement for
its purchase on installment basis was entered into between him and Magdalena Estate, Inc., or in
1959 when a deed of sale was finally executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., the legal results would
be the same.
Ruling:
Yes. The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his
legitimate wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code
(Article 1407), "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
The applicable prescriptive period for an action seeking a reconveyance of the properties
by the beneficiaries is ten years (Article 1144, civil code). The case has been initiated seasonably.
VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa Leus, etc., et al. plaintiffs and appellees, vs. EUGENIO
JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., AND ROSALIA ARROYO,
defendants and appellants
278
Facts:
Eugenio was the registered owner and operator of a passenger jeepney involved in an
accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways which resulted to
the death pf seven and physical injuries to five passengers.
Eugenio was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendantappellant Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen years. The ruling of the case for damages held Eugenio and
Rosalia to pay the damages. The lower court based her liability on the provision of Artcile 144 of
the civil code.
Rosalia then appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the ruling of the lower
court.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the
parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry
Ruling:
No. the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man
and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since
Eugenio is legally married to Socorro, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with
Rosalia, thus, Rosalia cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Eugenio and Socorro. There is therefore, no legal basis for the liability of Rosalia
for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered, by the passengers of the
jeepney. Only the registered owner of the public service vehicle is responsible for damages.
279
Facts:
On October 29, 1933, Lucio Adriano married Gliceria Dorado; they had three children,
namely, Celestina, Manolo, and Aida, private respondents in this case. On or before 1942, Lucio
and Gliceria separated. The latter settled in Laguna where she died on June 11, 1968. After their
separation Lucio cohabited with Vicenta Villa and subsequently five months after the death of
Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta with whom he had eight children: Marino, Renato, Leticia,
Imelda, Maria, Alicia, Ligaya, Jose Vergel, and Zenaida. All were petitioners except to Jose
Vergel due to his death before the inception of the proceedings. In 1972 the spouses separated.
On October 10,1980, Lucio executed his last will and testament disposing of all his
properties, and assigning, among others his second wife Vicenta and all his children by first and
second marriages as devisees and legatees therein. The properties bequeathed in the will were a
45,000 sq. m. lot and the residential house, rice mill, warehouse and with all the equipment
situated thereon in Candelaria, Quezon. On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and Celestina
Adriano, Lucios executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the will immediately after the death
and Vicenta opposed the said petition, but still granted. Hence, the petitioner filed an action for
the annulment of Lucio Adrianos will.
Issue:
Whether or not the property bequeathed in the will of Lucio Adriano were conjugal
property of the latter and his second wife, Vicenta Villa-Adriano.
Ruling:
No. The properties, which were under this issue, belong to the conjugal property of Lucio
and Gliceria. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that a man and woman
living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be in
capacitated to marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucios
marriage with Gloria subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Because it was clearly supported that the
properties was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of the conjugal fund from his first
marriage.
GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner, vs. RTC OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE
LUIS BELLO, AND PEDRO HERNANDO, respondents
G.R. No. 109068. January 10, 1994
Facts:
280
There was a complaint filed by Gaudencio Guerrero against Pedro Hernando, respondent.
On December 7, 1992, at the pre-trial conference, the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio
Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they being
married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law. This case was dismissed by respondent Judge
on the ground that the parties being brothers-in-law the complaint should have alleged that
earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise. Thus, the petitioner appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family.
Ruling:
The court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private
respondent Hernando was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing
the present suit. The enumeration of brothers and sisters as members of the same family does
not comprehend brothers-in-law. In Gayon vs. Gayon it was emphasized that sisters-in-law
(hence, also brothers-in-law) are not listed under Article 217 of the New Civil Code as
members of the same family. Article 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same
enumeration of members of the family, then there is no reason to alter existing jurisprudence
on the matter.
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. EDMUNDO ACUNA and
ALBERTO MORENO, respondents
G.R. No. 154132. August 31, 2006
Facts:
281
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC a complaint against Hiyas
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the
Register of Deeds for cancellation of mortgage.
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that private
respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no
suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code applies in the case at bar
Ruling:
No. once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the
law no longer makes it a condition to precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a
compromise before an action can prosper.
On March 6, 1993, Daniel, Sr. executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision
of the property owned by him and his wife Natividad into three lots bequeathed to each of his
sons.
On May 1995, Daniel, Sr. suffered a stroke which resulted in the paralysis of the right
side of his body. On October 26, 1996, Natividad died. Daniel, Sr. passed away on October 6,
1997.
On September 16, 1998, Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on
September 15, 1996, where the latter appears to have sold the lot to Manolo and his wife Lucila.
Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale against his brother Manolo and his
sister-in-law before the RTC. He also filed a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of
public document against Manolo.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the spouses holding that the spouses
substantially complied with Article 151 of the Family Code based on the allegations of the
complaint and the appended certification to file action issued by the barangay captain.
On November 27, 2003, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code was duly complied with
Ruling:
Yes. The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of the
Family Code because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against
the respondent for unlawful detainer in the Katarungang Pambarangay, in compliance with P.D.
No. 1508; and that, after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at, resulting in the
barangay chairmans issuance of certificate to file action.
The petitioners petition is granted.
On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a
complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. In said complaint, petitioners alleged that they are
the owners of a parcel of land, in the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz, in a land registration
case filed by private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros, brother of Augusto; that petitioners were
deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case; that such
income consisted of rentals from tenants of the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from
1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00 per year thereafter; and that private respondents filed the land
registration case and withheld possession of the land from petitioners in bad faith. The
respondents filed an answer denying all allegations by the petitioner. Private respondents prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay damages to private
respondents by way of counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject land to private
respondents.On November 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners motion. At the same time,
however, it dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required by
Art. 151 of the Family Code and, therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made
to arrive at a compromise.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code was attended in the case
Held:
Art. 151 provides, No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed. It if is shown that no such efforts were in fact
made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the
subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Art. 151 of the Family Code do not apply in this
case since the suit is not exclusively among family members. The private respondent Ayson is
admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the requirements of
Art. 151 of the Family Code. The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 do not affect
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the complaint. The verification is merely a
formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and
correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations regarding efforts made to settle the
case among members of the same family, it could simply have ordered petitioners to verify them.
284
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived
by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio
Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo
Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo, and Imelda Manalo, who are all of
legal age. At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real
properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac. On November 26, 1992, the eight (8)
of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina,
Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of
Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the
appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. The order of general
default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners namely: Pilar S. Vda. De
Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10) days within which to file their
opposition to the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code shall be applied
Held:
Under Article 222 of the Civil Code, No suit shall be filed or maintained between
members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035. This is
clear from the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or
others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him
for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil
action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Besides, an excerpt from the
Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to
make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and
involve members of the same family.
NICANOR T. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS CONSUELO T. SANTOSGUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO, respondents.
G.R. No. 134787. November 15, 2005
Facts:
285
286
Cecilio and Luisa were married on September 2, 1953 and lived together as husband and
wife until July 14, 1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his studies
and practice his profession. Since then, the husband without justifiable cause or reason
deliberately abandoned and neglected the wife and despite repeated demands from her, the
husband failed and refused to provide for the maintenance and support of the wife who is
pregnant sickly and without source of revenue. Thus, she filed a complaint against her husband.
The husband filed two motions of dismissal consecutively but both were denied. Then he
petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to stop to
stop the Court of First Instance from further proceeding with the case. After the CA heard and
considered the merits, it d3enied the writ of prohibition and dissolved the injunction.
Issue:
(a) Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code shall be applied
(b) Whether or not Article 2053 of the Civil Code shall be applied to claim future support
Held:
(a) Article 222 of the Civil Code requires that before a suit between members of the family is
filed or maintained, it must appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made and the only way to make it so appear when the suit is filed is by proper averment
to that effect in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being initiated unless such
efforts at compromise appear, the showing that efforts in question were made is a
condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows that the failure of
the complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of
court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be so attacked at any
stage of the case even on appeal.
(b) A claim for future support that under Article 2053vof the Civil Code cannot be subject of
a valid compromise, therefore, outside the sphere of Article 222 of the Code upon which
petitioner relies. The validity of marriage is also a non-compromisable issue. Since no
valid compromise is valid on these issues, a showing of previous effects to compromise
them would be superfluous.
287
On March 4, 1964, a verified complaint later amended, for monthly support in arrears and
damages and custody of the children with a petition for support pendiente lite was lodged against
Jose Maria Versoza by his wife and their three minor children. Reason gives are that defendant
has abandoned plaintiff without providing for their support and maintain illicit relation with
another woman.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code is applicable in the case
Ruling:
Article 222 of the Civil Code , construed in relation of Section 1 (j) Rule 16, Rules of
Court; Meaning of no suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest effects toward a compromise have been made but that the
same have failed, subject to limitations in Article 2035. The right to support cannot be: (1)
removed; (2) transmitted to third persons; (3) nor compensated with what the receipients owes
the obligor (Article 301). The alleged defect is that the complaint does not state a cause of action.
The proposed amendment seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect that the requirements
of Article 222 have been complied with does not confer jurisdiction upon the lower Court. The
defect is curable.
288
The debt was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident and the money judgment
arising there from was rendered by the Appellate Court on January 27, 1988 which ordering the
petitioner to pay the Salinas spouses the due damages. The said judgment having become final
and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Court to satisfy the said judgment on the
goods and chattels of the defendants including the petitioner. On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied
on a parcel of residential land registered in the name of Jose Modequillo. A motion to quash or
set aside levy of execution was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land located is
where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is
exemt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code
except for liabilities mentioned in article 155 thereof; and that the judgment debt sought to be
enforced against the family home of the defendant is not one of those enumerated under article
155 of the Family Code. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Issue:
Whether or not the case fall under the exemption from the execution provided in the
Family Code
Ruling:
Case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family
Code.Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from time
it is occupied as a family residence. Thus, the creditors should take necessary precautions to
protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family owes the home.
Exemption is effective from the time of the Constitution of the Family home as such and lasts so
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. The residential house and lot of petitioner
was not constituted as a family home whether judicial or extrajudicial under the Civil Code. It
became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code of the
Philippines on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila
Chronicles on August 4, 1987.
289
Facts:
On June 17, 1986, Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez- Salcedo
filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Pasig against Marietta Dela Cruz Sta. Inez
alleging that they are the children of the cdeceased Purificacion Dela Cruz Gomez who, during
her lifetime, entrusted her rice land located at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta together
with the Transfer of Certificate of Title covering said land for the latter to manage and supervise.
The sisters further alleged that they have demanded for an accounting of the produce of the said
rice land while under the management of Marietta and for the return of the TCT to the property,
but the latter refused. The trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and after such judgment
became final and executor, a writ of execution was issued by the Pasig RTC, by virtue of which,
a parcel of land located at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, registered in the name of Marietta Dela
Cruz Sta. Ines, was levied upon by Flaviano Balgos Jr., to satisfy the damages awarded in the
civil case. Said property was sold at a public auction to Mary Josephine as the highest bidder.
The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya. A complaint for annulment
of sale was filed by the husband and children of Marietta on the ground that said house and lot
sold during the public auction is their family residence, and is thus exempt from execution under
Section 12 (a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and under Article 155 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 155 of the Family Code is applicable in the case
Ruling:
Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to the constitution
of the family home. In the case, the house and lots of Sta.Ines family was not constituted as a
family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, at the time Marietta incurred her debts. Under
prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such only upon the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, thus, the debts were incurred before the constitution before the family
home.
Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a
residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00. On March 17, 1986, Private
Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop
Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an
indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered
into a compromise agreement with private respondent. On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered
judgment approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to
comply with the agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a motion
for execution which the lower court granted on September 23, 1986. However, execution of the
judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal
properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold at
public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff. On
August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution
and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not
yet executory. On September 26, 1989, the lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of
execution and the prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner and his company.
Finding that petitioner and his company had not paid their indebtedness even though they
collected receivables amounting to P57,224,319.75, the lower court held that the case had
become final and executory. It also ruled that petitioners residence was not exempt from
execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not a final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued
before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the
provisions of the said Code.
