FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

1) TERMINIELLO v. CHICAGO
Facts of the Case
Father Arthur Terminiello, in an auditorium in Chicago, delivered a vitriolic
speech in which he criticized various political and racial groups and
viciously condemned the protesting crowd that had gathered outside the
auditorium. Policemen assigned to the event were unable to prevent
several disturbances by the "angry and turbulent" crowd. The police
arrested Terminiello for "breach of the peace." He was then tried and
convicted for his central role in inciting a riot.
Question
Did the Chicago ordinance violate Terminiello's right of free expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment?
Conclusion
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the "breach of the peace" ordinance
unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedom of speech. Noting that "[t]he
vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free
discussion," the Court held that speech could be restricted only in the event
that it was "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
unrest." Justice Douglas wrote that "a function of free speech under our
system is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when
it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger."
2) Near v. Minnesota
Brief Fact Summary. A Minnesota law that gagged a periodical from
publishing derogatory statements about local public officials was held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme
Court).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The freedom of press is essential to the nature of a
free state but that freedom may be restricted by the government in certain
situations.
Facts. The Saturday Press (the Press) published attacks on local officials.
The Press claimed that the chief of police had illicit relations with
gangsters. Minnesota officials obtained an injunction in order to abate the
publishing of the Press newspaper under a state law that allowed this
course of action. The state law authorized abatement, as a public nuisance,
of a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, or other periodical.
A state court order abated the Press and enjoined the Defendants,
publishers of the Press (Defendants), from publishing or circulating such
defamatory and scandalous periodicals.
Issue. Whether a statute authorizing such proceedings is consistent with the
conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and
guaranteed?

3) KINGSLEY BOOKS, INC. v. BROWN

Facts of the Case
New York state law authorized the legal counsel for a municipality to seek
an injunction against and the destruction of material deemed by the courts
to be obscene. Peter Campbell Brown, Corporation Counsel for the City of
New York, sought such an injunction against several bookstores. The
process of review that followed was a civil, rather than criminal procedure,
and the courts ultimately granted the injunction and sought to destroy the
obscene material.
Question
Did the civil procedure as laid out by New York statute violate the
booksellers' rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by not allowing for a criminal trial before imposing an
injunction and destroying the obscene material?
Conclusion
Decision: 5 votes for Brown, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly
No. In a 54 opinion authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court
concluded that the civil procedure complied with the requirements of due
process. Justice Frankfurter noted that the procedural safeguards were not
significantly different from many state criminal misdemeanor procedures,
nor were the penalties any more severe. The opinion also reaffirmed the
existing notion that the constitutional protection of speech does not extend
to obscene material.
4) GROSJEAN v. AMERICAN PRESS CO., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)
Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought by appellees, nine publishers of newspapers in the
state of Louisiana, to enjoin the enforcement against them of the provisions
of section 1 of the act of the Legislature of Louisiana known as Act No. 23,
passed and approved July 12, 1934, as follows: 'That every person, firm,
association or corporation, domestic or foreign, engaged in the business of
selling, or making any charge for, advertising or for advertisements,
whether printed or published, or to be printed or published, in any
newspaper, magazine, periodical or publication whatever having a
circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week, or displayed and
exhibited, or to be displayed and exhibited, by means of moving pictures, in
the State of Louisiana, shall, in addition to all other taxes and licenses
levied and assessed in this State, pay a license tax for the privilege of
engaging in such business in this State of two per cent. (2%) of the gross
receipts of such business.'
The nine publishers who brought the suit publish thirteen newspapers; and
these thirteen publications are the [297 U.S. 233, 241] only ones within
the state of Louisiana having each a circulation of more than 20,000 copies
per week, although the lower court finds there are four other daily
newspapers each having a circulation of 'slightly less than 20, 000 copies
pert week' which are in competition with those published by appellees both

as to circulation and as to advertising. In addition, there are 120 weekly

newspapers published in the state, also in competition, to a greater or less
degree, with the newspapers of appellees. The revenue derived from
appellees' newspapers comes almost entirely from regular subscribers or
purchasers thereof and from payments received for the insertion of
advertisements therein.
The act requires every one subject to the tax to file a sworn report every
three months showing the amount and the gross receipts from the business
described in section 1. The resulting tax must be paid when the report is
filed. Failure to file the report or pay the tax as thus provided constitutes a
misdemeanor and subjects the offender to a fine not exceeding $500, or
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both, for each violation. Any
corporation violating the acts subjects itself to the payment of $500 to be
recovered by suit. All of the appellees are corporations. The lower court
entered a decree for appellees and granted a permanent injunction. (D.C.)
10 F.Supp. 161.