Ruling:
In that case, petitioner incurred the indebtedness in 1987 or prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. Hence, petitioners family home was not exempt from
attachment by sheer force of exclusion embodied in paragraph 2, Article 155 of the Family
Code cited in Modequillo, where the Court categorically ruled:Under the Family Code, a
family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the
Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as
contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their
interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. Article
155 provides that the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except:(1) For nonpayment of taxes;(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home;(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. The exemption
provided is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. In the present case, the residential house
and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially
under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the
Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August
4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T.
MORING and HUSBAND, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG, respondents.
G.R. No. 108532. March 9, 1999
291
Facts:
As a result of a judgment for recovery of property in favor of private respondent , two of
the petitioners properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount. The subject properties
were sold to a public auction to the private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after
petitioners failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed definitely
transferring, selling, and conveying said properties to the private respondent. The petitioners
filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a
prayer to writ of preliminary injunction. The petitioners alleged that they are the children of
Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras, who are both dead and the subject property has been
acquired through free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any
encumberance for the payment of debt.
Issue:
(a) Whether or not the conveyance made by way of the sheriffs sale pursuant to the writ of
execution issued by the trial court is prohibited
(b) Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution
Ruling:
(a) Court agrees with the respondent court that the conveyance made by way of the sheriffs
sale was not violative of the law. The final deed of conveyance ceding the subject
property to Abdon Gilig was issued after the petitioners failed to redeem the property
after the reglementary period. The petitioners are not the owners of the land and cannot
claim to be such by invoking Commonwealth Act No. 141. The prohibition does not
apply since it is clear from the records that judgment debt and the execution sale took
place prior to the approval of the application for free patent.
(b) A family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable, and free from attachment
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated. It cannot be
seized by creditors except in certain special cases. It may be constituted judicially and
extrajudicially. Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence. The
article does not mean that it has a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Instances where the family home
is not exempted from the execution, forced sale or attachment under the Civil Code.
Asis, alleging that the defendant is the father of the subject minor and the former refused and/ or
failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands.
Issue:
(a) Whether or not future support can be the subject of a compromise
(b) Whether or not a former dismissal predicated upon a compromise affecting the civil
status of persons can have force and effect
Ruling:
(a) The right to receive can neither renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article
301 of the Civil Code provides that future support cannot be the subject of a
compromise. An agreement for the dismissal of a complaint and support conditioned
upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot
be countenanced.
(b) A former dismissal predicated upon a compromise affecting the civil status of persons
and future support cannot have force and effect and cannot bar the filing of another
action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant.
293
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were the registered
owners of a parcel of land located at Dagupan City and the two storey building constructed
thereon. It is undisputed that Generosa gave birth to Rogelio who died when he was only 12
years old as paralytic. In the testimony of Romeo Fernandez, it was revealed that the late
Spouses being childless by the death of their son, purchased a one month baby boy, who was
later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez. He was taken care of by the couple and was sent to
school and became a dental technician. On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died and left his
wife and Rodolfo an estate. On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa executed a Deed of
extra-judicial Partition. On the same day, Generosa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Eddie Fernandez, appellants son. After learning the transaction, the nephews and nieces of the
deceased, their father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed an action to declare the Extra-Judicial
Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio. They alleged that the appellants were
motivated by unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious acts of depriving them and other heirs
of the deceased their rights.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 1105 of the New Civil Code is applicable
Ruling:
Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the
spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of the deceased, thus the subject deed of extra-judicial
settlement of the estate between Generosa and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is
concerned pursuant to Article 1105 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines which states; A
partition which includes a person believed to be an heir but who is not shall be void only with
respect to such person. Moreover, While ones legitimacy be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no application in a case where the
allegation by one party is that a person claiming to be a child of the deceased spouses was not
born to said deceased persons.
294
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. After their marriage, they
lived Ma. Theresas parents. Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. The
couples relationship turned out to be short-lived. On December 19, 1991, the husband filed a
petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before
he married Ma. Theresa, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which married was never annulled.
Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive. The wife did not deny marrying Mario when
she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham that she never
lived with Mario at all. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and
susbsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being
bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the
child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
Issue:
Whether or not Articles 164, 166, 49 of the Family Code is applicable
Ruling:
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code
is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides: Article 167: The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The law
requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of the legitimacy. The presumption
of legitimacy proceeds from sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of
conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166(1)(b) of the Family Code,
it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enable the
husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not
disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The presumption is
quasi-collective and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus
between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded
the birth of the child. In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article
49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his
children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each
others company. There being no such parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no
legally demandable rights to visit Jose Gerardo.
she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and together with
petitioner, decedents wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent.
Petitioner opposed the petition of the respondent. She averred that respondent could not be the
daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Furthermore, the respondent failed to
present the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produce any acceptable document
to prove such union.
Issue:
(a) Whether or not the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may
be availed by the respondent
(b) Whether or not birth certificate may use as proof of paternity and recognition
Ruling:
(a) A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal
presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact.
For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be overemphasized, that while a fact overthrown, stand as proved, the presumption of legitimacy
under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convinvcing proof of the
factual basis. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise. A
legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage.
Remove the elements of the lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation
between parents and children.
(b) Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of
paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother
jointly, or by the mother if the father refuses. In this case, the Birth Certificate presented
was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by
Genoveva, instead by the attending physician, who certified to having attended the birth
of a child. Thus, the birth certificate presented is not valid to prove the paternity.
Memorandum Agreement (RMOA) dated October 17, 1989 in favor of the respondent, binding
himself to sell to respondent the subject property and not to offer the same to any other party
within thirty (30) days from date. Arturo acknowledged receipt of a check from the respondent in
certain amount, representing earnest money for the subject property, the amount of which would
be deducted from the purchase price. Further, the RMOA stated that full payment would be
effected as soon as possession of the property shall have been turned over to respondent.
Subsequently, Esther executed a SPA dated on October 25, 1989, appointing her sister to act for
and in her behalf relative to the transfer of the property to respondent. Ostensibly, a marital
squabble was brewing between the spouses at the time and to protect is interest, respondent
caused the annotation of his adverse claim on the title of the spouses to the property. On
November 16, 1989, the respondent sends a demand letter informing the spouses of his readiness
and willingness to pay the full amount of the purchase price. The letter contained a demand upon
the spouses to comply with their obligation to turn over possession of the property to him. Arturo
and Esther failed to deliver the property which prompted the respondent to cause the annotation
of another adverse claim. On January 12, 1990, respondent filed a complaint against petitioners
for specific performance with damages. Arturo filed his answer to the complaint while his wife
was declared in default.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership
(b) Whether or not the consent of both spouses is needed in the sale of property under
conjugal partnership
(c) Whether or not a written consent of the other spouse is required in selling property under
conjugal partnership
Ruling:
(a) Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This
right is clearly granted to him by law. More, the husband is the sole administrator. The
wife is not entitled as of right to joint administration. The right of the husband or wife to
one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations,
there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective
heirs.
(b) The sale by the husband of the property belonging the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the wife when there is no showing that the latter is incapacitated is void ab
initio because it is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Article 166 of the
Civil Code. This Article requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that acts or transactions
executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law itself authorize
their validity.
(c) The Family Code now requires the written consent of the other spouse, or authority of the
court for the disposition or encumberance of conjugal partnership property without
which, the disposition or encumberance shall be void.
JANICE MARIE JAO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
No. L-49162 July 28, 1987
Facts:
297
On October 28, 1968, petitioner Janice Marue Jao, then minor, represented by her mother
and guardian ad-litem, filed a case for recognition and support with respondent Perico V. Jao.
The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon order of the trial court. The result of the
said test indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring by Perico and Arlene.
Issue:
Whether or not the result of blood grouping test may use as an evidence for filiation
Ruling:
The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they
show only a possiblility that the alleged father or any one of many others with the same blood
type may have been the father of the child. But the Uniform Act recognizes the tests have some
probative value to establish paternity where the blood type and the combination in the child is
shown to be rare, in which case the judge is given discretion to let it in.
298
The husband was suffering from tuberculosis in such a condition that he could hardly
move and get up from his bed, with feet swollen and voice hoarse. The wife had carnal
intercourse with a man other than her husband during the first 120 days of the 300 days
immediately preceding the birth of the child. The husband soon died, but within 300 days
following dissolution of the marriage, a child was born to the wife.
Issue:
Whether or not the late husband is the father of the child
Ruling:
The Court held that the child is still his legitimate child. The fact that the husband was
seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. There are cases where
persons suffering from such illness can do carnal act even in the most crucial stage of his health
because then they seem to be more inclined to sexual intercourse. This presumption can only be
rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife
during the first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of
access by husband to wife would include absence during the initial period of conception,
impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable; and imprisonment, unless it can be shown
that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulation. The fact that the wife
had illicit intercourse with a man other than her husband during the initial period, do not
preclude cohabitation between said husband and wife.
299
Presentacion B. Catotal filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of
Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry of Ilagan City. She asserted that she is the only surviving
child of the late Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera. She alleged that Teofista is not her sister
because she is the daughter of Flora Guinto who is the housemaid of the spouses and gave birth
through hilot at the house of the spouses without their knowledge. This caused the registration
of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that the child was the child of the spouses
Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hemogena, then 54 years old, and made her to be the mother of
the child. Due to lack of evidence presented that Hermogena became pregnant and was already
54 at the alleged time of Teofistas birth, both the trial and appellate court declared the certificate
of birth of Teofista as null and void ab initio and ordering her Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to
cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not Article 171 of the Family Code shall be applied
(b) Whether or not Article 170 of the Family Code shall be applied
Ruling:
(a) A legitimate child has the requisite standing to initiate an action to cancel the birth
certificate of one claiming to be the child of the formers mother. Article 171 of the
Family Code states that the childs filiation can be impugned only by the father or in
special circumstances, his heirs. It applies to instances in which the father impugns the
legitimacy of his wifes child. This Article is not applicable in the present case because it
does not impugn petitioners filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera since
there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. In Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, provides that a real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
(b) The prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. An
action to cancel a persons Birth Certificate for being allegedly void ab initio does not
prescribe.
300
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in
Laguna. Isabel died and followed her in the grave, seven years after. He died intestate. The fight
for administration of Vicentes estate ensued on September 24, 1990, private respondent Victoria
Benitez- Lirio and Feodor Benitez- Aguilar, Vicentes sister and nephew, respectively. They
prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicentes favor of private respondent
Aguilar. On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole
heir of the deceased and capable of administering his estate.
Issue:
Whether or not Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code shall be contemplated
Ruling:
Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code do contemplate a situation where a
child is alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. The instant case
does not contemplated by these articles. These articles govern a situation where a husband (or his
heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can
impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (a) it was physically impossible for him to have
sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child; (b) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been his child; (c) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the
written authorization or ratification by either spouse was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner, vs.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND
LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO, respondents.
G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002
Facts:
301
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for
more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the civil case filed by her in favor to her
son. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams
untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazons two (2)
children from her subsisting marriage. This was with the knowledge of William Liyaos
legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting
marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East
Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice president and president,
respectively. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos
Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and
stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital
expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even
asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billys birth
certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein.
William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had
their pictures taken together. During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken
showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billys godfather, Fr. Julian
Ruiz, William Liyaos legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio. Corazon also
presented pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while
attending various social gatherings and other important meetings.
Issue:
Who shall invoke the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code
Ruling:
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be
legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration
contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from
the odium of illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive
and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New
Civil Code provides: Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no
evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused:1) By the impotence of
the husband;2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access
was not possible;3) By the serious illness of the husband. The fact that Corazon Garcia had been
living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born
is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that
the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code
may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth
under Article 262 of the Civil Code.
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented
by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, respondent.
G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001
Facts:
302
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in
lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their
respective shares in the latters estate under the rules on succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and
Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that
Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, were born, the former on 01 March 1979
and the latter on 06 July 1982. In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina
Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable
assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the
strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for
Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate. Respondents, the surviving
spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of
which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for
altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased
Juan Dizon.
Issue:
Whether or not Articles 170 and 171 shall be observed in the case
Ruling:
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that
there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of
the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which
took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer
be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. TIJING, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents
G.R. No. 125901. March 8, 2001
Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children and the youngest is Edgardo
Tijing Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989 at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse LourdesVasquez. Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of angelita, the respondent. On August, 1989,
303
angelita went to her house to fetch for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way
to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month
old son, Edgardo Jr. under the care of Aangelita as she usually let her take care of the child while
Bienvenida was doing laundry. When she came back from the market, the two were gone
already. She went to Angelitas home but she was informed that Angelita already moved to other
place. Bienvenida and her husband searched for their missing son in other places.
Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts. Four years later,
Bienvenida read in the tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common husband
of Angelita. They went to the place and saw her son. She claims that the boy was already named
John Thomas Lopez. The spouses filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in
order to recover their son. The petitioners presented two witnesses, Lourdes Vasquez, the
midwife and Benjamin Lopez, the brother of Tomas. Benjamin Lopez declared that his brother
could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as he was sterile. The trial court granted
the petition while in the appellate court, it reversed the decision of the lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Edgardo Jr. and John Thomas is the same person
Ruling:
Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance of birth should cause the
recognition of such birth and only is default of the physician or midwife can the parent register
the birth of his child. A false entry in the birth certificate regarding the alleged marriage between
the parents of the child puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate. Moreover,
resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to
establish parentage. Bienvenida and the subject child have a common resemblance. Thus, the
court considered this in the decision. Parentage will shall be resolved using conventional
methods unless adopt the modern and scientific ways available like Deoxyrebonuclei Acid
(DNA) test.
filed a complaint against the respondents to declare the properties and businesses held by them as
part of the estate of Bonifacio Go Kim and compel them to render an accounting. Respondent
Santiago avers that he is the only son of Bonifacio Go Kim. He maintains that petitioner has
lived and worked with them and was treated as a family member because petitioners real father
was close friend of the decedent. His real parents were Gaw Gee and Ng Kee appearing in his
landing certificate. He denied any relation with petitioner ad declares that the grant of petition for
change of name from Gaw Piak to William Go Kim Huy did not make petitioner a member of the
family of Bonifacio Go Kim.
Issue:
Whether or not William Go Kim Huy established his filiation with the deceased
Ruling:
From the time of death of Bonifacio Go Kim in 1974, his heirs acquired a definite right to
inheritance. By provision of will or operation of law, his heirs are called to succeed.
Nevertheless, the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish his affirmative allegation that
Bonifacio is his father. Under our legal system, filiation is established by any of the following:
(a) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a fial judgment; (b) an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws.
305
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan"
Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Petitioner
initiated a petition to disqualify the respondent and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate
of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth his parents were foreigners. His
mother was Bessie Kelley Poe, an American and his father was Allan Poe, a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Poe, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated that Allan Poe
was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate
birth of respondent on two assertions- first, Allan Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain
Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley, and second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, His parents got married only a year after the birth of respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not FPJ is a legitimate child
Ruling:
Under Article 172 of the Family Code, The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2 any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Under
Article 173, the action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity.
In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. The
action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both
of the parties; Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children., The action must be brought
within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent. The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the
code reads: "Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. The 1950
Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into
voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child
who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be
demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation.
Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might
pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could
only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent. In case of an illegitimate child, the
birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the
mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the
document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified. In order that the birth certificate could then
be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was
required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the
same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.
306
1981, Florencia was hired as petitioners household help. During the course of her employment,
she often went home to her husband in the afternoon and return to work for the morning. This
displeased petitioners wife, hench, she was told to look for another job. One time, petitioner and
Florencia accidentally saw each other in a bus. They went for a dinner and spent the night in a
Hotel, where they had sexual intercourse. In that time, the woman confessed that she was
pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home following that day. Florencia went to
petitioners house hoping to be re-employed as servant. Since petitioners wife was in need one
that time, she was re-hired. However, petitioners wife noticed her pregnancy and she disclosed
that the father was her husband. Thus, she was again told to go home and after that they did not
see each other anymore.
Issue:
Whether or not paternity or filiation was duly established
Ruling:
An order for recognition and support may create a wholesome situation or may be on
irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father was in the preparation of the said certificate. The presumption of
legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but it is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded
on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. The fact that
Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsistence marriage between them gives rise to
presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the matter may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
located at Starford, Cubao, Quezon City. Isaac died in 1967, leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente
as his compulsory heirs. In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime however he sired Maria
Theresa an illegitimate daughter. Thus, at the time of his death his compulsory heirs are his
mother and illegitimate daughter. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for Partition and Accounting with Damages against Rosalina alleging by
virtue of her fathers death, she became Rosalinas co-heir and co-owner of the Cubao property.
Trial, Appellate, and Supreme Court granted Maria Theresas prayers.
Issue:
Whether or not Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation
Held:
Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly
authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed the birth certificate thereby acknowledging
that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity
over Maria Theresa. Thus, the filiation of illegitimate children like legitimate children is
established by: (a) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (b)
admission of legitimate filiation is public document or private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by: (a) the open and
continuous possession of the status of the legitimate child; or (b) only other means allowed by
the Rule of the Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is in itself a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child and no further court action is required.
correspondences. On September 18, 1967, Juan died intestate. His widow, Yolanda Alberto, filed
a petition for the administration of his estate. After the publication of notices, she was appointed
as the administratrix of the estate. After the Inventory and Appraisal and the Administratrix
Accounting were approved, the proceedings were ordered closed and terminated. On September
15, 1978, Ma. Theresa filed a motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open the
proceedings praying that she be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and as
such, entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. The motion was granted by the probate court.
The Court was convinced that the petitioner had been in continuous possession of the status of a
natural child. Thus, it compelled the decedents heirs and estate to recognize her as a natural
daughter and allow her to participate in the estate proceedings.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not the natural child occupies the highest position under the old Civil Code
(b) Whether or not the petitioner is barred to file an action
Ruling:
(a) While he did contract marriage subsequently with another woman, it was only too clear
that he had no intentions of closing definitively that chapter in his life when he begat his
first-born. Of the different categories of illegitimate children under the old Civil Code,
the natural child occupies the highest position, she being the child of parents who, at the
time of her conception, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other and
could, therefore, have contracted a valid marriage.
(b) An illegitimate child whose father or mother dies during her minority has four (4) years
from the attainment of her majority within which to file an action for the recognition. The
motion of the petitioner was seasonably filed three days before the expiration of the fouryear period. Hence, the said motion is valid.
310
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in
lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their
respective shares in the latters estate under the rules on succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and
Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that
Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, were born, the former on 01 March 1979
and the latter on 06 July 1982. In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina
Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable
assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the
strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for
Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate. Respondents, the surviving
spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of
which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for
altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased
Juan Dizon.
Issue:
Whether or not voluntary recognition of illegitimate children is present
Ruling:
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to
be of any relevance in this instance. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount
declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated
or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such
wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. The filiation of illegitimate
children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on
other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the childs acknowledgment. A scrutiny of
the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon,
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latters heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.
311
disgrace in the public, she decided to marry Anastacio Mamburao. Fr. Lumain solemnized their
marriage. They never lived together as man and wife. On September 12, 1924, 192 days after the
marriage, Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion Lumain. As shown by her birth certificate her
registered parents are Trinidad and Anastacio. On October 31, 1986, Fr. Lumain died but he left a
last will and testament wherein he acknowledge Consolacion his daughter and instituted her as
the sole and universal heir of all property rights and interests. This was duly probated by the
Court of First Instance of Bohol and on appeal it was affirmed by Court of appeals. Soon
afterreachung the age of majority, Consolacion filed an action against Hipolito for the recovery
of certain parcel of lands she claim to have inherited from Fr. Lumain and for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Consolacion is the lawful heir
Ruling:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will all his estate or any part of it in
favor of any person having capacity to succeed; Determination of paternity not even necessary.
In the last will anjd testament of Fr. Lumain, he not only acknowledged appellee, Consolacion as
his natural daughter but designated her as his only heir. Thus, Consolacion is the lawful heir.
(RTC) of Naga City, for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their father, Benito
Dy Chiao, Sr., and for the administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate on
July 27, 1995. Since Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley
Arevalo, filed the complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito Sr.s wife, was not impleaded as
she had died on July 7, 1995. The CA nullified the decision of the RTC on the ground, inter alia,
that the filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise, and that Mary Jane had
no authority to execute the compromise agreement for and in behalf of her brothers.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo for
recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr
Ruling:
The petitioners claims that there was no factual basis for the appellate courts finding
that the respondents were incompetent cannot prevail. It must be stressed that the CA conducted
a hearing before arriving at the conclusion that respondent Benito, Jr. was incompetent. More
importantly, such claim involves a factual issue which cannot be raised before this Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The contention of the petitioners is bereft of merit. The Court
finds and so holds that the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by
Mary Jane is null and void. , the Court is convinced that the compromise agreement signed by
Mary Jane and Benedick was a compromise relating to the latters filiation. Mary Jane
recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her deceased father, the consideration for which
was the amount of P6, 000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, the waiver of other claims from
the estate of the deceased, and the waiver by the Dy Chiao siblings of their counterclaims against
Benedick. This is readily apparent, considering that the compromise agreement was executed
despite the siblings unequivocal allegations in their answer to the complaint filed only two
months earlier, that Benedick was merely an imposto
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
provided by law; to indemnify complainant Maria Elena Nieto in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50, 000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs.
In her sworn complaint dated 22 February 1993 and filed on 24 February 1993 with the court
below, the complainant charged the accused with the crime of rape allegedly committed.
Issue:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE ON A
SWORN STATEMENT OF THE COMPLAINANT CHARGING THE APPELLANT
THE CRIME OF RAPE, FOR THE REASON THAT THE SIGNATURE APPEARING
THEREON WAS NOT IDENTIFIED BY COMPLAINANT AND NOT PRESENTED
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT BY THE PROSECUTION.
Ruling:
Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children on
the mother, and likewise provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with the Family
Code. As such, there is no further need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of the
offspring by an offender who is married, which would vest parental authority in him. Therefore,
under Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is married can only
be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be any. In the instant case
then, the accused should also be ordered to support his illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen Nieto,
72 with Marie Elena Nieto, but in light of Article 20173 of the Family Code, the amount and
terms thereof to be determined by the trial court only after due notice and hearing.
suddenly awakened when she felt someone beside her. Upon opening her eyes she saw accused
Manuel Manahan as he immediately placed himself on top of her. . He succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of her. Within the month Teresita left the canteen and returned home to her
parents in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The sexual encounter resulted in her pregnancy. From there
they proceeded to the police station where a statement of Teresita was taken by SPO1 Isagani L.
Ico. Police Chief Inspector Wendy G. Rosario later endorsed the complaining witness to the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan City for appropriate legal action. Thereafter, with the
assistance of her mother, Teresita filed a criminal complaint accusing Manuel Manahan alias
Maning of rape. Meanwhile, on 2 October 1995, she gave birth to a healthy baby girl and
christened her Melanie Tibigar. The accused banks heavily on his "sweetheart theory," a usual
defense in alleged rape, but the accused miserably failed to prove that he and the complaining
witness indeed had a romantic liaison as this claim was categorically denied by her. In September
1995, the accused was arrested in connection with the case filed by Teresita. On review ofthe
records and the court sustain the conviction of the accused. The prosecution for rape almost
always involves sharply contrasting and irreconcilable declarations of the victim and the
accused.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused of rape
Ruling:
In the instant case, the complaining witness may not have even filed the rape charge had
she not become pregnant. This Court has taken cognizance of the fact that many of the victims of
rape never complain or file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy
in painful silence rather than reveal their shame to the world and risk the rapists' making good
their threats to kill or hurt their victims.
On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the
court a quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of
rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him
from doing so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case before us, compulsory
acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in
doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this Court in People
v. Guerrero, 16 the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize
the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate."
Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, the
court sustains that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law.
Gonzales (hereinafter Gonzales). Respondents Catalino, Lucia, Purificacion and Melchor, all
surnamed Villanueva, and Arnaldo V. Avendano are allegedly the siblings, full and half-blood of
Romualdo Villanueva (hereinafter Villanueva).They are denominated as the heirs of Villanueva
and are represented by Melchor. They were allowed to substitute for Villanueva upon his death.