people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the election.
It was contended that such issue cannot be properly raised before the
courts because it is a political one.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue involves a political question.
HELD: Pursuant to Art 15 of the 35 Constitution, SC held that there is
nothing in this provision to indicate that the election therein referred to is a
special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous
amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for
ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best
to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general
elections. The SC also noted that if what is placed in question or if the crux
of the problem is the validity of an act then the same would be or the issue
would be considered as a justiciable question NOT a political one.
7) SANTIAGO V FAR EAST BROADCASTING
8) Primicias vs. Fugoso [L-18000. Jan 27, 1948]

5) NEW YORK TIMES v. UNITED STATES

Facts of the Case
In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon
Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington
Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense
Department study regarding the history of United States activities in
Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect
national security. This case was decided together with United States v.
Washington Post Co.
Question
Did the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the publication of what it
termed "classified information" violate the First Amendment?
Argument
New York Times v. United States - Oral Argument
Conclusion
Decision: 6 votes for New York Times, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 1: Speech, Press, and Assembly
Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not
overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in
this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security"
should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First
Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not
cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of
American forces, prior restraint was unjustified.
6) Gonzales vs COMELEC
** Consolidated with PHILCONSA vs COMELEC
Constitutional Law Political Question vs Justiciable Question
One of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission of
certain proposed constitutional amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on
the same day as the regular elections. Petitioners argued that this was
unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposal to the

Doctrine:
Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of Assembly and Expression
FACTS:
This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano
Primicias, manager of theCoalesced Minority Parties, against respondent
Manila City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to compel thelatter to issue a permit
for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16, 1947.
The
petitioner requested for a permit to hold a peaceful public meeting.
However, the respondent refused
to issue such permit because he found that there is a reasonable ground to
believe, basing upon
previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of
the losing groups, remainsbitter and high, that similar speeches will
be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of
the people in their government, and in the duly peace and a disruption of
public order.
Respondentbased his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting
as an offense against public peace, andpenalizes as a misdemeanor, "any
act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb thepeace
or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any
unlawful purpose; ordisturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any
lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Freeuse of Public Place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence
violating freedom of assembly.
HELD:
The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech,
and to peacefullyassemble and petition the government for redress of

grievances, are fundamental personal rights of thepeople recognized and

guaranteed by the constitution. However, these rights are not absolute.
They can
be regulated under the states police power
that they should not be injurious to the equal enjoymentof others having
equal rights, nor to the rights of the community or society.The Court holds
that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of
Manila isvested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant
permit for the holding of a lawfulassembly or meeting, parade, or
procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila;and 2)
The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or
specify the streets orpublic places to be used with the view to prevent
confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and
public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize therisk of disorder.The court favored the second construction
since the first construction is tantamount to authorizing theMayor to
prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government
no such unlimitedpower may be validly granted to any officer of the
government, except perhaps in cases of nationalemergency. It is to be
noted that the permit to be issued is for the use of public places and not for
theassembly itself.The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus
cannot be struck down. Fear of serious injurycannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free
menfrom the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free
speech there must be reasonableground to fear that serious evil will result if
free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable groundto believe that
the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to
believe thatthe evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech
is likely to result in some violence or in
Allinanutshelll.wordpress.com
destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must
be the probability of serious injury to the state. PETITION IS GRANTED.
9)

Amelito Mutuc vs. COMELEC

Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention

(1970). His candidacy was given due course by the COMELEC but he was
prohibited from playing his campaign jingle on his mobile units because this
is an apparent violation of COMELECs band to purchase, produce, request
or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens,
lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of
domestic or foreign origin. It was COMELECs contention that the jingle
proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer
and therefore a tangible propaganda material (falling under and the
likes category), under the above COMELEC statute subject to confiscation.
HELD: 1. By virtue of Ejusdem Generis, general words following any
enumeration must be of the same class as those specifically referred to. It
did contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes

unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being

made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets,
bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the
words and the like. For respondent Commission, the last three words
sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was
done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem
generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only
to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is
quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution
of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a
favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.
2. This is a curtailment of Freedom of Expression. The Constitution prohibits
the abridgment of the freedom of speech.
10) NAVARRO V VILLEGAS
11) Reyes vs Bagatsing
Political Law Primacy of the Constitution over International Law
Retired Justice Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition
sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US
embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied
by then Manila mayor Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been
intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by
lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the
staging of rallies within the 500 meter radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing
pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to the US
embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art 22 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we
adhere
to
generally
accepted
principles
of
international
law. www.uberdigests.info
ISSUE: Whether or not a constitutional right is being violated by the
mayors ordinance.
HELD: Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign
diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a
restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But
the same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of the Philippine
Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free speech and
peacable assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued by
respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application thereof would collide
with a constitutionally guaranteed right/s.
12) CABANSAG V FERNANDEZ
13) Ruiz v Gordon G.R. No. L-65695 December 19, 1983
Facts:
Hector S. Ruiz, Coordinator of Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National
Reconciliation, filed apetition for mandamus against Richard Gordon to be
allowed to hold a parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal
Triangle starting at 1:00 P.M.