The remaining respondents, Angelina Villanueva (hereinafter respondent Angelina) and husband
Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, of the late
Villanueva. Petitioners (Gonzales' half-brothers, etc.) filed a case for partition of Gonzales' estate
and annulment of titles and damages, with the Regional Trial Court. In dismissing the complaint,
the RTC made two findings: (1) Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and (2) respondent
Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of
petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in finding that respondent Angelina was Gonzales'
illegitimate daughter
Ruling:
Both the trial court and the CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the illegitimate
daughter of the decedent, based solely on her birth certificate. According to the assailed decision,
"the birth certificate clearly discloses that Pacita Gonzales was the mother of Angelina
Villanueva while municipal treasurer Romualdo Villanueva was denominated therein as her
father."13 The CA found this to be adequate proof that respondent Angelina was Gonzales'
illegitimate child.
However, a closer examination of the birth certificate14 reveals that respondent Angelina
was listed as "adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales. A record of birth is merely a prima
facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963 was adulterous,
their property relations during those 36 years were not governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code
which applies only if the couple living together is not in any way incapacitated from getting
married.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
are reversed and set aside, and a new one entered ANNULLING the deed of extrajudicial
partition with sale and REMANDING the case to the court of origin for the determination and
identification of Pacita Gonzales' heirs and the corresponding partition of her estate.
Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents
(Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez. Sometime in the
year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later, petitioners
learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property
and transferred its title to their names.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal
certificates of Elisa, [3] Anselmo, [4] and the late Socorro [5] were presented. After trial on the
merits, the trial court rendered a judgment [8] on 11 July 1997, dismissing the case, ruling that
petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the
baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that petitioners
inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches.
Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its Decision [9] dated
22 July 1999, ruled that they were able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura
Cristobal thru other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, but affirmed the
ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their share of the subject property because of
laches.
Issue:
Whether or not filiation was properly proven by the respondents with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal
Ruling:
The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are, indeed,
children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:
(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late Buenaventura
Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not binding upon
petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof;
(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and No. 165135, in
the name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters is ORDERED to be partitioned
and distributed in accordance with this Decision and appropriate certificates of title be issued in
favor of each of the recognized heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and
(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00)
PESOS as damages, to be paid by private respondents.
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C which
compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge private respondent Camelo Regodos as
his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter in the amount of P 500 per month.
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia
Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.
Issue:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283 OF
THE CIVIL CODE ON THE COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT
IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS
Ruling:
Both the trial court and the appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of
Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as
minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencias
husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the
presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[11] The
presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on
the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is
grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.[12]
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to
prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz
City is reversed and set aside.
41515, finding herein petitioner to be the owner of 1/3 pro indiviso share in a parcel of land. Jose
T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729, located in Rizal Avenue
Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his name alone,
his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of
the property. On April 20, 1981, the trial court in that case decided in favor of the sisters,
recognizing their right of ownership over portions of the property covered by TCT No. 64729.
The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in
the certificate of title to said property. Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5,
1987, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against
herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to, recover from
her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole
possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to them by operation of law,
because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and without issue. They
claimed that the purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in
March 1979 was executed through petitioner's machinations and with malicious intent, to enable
her to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 172334) in petitioner's name
alone.
On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. Ida C. Labagala, thus
affecting their credibility. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Hence, the present petition wherein the following issues are raised for consideration:
1. Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence to prove that she is the daughter
of the late Jose T. Santiago, and
2. Whether or not respondents could still impugn the filiation of the petitioner as the daughter of
the late Jose T. Santiago.
Ruling:
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove
that a person is not a mans child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning a
petitioners legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate
child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. Moreover, the present action is one for
recovery of title and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive
periods. Article 263 should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on
paternity and filiations in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it
contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a mans child by his wife, and
the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the childs filiations. It does not refer to
situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. Article 263
should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and
filiations in the civil code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates
situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a mans child by his wife, and the husband
denies the childs filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the
child at all of a particular couple.A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive
proof of filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that
income tax has been paid and the amount thereof. The Supreme Court is constrained to agree
with the factual finding of the court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon
Labagala and Cornelia abrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza
Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner cannot inherit from him through
intestate succession. It now remains to be seen whether the property in dispute was validly
transferred to petitioner through sale or donation.
320
321
322
Francisco Jison married Lilia Lopez in 1940. At the end of 1945 or at the beginning of
1946, Francisco impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar, who was a nanny for Franciscos daughter,
Lourdes. As a result, Monina Jison was born on August 6, 1946. Petitioner alleges she enjoyed
continuous implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco. Monina further alleges that
Francisco has always given her support and support for her education.
On March 15, 195, Monina Jison, praying for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate
status and for Francisco to recognize her as such, filed a complaint against Francisco L. Jison in
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. A decision was rendered dismissing the complaint with
costs against Monina Jison.
On appeal by Monina, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court in April 25, 1995.
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for recognition is of merit?
Ruling:
Monina Jisons evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required for the success of
an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding
open and continuous possession or any other means allowed the by the Rules of Court and
special laws; moreover, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of
evidence.
323
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes
Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private
respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida
forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Angelita's
maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back
later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved
to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police
who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance Four years later or in October 1993,
Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law
husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order
to recover their son. On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her
common-law husband could not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an
impossibility.5 The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial
similarity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the
trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its
view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother
of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John
Thomas Lopez are one and the same person
Issue:
Whether or not Eduardo Tijing Jr. is the same person as John Tomas Lopez?
Ruling:
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son,
Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
There is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of
siring a son. The trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both
in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to
establish parentage. All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed
the son of petitioners.
November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth
to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for
Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child. In his pre-trial brief filed on
May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to
consider any proposal to settle the case.On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance
of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to
Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Issue:
Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without
violating petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination
Ruling:
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny
their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much
needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the
merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a
perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of
evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA
testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis
or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled
to support depends completely on the determination of filiation.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for
determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch
of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.
with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and
duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he
later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. In her
counterclaim, Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their
marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private
respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy,
which ended in their son being born prematurely.
Issue:
Whether the marriage be annulled on the ground that the defendant allegedly concealed
her pregnancy at the time of the celebration of marriage.
Ruling:
The appellants contention that his wifes concealment of her pregnancy during the
solemnization of their marriage constitutes a ground to annul his marriage, as he was made to
believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married, is
untenable. Appellants excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not
have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is
bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. In the light of appellants
admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to
attribute the latters pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived
by the appellee into marrying her.
of her genitals existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist. Remedios was summoned
but failed to answer. Thereupon, pursuant to Article 88 of the Civil Code, the court directed the
city attorney to inquire whether there was collusion between the parties or if otherwise, to see
that the evidence for the plaintiff is nor fabricated. The court further directed defendant to
undergo physical examination and t submit a medical certification. Still, defendant failed to
participate and comply. Hearing of the case ensued and a decree annulling the marriage between
the plaintiff and the defendant was issued.
Issue:
Whether the marriage may be annulled which is grounded solely of the lone testimony of
the husband who claimed that his wife as impotent.
Ruling:
The answer is in the negative. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that
must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. The annulment of the
marriage in question forwarded in this case, was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband.
The impotence of the wife has not been satisfactorily established because from the
commencement until the entry of the decree, she had abstained from participating. Furthermore,
as to be noted, the husband left the home two nights and one day after they had married for the
reason already stated. Said duration would not be enough to fortify her claim that the wife was
impotent.
of her genitals existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist. Remedios was summoned
but failed to answer. Thereupon, pursuant to Article 88 of the Civil Code, the court directed the
city attorney to inquire whether there was collusion between the parties or if otherwise, to see
that the evidence for the plaintiff is nor fabricated. The court further directed defendant to
undergo physical examination and t submit a medical certification. Still, defendant failed to
participate and comply. Hearing of the case ensued and a decree annulling the marriage between
the plaintiff and the defendant was issued.
Issue:
Whether the marriage may be annulled which is grounded solely of the lone testimony of
the husband who claimed that his wife as impotent.
Ruling:
The answer is in the negative. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that
must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. The annulment of the
marriage in question forwarded in this case, was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband.
The impotence of the wife has not been satisfactorily established because from the
commencement until the entry of the decree, she had abstained from participating. Furthermore,
as to be noted, the husband left the home two nights and one day after they had married for the
reason already stated. Said duration would not be enough to fortify her claim that the wife was
impotent.
Naga City, for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy Chiao,
Sr., and for the administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate on July 27, 1995.
Since Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley Arevalo, filed the
complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito Sr.s wife, was not impleaded as she had died on
July 7, 1995. The CA nullified the decision of the RTC on the ground, inter alia, that the filiation
of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise, and that Mary Jane had no authority to
execute the compromise agreement for and in behalf of her brothers.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo for
recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr
Ruling:
The petitioners claims that there was no factual basis for the appellate courts finding
that the respondents were incompetent cannot prevail. It must be stressed that the CA conducted
a hearing before arriving at the conclusion that respondent Benito, Jr. was incompetent. More
importantly, such claim involves a factual issue which cannot be raised before this Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The contention of the petitioners is bereft of merit. The Court
finds and so holds that the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by
Mary Jane is null and void. , the Court is convinced that the compromise agreement signed by
Mary Jane and Benedick was a compromise relating to the latters filiation. Mary Jane
recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her deceased father, the consideration for which
was the amount of P6, 000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, the waiver of other claims from
the estate of the deceased, and the waiver by the Dy Chiao siblings of their counterclaims against
Benedick. This is readily apparent, considering that the compromise agreement was executed
despite the siblings unequivocal allegations in their answer to the complaint filed only two
months earlier, that Benedick was merely an imposto
surnamed Villanueva, and Arnaldo V. Avendano are allegedly the siblings, full and half-blood of
Romualdo Villanueva (hereinafter Villanueva).They are denominated as the heirs of Villanueva
and are represented by Melchor. They were allowed to substitute for Villanueva upon his death.
The remaining respondents, Angelina Villanueva (hereinafter respondent Angelina) and husband
Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, of the late
Villanueva. Petitioners (Gonzales' half-brothers, etc.) filed a case for partition of Gonzales' estate
and annulment of titles and damages, with the Regional Trial Court. In dismissing the complaint,
the RTC made two findings: (1) Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and (2) respondent
Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of
petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in finding that respondent Angelina was Gonzales'
illegitimate daughter
Ruling:
Both the trial court and the CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the illegitimate
daughter of the decedent, based solely on her birth certificate. According to the assailed decision,
"the birth certificate clearly discloses that Pacita Gonzales was the mother of Angelina
Villanueva while municipal treasurer Romualdo Villanueva was denominated therein as her
father."13 The CA found this to be adequate proof that respondent Angelina was Gonzales'
illegitimate child.
However, a closer examination of the birth certificate14 reveals that respondent Angelina
was listed as "adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales. A record of birth is merely a prima
facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963 was adulterous,
their property relations during those 36 years were not governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code
which applies only if the couple living together is not in any way incapacitated from getting
married.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
are reversed and set aside, and a new one entered ANNULLING the deed of extrajudicial
partition with sale and REMANDING the case to the court of origin for the determination and
identification of Pacita Gonzales' heirs and the corresponding partition of her estate.
(Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez. Sometime in the
year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later, petitioners
learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property
and transferred its title to their names.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal
certificates of Elisa, [3] Anselmo, [4] and the late Socorro [5] were presented. After trial on the
merits, the trial court rendered a judgment [8] on 11 July 1997, dismissing the case, ruling that
petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the
baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that petitioners
inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches.
Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its Decision [9] dated
22 July 1999, ruled that they were able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura
Cristobal thru other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, but affirmed the
ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their share of the subject property because of
laches.
Issue:
Whether or not filiation was properly proven by the respondents with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal
Ruling:
The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are, indeed,
children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:
(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late Buenaventura
Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not binding upon
petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof;
(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and No. 165135, in
the name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters is ORDERED to be partitioned
and distributed in accordance with this Decision and appropriate certificates of title be issued in
favor of each of the recognized heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and
(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00)
PESOS as damages, to be paid by private respondents.
333
334
On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support was brought
before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio-Benguet, Br. 9, by herein respondent Clarito Agbulos
against Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother,
Felecitas Agbulos Haber, as first witness. In the course of her direct examination, she was asked
by counsel t reveal the identity of the plaintiffs father but the defendants counsel raised a timely
objection, which the court sustained. The plaintiff file before the Supreme Court a petition for
review on certiorari questioning the said order in UDK 8516 entitled Clarito Agbulos vs. Hon.
Romeo A. Brawner and Bienvenido Rodriguez. On March 18, 1988, the Supreme Court referred
the petition to the Court of Appeals, which promulgated the questioned decision dated November
2, 1988.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for compulsory recognition is deserves merit?
Ruling:
In view in Art. 172 of the Family Code, with respect to Art. 283 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, filiation may be proven by any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
335
Facts:
In 1978, Maribel Cruz, then 16, was a part-time student at the same time a receptionist at
the Tonights Club and Resthouse. It was here where she met Raymond Pe Lim on her first night
on the job. Lim allegedly wooed Maribel and the latter reciprocated. They soon lived together
with Lim paying the apartment rentals. Maribel left for Japan, already pregnant, in July 1981 and
returned to Manila in October of the same year.
On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to a girl and was named Joanna Rose C. Lim.
Lim paid the bills for Maribels confinement.
Towards the latter part of 1983, petitioner abandoned the mother and child.
Unfortunately, various jobs and he from relatives were not enough to meet their needs. Maribel
asked Lim for support but, despite promises, were never given. Maribel then filed a complaint
for support in the Regional Trial Court on Manila. The trial court rendered its decision enjoining
Lim to provide support for Joanna Rose and pay litigation expenses.
Lim elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which in turn affirmed the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for compulsory recognition is of merit?
Ruling:
Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love letters to Maribel
vowing to be a good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on various occasions cuddling
Joanna Rose and Certificate of Live Birth say it all. The rule in Art. 283 of the Civil Code that
filiation may be proven by any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father shall govern.
336
Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes
Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private
respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone.
Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them
there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told
Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover
that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman
and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance Four years later or in
October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the
common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order
to recover their son. On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her
common-law husband could not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an
impossibility.5 The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial
similarity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the
trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its
view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother
of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John
Thomas Lopez are one and the same person
Issue:
Whether or not Eduardo Tijing Jr. is the same person as John Tomas Lopez?
Ruling:
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son,
Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
There is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of
siring a son. The trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both
in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to
establish parentage. All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed
the son of petitioners.
337
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they
entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on
November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth
to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for
Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child. In his pre-trial brief filed on
May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to
consider any proposal to settle the case.On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance
of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to
Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Issue:
Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without
violating petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination
Ruling:
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny
their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much
needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the
merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a
perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of
evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA
testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis
or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled
to support depends completely on the determination of filiation.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for
determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch
of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.
Facts:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by his
mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim
where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical
contact with respondents mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos,
Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where
she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences
Research Institute (UP-NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the
University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular
Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the
process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in
establishing paternity.[4]
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondents motion to conduct
DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba.
Issue:
Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation
Ruling:
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity
and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of
the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses.[57] Where the evidence to aid this
investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such
evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the court AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2000.
(2 October 2007)
SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence, as defined in Section 3
hereof, is offered, used, or proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all criminal and civil
actions as well as special proceedings.
DNA analysis is found to have several uses for forensic investigation, including, but not
limited to the 1) Identification of potential suspects whose DNA may match evidence left at
crime scene; 2) Exoneration of persons wrongly accused of crimes; 3) Identification of crime and
catastrophe victims; 4) Establish paternity and other family relationships, through its variable
number tandem repeats (VNTR) patterns; 5) Identification of endangered and protected species
as an aid to wildlife officials (could be used for prosecuting poachers; 6) Detection of bacteria
and other organism that may pollute air, water, soil and food; 7)Match organ donors with
recipients in transplant programs; and 8) Determination of pedigree for seed or livestock breeds.
DNA is now being used as evidence in trial courts especially in various criminal cases. In A. M.
No. 06-11-5-SC, the Supreme Court has approved has approved on October 2, 2007 the Rules on
DNA Evidence to apply in civil, criminal and special proceedings whenever DNA is offered or
used as evidence.
The said rules defined DNA (acronym for deoxyribonucleic) as the chain of molecules
found in every nucleated cell of the body. The totality of an individuals DNA is unique for the
individual, except identical twins. DNA profile refers to the genetic information derived from
DNA testing of a biological sample obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly
identifiable as originating from that person. DNA evidence, on the other hand, constitutes the
totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic information directly generated from DNA
testing of biological samples.
While the Supreme Court provides for DNA Evidence Rules, it is important therefore that
Congress shall immediately pass the present bill centering on the capacity of forensic DNA
technology to contribute to the criminal justice system. Specifically, this bill will provide the
statutory authority for the creation of the National DNA Index System (NADIS) in the country.
The greatest role of DNA analysis lies in its capability to accelerate criminal
investigations by identifying perpetrators and excluding individuals right at the onset of the
criminal investigation. With the aid of DNA analysis, a fair and swift administration of justice
system in the country can be expected.
The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This may be
considered a 180 degree turn from the Courts wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe
Lim case, where we stated that DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has not yet been
accorded official recognition by our courts. In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs
taken from the rape victim matched the accuseds DNA profile. By 2002, there was no longer
any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence.
340
Facts:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent minors Karen and Kamille Oanes Wei
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a pertition for letters of administration before
the Regional trial court of Makati.
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledge illegitimate children of
Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at 10,
000, 000. 00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are surviving spouse
Guy, children Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael all surnamed Guy. Petitioners argued
that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the
lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code, they further alleged that
private respondents claim had been paid, waived, abandoned, extinguished by reason of
Remedios June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial
and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge
the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
Issue:
Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming
their hereditary rights?
Ruling:
Remedios Release and Waiver of claim does not bar private respondents from claiming
succession rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and equivocal
terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of her
children, such waiver does not bar the latters claim. Article 104 of the Civil Code requires
judicial authorization of the said waiver which it lacks. Since the affiliation of the private
respondents as co heirs to Sima Weis Estates, it would thus be inconsistent to rule that they
waived their hereditary rights when they do not have such right.
341
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor
child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996
as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a
Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that the custody of his
son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and [as] he has demonstrated
his capability to support and educate him.
The said case was withdrawn ex-parte. Applying Article 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family
Code, the CA awarded the custody of Michael Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother, Respondent
Loreta P. Miguel. While acknowledging that petitioner truly loved and cared for his son and
considering the trouble and expense he had spent in instituting the legal action for custody, it
nevertheless found no compelling reason to separate the minor from his mother. Petitioner,
however, was granted visitorial rights.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner, as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental
care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away
Ruling:
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling factor,
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mothers unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone
else.In the past, the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a
communicable disease. Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the
age of majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the
child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was
awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case,
parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother.
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and
those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives
them legitimate status.
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under
one category, without any distinction between natural and spurious. The concept of natural
child is important only for purposes of legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a natural
child remains an illegitimate child.
Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code) child, as there is
nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry
at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and
pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta,
notwithstanding his fathers recognition of him.
343
Facts:
On April 9, 1987, Emilei Dayrit Cuyugan, as other and legal guardian of minor Chad D.
Cuyugan, filed a complaint for Claim of Inheritance against Corito Ocampo Tayag, the
administatrix of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Emilei D. Cuyugan, petitioner therein, alleged
that several years before Atty. Ocampo died, they had an illicit relationship, which later brought
about Chad on October 5, 1980, therefore Chad is entitled to a share of the estate of Atty.
Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs.
Petitioner Tayag, respondent therein, filed a counterclaim and a Motion to Dismiss. The
motion was denied on October 12, 1987. Likewise her Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied on November 19, 1987.
Tayag proceeded to the Court of Appeals on December 10, 1987 and filed a petition
praying for certiorari and prohibition, which was granted on August 2, 1989 and enjoined the
trial court judge to resolve petitioners motion to dismiss. In compliance with the order, the trial
court acted on and denied motion to dismiss the complaint. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied on January 30, 1990.
As a consequence, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition on March
12, 1990 with the Court of Appeals, praying to set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court.
On May 10, 1990, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and on September 5,1990, denied
motion for reconsideration
Hence this petition
Issue:
Whether or not the right of a minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested
right?
Ruling:
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to this case since
it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequently, of the minor
child she represents, both of which has been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The
trial court, therefore, was correct in applying Article 285 of the Civil Code and holding that
private respondents cause of action has not yet prescribed.
344
Facts:
Sgt. Moreno Bayani, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), seeks the
reversal of the 28 April 1995 decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch
11, in Criminal Case No. 6433, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
provided by law; to indemnify complainant Maria Elena Nieto in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50, 000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs.
In her sworn complaint dated 22 February 1993 and filed on 24 February 1993 with the court
below, the complainant charged the accused with the crime of rape allegedly committed.
Issue:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE ON A
SWORN STATEMENT OF THE COMPLAINANT CHARGING THE APPELLANT
THE CRIME OF RAPE, FOR THE REASON THAT THE SIGNATURE APPEARING
THEREON WAS NOT IDENTIFIED BY COMPLAINANT AND NOT PRESENTED
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT BY THE PROSECUTION.
Ruling:
Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children on
the mother, and likewise provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with the Family
Code. As such, there is no further need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of the
offspring by an offender who is married, which would vest parental authority in him. Therefore,
under Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is married can only
be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be any. In the instant case
then, the accused should also be ordered to support his illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen Nieto,
72 with Marie Elena Nieto, but in light of Article 20173 of the Family Code, the amount and
terms thereof to be determined by the trial court only after due notice and hearing.
454 S 541
Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition[1] to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others,
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower
and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be
changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to
Catindig, his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption.
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration[5]
praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as
her middle name and on May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Issue:
Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father
Ruling:
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner
that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural
mother. The Court said that, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her
natural mother becuse under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir
of athe latter.
Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her
relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and that ,
there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED
in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers surname GARCIA as her
middle name.
348
349
Facts:
That on or about the month of October, 1991, at Sitio Siniaran, Bgy. Banbanan, in the
Municipality of Taytay, Province of Palawan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd design and by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
one Mila Lobrico against her will and consent to the damage and prejudice of said Mila Lobrico
in such amount as may be awarded her by the court.
In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that during the entire month of October 1991, he
was plowing the field of one of his sisters in Sitio Yakal, new Guinto, Taytay, Palawan. The
victims mother, Gloria Glabo-Lobrico, testified for the defense. She stated that she wanted the
case to be settled to restore her good relationship with accused-appellant, who is her brother.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is further obliged to provide support to the victims
child born out of the rape, subject to the amount and terms to be determined by the trial court in a
proper proceeding?
Ruling:
Concerning the acknowledgement and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the
Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the
offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should
prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the
Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal
fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental
authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an
offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental
authority over his children, no further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself
provides for the childs status. Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify
and support the victims child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined
by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.
350
Facts:
On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde
Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. Petitioner was then
a nursing student while private respondent was a licensed physician. They cohabited for a time
and lived with private respondents parents and sister in the latters house in Quezon City where
the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the family.
A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America where
she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private
respondent herein) and paternal grandparents.
On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053, in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On March 9,
1992, the trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the
minor, Gardin Faith.
Issue:
With regard to guardianship, who is entitled over Gardin Faith, an illegitimate child, would it
be the father or the mother?
Ruling:
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been
terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the
minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that
the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the
meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her
familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to
which she had apparently formed an attachment.
A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a preference
toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a statement against petitioners fitness to have final
custody of her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood that, for the present and until
finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father, the
private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053.
351
Facts:
On December 2, 1989, petitioner Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld, single, 31 years of age, gave
birth to a baby boy at the Medical City General Hospital, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. It was
the third time that she delivered a child. The presumed father, one Eleazar Siriban Calasan, 42
years old, a lawyer, married, and a resident of 8632 San Jose St. Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati,
Metro Manila, signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the
childs first name as Jonathan, middle name as Mossesgeld, and last name as Calasan. Both the
presumed father, Eleazar S. Calasan and the mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld, accomplished the
dorsal side of the certificate of live birth stating that the information contained therein were true
and correct. In addition, lawyer Calasan executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child.
On December 6, 1989, due to the refusal of the person in charge at the hospital to placing the
presumed fathers surname as the childs surname in the certificate of live birth, petitioner
himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for
registration.
On December 28, 1989, the municipal treasurer of Mandaluyong, as officer in charge of the
office of the local civil registrar, rejected the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4, dated
October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing that under Article 176 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the
surname of their mother.