The Court required the respondents to answer. Respondents replied by

stating the request for a prayer rally was received in the Office of the Mayor
and that respondent had repeatedlyannounced in his regular program on
Sunday over the radio (DWGO) and at the Monday morning flag ceremony
before hundreds of government employees that he would grant the request
of any group that would like to exercise their freedom of speech and
assembly.
When interviewed on the matter by the Editor-in Chief of the 'Guardian', he
mentioned the fact that he had granted the permit of the petitioner, which
interview appeared in the November 22-28, 1983 issue of the
said newspaper.
Given these, the respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition. This
was complied with.
Issue: Can the petition be granted?
Held No. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
The Reyes case was given some discussion in the course of this petition as
to the role of the judiciary in petitions for permits to hold peaceable
assembles.
"The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take
place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed
well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its
grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such
refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the
standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be
heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision must be transmmitted to them at the earliest
opportunity. They can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free
speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms,
are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too
strongly stressed that on the judiciary, even more so than on the other
departments rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring
respect for and deference to such preferred rights.
As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this action for
mandamus could have been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of
verifying on November 23 whether or not a permit had been issued. A party
desirous of exercising the right to peaceable assembly should be the one
most interested in ascertaining the action taken on a request for a permit.
Necessarily, after a reasonable time or, if the day and time was designated
for the decision on the request, such party or his representative should be
at the office of the public official concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of
the decision reached, whether adverse or favorable, should be sent to the
address of petitioner.

Teehankee concurring:
The burden to show the existence of such grave and imminent danger that
would justify an adverse action lies on the mayor as the licensing authority.
There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof
of the existence of such clear and present danger. As the Court stated in its
Resolution of October 25, 1983 in the J. B. L. Reyes case, "It is essential for
the validity of a denial of a permit which amounts to a previous restraint or
censorship that the licensing authority does not rely solely on his own
appraisal of what public welfare, peace or safety may require. To justify
such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to
satisfy the clear and present danger test. The possibility that subversives
may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators is not enough."
As likewise underscored in the J. B. L. Reyes case, the exercise of the right
of peaceable assembly is not to be 4 abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place" (at paragraph 6) and "It is the duty of the
city authorities to provide the proper police protection to those exercising
their right to peaceable assembly and freedom of expression" (at paragraph
7).
J. Conception concurring opinion
9
In order that public officials may not be charged, rightly or
wrongly, with dereliction of duty or abuse of powers in the granting or
denying of such permits, the following guidelines are deemed necessary:
(a) When a peaceful assembly is to be held in a private lot, house, or
edifice, only the consent of the owner of the place is necessary. No permit
from the government or any public officer is required.
(b) When an application to hold a rally, parade, or peaceful assembly has to
make use of public places like parks, plazas, and streets, the public
authority charged with the duty of granting or denying the permit should
also consider the convenience and the right of the rest of the public to use
and enjoy these same facilities.
(c) Conditions of peace and order in the locality should be carefully
considered and precautionary steps taken to prevent vandals, hooligans,
provocateurs, and other criminals from turning into a violent one what
otherwise should be a peaceful demonstration,

14) People v. Perez, G.R. No. 122764, September 24, 1998

FACTS:
Accused-appellant was charged for rape. The information alleged that the
victim was his stepdaughter but did not allege that the victim was only 13
years old at the time of the rape.
During arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the accusation against
him. During trial it was proved that the victim was the stepdaughter of the
accused and was in fact 13 years old at the time the crime of rape was

committed. Accused was then convicted of qualified rape and was meted
out the penalty of death.
ISSUE: WON an accused may be convicted of qualified rape when the
information alleged only simple rape?
HELD: NO. Citing People vs. Garcia, the court held that it would be a
denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges
against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is
charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form
punishable by death, although the attendant circumstance
qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not
alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned. Procedurally,
then, while the minority of Maribel and the relationship of appellant and his

victim were established during the trial, appellant can only be convicted of
simple rape because he cannot be punished for a graver offense than that
with which he was charged.
Under the rules of criminal procedure, a qualifying circumstance to be
considered as such must be so alleged in the information, which is
not required of aggravating circumstances.
The requirement for complete allegations on the particulars of the
indictment is based on the right of the accused to be fully informed of the
nature of the charge against him, so that be may adequately prepare for
this defense pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.