Issue:
The issue raised is whether mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a
certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged fathers surname where the latter
admitted paternity.
Ruling:
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that illegitimate children shall
use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father
admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the
certificate of live birth of petitioners illegitimate child using the surname of the alleged father,
even with the latters consent. Of course, the putative father, though a much married man, may
legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of adoption, the child shall be considered a
legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his surname.
Facts:
In this administrative complaint initiated by Corazon M. Layug, Social Welfare Officer IV
of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Field Office No. 1 stationed in
San Fernando, La Union, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is charged with rendering an erroneous decree of adoption
in violation of Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as The Child and
Youth Welfare Code, and the corresponding Supreme Court circular thereon, namely, Circular
No. 12 dated October 2, 1986.
Respondent Elma P. Vedaa, Social Welfare Officer II, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan is charged with disregarding the provisions of the
same Circular No. 12 of this Court in connection with the aforementioned special proceeding.
As appears from the records, the spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano,
both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their
niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea, which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5830 of
the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, and assigned to Branch 38 thereof. In due
time, respondent Judge Belen granted the petition in a decision dated June 25, 1992, after finding
that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own.
Issue:
Is there a violation of Article 33 of PD 603 in dispensing with the procedure of adopting a
child?
Ruling:
We are, however, persuaded that respondent judge acted in good faith when he stated in his
decision that the DSWD submitted the required reports to his court through respondent Vedaa,
presumably in the belief that it was standard procedure for the Social Welfare Officer II of a
Regional Trial Court to do so in coordination with the DSWD. We also agree with the findings
of the OCA that there is no evidence whatsoever that respondent Vedaa sought to obtain any
amount from the adopting parents. In fact, this is belied by the affidavit of the childs natural
mother, Loreta Ibea. We are, therefore, inclined to adopt a liberal view on the charges against
respondents.
354
Facts:
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America
(USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of
minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who was
born on September 7, 1987; and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. The
minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner's brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990,
the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother,
Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no
longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she
left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the
petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000,
petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent to the
adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has
children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective
families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and
works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors;
her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the minors. Petitioner's brother,
Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to
support the minors while in petitioner's custody.
Issue/s:
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether the
petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother,
Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the
petitioner-adopter's children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner
is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.
Ruling:
While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children and
siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the
adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover,
the records do not prove nor support petitioner's allegation that her siblings and her children are
financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore,
again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces
and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In
any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.
355
Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973,
begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977,
and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couples relationship was undisturbed.
Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husbands alleged extramarital affair
with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husbands alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Cebu which rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing
that they agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and board.
Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them?
Ruling:
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural
parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement
of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent
is insane or hopelessly intemperate. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even
without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for
adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in
consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is
not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was
then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
The Court ruled that the liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption
insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of
the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall
benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and
perspective. The Court's position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to
inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve
adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with
due
regard
to
the
natural
rights
of
the
parents
over
the
child.
356
357
Facts:
Roberto and Shriley became sweethearts while studying law at Sto. Tomas. This resulted to
Shirleys giving birth to Robby. They never got married. They lived separate lives. Roberto
married another woman and had children with her. Roberto gave support twice only (1992 &
1993); in 1994, he gave money for medical expenses because Robby was sick. He desisted in
giving support hence. Due to financial difficulties, Shirley worked as a factory worker in Taiwan
for a brief period. When Robby about to enter high school, Shirley demanded support from
Roberto who merely ignored her. While Shirley was in financial distress, Roberto lived a
luxurious lifestyle (5 luxury cars, 1 big house in Ayala, frequently travels abroad, sends his
children to expensive schools; stock shares worth P 750,000). Despite the obvious luxury,
Roberto maintains that he is financially incapable of supporting Robby. Hence, Shirley filed a
criminal case for NEGLECT of CHILD under Art. 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to Section 10(a)
of RA 7610.
Issue:
Is Shirleys criminal case for neglect of child against Roberto tenable?
Ruling:
Roberto can be charged with NEGLECT OF CHILD. That the Secretary of Justice didnt err
in its decision.
MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor children REBECCA
ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL DELGADO, petitioner, vs.
358
Facts:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages
13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr. a member of
the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in
Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They
have two children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their
consent to the adoption.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September 10, 1990 granting the petition
and declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption. Respondent
Regional Trial Court disregarded the sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses
being only fifteen years and three months and fifteen years and nine months older than Maricel
Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of the law would defeat the very philosophy
behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child. The court also found that the
petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit to adopt, possess good moral character,
sufficient financial capability and love and affection for the intended adoptees.
Issue:
The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, is contention of the
petitioner that the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due
correct?
Ruling:
As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under Article 184
of the Family Code.
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of
the welfare of children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will
sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care
and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the
trial court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be
modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however,
that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for
adoption.
362
Facts:
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B.
Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who
had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When
private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with
them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and
purposes;
b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and
that the first name which was mistakenly registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to
"MICHAEL."
Issue:
The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of
the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction sought concerned
only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for
adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Is he correct?
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED
by deleting from the decision of the Regional Trial Court the order to the local civil registrar to
change the name "MIDAEL" to "MICHAEL" in the birth certificate of the child. In other
respects relating to the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
363
Facts:
On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba,
Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph
Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on March
12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The said Order was published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province of Zambales and City of Olongapo for three (3)
consecutive weeks.
The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born
citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at
Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of
America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting
Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala
was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent
to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to
poverty and inability to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study,
favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.
Issue:
The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private respondents spouses Alvin A.
Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens to adopt under Philippine Law.
Ruling:
We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote that objective. Adoption is geared more towards the
promotion of the welfare of the child and enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and
happy life. It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the interest of the child that should be the
principal criterion in adoption cases. Executive Order 209 likewise upholds that the interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted should be the paramount consideration. These considerations
notwithstanding, the records of the case do not evince any fact as would justify us in allowing the
adoption of the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents who are aliens.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the
Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the
requisite publication and service to all parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of
the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the
following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was
physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will
was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no
legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to
intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended
her opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr.
Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last
illness.
Issue:
Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would
she acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?
Ruling:
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring
invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having
been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set
aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he
was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements
touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be
set aside for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the
will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision
is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie
has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed
to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
surname.
Issue:
Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father?
Ruling:
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner
that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother
for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter.
Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of
that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code.
In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED
in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers surname GARCIA as her
middle name.
366
In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of gross immorality
on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited
with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita
Banzuela. Adding ignominy to an ignominious situation, respondent allegedly shamefacedly
contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan on May 23, 1986. Complainant claims that
this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much
married to Teresita Banzuela.
In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent caused to
be registered as "legitimate", his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan, by falsely
executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence,
excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these children
cannot be legally registered as legitimate.
Issue:
Is the act of the judge legitimating his illegitimate child valid?
Ruling:
The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous
relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code: (Executive Order, No. 209), which
took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision thus:
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at
the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment
to marry each other may be legitimated.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of gross
immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently, orders his dismissal from the
service. Such dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits
and retirement benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the government-service, all
without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.
367
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed
with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship
became strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor,
Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first
marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949.
Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had
been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children.
On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967,
Antonio and private respondent contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under
Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated
value of P15,000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She
alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely,
herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. There being no opposition, her petition was
granted.
On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her administration,
the court a quo passed upon petitioner's motion. The court, citing the case of Francisco H.
Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (23 SCRA 99 [1983]), declared private respondent's ten
children legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and
private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
Issue:
Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized?
Ruling:
A legal fiction had to be resorted to, that device contrived by law to simulate a fact or
condition which, strictly and technically speaking, is not what it purports to be. In this case, the
term "natural children by legal fiction" was invented, thus giving rise to another category of
illegitimate children, clearly not to be confused with "natural children" as defined under Art. 269
but by fiction of law to be equated with acknowledged natural children and, consequently,
enjoying the status, rights and obligations of the latter.
Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the
provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of
children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure
fiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of the court a
quo dated November 14, 1991 and January 9, 1992, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Maria Rosario de Santos is hereby declared the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD of the decedent
Antonio de Santos and, as such, entitled to all the rights accorded to her by law.
369
370
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children. The
realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to
take into their care Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At
the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who
treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally
adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05
May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before
the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil
Registrar of Naga City changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 22, of Naga City.
Issue:
Can the adopter rescind the decree of adoption?
Ruling:
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from
the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee,
with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but
is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the
life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to
comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission
by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing
to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny
to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
371
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus
against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody
of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P.
Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the
respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda
on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by
his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national
and is presently residing in Japan.
Issue:
Whether or not [he], as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his
own child in the absence of the mother who is away?
Ruling:
Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code) child, as there is
nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry
at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and
pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta,
notwithstanding his fathers recognition of him.
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental
authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her
company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it
except in the cases authorized by law.
In the present case, it has been established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta were never
married. Hence, that portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to choose which parent to live
with is deleted, but without disregarding the obligation of petitioner to support the child.
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996
Facts:
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming
as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar
372
Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs
substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his
estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the
decedents will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action
for the probate of his fathers holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testators death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar
Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the
probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond Ruiz. Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was
executed under undue influence.
Issue:
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but
before payment of the estates debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance
from the funds of the estate for the support of the testators grandchildren; (2) to order the release
of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the
executor of the will.
Ruling:
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is
merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is
a mere trustee of his fathers estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is
held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally
assign to himself and possess all his parents properties and the fruits thereof without first
submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased,
rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the
obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their
veracity, propriety and justness.
373
Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home, virtually forcing mother and children to seek,
apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. After some time, they rented an
apartment only to return later to the house of Lea's mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the
sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from
one dwelling place to another not their own. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on
his promise of support, despite Lea's efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would
admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school
expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edward's mother, Alicia Lacson,
also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom
eventually took up nursing at St. Paul's College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea,
in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their
mother. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether the appellate court erred when it affirmwd the grant of supoort in arrears from
1976 to 1994.
Ruling:
The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA
confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner to secure
support for the respondents. As a matter of long and sound appellate practice, factual findings of
the CA are accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons.
Furthermore, the respondents appeared to have stayed longest with their uncle, Noel
Daban. Logically, the sisters would, thru their mother, turn to their uncle (Noel Daban) for their
sustenance and education when petitioner failed to give the same, a failing which stretched from
their pre-schooling days to their college years. Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel
Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner. As for the amount of support in
arrears, there is also no reason to disturb the absolute figures arrived at by the two courts below,
appearing as they do to be reasonable and proper. As a matter of law, the amount of support
which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.
Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide respondents
with support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the sisters have been
deprived by a neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been
born. This disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong done the
herein respondents who are no less petitioner's daughters.
respondents demand. She thus filed a criminal complaint for abandonment and neglect of child
under Art. 52 (2) and (4) of PD 603 before the Office of the City Prosecutor.
In his counter-affidavit, petitioner averred that he never abandoned or neglected the child
whom he readily acknowledged as his son and pointed out that respondent was the financially
capable parent while he had no fixed job and merely depended on the charity of his father.
The City Prosecutor issued his resolution dismissing the complaint for abandonment but
charged the petitioner with neglect of child punishable under Art. 59 (4) of PD 603 in relation to
Sec. 10 (a) of RA 7610. The resolution was filed before the RTC which subsequently affirmed
such.
Issue:
Whether the court acted with grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the City Prosecutors
resolution.
Ruling:
The assailed resolution of private respondent was used as an evidence o record and
grounded in law.
Petitioners position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the neglectful parent to
shield himself from criminal liability by defeating the proscription that in all intent regarding the
care, custody, education, and property of the child and his welfare shall be paramount
consideration.
There is prima facie evidence showing from the evidence that petitioner is in fact
financially capable of supporting the childs education. The notarized GIS of RNCD
Development Corporations indicated that petitioner owns 750,000 pesos worth of paid-up shares
in the company.
The neglect of child punished under Art. 59 (4) of PD 603 is also a crime. Thus,
petitioners guilt should still be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Petition is denied.
father and paternal grandparents. On January 1990, respondent filed a petition for guardianship,
on which a month later, he was appointed as the legal guardian. Petitioner avers that she only
learned of the decision a month later, and accordingly filed for relief of judgment, on which she
was then granted to file her opposition to private respondent petitions, as well as a motion to
remand the custody of the child to her.
The Court of Appeals decided over the issue of guardianship and custody over the child
that such custody shall then be awarded to the respondent temporarily pending the resolution of
the main case.
Issue:
Who shall hold custody over the child pending the resolution of the guardianship
proceeding, on who shall have the final custody over the child.
Ruling:
In custody disputes, it is the axiomatic that the criteria are the welfare and well being of
the child. Incurring at its decisions, the court must take into the account the respective resources
and the social and moral situations of the contending party.
Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as
illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate
children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the
Family Code provides that [n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. It will be observed that in
both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is specially evident in
Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian.
The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the
child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has
erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative
divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not
have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation.
Bearing in mind the welfare of the minor is the controlling factor; the court finds that the
Court of Appeals did not err in the allowing the father to retain in the meantime parental custody
over the child.
Sometime in May 1987, petitioner filed guardianship proceedings over the persons and
properties of the children. A month after, petitioner was appointed legal guardian over the
persons and properties of her grandchildren. Helen, natural mother of the two children, however
submitted an opposition to the said proceedings, and concurrently, she had filed a similar petition
for guardianship.
RTC decided in favor of Bonifacia. CA reversed and favored Helen. Hence, this petition
by Bonifacia.
Issue:
Who is the legal guardian of the minors?
Ruling:
Parents are placed first in the rank of priority in matters of parental authority. The
children illegitimacy does not in any way affect the order of priority. Respondent, being the
natural mother of the minors, has the preferential right over that of the petitioner in issue of
guardianship. Petitioner as the surviving grandparent can exercise substitute parental authority
only if in case of death, absence of unsuitability of respondent.
This follows the provision of article 212 which qualify that the parents exercise parental
authority jointly. Article 214, which provides for the substitution of the parental authority by the
grandparents, applies only when the abovementioned conditions exist.
The case regarding the daughter Valerie is moot and academic since she had reached the
age of majority. In the case of Vincent, parental authority is vested on the father and mother (Art.
211 of FC). It is only in the cases of death, absence, or unsuitability of the parents wherein the
parental authority is bested on the surviving grandparents (Art. 214 of FC). There is no showing
of unsuitability of the mother. Moreover, the grandmother is a naturalized American citizen
whose residence is in America. She will find it difficult to perform her rights and duties as a
guardian. Furthermore, the grandmother has not set foot in the Philippines for more than a
decade. She is old. She has a conviction of libel in a criminal case which would make her think
twice coming here to the Philippines. Lastly, the Court emphasized that jurisprudence shows that
guardianship is not allowed where the guardian is outside the jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
Sometime in 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrinas mother. Fouzi alleged that
he could not see his children until he got an order from the court. One year thereafter Sabrina had
the children baptized as Christian and had their names changed too.
Respondent alleged also that on various occasions, Sabrina was seen with different men
at odd hours in Manila and wearing outfits detestable under the Islamic law on culture.
Respondent then filed with the Shari a court an action to obtain custody of his minor
children now ages 10 and 9 respectively. The judgment rendered by the Shari a Court awarded
the custody of the minors to their father finding their mother unworthy to care for her children.
Issue:
Whether or not a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and
converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bounded by the moral laws of Islam in
the determination of her fitness to be the custodian of their children.
Ruling:
The court applies the civil law in the best interest of the children. The standard in the
determination of sufficiency of proof to establish the unfitness of a mother who had converted to
Muslim before marriage but had converted back to Catholicism in relation to custody of her
children is not restricted to Muslim laws. The family code shall also be taken in consideration in
deciding whether she is incompetent. The burden is upon the respondent to prove that the
petitioner is not worthy to have the custody of her children.
The Court found that the evidence presented by the respondent was not sufficient to
establish her unfitness according to Muslim laws or the Family Code. However the award of
custody to the wife does not deprive the husband of parental authority and visitation rights over
the children.
Out of their marriage, two children were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao and Angelica Eslao. In
the meantime, Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of petitioner's mother while Angelica
stayed with her parents at respondent's house. On August 6, 1990, petitioner's husband Reynaldo
Eslao died, petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but the respondent
prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning out that her
son just died and to assuage her grief therefore, she needed the company of the child to at least
compensate for the loss of her late son. In the meantime, the petitioner returned to her mother's
house in Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie.
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced by her auntie to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a
Japanese-American, whom she became her husband. On June 24, 1993, the petitioner returned to
the Philippines then informed the respondent about her desire to take informed the respondent
about her desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr. James
Ouye, expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and
education, however, respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was
entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused the petitioner of having abandoned
Angelica. The RTC grants the petition in favor of petitioner and the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto.
Issue:
Whether the court erred in not finding the petitioner fit to be given of minor, Angelica
Eslao.
Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts
the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is
given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.
Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Hence, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner,
what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment
or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely
personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship
and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar.
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
prayer for the custody pendente lite of their almost four year old son, whom Joycelyn allegedly
took away with her from the conjugal home when she decided to abandon him sometime in the
early February of the same year.
The trial court heard the ancillary prayer of Crisanto for
custody pendente lite. Because Joycelyn allegedly failed to appear despite notice, and in the face
of witnesses and evidence presented, the court awarded such temporary custody to Crisanto.
Such was affirmed by the Court of Appeals pending the resolution of the other issue
raised.
Issue:
Whether or not a child less than seven years of age, and without compelling reasons not
to, be separated from the mother, and that such custody be awarded to the father.
Ruling:
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their
mother finds its raison detre in the basic need of the minor children for the their mother loving
care. In explaining the rationale for Article 213, the Code Commission said that The general
rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of
tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good of
the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she
has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative
divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not
have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation.
Exception allowed by the court has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child,
which she had erred, like in the cases of adultery when awarded a penalty of imprisonment.
The Court found no sufficient proof of any compelling reason to separate the minor from
his mother, custody should remain with her.
from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal
grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner and wife Julia
agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the respondent spouses
Bedia.
Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not
aware of her whereabouts but private respondents claim that although abroad, their daughter
Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son. The spouses Bedia then filed a
"Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the RTC, with
Santos, Sr. as respondent, which was subsequently granted and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding custody of the boy to his grandparents.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the fact that petitioner was unable to provide financial
support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his inlaws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to
the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the
severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision
against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious
efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between
parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and for the son
to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority.
Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents
rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required
by the latter' s needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of
their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, "there is
no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust
for the welfare of the minor." The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over
the persons of their common children.
The petition is GRANTED.
of the case, a hearing for custody pendente lite of the two children was held. In an order dated
July 21, 1994, the trial court awarded the two children to Lucia while Rene was given visitation
rights of at least one week in a month. Therafter Rene questioned the order dated July 21, 1994
with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however dismissed the petition and instead
affirmed the order of the trial court. Not contented, Rene appealed the resolution of the Court of
Appeals affirming the order dated July 21, 1994 before this court, and the case was docketed as
G.R. No. 120831. On July 17, 1995, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for failure of
petitioner Rene to show that grave abuse of discretion had been committeds by the appellate
court.
On August 15, 1995, Lucia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction because she alleged that her estranged
husband physically abused their son Justin. Due to the incident, a criminal complaint for slight
physical injuries was filed. The trial court granted the writ of preliminary injunction restraining
Rene from seeing his children. Rene Filed a petition for certiorari, however, the court of appeals
dismissed the petition for violation for on non-forum shopping. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether Rene should be prohibited from seeing his children.
Ruling:
It is a fundamental and settled rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court
are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, unless strong and cogent
reasons dictate otherwise. This is because the trial court is in a better position to examine the real
evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. The
court, therefore, finds no justifiable reason or exception sufficient to cause the reversal of the
trial courts declaration in granting the writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. 38866 dated January 10, 1996, is SET ASIDE. The order
dated October 4, 1995, issued by the court a quo is hereby affirmed in toto.
began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous
objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzale who claimed that she, in fact, had
never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to
allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his
company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the
RTC. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in gambling
and womanizing which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.
The trial court has adjudged in favor of petitioner by holding that he shall have visitorial
rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case (could) he takes out the
children without the written consent of the mother. The visitation right referred to is the right of
access of a noncustodial parent to his or her child or children.
Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales interposed an
appeal from the RTCs order to the Court of Appeals.
For the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds emigrated
to Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
Issue:
Whether or not trial court erred in awarding the petitioner visitation rights.
Ruling:
The court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant
concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior
motives or undue designs more than a parents natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were
only on brief visits, his own children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to
understandably provide this precautionary measure, i.e., in no case (can petitioner) take out the
children without the written consent of the mother.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED, reversing thereby the
judgment of the appellate court which is herby SET ASIDE. No costs.
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent
developed into an intimate ionic, as a result of which a son, Christopher J. was followed by two
more children, both girls, namely Christine.
The relationship became known to private respondents wife when Daisie took
Christopher J. to Villars house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced
him to Villars legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his
house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J. then six years of age,
to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the
child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school
year.
Pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher j. is under the parental authority of his
mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody
of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by
private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Issue:
Whether or not the mother is the rightful parent to the custody of her child.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven
years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the
mothers custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mothers custody over
him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his
mother. Under Art. 213 of the family code, courts must respect the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit and here it has not been shown that the
mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his
child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him
(private respondent)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private
respondent is ORDERED to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his
mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00
pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action.
.
National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer while respondent
worked as a nurse in Los Angeles, California. On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind
Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita
got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and
given the name Reginald Vince.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate and Teresita left
Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to
the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent
back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner
Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, however, the trial court
dismissed the petition and suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald
and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to
be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court. The Court of Appeals, however,
reversed the decision and gave the Teresita the custody to her children.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual findings of the trial court.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court is inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial
court because it gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all the
relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody. In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of
the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best
custodian. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is
paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find
the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems
fit under the circumstances.
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now
both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from
the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements
found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the
second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming
that the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the
age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant
considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate
shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.
miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Perez
II in New York. The couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa
returned to the U.S. because the respondent has to take care of his mother and promised to her
with the baby.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was no
longer on good terms. On July 26, 1993, Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas corpus
asking respondent Ray C. Perez to surrender the custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her and
the court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother, Nerissa
Perez. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order and awarded custody of the boy to
his father.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding the custody of the child to his father.
Ruling:
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the
applicable law. It provides: ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority
shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all
relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Since the Code does not qualify the word separation to mean legal separation
decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such as petitioner and private respondent,
are covered within its terms.
The petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 27, 1994 as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 1995 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Order of the trial court dated August 27, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
Custody over the minor Ray Z. Perez II is awarded to his mother, herein petitioner Nerissa Z.
Perez. This decision is immediately executory.
Out of their marriage, two children were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao and Angelica Eslao. In
the meantime, Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of petitioners mother in Sta. Ana,
Pamapanga, while Angelica stayed with their parents at respondents house. On August 6, 1990,
petitioners husband Reynaldo Eslao died petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her to
Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her,
respondent reasoning out that her son just died and to assuage her grief therefore, she needed the
company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. In the meantime, the
petitioner returned to her mothers house in Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie.
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced by her auntie to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a
Japanese-American, who is an orthodontist practicing in the United States; their acquaintance
blossomed into a meaningful relationship where on March 18, 1992, the petitioner and Dr. James
Ouye decided to get married and migrated to USA to join her new husband. On June 24, 1993,
the petitioner returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the
United States. The petitioner then informed the respondent about her desire to take custody of
Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr, James Ouye, expressed his willingness to
adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for the support and education; however, respondent
resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten years
old and accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica. Because of the adamant attitude of
the respondent, the petitioner then sought the assistance of a lawyer, Atty. Mariano de Joya, Jr.,
who wrote a letter to the respondent demanding for the return of the custody of Angelica to her
natural mother and when the demand remain[ed] unheeded, the petitioner instituted the present
action.
Issue:
Whether or not Parental Authority and Responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or removed.
Ruling:
When private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what
she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or
renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely
personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship
and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar.
Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that "the right of
parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a
right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created
by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.
school year 1995-1996. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the
campaigning group. Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi
jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva, were on their way to an elementary school. The
jeep was driven by James Daniel II then fifteen years old and a student of the same school. The
jeep was owned by Vivicencio. The driver, James II, drove the jeep in a reckless manner which
cause it to turn turtle. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the
jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin died as a consequence. The trial court then awarded damages to the parents of
Sherwin against the petitioner by virtue of Art. 218 and 219 of the family code.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin.
Ruling:
Article 218 of the Family code enumerates those who have special parental authority over
a minor child and article 219 of the same code provides that those exercising special parental
authority are principally and subsidiary liable for damages caused by the acts or omission of the
emancipated minor under their supervision, instruction or custody.
However, for the persons and institutions enumerated therein are to be held liable, there
must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the
injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. Thus, injury
for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done.
The negligence of the petitioner was only a remote cause of the accident. There was the
intervention of the negligence of the minors parents who drove the jeep and the detachment of
the steering wheel of the jeep was the one which caused the accident.
The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of
negligence, must have causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such. The
immediate cause was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Also, there was no
evidence that the school allowed the James II to drive the jeep. The one primarily liable is the
registered owner of the vehicle.
auditorium of their school, the Collegio de San Jose-Recoletes, a classmate, Pablito Daffon,
bared a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim
was only seventeen years old.
Pablito was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the parents of
the victim filed this petition for civil damages against the accused with two other students (thru
their parents) together with the College, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys,
and the physics teacher, under Art. 2180. After Trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu has
convicted the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal of the respondent court,
however, the decision was reversed in all the defendants were completely absolved.
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for criteriorai under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the
Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of Arts and Trades but an academic institution
of learning.
Issue:
Whether or not school may be held liable under diligence of bonus pater families.
Ruling:
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180) should
apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Following the canon of reddendo
singular singuli: Where the school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. [Teachers to
pupils/students] Reason: Old academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who are the
ones directly involved with the students. Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head
and only he who shall be held liable as am exception to the general rule. [Heads to apprentices]
Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters (or heads of the school) personally and
directly instructed the apprentices. Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is
not also liable because theres no showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline against
the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school, or condoned
their non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasnt present cant be considered against him
because he wasnt required to report on that day. Classes had already ceased.
.
389
Training Corps (ROTC), Half, which is under the full control of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon,
appointed armorer of ROTC, shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the armor took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a
result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime
of Homicide by Military Commision No. 30, AFP.
Subsequently, the heirs of napoleon Castro sued for damage, Impleading Jimmy B.
Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC, commandant), Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of
the Borad of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio
(Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges
Foundation, Inc. as party defendants. After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1)
sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc.,
jointly and severally, to pay private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can be held solidarily liable with Jimy B. Abon for damages
under Art. 2180 of the civil code, as a consequences of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
Ruling:
Under Art. 2180 that the petition should apply to all schools, academic as well as nonacademic. Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli: Where the school is academic,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such
student. The teacher-in-charge is not also liable because theres no showing that he was negligent
in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasnt present
cant be considered against him because he wasnt required to report on that day. Classes had
already ceased.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED in so far as it holds
petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for his tortious act in killing of Napoleon
Castro. No costs.
Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial
Court. Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D.
Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M Magtalas ( Treasurer/Cashier)
Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security).
Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the
victims untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. During the
proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by
resigning from his position in the school.
The defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that
since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no
cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic
institutions, such as the PSBA.
The respondent trial courtoverruled petitioners contention and denied their motion to
dismiss. the respondent appellate court affirmed the trial courts orders.
Issue:
Whether or not an academic institution has a bilateral obligation upon students which
both parents are bound to comply.
Ruling:
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private
respondents complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only
the trial court can make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.
WHERFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of
origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this
ruling of the court. Costs against the petitioners.
(finding the guy sadistic and irresponsible), the boy incessantly pursued her and prayed that they
be together again (which made the guy resort to threats). But, the girl hold steadfast to her
decision. In order to avoid the guy, the girl lived with her best friend. On the day of the incident,
the two were found shot dead with a Smith and Wesson revolver. The parents of the girl
instituted this case against the parents of the guy for damages. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. In the Court of Appeals the RTC decision was
reversed and ordered the Libi spouses to pay ,moral and exemplary damages.The court found out
by convincing evidence that Wendell Libi shot Gotiong before committing suicide. Subsequently,
the Libi spouses filed an appeal contending that they should only assume subsidiary liability for
damages cause by their minor child.
Issue:
Whether or not parental liability for damages cause by the minor child is subsidiary.
Ruling:
The parents of Wendel Libi are held liable for not exercising due diligence, diligentissimi
patris familias, (Art. 2180). The father of the guy owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit
box. The father and the mother each had a key. The guy knew of it. The key must have been
negligently left lying around or he had free access to it, such as the bag of his mother. The said
gun was missing. The parents were also unable to explain the photograph of their son holding a
gun. The said photograph was dedicated to the girl. Moreover, they were remiss in their duties as
parents as not being able to know that their son was a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unite
(CANU) agent involved in a dangerous work of as either a drug informer or drug user. The
damages is based on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Art. 101 of RPC doesnt apply since the guy is
or above 18 y.o. already.
The Supreme Court believes that the civil liability of parents for quasi delicts of their
minor children as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code is primary and not subsidiary.
Accordingly, just like the rule in 2194 of the Civil Code the civil liability of the parents for
crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary and also subject to the
defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of the family.
respondents contend that the adopting parents namely the Rapisura spouses were the
indespensible parties to the action since parental authority have shifted to them from the moment
the successful petition for adoption was filed on November 18, 1982.
Issue:
Whether or not the effects of adoption insofar as parental authority is concern maybe
given retroactive effect.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court did not consider the retroactive effect that may be given to the decree
of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when the
adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child. This is consistent wit the doctrine
of vicarious liability. No presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents,
the Rapisura spouses could have arisen since Adelberto Bundoc was not in fact subject to their
control at the time the tort was committed.
393
minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos. The minors are the
natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990,
the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother,
Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there. The minors are being financially supported by the
petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad. Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered in her favor.
The court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a decision granting said
petition. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the ruling of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos.
Ruling:
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect
the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent
must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to
the adoption.
When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect.
Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained,
the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner,
that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have
adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
The petition is hereby DENIED.
Sombong failed to pay the cost of P300.00. The petitioner, allegedly tried to seek help from
public officers to recover her child but he availed of nothing. Subsequently, she filed a petition in
the Regional Trial Court for kidnapping of minor against the spouse Ty. The spouses disclosed
that the baby was given to their staff to act as guardian. The Court of Appeals set aside the said
decision and give to Marieta Neri Alviar, the staff of the spouses in their clinic the custody of the
said child. This is because the persons concerned cannot ascertain whether the said child really
belongs to the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the child shall be given to Miss Neri Alviar.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court states that the custody of the child shall be given to Miss Neri Alviar
citing the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which provides that all questions regarding the care
and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. In the
same nein, the Family Code authorizes the courts to, the welfare of the child so demands,
deprived the parents concern of authority over the child or adopt such measures as maybe proper
under the circumstances.
also a Muslim Filipino in accordance with Muslim rites and customs, and who is now residing at
Barangay Recodo, Zamboanga City, but sometime on March 13, 1984, they were granted a
decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic
Law. The former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to another woman and
the petitioner prayed to resume the use of her maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul in accordance
with the provisions of Rules 103, Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition
for change of name.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by
petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law
requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining
a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.
Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal
right, nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be
obtained. In view of such circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced
woman to resume her maiden name and surname. In the absence of a specific rule or provision
governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by competent
proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of
change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course and
summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent court dated July
4, 1990 and August 10, 1990 are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner is authorized to resume her
maiden name and surname.
396
397
Facts:
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in RTC Manila. His name was registered
as Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as male. He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a female and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood. His attempts to transform himself to a woman culminated on January 27, 2001
when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. From then on, petitioner
lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his
birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to
female.
Judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar to
change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of petitioner, specifically for petitioners
first name from Rommel Jacinto to MELY and petitioners gender from Male to
FEMALE.The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the
trial courts decision lacked legal basis.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of
name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that
No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground
of Sex Reassignment. The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil
Code provides that No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order. For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as
to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity. The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury
or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit
neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them,
life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public
policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
398
Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February
6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho
contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho with whom he had been living
since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Chito Faustino C.
Camacho, born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio
and Luisita had been living since 1958.
Because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time.
In her case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her
husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and apparently won her heart because from June 1968
until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last time in a duplex apartment in
Quezon City. Petitioner's daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito, who
lived with them for about a year in 1976.
On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan and Aurelio's
account in the PCI Bank, took care of the funeral arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in
the United States with respondent Chito, having gone there, according to her, at the instance of
Aurelio in order to look for a house in San Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and rejoin
them. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio she and her son Chito came home on May 31, 1988.
Respondent Luisita was granted death benefits by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as
the surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on Scout
Delgado Street in which Nenita had been living.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the
payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any
event it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.
On August 29,1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property
to petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of
petitioner to be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the
property until 1988 despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented
himself to be single.
On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in
dispute.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in presuming the validity of the marriage between Aurelio
and Luisita
Held:
On the question of validity of Luisita's marriage to Aurelio, there is no dispute on the fact
of appellant Luisita's marriage in 1962 to Aurelio. The Court finds that the presumption of the
validity of the marriage Aurelio and Luisita has not been successfully assailed by appellee. The
Court of Appeals thus presumed the validity of Aurelio's second marriage from the failure of
petitioner to prove that at the time of such marriage Aurelio's first wife, Consejo, had not been
absent for at least seven years and that Aurelio did not have news that his first wife we still alive.
It was the burden of herein respondents to prove that, at the time of his second marriage to
respondent Luisita, Aurelio's first wife, Consejo Velasco, had been absent for at least seven years
and that Aurelio had no news that she was alive. To assume these facts because petitioner has not
disproved them would be to stand the principle on its head. Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting
marriage to Consejo Velasco, his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was void for being
bigamous.
IN THE RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN WANG
G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005
Facts
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born to parents Anaa Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang. The
399
parents married some time after. They executed a deed of legitimation in favor of Julian. The
legitimation prayed for the dropping of the middle name for two reasons: (1) possible confusion
and discrimination, and (2) best interest of the child. The parents planned to send their son to
Singapore to study. They alleged that in there the middle name is disregarded. As such, people
might get confused and discriminate Julian and his sister who is already studying there.
Likewise, the Singaporean Mandarin language dont have the letter R, instead they pronounce
it as L. In effect, the name of Julian will sound funny.
The Lower Courts denied the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General also pointed
out that the cause of change was only for mere convenience and not one of necessity. The link
between the change/dropping of the middle name and the child's welfare were not well
substantiated?
Issue:
When can a person avail of a name change?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. The reasons are insufficient. There is no proper
and reasonable cause for a change of name. There is no showing of Singaporean laws regarding
names, and the possible effects of confusion and discrimination are imaginary than real.
Philippine law dictates that the legitimate and legitimated children shall carry the surnames of
the father and the mother.
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable
cause for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must
show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been
held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
two (2) different mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek
Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly
children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan. Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng,
Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee,
Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee
(hereinafter referred to as private respondents) filed two (2) separate petitions for the
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina LeeYoung, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee
(hereinafter referred to as petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the petition against all petitioners,
with the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On February
3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee. Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the
false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or
canceling therein the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as their mother, and by substituting the same
with the name Tiu Chuan, who is allegedly the petitioners true birth mother.
The Regional Trial Court allowed itself to take cognizance of the case for the cancellation
and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners. The Court of Appeals upheld the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and
Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young then filed a motion to the Supreme Court
alleging that no change can be effected because the change would affect their civil status
contrary to previous doctrine.
Issue:
What entries in a civil register shall be changed or corrected? Is a judicial order necessary
in order to do so?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows: No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without a judicial order. It does not provide for a specific procedure of
law to be followed except to say that the corrections or changes must be effected by judicial
order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining
such judicial order is summary in nature.
Article 412 uses both the terms corrected and changed. In its ordinary sense, to
correct means to make or set right; to remove the faults or errors from while to change
means to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves
as a substitute. The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected
nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may have. Hence,
it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under
Article 412. It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions
include not only status but also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that
Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is
erroneous.
401